Legal Foundations of a Free Society in Chinese

by Stephan Kinsella on December 20, 2024

Here is a first draft of a translation of Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) into Chinese, translated by Li San (李三). The following is not yet proofread, according to the translator.

LEGAL

FOUNDATIONS

o f a

FREE SOCIETY

自由社会的法律根基

斯蒂芬·金塞拉著

李三译

出版信息

Published under a Creative Commons Zero (CC0) 1.0 License No Rights Reserved

http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

To the extent possible under law, the author has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this work.

Cover Design & Interior Formatting by Susi Clark of Creative Blueprint Design Main text font is Adobe Caslon; headers are LeMonde

ISBN Paperback 979-8-9890306-1-3

ISBN Hardcover 979-8-9890306-0-6

ISBN Ebook 979-8-9890306-2-0

To Ethan, and his generation, in hopes that they and their descendants live in a freer world.

献给伊森和他那一代人，希望他和他的后代生活在一个更加自由的世界里。

Sir, I have found you an argument; but I am not obliged to find you an understanding. —Samuel Johnson

先生，我为你找到了论点，但我没有义务为你找到理解。

——塞缪尔-约翰逊

even if the libertarian ethic and argumentative reasoning must be regarded as ultimately justified, this still does not preclude that people will act on the basis of unjustified beliefs either because they don’t know, they don’t care, or they prefer not to know. I fail to see why this should be surprising or make the proof somehow defective. More than this cannot be done by propositional argument.

—Hans-Hermann Hoppe

即使自由意志主义伦理和论证性推理必须被视为最终是合理的，但这仍然不能排除人们会基于不合理的信念行事，要么是因为他们不知道，他们不在乎，要么是他们宁愿不知道。我不明白为什么这应该令人惊讶，或者为什么这会使证明在某种程度上有缺陷。命题论证无法做到更多。

——汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普

All throughout intellectual history, one prominent answer to this question has been to say that it is “might” that makes “right.” Or more specifically: that what is right or wrong, just or unjust, is unilaterally decreed by a State qua territorial monopolist of violence. The self-contradictory nature of this “decisionist” position, i.e. of “legal positivism,” comes to light once we ask its proponents for a reason or evidence as to why we should believe the proposition that “might makes right” to be true and correct. By virtue of providing any such reason or evidence, however, and thus seeking—ultimately—unanimous agreement regarding the validity of the proposition in question, any such proponent implicitly acknowledges the presence of other reasonable and sensible persons and, importantly, that the question of right or wrong, true or not-true, then, is not a matter of “might” or “fiat,” but a question to be decided on the basis of common reason and experience instead. Yet reason and experience demonstrate, contrary to the proponent’s initial claim, that “might does not make right.” That “might is might” and “right is right,” but “no might can ever make a right.”

纵观整个思想史，对这一问题的一个著名的回答就是：”强权 “造就 “正义”。或者更具体地说：什么是对的，什么是错的，什么是正义的，什么是不正义的，是由一个作为武力的领土垄断者——国家所单方面决定的。一旦我们要求这种 “决定论 “立场（即 “法律实证主义”）的支持者提供理由或证据，说明为什么我们应该相信 “强权即公理 “这一命题是真实和正确的，那么这种 “决定论 “立场（即 “法律实证主义”）自相矛盾的本质就会暴露无遗。然而，通过提供任何这样的理由或证据，从而寻求——最终——就有关命题的有效性达成一致意见，任何这样的支持者都隐含地承认了其他理性和明智的人之存在，而且重要的是，那么，对或错、真或假的问题就不是一个 “强权 “或 “命令 “的问题，而是一个需要根据共同的理性和经验来决定的问题。然而，理性和经验证明，与支持者最初的主张相反，”强权并不代表公理”。”强权就是强权”，”公理就是公理”，但 “任何强权都不可能造就公理”。

Aside from the decisionism championed by legal positivists, the most prominent answer in modern times to the question under consideration, then, has come from so-called social-contracts theorists.

那么，除了法律实证主义者所倡导的决定论之外，近代以来对我们所讨论的问题最有名的答案来自所谓的社会论者。

According to them, what is just or not is determined by the terms of a contract concluded and agreed upon by all members of a society. — Yet this solution opens more questions than it answers and ends in a tangle of confusion. For one, no such contract has ever been concluded anywhere. Yet in the absence of any such contract, would people still be able to distinguish between right and wrong? Obviously, one would think so, because otherwise they would not even be able to rightfully conclude a—indeed any—valid contract. Put differently: there first must be a contractor—a person—and then there must be something rightfully owned and to be contracted by this person—private or personal property—before there can ever be a valid contractual agreement. Thus, personhood and private property logically—or more precisely: praxeologically—precede contracts and contractual agreements; and hence, trying to construct a theory of justice on the foundation of contracts is a fundamental praxeological error.

根据他们的观点，什么是公正的，什么是不公正的，是由社会所有成员缔结并同意的条款决定的。—— 然而，这种解决方案提出的问题比它回答的问题要多，最终陷入混乱。首先，任何地方都没有缔结过这样的。然而，如果没有这样的，人们还能分辨是非吗？显然，人们会这么认为，因为否则他们甚至无法正当地缔结一份——事实上是任何——有效的。换句话说：首先必须有一个立约人——一个人——然后必须有这个人合法拥有并可以订立的东西——私有财产或个人财产——然后才可能缔结有效的协议。因此，人格和私有财产在逻辑上——或者更准确地说：在行动学上——先于和协议；因此，试图在的基础上构建正义理论是一个根本的行动学错误。

Moreover, with personhood and private property as the praxeological foundation of contracts, then, any universal, all-encompassing and including social contract as imagined by social-contract theorists is impossible. Rather: on this basis, all contracts are contracts between identifiable and enumerable persons and concerning identifiable and enumerable things or matters. No contract can bind anyone other than the actual contractors, and no contract can concern things or matters other than those specified in the contract. Accordingly: Real persons with their various real, separate and exclusive properties simply can not—praxeologically cannot—conclude a contract as fancied by social contract theorists.

此外，以人格和私有财产作为契约的行动学基础，社会契约理论家所想象的任何普遍的、包罗万象的、包括社会契约在内的契约都是不可能的。相反：在此基础上，所有的契约都是可识别和可列举的人之间的契约，并且涉及可识别和可列举的事物或事项。没有契约可以约束实际缔约方以外的任何人，也没有契约可以涉及契约中未明确规定的事物或事项。因此：拥有各种真实、独立且排他性财产的真实的人，在行动学上不可能订立社会契约理论家所幻想的那种契约。

For such a contract to be conceivable, a “new person” must be invented. A fictitious person, that can do what no real person can! This “new person,” invented for the purpose by social contract theorists, then, is invariably some wildly unrealistic, severely “dis-embodied” entity, i.e., a person without any bodily needs or appetites; “pure” reason, if you will, freed from all constraints of time and place. — The theorists then ask what arrangement of the world such persons would agree on as just. And they then spin out an answer as to what they believe this agreement between such entities to be, and why. — Any such answer, however, whatever it may be, is always arbitrary, because the only thing that can possibly be known about fictitious people and an agreement among them is whatever has already been invested in such beings from the very outset, per assumption. Indeed, as John Rawls, the most celebrated modern social contract theorist, has admitted with captivating frankness, he had simply “define(d) the original position [of fictitious people placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance,’ HHH] so that we get the desired solution.”1 While the results that Rawls gets from his assumptions concerning the original position agree largely with the political views of the social democratic left, other social contract theorists, with different assumptions about the original meeting-of-the-minds, such as James M.Buchanan and his fictitious constructs of “conceptual contracts” and “quasi-unanimity,” for instance, have proposed answers more closely associated with the political right. Still other theorists have presented yet other results. Demonstrating, then, that the intellectual endeavors of social contract theorists, however ambitious and sophisticated they may appear, are ultimately no more than idle mental exercises: deriving wildly unrealistic conclusions from wildly unrealistic assumptions, i.e., examples of “garbage-in-and-garbage-out.”

要想达成这样的，就必须发明一个 “新人”。一个虚构的人，可以做真人做不到的事！社会论者为此发明的这个 “新人”，无一例外地都是一些天马行空、严重 “非实体化 “的实体，即一个没有任何身体需求或欲望的人；可以说是 “纯粹 “的理性，不受任何时间和地点的限制。理论家们接着问，这样的人会认同什么样的世界安排才是公正的。然后，他们会给出一个答案，说明他们认为这些实体之间的协议是什么，以及原因为何。——然而，任何这样的答案，无论它是什么，都是任意武断的，因为关于虚构的人和他们之间的协议，唯一可能知道的东西就是从一开始就已经根据假设赋予这些人的东西。事实上，正如最著名的现代社会理论家约翰-罗尔斯（John Rawls）以其迷人的坦率所承认的那样，他只是 “定义了[被置于“无知之幕”之下的虚构的人的]原始立场，这样我们就得到了想要的解决方案”。[1] 虽然罗尔斯从其关于原初立场的假设中得出的结果在很大程度上与社会民主左派的政治观点一致，但其他社会理论家对原初思想交锋的假设不同，例如如詹姆斯-布坎南（James M. Buchanan）及其虚构的 “概念 “和 “准一致 “等，提出的答案与政治右派更为接近。还有一些理论家提出了其他的结果。由此可见，社会论者的智力努力，无论看起来多么雄心勃勃、多么高深莫测，归根结底不过是无聊的智力游戏：从天马行空的假设中推导出不切实际的结论，都是些 “屎进屎出 “的例子而已。

But there is another, more sinister aspect to the idea of a social contract that comes to light once anyone of the various contractual agreements as fancied by social contract theorists is actually put to the test, implemented and enforced. Because implementing and enforcing the terms of a contract that no real person had or could have agreed on means, in effect, that all real contracts between real people are superseded and replaced by the terms of some alleged agreement among fictitious people as the ultimate judge in matters of right and wrong. The word “contract,” then, with its positive connotations, is used by social contract theorists to advance a program that is actually destructive of all contracts. They declare non-contracts and non-agreements to be contracts and agreements and contracts and agreements to be non-contracts and non-agreements. — Thus, ultimately, social contract theory turns out barely less arbitrary than the decisionism of legal positivists. For its proponents, the question of right or wrong may not be considered a matter of mere decree as for some strict positivists. Instead, for them, it is the intuitions and fancies of some philosophers that are supposed to do the job. But this is hardly less arbitrary, one would think! And, of course, since no real person had or could have agreed to any so-called social contract, its enforcement then always requires an agency not itself founded on agreement and contract but on disagreement, violence and coercion instead: a State. And just like legal positivists, then, social contract theorists invariably turn out to be statists, too, assigning and entrusting the role of the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong to the State qua territorial monopolist of violence. Another popular answer to the question under consideration is that of utilitarianism. Utilitarians essentially contend that the very rules that maximize or promise to maximize total social utility or bring about the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people are and should be considered just. Apart from other difficulties connected with its consequentialism, however, this answer can be quickly dismissed as fatally flawed for the simple reason that there exist no units of utility or happiness, and hence, that any interpersonal comparison of utility or happiness and any aggregation of individual utility or happiness to “social utility” or “social happiness” must be considered impossible (or,if still invoked, as entirely arbitrary).

但是，一旦社会论者所幻想的各种协议中的任何一种被实际检验、实施和强制执行，社会思想的另一个更险恶的方面就会显现出来。因为实施和执行一个没有真人参与或不可能达成一致的条款，实际上意味着真人之间的所有真实都被取代，取而代之的是虚构的人之间达成的所谓协议条款，作为是非问题的最终裁决。如此一来，” “这个具有积极意义的词，却被社会论者用来推进一个实际上是破坏一切的计划。他们把非和非协议宣布为和协议，把和协议宣布为非和非协议。——因此，最终，社会论的武断程度不亚于法律实证主义者的决定论。对于社会论的支持者来说，对与错的问题可能并不像某些严格实证主义者所认为的那样，纯粹是一个法令问题。相反，对他们来说，应该由一些哲学家的直觉和幻想来做这件事。但人们却认为，这并不那么武断！当然，既然没有一个真实的人同意或可能同意任何所谓的社会，那么的执行就总是需要一个本身并非建立在协议和基础上，而是建立在分歧、武力和胁迫基础上的机构：一个国家。因此，就像法律实证主义者一样，社会论者也总是变成国家主义者，把是非对错的最终仲裁者的角色分配和委托给作为武力的领土垄断者的国家。此问题的另一个流行的答案是功利主义。功利主义者基本上认为，能够使社会总效用最大化或承诺使社会总效用最大化或给最大多数的人带来最大幸福的规则是，而且应该被认为是公正的。然而，除了与其后果主义相关的其他困难之外，这个答案可以很快因其存在致命缺陷而被摒弃，原因很简单，即不存在效用或幸福的单位，因此，任何对效用或幸福的人际比较以及将个人效用或幸福聚合成“社会效用”或“社会幸福”必然被认为是不可能的（或者，如果仍然被援引，则完全是任意武断的）。

With the answers of legal positivists, social contract theorists and utilitarians all rejected as fundamentally flawed, however popular they may be, the only remaining answer, then, comes from the old, premodern intellectual tradition of natural law and natural rights. It is also in this nowadays rather unfashionable intellectual tradition, broadly conceived, that Stephan Kinsella’s here presented work must be placed. Natural law and rights theorists contend that the principles of just human conduct can be discovered from the study of human nature. On the one hand, such study reveals that humans are endowed with reason, as manifested by the indisputable fact that they can speak and communicate with one another, from person to person, in a common language. On the other hand, this study shows that humans are also actors (and in combination then: reasonable actors). Speaking and communicating itself are purposeful activities directed at a goal. Yet even if and when we are not speaking or communicating but do things silently, we are still acting and cannot but act as long as we are not asleep, comatose or dead.

法律实证主义者、社会论者和功利主义者的答案，无论多么受欢迎，都因存在根本性缺陷而遭到否定，那么，剩下的唯一答案就来自古老的、前现代的自然法和自然权利的思想传统。从广义上讲，斯蒂芬·金塞拉在此介绍的作品也必须置于这一如今相当不时髦的思想传统之中。自然法和自然权利的理论家认为，可以从对人性的研究中发现人类公正行为的原则。一方面，这种研究揭示了人类被赋予了理性，这体现在人类可以用共同的语言进行人与人之间的对话和交流这一不争的事实上。另一方面，这项研究还表明，人类也是行动人（结合起来就是：理性的行动人）。说话和交流本身就是有目的的活动，是为了达致一个目标。然而，即使我们不说话或不交流，而是默默地做事，只要我们不是睡着了、昏迷了或死了，我们就仍然在行动，而且不能不行动。

Further, this study also reveals the “deep structure” of human action,i.e. what all actions of all humans have in common. Every individual actor (and only individuals act!), whatever he does, pursues a goal or end the attainment of which he considers more satisfying than the satisfaction to be expected from acting differently. Every actor is thereby placed in a given environment, at a specific point in time and space, with specific external surroundings of men and materials, and equipped with his own nature-given bodily makeup and mental endowment; and every action, then, whatever it may be, invariably aims to alter an actor’s specific present situation to his personal advantage and greater satisfaction. In any case, to reach his goals, whatever they may be, an actor invariably must employ means. At a minimum, he must employ his own physical body and brain (plus the body’s standing room) as means for the attainment of some expected bodily or psychic gain, and he must thereby use up some time that he also could have used differently.

此外，这项研究还揭示了人的行动的 “深层结构”，即所有人的所有行动的共同点。每一个个体行动者（并且只有个体才会行动！），无论他做什么，都追求一个目标或目的，对他来说该行动会获得的满足感，比从不同行动中所预期获得的满足感更令他满意。因此，每个行动人都被置于特定的环境中，处于特定的时间和空间点上，与特定的外部人和物质环境相伴，并拥有自己的天性所赋予的身体构造和精神禀赋；那么，每个行动，不管是什么行动，无一例外都是为了改变行动人的特定现状，使之有利于他的个人利益和更大的满足感。在任何情况下，为了达到目标，无论目标是什么，行动人都必须使用手段。至少，他必须使用自己的身体和大脑（加上身体所站立的空间）作为手段，以达到某种预期的物质的或精神上的收获，他因此必须耗费一些时间，而这些时间他本可以以其他方式使用。

Generally, however, a person’s actions involve more than the purposeful use of one’s physical body and mind. It involves also various elements of the external world that, unlike a person’s own body, can only be indirectly controlled by means of one’s directly controlled body. Such elements of the external world that can be indirectly controlled and manipulated by a person and that are recognized or believed by an actor to be suitable for the attainment of his ends are called means. Those elements of the external world beyond or believed to be beyond human control on the other hand are referred to as external conditions under which a person’s actions are to take place. The choice of means employed by a person for the attainment of his ends is always a matter of ideas, i.e. of reason and reasoning. An actor always chooses such an allocation and arrangement of means that he believes to bring about some desired result. The choice of means is validated by their result. A person’s actions then are always guided by some ideas about cause and effect: performing A, B and C will lead to X, Y and Z. But man is not infallible and a person’s ideas concerning cause and effect or the interconnectedness and regularity of events may be false, and a person’s action based on these ideas then will lead to failure rather than the anticipated success, inducing the person to learn, i.e. to revisit and possibly revise his original ideas.

然而，一般来说，一个人的行动不仅仅是有目的地使用自己的身体和思想。它还涉及外部世界的各种元素，这些元素与一个人自己的身体不同，只能通过一个人直接控制的身体来间接控制。外部世界中可以被人间接控制和操纵的、行动人认识到或认为适合于实现其目的的要素被称为手段。另一方面，那些超出或被认为超出人的控制范围的外部世界的要素则被称为人的行动所处的外部条件。一个人为实现其目的而选择使用的手段，始终是一个观念问题，即理性和推理问题。行动人总是选择这样一种手段的界定和安排，他认为这会带来某种预期的结果。手段的选择由结果来验证。因此，一个人的行动总是受到一些因果观念的指导：执行 A、B 和 C 将导致 X、Y 和 Z。但是，人非圣贤孰能无过，一个人关于因果关系或事件的相互关联性和规律的观念可能是错误的，而一个人基于这些观念的行动就会导致失败，而不是预期的成功，这就促使他去学习，即重新审视并可能修正他原来的观念。

Given this insight into the general human condition, it becomes immediately clear what a human ethic or a theory of justice worth its salt must accomplish. It must give an answer to the question of what am I and what is every other person permitted (or not permitted) to do, right now and right here, wherever a person may find himself and whatever his external surroundings of men and materials may be. More specifically, what is a person permitted (or not permitted) to do in an interaction with another person? And: what external entities is a person permitted (or not permitted) to bring under his control to be used as means toward his personal ends?

鉴于对人类普遍状况的这种洞察，人类伦理或有价值的正义理论必须实现的目标也就一目了然了。它必须回答这样一个问题：此时此地，无论一个人身处何地，无论他所处的外部环境是怎样的人和物，我和其他人被允许（或不被允许）做什么。更具体地说，一个人在与他人的互动中允许（或不允许）做什么？以及：一个人允许（或不允许）将哪些外部实体对象置于自己的控制之下，作为实现个人目的的手段？

Because no person can ever stop acting, from his beginnings as a person until his very end (except when asleep, comatose or dead), these questions arise again and again, without end, for everyone, wherever and whenever he may find himself and must act. Obviously, then, an answer to pressing questions such as these cannot wait for the establishment of the institution of a State, the conclusion of a contract (which would actually have to presuppose a valid answer to these very questions in order to make it a valid contract) or the arrival of some future consequences. Instead, the answer must be discoverable and recognizable from the very outset, from the first, immediate insight into the nature of man as a reasonable actor. And indeed, this is so once the purpose, the ultimate end, of all reason and reasoning is recognized and acknowledged. As already noted, human reason is manifested in the indisputable fact that one person can communicate with another person in a common language (and different languages are inter-translatable). The purpose of speaking and communicating with one another, then, even if and when expressing one’s disagreement with another person’s say-so in meaningful words, is to guide or coordinate the actions of different persons by words or meaningful symbols alone. This endeavor may succeed and words help guide or coordinate the actions of different persons to mutual satisfaction. Or the endeavor may fail. But in any case, the goal of speaking and communicating is always and invariably the same: to maintain peace and seek peaceful cooperation or coexistence—and in reverse: to avoid conflict, i.e., physical clashes or conflagrations of people that are destined to result whenever and wherever two or more people pursue their own different goals with the help of one and the same person’s body or one and the same indirectly controlled or controllable external means of action at the same time.

因为没有一个人可以停止行动，从他作为一个人始直至终结（睡着、昏迷或死亡时除外），这些问题对每个人来说都是一而再、再而三地出现，没有尽头，无论他置身于何时何地，都必须行动。因此，对这些紧迫问题的回答，显然不能等到国家制度的建立、的缔结（实际上必须以这些问题的有效回答为前提，才能成为有效的）或某些未来后果的到来。相反，答案必须从一开始，从对作为合乎理性的行动人的本质的最初、直接的洞察中就可以发现和认识。事实上，一旦认识到并承认所有理性和推理的目的、终极目标，情况就会如此。如前所述，人类的理性体现在一个人可以用共同的语言与另一个人交流（不同的语言是可以互译的）这一不争的事实中。那么，相互交谈和沟通的目的，即使是在用有意义的语言表达对他人说法的不同意见时，也是为了仅仅通过语言或有意义的符号来指导或协调不同人的行动。这种努力可能会成功，语言会帮助指导或协调不同人的行动，使彼此满意。这种努力也可能失败。但无论如何，说话和交流的目的始终不变：维护和平，寻求和平合作或共存——反之亦然：避免冲突，即无论何时何地，两个或两个以上的人借助同一个人的身体，或借助同一个间接控制或可控制的外部行动手段，追求各自不同的目标时，注定会产生的肢体冲突或人与人之间的冲突。

The objective for a human ethic or a theory of justice, then, is the discovery of such rules of human conduct that make it possible for a— indeed, any—bodily person to act—indeed, to live his entire active life—in a world made up of different people, a “given” external, material environment, and various scarce—rivalrous, contestable or conflictable—material objects useable as means toward a person’s ends, without ever running into physical clashes with anybody else.

因此，人类伦理或正义理论的目标是发现人类行为规则，使一个人——实际上是任何一个人——能够在由不同的人、”给定的 “外部物质环境和各种稀缺的——有竞争性的、有争议的或有冲突的——可用作实现个人目的的手段的物质对象组成的世界中行动——实际上，度过他的整个积极的一生，而不会与任何人发生有形的物理冲突。

Essentially, these rules have been known and recognized since eternity. They consist of three principal components. First, personhood and self-ownership: Each person owns—exclusively controls—his physical body that only he and no one else can control directly (any control over another person’s body, by contrast, is invariably an indirect control, presupposing the prior direct control of one’s own body). Otherwise, if body-ownership were assigned to some indirect body-controller, conflict would become unavoidable as the direct body-controller cannot give up the direct control over his body as long as he is alive. Accordingly, any physical interference with another person’s body must be consensual, invited and agreed to by such a person, and any non-consensual interference with his body constitutes an unjust and prohibited invasion.

从本质上讲，这些规则自古以来就为人们所熟知和认可。它们由三个主要部分组成。第一，人格和自我所有权：每个人都拥有——排他性控制——自己的身体，只有他自己而没有其他人可以直接控制自己的身体（相比之下，对他人身体的任何控制无一例外都是间接控制，前提是预先直接控制自己的身体）。否则，如果将身体所有权分配给某个间接的身体控制者，冲突将不可避免，因为直接的身体控制者只要还活着，就不能放弃对自己身体的直接控制。因此，对他人身体的任何干涉都必须是双方同意的，是受他人邀请和同意的，而对他人身体的任何未经同意的干预都构成不公正的和被禁止的侵犯。

Second, private property and original appropriation: Logically, what is required to avoid all conflict regarding external material objects used or usable as means of action, i.e. as goods, is clear: every good must always and at all times be owned privately, i.e. controlled exclusively by some specified person. The purposes of different actors then may be as different as can be, and yet no conflict will arise so long as their respective actions involve exclusively the use of their own private property. And how can external objects become private property in the first place without leading to conflict? To avoid conflict from the very start, it is necessary that private property be founded through acts of original appropriation, because only through actions, taking place in time and space, can an objective—intersubjectively ascertainable—link be established between a particular person and a particular object. And only the first appropriator of a previously unappropriated thing can acquire this thing as his property without conflict. For, by definition, as the first appropriator he cannot have run into conflict with anyone else in appropriating the good in question, as everyone else appeared on the scene only later. Otherwise, if exclusive control is assigned instead to some late-comers, conflict is not avoided but contrary to the very purpose of reason made unavoidable and permanent.

第二，私有财产和先占：从逻辑上讲，在作为行动手段（即物品）使用或可用的外部物质对象方面，要避免一切冲突，所需的条件是显而易见的：每种物品在任何时候都必须为私人所有，即完全由某个特定的人排他性地控制。因此，不同行动人的目的可以千差万别，但只要他们各自的行动排他性地使用自己的私有财产，就不会产生冲突。那么，外部物体如何在不引起冲突的情况下首先成为私有财产呢？要想从一开始就避免冲突，就必须通过先占行动来建立私有财产，因为只有通过在时间和空间上发生的行动，才能在特定的人和特定的物之间建立起客观客观的、主体间可确定的联系。而且，只有先前未被占有之物的第一个占有者才能在不发生冲突的情况下将此物作为自己的财产。因为，顾名思义，作为第一个占有者，他在占有该物品时不可能与其他人发生冲突，因为其他人都是后来才出现的。否则，如果把排他性地控制权分配给一些后来者，冲突就不可避免，这与理性的根本目的背道而驰，使冲突变得不可避免且永久性存在。

Third, exchange and contract: Other than per original appropriation, property can only be acquired by means of a voluntary—mutually agreed upon—exchange of property from some previous owner to some later owner. This transfer of property from a prior to a later owner can either take the form of a direct or “spot” exchange, which may be bior multi-lateral as when someone’s apples are exchanged for another’s oranges, or it may be unilateral as when a person makes a gift to someone else or when someone pays another person with his property now, on the spot, in the expectation of some future services on the part of the recipient. Or else the transfer of property can take the form of contracts concerning not just present but in particular also prospective, future-dated transfers of property titles. These contractual transfers of property titles can be unconditional or conditional transfers, and they too can involve bior multi-lateral as well as unilateral property transfers. Any acquisition of property other than through original appropriation or voluntary or contractual exchange and transfer from a previous to a later owner is unjust and prohibited by reason. (Of course, in addition to these normal property acquisition rules, property can also be transferred from an aggressor to his victim as rectification for a previous trespass committed.)

第三，交换与：除了先占之外，财产只能通过自愿的、双方同意的交换的方式从某个先前的所有者手中转让到某个后来的所有者手中。从先前的所有者到后来的所有者的这种财产转让可以采取直接交换或 “现场 “交换的形式，这种交换可以是双边或多边的，如某人用苹果交换另一人的桔子；也可以是单边的，如某人赠与他人，或者某人现在当场将财产支付给另一人，以期待接受者将来提供某种服务。或者，财产转让可以采取的形式，不仅涉及现在的财产所有权转让，而且还涉及潜在的、未来日期的财产所有权转让。这些财产权的性的转让可以是无条件的，也可以是有条件的，同样也可以涉及双边或多边以及单边的财产权转让。任何并非通过原始占有或并非从先前所有者到后来所有者的自愿或性交换和转让而获得财产的行为都是不公正的，并且因理性而被禁止。(当然，除了这些正常的财产取得规则外，财产也可以从侵害者转让给受害者，作为对先前侵犯行为的纠正）。

Drawing on the long, but in today’s world largely forgotten or neglected, intellectual tradition of natural law and natural rights theory with its three just briefly sketched principal components, then, the most elaborate, systematic, rigorous and lucid presentation of a theory of justice up until then had been developed in the course of the second half of the 20th century by economist-philosopher Murray N. Rothbard, culminating in his Ethics of Liberty, originally published in 1982. Unfortunately, but not entirely surprisingly, however, his work was typically either completely ignored or else dismissed out of hand by the gatekeepers and high priests of academia. The anarchist conclusions ultimately arrived at by Rothbard in his works appeared simply outlandish in an ideological environment molded overwhelmingly by tax-funded intellectuals and steeped to the hip in statism or étatisme. Among academic big shots, only Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State and Utopia acknowledged his intellectual debt to Rothbard and seriously tried to refute his anarchist conclusions—but miserably failed.

借鉴长期存在但在当今世界很大程度上被遗忘或忽视的自然法和自然权利理论的思想传统及其三个刚刚简要勾勒的主要组成部分，那么，迄今为止最详尽、最系统、最严谨、最清晰的正义理论是由经济学家兼哲学家默里·N·罗斯巴德在 20 世纪下半叶发展起来的，并最终在他 1982 年初版的《自由的伦理》一书中达到顶峰。然而，不幸的是，但也并非完全出人意料的是，他的著作通常要么被完全忽视，要么被学术界的看门人和大祭司们断然否定。罗斯巴德在其著作中最终得出的无政府主义结论，在一个绝大多数由税收资助的知识分子塑造的、一个沉浸于国家主义或国家主义的意识形态的环境中，显得简直就是大逆不道。在学术界大佬中，只有哈佛大学哲学家罗伯特-诺齐克（Robert Nozick）在他的《无政府、国家与乌托邦》（Anarchy, State and Utopia）中承认自己在思想上欠罗斯巴德一个红包，并认真地试图反驳他的无政府主义结论——但却惨遭失败。

While Rothbard’s work largely fell on deaf ears within academia, then, it exerted considerable influence outside of it, in the public at large. Indeed, through his work Rothbard became the founder of the modern libertarian movement, attracting a sizable popular following far exceeding that of any mainstream academic in numbers. As for the further development of a natural-law and -rights based theory of justice, however, this very success turned out to be a rather mixed blessing. On the one hand, the movement inspired by Rothbard likely helped dampen and slow down the popularity and growth of statism, but it manifestly failed in halting or even reversing the long-run historical trend toward ever increasing state power. On the other hand (and that may well be one of the reasons for this failure), the larger the movement grew in numbers, the greater also the confusion and the number of intellectual errors spread and committed by its followers. The pure theory of justice as presented by Rothbard was increasingly watered down, misunderstood, misinterpreted or downright falsified, whether for short-run tactical gains, out of ignorance or plain cowardice. As well, all too often sight was lost of the fundamentally important distinction between the core, the foundational principles of a theory on the one hand and its application to various peripheral—often farfetched or merely fictional—practical problems on the other; and far too much effort and time, then, has been spent on debating peripheral issues the solution of which may well be arguable, but which is of minor importance in the larger scheme of things and helps distract public attention and concentration away from those questions and issues that truly matter and count.

虽然罗斯巴德的著作在学术界基本上无人问津，但在学术界之外的广大公众中却产生了相当大的影响。事实上，罗斯巴德通过他的著作成为现代自由主义运动的创始人，吸引了相当多的大众追随者，在数量上远远超过任何主流学者。然而，对于以自然法和自然权利为基础的正义理论的进一步发展而言，这一成功却喜忧参半。一方面，由罗斯巴德激发的运动很可能有助于抑制和减缓国家主义的流行和发展，但它显然未能阻止甚至扭转国家权力不断增长的长期历史趋势。另一方面（这很可能也是失败的原因之一），这场运动的人数越多，其追随者传播和犯下的混乱和思想错误也就越多。罗斯巴德提出的纯粹的正义理论被越来越多地淡化、误解、曲解或直接篡改，无论是为了短期战术利益，还是出于无知或单纯的懦弱。同样，人们也常常忽略了理论的核心，即理论的基本原则与理论在各种次要问题(通常是牵强附会或仅仅是虚构的)上的应用之间的根本区别;因此，人们花费了太多的精力和时间来讨论次要问题，这些问题的解决方案可能是有争议的，但在更大的计划中却并不重要，而且会分散公众的注意力，使其不能聚焦于那些真正重要的问题和议题。

In this situation, then, more than 40 years after the first publication of Rothbard’s Ethics of Liberty and characterized by much practical disappointment and increasing theoretical confusion, the publication of Stephan Kinsella’s present work must be considered a most welcome sign of renewed hope and new, refreshing intellectual inspiration.

在这种情况下，在罗斯巴德的《自由的伦理》首次出版 40 多年之后，在现实生活令人失望、理论日益混乱的情况下，斯蒂芬·金塞拉这部著作的出版必须被视为一个最值得欢迎的迹象，它带来了新的希望和令人耳目一新的思想启迪。

Indeed, with this work, that has been in the making for more than two decades, Kinsella has produced no less than an intellectual landmark, establishing himself as the leading legal theorist and the foremost libertarian thinker of his generation. While following in Rothbard’s footsteps, Kinsella’s work does not merely rehash what has been said or written before. Rather, having absorbed as well all of the relevant literature that has appeared during the last few decades since Rothbard’s passing, Kinsella in the following offers some fresh perspectives and an innovative approach to the age-old quest for justice, and he adds several highly significant refinements and improvements and some centrally important new insights to the theories of personhood, property and contract, most famously some radical criticism and rejection of the idea of “intellectual property” and “intellectual property rights.”

事实上，金塞拉通过这部酝酿了二十多年的著作，创造了不亚于一座思想里程碑的作品，确立了自己在同代人中领先的法律理论家和最重要的自由意志主义思想家的地位。在继承罗斯巴德思想的同时，金塞拉的著作不仅仅是对前人言论或著作的翻版。相反，在吸收了罗斯巴德逝世后几十年间出现的所有相关文献之后，金塞拉在接下来的著作中为长久以来对正义的追求提供了一些全新的视角和创新的方法，他对人格、财产和理论增添了几处极具意义的完善和改进，并且提出了一些核心的重要的新见解，其中最著名的是对 “知识产权 “和 “知识产权 “思想的一些激进批判和否定。

Henceforth, then, all essential studies in the philosophy of law and the field of legal theory will have to take full account of the theories and criticisms expounded by Kinsella.

因此，从今以后，法律哲学和法律理论领域的所有重要研究都必须充分考虑金塞拉所阐述的理论和批评。

Hans-Hermann Hoppe Istanbul, May 2023

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普伊斯坦布尔，2023 年 5 月

Preface

前言

The issue of what property rights we have, or should have, what laws are just and proper, has long confronted mankind, and continues to be the subject of debate today. This book seeks to address these issues, with an approach that keeps in mind the nature and reality of human life—that we are purposeful human actors living in a world of scarcity and facing the possibility of interpersonal conflict—and the purpose of law and property norms: to enable us to live together, in society, peacefully and cooperatively. The goal is to vindicate the private law as developed in the decentralized systems of the Roman and common law, with an emphasis on consistency, principle, and the inviolable rights of the individual. In short, to argue for a private law system informed by libertarian principles.

我们拥有或应该拥有哪些财产权，哪些法律是公正和适当的，这些问题长期以来一直困扰着人类，今天依然是争论的主题。本书试图解决这些问题，其方法是牢记人类生活的本质和现实——我们是有目的的行动人，生活在一个稀缺的世界中，面临着人际冲突的可能性——以及法律和财产规范的目的：使我们能够在社会中和平、合作地共同生活。我们的目标是维护在罗马法和普通法的分权体系中发展起来的私法，强调一致性、原则性和个人权利的不可侵犯性。简而言之，就是主张建立一个以自由意志主义原则为基础的私法体系。

Thus, in these pages, I try to explain what libertarianism is, why individual self-ownership and property rights are justified, how the law ought to deal with criminals and tortfeasors, how property rights should be understood so that errors such as intellectual property (IP), taxes, and the drug war can be exposed, and, finally why a consistent libertarianism implies that a stateless society, sometimes called anarchy, offers the best hope for a free and just social order. I explore the nature of law and legislation, and subject various aspects of positive law, as well as other theories of law, including that of others libertarians, to criticism and appraisal.

因此，在这些篇幅中，我试图解释什么是自由意志主义，为什么个人的自我所有权和财产权是正当的，法律应该如何处理罪犯和侵权者，应该如何理解财产权，以便能够揭露诸如知识产权（IP）、税收和毒品战争等错误，最后，为什么一致的自由意志主义意味着无政府社会（有时称为无政府状态）为自由和公正的社会秩序提供了最好的希望。我探讨了法律和立法的本质，并对实在法的各个方面以及其他法律理论（包括其他自由意志主义学者的理论）进行了批评和评价。

These arguments are premised on the thesis that just law is anchored in core principles of self-ownership plus ownership of external scarce resources as governed by principles of original appropriation, contractual title transfer, and rectification. The developed legal system of an advanced, free society is the detailed working out of the implications and applications of these basic principles to various practical and recurring situations in human interactions. This book looks from numerous angles at why these principles are important and how adhering to them consistently can help us achieve a freer society and adjudge the legitimacy of concrete laws and legal systems.

这些论点的前提是，正义的法律立足于自我所有权和外部稀缺资源所有权的核心原则，这些原则受先占原则、所有权转让原则和纠正原则的制约。一个先进、自由社会的发达法律体系，是对这些基本原则在人类互动中各种实际和经常出现的情况下的影响和应用的详细阐述。本书从多个角度探讨了这些原则为何重要，以及坚持这些原则如何帮助我们实现一个更加自由的社会，并判断具体法律和法律制度的合法性。

As to how this book came about: I’ve been intensely interested in—some might say obsessed with—libertarian ideas for over forty years, since high school. It has become a life passion and an avocation of sorts. A calling, though not a career.1 After starting, as so many libertarians of my generation have, with the ideas of Ayn Rand,2 I soon discovered the work of Austrian economists and anarcho-libertarians, such as Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, whose ideas are my greatest influence.

至于这本书是如何诞生的：自从高中以来，四十多年来我一直对自由意志主义思想抱有浓厚的兴趣——有人可能会说是痴迷。它已经成为一种生活热情和某种业余爱好。一种召唤，尽管不是一种职业。[2]和我们这一代的许多自由意志主义者一样，我也是从安-兰德[3]的思想开始的，之后我很快发现了奥派经济学家和无政府自由意志主义者的著作，如路德维希-冯-米塞斯、默里-罗斯巴德和汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普，他们的思想对我的影响最大。

I started publishing on matters of libertarian theory in 1992, fresh out of law school.3 I tried to use my knowledge of the law—both the English common law and the Roman law, as embodied in the civil law of most European countries and my own home state, Louisiana—and Austrian economics and libertarian principles, to advance libertarian theory where I thought I could contribute. I first wrote on rights and punishment theory in the early 1990s (see chapters 5 and 22), and then on related areas like legislation (chapter 13), contract and inalienability theory (chapters 9 and 10), and so on. In 2001, I published “Against Intellectual Property,”4 which was controversial and influential, so I’ve become known by many libertarians primarily for my IP arguments. As the essays in the current volume illustrate, however, IP is not my sole area of interest. My interest in and passion for libertarian ideas has always been driven by my love of philosophy, truth, justice, logic, consistency, and economics. This book includes several chapters on IP but also covers other aspects of libertarian legal theory, such as rights theory and others noted above.

1992 年，我刚从法学院毕业，就开始发表有关自由意志主义理论的文章。[4]我试图利用我的法律知识——包括英国普通法和罗马法（体现在大多数欧洲国家和我自己的家乡路易斯安那州的民法中）——以及奥派经济学和自由意志主义原则，在我认为我可以做出贡献的地方推进自由意志主义理论。20 世纪 90 年代初，我首先撰写了关于权利和惩罚理论的文章（见第 5 章和第 22 章），随后又撰写了立法（第 13 章）、和不可让渡理论（第 9 章和第 10 章）等相关领域的文章。2001 年，我出版了《反对知识产权》，[5] 这本书颇具争议和影响力，因此我主要因知识产权论点而为许多自由意志主义者所熟知。然而，正如本卷中的文章所表明的，知识产权并不是我唯一感兴趣的领域。我对自由意志主义思想的兴趣和热情始终来自于我对哲学、真理、正义、逻辑、一致性和经济学的热爱。本书包括几章关于知识产权的内容，但也涉及自由意志主义法律理论的其他方面，如权利理论和上文提到的其他理论。

By 2010 or so, most of the theory-laden articles that became the chapters in this book had been published, so around that time I thought of collecting some of these articles in a single book, since they covered a large and complementary number of interrelated topics, such as rights and punishment theory, contract theory, causation and responsibility, intellectual property, anarchy, legislation, and so on. But I kept putting the project off. I felt I was missing some material that should be in such a book, such as a general overview of libertarianism itself, and an update of the intellectual property material I had initially published in 2001. I eventually wrote these articles (now chapters 2, 14, and 15), so I felt it was time to finally assemble and complete this book.

到 2010 年左右，大部分成为本书章节的理论性文章都已发表，因此在那前后，我曾想过将其中一些文章集结成书，因为这些文章涵盖了大量相互关联的主题，如权利与惩罚理论、理论、因果关系与责任、知识产权、无政府状态、立法等，而且这些主题相互补充。但我一直在推迟这个计划。我觉得自己缺少了一些应该写进这本书的材料，比如对自由意志主义本身的总体概述，以及对我最初于 2001 年出版的知识产权材料的更新。我最终写出了这些文章（现在是第 2、14 和 15 章），所以我觉得是时候将此书编辑成册了。

The twenty-five chapters are based on articles published over an almost thirty-year period, from 1994 to 2022, with one chapter (15) being formally published for the first time here (2023). I decided to omit some articles I had published before, as they are a bit too focused on American-specific issues like the US Constitution, federalism, and so on, and also for space reasons.5 I also did not include any purely legal publications—those related to my vocation, not my avocation—such as those found at my legal website www.KinsellaLaw.com. I included only writing having to do with libertarian issues.

这二十五章基于从 1994 年到 2022 年近三十年间发表的文章，其中一章（第 15 章）是首次在此正式发表（2023 年）。我决定略去一些我以前发表过的文章，因为它们过于关注美国的具体问题，如美国宪法、联邦制等，同时也是出于篇幅的考虑。[6] 我也没有收录任何纯粹的法律出版物——那些与我的职业相关，而非我的兴趣所在——比如我在法律网站 www.KinsellaLaw.com 上发表的文章。我只收录了与自由意志主义问题有关的文章。

Most of these articles were published in scholarly journals or in online publications. A few chapters are more conversational in tone, as they were based on interviews or transcripts of speeches (e.g. chapters 17 and 23–25). Even with these, I have added extensive references and cross-references where appropriate.

这些文章大多发表在学术期刊或网络出版物上。有几章的基调更偏向于对话，因为它们是基于访谈或演讲实录（如第 17 章和第 23-25 章）。即使是这些文章，我也在适当的地方添加了大量参考文献和对照索引。

I divided the book into six sections. Part I—Libertarianism covers my own introduction to libertarianism, an overview of libertarianism, and my take on anarchism. Part II—Rights concerns arguments for self-ownership, property rights, and punishment theory. Part III— Libertarian Legal Theory has chapters building on the theory in previous chapters to apply to various laws and libertarian issues, like causation and responsibility (chapter 8), contract and inalienability theory (chapters 9–11), and a long chapter on the pitfalls of legislation as a way of making law (chapter 13) (I probably should have turned this one into a PhD dissertation…).

我将本书分为六个部分。第一部分——自由意志主义涵盖了我本人对自由意志主义的介绍、自由意志主义概述以及我对无政府主义的看法。第二部分——权利，涉及对自我所有权、财产权和惩罚理论的论证。第三部分——自由意志主义法律理论有几章是在前几章理论的基础上应用于各种法律和自由意志主义问题，比如因果关系和责任（第8章）、和不可让渡理论（第9-11章），还有很长一章是关于立法作为制定法律的一种方式的弊端（第13章）（我也许应该把这一章变成博士论文……）。

Part IV—Intellectual Property contains a chapter presenting the basic case against IP (chapter 14), basically a streamlined and somewhat updated version of AIP, followed by chapter 15, which summarizes other IP arguments and issues that I wrote and spoke on after AIP. I also include some of my discussion with, and commentary on the views of, my pro-IP libertarian friend, the late J. Neil Schulman, and a piece on the nature of scarce and nonscarce goods, which is relevant to the IP issue.

第四部分——知识产权，其中有一章介绍了反对知识产权的基本理由（第14章），基本上是《反对知识产权》的精简版和更新版，之后的第15章总结了我在《反对知识产权》之后撰写和发表的其他知识产权论点和问题。我还收录了我与支持知识产权的自由意志主义朋友、已故的尼尔-舒尔曼（J. Neil Schulman）的一些讨论和对其观点的评论，以及一篇与知识产权问题相关的关于稀缺和非稀缺财货性质的文章。

Part V—Reviews contains four book reviews or review essays providing libertarian commentary on various books on law or political philosophy. Finally, Part VI—Interviews & Speeches is less formal and contains two interviews and a speech assessing the last five or six decades of the libertarian movement.

第五部分——评论，包含四篇书评或评论文章，对各种法律或政治哲学书籍进行自由意志主义的评论。最后，第六部分——不那么正式的访谈与演讲，包含两篇访谈和一篇演讲，对过去五六十年的自由意志主义运动进行了评估。

For those who want to skip the more extraneous material and focus on the core libertarian theory chapters, I recommend chapters 2–12, 14–15, and 18.

对于那些想跳过较多无关材料，专注于自由意志主义理论核心章节的人，我推荐第 2-12 章、第 14-15 章和第 18 章。

I have revised all the material in the book, which was required since many of the original articles used different citation formats and also because some of my thinking and terminology has changed over the years. Several chapters are significantly revised or expanded, which in a few cases led to very long footnotes, since it would have been too disruptive to rewrite the article to integrate the extra commentary into the text; in some cases I moved very long footnotes to an appendix.

我对书中的所有材料进行了修订，这是必要的，因为许多原始文章使用了不同的引用格式，还因为我的一些想法和术语多年来发生了变化。有几章做了大幅修改或扩充，在某些情况下，注释很长，因为要将额外的注释融入正文，重写文章会造成太大的干扰；在某些情况下，我将很长的注释移到了附录中。

Although the chapters were all written separately and at different times over three decades, many of them build on (or anticipated) others.

虽然这些章节都是在三十年间的不同时间分别撰写的，但其中许多章节都是在其他章节的基础上发展（或预期过的）的。

For example, in chapter 10, originally published 1998–99, I outlined a sketch of a view of contracts, inalienability, and so on (note 48), and wrote “Elaboration of these ideas will have to await a subsequent article.” I did so in 2003, in the article which became chapter 9. Thus, I was able to piece together several articles in a fairly systematic form since they either built on or anticipated each other and were written to be consistent with each other and all flowing from the same core principles and reasoning.

例如，在最初于 1998-1999 年出版的第 10 章中，我勾勒出了关于、不可让渡性等观点的草图（注 48），并写道：”对这些观点的详细阐述将有待于后续文章。”2003 年，我在后来作为第 9 章的文章中阐述了这些观点。因此，我能够以一种相当系统的形式将几篇文章拼凑在一起，因为这些文章或是建立在彼此的基础之上，或是预见到了彼此，而且在写作时彼此一致，都源于相同的核心原则和推理。

I have added extensive cross-references pointing to related discussion in other chapters. There is a bit of redundancy in some of the chapters since they were published independently. However, it is my view that the repetition that does exist in some articles can help reinforce a given argument or idea or show it from a different angle.

我增加了大量交叉引用，指向其他章节中的相关讨论。由于这些文章是独立出版的，因此有些章节存在一些重复。不过，我认为，虽然某些文章中确实存在的重复，却有助于强化某个论点或观点，或从不同角度给予阐述。

In one case I now disagree with something I originally wrote; I retained the original text and added an explanatory note (chapter 13, Part III.C). And in chapter 9 (Part III.C), I note that, regarding my earlier criticism of Rothbard’s argument for inalienability: “I now think it is possible that his approach is more compatible with my own than I originally realized.” But otherwise, I today still stand by most of the original content of those articles, in terms of substance. However, as noted several places in the text, I often now use terminology somewhat differently, e.g., the term state instead of government; rivalrous or “conflictable” instead of scarce; using the word property to refer to the relation between humans with respect to owned resources, instead of referring to the owned resource itself, and so on. I have in some cases updated the text to my current, preferred usage, but not always since it would have been too drastic and tedious.

一个案例中，我如今不同意我原来写的东西；我保留了原文，并添加了解释性说明（第 13 章，第 III.C 部分）。在第 9 章（第 III.C 部分）中，我指出，关于我之前对罗斯巴德不可让渡论证的批评： “我现在认为，他的方法有可能比我最初意识到的更符合我的方法”。但除此之外，就实质内容而言，我今天仍然坚持这些文章的大部分原始内容。不过，正如文中多处指出的那样，我现在使用的术语经常有些不同，例如，用国家代替政府；竞争性的或 “有冲突的” 代替稀缺性；用所有权来指人与所拥有的资源之间的关系，而不是指所拥有的资源本身，等等。在某些情况下，我将文本更新为我当前喜欢的用法，但并不总是这样，因为这样做过于激烈和繁琐。

I have also included a table of contents for some of the chapters where I thought it would be useful. And as noted above, in several chapters I moved very long footnotes to an appendix.

我还为一些我认为有用的章节添加了目录。如上文所述，在几章中，我将很长的注释移到了附录中。

I have tried to conform references to a more or less uniform citation style of my own preference (a modified version of Chicago style), although my main goal was to simply provide sufficient information for the reader to locate the cited work, not to conform to some arbitrary format (and also not to obsess over consistency). In this, I am influenced by the citation policy of the second incarnation of the legal journal The Greenbag: “Citations should be accurate, complete, and unobtrusive.

尽管我的主要目标只是为读者提供足够的信息来查找所引用的作品，而不是遵守某种武断的格式（也不是执着于一致性），但我还是试图使参考文献符合我自己偏好的或多或少统一的引用风格（芝加哥风格的修改版）。在这一点上，我受到了法律期刊《The Greenbag》第二版的引文政策的影响：”引用应准确、完整、不突兀。“

Familiar sources need no citation. Authors may use whatever citation form they prefer; we will make changes only to keep footnotes from looking like goulash.”6

熟悉的资料来源无需引用。作者可以使用他们喜欢的任何引文形式；我们进行修改只是为了使注释看起来不那么杂乱 “[7]。

I have also included hyperlinks for online versions of cited material where possible. If we lived in a copyright-free world, everything would be online and readers could easily find any cited work with a search. Alas. For my own work that I reference, since it is mostly available on my own website, I provide an initial hyperlink in the title but do not type out the URL in the text. Almost all of my work referenced in the text can be found at www.StephanKinsella.com/publications, www.StephanKinsella.com/lffs, or www.c4sif.org. I have liberally used permalinks via www.perma.cc in cases where I suspected future possible linkrot or where the original URL is overlong.

在可能的情况下，我还提供了引用资料在线版本的超链接。如果我们生活在一个没有版权的世界里，那么所有的东西都可以在网上找到，读者只要搜索一下就可以轻松找到任何引用的作品。呜呼可叹。对于我自己引用的作品，由于大部分可以在我自己的网站上找到，所以我在标题中提供了一个初始超链接，但没有在正文中键入 URL。我在文中引用的几乎所有作品都可以在 www.StephanKinsella.com/publications、www.StephanKinsella.com/lffs 或 www.c4sif.org 上找到。在我怀疑将来可能出现链接错误或原始 URL 过长的情况下，我通过 www.perma.cc 自由地使用永久链接。

I debated various titles for this work. Titles like Freedom and the Law and Liberty and Law were already taken.7 I considered at one time calling this work The Ethics of Action, as an amalgamation and nod to similar titles by other authors 8 and to evoke a recurring theme in my writing: an exploration of the ethics that guide action and of ethics implied by certain classes of action (see the argumentation ethics and estoppel theory of rights I advance in chapters 5 and 6). But in the end, this seemed too inscrutable and only applicable to a small part of this book’s content, so for years I planned on using the title Law in a Libertarian World: Legal Foundations of a Free Society. In the end, some trusted colleagues urged me to drop the main title and use the subtitle instead. I have.

我为这部作品讨论了各种标题，《自由与法律》（Freedom and the Law）和《自由与法律》（Liberty and Law）等书名已被采用。[8]我曾一度考虑将这部作品命名为《行动的伦理学》（The Ethics of Action），作为对其他作者[9]类似主题的融合和致意，同时也是为了唤起我写作中反复出现的一个主题：对指导行动的伦理学以及某些类别的行动所隐含的伦理学的探索（参见我在第5章和第6章中提出的论证伦理学和权利的禁止反言理论）。但最终，这似乎过于高深莫测，而且只适用于本书内容的一小部分，因此多年来我一直计划使用《自由意志主义世界中的法律：自由社会的法律基础》这一书名。最后，一些值得信赖的同事劝我放弃主标题，而改用副标题。我选择从谏如流。

The length of the book turned out to be larger than expected, but I have chosen to publish this book as one volume instead of breaking it into two. I think this will be easier for the reader, given the extensive cross-references between chapters, and should make for a lower cost. My goal was never sales. It was only to help advance libertarian theory by making these thoughts accessible to whoever might be interested now or in the future.Thus, in addition to print (both hard and softcover) and ebook versions for sale on major platforms, I am of course posting a free digital version online at www.StephanKinsella.com/lffs, and with a Creative Commons Zero license. Anyone is free to republish this work, or translate it, or make audio versions, without asking my permission.

本书的篇幅比预期的要长，但我选择将本书作为一卷出版，而不是分成两卷。鉴于各章之间有大量的交叉引用，我认为这样对读者来说会更方便，而且成本也会更低。我的目标从来都不是销售，只是为了让现在或将来可能感兴趣的人都能了解这些思想，从而推动自由意志主义理论的发展。因此，除了在主要平台上出售印刷版（包括硬皮和软皮）和电子书外，我当然还会在 www.StephanKinsella.com/lffs 上发布免费的电子版，并采用知识共享零许可证（ Creative Commons Zero license）。任何人无需征得我的同意，均可自由转载、翻译或制作音频版本。

I have published in the past with various publishing houses, such as the Mises Institute, Oceana Publications, Oxford University Press, and so on, but for this book I have decided to self publish, under my own imprint, Papinian Press (www.PapinianPress.com), for a variety of reasons. First, my own procrastination has delayed this project for over a decade, so I was reluctant to add yet another year to this project by engaging a normal publisher. Second, I saw no benefit to using a mainstream publisher. I do not need their delays or “helpful suggestions,” which would no doubt urge me to water down my arguments or make them more mainstream. No, thank you. And I have no career or academic ambitions to burnish by using a prestigious press. Also, I wanted freedom to release this book totally open source, free of any copyright restrictions, and to post free online versions, which most publishers would balk at. I’m frankly tired of the dinosaur legacy publishing industry. Finally, I may use the Papinian Press imprint for future book projects, so am glad to use this book to kick it off.

我过去曾在米塞斯研究院、Oceana 出版社、牛津大学出版社等多家出版社出版过作品，但出于种种原因，我决定以自己的出版社帕皮尼恩出版社（Papinian Press ，www.PapinianPress.com) 自费出版这本书。首先，我自己的拖延症已经让这个项目耽搁了十多年，因此我不愿意通过聘请普通出版商来为这个项目再增加一年的时间。其次，我认为使用主流出版商没有任何好处。我不需要他们的拖延或 “有益的建议”，他们无疑会敦促我淡化我的论点或使其更加主流化。但是，敬谢不敏。我也没有职业或学术上的野心要通过使用知名出版社来实现。此外，我还想自由地发布这本书，完全开放源代码，不受任何版权限制，并发布免费的在线版本，而大多数出版商都会对此望而却步。老实说，我已经厌倦了过时的传统出版业。最后，我可能会在未来的图书项目中使用帕皮尼恩出版社的品牌，所以我很高兴能用这本书来启动它。

The imprint, by the way, is named after the third-century Roman jurist Papinian (Aemilius Papinianus), who also adorned the advertisement for my 2011 Mises Academy course on libertarian legal theory.9 The reason I admire Papinian, in addition to his being a great jurist:

Papinian is said to have been put to death for refusing to compose a justification of Caracalla’s murder of his brother and co-Emperor, Geta,declaring, so the story goes, that “it is easier to commit murder than to justify it.”10

顺便提一下，这个印记是以三世纪罗马法学家帕皮尼安（Aemilius Papinianus）的名字命名的，他也是我 2011 年米塞斯学院自由意志主义法律理论课程的广告装饰。[10]我之所以钦佩帕皮尼安，除了他是一位伟大的法学家之外：

据说帕皮尼安因为拒绝为卡拉卡拉谋杀他的兄弟和共同皇帝盖塔撰写辩护词而被处死，他宣称，”实施谋杀比为谋杀辩护更容易 “[11]。

Papinian bravely chose death in the name of justice; and his formulation “it is easier to commit murder than to justify it” brilliantly encapsulates the distinction between committing an action and normatively justifying the action. It emphasizes the importance of justifying interpersonal violence, and the difference between description and prescription, between fact and value, between is and ought—insights which play a crucial role in my own defenses of rights (see chapters 5–7).

帕皮尼安以正义之名选择慷慨赴死；他的表述 “实施谋杀比为谋杀辩护更容易 “精辟地概括了实施行动与规范地为行动辩护之间的区别。它强调了为人与人之间的武力行为辩护的重要性，以及描述与规定、事实与价值、是与应该之间的区别——这些见解在我自己的权利辩护中发挥着至关重要的作用（见第 5-7 章）。

Although this book is written in English, many of the articles from which it derives have been translated into other languages, and some have audio versions available. They are online at www.StephanKinsella. com/translations and www.StephanKinsella.com/media.

虽然本书是用英语撰写的，但其中的许多文章已被翻译成其他语言，有些还提供音频版本。请访问 www.StephanKinsella. com/translations 和 www.StephanKinsella.com/media。

I refer readers to www.StephanKinsella.com/lffs for errata, links to my own publications referenced in the book, and for supplementary material.

有关勘误、书中引用的我本人出版物的链接以及补充材料，请读者访问 www.StephanKinsella.com/lffs。

It is my hope that readers and future scholars will benefit from the arguments offered in these pages.

我希望读者和未来的学者能从这些页面中提供的论点中受益。

Stephan Kinsella Houston, June 2023

斯蒂芬·金塞拉休斯顿，2023 年 6 月

Acknowledgments

致谢

As noted in the Preface, I’ve been intensely involved in libertarianism for over forty years and, for almost thirty years, with the Mises Institute. I’ve been fortunate to have learned from thinkers from the past such as Rothbard, Mises, Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman, Frederic Bastiat, and many others,1 but also from countless friends, mentors, colleagues, co-authors, acquaintances, interlocutors, discussants, and so on over the last forty years. It would be impossible to try to thank them all by name. Nonetheless I would like to try to express my appreciation for some special people and groups that have meant so much to me. I apologize in advance for those I have inadvertently omitted.

如前言所述，我深入研究自由意志主义已有四十多年，在米塞斯研究院工作也有近三十年。我有幸师从罗斯巴德、米塞斯、安-兰德、米尔顿-弗里德曼、弗雷德里克-巴斯蒂亚特等前辈思想家[12]，受益良多，也从过去四十年中无数的朋友、导师、同事、合著者、熟人、对话者、讨论者等那里学到了很多东西。要一一对他们表示感谢是不可能的。不过，我还是想对一些对我意义重大的特殊人士和团体表示感谢。对于我无意中遗漏的人，我预先表示歉意。

First and foremost, to my wife of thirty years, Cindy, and to all my close friends and family, for tolerating my libertarian obsessions and libertarian macho flashes for decades, and for listening to me argue, explain, and explore ideas.2 To my son Ethan, to whom this book is dedicated, for inspiring me and enriching my life, and for also loving liberty and goodness. And to my trainer and friend, Stephanie Rakoczy, for letting me vent about all matters libertarian for many years now in between squats and pushups. I am grateful to my birth mother, Gail Doiron McGehee, for blessing me with my adoptive parents; to my mom for taking me to the library as much as I wanted; to my dad for driving me to school so far away in another parish for so many years; and to Mrs. Reinhardt, a librarian at Catholic High School in Baton Rouge, for recommending that I read The Fountainhead.

首先要感谢我结婚三十年的妻子辛迪，以及我所有的亲朋好友，感谢他们几十年来容忍我对自由意志主义的痴迷和自由意志主义大男子主义的臭脾气，感谢他们听我争论、解释和探索各种观点[13]。献给我的儿子伊森，感谢他激励了我，丰富了我的生活，也感谢他对自由和善良的热爱。还要感谢我的教练和朋友斯蒂芬妮-拉科奇（Stephanie Rakoczy），多年来她让我在深蹲和俯卧撑的间隙宣泄所有关于自由意志主义的事情。我感谢我的生母盖尔-多伊隆-麦基希（Gail Doiron McGehee），感谢她赐予我养父母；感谢我的母亲，我想去图书馆就带我去；感谢我的父亲，感谢他多年来开车送我到那么远的另一个教区上学；感谢巴吞鲁日天主教高中的图书管理员莱因哈特夫人，感谢她推荐我阅读《源泉》。

This book would not be possible without the understanding of property rights I’ve arrived at, and this in turn would not be possible without the work of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, whom I have also been fortunate to call a close friend. His support, friendship, guidance, and example of personal and intellectual integrity over the years mean more to me than I can properly express. My life would not be the same, nor this book possible, without him.

如果没有我对财产权的理解，这本书是不可能完成的，而如果没有汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普的工作，这本书也不可能完成，我有幸能与他做一对好基友。他多年来对我的支持、友谊、指导，以及在人格和学识上的正直表率，对我来说意义非凡，我无法用言语来表达。没有他，我的生活不会是现在这样，这本书也不可能出版。

I’ve had a host of libertarian friends and friend groups that I’ve learned and benefitted from, or had support from, over the years, including my longtime friend Jack Criss, Jr.; the “Las Vegas crew”— former students of Rothbard and Hoppe, and now my good friends: Doug French (and Deanna Forbush), Jeff Barr, Lee Iglody, Jim Yohe, Joe Becker; others such as Juan Fernando Carpio; Greg and Joy Morin; Konrad Graf, Michael Conaghan, Jacob Huebert, Gene Healy, Gary Chartier, Gerard Casey, Richard Storey, Tom Woods, Michael Malice, Bob Murphy, Roderick Long, Jan Narveson, Frank van Dun, Robert Bradley, Jr.; Gil Guillory, Paul Edwards, Jacob Lovell, Rob Wicks, Greg Rome, Brian Martinez, Dick Clark, Isaac Bergman, Daniel Coleman, Timo Virkkala, and many others in my “Libertarian Forum” crowd (you know who you are); James Cox and Daniel Rothschild; many friends and scholars from the Property and Freedom Society and from countless Mises Institute events and conferences since 1995, including Lew Rockwell, David Gordon, Tom DiLorenzo, Peter Klein, Jeff Herbener, Joe Salerno, Sean Gabb, and others; correspondents from years ago such as Johan Ridenfeldt and Chris Whitten; co-authors and friends such as Patrick Tinsley, Jeff Tucker, and Walter Block, the first two of whom co-authored chapters with me in this volume. Thanks also to Nelson Loftin, for nudging me over several years to complete this book.

多年来，我有许多自由意志主义的朋友和朋友团体，我从他们那里学到了很多东西，受益匪浅，或者得到了他们的支持，其中包括我的老朋友小杰克-克里斯；”拉斯维加斯团队”——罗斯巴德和霍普以前的学生，现在是我的好朋友：道格·弗伦奇（和迪安娜·福布什）、杰夫·巴尔、李·伊格洛迪、吉姆·约赫、乔·贝克尔；还有其他人，比如胡安·费尔南多·卡皮奥；格雷格和乔伊·莫林；康拉德·格拉夫、迈克尔·康纳根、雅各布·休伯特、吉恩·希利、加里·查蒂尔、杰拉德·凯西、理查德·斯托里、汤姆·伍兹、迈克尔·马利斯、鲍勃·墨菲、罗德里克·朗、扬·纳维森、弗兰克·冯·顿、小罗伯特·布拉德利；吉尔·吉洛里（Gil Guillory）、保罗·爱德华兹（Paul Edwards）、雅各布·洛弗尔（Jacob Lovell）、罗布·威克斯（Rob Wicks）、格雷格·罗马（Greg Rome）、布莱恩·马丁内斯（Brian Martinez）、迪克·克拉克（Dick Clark）、艾萨克·伯格曼（Isaac Bergman）、丹尼尔·科尔曼（Daniel Coleman）、蒂莫·维尔卡拉（Timo Virkkala），以及我在”自由意志主义论坛 “上的许多其他朋友（你们知道你们是谁）；詹姆斯·考克斯（James Cox）和丹尼尔·罗斯柴尔德（Daniel Rothschild）；财产与自由协会以及米塞斯研究院自 1995 年以来举办的无数活动和会议中的许多朋友和学者，包括卢-罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）、大卫-戈登（David Gordon）、汤姆-迪洛伦佐（Tom DiLorenzo）、彼得-克莱因（Peter Klein）、杰夫-赫伯纳（Jeff Herbener）、乔-萨勒诺（Joe Salerno）、肖恩-加布（Sean Gabb）等人；多年前的通信作者，如约翰-里登费尔特（Johan Ridenfeldt）和克里斯-惠滕（Chris Whitten）；合著者和朋友，如帕特里克-廷斯利（Patrick Tinsley）、杰夫-塔克（Jeff Tucker）和沃尔特-布洛克（Walter Block），其中前两位与我合著了本卷中的章节。还要感谢纳尔逊-洛夫廷（Nelson Loftin），感谢他数年来一直督促我完成本书。。

My dear friend Guido Hülsmann, whom I met on a bus from the Atlanta airport to the Mises Institute in Auburn in 1995 when we were both going there to meet Hans-Hermann Hoppe, has been an important friend and influence, both personally and intellectually.

我的挚友吉多-胡斯曼（Guido Hülsmann）是我在 1995 年从亚特兰大机场前往奥本米塞斯研究院的巴士上认识的，当时我们都要去那里见汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe），他一直是我重要的朋友，对我产生了重要的个人和思想影响。

My friend Wendy McElroy has also been an inspiration and sounding board and helped me see the light on IP.

我的朋友温迪-麦克罗伊（Wendy McElroy）也给了我很多启发和建议，让我看清了知识产权的方向。

The notes for various chapters in this book also thank various commentators.

本书各章的注释也感谢了不同的评论家。

I would also like to thank Randy Barnett, and several LSU law professors, such as Saúl Litvinoff, Glenn Morris, William Hawkland, Alain Levasseur, Robert Pascal, and John Devlin, for inspiration, support, and guidance in my earlier years in law school and in the beginning years of my legal practice and scholarly and educational endeavors (Litvinoff and Pascal were not my professors but they became friends and correspondents after law school). I learned a great deal at the LSE about international law and legal scholarship from professor and now Baroness Rosalyn Higgins, later President of the International Court of Justice; she inspired and informed much of my subsequent legal publications on international law.

我还要感谢兰迪-巴尼特（Randy Barn如Saúl利特维诺夫（Saúl Litvinoff）、格伦·莫里斯（Glenn Morris）、威廉·霍克兰（William Hawkland）、阿兰·莱瓦瑟（Alain Levasseur）、罗伯特·帕斯卡（Robert Pascal）和约翰·德夫林（John Devlin），他们在我早年就读于法学院以及开始从事法律实践、学术和教育工作的最初几年给予了我启发、支持和指导（Litvinoff和Pascal不是我的教授，但他们在法学院毕业后成了我的朋友和通信者）。在伦敦政治经济学院，我从教授、现任男爵夫人罗莎琳-希金斯（Rosalyn Higgins，后任国际法院院长）那里学到了很多关于国际法和法律学术的知识；她启发并指导了我后来关于国际法的许多法律著作。

I am also grateful to my intellectual adversaries, who have forced me to hone, refine, and clarify my arguments to counter and explain the errors in theirs.

我还要感谢我思想上的对手们，是他们迫使我反复淬炼、完善和澄清我的论点，以反驳和解释他们论点中的错误。

P.J. Doland, a fellow libertarian and web-designer with www. DancingMammoth.com, has graciously hosted and helped me run my own websites and others I manage over the years, all in the service of liberty, which were invaluable in collecting, publishing, and assembling material used in the preparation of this book. Since I haltingly started this book project about fifteen years ago, I’ve had the assistance of several people, including Lisa Eldridge and Rosemary Denshaw (transcriptions); Justina Clark, Harry David, Lauren Barlow, and Carly Catt (copyediting); Susi Clark, of www.creativeblueprintdesign.com, for cover design, typesetting and publishing assistance; and Susan Bruck (proofreading, indexing, and bibliography).

P.J.多兰德（P.J. Doland）是一位自由意志主义者，也是www. DancingMammoth.com的网页设计者，多年来，他慷慨地主持并帮助我运营自己的网站和我管理的其他网站，所有这些都是为了自由服务，这些网站对于收集、出版和汇集本书编写过程中使用的材料非常宝贵。自从我在十五年前犹豫不决地开始写作本书以来，我得到了很多人的帮助，包括丽莎-埃尔德里奇（Lisa Eldridge）和罗斯玛丽-邓肖（ Rosemary Denshaw誊写）；贾斯蒂娜-克拉克（Justina Clark）、哈里-戴维（Harry David）、劳伦-巴洛（Lauren Barlow）和卡莉-卡特（Carly Catt 校对）；苏西-克拉克（ Susi Clark）为www.creativeblueprintdesign.com提供的封面设计、排版和出版帮助；以及苏珊-布鲁克（Susan Bruck，负责校对、索引和书目）。

The image on the back cover of the book is based on a painting by my childhood friend John Wax, of www.JohnWaxArt.com, which itself was based on photographs of a statue by H.C. Andersen.3 To get permission and arrange a private photographer at the Anderson Musuem in Rome, I was fortunate to have the help of my Italian libertarian friend and scholar, Roberta Modugno, and my Italian-speaking Canadian libertarian attorney friend Daniel Roncari.

本书封底的图片是基于我儿时的朋友约翰·瓦克斯(JohnWax)在www.JohnWaxArt.com上的一幅画创作的，而这幅画本身是基于安徒生(H.C. Andersen)的一尊雕像照片创作的。[14]为了获得许可并在罗马安德森博物馆安排一位私人摄影师，我有幸得到了我的意大利自由意志主义朋友兼学者罗伯塔-莫杜格诺（Roberta Modugno），以及我的讲意大利语的加拿大自由意志主义律师朋友丹尼尔-朗卡里（Daniel Roncari）的帮助。

To all these, and many others not mentioned, I am grateful.

对于所有这些人，以及许多其他未提及的人，我都心存感激。

第一辑PART I

自由意志主义

LIBERTARIANISM

How I Became a Libertarian

第一章我如何成为一名自由意志主义者

First published as part of the LewRockwell.com autobiography series initiated by Walter Block, as “How I Became A Libertarian,” LewRockwell.com (December 18, 2002). Later included as “Being a Libertarian” in I Chose Liberty: Autobiographies of Contemporary Libertarians (compiled by Walter Block; Mises Institute 2010). Additional biographical pieces may be found at www.stephankinsella.com/publications/#biographical.

作为沃尔特-布洛克（Walter Block）发起的 LewRockwell.com 自传系列的一部分，首次发表于 LewRockwell.com（2002 年 12 月 18 日），标题为《我如何成为一名自由意志主义者》。后改为《作为一个自由意志主义者》被收录于《我选择了自由：当代自由意志主义者的自传》一书（沃尔特-布洛克编著；米塞斯研究院 2010 年出版）。更多的传记作品见 www.stephankinsella.com/publications/#biographical。

Unlike many libertarians who dally with socialism before seeing the light, I have never been attracted to leftism. Indeed, although I of course welcome former pinkos to our ranks, I’m always a bit suspicious of anyone who could ever be swayed by that bunk.

许多自由意志主义者在看清真相之前都会徘徊于社会主义，而我与他们不同，我从未被左派主义所吸引。事实上，尽管我当然欢迎前粉红们加入我们的行列，但我总是对那些会被这种左派话语所吸引的人持怀疑态度。

Born in 1965, I was reared in a small town near Baton Rouge, Louisiana. My natural aversion to leftism stems from this upbringing. The milieu—if South Louisiana can be said to have one—was nominally Democratic, but relatively apolitical, culturally conservative, and Catholic. I can’t recall ever meeting any open or hardcore leftists until college.

我出生于 1965 年，在路易斯安那州巴吞鲁日（Baton Rouge, Louisiana）附近的一个小镇长大。我对左派的天然反感源于这种成长环境。那里的社会环境——如果南路易斯安那州可以被称为存在社会环境的话——名义上是民主党，但相对来说不关心政治，文化上保守，信奉天主教。在上大学之前，我从未见过任何公开或顽固的左派人士。

There were other contributing factors that made me ripe for libertarianism. For one, I have always been strongly individualistic and merit-oriented. This is probably because I was adopted and thus have always tended to cavalierly dismiss the importance of “blood ties” and any inherited or “unearned” group characteristics. This made me an ideal candidate to be enthralled by Ayn Rand’s master-of-universe “I don’t need anything from you or owe you anything” themes.

还有其他一些促成因素让我完全地接受了自由意志主义。首先，我一直是强烈的个人主义和功利主义者。这可能是因为我是被领养的，因此总是轻率地认为 “血缘关系 “和任何继承的或 “不劳而获 “的群体特征都不重要。这使我成为被安-兰德（Ayn Rand）”我不需要你的任何东西，也不欠你任何东西 “的宇宙之主主题所迷惑的理想人选。

Another factor is my strong sense of outrage at injustice, which probably developed as a result of my hatred of bullies and bullying. I was frequently attacked by them as a kid, because I was small for my age, bookish, and a smartass. Not a good combination.

另一个因素是我对不公正的强烈愤慨，这可能是我憎恨恶霸和欺凌的结果。我小时候经常受到他们的霸凌，因为我在同龄人中个子小、书呆子气、又喜自作聪明。这可不是个好的组合。

I attended Catholic elementary and high school in Baton Rouge. I had a love-hate relationship with Mrs. Reinhardt, Catholic High School’s librarian. When she was not expelling me and my cronies from the library for pulling pranks, she would recommend books to me, as she knew I was an avid reader of both fiction and nonfiction. One day she recommended Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead to me.1 (I believe this was in 1982, when I was a junior in high school—the same year Rand died.) “Read this. You’ll like it,” she told me. Ex nihilo—something. Rand’s ruthless logic of justice appealed to me. I was thrilled to see a more-orless rigorous application of reason to fields outside the natural sciences. I think this helped me to avoid succumbing, in college, to the simplistic and naïve empiricism-scientism that most of my fellow engineering classmates naturally absorbed. Mises’s dualistic epistemology and criticism of monism-positivism-empiricism, which I studied much later,also helped shield me from scientism.

我在巴吞鲁日上的是天主教小学和中学。我对天主教高中的图书管理员莱因哈特夫人（Mrs. Reinhardt）又爱又恨。她知道我热衷于阅读小说和非小说类书籍，所以在她不因我和我的小伙伴们搞恶作剧而将我逐出图书馆时，她会给我推荐书。有一天，她向我推荐了安-兰德（Ayn Rand）的《源泉》（The Fountainhead）[15]1（我想那是 1982 年的事了，当时我上高三，兰德也是在那一年去世的）。 “读读这本书吧。你会喜欢的，”她告诉我。从无到有（Ex nihilo—something）。兰德冷酷无情的正义逻辑吸引了我。我很高兴看到理性在自然科学以外的领域或多或少地得到了严谨的应用。我认为这有助于我在大学里避免屈服于简单幼稚的经验主义-科学主义，而我的大多数工科同学自然而然地接受了这种经验主义-科学主义。米塞斯的二元论认识论和对一元论-实证主义-经验主义的批判，也帮助我远离了科学主义。

By my first year of college (1983), where I studied electrical engineering, I was a fairly avid “Objectivist” style libertarian. I had read Henry Hazlitt’s Economics in One Lesson2 and some of Milton Friedman’s works, but I initially steered clear of “libertarian” writing. Since Rand was so right on so many things, I at first assumed she—and her disciples Peter Schwartz and Leonard Peikoff—must be right in denouncing libertarianism as the enemy of liberty.

我在大学一年级（1983 年）学习电子工程，那时我已经是一个相当狂热的 “客观主义 “风格的自由意志主义者。我读过亨利-哈兹利特（Henry Hazlitt）的《一课经济学》[16] 和米尔顿-弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）的一些作品，但我最初对 “自由意志主义 “的文章避而远之。由于兰德在很多事情上都是对的，我起初以为她——以及她的弟子彼得-施瓦茨（Peter Schwartz）以及伦纳德-佩科夫（Leonard Peikoff）——谴责自由意志主义是自由之敌——一定是正确的。

And yet in my reading I kept coming across libertarians, whose views seemed virtually identical to Rand’s “capitalist” politics. Finally, out of exasperation at trying to reconcile Rand’s denunciation of libertarians with their seemingly similar views, I read Rothbard’s For a New Liberty,3 and then several other works, such as Nozick, the Tannehills, David Friedman, etc.4 Before long I realized Rand’s minarchism was flawed. Individual rights entail anarcho-capitalism; a state, even a minarchist one, necessarily violates the individual rights that Rand so passionately championed. Rand made a lot of sense on a lot of issues, but her arguments in favor of government were strained.

然而，我在阅读过程中不断遇到自由意志主义者，他们的观点似乎与兰德的 “资本主义 “政治几乎完全相同。最后，出于试图调和兰德对自由意志主义的谴责与他们看似相似的观点的愤懑，我读了罗斯巴德的《为了新自由》[17]，然后又读了其他几本著作，如诺齐克、坦尼希尔夫妇、大卫·弗里德曼等[18]。不久之后，我意识到兰德的小政府主义是有缺陷的。个人权利意味着无政府资本主义；一个国家，即使是一个小政府主义的国家，也必然会侵犯兰德所热衷拥护的个人权利。兰德在很多问题上都说得很有道理，但她支持政府的论点却很牵强。

I remember attending my only Objectivist conference, in Dallas, with my good friend Jack Criss (a libertarian radio talk show host from Jackson, Mississippi). Entitled “Meeting of the Minds,” the conference showcased Objectivist stars David Kelley, John Ridpath, and Alan Gotthelf. This was in March 1989, I believe, before David Kelley had been purged from official Objectivist circles for daring to praise Barbara Branden’s biography The Passion of Ayn Rand.5 I had corresponded with Kelley who was gracious enough to take time to reply (this was before email) to my questions. I have always admired and respected Kelley.

我记得我唯一一次参加客观主义的研讨会是在达拉斯，和我的好朋友杰克-克里斯（来自密西西比州杰克逊市的自由意志主义电台脱口秀主持人）一起参加的。这次研讨会的主题是 “思想交锋”，会上展示了客观主义的大咖大卫-凯利（David Kelley）、约翰-里德帕斯（John Ridpath）和艾伦-高特夫（Alan Gotthelf）。我相信那是在 1989 年 3 月，当时大卫-凯利还没有因为敢于称赞芭芭拉-布兰登的传记《安·兰德蒙难记》[19]而被清除出官方的客观主义圈子。我曾与凯利通信，他很友好地花时间回复了我的问题（当时还没有电子邮件）。我一直非常钦佩和尊敬凯利。

I had several stimulating conversations with him at the conference, mostly on epistemology and philosophy. But I remember at a reception one of the students telling how he had taken his copy of The Passion of Ayn Rand and burned it in a private ceremony in his mom’s back yard when he realized how “evil” it was. I think he sought to gain points among his audience by relating this tale. I recall Jack and I looking at each other with cocked eyebrows. “Book burning.” Yes. Well. That was the last and only Objectivist conference I ever attended.

在会议上，我与他进行了几次很有启发性的谈话，主要是关于认识论和哲学的。但我记得在一次招待会上，一位学生告诉我，当他意识到这本书有多么“邪恶”时，他把自己的那本《安·兰德蒙难记》(the Passion of Ayn Rand)在他母亲的后院举行了一个私人仪式，把它烧掉了。我想他是想通过讲述这个故事来赢得听众的好感。我记得杰克和我眉头紧锁，面面相觑。”焚书！” 是的。好吧。那是我参加的最后一次也是唯一一次客观主义会议

In the late-80s I started publishing columns in the LSU student newspaper, The Daily Reveille, from an explicitly libertarian perspective. As my interests became more sharply political and philosophical, my girlfriend (later wife) and friends urged me to consider law school. I was by this time in engineering grad school. Unlike many attorneys, I was not one of those who had always wanted to be a lawyer. In fact it never occurred to me until my girlfriend suggested it over dinner, when I was wondering what degree I could pursue next, so as to avoid having to enter the workforce. At the time I thought one had to have a pre-law degree and many prerequisite courses that engineers would lack; and I feared law school would be difficult. I remember my girlfriend’s chemical engineer father laughing out loud at my concern that law school might be more difficult than engineering. In retrospect, I can say that law school is not easy, it is a lot of work—but it is not that conceptually difficult. Lots of morons graduate from law school.

上世纪 80 年代末，我开始在路易斯安那州立大学的学生报刊《笛声日报》上发表专栏文章，明确提出自由意志主义的观点。随着我对政治和哲学的兴趣越来越浓厚，我的女朋友（后来的妻子）和朋友们劝我考虑读法学院。当时我正在读工程学研究生。与许多律师不同，我并不是那种一直想成为律师的人。事实上，我从未想过要成为一名律师，直到我的女朋友在晚餐时建议我这样做，当时我正在想我下一步可以攻读什么学位，以避免进入职场。当时，我认为一个人必须拥有法学预科学位和许多工程师缺乏的先修课程；我担心法学院会很难。我还记得，我女朋友的化学工程师父亲听到我担心法学院可能比工程学院更难，笑得前仰后合。现如今回想起来，我可以说法学院并不容易，需要付出很多努力，但在概念上掌握却并不难。法学院毕业的蠢货比比皆是。

By 1988 I was in law school and becoming a more well-rounded libertarian, having read by this time Rothbard, Mises, Bastiat, the Tannehills, and a non-trivial portion of the books offered in the LaissezFaire Books catalog. In that year there were two significant events in my life, from a libertarian perspective. One was Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s controversial and provocative article in Liberty, “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic.”6 In this article Hoppe sets forth his “argumentation ethics,” which holds that the libertarian private property ethic is implied in the very activity of argumentation— because those engaged in argumentation already presuppose the value of conflict-avoidance and the ability to control property and thus, those arguing in favor of socialism contradict themselves.

1988 年，我进入法学院学习，成为了一名更加全面的自由意志主义者，此时我已经阅读了罗斯巴德、米塞斯、巴斯夏、坦内希尔夫妇的著作，以及自由放任主义图书目录中的大部分书籍。那一年，从自由意志主义的角度来看，我的生活中发生了两件大事。一是汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）在《自由》（Liberty）杂志上发表了一篇颇具争议和挑衅性的文章——《私产伦理的终极证成》（The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic）[20]。霍普在这篇文章中提出了他的 “论证伦理学”（argumentation ethics），认为自由意志主义的私有财产伦理隐含在论证活动中——因为参与论证的人已经预先假定了避免冲突的价值和控制财产的能力，因此，那些支持社会主义的论证者自相矛盾。

The second thing was that I encountered the legal principle of “estoppel” in my contracts class. This is the ubiquitous legal principle that precludes someone from asserting a legal claim or position that is inconsistent with earlier statements or behavior. I remember sitting in contracts class, as Professor Morris lectured on this topic, thinking “Eureka!” to myself, as I began to see that the concept of estoppel meshed perfectly with libertarian logic (and also with Hoppe’s argumentation ethics). The libertarian non-aggression principle holds that force may only be used in response to (initiated) force. There is a nice symmetry here. One may use force, if and only if it is in response to initiated force (aggression).7

第二件事是，我在课上遇到了 “禁止反言 “的法律原则。这是一项无处不在的法律原则，它禁止某人提出与先前陈述或行为不一致的法律主张或立场。我记得坐在课上，莫里斯教授讲到这个话题时，我心里想 “我找到了！”，因为我开始发现禁止反言的概念与自由意志主义逻辑（也与霍普的论证伦理学）完美契合。我记得坐在课上，莫里斯教授讲到这个话题时，我心里想 “我找到了！”，因为我开始发现禁止反言的概念与自由意志主义逻辑（也与霍普的论证伦理学）完美契合。自由意志主义的 “互不侵犯原则 “认为，武力只能作为对（主动发起的）武力的回应。这里有一个很好的对称性。一个人可以使用武力，当且仅当它是对发起的武力(侵犯)的回应。[21]

I saw in class that day that the principle of estoppel could help explain and justify the non-aggression rule. Force was justified against an aggressor, because having used force himself he would be estopped from objecting to retaliation. For him to assert that force is wrong— which he must do in order to object to retaliation—would contradict the “force is permissible” maxim underlying his own act of aggression. He is “estopped” from asserting a claim inconsistent with that underlying his earlier behavior.

那天我在课堂上看到，禁止反言原则可以帮助解释和证明互不侵犯原则。对侵害者使用武力是正当的，因为他自己先使用了武力，就不得反对报复。如果他声称武力是错误的——为了反对报复，他必须这样做——将与他自己侵犯行为所依据的“武力是允许的”格言相矛盾。他被 “禁止 “提出与他先前行为所依据的原则不一致的主张。

My estoppel theory complements and draws on Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. For years I believed that I first came up with my estoppel theory and then read Hoppe’s work and linked the two together. Now I am not so sure and think that I first read and absorbed Hoppe’s argumentation ethic, which made me fixate on the similar logic of estoppel when I coincidentally studied it in law school shortly thereafter.

我的禁止反言理论补充并借鉴了霍普的论证伦理学。多年来，我一直认为我首先提出了禁止反言理论，然后阅读了霍普的著作，并将两者联系在一起。现在我不那么肯定了，我认为是我首先阅读并吸收了霍普的论证伦理学，这使我在不久之后碰巧在法学院学习禁止反言理论时，对类似的逻辑产生了兴趣。

I was at King’s College London in 1991, pursuing a master’s degree in law, when I produced the first draft of a paper arguing estoppel can help justify libertarian rights. Somewhat naïvely, I submitted it to King’s College Law School’s law review, whereupon it was summarily rejected. Not daunted, I submitted an improved draft to Tibor Machan for his journal Reason Papers. I had read many of Machan’s works, including his Human Rights and Human Liberties8 and Individuals and Their Rights,9 and he had been kind enough to respond to several of my letters. I remember speaking with him one night, about the submission, from a students’ pay telephone at King’s College in London, and then getting drinks at a pub with friends, none of them knowing or able to appreciate that I had just spoken with a “famous” libertarian writer whose books I had read. “Estoppel: A New Justification for Individual Rights” was published in the Fall 1992 issue of Reason Papers.10

1991 年，我在伦敦国王学院(King’s College London)攻读法学硕士学位，当时我写了一篇论文的初稿，论证禁止反言可以帮助证明自由意志主义权利的正当性。我有些天真地将它提交给了国王学院法学院的法律评论，结果被立即驳回。我并不气馁，又向蒂博尔·马钱（Tibor Machan）提交了一份改进稿，供他在《理性论文》（Reason Papers）杂志上发表。我读过马钱的许多作品，包括他的《人权与人类自由》[22] 和《个人及其权利》[23] ，他也很友好地回复了我的几封信。我记得有一天晚上，我在伦敦国王学院的学生付费电话上和他谈起了这篇论文，然后和朋友们去酒吧喝酒，他们都不知道也无法理解我刚刚和一位 “著名 “的自由意志主义作家谈过话，而我读过他的书。《禁止反言：个人权利的新理由》发表于《理性论文》1992 年秋季号。[24]

Another shift in my libertarian life occurred in 1994, when I first met Lew Rockwell, Hans Hoppe, and Murray Rothbard. But let me back up. After finally completing my nine years of higher education, I had to earn a living. So in 1992 I started practicing law in Houston. When Hoppe’s second English-language book, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, came out in 1993,11 I decided to do a review essay for a law review; the review was published in 1994 in the St. Mary’s Law Journal.12 I promptly sent it to Hoppe, who sent back a warm thank you note.

我的自由意志主义人生的另一次转变发生在 1994 年，那时我第一次见到了卢-罗克韦尔、汉斯-霍普和默里-罗斯巴德。不过，让我回头细说。在终于完成了九年的高等教育之后，我必须谋生。于是在1992年，我开始在休斯顿从事法律工作。1993 年，霍普的第二本英文著作《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》问世，[25] 我决定为法律评论撰写一篇评论文章；这篇评论于 1994 年发表在《圣玛丽法律杂志》上。[26]我立即把它寄给了霍普，他给我回了一封热情洋溢的感谢信。

By mid-1994 I had moved to Philadelphia (I was there for three years, until I returned to Houston in 1997, where I reside today), and resolved to attend the John Randolph Club meeting in October 1994, near Washington, D.C., which was a gathering of paleoconservatives from the Chronicles crowd and several libertarians associated with the Mises Institute, part of a short-lived attempt at yet another libertarian-conservative “fusionism.”13 My primary goal was to meet Hoppe, Rothbard, and Rockwell. I was thrilled to meet them and other scholars associated with the Mises Institute, and was able to get Murray to autograph my copy of Man, Economy, and State,14 which he inscribed “To Stephan: For Man & Economy, and against the state –Best regards, Murray Rothbard.” Well, I know the nicer one-volume edition is out now, but just try to get me to part with my musty, tattered two-volume copy. Rothbard unfortunately passed away on January 1995, just two months later, but I was happy that I was able to meet him.

到 1994 年年中，我搬到了费城（我在那里待了三年，直到 1997 年回到休斯顿，现在我居住在那里），并决心参加 1994 年 10 月在华盛顿特区附近举行的约翰-伦道夫俱乐部会议，这是一个聚集了《编年史》的旧保守主义者和几位与米塞斯研究院有联系的自由意志主义者的会议，是又一次自由意志主义与保守主义 “融合主义 “的短暂尝试的一部分。[27]我的首要目标是见到霍普、罗斯巴德和罗克韦尔。见到他们和其他与米塞斯研究院有关的学者让我激动不已，我还得到了默里在我那本《人、经济与国家》[28] 上的亲笔签名，他在上面题词：”致斯蒂芬：支持人与经济，反对国家——最诚挚的问候，默里-罗斯巴德”。我知道现在已经出了更好的单行本，但你尽管试试让我扔掉我那本发霉、破烂的两卷本。两个月后，罗斯巴德不幸于 1995 年 1 月去世，但我很高兴能够见过他。

Since then I have attended many Mises Institute conferences, including every one of the annual Austrian Scholars Conferences, initiated, if I am not mistaken, in 1995. Over the years I gained more appreciation for Mises and Austrian economics, and for the unparalleled scope of Rothbard’s scholarly contributions to economics and political philosophy, and related fields. I am now not only an anarcho-libertarian, but a Misesian-Austrian. I have gained an increasingly deeper respect for Lew Rockwell and the singular achievement that is the Mises Institute. It has become my intellectual home.

从那时起，我参加了米塞斯研究院的许多会议，包括每一届的奥地利学者年会，如果我没记错的话，会议是从1995 年开始的。多年来，我对米塞斯和奥地利经济学有了更多的领悟，对罗斯巴德在经济学和政治哲学以及相关领域无与伦比的学术贡献也有了更多的体会。我现在不仅是一个无政府自由意志主义者，还是一个米塞斯主义的奥派。我对卢-罗克韦尔和米塞斯研究院的独特成就越来越深怀敬意。米塞斯研究院已成为我的思想家园。

What Libertarianism Is

第二章何为自由意志主义

Originally published in Property, Freedom, and Society: Essays in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Guido Hülsmann & Stephan Kinsella, eds.,

Mises Institute, 2009). The original author’s note thanked “fellow Hoppe aficionados Juan Fernando Carpio, Paul Edwards, Gil Guillory,

Manuel Lora, and Patrick Tinsley for helpful comments.”

最初发表于《财产、自由与社会:纪念汉斯-赫尔曼霍普的论文集》(Guido hlsmann & Stephan Kinsella主编，米塞斯研究院，2009)。原作者在注释中感谢了 “霍普的同道胡安·费尔南多·卡皮奥、保罗·爱德华兹、吉尔·吉洛里、曼努埃尔·劳拉和帕特里克·廷斯利的宝贵意见。”

PROPERTY, RIGHTS, AND LIBERTY

财产，权利与自由

Libertarians tend to agree on a wide array of policies and principles. Nonetheless it is not easy to find consensus on what libertarianism’s defining characteristic is, or on what distinguishes it from other political theories and systems.

自由意志主义者倾向于就一系列广泛的政策和原则达成一致。尽管如此，要就自由意志主义的决定性特征是什么，或就其与其他政治理论和制度的区别是什么达成共识并不容易。

Various formulations abound. It is said that libertarianism is about: individual rights; property rights;1 the free market; capitalism; justice;the nonaggression principle. Not all these will do, however. Capitalism and the free market describe the catallactic conditions that arise or are permitted in a libertarian society, but do not encompass other aspects of libertarianism. And individual rights, justice, and aggression collapse into property rights. As Murray Rothbard explained, individual rights are property rights.2 And justice is just giving someone his due—which, again, depends on what his rights are.3

各种说法层出不穷。有人说，自由意志主义者就是要：个人权利；财产权利；[29]自由市场；资本主义；正义；互不侵犯原则。但并非所有这些都适用。资本主义和自由市场描述了自由意志主义者社会中产生或允许的催化条件，但并不包括自由意志主义者的其他方面。而个人权利、正义和侵犯则归结为财产权。正如默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）所解释的，个人权利就是财产权。[30]而正义只是给予某人应有的权利——这同样取决于他的权利是什么。[31]

The nonaggression principle is also dependent on property rights, since whataggression is depends on what our (property) rights are. If you hit me, it is aggression because I have a property right in my body. If I take from you the apple you possess, this is trespass, aggression, only because you own the apple. One cannot identify an act of aggression without implicitly assigning a corresponding property right to the victim.4

互不侵犯原则也取决于财产权，因为什么是侵犯取决于我们的（财产）权利是什么。如果你打我，这就是侵犯，因为我对我的身体拥有财产权。如果我从你那里拿走了你拥有的苹果，这是非法侵入，是侵犯，正是因为你拥有苹果。如果不隐含地赋予受害者相应的财产权，我们就无法确认侵犯行为。[32]

So, as descriptive terms for our political philosophy, capitalism and the free market are too narrow, and justice, individual rights, and aggression all boil down to, or are defined in terms of, property rights. What of property rights, then? Is this what differentiates libertarianism from other political philosophies—that we favor property rights, and all others do not? Surely such a claim is untenable. After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource— what I often refer to now as conflictable resources.5 Property rights specify which persons own—have the right to control—various scarce resources in a given region or jurisdiction. Yet everyone and every political theory advances some theory of property. None of the various forms of socialism deny property rights; each socialism will specify an owner for every scarce resource.6 If the state nationalizes an industry, it is asserting ownership of these means of production. If the state taxes you, it is implicitly asserting ownership of the funds taken. If my land is transferred to a owner of the money.7 If the state conscripts someone, or imprisons them as the penalty for refusing to serve in the military, or for failure to pay taxes, or for using illegal narcotics, then the state is claiming legal ownership of the person’s body.

因此，作为我们政治哲学的描述性术语，资本主义和自由市场过于狭隘，正义、个人权利和侵犯都归结为财产权，或者说都是用财产权来定义的。那么，财产权又是什么呢？难道这就是自由意志主义与其他政治哲学的区别——我们赞成财产权，而其他所有哲学都不赞成？很显然，这种说法是站不住脚的。毕竟，财产权只是控制稀缺资源——我现在常说的冲突性资源——的排他性权利。[33]财产权规定了哪些人拥有——有权控制——特定地区或管辖范围内的各种稀缺资源。然而，每个人和每种政治理论都提出了某种财产理论。各种形式的社会主都不否认财产权；每种社会主义都会为每种稀缺资源指定一个所有者。[34]如果国家将某个行业国有化，就意味着国家对这些生产资料拥有所有权。如果国家向你征税，就意味着国家对所征收的资金拥有所有权。如果我的土地被转让给了资金的所有者。[35]如果国家征召某人入伍，或将其监禁，作为对其拒绝服兵役、未纳税或使用非法毒品的惩罚，那么国家就声称对该人的身体拥有合法所有权。

Protection of and respect for property rights is thus not unique to libertarianism. Every legal system defines and enforces some property rights system. What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules—its view as to who is the owner of each contestable, conflictable resource, and how to determine this.

因此，保护和尊重财产权并非自由意志主义所独有。每个法律体系都定义并执行某种财产权制度。自由意志主义的独特之处在于其特定的财产分配规则——它认可谁是每种可争夺、冲突性资源的所有者，以及如何确定这一点。

自由意志主义的财产权LIBERTARIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS

A system of property rights assigns a particular owner to every scarce (conflictable) resource.8 These resources obviously include natural resources such as land, fruits of trees, and so on. Objects found in nature are not the only scarce resources, however. Each human actor has, controls, and is identified and associated with a unique human body, which is also a scarce resource.9 Both human bodies and non-human scarce resources are desired for use as means by actors in the pursuit of various goals.10

财产权制度为每一种稀缺（冲突性）资源指定了一个特定的所有者。[36]这些资源显然包括土地、树木果实等自然资源。然而，自然资源并不是唯一的稀缺资源。每个行动人都拥有、控制、识别并与一个独特的人体相关联，这也是一种稀缺资源。[37]无论是人的身体还是非人的稀缺资源，都是行动人追求各种目标的手段。[38]

Accordingly, any political or legal system must assign ownership rights in human bodies as well as in external things.

因此，任何政治或法律制度都必须赋予人的身体以及外部事物以所有权。

The libertarian view is that individual rights—property rights—are assigned according to a few simple principles: self-ownership, in the case of human bodies; and, in the case of previously-unowned external things (conflictable resources), in accordance with principles of original appropriation, contractual title transfer, and rectification.11 Let us discuss these in turn in the following sections. Note that in this chapter I aim mostly to describe libertarian principles, not necessarily to justify them; subsequent chapters provide further arguments in support of these principles.

自由意志主义认为，个人权利——财产权——是根据几条简单的原则分配的：就人的身体而言，是自我所有权；就先前无主的外部事物（冲突性资源）而言，按照先占、的所有权转让和纠正的原则分配的。[39] 下面我们将依次讨论这些问题。请注意，在本章中，我的主要目的是描述自由意志主义的原则，而不一定要证明这些原则的合理性；随后的章节将提供支持这些原则的进一步论证。

身体财产PROPERTY IN BODIES

Let us consider first the libertarian property assignment rules with respect to human bodies, and the corresponding notion of aggression as it pertains to bodies.12

让我们先来看看自由意志主义关于人体的财产分配规则，以及与人体有关的相应的侵犯概念[40]。

Libertarians often refer to the non-aggression principle, or NAP, as their prime value. As Ayn Rand said, “So long as men desire to live together, no man may initiate—do you hear me? No man may start— the use of physical force against others.”13 Or, as Rothbard put it:

The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.14

自由意志主义者常常把互不侵犯原则（或 NAP）作为他们的首要价值观。正如安-兰德（Ayn Rand）所说：”只要人们渴望共同生活，任何人都不得主动-——你听到了吗？任何人不得对他人使用武力”[41] 或者，正如罗斯巴德所说：

自由意志主义的信条建立在一个核心公理之上：任何个人或群体都不得侵犯他人的人身与财产。这可以被称为 “互不侵犯公理”。”侵犯 “的定义是对他人的人身或财产使用或威胁使用有形的武力。因此，”侵犯 “与 “入侵 “同义。[42]

In other words, libertarians maintain that the only way to violate rights is by initiating force—that is, by committing aggression. (Libertarianism also holds that, while the initiation of force against another person’s body is impermissible, force used in response to aggression—such as defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory/punitive force—is justified.15) Now in the case of the body, it is clear what aggression is: invading the borders of someone’s body, commonly called battery, or, more generally, using the body of another without his or her consent.16 The very notion of interpersonal aggression presupposes property rights in bodies—more particularly, that each person is, at least prima facie, the owner of his own body.17

换句话说，自由意志主义主张，侵犯权利的唯一方式是使用武力，即实施侵犯。(自由意志主义还认为，虽然对他人身体使用武力是不允许的，但为应对侵犯而使用的武力——如防御性、恢复性或报复性/惩罚性武力——是正当的[43]）。现在，就身体而言，什么是侵犯是很清楚的：侵入他人身体的边界，通常称为殴打，或更一般地说，未经他人同意使用其身体。 [44]人与人之间的侵犯这一概念本身就预设了对身体的财产权——更具体地说，每个人至少在表面上都是自己身体的所有者。[45]

Non-libertarian political philosophies have a different view. In these systems, each person has some limited rights in his own body, but not complete or exclusive rights. Society or the state, purporting to be society’s agent, has certain rights in each citizen’s body, too. This partial slavery is implicit in state actions and laws such as taxation, conscription, and drug prohibitions.18 The libertarian says that each person is the full owner of his body: he has the right to control his body, to decide whether or not he ingests narcotics, joins an army, pays taxes, and so on. Those various non-libertarians who endorse any such state prohibitions, however, necessarily maintain that the state, or society, is at least a partial owner of the body of those subject to such laws—or even a complete owner in the case of conscriptees or non-aggressor “criminals” incarcerated for life or executed. Libertarians believe in self-ownership. Non-libertarians—statists—of all stripes advocate some form of slavery.19

非自由意志主义政治哲学有不同的观点。在这些体系中，每个人对自己的身体都有一些有限的权利，但不是完全或排他性的权利。社会或国家自称是社会的代理人，对每个公民的身体也拥有某些权利。这种部分奴役隐含在税收、征兵和毒品禁令等国家行为和法律中。[46]自由意志主义者说，每个人都是其身体的完全所有者：他有权控制自己的身体，有权决定是否吸食毒品、参军、纳税等等。然而，那些赞同任何此类国家禁令的各种非自由意志主义人士必然认为，国家或社会至少是那些受此类法律约束的人的身体的部分所有者——如果是被终身监禁或被处决的被征召者或非侵犯性 “罪犯”，甚至是完全的所有者。自由意志主义者信奉自我所有权。非自由意志主义——各形各色的国家主义者——则主张某种形式的奴隶制。[47]

自我所有和避免冲突SELF-OWNERSHIP AND CONFLICT AVOIDANCE

Without property rights, there is always the possibility of conflict over contestable resources. By assigning an owner to each resource, legal systems make possible conflict-free use of resources by establishing public, visible boundaries that non-owners can avoid. Libertarianism does not endorse just any property assignment rule, however.20 It favors self-ownership over other-ownership (slavery).21

如果没有财产权，在可争夺的资源问题上就始终可能存在冲突性。通过为每种资源指定一个所有者，法律制度建立了非所有者可以回避的公开、可见的边界，从而使资源的使用不存在冲突性。然而，自由意志主义并不认可任何一种财产分配规则。[48] 自由意志主义倾向于自我所有权，而非他人所有权（奴隶制）。[49]

The libertarian seeks property assignment rules because he values or accepts various grundnorms such as justice, peace, prosperity, cooperation, conflict-avoidance, civilization.22 The libertarian view is that self-ownership is the only property assignment rule compatible with these grundnorms; it is implied by them. As Professor Hoppe has shown, the assignment of ownership to a given resource must not be random, arbitrary, particularistic, or biased if it is to actually be a property norm that can serve the function of conflict-avoidance.23 Property title has to be assigned to one of competing claimants based on “the existence of an objective, intersubjectively ascertainable link between owner and the” resource claimed.24 In the case of one’s own body, it is the unique relationship between a person and his body—his direct and immediate control over his body, and the fact that, at least in some sense, a body is a given person and vice versa—hat constitutes the objective link sufficient to give that person a claim to his body superior to typical third party claimants.

自由意志主义追求财产分配规则，因为他重视或接受各种基本准则，如正义、和平、繁荣、合作、避免冲突、文明。[50]自由意志主义认为，自我所有权是与这些基本规范相容的唯一财产分配规则；它隐含在这些基本规范之中。正如霍普教授所表明的，如果要真正成为一种能够起到避免冲突作用的财产规范，对特定资源的所有权分配就不能是随机的、任意的、特殊的或有偏见的。[51]财产所有权必须在 “所有权人与所主张的资源之间存在客观的、主体间可确定的联系 “的基础上分配给相互竞争的权利主张人之一。[52]就一个人自己的身体而言，一个人与其身体之间的独特关系——他对自己身体的直接和即时的控制，以及至少在某种意义上，一个身体是一个给定的人，反之亦然——这一事实构成了客观联系，足以使这个人对其身体的权利主张优于典型的第三方权利主张人。

此外，任何声称拥有他人身体的局外人都不能否认这种客观联系及其特殊地位，因为局外人在自己的案例中也必然预设了这一点。之所以如此，是因为在寻求对他人的支配权、主张对他人身体的所有权时，他必须预设自己对自己身体的所有权，这表明他确实赋予这种联系以某种意义，与此同时他却忽视了他人与其身体联系的意义。[53]

Libertarianism realizes that only the self-ownership rule is universalizable and compatible with the goals of peace, cooperation, and conflict avoidance. We recognize that each person is prima facie the owner of his own body because, by virtue of his unique link to and connection with his own body—his direct and immediate control over it—he has a better claim to it than anyone else.

自由意志主义认识到，只有自我所有权规则才是普遍适用的，并且与和平、合作和避免冲突的目标相一致。我们认识到每个人表面上都是自己身体的所有者，因为凭借他与自己身体独特的联系和关联——他对其直接和即时的控制——他比其他任何人都更有资格拥有它。

关于外部事物的财产权PROPERTY IN EXTERNAL THINGS

Libertarians apply similar reasoning in the case of other scarce resources—namely, external objects in the world that, unlike bodies, were at one point unowned. In the case of bodies, the idea of aggression being impermissible immediately implies self-ownership. In the case of external objects, however, we must identify who the owner is before we can determine what constitutes aggression.

自由意志主义对其他稀缺资源——即世界上的外部物体——也采用了类似的推理方法，这些物体与身体不同，曾一度无主。就身体而言，不允许侵犯的概念直接蕴含了自我所有权。然而，就外部物体而言，我们必须先确定谁是所有者，然后才能确定什么构成了侵犯。

As in the case with bodies, humans need to be able to use external objects as means to achieve various ends. Because these things are scarce, there is also the potential for conflict. And as in the case with bodies, libertarians favor assigning property rights so as to permit the peaceful, conflict-free, productive use of such resources. As in the case with bodies, then, property is assigned to the person with the best claim or link to a given scarce resource—with the “best claim” standard based on the goals of permitting peaceful, conflict-free human interaction and use of resources.

就像利用身体一样，人类需要能够利用外部物品作为手段来达到各种目的。因为这些东西是稀缺的，所以也存在潜在的冲突。与对待身体的情况一样，自由意志主义主张分配财产权，以便和平、无冲突、有效地使用这些资源。因此，与身体的情况一样，财产被分配给对某一稀缺资源拥有最佳权利主张或联系的人——”最佳权利主张 “的标准是基于允许和平、无冲突的人类互动和使用资源的目标。

Unlike human bodies, however, external objects are not parts of one’s identity, are not directly controlled by one’s will—and, significantly, they are initially unowned.26 Here, the libertarian realizes that the relevant objective link is original appropriation—the transformation or embordering of a previously unowned resource, Lockean homesteading, the first use or possession of the thing.27 Under this approach, the first(prior) user of a previously unowned thing has a prima facie better claim than a second (later) claimant solely by virtue of his being earlier.

然而，与人的身体不同，外部物体不是个人身份的一部分，不受个人意志的直接控制——更重要的是，他们最初是无主的。[54]在这里，自由意志主义意识到，相关的客观联系是原始占有——对先前无主资源的改造或嵌入，洛克式的拓殖，对事物的首次使用或占有。[55]根据这种方法，对于一个先前的无主之物，第一个（在前的）使用者仅凭借其更早的使用时间，就比第二个（在后的）权利主张者拥有表面上更合理的权利主张。

Why is appropriation the relevant link for determination of ownership? First, keep in mind that the question with respect to such scarce resources is: who is the resource’s owner? Recall that ownership is the right to control, use, or possess,28 while possession is actual control—“the factual authority that a person exercises over a corporeal thing.”29 The question is not who has physical possession; it is who has ownership. Thus, asking who is the owner of a resource presupposes a distinction between ownership and possession—between the right to control (or exclude) (ownership, or property rights), and actual control (possession; economic dominion). And the answer has to take into account the nature of previously-unowned things: to wit, that they must at some point become owned by a first owner.

为什么占有是确定所有权的相关环节？首先，请记住，对于这种稀缺资源，问题是：谁是资源的所有者？回想一下，所有权是控制、使用或占有的权利，[56] 而占有则是实际控制——”一个人对有形物行使的实际权利”。[57]问题不在于谁物理占有，而在于谁拥有所有权。因此，要问谁是资源的所有者，前提是要区分所有权和占有权——区分控制权（或排除权）（所有权或财产权）和实际控制权（占有权；经济支配权）。答案必须考虑到先前无主物的性质：那就是说，它们必须在某个时刻被第一所有者拥有。

The answer must also take into account the presupposed goals of those seeking this answer: rules that permit conflict-free use of resources. For this reason, the answer cannot be whoever has the resource or whoever is able to take it is its owner. To hold such a view is to adopt a might makes right system where ownership collapses into possession for want of a distinction.30 Such a “system,” far from avoiding conflict, makes conflict inevitable.31

答案还必须考虑到寻求这一答案的人的预设目标：允许无冲突使用资源的规则。由于这个原因，答案不能是谁拥有资源或谁能够获取资源，谁就是资源的所有者。持这种观点就是采用了一种强权即公理的制度，在这种制度下，由于缺乏区别，所有权就沦为了占有权。 [58] 这种 “制度 “非但不能避免冲突，反而使冲突不可避免。[59]

Instead of a might-makes-right approach, from the insights noted above it is obvious that ownership presupposes the prior-later distinction: whoever any given system specifies as the owner of a resource has a better claim than latecomers.32 If he does not, then he is not an owner, but merely the current user or possessor, in a might-makes-right world in which there is no such thing as ownership—which contradicts the presuppositions of the inquiry itself. If the first owner does not have a better claim than latecomers, then he is not an owner, but merely a possessor, and there is no such thing as ownership. More generally, latecomers’ claims are inferior to those of prior possessors or claimants, who either homesteaded the resource or who can trace their title back to the homesteader or earlier owner.33 The crucial importance of the prior-later distinction to libertarian theory is why Professor Hoppe repeatedly emphasizes it in his writing.34

与 “强权即公理 “的方法不同，从上述见解中可以明显看出，所有权的前提是先后有别：任何特定方式赋予谁是资源的所有者，谁就比后来者拥有更合理的权利要求。[60]如果他不这样做，那么他就不是所有者，而只是当前的使用者或占有者，在这个强权即公理的世界里，根本不存在所谓的所有权——这与探究本身的预设相矛盾。如果第一位所有者没有比后来者更合理的权利主张，那么他就不是所有者，而仅仅是一个占有者，也就不存在所谓的所有权。更一般地说，后来者的权利主张不如先前的占有者或权利主张者，先来者要么是拓殖了该资源，要么其权利可以追溯到拓殖者或先前的所有者。[61]先来-后到的区别对于自由意志主义理论至关重要，这也是霍普教授在其著作中反复强调这一区别的原因。[62]

Thus, the libertarian position on property rights is that, in order to permit conflict-free, productive use of scarce resources, property titles to particular resources are assigned to particular owners. As noted above, however, the title assignment must not be random, arbitrary, or particularistic; instead, it has to be assigned based on “the existence of an objective, intersubjectively ascertainable link between owner and the” resource claimed.35 As can be seen from the considerations presented above, the link is the physical transformation or embordering of the original homesteader, or a chain of title traceable by contract back to him.36

因此，自由意志主义在财产权问题上的立场是，为了允许稀缺资源的无冲突、生产性使用，特定资源的财产权被分配给特定的所有者。然而，如上所述，财产权分配不能是随机的、任意的或特定的；相反，财产权分配必须基于 “所有者与所要求的资源之间存在客观的、主体间可确定的联系”。[63]从上述考量中可以看出，这种联系是原始拓殖者的物理转变或嵌入，或通过可追溯他的所有权链。[64]

As Hoppe summarizes self-ownership rights and property rights in external resources based in original appropriation and contractual title transfer:

But who owns what scarce resource as his private property and who does not? First: Each person owns his physical body that only he and no one else controls directly (I can control your body only indirectly, by first directly controlling my body, and vice versa) and that only he directly controls also in particular when discussing and arguing the question at hand. Otherwise, if body-ownership were assigned to some indirect body-controller, conflict would become unavoidable as the direct body-controller cannot give up his direct control over his body as long as he is alive; and in particular, otherwise it would be impossible that any two persons, as the contenders in any property dispute, could ever argue and debate the question whose will is to prevail, since arguing and debating presupposes that both, the proponent and the opponent, have exclusive control over their respective bodies and so come to the correct judgment on their own, without a fight (in a conflict-free form of interaction).

霍普总结了基于先占和的所有权转让的外部资源的自我所有权和财产权:

但是，谁拥有什么稀缺资源作为他的私有财产，谁不拥有呢?首先：每个人都拥有自己的身体，只有他自己而不是其他人可以直接控制（我只能通过直接控制我的身体来间接控制你的身体，反之亦然），只有他自己可以直接控制身体，尤其是在讨论和争论当前问题时。否则，如果将身体所有权分配给某个间接的身体控制者，冲突将不可避免，因为直接的身体控制者只要还活着，就不能放弃对自己身体的直接控制；特别是，否则，作为任何财产纠纷中的争论者，任何两个人都不可能就谁的意志占上风的问题进行争论和辩论，因为争论和辩论的前提是，正反双方都对各自的身体拥有排他性地控制权，因此勿需争斗（在无冲突的互动形式中）而自行得出正确的判断。

And second, as for scarce resources that can be controlled only indirectly (that must be appropriated with our own nature-given, i.e., un-appropriated, body): Exclusive control (property) is acquired by and assigned to that person, who appropriated the resource in question first or who acquired it through voluntary (conflict-free) exchange from its previous owner. For only the first appropriator of a resource (and all later owners connected to him through a chain of voluntary exchanges) can possibly acquire and gain control over it without conflict, i.e., peacefully. Otherwise, if exclusive control is assigned instead to latecomers, conflict is not avoided but contrary to the very purpose of norms made unavoidable and permanent.37

其次，对于只能间接控制的稀缺资源（必须用我们本人自然赋予的、即未被他人占用的身体来占有）：排他性地控制权（财产）由首先占有该资源的人或通过自愿（无冲突）交换从其前所有者那里获得该资源的人获得并分配给他。因为只有资源的第一个占有者（以及所有后来通过自愿交换链与他联系在一起的所有者）才有可能在没有冲突的情况下（即和平地）获得并取得对资源的控制权。否则，如果将排他性地控制权分配给后来者，冲突不可避免，这与规范永久性避免冲突的目的背道而驰。[65]

一致性和原则CONSISTENCY AND PRINCIPLE

Not only libertarians are civilized. Most people give some weight to some of the above considerations. In their eyes, a person is the owner of his own body—usually. A homesteader owns the resource he appropriates—unless the state takes it from him “by operation of law.”38 This is the principal distinction between libertarians and non-libertarians: libertarians are consistently opposed to aggression, defined in terms of invasion of property borders, where property rights are understood to be assigned on the basis of self-ownership, in the case of bodies, and on the basis of prior possession or homesteading and contractual transfer of title, in the case of other things (plus transfers for purposes of rectification).

并非只有自由意志主义者才是文明人。大多数人都会对上述一些考虑因素给予一定的重视。在他们眼中，一个人通常是自己身体的主人。一个拓殖者拥有他占有的资源——除非国家 “通过法律运作 “从他手中夺走。[66]这是自由意志主义者与非自由意志主义者之间的主要区别：自由意志主义者一贯反对侵犯，这种侵犯被定义为侵犯财产边界，在这种情况下，如果是身体，财产权被理解为在自我所有权的基础上分配；如果是其他物，财产权被理解为在先前占有或拓殖以及转让所有权的基础上分配（加上为纠正目的而进行的转让）。

This framework for rights is motivated by the libertarian’s consistent and principled valuing of peaceful interaction and cooperation— in short, of civilized behavior. A parallel to the Misesian view of human action may be illuminating here. According to Mises, human action is aimed at alleviating some felt uneasiness.39 Thus, means are employed, according to the actor’s understanding of causal laws, to achieve various ends—ultimately, the removal of some felt uneasiness.

这一权利框架是自由意志主义对和平互动与合作——简言之，对文明行为——的一贯和原则性重视所激发的。与米塞斯关于人的行动的观点相似的观点可能会对我们有所启发。根据米塞斯的观点，人的行动的目的是减轻某种不安逸。[67]39 因此，根据行动人对因果规律的理解，采用各种手段来实现各种目的——最终是消除某种不安逸。

Civilized man feels uneasy at the prospect of violent struggles with others. On the one hand, he wants, for some practical reason, to control a given scarce resource and to use violence against another person, if necessary, to achieve this control. On the other hand, he also wants to avoid a wrongful use of force. Civilized man, for some reason, feels reluctance, uneasiness, at the prospect of violent interaction with his fellow man. Perhaps he has reluctance to violently clash with others over certain objects because he has empathy with them.40 Perhaps the instinct to cooperate is a result of social evolution. As Mises noted,

There are people whose only aim is to improve the condition of their own ego. There are other people with whom awareness of the troubles of their fellow men causes as much uneasiness as or even more uneasiness than their own wants.[68]41

文明人对与他人武力斗争的前景感到不安。一方面，出于某种实际原因，他希望控制某种特定的稀缺资源，并在必要时对他人使用武力，以达到控制的目的。另一方面，他也希望避免错误地使用武力。出于某种原因，文明人在与同伴发生武力冲突时会感到不情愿和不安逸。也许他不愿与他人就某些物品发生武力冲突，是因为他与他人有同理心[69]。也许合作的本能是社会进化的结果。正如米塞斯所指出的，

有些人的唯一目的就是改善本人的自我状况。还有一些人，他们意识到同胞的困难所带来的不安逸不亚于甚至超过了他们自身的需求。

Whatever the reason, because of this uneasiness, when there is the potential for violent conflict, the civilized man seeks justification for the forceful control of a scarce resource which he desires but which some other person opposes. Empathy—or whatever spurs man to adopt the libertarian grundnorms—gives rise to a certain form of uneasiness, which gives rise to ethical action. Civilized man may be defined as he who seeks justification for the use of interpersonal violence. When the inevitable need to engage in violence arises—for defense of life or property—civilized man seeks justification. Naturally, since this justification-seeking is done by people who are inclined to reason and peace (justification is after all a peaceful activity that necessarily takes place during discourse),42 what they seek are rules that are fair, potentially acceptable to all, grounded in the nature of things, and universalizable, and that permit conflict-free use of resources. Libertarian property rights principles emerge as the only candidate that satisfies these criteria. Thus, if civilized man is he who seeks justification for the use of violence, the libertarian is he who is serious about this endeavor. He has a deep, principled, innate opposition to violence, and an equally deep commitment to peace and cooperation.

无论出于何种原因，由于这种不安逸，当存在武力冲突的可能性时，文明人就会为武力控制稀缺资源寻找理由，他渴望得到这种资源，但其他人却反对。同理心——或者说促使人类采取自由意志主义基本准则的任何东西——引起了某种形式的不安逸，从而导致了伦理行动。文明人可以被定义成为使用人际武力寻找正当理由的人。当不可避免地需要使用武力来保卫生命或财产时，文明人就会寻求正当理由。当然，由于寻求正当理由的人倾向于理性与和平（论证毕竟是一种和平活动，必然发生在对话过程中），[70] 他们所寻求的是公平的、所有人都有可能接受的、基于事物本质的、普遍化的、允许无冲突使用资源的规则。自由意志主义财产权原则是唯一符合这些标准的候选规则。因此，如果说文明人是为使用武力寻找正当理由的人，那么自由意志主义者就是严肃认真对待这一努力的人。他对武力有着深刻的、原则性的、天生的反对，对和平与合作有着同样深刻的承诺。

For the foregoing reasons, libertarianism may be said to be the political philosophy that consistently favors social rules aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, and cooperation.43 It recognizes that the only rules that satisfy the civilized grundnorms are the self-ownership principle and the Lockean homesteading principle, applied as consistently as possible.

基于上述原因，自由意志主义可以说是一种政治哲学，它始终赞成旨在促进和平、繁荣与合作的社会规则。[71] 自由意志主义认识到，唯一能够满足文明基本准则的规则是尽可能一致适用的自我所有权原则和洛克式的拓殖原则。

And as I have argued elsewhere, because the state necessarily commits aggression, the consistent libertarian, in opposing aggression, is also an anarchist.44

正如我在其他地方所论证的那样，由于国家必然实施侵犯，因此一贯反对侵犯的自由意志主义者也是无政府主义者。[72]

附录 I APPENDIX I

“财产”——概念和术语“PROPERTY”—CONCEPT AND TERMINOLOGY

As noted above, the material here was originally intended to appear in footnote 5, above. Due to its length, I include this material in this appendix.

如上所述，此处的材料原本打算放在上文注释 5 中。由于篇幅较长，我将其列入本附录。

”财产“的概念与定义Concept and Definition of “Property”

As Professor Yiannopoulos explains:

Property is a word with high emotional overtones and so many meanings that it has defied attempts at accurate all-inclusive definition. The English word property derives from the Latin proprietas, a noun form of proprius, which means one’s own. In the United States, the word property is frequently used to denote indiscriminately either the objects of rights … or the rights that persons have with respect to things. Thus, lands, automobiles, and jewels are said to be property; and rights, such as ownership, servitudes, and leases, are likewise said to be property. This latent confusion between rights and their objects has its roots in texts of Roman law and is also encountered in other legal systems of the western world. Accurate analysis should reserve the use of the word property for the designation of rights that persons have with respect to things.

正如扬诺普洛斯教授（Professor Yiannopoulos）所解释的那样：

财产是一个带有强烈情感色彩的词，它有如此多的含义，以至于人们无法给它下一个包罗万象的准确定义。英文单词 Property 源自拉丁文 proprietas，是 proprius 的名词形式，意思是自己的。在美国，”财产 “一词经常被用来不加区分地表示权利的客体……或人对物所拥有的权利。因此，土地、汽车和珠宝被说成是财产；而所有权、地役权和租赁权等权利也同样被说成是财产。这种权利与客体之间的潜在混淆源于罗马法的文本，在西方世界的其他法律体系中也会遇到。准确的分析应将财产一词保留用于指定人对物所拥有的权利。

Property may be defined as an exclusive right to control an economic good…; it is the name of a concept that refers to the rights and obligations, privileges and restrictions that govern the relations of man with respect to things of value. People everywhere and at all times desire the possession of things that are necessary for survival or valuable by cultural definition and which, as a result of the demand placed upon them, become scarce. Laws enforced by organized society control the competition for, and guarantee the enjoyment of, these desired things. What is guaranteed to be one’s own is property.…

[Property rights] confer a direct and immediate authority over a thing.45

财产可以被定义为控制某种经济物品的排他性地权利……；它是一个概念的名称，指的是支配人与有价值物品之间关系的权利和义务、特权和限制。无论何时何地，人们都渴望拥有生存所必需或文化定义上有价值的物品，而这些物品由于人们的需求而变得稀缺。有组织的社会所实施的法律控制了对这些所需之物的竞争，并保证了人们对这些所需之物的享有。保证属于自己的东西就是财产……

[财产权]赋予人们对某一事物的直接和即时的权力。[73]

In this book, I endeavor to use the term “property” to refer to rights a person has with respect to a given thing or resource, instead of to the thing itself, but on occasion (partly due to the fact that many of these chapters are over 20 years old and I did not want to rewrite everything completely), I will employ the more colloquial usage where “property” refers to the object or resource or thing owned. It is sometimes necessary to avoid the inconvenience of nonstandard language in order to communicate (just as I use the term “intellectual property” in discussing modern patent and copyright law, even though I dislike the term,46 so that people understand what I’m referring to).

在本书中，我尽量使用 “财产 “一词来指人对某一特定物或资源所拥有的权利，而不是指物本身，但有时（部分原因是这些章节中有许多已超过 20 年，我不想全部重写），我会使用更通俗的用法，即 “财产 “指所拥有的对象或资源或事物。有时为了交流，避免非标准语言带来的不便是必要的(就像我在讨论现代专利和版权法时使用术语“知识产权”一样，尽管我不喜欢这个术语[74] ，这样人们才能明白我指的是什么）。

“物”“Things”

As Yiannopoulos notes:

Accurate definition of the word things is indispensable in view of the fact that only things in the legal sense may be objects of property rights.… In most legal systems, including common law jurisdictions, Louisiana, and legal systems of the French family, the word things applies both to physical objects and incorporeals [intangibles]. In legal systems following the model of the German Civil Code, however, the word things applies only to corporeal objects that are susceptible of appropriation.47

正如扬诺普洛斯所指出的：

鉴于只有法律意义上的物才能成为财产权的客体，对物一词进行准确定义是不可或缺的….，在大多数法律制度中，包括普通法司法管辖区、路易斯安那州和法兰西家族的法律制度，物一词既适用于有形物体，也适用于无形物体[无形资产]。但在以《德国民法典》为范本的法律体系中，“物”一词仅适用于可被占有的有形物体。[75]

Thus, the concept of “thing” in the civil law (res under Roman law; bien (good) and chose (corporeal thing) under French law; Sache under German law) denotes certain objects of rights in the law.

因此，大陆法系中 “物 “的概念（罗马法中的 res；法国法中的 bien（好的）和 chose（有形之物）；德国法中的 Sache）表示法律中的某些权利客体。

Things are also divided into different types, such as common, public, and private; corporeals and incorporeals; and movables and immovables.48 Things are divided into other types, as well, such as things in commerce and out of commerce, consumable and nonconsumable, and so on.49

物也分为不同的类型，如共有的、公共的和私有的；有形和无形；动产和不动产[76]。物还分为其他类型，如财货和非财货，消费品和非消费品，等等[77]。

The civil law concept of things, especially private things, more or less corresponds to the notion of economic goods, or appropriable objects having a pecuniary value, which itself is close to the concept of conflictable (contestable, rivalrous, scarce) resources I use in this book to refer to the types of things that can be the subject of property rights—that can be owned (see the section “Conflictable vs. Scarce,” below). They are things that can be used by acting man as means of action—possessed— and in society, that can be owned (property rights).50

大陆法系中关于物的概念，尤其是关于私人物品的概念，或多或少与经济财货或具有货币价值的可占有物品的概念相对应，而经济物品或具有货币价值的可占有物品本身又与我在本书中使用的可引发冲突的（争议性的、竞争性的、稀缺性的）资源的概念相近，指的是可以成为财产权标的物的类型——可以被拥有（见下文 “冲突性与稀缺性 “一节）。它们是可以被行动人用作行动手段——占有——的物品，在社会中，可以被拥有（财产权）。[78]

作为排他性权利的财产Property as a Right to Exclude

Technically speaking, a property right is not a right to control a resource but a right to exclude others from using the resource. Ironically, this is how patent rights work, although most non-specialists have trouble understanding this; having a patent on an invention does not allow the inventor to make or use it, but only to prevent others from doing so.51 I have explained elsewhere why property rights do not give the owner a right to control or use the resource.52 However, for our purposes in this chapter, this distinction is not particularly germane.

从技术上讲，财产权不是控制资源的权利，而是排除他人使用资源的权利。具有讽刺意味的是，这就是专利权的运作方式，尽管大多数非专业人士很难理解这一点；拥有发明专利并不是允许发明者制造或使用该发明，而只能阻止他人这样做[79]。我曾在其他地方解释过为什么财产权并不赋予所有者控制或使用资源的权利[80]。然而，就本章而言，这种区别并不特别重要。

财产是人与人之间的一种权利Property as a Right between People

Moreover, as noted in “A Libertarian Theory of Contract” (ch. 9), n.1, property rights can be conceived of not as a right between a human actor and an owned object, but rather as a right as between human actors, but with respect to particular (owned) resources.

此外，正如《的自由意志主义理论》（第 9 章）第 1 节所指出的，财产权可以不被视为行动人与所拥有的物体之间的权利，而被视为行动人之间的权利，但却是针对特定（拥有的）资源的权利。

As Judge Alex Kozinski writes:

But what is property? That is not an easy question to answer. I remember sitting in my first-year property course on the first day of class when the professor … asked the fundamental question: What are property rights? … I threw up my hand and without even waiting to be called on I shouted out, “Property rights define the relationship between people and their property.”

正如亚历克斯·科津斯基法官写道：

但什么是财产？这不是一个容易回答的问题。我记得我坐在第一年财产学课程的课堂上，第一天教授……就提出了一个基本问题：财产权是什么？……我举起手，甚至不等教授点名，就大声喊道：”财产权界定了人与财产之间的关系”。

Professor Krier stopped dead in his tracks, spun around, and gave me a long look. Finally he said: “That’s very peculiar, Mr. Kozinski. Have you always had relations with inanimate objects? Most people I know have relations with other people.”

克里尔教授（Professor Krier ）停住脚步，转过身来，看了我很久。最后他说： “这很奇怪，科津斯基先生。你总是和没有生命的物体发生关系吗？我认识的大多数人都和其他人有关系。”

That was certainly not the last time I said something really dumb in class, but the lesson was not lost on me. Property rights are, of course, a species of relationships between people. At the minimum, they define the degree to which individuals may exclude other individuals from the use and enjoyment of their goods and services….53

那当然不是我最后一次在课堂上说蠢话，但我还是吸取了教训。当然，财产权是人与人之间的一种关系。它们至少规定了个人可以在多大程度上排除其他人使用和享有其物品和服务….[81]。

冲突性与稀缺性Conflictable vs. Scarce

As noted elsewhere, in recent years I tend to emphasize the rivalrous or “conflictable” nature of ownable resources to avoid the inevitable equivocation when the term “scarce” is used. When I refer to scarce resources in this book it is to be understood as meaning conflictable resources.54

正如在其他地方提到的，近年来我倾向于强调可占有资源的竞争性或 “冲突性”，以避免在使用 “稀缺 “一词时不可避免的含糊不清。当我在本书中提及稀缺资源时，应将其理解为可引发冲突的资源。[82]

附录 II APPENDIX II

互相占有MUTUALIST OCCUPANCY

As noted above, the material here was originally intended to appear in footnote 31, above. Due to its length, I include this material in this appendix.

如上所述，此处的材料原本打算放在上文注释 31 中。由于篇幅较长，我将其列入本附录。

As pointed out in the text above, any workable and just legal system must distinguish ownership from possession, and must recognize the prior-later distinction. Instead of a might-makes-right approach, the owner of a resource has a better claim than latecomers. If he does not, then he is not an owner, but merely the current user or possessor, in a might-makes-right world in which there is no such thing as ownership. I have observed that this is also the reason the mutualist “occupancy” position on land ownership is unlibertarian and unjust.

正如上文所指出的，任何可行且公正的法律制度都必须区分所有权和占有权，必须承认先来与后到的区别。与 “强权即公理 “的做法不同，资源的所有者比后来者拥有更合理的权利要求。如果他不这样做，那么他就不是所有者，而只是当前的使用者或占有者，在这个”强权即公理 “的世界里，根本不存在所谓的所有权。据我观察，这也是互助主义关于土地所有权的 “占有 “立场不自由、不公正的原因。

Mutualist Kevin Carson writes:

For mutualists, occupancy and use is the only legitimate standard for establishing ownership of land, regardless of how many times it has changed hands. An existing owner may transfer ownership by sale or gift; but the new owner may establish legitimate title to the land only by his own occupancy and use. A change in occupancy will amount to a change in ownership.… The actual occupant is considered the owner of a tract of land, and any attempt to collect rent by a self-styled [“absentee”] landlord is regarded as a violent invasion of the possessor’s absolute right of property.55

互助主义者凯文-卡森（Kevin Carson）写道：

对于互助主义者来说，占用和使用是确定土地所有权的唯一合法标准，无论土地易手多少次。现有所有者可以通过出售或赠与转让所有权；但新所有者只能通过自己的占有和使用来确立对土地的合法所有权。占有权的改变等同于所有权的改变….，实际占有者被视为土地的所有者，任何自称[“缺席”]地主的收租企图都被视为对占有者绝对财产权的武力侵犯。[83]

Thus, for mutualism, the “actual occupant” is the “owner”; the “possessor” has the right of property. If a homesteader of land stops personally using or occupying it, he loses his ownership. Carson contends this is compatible with libertarianism:

[A]ll property rights theories, including Lockean, make provision for adverse possession and constructive abandonment of property. They differ only in degree, rather than kind: in the “stickiness” of property.… There is a large element of convention in any property rights system—Georgist, mutualist, and both proviso and nonproviso Lockeanism—in determining what constitutes transfer and abandonment.56

因此，对于互助主义来说，”实际占有者 “就是 “所有者”；”占有者 “拥有财产权。如果土地的拓殖者停止个人亲自使用或占有土地，他就失去了所有权。卡森认为这与自由意志主义是一致的：

[所有财产权理论，包括洛克的理论，都对财产的逆权占有和推定放弃做出了规定。它们只是在程度上而非种类上有所不同：在财产的 “粘性 “（stickiness）方面….，任何财产权制度——乔治主义（Georgist）、互助主义以及附带条件的和非附带条件的洛克主义——在确定什么构成转让和放弃方面都有很大的惯例因素。[84]

In other words, Lockeanism, Georgism, and mutualism are all types of libertarianism, differing only in degree. In Carson’s view, the gray areas in issues like adverse possession and abandonment leave room for mutualism’s “occupancy” requirement for maintaining land ownership.57

换句话说，洛克主义、乔治主义和互助主义都是自由意志主义的类型，只是程度不同而已。卡森认为，逆权占有和放弃等问题的灰色地带为互助主义维持土地所有权的 “占有 “要求留出了空间。[85]

But the concepts of adverse possession and abandonment cannot be stretched to cover the mutualist occupancy requirement. The mutualist occupancy view is essentially a use or working requirement, which is distinct from doctrines of adverse possession and abandonment. The doctrine of abandonment in positive law and in libertarian theory is based on the idea that ownership acquired by intentionally appropriating a previously unowned thing may be lost when the owner’s intent to own terminates. Ownership is acquired by a merger of possession and intent to own. Likewise, when the intent to own ceases, ownership does too—this is the case with both abandonment of ownership and transfer of title to another person, which is basically an abandonment of property “in favor” of a particular new owner.58

但是，逆权占有和放弃的概念不能延伸到相互占用的要求上。相互占有的观点本质上是一种使用或工作要求，有别于逆权占有和放弃理论。实在法和自由意志主义理论中的放弃理论基于这样一种观点，即通过有意占有先前无主之物而获得的所有权可能会在所有者的所有权意图终止时丧失。所有权是通过占有和拥有意图的混合而获得的。同样，当拥有意图终止时，所有权也随之终止——放弃所有权和将所有权转让给他人都属于这种情况，这基本上是放弃财产 “以有利于 “一个特定的新所有人。[86]

The legal system must therefore develop rules to determine when property has been abandoned, including default rules that apply in the absence of clear evidence. Acquisitive prescription is based on an implicit presumption that the owner has abandoned his property claims if he does not defend it within a reasonable time period against an adverse possessor. But such rules apply to adverse possessors—those who possess the property with the intent to own and in a sufficiently public fashion that the owner knows or should know of this.59 The “public” requirement means that the possessor possesses the property openly as owner, adverse or hostile to the owner’s ownership—which is not the case when, for example, a lessee or employee uses an apartment or manufacturing facility under color of title and permission from the owner. Rules of abandonment and adverse possession are default rules that apply when the owner has not made his intention sufficiently clear—by neglect, apathy, death, absence, or other reason.

因此，法律制度必须制定确定财产何时被放弃的规则，包括在没有明确证据的情况下适用的默认规则。取得时效是基于一种隐含的推定，即如果所有权人没有在合理期限内对逆权占有人进行抗辩，他就放弃了自己的财产主张。但此类规则适用于逆权占有人——那些意图占有财产并以足够公开的方式使所有人知道或应该知道这一点的人。[87]“公开 ”要求是指占有人以所有者的身份公开占有财产，逆权占有或与所有者的所有权相敌对——例如，当承租人或雇员以所有权的名义使用公寓或生产设施并获得所有人的许可时，就不属于这种情况。放弃和逆权占有规则是默认规则，适用于所有权人因疏忽、冷漠、死亡、缺席或其他原因而未充分表明其意图的情况。

In fact, the very idea of abandonment rests on the distinction between ownership and possession. Property is more than possession; it is a right to possess, originating and sustained by the owner’s intention to possess as owner. And abandonment occurs when the intent to own terminates. This happens even when the (immediately preceding) owner temporarily maintains possession but has lost ownership, as when he gives or sells the thing to another party.60

事实上，放弃的概念本身就建立在所有权与占有权的区别之上。财产不仅仅是占有；它是一种占有权，源于所有者作为所有者的占有意图，并由其维持。当拥有的意图终止时，就发生了放弃。即使（紧接着的）所有者暂时保持占有，但已失去所有权，如将物品赠与或出售给另一方时，也会发生这种情况。[88]

Clearly, default abandonment and adverse possession rules are categorically different from a working requirement, whereby ownership is lost in the absence of use.61 Ownership is not lost by nonuse, however, and a working requirement is not implied by default rules regarding abandonment and adverse possession. See, e.g., Louisiana Civil Code, art. 481 (emphasis added): “The ownership and the possession of a thing are distinct.… Ownership exists independently of any exercise of it and may not be lost by nonuse. Ownership is lost when acquisitive prescription accrues in favor of an adverse possessor.” Carson is wrong to imply that abandonment and adverse possession rules can yield a working (or use or occupancy) requirement for maintaining ownership. In fact, these are distinct legal doctrines. Thus, when a factory owner contractually allows workers to use it, or a landlord permits tenants to live in an apartment, there is no question that the owner does not intend to abandon the property, and there is no adverse possession (and if there were, the owner could institute the appropriate action to eject them and regain possession).62 There is no need for “default” rules here to resolve an ambiguous situation.63

显然，默认放弃和逆权占有规则与工作使用的要求截然不同，后者规定在没有使用的情况下所有权即告丧失。[89]然而，所有权并不因不使用而丧失，有关放弃和逆权占有的默认规则也不隐含工作要求。例如，参见《路易斯安那州民法典》第 481 条（重点为后加）： “物的所有权和占有权是截然不同的….，所有权独立于对它的任何行使而存在，不得因不使用而丧失。当取得时效有利于逆权占有人时，所有权即丧失”。卡森暗示放弃和逆权占有规则可以让步维持所有权的工作（或使用或占有）要求，这种说法是错误的。事实上，这些都是不同的法律理论。因此，当工厂所有者根据允许工人使用工厂或房东允许租户居住在公寓中时，毫无疑问，所有者并不打算放弃财产，也就不存在逆权占有（如果存在逆权占有，所有者可以提起适当的诉讼，驱逐他们并重新获得占有权）。[90]这里不需要 “默认 “规则来解决模棱两可的情况。[91]

A final note here: I cite positive law here not as an argument from authority, but as an illustration that even the positive law carefully distinguishes between possession and ownership—and also between a use or working requirement to maintain ownership, and the potential to lose title by abandonment or adverse possession—to illustrate the flaws in Carson’s view that an occupancy requirement is just one variant of adverse possession or default abandonment rules. Furthermore, the civilian legal rules cited derive from legal principles developed over the ages in largely decentralized fashion, and can thus be useful in our own libertarian efforts to develop concrete applications of abstract libertarian principles.64

最后要说明的是：我在此引用实在法并不是作为权威论据，而是为了说明，即使是实在法也仔细区分了占有权和所有权，而且还区分了维持所有权所需的使用或工作要求，以及因放弃或逆权占有而失去所有权的可能性，从而说明卡森认为占有要求只是逆权占有或默认放弃规则的一种变体的观点存在缺陷。此外，所引用的民事法律规则源于历代以大体上去中心化的方式发展起来的法律原则，因此有助于我们自己的自由意志主义的大业，发展抽象自由意志主义原则的具体应用。[92]

What It Means To Be an Anarcho-Capitalist

第三章无政府资本主义意味着什么？

Originally published at LewRockwell.com ( Jan. 20, 2004; https://perma.cc/ QAJ6-KHKN); reprinted in Keith Knight, ed., The Voluntaryist Handbook:

A Collection of Essays, Excerpts, and Quotes (2022; https://perma.cc/N8UX-4PX4).

See also Kinsella, “The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Anarcho- Libertarianism,” Mises Economics Blog (Aug. 20, 2009).

原文发表于 LewRockwell.com（2004 年 1 月 20 日；https://perma.cc/ QAJ6-KHKN）；转载于 Keith Knight 编著的《自愿者手册：

论文、摘录和引语集》（2022 年；https://perma.cc/N8UX-4PX4）。

另见金塞拉：《无政府自由意志主义不可能的无关性》，米塞斯经济学博客（2009 年 8 月 20 日）。

Butler Shaffer’s recent LRC article, “What is Anarchy?,”1 prompted discussion on the Reason blog and inspired me to set down a few ideas I’ve also had along these lines.

Butler Shaffer最近在LRC的文章《什么是无政府？》[93]，在理智博客（Reason blog）上引发了讨论，并启发我写下了一些我一直以来都在思考的想法。

Libertarian opponents of anarchy are attacking a straw man. Their arguments are usually utilitarian in nature and amount to “but anarchy won’t work” or “we need the (things provided by the) state.” But these attacks are confused at best, if not disingenuous. To be an anarchist does not mean you think anarchy will “work” (whatever that means), nor that you predict it will or “can” be achieved. It is possible to be a pessimistic anarchist, after all. To be an anarchist only means that you believe that aggression is not justified, and that states necessarily employ aggression. And, therefore, that states, and the aggression they necessarily employ, are unjustified. It’s quite simple, really. It’s an ethical view, so no surprise it confuses utilitarians.

自由意志主义的无政府主义的反对者是在攻击稻草人。他们的论点通常是功利主义的，无非是 “但无政府是行不通的 “或 “我们需要国家（提供的东西）”。但这些攻击充其量只是混淆视听，甚至是虚伪的。成为无政府主义者并不意味着你认为无政府状态会 “奏效”（不管那是什么意思），也不意味着你预测它会或 “能够 “实现无政府状态。毕竟，做一名悲观的无政府主义者也是有可能的。成为无政府主义者只意味着你相信侵犯是不正当的，而国家必然会使用侵犯手段。因此，国家及其必然采取的侵犯都是不正当的的。这真的一目了然。这是一种伦理观，因此功利主义者对此感到困惑也就不足为奇了。

Accordingly, anyone who is not an anarchist must maintain either:

(a) aggression is justified; or (b) states (in particular, minimal states) do not necessarily employ aggression.

Proposition (b) is plainly false. States always tax their citizens, which is a form of aggression. They always outlaw competing defense agencies, which also amounts to aggression. (Not to mention the countless victimless crime laws that they inevitably, and without a single exception in history, enforce on the populace. Why minarchists think minarchy is even possible boggles the mind.)

因此，任何不是无政府主义者的人，以下两种观点比占其一：

(a) 侵犯是正当的；或 (b) 国家（尤其是最小国家）不一定会采用侵犯手段。

命题(b)显然是错误的。国家总是向其公民征税，这是侵犯之一种。它们总是取缔与之竞争的安保机构，这也是侵犯之一种。(更不用说它们不可避免地、历史上无一例外地对民众实施的无数无受害者犯罪法了。为什么小政府主义者认为小政府主义是可能的，这让人难以置信）。

As for (a), well, socialists and criminals also feel aggression is justified. This does not make it so. Criminals, socialists, and anti-anarchists have yet to show how aggression—the initiation of force against innocent victims—is justified. No surprise; it is not possible2 to show this.3 But criminals don’t feel compelled to justify aggression; why should advocates of the state feel compelled to do so?

至于(a)，社会主义者和罪犯也认为侵犯是正当的。但事实并非如此。罪犯、社会主义者和反无政府主义者都还没有证明侵犯——对无辜受害者使用武力——是正当的。这并不奇怪，要证明这一点[94]是不可能的[95]。但罪犯们并不觉得有必要为侵犯行为辩护，为什么国家的拥护者们会觉得有必要这样做呢？

Conservative and minarchist-libertarian criticism of anarchy on the grounds that it won’t “work” or is not “practical” is just confused. Anarchists don’t (necessarily) predict anarchy will be achieved—I for one don’t think it will. But that does not mean states are justified.

保守主义者和小政府主义的自由意志主义者以无政府主义不会 “成功 “或不 “实用 “为由批评无政府主义，实在是混淆视听。无政府主义者并不（一定）预测无政府会实现——我就认为它不会实现的其中一员。但这并不意味着国家就是正当的。

Consider an analogy. Conservatives and libertarians all agree that private crime (murder, robbery, rape) is unjustified, and “should” not occur. Yet no matter how good most men become, there will always be at least some small element who will resort to crime. Crime will always be with us. Yet we still condemn crime and work to reduce it.

打个比方。保守主义和自由意志主义都认为，私人犯罪（谋杀、抢劫、强奸）是不正当的，”不应该 “发生。然而，无论大多数人变得多么善良，总会有至少一小部分人诉诸犯罪。犯罪将永远伴随着我们。然而，我们仍然谴责犯罪，并努力减少犯罪。

Is it logically possible that there could be no crime? Sure. Everyone could voluntarily choose to respect others’ rights. Then there would be no crime. It’s easy to imagine. But given our experience with human nature and interaction, it is safe to say that there will always be crime. Nevertheless, we still proclaim crime to be evil and unjustified, in the face of the inevitability of its recurrence. So to my claim that crime is immoral, it would just be stupid and/or insincere to reply, “but that’s an impractical view” or “but that won’t work,” “since there will always be crime.” The fact that there will always be crime—that not everyone will voluntarily respect others’ rights—does not mean that it’s “impractical”to oppose it; nor does it mean that crime is justified. It does not mean there is some “flaw” in the proposition that crime is wrong.

从逻辑上讲，有可能没有犯罪吗？当然可以。每个人都可以自愿选择尊重他人的权利。那就不会有犯罪了。这很容易想象。但根据我们对人性和人际交往的经验，可以肯定地说，犯罪总是存在的。尽管如此，在犯罪不可避免地一再发生的情况下，我们仍然宣称犯罪是邪恶和不正当的。因此，对于我所说的犯罪是不道德的，回答 “但这是不切实际的观点 “或 “但这是行不通的””因为犯罪永远存在 “是愚蠢和/或不真诚的。犯罪总是存在的——并不是每个人都会自愿尊重他人的权利——这一事实并不意味着反对犯罪是 “不切实际 “的，也不意味着犯罪是正当的。这并不意味着 “犯罪是错误的 “这一命题存在某种 “缺陷”。

Likewise, to my claim that the state and its aggression is unjustified, it is disingenuous and/or confused to reply, “anarchy won’t work” or is “impractical” or “unlikely to ever occur.”4 The view that the state is unjustified is a normative or ethical position. The fact that not enough people are willing to respect their neighbors’ rights to allow anarchy to emerge, i.e., the fact that enough people (erroneously) support the legitimacy of the state to permit it to exist, does not mean that the state, and its aggression, are justified.5

同样，对于我认为国家及其侵犯是不正当的观点，回答 “无政府状态行不通 “或 “不切实际 “或 “不可能出现 “是虚伪的和/或混乱的。[96]认为国家是不正当的观点是一种规范或伦理立场。没有足够多的人愿意尊重邻居的权利以允许无政府状态的出现，即存在足够多的人（错误地）支持国家的合法性以允许其存在，这并不意味着国家及其侵犯是正当的[97]。

Other utilitarian replies like “but we need a state” do not contradict the claim that states employ aggression and that aggression is unjustified. It simply means that the state-advocate does not mind the initiation of force against innocent victims—i.e., he shares the criminal/socialist mentality. The private criminal thinks his own need is all that matters; he is willing to commit violence to satisfy his needs; to hell with what is right and wrong. The advocate of the state thinks that his opinion that “we” “need” things justifies committing or condoning violence against innocent individuals. It is as plain as that. Whatever this argument is, it is not libertarian. It is not opposed to aggression. It is in favor of something else—making sure certain public “needs” are met, despite the cost—but not peace and cooperation. The criminal, gangster, socialist, welfare-statist, and even minarchist all share this: they are willing to condone naked aggression, for some reason. The details vary, but the result is the same—innocent lives are trampled by physical assault. Some have the stomach for this; others are more civilized—libertarian, one might say—and prefer peace over violent struggle.

其他功利主义的回答，诸如 “但我们需要一个国家”，并不与国家采用侵犯和侵犯是不正当的说法相矛盾。这只是意味着，国家的拥护者并不介意对无辜受害者使用武力，也就是说，他与罪犯/社会主义者的心态相同。私人罪犯认为自己的需求才是最重要的；他不惜使用武力来满足自己的需求；让是非曲直见鬼去吧。国家的拥护者认为，他认为 “我们””需要 “某些东西，就有正当理由对无辜的个人实施武力或纵容武力。事情就是这么简单。不管这种论调是什么，它都不是自由意志主义。它不反对侵犯。它支持的是其他东西——确保某些公共“需求”得到满足，尽管代价高昂——而不是和平与合作。罪犯、黑帮、社会主义者、福利国家主义者，甚至是小政府主义者都有这样的共同点：出于某种原因，他们愿意纵容赤裸裸的侵犯。虽然细节各不相同，但结果都是一样的——无辜的生命被人身攻击、被践踏。有些自由意志主义者能承受这些；另一些则更文明——可以说是自由意志主义——更偏爱和平而不是武力斗争。

As there are criminals and socialists among us, it is no surprise that there is a degree of criminal-mindedness in most people. After all, the state rests upon the tacit consent of the masses, who have erroneously accepted the notion that states are legitimate. But none of that means the criminal enterprises condoned by the masses are justified.

我们当中既有罪犯，也有社会主义者，因此，大多数人都有一定程度的犯罪心理也就不足为奇了。毕竟，国家建立在大众的默许之上，而大众错误地接受了国家是合法的这一观念。但这并不意味着大众纵容的犯罪活动是正当的。

It’s time for libertarians to take a stand. Are you for aggression, or against it?6

现在恰是自由意志主义者表明立场的好时机。你是支持还是反对侵犯？[98]

第二辑PART II

权利

RIGHTS

How We Come to Own Ourselves

第四章我们如何拥有自己

Originally published in Mises Daily (Sep. 7, 2006). The illustrating photo chosen by an editor at Mises.org for the original article inspired the image used on the back cover of this book. See my post “The Story of a Libertarian Book Cover,” StephanKinsella.com (March 4, 2011).

原文发表于《米塞斯日报》（2006 年 9 月 7 日）。Mises.org 网站的一位编辑为原选择的插图启发了本书封底所使用的图片。参见我的文章《自由意志主义书籍封面的故事》，StephanKinsella.com（2011 年 3 月 4 日）。

The primary social evil of our time is lack of respect for self-ownership rights. It is what underlies both private crime and institutionalized crime perpetrated by the state. State laws, regulations, and actions are objectionable just because the state is claiming the legal right to control how someone’s body is to be used.1

我们这个时代最主要的社会弊端是缺乏对自我所有权的尊重。这是私人犯罪和国家制度化犯罪的根源。国家法律、管制和行动之所以令人反感，仅仅是因为国家声称拥有控制如何使用某人身体的合法权利。[99]

When the state drafts a man or threatens him with imprisonment if he violates its narcotics laws, for example, it is assuming partial control of his body, contrary to his self-ownership rights. Moreover, laws such as tax laws or fines for failure to comply with arbitrary state decrees (e.g., economic regulations, anti-discrimination rules) also violate self-ownership rights, to the extent they threaten to imprison or harm the body of the person, and in any case violate the person’s derivative property rights in the expropriated resources.

例如，如果一个人违反了国家的禁毒法，国家就会对他进行征召或以监禁相威胁，这就意味着国家部分控制了他的身体，侵犯了他的自我所有权。此外，税法或对不遵守国家任意法令（如经济法规、反歧视规则）的罚款等法律也侵犯了自我所有权，因为它们威胁要监禁或伤害人的身体，而且在任何情况下都侵犯了人对被征用资源的派生财产权。

After all, although self-ownership is more fundamental than rights in external resources—one must own oneself, one’s body, in order to own other things—self-ownership is rendered meaningless if the right to own private property in external resources is not also respected.2 This is why Murray Rothbard insisted that all “human rights” are property rights: that is, ownership rights in scarce resources, whether self-ownership rights in one’s body, or property rights in external objects.3

毕竟，尽管自我所有权比外部资源的权利更为重要——必须拥有自己，拥有自己的身体，才能拥有其他东西——但如果对拥有外部资源私有财产权不加以尊重，自我所有权也就失去了意义。[100]这就是为什么默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）坚持认为，所有 “人权 “都是财产权：即对稀缺资源的所有权，无论是对个人身体的自我所有权，还是对外部物品的财产权。[101]

Now as the examples above show, all political theories advocate some form of property rights, since they specify certain owners of various types of resources.4 State policies that tax, conscript, or imprison or fine individuals for failure to comply with various regulations in effect assign partial ownership in the subjects’ bodies or other owned resources to the state. The state claims a partial ownership right in these resources.5 All political systems assign owners to resources according to some assignment rule. What sets libertarianism apart is its own unique property-assignment rule: the rule that specifies that individuals, not the state, are owners of their own bodies and other external scarce resources.

正如上述例子所示，所有政治理论都主张某种形式的财产权，因为它们规定了各类资源的特定所有者。[102]对不遵守各种管制的个人征税、征兵、监禁或罚款的国家政策，实际上是将臣民身体臣民拥有的其他资源的部分所有权赋予国家。国家声称对这些资源拥有部分所有权。[103]所有政治制度都根据某种分配规则来分配资源给所有者。自由意志主义的与众不同之处在于其独特的财产分配规则：该规则规定个人而非国家是自己身体和其他外部稀缺资源的所有者。

无主资源的首次使用和拓殖FIRST USE AND HOMESTEADING OF UNOWNED RESOURCES

It is, therefore, crucial that libertarian theory have a sound basis for property rights and for its unique property assignment rules.

因此，至关重要的是，自由意志主义理论必须为财产权及其独特的财产分配规则奠定一个坚实健全的基础。

Relying on some version of the Lockean notion of homesteading or original appropriation—an individual appropriating something unowned from the state of nature, thereby becoming the owner—libertarianism rightly focuses on the concept of first use of a previously unowned scarce resource as the key test for determining ownership of it.6

自由意志主义依据洛克的某种拓殖或先占概念——个人从自然状态中占有无主之物，从而成为所有者——正确地将重点放在首先使用先前无主的稀缺资源这一概念上，将其作为确定资源所有权的关键检验标准。[104]

One’s initial impression might be that first use is the bedrock principle of libertarian property assignment, that is, that it decides questions of ownership of all scarce resources, both human bodies and external things. The owner of a plot of land is its first user (or his descendent in title), just as the first user of a body is its owner. This would mean that self-ownership rests on the first use principle, or homesteading.

人们最初的印象可能是，首先使用是自由意志主义财产分配的基石原则，也就是说，它决定了所有稀缺资源（包括人的身体和外部事物）的所有权问题。一块土地的所有者是它的第一使用者（或他的后代），就像一个身体的第一使用者是它的所有者一样。这就意味着，自我所有权建立在首次使用原则或拓殖原则之上。

父母是第一所有人PARENTS AS FIRST OWNERS

And what is wrong with relying on first use as the basis for self-ownership? To be sure, with respect to most claimants to one’s body—a robber or state trying to conscript, say—one is indeed the “first user,” or a prior user, and thus has a better claim to the body than the outsider. 7 But what about one’s parents? Is one really the first user of one’s body? Was one’s body simply lying around unowned, in state of nature, waiting for some occupant to swoop down and appropriate it?

那么，将首次使用作为自我所有权的基础又有什么错呢？可以肯定的是，对于大多数对他人身体提出权利要求的人——比如说，强盗或试图征兵的国家——来说，一个人确实是自身的 “第一使用者”，或者说是优先的使用者，因此，他比外人更有资格对自己的身体提出权利要求。[105]但父母呢？一个人真的是自己身体的首位使用者吗？一个人的身体是否只是无主地躺在那里，处于自然状态，等待着某个占有者俯冲下来将其占有？

No, obviously not. One’s body was in the care of—and in a sense produced by—one’s parents, in particular one’s mother. So if we maintain that “first use” always determines the answer to the question “who owns this resource?,” for any resource at all, then it would seem that parents do own their children. The mother owns the physical matter and bits of food and nourishment that assemble into the zygote, embryo, fetus, and then baby, just as the owner of an apple tree owns the apples that fall and the owner of a cow owns the calves it produces.

不，显然不是如此。一个人的身体是由他的父母，尤其是他的母亲照料的，而且从某种意义上说是由他们生产的。因此，如果我们坚持认为，对于任何资源而言，”谁拥有这种资源？”这个问题的答案总是由 “首次使用 “决定，那么父母似乎确实拥有他们的孩子。就像苹果树的主人拥有掉下来的苹果，奶牛的主人拥有它所产的小牛一样，母亲拥有组成受精卵、胚胎、胎儿和婴儿的物质、食物和营养。

So, when does the child become a self-owner? Or does he? The libertarian seems to be faced with a dilemma.

那么，孩子什么时候成为自我所有者？他会吗？自由意志主义似乎面临着一个两难选择。

两难问题的可能解决方案POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEMMA

Several possible arguments might be put forward to avoid the uncomfortable specter of

children in bondage, slaves owned by their parents. First, it could be noted that the main political issue in society concerns third parties who want to dominate and control others. Slaveowning parents do not seem to pose the most pressing danger. For the typical case of conflict, the first-use principle suffices to prove self-ownership of one’s body vis-à-vis the third party claimant. Still, this leaves open the possibility of parents owning their children.

我们可以提出几种可能的论据，以避免儿童被奴役、成为父母的奴隶这一令人不安的幽灵。首先，我们可以指出，社会中的主要政治问题涉及那些想要支配和控制他人的第三方。拥有奴隶权的父母似乎并不构成最紧迫的危险。在典型的冲突案例中，首先使用原则足以证明，相对于第三方要求者，本人优先拥有身体的自我所有权。不过，这也为父母拥有子女留下了可能性。

Second, it could be argued that even if the parent does own the child, in most cases a decent parent would voluntarily manumit the child at a suitable age. This is probably true, but the possibility of a brutal parent selling his son or daughter into slavery is still unsettling.

其次，可以说，即使父母确实拥有孩子，在大多数情况下，正直的父母也会在孩子到了合适的年龄时自愿将其解放。这大概率是真实的，但残暴的父母将自己的儿子或女儿卖为奴隶的可能性仍然令人不安。

Third, it is not difficult to envision a scenario in which most lines of descent, at some point, become permanently “liberated” or “manumitted” by the benevolent actions of a key ancestor. Great-great-great-Granddad manumits his child on the condition that he free his issue, and so on. In this way, eventually all or most lines of descent become freed by some distant act in the past of a benevolent ancestor. But still, this leaves open the possibility that some might not; and, in any event, it admits that at some points in time, child-slavery exists and is permissible.

第三，我们不难想象这样一种情况，即大多数世系、血统在某一时刻会因为某个重要祖先的仁慈行为而永久性地 “自由”或”解放 “。曾曾曾曾祖父解放了他的后代，在他获得自由身之后，以此类推。通过这种方式，最终所有或大多数世系、血统都会因为一位仁慈的祖先在过去的某个遥远的行动而获得自由。但是，这仍然留下了一种可能性，即有些人可能不会获得自由；而且，无论如何，这也承认，在某些时间点上，奴役儿童的现象是存在的，并且是被允许的。

Finally, and to me most decisive: it could be argued that the parent has various positive obligations to his or her children, such as the obligation to feed, shelter, educate, etc. The idea here is that libertarianism does not oppose “positive rights”; it simply insists that they be voluntarily incurred. One way to do this is by contract, or so some would argue;8 another is by trespassing against someone’s property. Now, if you pass by a drowning man in a lake you have no enforceable (legal) obligation to try to rescue him; but if you push someone in a lake you have a positive obligation to try to rescue him, to mitigate the harm resulting from your tort. If you don’t attempt the rescue, you could be liable for homicide.

最后，在我看来也是最具决定性的一点是：可以说父母对其子女负有各种积极义务，如抚养、庇护、教育等义务。这里的意思是，自由意志主义并不反对 “积极权利”；它只是坚持认为，这些权利是自愿产生的。做到这一点的一种方法通过，或者有人会这么说；[106]8 另一种方法是侵犯他人财产。现在，如果你从湖中一个溺水者身边经过，你就没有试图营救他的强制（法律）义务；但如果你在湖中推人，你就有试图营救他的积极义务，以减轻你的侵权行为造成的伤害。如果你不试图营救，你可能会被判杀人罪。

Likewise, if your voluntary actions bring into being an infant with natural needs for shelter, food, care, and with human rights, it is akin to throwing someone into a lake. In both cases you create a situation where another human is in dire need of help and without which he will perish. By creating this situation of need you incur an obligation to provide for those needs. And surely this set of positive obligations to one’s child would encompass the obligation to manumit the child at a certain point. This last argument is, to my mind, the most attractive,but it is also probably the least likely to be accepted by most libertarians, who generally seem opposed to positive obligations, even if they are incurred as the result of one’s actions. Rothbard, for example, puts forward several objections to such an approach.9

同样，如果你的自愿行为使一个婴儿出生，他自然需要住所、食物和照顾，并享有人权，这就好比把一个人扔进湖里。在这两种情况下，你都造成了另一个人急需帮助的局面，如果没有帮助，他就会灭亡。在造成这种需要的情况下，你就有义务满足这些需要。当然，对自己孩子的这一系列积极义务也包括在某一时刻解放孩子的义务。在我看来，最后一个论点是最有吸引力的，但也可能是最不可能被大多数自由意志主义者所接受的，他们通常反对”积极的义务“，即使这种义务是由于他们行动的结果所导致的。例如，罗斯巴德（Rothbard）就对这种方法提出了若干反对意见。[107]

客观联系：真正的试金石OBJECTIVE LINK: THE REAL TOUCHSTONE

All this said, it turns out that these Herculean efforts are unnecessary. The dilemma arises only if it is assumed that “first use” determines ownership not only for homesteaded resources, but also for bodies.

说了这么多，事实证明这些艰巨的努力是不必要的。只有假定 “首先使用 “不仅决定了拓殖资源的所有权，也决定了身体的所有权，才会出现进退两难的局面。

However, the “first use” rule is merely the result of the application of the more general principle of objective link to the case of objects that may be homesteaded from an unowned state. Recall that the purpose of property rights is to permit conflicts over scarce (rivalrous, conflictable) resources to be avoided.10 To fulfill this purpose, property titles to particular resources are assigned to particular owners. The assignment must not, however, be random, arbitrary, or biased, if it is to actually be a property norm and possibly help conflict to be avoided. What this means is that title has to be assigned to one of the competing claimants based on “the existence of an objective, intersubjectively ascertainable link between owner and the” resource claimed.11

然而，”首先使用 “规则仅仅是将客观联系这一更为普遍的原则应用于可从无主状态中拓殖的物品的情况的结果。回想一下，财产权的目的是为了避免稀缺（竞争性、冲突性）资源的冲突。[108]为了实现这一目的，特定资源的财产权被分配给特定的所有者。然而，如果要使这种分配真正成为一种财产规范，并有可能帮助避免冲突，那么这种分配就不能是随意的、武断的或有偏见的。这就意味着，必须根据 “所有者与所主张的资源之间存在客观的、主体间可确定的联系”，将所有权分配给竞争者之一。[109]

Thus, it is the concept of objective link between claimants and a claimed resource that determines property ownership. First use is merely what constitutes the objective link in the case of previously unowned resources. In this case, the only objective link to the thing is that between the first user—the appropriator—and the thing. Any other supposed link is not objective, and is merely based on verbal decree, or on some type of formulation that violates the prior-later distinction. But the prior-later distinction is crucial if property rights are to actually establish rights and make conflict avoidable. Moreover, ownership claims cannot be based on mere verbal decree, as this also would not help to reduce conflict, since any number of people could simply decree their ownership of the thing.12

因此，决定财产所有权的是权利主张人与权利主张资源之间的客观联系这一概念。在先前无主资源的情况下，首次使用只是构成客观联系的因素。在这种情况下，与事物之间的唯一客观联系是首次使用者——占有者——与事物之间的联系。任何其他所谓的联系都不是客观的，而只是基于口头命令或某种违反先来-后来区别的表述。但是，如果财产权要真正确立权利并使冲突得以避免，那么先来-后到的区别就至关重要。此外，所有权主张不能仅以口头命令为基础，因为这也无助于减少冲突，因为任何数量的人都可以简单地宣布他们对该事物的所有权。[110]

So for homesteaded things—previously unowned resources—the objective link is first use. It has to be, by the nature of the situation.

因此，对于拓殖的事物——以前不属于自己的资源——客观联系就是首次使用。根据上述情势的性质，必须如此。

人的身体Human Bodies

But for human bodies, matters are somewhat different. As noted above, one is not really the “first user” of one’s body in the same sense as one is the first user of a previously unowned thing that one appropriates. It’s not as if the body was just lying, unoccupied and unused, in the wild, waiting for an occupant to homestead it. And moreover, as noted above, the occupant is not exactly the first user of his body, with respect to his parents.

但对于人的身体来说，情况就有些不同了。如上所述，一个人并不是自己身体的真正 “第一使用者”，就像一个人不是自己占有的以前不属于自己的事物的第一使用者一样。这并不是说，身体只是躺在野外，未被占领也无人使用，等待着有人来拓殖。此外，如上所述，对其父母而言，占有者恰恰不是其身体的第一使用者。

Additionally, to homestead an unowned resource presupposes one already has a body, which one uses to act in the world and to homestead such unowned things. But this is not the case for “homesteading” one’s body. One has no body before one gains rights to it.13

此外，拓殖无主资源的前提是一个人已经有了身体，他用身体在世界上行动，并拓殖这种无主之物。但 “拓殖 “自己的身体却不是这样。一个人在获得对身体的权利之前是没有身体的。[111]

直接控制Direct Control

If “first use” is not the ultimate test for the “objective link” in the case of body ownership, what is? It is the unique relationship between a person and “his” body—his direct and immediate control over the body, and the fact that, at least in some sense, a body is a given person and vice-versa (as it is impossible to imagine a person that does not have a body, without accepting groundless religious conceptions). This is what constitutes the objective link sufficient to give that person better title to his body than any third party claimant, even his parents.14 (This link is only a presumption, it is defeasible, as noted below, since it may be severed or forfeited by a person committing an act of aggression that gives the victim rights over the aggressor’s body, for purposes of self-defense, restitution, or retribution.)

如果 “首次使用 “不是检验身体所有权中 “客观联系 “的最终标准，那什么才是呢？那就是一个人与 “他的 “身体之间的独特关系——他对身体直接的和即时的控制，以及至少在某种意义上，身体就是一个给定的人，反之亦然（因为如果不接受毫无根据的宗教观念，就无法想象一个没有身体的人）。这就是构成客观联系的因素，足以使这个人对其身体的所有权优于任何第三方权利要求者，甚至优于他的父母。[112] (这种联系只是一种假定，如下文所述，它是可以被推翻的，因为它可能被实施侵犯的人切断或剥夺，从而使受害者出于自卫、赔偿或报复的目的对侵害者的身体拥有权利。)

Moreover, any outsider who claims another’s body cannot deny this objective link and its special status, since the outsider also necessarily presupposes this in his own case. This is so because in seeking dominion over the other, in asserting ownership over the other’s body, he has to presuppose his own ownership of his body, which demonstrates he does place a certain significance on this link, at the same time that he disregards the significance of the other’s link to his own body. (Notice that if a victim seeks dominion over the body of his aggressor for purposes of self-defense or proportional punishment, his claim of ownership over the aggressor’s body is not incompatible with a claim of self-ownership, since the cases are different. It is not inconsistent to claim that the special link between an innocent person and his body gives him the best claim over that body, and to also claim that this no longer holds for an aggressor because he has committed aggression. This distinction is neither arbitrary nor particularizable; it is grounded in the nature of things.)15

此外，任何声称拥有他人身体的局外人都不能否认这种客观联系及其特殊地位，因为局外人在反观自身时也必然预设了这一点。之所以如此，是因为在寻求对他人身体的支配权、主张对他人身体的所有权时，他必须预先假定自己对自己身体的所有权，这表明他确实对这种联系赋予了一定的意义，与此同时，他忽视了他人与其身体联系的意义。 (要注意的是，如果受害者出于自我防卫或相称惩罚的目的而寻求对侵害者身体的支配权，他对侵害者身体的所有权主张与自我所有权主张并不冲突，因为情况不同。声称一个无辜的人与其身体之间的特殊联系使他对该身体享有最佳的所有权，同时又声称这一点对侵害者不再适用，因为他实施了侵犯行为，这并不矛盾。这种区别既不是武断的，也不是特殊化的；它是以事件的性质为基础的。）[113]

The basic point about the primacy of the “direct” link over an “indirect” link (ceteris paribus—see the point above about punishment of criminals) was first suggested to me by Hoppe. As might be apparent to those familiar with Hoppe’s argumentation ethics,16 the Hoppean theory implies the logical priority of direct versus indirect control over one’s body. In fact, the argument made above (that any outsider who claims another’s body cannot deny the objective link between person and body) is merely an application of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics approach. It turns out Hoppe made a similar argument in a German publication in 1987:

关于 “直接 “联系优先于 “间接 “联系的基本观点（其它条件相同——见上文关于惩罚犯罪的观点），是霍普首先向我提出的。熟悉霍普的论证伦理学[114] 的人可能会发现，霍普的理论意味着对自己身体的直接控制与间接控制在逻辑上的优先性。事实上，上文提出的论点（任何声称拥有他人身体的局外人都不能否认人与身体之间的客观联系）只是霍普论证伦理学方法的一种应用。原来，霍普曾在 1987 年的一份德国出版物中提出过类似论点：

The answer to the question what makes my body “mine” lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do we say “This is my body”? For this, a twofold requirement exists. On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will.

是什么让我的身体成为 “我的”？这个问题的答案就在于一个显而易见的事实，那就是这不仅仅是一个断言，而是每个人都能看到的事实。为什么我们要说 “这是我的身体”？这需要两方面的条件。一方面，被称作 “我的 “身体必须确实（以主体间确定的方式）表达或 “具化 “我的意志。就我的身体而言，这一点很容易证明：当我声明我现在要抬起胳膊、转下头、在椅子上放松一下（或其他什么），而这些声明随后变成了事实（得到了实现），那么这就表明，做出这些动作的身体确实被我的意志所占有。

If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my body” would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”). On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that my will has been “objectified” in the body called “mine,” it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by another person.

相反，如果我的声明与我身体的实际行为没有系统的联系，那么 “这是我的身体 “这个命题就必须被视为一个空洞的、客观上毫无根据的断言；同样，如果在我宣布之后，不是我的手臂抬起来，而是穆勒、迈尔或舒尔茨的手臂抬起来（在这种情况下，人们更有可能倾向于认为穆勒、迈尔或舒尔茨的身体是 “我的”），那么这个命题就会被视为不正确而遭到否定。另一方面，除了证明我的意志在被称为 “我的 “的身体中被 “具化 “之外，还必须证明我的占有与其他人对同一身体的可能占有相比具有优先权。

As far as bodies are concerned, it is also easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and direct control must obviously have logicaltemporal priority (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. The latter simply follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be presupposed as justified. It thus follows: If the justice of an appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).17

就身体而言，要证明这一点也很容易。我们可以通过证明它是在我的直接控制之下，而其他人只能间接地，即通过他们自己的身体，在我的身体中具化（表达）它自己来证明这一点，与任何间接控制相比，直接控制显然必须具有逻辑上的时间优先权（优先级）。这是因为，一个人对物品的任何间接控制都以他对自己身体的直接控制为前提；因此，为了使稀缺物品得到合理的占有，对一个人直接控制的 “自己 “的身体的占有必须预先假定为是正当的。这是因为，一个人对物品的任何间接控制都以他对自己身体的直接控制为前提；因此，为了使稀缺物品得到合理的占有，对一个人直接控制的 “自己 “的身体的占有必须预先假定为是正当的。由此可见：如果必须以通过直接控制进行的占有的正当性作为任何进一步的间接占有的前提，如果只有我才能直接控制我的身体，那么除我之外，任何人都无法正当地拥有我的身体（或者换句话说，我身体的财产不能转让给他人），除非我明确同意，否则他人对我身体的任何间接控制企图都必须被视为是不正当的。[115]

And as Hoppe adds in the Foreword, “if body-ownership were assigned to some indirect body-controller, conflict would become unavoidable as the direct body-controller cannot give up the direct control over his body as long as he is alive” (emphasis added). In other words, direct control has logical-temporal priority as compared to any indirect control, since otherwise conflict is unavoidable, contrary to the very purpose of property norms.

霍普在前言中补充道，”如果将身体所有权分配给某个间接的身体控制者，冲突将变得不可避免，因为直接的身体控制者只要还活着，就不能放弃对其身体的直接控制”（重点为后加）。换句话说，与任何间接控制相比，直接控制在逻辑-时间上具有优先权，否则冲突将不可避免，这显然与财产规范的根本目的背道而驰。

总结Summary

Perhaps it is time to summarize the (interrelated) reasons why direct control is the relevant link for determining ownership of human bodies, and why self-ownership is thus justified:

First, it is intuitively obvious; it’s the “natural” Who better to own my body than me? (See Hoppe’s discussion of this in A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, at p. 21 et seq.) As Locke wrote, “every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself.”18
The arguments made by both Rothard and Hoppe, in the Appendix, below, rejecting the only two possible alternatives to self-ownership: the “communist” alternative of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, which is unworkable and would lead to the death of the human race; and other-ownership (slavery, domination), which is not
The prior-later distinction, noted above (see notes 6, 7): It is difficult to deny that a person has a claim to self-ownership based on his direct control of his body. This is the objective link par excellence. As Hoppe writes, “While I can cite in favor of my property claim regarding my body the objective fact that I was the body’s first occupant—its first user—anyone else who claims to have the right to control this body can cite nothing of the sort.” (note 7, above) Anyone claiming a right to enslave this person via indirect control always comes along later. Indirect control of a person is impossible unless he is a person. When he becomes a person, his direct control makes him the first owner of his The would-be enslaver is thus a latecomer, in violation of the prior-later distinction. Thus, a property norm assigning property rights in a latecomingindirect controller cannot be justifiable since it would, like any property norm violating the prior-later distinction, generate rather than reduce conflict.
Related to the universalizability points made in point 2 above: human actors who seek to own external resources presuppose they already own their own bodies. This right did not come from homesteading, but is based on some other reason (e.g., direct control). Thus, when the slaver attempts to dominate and own another person, he must claim self-ownership rights in himself—on some Whatever the basis for the would-be enslaver’s claim to self-ownership, he cannot deny that similarly situated other persons do not have this same right.
Perhaps most decisively, as Hoppe argues in previous work (quote at note 17, above), and as he emphasizes in a related comment in the Foreword: “if body-ownership were assigned to some indirect body-controller, conflict would become unavoidable as the direct body-controller cannot give up the direct control over his body as long as he is alive.” As I discuss also in chapter 7 (note 35, text following note 36), what Hoppe is pointing out here is that assigning ownership over a person (the direct body-controller) to an enslaver (the indirect body-controller), necessarily generates conflict because the enslaved person maintains his direct control over his body—as Rothbard points out, his will remains “inalienable” (see chapter 9, Part III.C). In other words, direct control has priority as compared to any indirect control, since otherwise conflict is unavoidable, contrary to the very purpose of property norms. A norm that generates conflict cannot be considered a property norm aimed at reducing conflict, and thus cannot be justified. For this reason, direct control has logical-temporal precedence over indirect control, and the only justified property norm is self-ownership.19

也许是时候总结一下(相互关联的)原因了，为什么直接控制是决定人体所有权的相关环节，以及为什么自我所有权因此是正当的:

首先，这在直觉上是显而易见的；这是 “自然 “的立场。谁能比我更合理地拥有我的身体？(见霍普在《社会主义与资本主义的理论》一书中的论述，第 21 页及以下各页）。正如洛克所写，“每个人都对自己的人身拥有所有权:除了他自己，任何人都无权拥有这种所有权。”[116]
在下面的附录中，罗斯巴德和霍普提出的论点，否定了自我所有权之外仅有的两种可能的替代方案：普遍且平等的他者所有权的“共产主义”替代方案，这是不可行的，并且会导致人类的灭亡；以及他者所有权（奴役、统治），这是不可普遍化的。
上文提到的先来-后到的区别（见注 6、7）：很难否认，一个人对自己身体的直接控制权就是他的自我所有权。这是最好的客观联系。霍普写道：“我可以引用一个客观事实来支持我对我身体的财产主张，那就是我是这个身体的第一个占有者——它的第一个使用者——与此同时，任何声称有权控制这个身体的人都不能引用任何这样的事实。”(注 7）任何声称有权通过间接控制奴役这个人的人总是后来才出现。除非他是一个人，否则间接控制一个人是不可能的。当一个人成为一个人时，他的直接控制使他成为其身体的第一所有者。因此，未来的奴役者是一个后到者，违反了先来-后到的区别。因此，将财产权分配给后到的间接控制者的财产规范是不正当的，原因在于，它与任何违反先来-后到区别的财产规范一样，会产生而不是减少冲突。
与上文第 2 点中提出的普遍化观点相关：行动人寻求拥有外部资源的前提是他们已经拥有自己的身体。这种权利并非来自拓殖，而是基于其他原因（如直接控制）。因此，当奴隶主试图支配和拥有另一个人时，他必须在某种基础上主张对自己的自我所有权。无论可能成为奴隶主的人，其主张自我所有权的依据是什么，他都不能否认处境类似的其他人享有同样的权利。
也许最有决定性的是，正如霍普在以前的著作中所论证的（引自上文注 17），以及他在前言的相关评论中所强调的：”如果将身体所有权分配给某个间接的身体控制者，冲突将变得不可避免，因为直接的身体控制者只要活着，就无法放弃对其身体的直接控制。“正如我在第 7 章（注 35，注 36 后面的文字）中所讨论的那样，霍普在这里指出的是，将一个人（直接的身体控制者）的身体所有权分配给一个奴役者（间接的身体控制者），必然会产生冲突，因为被奴役者保持着他对自己身体的直接控制——正如罗斯巴德指出的，他的意志仍然是 “不可让渡的”（见第 9 章，第三辑 C）。换言之，与任何间接控制相比，直接控制具有优先权，否则冲突将不可避免，这与财产规范的根本目的背道而驰。产生冲突的规范不能被视为旨在减少冲突的财产规范，因此也不能被证明是正当的。基于这个原因，直接控制在逻辑-时间上优先于间接控制，唯一合理的财产规范是自我所有权。[117]

回到孩子这个话题Returning to the Child

So, who owns a child’s body? We may say that initially, before the child has rights (say, as a very early stage fetus), the mother owns the growing fetus that is part of her body and that was produced by her body.20 Once the child is recognized as having rights, the child owns his own body because of his direct control over it, but the parents serve as presumptive guardians who can make decisions on the child’s behalf. (The presumption can be overcome if the parents are abusive, meaning some other adults would be selected as the guardians/parents.) When the child reaches a sufficient level of maturity, he or she becomes an adult, so to speak, and the parents’ guardianship ends. 21

那么，谁拥有孩子的身体呢？我们可以说，最初，在儿童拥有权利之前（例如，作为一个非常早期的胎儿），母亲拥有正在成长的胎儿，这是她身体的一部分，也是由她的身体产生的。[118] 一旦儿童被承认拥有权利，儿童就拥有自己的身体，因为他可以直接控制自己的身体，但父母作为假定的监护人，可以代表孩子做出决定。(如果父母有虐待行为，则可以推翻这一推定，也就是说，可以选择其他成年人作为监护人/父母）。当孩子达到足够成熟的程度时，他或她就可以说是成年人了，父母的监护权也就结束了。[119]

Hoppe recognized this basic conclusion in his 1989 treatise, where he wrote:

It is worth mentioning that the ownership right stemming from production finds its natural limitation only when, as in the case of children, the thing produced is itself another actor-producer. According to the natural theory of property, a child, once born, is just as much the owner of his own body as anyone else. Hence, not only can a child expect not to be physically aggressed against but as the owner of his body a child has the right, in particular, to abandon his parents once he is physically able to run away from them and say “no” to their possible attempts to recapture him. Parents only have special rights regarding their child—stemming from their unique status as the child’s producers—insofar as they (and no one else) can rightfully claim to be the child’s trustee as long as the child is physically unable to run away and say “no.”22

霍普在 1989 年的论文中承认了这一基本结论，他写道：

值得一提的是，只有当生产出来的东西本身就是另一个行动人-生产者时，譬如孩子的情况下，源于生产的所有权才会受到自然的限制。根据财产的自然理论，孩子一旦出生，就和其他人一样拥有自己的身体。因此，孩子不仅可以期望自己的身体不受侵犯，而且作为自己身体的所有者，一旦他的身体能够逃离父母，并对父母可能试图重新抓住他的行为说 “不 “时，他就有权脱离自己的父母。父母只有在孩子没有能力逃跑和说“不”的情况下，才对孩子拥有特殊的权利——这源于他们作为孩子的生产者的独特地位——只有他们(而不是其他人)可以正当地声称自己是孩子的受托人。[120]

Here Hoppe adopts the Rothbardian approach, which uses the child’s capacity to run away and say “no” as a sort of rule of thumb for indicating when a child fully appropriates his body.23 But a more general conception of body-appropriation may be developed by considering the following. First, as Hoppe emphasizes, to appropriate means to bring under control.24

在这里，霍普采用了罗斯巴德的方法，即把儿童逃跑和说 “不 “的能力作为一种经验法则，用以说明儿童何时完全占有了自己的身体。[121]但是，可以通过考虑以下几点来形成一种更普遍的身体占有概念。首先，正如霍普所强调的，占有意味着控制[122]。

Hoppe also argues that rights are held by rational agents—those who are “capable of communicating, discussing, arguing, and in particular, [who are] able to engage in an argumentation of normative problems.”25 This implies that a person reaches adulthood, or “appropriates” his body and gains full ownership rights to it, when he reaches the point where he is a rational agent in this sense. (The act of gaining full self-ownership rights may be regarded as a type of homesteading or appropriation of one’s body—reaching adulthood, so to speak—so long as it is kept in mind that it is a special type of homesteading: not homesteading by a body-owner of an unowned (non-agent) resource, but the establishment of an objective link constituted by direct and immediate control of the body by a rational agent. The child becomes a full self-owner or body-owner, when he reaches sufficient rational agency to be rights-bearing and independent, because he has direct control over his body. It is the union of these two characteristics that gives him a proprietary right over his body: rational agency + direct control. Animals also have direct control over their bodies but can be owned because they have no rational agency, that is, no rights. Both characteristics are needed for the young human to become a self-owning adult, so to speak.)

霍普还认为，权利是由理性主体——那些 “能够交流、探讨、论证，尤其是[能够]参与规范性问题论证的人”——所拥有的。[123]这就意味着，当一个人在这个意义上成为理性主体时，他就成年了，或者说 “占有 “了自己的身体，获得了对身体的完全所有权。(获得完全的自我所有权的行动可以被视为一种拓殖或占有自己的身体——可以说是成年——只要记住这是一种特殊类型的拓殖：不是身体所有者对无主（无代理人）资源的拓殖，而是由理性主体对身体的直接和即时的控制所构成的客观联系而建立的。当孩子具有足够的理性能力，能够独立享有权利时，他就成为完全的自我所有者或身体所有者，因为他可以直接控制自己的身体。正是这两个特征的结合赋予了他对自己身体的所有权：理性主体 + 直接控制。动物也能直接控制自己的身体，但被可以被人拥有，因为它们并不是理性主体，也就是没有权利。可以说，这两个特征都是年幼的人类成为拥有自我的成年人所必需的）。

Obviously, there are other issues that could be explored here: when and exactly how does a child homestead himself, or reach adulthood; and exceptions to the prima facie case, such as where a person commits a crime which in some sense severs his objective link or transfers it to his victim (creating a “superior” link on behalf of the victim), so that the victim has the right to retaliate. But it should be clear that what distinguishes libertarianism from all competing political theories is its scrupulous adherence—informed by sound, i.e., Austrian, economics— to the idea that property rights in scarce resources must be assigned to the person with the best objective link to the resource in question; and that, in the case of bodies, the link is the natural connection to and relationship between the occupant and the body, while for all other resources, the objective link is first use and contractual transfer.

显然，这里还可以探讨其他问题：孩子何时以及究竟如何拓殖自己，或成年；以及表面证据确凿的例外情况，例如某人犯罪，就是在某种意义上切断了他与其身体的客观联系，或将其转让给受害者（代表受害者拥有了 “优先 “联系），因此受害者有权进行报复。但应该清楚的是，自由意志主义与所有相互竞争的权力理论的区别在于，它严格遵守健全的（即奥派经济学的）理念，即稀缺资源的财产权必须分配给与该资源有最佳客观联系的人；就身体而言，这种联系是占有者和身体之间的自然联系和关系，而对于所有其他资源而言，客观联系是首次使用和的转让。

附录APPENDIX

直接控制和客观联系DIRECT CONTROL AND OBJECTIVE LINKS

As noted above, the material here was originally intended to appear in footnote 14, above. Due to its length, I include this material in this appendix.

如上所述，此处的材料原本打算放在上文注释 14 中。由于篇幅较长，我将其列入本附录。

In the text above, I noted that “first use” is not the ultimate test for the “objective link” in the case of body ownership, but that rather it is a person’s direct and immediate control over his body. See also, on this, Rothbard, who argues in favor of self-ownership because the only logical alternatives are “(1) the ‘communist’ one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or (2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another—a system of rule by one class over another.”26 However, Alternative(2) cannot be universal, as it is partial and arbitrary; and Alternative （1）either breaks down in practice and reduces to Alternative（2）, or, if actually implemented, would result in the death of the human race. As Rothbard writes:

我在上文中指出，涉及身体所有权的情况下，”首次使用 “并不是检验 “客观联系 “的最终标准，而是一个人对自己身体的直接和即时控制。关于这一点，也可参见罗斯巴德，他主张自我所有权，因为唯一合乎逻辑的替代方案是：”（1）普遍平等的’共产主义’的他者所有权，或（2）一个群体对另一个群体的部分所有权——一个阶级对另一个阶级的统治制度 “。[124] 然而，备选方案（2）不可能是普遍的，因为它是片面的和武断的；而备选方案（1）要么在实践中崩溃，沦为备选方案（2），要么，如果真正实施，将导致人类的死亡。罗斯巴德写道：

Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish. But if a world of zero or near-zero self-ownership spells death for the human race, then any steps in that direction also contravene the law of what is best for man and his life on earth.27

我们能否想象这样一个世界，在这个世界上，没有人可以在没有事先得到社会上其他人批准的情况下自由地采取任何行动？显然，没有人能够做任何事情，人类将很快灭亡。但是，如果一个零自我所有权或接近零自我所有权的世界会给人类带来死亡，那么朝这个方向迈出的任何一步也都违背了对人类及其在地球上的生活最有利的法则。[125]

Hoppe also writes on this:

If a person A were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods voluntarily (contractually) acquired from another previous owner, then only two alternatives exist. Either another person B must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or else all persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.

霍普还这样写道：

如果一个人 A 不是他自己身体的所有者，也不是先占和/或用这个身体生产的场所和物品以及自愿（）从另一个前所有者那里获得的物品的所有者，那么就只有两种选择。要么承认另一个人 B 是 A 的身体以及由 A 占有、生产或获得的场所和物品的所有者，要么将所有人 A 和 B 视为所有身体、场所和物品的平等共同所有者。

In the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object of exploitation.… such a ruling must be discarded as a human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being (rational animal). From the very outset, any such ruling can be recognized as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law. For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a just rule—it is necessary that such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone.

在第一种情况下，A 将沦为 B 的奴隶和被剥削的对象….，这样的裁决必须作为同样适用于每个人（理性动物）的人类伦理而被抛弃。从一开始，任何这样的裁决就可以被认为不是普遍接受的，因而不能声称代表法律。一项规则要想成为法律——一项公正的规则，就必须平等、普遍地适用于每一个人。

Alternatively, in the second case of universal and equal co-ownership, the requirement of equal law for everyone is fulfilled. However, this alternative suffers from another even more severe deficiency, for if it were applied, all of mankind would instantly perish. (And since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative must be rejected.)

或者，在第二种普遍平等的共同所有权的情况下，人人平等的法律要求也得到了满足。然而，这种选择存在另一个更为严重的缺陷，因为如果适用这种选择，全人类都会立即灭亡。(由于每一种人类伦理都必须允许人类生存，因此必须摒弃这种选择）。

… This insight into the praxeological impossibility of “universal communism,” as Rothbard referred to this proposal, brings us immediately to an alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original appropriation and private property as the only correct solution to the problem of social order.28

……罗斯巴德对 “普遍共产主义”（罗斯巴德称之为 “普遍共产主义”）在行动学上的不可能性的这一洞察力，使我们立即想到了另一种方法，来证明先占和私有财产是解决社会秩序问题的唯一正确的方法。[126]

And in another work, Hoppe adds:

What is wrong with this idea of dropping the prior-later distinction as morally irrelevant? First, if the late-comers, i.e., those who did not in fact do something with some scarce goods, had indeed as much of a right to them as the first-comers, i.e., those who did do something with the scarce goods, then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything, as one would have to have all of the late-comers’ consent prior to doing whatever one wanted to do. Indeed, as posterity would include one’s children’s children—people, that is, who come so late that one could never possibly ask them—advocating a legal system that does not make use of the prior-later distinction as part of its underlying property theory is simply absurd in that it implies advocating death but must presuppose life to advocate anything. Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do, or will survive and say or argue anything if one were to follow this rule. In order for any person—past, present, or future—to argue anything it must be possible to survive now. Nobody can wait and suspend acting until everyone of an indeterminate class of late-comers happens to appear and agree to what one wants to do. Rather, insofar as a person finds himself alone, he must be able to act, to use, produce, consume goods straightaway, prior to any agreement with people who are simply not around yet (and perhaps never will be).29

在另一部著作中，霍普补充道：

把先来-后到的区别视为与道德无关，这种想法存在什么问题呢？首先，如果后到者，即那些事实上没有对某些稀缺物品做任何事情的人，与先来者，即那些确实对稀缺物品做了某些事情的人一样，对这些物品拥有同样多的权利，那么实际上就没有人可以对任何物品做任何事情，因为一个人在做任何事情之前都必须得到所有后到者的同意。事实上，由于子孙后代将包括一个人的孩子的孩子——即那些来得太迟以至于人们永远不可能向他们提出要求的人——倡导一种不把先来后到的区别作为其基本财产理论的一部分的法律制度是荒谬的，因为它意味着主张死亡，但必须以生命为前提才能提出主张。如果遵循这一规则，无论是我们、我们的先辈还是我们的后代，都不可能、做不到或不会存活下来，也不会说什么或论证什么。为了让任何人——过去、现在或未来的人——能够论证任何事情，必须允许他们现在就有可能生存下来。没有人可以等待和暂停行动，直到不确定的后到者中的每个人都碰巧出现并同意自己想要做的事情。相反，只要一个人发现自己孤身一人，在与那些还不在身边（也许永远不会在身边）的人达成任何协议之前，他就必须能够采取行动，直接使用、生产、消费物品。[127]

Marxist philosopher G.A. Cohen acknowledges:

people can do (virtually) nothing without using parts of the external world. If, then, they require the leave of the community to use it, then, effectively…, they do not own themselves, since they can do nothing without communal authorization.30

马克思主义哲学家G.A.科恩（G.A. Cohen）承认:

如果不利用外部世界的某些部分，人们（实际上）什么也做不了。那么，如果他们需要得到社区的许可才能使用，那么，实际上……，他们并不拥有自己，因为没有社区的授权，他们什么也做不了。[128]

Regarding this remark by Cohen, libertarian philosopher Jan Narveson comments: “It is testimony to the strength of our position that even someone so ideologically opposed gives it clear recognition as an argument that must be confronted.”31

对于科恩的这一言论，自由意志主义哲学家扬-纳尔维森（Jan Narveson）评论道： “连意识形态上如此对立的人都明确承认这是一个必须面对的论点，这证明了我们立场的力量。“[129]

John Locke also rejected the idea that people can only use unowned resources by getting the consent of everyone else as absurd:

By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one’s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part.32

约翰-洛克还认为，人们只有征得其他人的同意，才能使用无主资源，这种观点是荒谬的：

每个人都必须明确表示同意，才能将共有资源的一部分据为己有，父亲或主人没有为孩子或仆人做好每块肉的配属，那么后者就不能分割前者提供给他们的共有的食物。[130]

For a point related to those mentioned above, see Hoppe, in the Foreword:

[It is] clear what a human ethic or a theory of justice worth its salt must accomplish. It must give an answer to the question of what am I and what is every other person permitted (or not permitted) to do, right now and right here, wherever a person may find himself and whatever his external surroundings of men and materials may be.

与上述观点相关的一点，见霍普在前言中的论述：

显然，人类伦理或有价值的正义理论必须做到这一点。它必须回答这样一个问题：此时此地，无论一个人身处何地，无论他所处的外部人与物的环境如何，我和其他每个人都被允许（或不被允许）做什么。

A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights

第五章自由意志主义的惩罚与权利理论

I published my first article on libertarian theory, “Estoppel: A New Justification for Individual Rights,” in Reason Papers in 1992.* An expanded treatment was published in the Journal of Libertarian Studies in 1996 and a similar version in the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.† This chapter is based on the latter article, also incorporating some material from the JLS article. There I thanked “Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe and Jack Criss for helpful comments on an earlier draft.”

1992 年，我在《理性论文》*（Reason Papers）上发表了第一篇关于自由意志主义理论的文章《禁止反言》（Estoppel）。自由意志主义研究期刊》（Journal of Libertarian Studies）于 1996 年发表了一篇扩充的文章，《洛杉矶洛约拉法律评论》†（Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review）也发表了类似的文章。在该文中，我感谢 “汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普教授和杰克-克里斯对早先的草稿提出的有益意见”。

Introduction 66

Punishment and Consent 70

Punishment and Estoppel 72

Property Rights 90

Types of Punishments and the Burden of Proof 93
1. Proportional Punishment 93

The Victim’s Options 95

Enhancing Punishment Due to

Other Factors 99

Graduated Scale of Punishment 100
Property Crimes 102

Why Assault, Threats, and Attempts Are Aggression 103

The Burden of Proof 104

Conclusion 109

Appendix: The Justice of Responsive Force 109

[I]t is easier to commit murder than to justify it.1

谋杀比为其辩护更容易。[131]

I. 简介 INTRODUCTION

Punishment serves many purposes. It can deter crime and prevent the offender from committing further crimes. It can even rehabilitate some criminals—except, of course, if it is capital punishment. It can satisfy a victim’s longing for revenge or a relative’s desire to avenge. Punishment can also be used as a lever to obtain restitution or rectification for some of the damage caused by the crime. For these reasons, the issue of punishment is and always has been a vital concern to civilized people. They want to know the effects of punishment and effective ways of carrying it out.2

惩罚有多种目的。它可以震慑犯罪，防止罪犯再次犯罪。它甚至可以改造一些罪犯——当然，死刑除外。惩罚可以满足受害者复仇的渴望或亲属复仇的愿望。惩罚还可以作为一种手段，使犯罪造成的某些损失得到补偿或纠正。出于这些原因，惩罚问题一直是文明人所关心的重要问题。他们希望了解惩罚的效果以及实施惩罚的有效方法。[132]

Civilized people are also concerned about justifying punishment. They want to punish, but they also want to know that such punishment is justified. They want to be able to punish legitimately—hence the interest in punishment theories.3 As pointed out by Murray Rothbard in his short but insightful discussion of punishment and proportionality, however, the theory of punishment has not been adequately developed, even by libertarians.4

文明人也关注惩罚的正当性。他们想要惩罚，但也想知道这种惩罚是否合理。他们希望能够合法地进行惩罚——这就是人们对惩罚理论感兴趣的原因。[133]然而，正如默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）在其关于惩罚与相称性的简短而精辟的论述中所指出的，惩罚理论尚未得到充分发展，即使是自由意志主义者也是如此。[134]

In conventional theories of punishment, concepts of restitution, deterrence,5 retribution, and rehabilitation are often forwarded as justifications for punishment, even though they are really the effects or purposes of punishment.6 This reversal of logic is not surprising given the consequentialist, result-oriented type of thinking that is so prevalent nowadays. Nevertheless, the effects of punishment or the uses to which it might be put do not justify punishment.

在传统的惩罚理论中，赔偿，威慑、[135] 报复和改造等概念常常被作为惩罚的理由而提出，尽管它们实际上是惩罚的效果或目的。[136] 鉴于当今盛行的结果主义、结果导向型思维，这种逻辑颠倒并不奇怪。然而，惩罚的效果或惩罚的用途并不能证明惩罚就是正当的。

Take the analogous case of free speech rights as an example. Modernday liberals and other consequentialists typically seek to justify the First Amendment right to free speech on the grounds that free speech promotes political discourse.7 But, as libertarians—the most systematic and coherent school of modern political philosophy and the contemporary heirs of the classical liberal Founding Fathers—have explained, there is a right to free speech simply because it does not involve aggression against others, not because it “promotes political discussion.”8

以类似的言论自由权为例。现代自由主义者和其他结果论者通常以言论自由促进政治对话为由，为第一修正案规定的言论自由权辩护。[137] 但是，正如自由意志主义——现代政治哲学中最系统、最一致连贯的流派以及作为古典自由主义开国元勋的当代继承者——所解释的那样，言论自由权的存在仅仅是因为它不涉及对他人的侵犯，而不是因为它 “促进了政治讨论 “。[138]

This analogy highlights the fact that the purpose to which a right holder might put the right is not necessarily what justifies the right in the first place. Turning back to punishment, if individuals have a right to punish, the purpose for which a person exercises this right— for example, for revenge, for restitution, or for deterrence—and the consequences that flow from it may well be irrelevant to the question of whether the right claimed can be justified.9

这一类比强调了这样一个事实，即权利人行使权利的目的并不一定证明权利的正当性。回过头来看惩罚，如果个人有惩罚权，那么一个人行使这一权利的目的——例如为了复仇、恢复原状或威慑——以及由此产生的后果很可能与所主张的权利是否正当的问题无关。[139]

In this chapter I will attempt to explain how and why punishment can be justified. The right to punish discussed herein applies to property crimes such as theft and trespass as well as to bodily-invasive crimes such as assault, rape, and murder. I will develop a retributionist, or lex talionis, theory of punishment, including related principles of proportionality. This theory of punishment is largely consistent with the libertarian-based lex talionis approach of Murray Rothbard.10 I will not follow the approach of some theorists who derive principles of punishment from a theory of rights or from some other ethical or utilitarian theory. Instead, I will follow the opposite approach in which justifying punishment itself defines and justifies our rights.11

在本章中，我将尝试解释如何以及为什么惩罚是正当的。本文讨论的惩罚权适用于财产犯罪，如盗窃和非法侵入，也适用于侵犯人身的犯罪，如殴打、强奸和谋杀。我将提出一种惩罚的报应主义（或称lex talionis）理论，包括相关的比例原则。这一惩罚理论在很大程度上与默里-罗斯巴德[140]（Murray Rothbard）基于自由意志主义的 “惩罚法”（lex talionis）方法相一致。一些理论家从权利理论或其他伦理或功利主义理论中推导出惩罚原则，我不会效仿他们的做法。相反，我将采用相反的方法，即惩罚本身的正当性界定并证明了我们的权利。[141]

II. 惩罚与许可PUNISHMENT AND CONSENT

What does it mean to punish? Dictionary definitions are easy to come by, but in the sense that interests those of us who want to punish, punishment is the infliction of physical force on a person in response to something that the person has done or has failed to do.12 Thus, punishment comprises physical violence committed against a person’s body, against any property (resource) that a person legitimately owns, or against any rights that a person has.13 It is a use of someone’s body or owned resource without their currently-expressed consent, that is, over their expressed objection. Punishment is distinct from aggression, in that it is for, or in response to, some action, inaction, feature, or status of the person punished; otherwise, it is simply random violence or aggression, unconnected with some previous action or inaction of the one punished.14 Naked aggression against an innocent victim is not punishment; it is simply aggression. When we punish a person, it is because we consider that person to be a wrongdoer of some sort. We typically want to teach that person or others a lesson or exact vengeance or restitution for what that person has done.

惩罚意味着什么？词典中的定义很容易找到，但对于我们这些想要实施惩罚的人感兴趣的那种意义而言，惩罚是对一个人施加有形的物理力量，以回应这个人所做的事情或未做成的事情。[142]因此，惩罚包括对一个人的身体、一个人合法拥有的任何财产（资源）或一个人拥有的任何权利实施的有形的武力。[143]它是指未经某人当前明确表示的同意，即在其明确表示反对的情况下，使用其身体或所拥有的资源。惩罚有别于侵犯，因为惩罚是针对或回应被惩罚者的某些行为、不作为、特征或状态；否则，惩罚就只是随意的武力或侵犯，与被惩罚者之前的某些行为或不作为无关。[144]对无辜受害者赤裸裸的侵犯不是惩罚，而只是侵犯。当我们惩罚一个人的时候，是因为我们认为这个人犯了某种错误。我们通常想给这个人或其他人一个教训，或对其所作所为进行精确的报复或赔偿。

If wrongdoers always consented to the infliction of punishment in response to the perpetration of a crime or tort, we would not need to justify punishment. It would be justified by the very consent of the purported wrongdoer. As the Roman jurist Ulpian summarized this commonsense insight centuries ago, “there is no affront [or injustice] where the victim consents.”15 The need to justify punishment only arises when a person resists and refuses to consent to being punished. As philosopher John Hospers notes, the very thing that is troublesome about punishment “is that in punishing someone, we are forcibly imposing on him something against his will, and of which he may not approve.”16

如果不法行为人总是同意对犯罪或侵权行为实施惩罚，我们就不需要证明惩罚的正当性。所谓的不法行为人的同意本身就证明了惩罚的正当性。正如罗马法学家乌尔皮安（Ulpian）在几个世纪前总结的这一常识性见解，”只要受害者同意，就不存在侮辱[或不公正]”。[145]只有当一个人反抗并拒绝同意接受惩罚时，才需要为惩罚辩护。正如哲学家约翰·霍普斯（John Hospers）所指出的，惩罚的麻烦之处就在于 “在惩罚某人时，我们违背了他的意愿，强行将他可能不同意的东西强加于他 “。[146]

I will thus seek to justify punishment exactly where it needs to be justified: the point at which we attempt to inflict punishment upon people who oppose it. In short, I will argue that society may justly punish those who have initiated force, in a manner proportionate to their initiation of force and to the consequences thereof, because they cannot coherently object to such punishment. In brief, it makes no sense for them to object to punishment because this requires that they maintain that the infliction of force is unjustified, which is contradictory because they intentionally initiated force themselves. Thus, they are dialogically estopped, to use related legal terminology, or precluded, from denying the legitimacy of their being punished and from withholding their consent.17 As argued below, this reasoning may be used to develop a theory of punishment and rights.

因此，我将在惩罚需要正当化的地方，即我们试图对反对惩罚的人实施惩罚的地方，寻求惩罚的正当化。简言之，我将论证，社会可以公正地惩罚那些主动使用武力的人，惩罚的方式与其使用武力的行为及其后果相称，因为他们无法逻辑一致地反对这种惩罚。简言之，他们反对惩罚是没有意义的，因为这要求他们坚持认为使用武力是不正当的，而这是自相矛盾的，因为他们自己故意使用了武力。因此，用相关的法律术语来说，他们在对话中被禁止（或被排除）否认他们受到惩罚的合法性和拒绝同意。[147] 正如下文所论证的，这一推理可用于发展惩罚与权利理论。

III. 惩罚和禁止反言PUNISHMENT AND ESTOPPEL

A. 法律上的禁止反言Legal Estoppel

Estoppel is a well-known common law principle that prevents or precludes someone from making a legal claim that is inconsistent with prior conduct if some other person has changed position detrimentally in reliance on the prior conduct (referred to as “detrimental reliance”).18 Estoppel thus denies a party the ability to assert a fact or right that the party otherwise could. Estoppel is a widely applicable legal principle that has countless manifestations.19 Roman law and its modern heir, the civil law, contain the similar doctrine “venire contra proprium factum,” or “no one can contradict his own act.”20 Under this principle, “no one is allowed to ignore or deny his own acts, or the consequences thereof, and claim a right in opposition to such acts or consequences.”21 Estoppel may even be applied if a person’s silent acquiescence in the face of a duty to speak amounts to a representation.22 The principle behind estoppel can also be seen in common sayings such as “actions speak louder than words,” “practice what you preach,” and “put your money where your mouth is,” all of which embody the idea that actions and assertions should be consistent.23 As Lord Coke stated, the word “estoppel” is used “because a man’s own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth.”24

禁止反言是一项众所周知的普通法原则，它阻止或排除某人提出与先前行为不一致的法律主张，如果其他人因依赖先前行为而不利地改变了立场（称为 “不利依赖”）。[148] 因此，禁止反言剥夺了一方当事人主张其原本可以主张的事实或权利的能力。禁止反言是一项广泛适用的法律原则，有无数种表现形式。[149] 罗马法及其现代继承者大陆法系都包含类似的原则 “venire contra proprium factum”，即 “任何人不得反驳自己的行为 “。[150] 根据这一原则，”任何人不得忽视或否认自己的行为或其后果，并主张与这些行为或后果相对立的权利 “。[151]如果一个人在有义务说话的情况下无声的默许相当于一种陈述，那么禁止反言也可以适用。 [152]不容反悔背后的原则还体现在 “行胜于言”、”言出必行 “和 “言行一致 “等俗语中，所有这些俗语都体现了行动和主张应保持一致的理念。[153] 正如科克勋爵（Lord Coke）所说，”禁止反言 “一词的使用 “是因为一个人的自身行为或接受阻止或封住了他的嘴，使他不能主张或申辩真相。[154]

For legal estoppel to operate, there usually must have been detrimental reliance by the person seeking to estop another.25 Proof of detrimental reliance is required because until a person has relied on another’s prior action or representation, the action or representation has not caused any harm, and thus, there is no reason to estop the actor from asserting the truth or from rejecting the prior conduct.26

为使法律禁止反言生效，寻求禁止他人反言的人通常必须有损害性依赖。[155]之所以需要证明致害依赖，是因为在某人依赖他人先前的行为或陈述之前，该行为或陈述并未造成任何损害，因此，没有理由禁止行动人主张事实真相或拒绝先前的行为。[156]

As an example, in the recent case Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, a daughter sued her father for tuition fee debts she had incurred during her second and third years at college.27 In this case, when the daughter was a senior in high school, the father promised to pay her tuition fees and related expenses if she attended a local college (Adelphi University). However, the promise was a “mere” promise, because it was not accompanied by the requisite legal formalities such as consideration, and therefore did not constitute a normally binding contract. Nevertheless, during her first year at college, her father paid her tuition for her, as he had promised. However, he failed to pay her tuition during the second and third years, although he repeatedly assured her during this time that he would pay the tuition fees when he had the money. This resulted in the daughter’s legal obligation to pay approximately $6,700 to Adelphi. In this case, although the promise itself did not give rise to an enforceable contract (because of lack of legal formalities such as consideration), it was found that the father should have reasonably expected that his daughter would rely on his promise, and that she did in fact rely on the promise, taking substantial action to her detriment or disadvantage (namely, incurring a debt to Adelphi). Therefore, the daughter was awarded an amount sufficient to cover the unpaid tuition. The father was, in effect, estopped from denying that a contract was formed, even though one was not.28

例如，在最近的 “齐默尔曼诉齐默尔曼”（Zimmerman v. Zimmerman）一案中，一名女儿就其父亲在其大学二年级和三年级期间欠下的学费提起诉讼。[157]在此案中，女儿读高三时，父亲承诺如果她上当地的一所大学（阿德尔菲大学），就会支付她的学费和相关费用。然而，该承诺只是一个 “单纯 “的承诺，因为它没有附带必要的法律手续，如对价，因此不构成一个具有正常约束力的。尽管如此，在她上大学的第一年，她的父亲还是按照承诺为她支付了学费。然而，在第二年和第三年，他却没有为她支付学费，尽管在此期间他一再向她保证，等他有钱了就会支付学费。这导致女儿有法律义务向阿德尔菲大学支付约 6700 美元。在本案中，虽然承诺本身并不构成可强制执行的（因为缺乏对价等法律手续），但法院认为，父亲本应合理地预见到其女儿会依赖他的承诺，而且她实际上也确实依赖了该承诺，采取了对她不利或造成损害的实质性行动（即欠下阿德尔菲大学的债务）。因此，女儿获得了一笔足以支付未付学费的赔偿金额。实际上，即使并未形成，父亲也被禁止否认的成立。[158]

B. 对话式的禁止反言Dialogical Estoppel

As can be seen, the heart of the idea behind legal estoppel is consistency. A similar concept, “dialogical estoppel,” can be used to justify the libertarian conception of rights because of the reciprocity inherent in the libertarian tenet that force is legitimate only in response to force and because of the consistency that must apply to aggressors trying to argue why they should not be punished.29 The basic insight behind this theory of rights is that people who initiate force cannot consistently object to being punished. They are dialogically, so to speak, “estopped” from asserting the impropriety of the force used to punish them because of their own coercive behavior. This theory also establishes the validity of the libertarian conception of rights as being strictly negative rights against aggression.

可以看出，法律禁止反言背后的核心思想是一致性。一个类似的概念，即 “对话式禁止反言”，可被用于为自由意志主义的权利概念提供正当性，因为自由意志主义的信条中固有的对等性原则，即武力只有在回应武力时才是合法的，而且侵害者在试图论证为什么他们不应该受到惩罚时必须适用一致性。 [159]这一权利理论背后的基本观点是，主动使用武力的人无法始终如一地反对受到惩罚。可以说，由于他们自身的胁迫行为，他们在对话中被 “禁止 “主张用来惩罚他们的武力是不恰当的。这一理论也确立了自由意志主义的权利概念的正确性，即权利是反对侵犯的严格的消极权利。

The point at which punishment needs to be justified is when we attempt to inflict punishment upon a person who opposes it. Thus, using a philosophical, generalized version of dialogical estoppel, I want to justify punishment in just this situation by showing that an aggressor is estopped from objecting to punishment. Under the principle of dialogical estoppel, or simply “estoppel,” a person is estopped from making certain claims during discourse if these claims are inconsistent and contradictory. To say that a person is estopped from making certain claims means that the claims cannot possibly be right because they are contradictory. It is to recognize that his assertion is simply wrong because it is contradictory.

当我们试图对一个反对惩罚的人实施惩罚时，就需要证明惩罚的正当性。因此，我想利用对话式禁止反言的哲学的一般化的版本，证明侵害者不得反对惩罚，从而在这种情况下证明惩罚的正当性。根据对话式的禁止反言原则（或简称 “禁止反言”），如果一个人在话语中提出的某些主张是前后不一致和相互矛盾的，那么他就会被禁止提出这些主张。说某人被禁止提出某些主张，意味着这些主张不可能是正确的，因为它们相互矛盾。认识到他的主张完全是错误的，因为它自相矛盾。

Applying estoppel in this manner perfectly complements the purpose of dialogue. Dialogue, discourse, or argument—terms that are used interchangeably herein—is by its nature an activity aimed at finding truth. Anyone engaged in argument is necessarily endeavoring to discern the truth about some particular subject; otherwise, there is no dialogue occurring but mere babbling or even physical fighting. This cannot be denied. Any person arguing long enough to deny that truth is the goal of discourse contradicts this denial because that person is asserting or challenging the truth of a given proposition. Thus, asserting that something is true that cannot be true is incompatible with the purpose of discourse. Anything that clearly cannot be true is contrary to the truth-finding purpose of discourse and, consequently, is impermissible within the bounds of the discourse.

以这种方式应用禁止反言完全符合对话的目的。对话、交谈或争论——这些术语在本文中交替使用——就其本质而言，是一种旨在发现真理的活动。任何参与争论的人都必然在努力探寻某个特定主题的真相；否则，就不是对话，而只是胡言乱语，甚至是肢体冲突。这一点不容否认。任何长时间争论而否认真理是话语目标的人，都与这一否认相矛盾，因为这个人是在断言或质疑给定命题的真理性。因此，断言不可能为真的事物为真，这与对话的目的是不相容的。任何显然不可能为真的事物都违背了对话探求真理的目的，因此在对话的范围内是不允许的。

Contradictions are certainly the archetype of propositions that cannot be true. A and not-A cannot both be true simultaneously and in the same respect.30 This is why participants in discourse must be consistent. If an arguer does not need to be consistent, truth-finding cannot occur. And just as the traditional legal theory of estoppel mandates a sort of consistency in a legal context, the more general use of estoppel can be used to require consistency in discourse. The theory of estoppel that I propose is nothing more than a convenient way to apply the requirement of consistency to arguers—those engaged in discourse, dialogue, debate, discussion, or argumentation. Because discourse is a truth-finding activity, any such contradictory claims should be disregarded since they cannot possibly be true. Dialogical estoppel is thus a rule of discourse that rejects any inconsistent, mutually contradictory claims because they are contrary to the very goal of discourse. This rule is based solely on the recognition that discourse is a truth-seeking activity and that contradictions, which are necessarily untrue, are incompatible with discourse and thus should not be allowed.31 The validity of this rule is undeniable because it is necessarily presupposed by any participant in discourse.

自相矛盾毫无疑问是不可能为真的命题的原型。A与非A不可能同时且在同一方面为真[160]。这就是对话的参与者必须前后一致的原因。如果论证者不需要保持一致，真理的探寻就不可能发生。正如禁止反言的传统法律理论在法律语境中强制要求某种一致性一样，禁止反言的更一般用法也可以用来要求对话中的一致性。我提出的禁止反言理论不过是将一致性要求应用于论证者——那些参与交谈、对话、辩论、讨论或论证的人——的一种便捷方式。因为对话交流是一种探求真理的活动，任何此类自相矛盾的主张都应被忽略，因为它们不可能为真。因此，”禁止反言”（dialogical estoppel）是一种话语规则，它拒绝任何不一致的、相互矛盾的主张，因为它们违背了对话的根本目标。这一规则完全基于这样一种认识，即对话交流是一种寻求真理的活动，而矛盾必然非真，与对话不相容，因此不应被允许。 [161] 这一规则的有效性是不可否认的，因为任何对话交流的参与者都必然预设了这一规则。

There are various ways that contradictions can arise in discourse. First, an arguer’s position might be explicitly inconsistent. For example, if a person states that A is true and that not-A is also true, there is no doubt that the person is incorrect. After all, as Ayn Rand repeatedly emphasized, A is A; the law of identity is indeed valid and unchallengeable.32 It is impossible for him33 to coherently and intelligibly assert that two contradictory statements are true; it is impossible for these claims to both be true. Thus, he is estopped from asserting them and is not heard to utter them because they cannot tend to establish the truth, which is the goal of all argumentation.34As Wittgenstein noted, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”35

话语中出现矛盾有多种方式。首先，论证者的立场可能明显不一致。例如，如果一个人说 A 是真的，而非 A 也是真的，那么毫无疑问，这个人是不正确的。毕竟，正如安-兰德（Ayn Rand）反复强调的那样，A 就是 A；同一性法则确实有效，不容质疑[162]。他[163] 不可能逻辑一致地断言两个相互矛盾的说法都为真；这两种说法不可能都为真。因此，他被禁止主张这两种说法，也听不到他说这两种说法，因为这两种说法不可能确立真理，而真理是一切论证的目标[164]。正如维特根斯坦所指出的，”对于不可言说之物，我们必须保持沉默”[165]。

An arguer’s position can also be inconsistent without explicitly maintaining that A and not-A are true. Indeed, rarely will an arguer assert both A and not-A explicitly. However, whenever an arguer states that A is true, and also necessarily holds that not-A is true, the inconsistency is still there, and he is still estopped from explicitly claiming that A is true and implicitly claiming that not-A is true. The reason is the same as above: he cannot possibly be right that explicit A and implicit not-A are both true. Now he might, in some cases, be able to remove the inconsistency by dropping one of the claims. For example, suppose he asserts that the concept of gross national product is meaningful and a minute later states the exact opposite, apparently contradicting the earlier assertion. To avoid inconsistency, he can disclaim the earlier statement, thereby necessarily maintaining that the previous statement was incorrect. But it is not always possible to drop one of the assertions if it is unavoidably presupposed as true by the arguer. For example, the speaker might argue that he never argues. However, since he is currently arguing, he must necessarily, at least implicitly, hold or recognize that he sometimes argues. We would not recognize the contradictory claims as permissible in the argument because contradictions are untrue. The speaker would be estopped from maintaining these two contradictory claims, one explicit and one implicit, and he could not drop the second claim—that he sometimes argues—for he cannot help but hold this view while engaged in argumentation itself. To maintain an arguable—that is, possibly true—position, he would have to renounce the first claim that he never argues.

一个论证者的立场也可以是不一致的，而不必明确坚持 A 和非 A 均为真。事实上，论证者很少会同时明确断言 A 和非 A。然而，只要论证者声明 A 为真，同时也必然认为非 A 为真，那么不一致就仍然存在，他仍然被禁止明确地声称 A 为真，同时也不能含蓄地声称非 A 为真。原因同上：他不可能正确地认为显式 A 和隐式非 A 都为真。现在，在某些情况下，他也许可以通过放弃其中一个断言来消除不一致。例如，假设他断言国民生产总值的概念是有意义的，但一分钟后又说了完全相反的话，显然与先前的断言相矛盾。为了避免前后矛盾，他可以放弃先前的说法，从而必然得出先前的说法是不正确的。但是，如果论证者不可避免地预设其中一个断言为真，那么就不一定能放弃这个断言。例如，说话人可能会说他从不论证。然而，既然他现在正在论证，那么他必然（至少是隐含地）认为或承认他有时会论证。我们不会承认论证中允许矛盾的说法，因为矛盾为非真。说话者将被禁止坚持这两个相互矛盾的主张，一个是明确的，一个是隐含的，他不能放弃第二个主张——他有时会论证——因为他在进行论证时不得不坚持这一观点。要维持一个可论证的——也就是可能为真的——立场，他就必须放弃第一个主张，即他从不论证。

Alternatively, if this person was so incoherent as to argue that he somehow does not believe or recognize that arguing is possible, despite engaging in it, he would still be estopped from asserting that argumentation is impossible. For even if he does not actually realize that argumentation is possible—or, what is more likely, does not actually admit it—it still cannot be the case that argumentation is impossible if someone is indeed arguing.

或者，如果这个人语无伦次地辩称，他不相信或不承认论证是可能的，尽管他参与了论证，但他仍然被禁止断言论证是不可能的。因为即使他实际上没有意识到论证是可能的——或者更有可能的是，他实际上并不承认这一点——但如果有人确实在争论，就仍然不可能说论证是不可能的。

We know this to be true whether or not others admit or recognize this. Thus, if someone asserts that argumentation is impossible, this assertion contradicts the undeniable presupposition of argumentation—that argumentation is possible. This person’s proposition is facially untrue. Again, the person would be estopped from asserting such a claim since it is not even possibly true; the assertion flies in the face of undeniably true facts of reality.

无论他人是否承认或认识到这一点，我们都知道这是事实。因此，如果有人断言论证是不可能的，那么这个断言就与论证的不可否认的前提——论证是可能的——相矛盾。这个人的命题一眼看出就是不真实的。同样，这个人也被禁止断言这种的主张，因为它根本不可能为真；这种断言与不可否认的真实的现实事实背道而驰。

Thus, because dialogue is a truth-finding activity, participants are estopped from making explicitly contradictory assertions since they subvert the goal of truth-seeking by being necessarily false. For the same reason, arguers are estopped from asserting one thing if (1) it contradicts something else that they necessarily maintain to be true;（2）it contradicts something that is necessarily true because it is a presupposition of discourse; or (3) it is necessarily true as an undeniable feature of reality or human existence. Further, no one can disagree with these general conclusions without self-contradiction, for anyone disagreeing with anything is a participant in discourse and, therefore, necessarily values truth-finding and consistency.

因此，由于对话是一种探求真理的活动，参与者被禁止提出明显矛盾的论断，因为这些论断必然是假的，从而颠覆了探求真理的目标。出于同样的原因，在以下情况下，论证者也不得断言某件事情：（1）它与他们认为必然为真的其他事物相矛盾；（2）它与必然为真的事物相矛盾，因为这些事物是对话的前提；或者（3）作为现实或人类存在的一个不可否认的特征，它必然为真。此外，没有人可以在不自相矛盾的情况下不同意这些一般性结论，因为任何不同意的人都是对话的参与者，因此必然重视真理的探索和逻辑一致性。

C. 惩罚侵犯行为Punishing Aggressive Behavior

The conduct of individuals can be divided into two types: (1) coercive or aggressive—that is, the initiation of force—and (2) noncoercive or nonaggressive. This division is purely descriptive and does not presume that aggression is invalid, immoral, or unjustifiable. It onlyassumes that at least some human action can be objectively classified as either aggressive or nonaggressive.36 Thus, there are two types of behavior for which we might attempt to punish a person: aggressive and nonaggressive.37 I will examine each in turn to show that punishment of aggressive behavior is legitimate while punishment of nonaggressive behavior is illegitimate.

个人行为可分为两类：(1) 强制性或侵犯性——即使用武力；(2) 非强制性或非侵犯性。这种划分纯粹是描述性的，并不假定侵犯是无效、不道德或不正当的。它只是假定至少人的行动可以客观地划分为侵犯性或非侵犯性。[166]因此，我们可以尝试对两类行为进行惩罚：侵犯性和非侵犯性。[167]我将依次研究这两种行为，以说明对侵犯行为的惩罚是合法的，而对非侵犯行为的惩罚是非法的。

The clearest and most severe instance of aggression is murder, so let us take this as an example. In what follows I will assume that the victim B, or B’s agent, C, attempts to punish a purported wrongdoer A.38 Suppose that A murders B, and C convicts and imprisons A. In order for A to object to his punishment, A must claim that C should not and must not treat him this way; that he has a right39 to not be punished or, at least, that the use of force is wrong so that C should, therefore, not punish him.40 However, such a claim is blatantly inconsistent with what must be A’s other position: because A murdered B, which is clearly an act of aggression, his actions have indicated that he also holds the view that “aggression is not wrong.”

最明显、最严重的侵犯是谋杀，让我们以此为例。在下文中，我将假定受害者 B 或 B 的代理人 C 试图惩罚所谓的不法行为人 A。[168] 假设 A 谋杀了 B，C 将 A 定罪并监禁。A 要反对对他的惩罚，就必须声称 C 不应该也一定不能这样对待他；他有权[169]不受惩罚，或者至少使用武力是错误的，因此 C 不应该惩罚他。[170] 然而，这样的主张显然与A 的另一个立场明显不一致：因为 A 谋杀了 B，这无疑是一种侵犯行为，他的行为已经表明他也持有 “侵犯没有错 “的观点。

Thus, because of his earlier actions, A is estopped from claiming that aggression is wrong.41 He cannot assert contradictory claims and is estopped from doing so. The only way for A to maintain consistency is to drop one of his claims. If A retains only the claim “aggression is proper,” then he is failing to object to his imprisonment; thus, the question of justifying the punishment does not arise. By claiming that aggression is proper, A consents to his punishment. If, on the other hand, A drops his claim that “aggression is proper” and retains only his claim that “aggression is wrong,” he indeed could object to his imprisonment. As we shall see below, it is impossible for him to drop the claim that “aggression is proper” just as it would be impossible for him to avoid maintaining that he exists or that he can argue.

因此，由于A先前的行为，他不得声称侵犯是错误的。[171]他不能提出相互矛盾的主张，也被禁止提出相互矛盾的主张。对A来说要保持一致性的唯一办法，就是放弃其中一个主张。如果 A 只保留 “侵犯是正当的 “这一主张，那么他就不能反对监禁他，因此就不存在惩罚是否正当的问题。通过主张侵犯是正当的，A 就同意了对他的惩罚。另一方面，如果A放弃 “侵犯是正当的 “这一主张，只保留 “侵犯是错误的 “这一主张，那么他确实可以反对监禁他。我们将在下文中看到，他不可能放弃 “侵犯是正当的 “这一主张，正如他不可能不坚持他存在或他可以论证一样。

To restate, A cannot consistently claim that murder is wrong, for it contradicts his view that murder is not wrong, evidenced by or made manifest in his previous act of murder. A is estopped from asserting such inconsistent claims. Therefore, if C attempts to kill A, A has no grounds for objecting since he cannot now say that such a killing by C is “wrong,”“immoral,” or “improper” or that it would violate his “rights.” And if A cannot complain if C proposes to kill him, then, a fortiori, he surely cannot complain if C merely imprisons him.42 Thus, we can legitimately apply force to—punish—a murderer in response to the crime. (And of course, if an aggressor may be punished after the fact, force used in self-defense is, a fortiori, obviously justified.)43

重述一下，A不能逻辑一直地主张谋杀是错误的，因为这与他认为谋杀不是错误的观点相矛盾，他以前的谋杀行为证明了这一点，或表明了这一点。A被禁止提出这种前后矛盾的主张。因此，如果 C 企图杀害 A，A 没有理由反对，因为他现在不能说 C 的这种杀害行为是 “错误的”、”不道德的 “或 “不正当的”，也不能说这会侵犯他的 “权利”。如果 A 不能抱怨 C 提议杀害他，那么更不用说，如果 C 只是监禁他，他肯定也不能抱怨。[172]因此，我们可以合法地对杀人犯使用武力——惩罚他——以应对犯罪。 (当然，如果侵害者可以在事后受到惩罚，那么更不用说，在自卫时使用武力显然是正当的）。[173]

Because the essence of rights is their legitimate enforceability, this establishes a right to life—that is, to not be murdered. It is easy to see how this example may be extended to less severe forms of aggression, such as assault and battery, kidnapping, and rape.44

由于权利的本质在于其合法的可实施性，这就确立了生命权，即不被谋杀的权利。不难看出，这个例子可以扩展到不太严重的侵犯形式，如攻击和殴打、绑架和强奸。[174]

D. 对侵犯的潜在防卫Potential Defenses by the Aggressor

A might assert several possible objections to this whole procedure. None of them bear scrutiny, however.

A可能会对整个程序提出若干反对意见。不过，这些反对意见都经不起推敲。

1. 侵犯的概念The Concept of Aggression

First, A might claim that the classification of actions as either aggressive or not aggressive is invalid. We might be smuggling in a norm or value judgment just by describing murder as “aggressive” rather than merely describing the murder without evaluative overtones. This smuggled norm might be what apparently justifies the legitimacy of punishing A, thus making the justification circular and, therefore, faulty. However, in order to object to our punishment of him, A must admit the validity of describing some actions as forceful—namely, his imminent punishment. If he denies that any actions can be objectively described as being coercive, he has no grounds to object to imprisonment, for he cannot even be certain what constitutes punishment, and we may proceed to punish him. The moment he objects to this use of force, he cannot help admitting that at least some actions can be objectively classified as involving force. Thus, he is estopped from objecting on these grounds.

首先，A 可能会主张，将行为划分为 “侵犯性 “或 “非侵犯性 “是无效的。我们将谋杀描述为 “侵犯”，而不仅仅是描述谋杀而不带评价色彩，这可能就偷换了一种规范或价值判断。这种被偷换的规范可能是惩罚 A 的合法性的明显理由，从而使这种理由成为循环论证，因此是错误的。然而，为了反对我们对他的惩罚，A 必须承认将某些行为描述为强制行为的有效性，即他即将受到的惩罚。如果他否认任何行为都可以客观地描述为强制性的，那么他就没有理由反对监禁，因为他甚至不能确定什么是惩罚，而我们可以继续惩罚他。一旦他反对使用武力，他就不能不承认，至少有些行为可以客观地归类为涉及武力。因此，他被禁止以这些理由提出反对。

2. 普适性Universalizability

It could also be objected that the estoppel principle is being improperly applied and that A is not, in fact, asserting inconsistent claims. Instead of having the contradictory views that “aggression is proper” and “aggression is improper,” A could claim to hold the consistent positions that “aggression by me is proper” and “aggression by others against me is improper.” However, we must recall that A, in objecting to C’s imprisonment of him, is engaging in argument. He is arguing that C should not—for some good reason—imprison him, and so he is making normative assertions. But as Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe points out:

也有人可能会反对说，禁止反言原则的适用是不恰当的，A 实际上并没有声明不一致的主张。与其说 A 持有 “侵犯是正当的 “和 “侵犯是不正当的 “这两种相互矛盾的观点，倒不如说 A 持有 “我的侵犯是正当的 “和 “他人对我的侵犯是不正当的 “这两种前后一致的立场。然而，我们必须记住，A 反对 C 监禁他，是在进行论证。他是在论证 C 不应该——出于某种充分的理由——监禁他，因此他是在做出规范性断言。但正如汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普教授所指出的：

Quite commonly it has been observed that argumentation implies that a proposition claims universal acceptability, or, should it be a norm proposal, that it is “universalizable.” Applied to norm proposals, this is the idea, as formulated in the Golden Rule of ethics or in the Kantian Categorical Imperative, that only those norms can be justified that can be formulated as general principles which are valid for everyone without exception.45

人们通常认为，论证意味着一个命题主张具有普遍可接受性，或者说，如果它是一个规范建议，它是 “可普遍化的”。应用于规范建议，这就是在伦理学的黄金法则或康德的绝对命令中提出的观点，即只有那些可以被表述为对每个人都无一例外有效的一般原则的规范才是正当的。[175]

This is so because propositions made during argumentation claim universal acceptability. “[I]t is implied in argumentation that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced by it simply because of its argumentative force…”46 Thus, universalizability is a presupposition of normative discourse, and any arguer violating the principle of universalizability is maintaining inconsistent positions—that universalizability is required and that it is not—and is thus estopped from doing so. Only universalizable normative propositions are consistent with the principle of universalizability necessarily presupposed by the arguer in entering the discourse. As Hare points out:

之所以如此，是因为论证过程中提出的命题具有普遍可接受性。”论证中隐含的意思是，每个能理解论证的人原则上都能被论证说服，这仅仅是因为论证的论证力…… “[176] 因此，普适性是规范性对话的前提，任何违反普适性原则的论证者都是在坚持不一致的矛盾立场——即普适性是必要的，又认为它不是——因而被禁止这样做。只有可普遍化的规范性命题才符合论证者在进入话语时必然预设的普遍化原则。正如 Hare 所指出的：

Offenses against the thesis of universalizability are logical, not moral. If a person says ‘I ought to act in a certain way, but nobody else ought to act in that way in relevantly similar circumstances’, then … he is abusing the word ‘ought’ he is implicitly contradicting himself [A]ll [the thesis of universalizability] does is to force people to choose between judgements which cannot both be asserted without self-contradiction.47

违背普适性论点的行为是逻辑上的，而不是道德上的。如果一个人说’我应该以某种方式行事，但其他人在相关的类似情况下不应该以这种方式行事’，那么……他就是在滥用’应该’一词，他就是在暗中自相矛盾……他是在滥用’应该’这个词，是在暗中自相矛盾。[所有普适性论点所做的]只是迫使人们在那些若同时断言就会自相矛盾的判断之间做出选择。[177]

The proper way, then, to select the norm that the arguer is asserting is to ensure that it is universalizable. The view that “aggression by me is proper” and “aggression by the state against me is improper” clearly does not pass this test. The view that “aggression is or is not proper” is, by contrast, perfectly universalizable and is thus the proper form for a norm. An arguer cannot escape the application of estoppel by arbitrarily specializing otherwise inconsistent views with liberally sprinkled “for me only’s.”48

因此，选择论证者所主张的规范的正确方法是确保其具有普适性。认为 “我的侵犯是正当的 “和 “国家对我的侵犯是不正当的 “的观点显然没有通过这一检验。相比之下，”侵犯是或不是正当的 “这一观点完全可以普遍适用，因此是规范的适当形式。论证者不能通过任意地将本来不一致的观点专门化，并随意地扔下一句 “只供我使用 “[178]来逃避禁止反言的适用。

Furthermore, even if A denies the validity of the principle of universalizability and maintains that he can particularize norms, he cannot object if C does the same. If A admits that norms may be particularized, C may simply act on the particular norm that “It is permissible to punish A.”

此外，即使 A 否认普适性原则的有效性，并坚持认为他可以将规范特殊化，但如果 C 也这样做，他也不能反对。如果 A 承认规范可以特殊化，那么 C 只需根据 “惩罚 A 是允许的 “这一特殊规范行事即可。

3. 时间Time

A could also attempt to rebut this application of estoppel by claiming that he, in fact, does currently maintain that aggression is improper and that he has changed his mind since the time when B was murdered.

A 也可以试图这一禁止反言的适用，主张他事实上目前确实坚持认为侵犯是不正当的，而且自 B 被谋杀后他已经改变了想法。

Thus, there is no inconsistency or contradiction because he does not simultaneously hold both contradictory ideas and is not estopped from objecting to imprisonment.49

因此，不存在不一致或矛盾之处，因为他并没有同时持有这两种相互矛盾的想法，也没有被禁止反对监禁。[179]

But this is a simple matter to overcome. First, A is implicitly claiming that the passage of time should be taken into account when determining what actions to impute to him. But then, if this is true, all C needs to do is administer the punishment and afterwards assert that all is in the past and that C, like A, now condemns its prior action. Since the impermissible action is “in the past,” it can no longer be imputed to C. Indeed, if such an absurd simultaneity requirement is operative, at every successive moment of the punishment, any objection or defensive action by A is directed at actions in the immediate past and thus become immediately irrelevant and past-directed. Therefore, the irrelevance of the mere passage of time cannot be denied by A,50 for in order to effectively object to being punished, A must presume that the passage of time does not make a difference to imputing responsibility-incurring actions to individuals.51

但这是一个很容易克服的问题。首先，A 含蓄地主张，在决定将哪些行为归咎于他时，应当考虑时间的流逝。但是，如果这是真的，那么 C 所需要做的就是实施惩罚，然后断言一切都已成为过去，C 和 A 一样，现在谴责其先前的行为。由于不被允许的行为是 “过去的”，因此不能再归咎于 C。事实上，如果这种荒谬的同时性要求生效，在惩罚的每一个连续时刻，A 的任何反对或辩护行动都是针对紧接着的过去的行为，因此立即变得无关紧要和过去导向。因此，A 不能否认时间流逝的无关性，[180] 因为为了有效地反对受到惩罚，A 必须假定时间流逝对于将引起责任的行为归咎于个人并无影响。[181]

Second, in objecting to punishment in the present, A necessarily maintains that force must not and should not occur. Even if he really does no longer believe that murder is proper, by his own current view, the earlier murder was still improper. He necessarily denounces his earlier actions and is estopped from objecting to his punishment imposed on that murderer—namely, himself. To maintain that a murderer should not be punished is inconsistent with a claim that murder should not and must not occur.

其次，A 在反对当前的惩罚时，必然坚持认为武力不得也不应发生。即使他真的不再认为谋杀是正当的，但根据他自己目前的观点，先前的谋杀仍然是不正当的。他必然会谴责自己之前的行为，并且被禁止反对对谋杀犯——也就是他自己——所施加的惩罚。坚持主张谋杀犯不应受到惩罚，这与主张谋杀不应且绝不应发生的主张是不一致的。

Third, even if A argues that he never held the view that “murder is not wrong” and that he murdered despite holding it to be wrong,52 he still admits that murder is wrong and that he, in fact, did murder B and still ends up denouncing his earlier action. Thus, A is again estopped from objecting to the punishment as in the situation where he claims to have changed his mind. Finally, if A maintains that it is possible to administer force while simultaneously holding it to be wrong, the same applies to C. So even if C is convinced by A’s argument that it would be wrong to punish A, C may go ahead and do so despite this realization, just as A himself claims to have done.53 Thus, whether A currently holds both views, or only one of them, he is still estopped from objecting to the imprisonment.

第三，即使 A 辩称他从未持有“谋杀并非错误”的观点，并且尽管他认为谋杀是错误的但还是实施了谋杀，[182] 他仍然承认谋杀是错误的，而且他实际上确实谋杀了 B，并最终还是谴责了自己先前的行为。因此，在他声称已经改变想法的情况下，A 再次被禁止反对惩罚。最后，如果 A 坚称在认为使用武力是错误的同时仍有可能使用武力，这同样适用于 C。所以，即使 C 被 A 的论点说服，认为惩罚 A 是错误的，C 仍可能不顾这一认识而继续这样做，就像 A 自己声称所做的那样。[183] 因此，无论 A 目前同时持有这两种观点，还是只持有其中之一，他仍然被禁止反对监禁。

Thus, we can see that applying the principle of estoppel would not hinder the prevention and punishment of violent crimes. The above murder analysis can be applied to any sort of coercive, violent crime. All the classical violent crimes would still be as preventable under the proposed scheme as they are today. All forms of aggression—rape, theft, murder, assault, trespass—would still be legitimately punishable crimes. A rapist, for example, could only complain about being imprisoned by saying that his rights are being violated by the aggressive imprisonment, but he would be estopped from saying that aggression is wrong. In general, any aggressive act—one involving the initiation of violence—would cause an inconsistency with the actor later claiming that he should not be imprisoned or punished in some manner.

因此，我们可以看到，适用禁止反言原则不会妨碍对武力犯罪的预防和惩罚。上述关于谋杀的分析可以应用于任何类型的强制性武力犯罪。在提议的方案下，所有传统的武力犯罪仍将像如今一样可以被预防。所有形式的侵犯行为——强奸、盗窃、谋杀、袭击、非法侵入——仍将是应受合法惩罚的罪行。例如，强奸犯只能通过声称其权利受到攻击性监禁的侵犯来抱怨被监禁，但他会被禁止说侵犯是错误的。总的来说，任何攻击性行为——涉及主动使用武力的行为——都会导致行动人后来声称自己不应以某种方式被监禁或惩罚时产生矛盾。

E. 惩罚非侵犯行为Punishing Nonaggressive Behavior

As seen above, punishment of aggression can be justified because the use of force in response to force cannot sensibly be condemned as a violation of the rights of the original aggressor. Is it ever legitimate to punish someone for nonaggressive behavior? If not, then this means that rights can only be negative rights against the initiation of force. As argued below, no such punishment is ever justified because punishment is the application of force to which a person is not estopped from objecting unless that person has initiated force. Otherwise, there is no inconsistency. Thus, nonaggressive force, consented-to force, and actions not involving force may not be punished.

如上所述，对侵犯行为的惩罚可以是正当的，因为以武力回应武力，不能被理智地谴责为对原侵害者权利的侵犯。那么，对一个人的非侵犯行为进行惩罚是否合法呢？如果不合法，那么这就意味着权利只能是反对使用武力的消极权利。正如下文所论证的，这种惩罚从来都不具有正当性，因为惩罚就是使用武力，除非某人主动使用武力，不然不能禁止他提出反对。否则，不存在不一致。因此，非侵犯武力、同意使用的武力以及不涉及武力的行为都不应受到惩罚。

First, a nonaggressive use of force, such as retaliation against aggression, cannot be justly punished. If someone were to attempt to punish B for retaliating against aggressor A, B is not estopped from objecting. There is nothing inconsistent or nonuniversalizable about maintaining both that (1) the use of retaliatory force in response to the initiation of force is proper—the implicit claim involved in retaliation against A—and (2) the use of force not in response to the initiation of force is improper—the basis for B’s objection to his own punishment. In short, the initiation of force is different from retaliatory force; retaliation is not aggression. B can easily show that the maxim of his action is “the use of force against an aggressor is legitimate,” which does not contradict “the use of force against nonaggressors is illegitimate.” Rather than being a particularizable claim that does not pass the universalizability test, B’s position is tailored to the actual nature of his prior action. The universalizability principle prevents only arbitrary, biased statements not grounded in the nature of things.54 Thus, the mere use of force is not enough to estop someone from complaining about being punished for the use of force. It is only aggression, that is, initiated force, that estops a person from complaining about force used against that person.

首先，武力的非侵犯性使用，如对侵害者进行报复，不应当受到惩罚。如果有人试图因B对侵害者A进行报复而对其进行惩罚，B并未被禁止反对之。同时坚持以下两种观点并没有什么不一致或不可普遍化之处：（1）针对武力的发起者使用报复性武力是正当的——这是对A进行报复所涉及的隐含主张，以及（2）不针对武力的发起者使用武力是不正当的——这是B反对自己受到惩罚的依据。简而言之，启用武力不同于报复性武力；报复不是侵犯。B 可以很容易地证明，他的行动格言是 “对侵害者使用武力是合法的”，这并不违背 “对非侵害者使用武力是非法的”。与其说 B 的立场是一种无法通过普适性检验的可特殊化的主张，不如说是根据其先前行动的实际性质量身定制的。普适性原则只能防止不以事物本质为基础的武断、有偏见的言论。[184] 因此，仅仅使用武力不足以禁止人们抱怨因使用武力而受到惩罚。只有侵犯，即主动使用武力，才能禁止一个人抱怨对其使用武力。

Similarly, if A uses force against B with B’s permission, A is not an aggressor and thus may not be punished. A may consistently assert that “using force against someone is permissible if they have consented” and that “using force against someone is impermissible if they have not consented.” For example, suppose that A slaps B after B has given consent. Is A estopped from objecting if B attempts to slap him back? Obviously, A is not estopped because he may consistently assert that “slapping someone is permissible if they have consented” and that “slapping someone is impermissible if they have not consented.” These are not inconsistent statements, and neither is barred by the universalizability principle because it rests on the recognition that the nature of a consented-to act is different than one objected to. Thus, although uninvited physical force estops the initiator thereof from complaining of punishment, invited or consented-to physical force does not.

同样，如果A在B同意的情况下对B使用武力，A就不是侵害者，因此可能不会受到惩罚。A可以逻辑一致地主张 “如果某人同意，对其使用武力是允许的”，而 “如果某人不同意，对其使用武力是不允许的”。例如，假设A在B同意后打了B一巴掌。如果B试图回击A的耳光，A是否不得反对？显然，A 并没有被禁止反言，因为他可以始终如一地主张：”如果某人同意，扇他耳光是允许的”，而 “如果某人不同意，扇他耳光是不允许的”。这两种说法并不矛盾，也不受普适性原则的限制，因为普适性原则的基础是基于这样一种认识，即同意的行为与反对的行为性质不同。因此，虽然不请自来的身体武力使其发起者被禁止抱怨受到惩罚，但邀请的或同意的身体武力则不然。

Other actions do not involve force or aggression at all, so there is no ground for punishing this behavior either. Suppose publisher P publishes a patently pornographic magazine, and some entity, such as the state, punishes him for this by conviction and imprisonment. Clearly, the state has committed naked aggression against him. Following the analysis of Part III.C, unless P is estopped from complaining about the punishment, the state itself may be punished, demonstrating that it has violated his rights. 55

其他行为根本不涉及武力或侵犯，因此也没有理由惩罚这种行为。假设出版商 P 出版了一本明显色情的杂志，而某个实体（如国家）为此对他进行了定罪和监禁的惩罚。很显然，国家对他实施了赤裸裸的侵犯。根据第 III.C 部分的分析，除非 P被禁止对惩罚提出申诉，否则国家本身也可能受到惩罚，这表明国家侵犯了他的权利。[185]

P has only published pornography, which is not aggression; he has not engaged in any activity nor necessarily made any claim that would be inconsistent with claiming that aggression is wrong. Thus, it is not inconsistent to simultaneously maintain that (1) it is legitimate to publish pornography and (2) it is illegitimate to aggress against a person. P is not estopped from complaining about his confinement.56

P 只出版了色情作品，这不是侵犯；他没有从事任何侵犯活动，也肯定未提出过任何与侵犯是错误的主张不一致的主张。因此，同时坚持（1）发表色情作品是合法的，（2）侵犯他人是非法的，这两者并不矛盾。P 并未因此而被禁止就其被监禁一事提出申诉。[186]

Unlike the case of retaliation against aggression, however, the state has not administered force in response to P’s initiation of force and is estopped from objecting to the proposed use of force against it. The state’s punishment of P is, therefore, not legitimate. Thus, it can be seen that punishment of any nonaggressive behavior is illegitimate and unjustified, as are laws prohibiting such behavior, since laws are themselves backed by and manifestations of force.57

然而，与对侵犯进行报复的情况不同的是，国家没有针对 P 发起的武力实施武力，也就被禁止反对拟议对其使用武力。因此，国家对 P 的惩罚是不合法的。由此可见，对任何非攻击性行为的惩罚都是不合法和不正当的，禁止此类行为的法律亦是如此，因为法律本身就是以武力为后盾，也是武力的体现。[187]

F. 财产权Property Rights

So far, the right to punish actors who initiate invasions of victims’ bodies has been established, which corresponds to a right in one’s own body, or self-ownership. Although there is not space here to provide a detailed justification for rights in scarce resources outside one’s body—property rights—I will briefly outline such a justification in this section. Because rights in one’s own body have been established, property rights may be established by building on this base. This may be done by pointing out that rights in one’s body are meaningless without property rights and vice versa.58

到目前为止，已经确立了对侵犯受害者身体的行为者进行惩罚的权利，这相当于对自己身体的权利或自我所有权。虽然这里没有篇幅详细论证对身体以外的稀缺资源的权利——财产权——但我将在本节中简要概述这种论证。由于对自己身体的权利已经确立，财产权可以在此基础上确立。要做到这一点，可以指出没有财产权的身体权利则毫无意义，反之亦然[188]。

For example, imagine that a thief admits that there are rights to self-ownership but that there is no right to property. If this is true, we can easily punish him simply by depriving him of external property, namely food, air, or space in which to exist or move. Clearly, the denial of his property through the use of force can physically harm his body just as direct invasion of the borders of his body can. The physical, bodily damage can be done fairly directly, for example, by snatching every piece of food out of his hands until he dies—why not, if there are no property rights? Or it can be done somewhat more indirectly by infringing upon his ability to control and use the external world, which is essential to his survival. Such property deprivation could continue until his body is severely damaged—implying, since this is tantamount to physical retaliation in its effect on him, that physical retaliation in response to a property crime is permissible—or until he objected to such treatment, thereby granting the validity of property rights. Just as one can commit an act of aggression against another with one’s body—for example, one’s fist—or with external property—a club, gun, bomb, poison—so one’s self-ownership rights can be aggressed against in a limitless variety of ways by affecting one’s property and external environment.

例如，设想一个小偷承认有自我所有权，但没有财产权。如果这是真的，我们只需剥夺他的外部财产，即食物、空气或生存或活动的空间，就可以轻而易举地惩罚他。显然，通过使用武力剥夺他的财产会对他的身体造成有形的伤害，就像直接侵犯他的身体边界一样。身体上的有形伤害可以相当直接地造成，例如，从他手中夺走每一块食物，直到他死去——如果没有财产权，为什么不呢？或者，可以通过侵犯他控制和利用外部世界的能力（这对他的生存至关重要）来间接地造成损害。这种财产剥夺可以持续下去，直到他的身体受到严重损害——这意味着，因为这相当于对他的身体报复，对财产犯罪的身体报复是允许的——或者直到他反对这种待遇，从而承认财产权的有效性。正如一个人可以用自己的身体——例如拳头——或用外部财产——棍棒、枪支、炸弹、毒药对他人实施侵犯行为一样，一个人的自我所有权也可以通过影响自己的财产和外部环境，以无限多样的方式受到侵犯。

Professor Hoppe’s “argumentation ethics” defense of individual rights also shows that the right to homestead is implied in the right to self-ownership. First, Hoppe establishes self-ownership by focusing on propositions that cannot be denied in discourse in general.59 Anyone engaging in argumentation implicitly accepts the presupposed right of self-ownership of all listeners and even potential listeners. Otherwise,the listener would not be able to consider freely and accept or reject the proposed argument.

霍普教授为个人权利辩护的 “论证伦理学 “也表明，拓殖权隐含在自我所有权中。首先，霍普通过关注一般对话论证中不可否认的命题来确立自我所有权[189]。任何参与论证的人都预设了所有听众甚至潜在听众的自我所有权。否则，听众将无法自由地考虑和接受或拒绝所提出的论点。

Second, because participants in argumentation indisputably need to use and control the scarce resources in the world to survive, and because their scarcity makes conflict over their use possible, norms are needed to determine the proper owner of these goods so as to avoid conflict. This necessity for norms to avoid conflicts in the use of scarce resources is itself undeniable by those engaged in argumentation—which is to say, undeniable—because anyone who is alive in the world and participating in the practical activity of argumentation cannot deny the value of being able to control scarce resources or the value of avoiding conflicts over such scarce resources. But there are only two fundamental alternatives for acquiring rights in unowned property: (1) by doing something with the property which no one else had ever done before, such as the mixing of labor or homesteading; or (2) by mere verbal declaration or decree. The second alternative is arbitrary and cannot serve to avoid conflicts. Only the first alternative, that of Lockean homesteading, establishes an objective link between a particular person and a particular scarce resource; thus, no one can deny the Lockean right to homestead unowned resources.

其次，由于论证的参与者无可争辩地需要使用和控制这世上的稀缺资源以维持生存，而稀缺资源的稀缺性又使争夺资源的冲突成为可能，因此需要规范来确定这些物品的正当所有者，以避免冲突。对于参与论证的人来说，这种避免稀缺资源使用冲突的规范的必要性本身是不可否认的——也就是说，是不可否认的——因为任何一个活在世上并参与论证这一实践活动的人，都无法否认能够控制稀缺资源的价值，也无法否认避免这些稀缺资源冲突的价值。但是，获得无主财产的权利只有两种根本的选择：（1）通过对财产做一些别人从未做过的事情，比如混合劳动或拓殖；或者（2）仅仅通过口头声明或法令。第二种选择是武断的，无法避免冲突。只有第一种选择，即洛克式拓殖，在特定的人和特定的稀缺资源之间建立了客观联系；因此，没有人能够否认拓殖无主资源的洛克式财产权。

As Hoppe points out, since one’s body is itself a scarce resource, it is “the prototype of a scarce good for the use of which property rights,i.e. rights of exclusive ownership, somehow have to be established, in order to avoid clashes.”60 Thus, the right to homestead external scarce resources is implied in the fact of self-ownership since “the specifications of the nonaggression principle, conceived of as a special property norm referring to a specific kind of good, must in fact already contain those of a general theory of property.”61 For these reasons, whether self-ownership is established by Hoppe’s argumentation ethics or by the estoppel theory—both theories that focus on the dynamics of discourse—such rights imply the Lockean right to homestead, which no aggressor could deny any more than he could deny that self-ownership rights are justified.

正如霍普所指出的，由于一个人的身体本身就是一种稀缺资源，因此它是 “一种稀缺物品的原型，为了避免冲突，必须以某种方式确立使用这种物品的财产权，即排他性所有权 “[190]。因此，拓殖外部稀缺资源的权利隐含在自我所有权的事实中，因为 “不侵犯原则被视为一种特殊的财产规范，涉及一种特定的物品，实际上必须已经包含一般财产理论的内容”。[191] 基于这些原因，无论自我所有权是建基于霍普的论证伦理学还是禁止反言理论——这两种理论都侧重于对话交流的动态性——这些权利都意味着洛克式的拓殖权，任何侵害者都无法否认这种权利，正如他无法否认自我所有权的正当性一样。

I will, for the remainder of this chapter, place property rights and rights in one’s body on the same level, both warranting punishment for their invasion. Thus, under the estoppel theory one who aggresses against another’s body or against another’s external property is an aggressor, plain and simple, who may be treated as such.

在本章的其余部分，我将把财产权和身体所有权放在同一层面上，两者受到侵犯时都应受到惩罚。因此，根据禁止反言理论，侵犯他人身体或他人外部财产的人就是侵害者，简单明了，可以被视为侵害者对待。

IV. 惩罚类型与举证责任TYPES OF PUNISHMENTS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A. 相称的惩罚Proportional Punishment

Just because aggressors can legitimately be punished does not necessarily mean that all concerns about proportionality may be dropped. At first blush, if we focus only on the initiation of force itself, it would seem that a victim could make a prima facie case that since the aggressor initiated force—no matter how trivial—the victim is entitled to use force against the aggressor, even including execution of the aggressor. Suppose A uninvitedly slaps B lightly on the cheek in response to a rude remark by B。Is B entitled to execute A in return? A, it is true, has initiated force, so how can he complain if force is to be used against him? But A is not estopped from objecting to being killed. A may, perfectly consistently, object to being killed since he may maintain that it is wrong to kill. This in itself is not inconsistent with A’s implicit view that it is legitimate to lightly slap others. By sanctioning slapping, A does not necessarily claim that killing is proper because usually—as in this example—there is nothing about slapping that rises to the level of killing.

仅仅因为可以合法地惩罚侵害者，并不一定意味着所有关于相称性的关切都可以被抛弃。乍一看，如果我们只关注使用武力本身，受害者似乎可以提出一个初步证据确凿的理由，即既然侵害者使用了武力——无论多么微不足道——受害者就有权对侵害者使用武力，甚至包括处决侵害者。假设A因B的一句粗鲁的话而不请自来地轻轻扇了B一巴掌。B是否有权反过来处决A？诚然，A已经主动使用了武力，如果要对他使用武力，他怎么能申述呢？但是，A并没有被禁止反对被杀。这本身与 A 认为轻扇他人耳光是合法的这一隐含观点并不矛盾。通过准许扇耳光，A并不一定主张杀人是正确的，因为通常情况下——就像在这个例子中一样——扇耳光并没有达到杀人的程度。

It is proper to focus on the consequences of aggression in determining to what extent an aggressor is estopped because the very reason people object to aggression, or wish to punish aggressors for it, is just because it has certain consequences.62 Aggressive action, by physically interfering with the victim’s person, is undesirable because, among other reasons, it can (1) cause pain or injury; (2) interfere with the pursuit of goals in life; or (3) simply create a risky, dangerous situation in which pain, injury, or violence are more likely to result. Aggression interferes with one’s physical control over one’s life, that is, over one’s own body and external property.

在确定侵害者在多大程度上受到禁止反言的限制时，关注侵犯的后果是适当的，因为人们反对侵犯或希望惩罚侵害者的根本原因就在于侵犯会产生某些后果。[192]侵犯行为通过对受害者的人身进行实际干扰，是不受欢迎的，除此之外，原因还包括：(1) 可能造成痛苦或伤害；(2) 妨碍追求生活目标；或 (3) 只是制造一种危险的境况，有很大可能造成痛苦、伤害或武力。侵犯会干扰一个人对自己生活的实际控制，即对自己身体和外部财产的控制。

Killing someone obviously brings about the most undesirable level of these consequences. Merely slapping someone, by contrast, does not in normal circumstances. A slap has relatively insignificant consequences in all these respects. Thus, A does not necessarily claim that aggressive killing is proper just because he slaps B. The universalization requirement does not prevent him from reasonably narrowing his implicit claim from the more severe “aggression is not wrong” to the less severe “minor aggression, such as slapping someone, is not wrong.” Thus, B would be justified in slapping A back but not in killing A. I do not mean that B is justified only in slapping A and no more, but certainly B is justified at least in slapping A, and is not justified in killing him; this would be murder. These outside boundaries, at least, we know.

杀人显然会带来最不受欢迎的后果。相比之下，在正常情况下，仅仅扇人耳光却不会。一个耳光在所有这些方面的后果都相对较小。因此，A 并不因为扇了 B 一耳光就一定声称侵犯性杀人是正当的。普遍化的要求并不妨碍他合理地缩小其隐含主张的范围，从较严重的 “侵犯是不对的 “缩小到较轻微的 “轻微的侵犯，如扇人耳光，是不对的”。因此，B 有理由回扇 A耳光，但没有理由杀死 A。我的意思并不是说，B只有扇A耳光才是正当的，而且不能扇更多的耳光，但可以肯定的是，B至少扇甲耳光是正当的，而杀死他则是不正当的，因为这属于谋杀。我们至少知道这些外在的界限。

In general, while the universalization principle prevents arbitrary particularization of claims—for example, adding “for me only’s”—it does not rule out an objective, reasonable statement of the implicit claims of the aggressor tailored to the actual nature of the aggression and its necessary consequences and implications. For example, while it is true that A has slapped B, he has not attempted to take B’s life; thus, he has never necessarily claimed that “murder is not wrong,” so he is not estopped from asserting that murder is wrong.63 Since a mere slapper is not estopped from complaining about his imminent execution, he can consistently object to being executed, which implies that B would become a murderer if he were to kill A.

一般而言，虽然普遍化原则可以防止任意将主张特殊化——例如，添加 “仅对我而言的”——但并不排除根据侵犯的实际性质及其必然结果和影响，客观、合理地陈述侵害者的隐含主张。例如，虽然A确实扇了B一个耳光，但他并没有试图夺取B的生命；因此，他从来没有必然地主张 “谋杀不是错的”，所以他并没有被禁止声称谋杀是错的。 [193] 由于只是打了一耳光的人不会被禁止申述他即将被执行的死刑，因此他可以逻辑一致地反对被执行死刑，这意味着如果B要杀A，那么他就会成为一名凶手。

In this way, we can see a requirement of proportionality—or, more properly, of reciprocity along the lines of the lex talionis or the law of retaliation64—accompanies any legitimate punishment of an aggressor. “As the injury inflicted, so must be the injury suffered.”65 There are, thus, limitations to the amount of punishment the victim may administer to the aggressor, related to the extent of the aggression committed by the aggressor, because it is the nature of the particular act of aggression that determines the extent of the estoppel working against the aggressor. The more serious the aggression and the consequences that flow from it, the more the aggressor is estopped from objecting to punishment. Consequently, a greater level of punishment may legitimately be applied.

通过这种方式，我们可以看到，对侵害者的任何合法惩罚都伴随着相称性的要求——或者更恰当地说，是按照 “同态复仇”（lex talionis）或 “报复法”（the law of retaliation）[194] 大体一致的对等性要求。 “所施加的伤害有多大，所承受的伤害就必须有多大 “[195]。因此，受害者对侵害者的惩罚程度是有限制的，这与侵害者的侵犯程度有关，因为正是特定侵犯行为的性质决定了禁止反言对侵害者起作用的程度。侵犯行为越严重，造成的后果越严重，侵害者就越被禁止反对惩罚。因此，可以合法地实施更高一级的惩罚。

B. 受害者的选择The Victim’s Options

At this point, we have established the basic right to one’s body and to property homesteaded or acquired from a homesteader, as well as the contours of the basic requirement of proportionality in punishment. This chapter now presents a further consideration of the various types of punishment that can be justly administered.

至此，我们已经确立了对自己的身体、拓殖或从拓殖者处获得的财产的基本权利，以及对惩罚相称性的基本要求的轮廓。现在，本章将进一步探讨可以公正实施的各类惩罚。

As has been shown, a victim of aggression may inflict on the aggressor at least the same level or type of aggression previously inflicted by the aggressor. In determining the maximum amount and type of punishment that may be applied, the distinction between victim and victimizer must be kept in mind, and we must recognize that, for most victims—those who are not masochists or sadists—punishing the wrongdoer does not genuinely make the victim whole and does not directly benefit the victim very much, if at all. A victim who has been shot in the arm by a robber and who consequently loses his arm is clearly entitled, if he wishes, to amputate the robber’s own arm. But this, of course, does not restore the victim’s arm; it does not make him whole. Perfect restitution is always an unreachable goal, for crimes cannot be undone.

正如已经证明的那样，侵犯行为的受害者可能会对侵害者施加至少与侵害者先前施加的同等程度或类型的侵犯。在确定可适用的最大惩罚量和惩罚类型时，必须牢记受害者和加害者之间的区别，我们必须认识到，对于大多数受害者——那些不是受虐狂或虐待狂的受害者——来说，惩罚不法行为人并不能真正使受害者得到补偿，即使能得到补偿，也不会使受害者直接受益太多。一个被抢劫犯击中手臂并因此失去手臂的受害者，如果他愿意，显然有权截断抢劫犯自己的手臂。当然，这并不能恢复受害者的手臂，也不能使他成为一个完整的人。完美的赔偿永远是一个遥不可及的目标，因为罪行是无法挽回的。

This is not to say that the right to punish is therefore useless, but we must recognize that the victim remains a victim even after retaliating against the wrongdoer. No punishment can undo the harm done. For this reason, the victim’s range of punishment options should not be artificially or easily restricted. This would further victimize him. The victim did not choose to be made a victim and did not choose to be placed in a situation where he has only one narrow punishment option—namely, eye-for-an-eye retaliation. On the contrary, the responsibility for this situation is entirely that of the aggressor who by his action has damaged the victim. Because the aggressor has placed the victim in a no-win situation where being restricted to one narrow type of remedy may recompense the victim even less than other remedies, the aggressor is estopped from complaining if the victim chooses among varying types of punishment, subject to the proportionality requirement.

这并不是说惩罚权因此就毫无用处，但我们必须认识到，即使对不法行为者进行了报复，受害者仍然是受害者。任何惩罚都无法挽回已经造成的伤害。因此，不应人为地或轻易地限制受害者的惩罚选择范围。这将使他进一步受害。受害者并没有选择成为受害者，也没有选择被置于只有一种惩罚选择狭隘的——即以牙还牙的报复——的境地。相反，造成这种局面的责任完全在于侵害人，他的行为损害了受害者。由于侵害人将受害者置于一种无利可图的境地，被限制在一种狭隘的赔偿方式可能比其他赔偿方式对受害者的补偿更少，因此，如果受害者在各种不同的惩罚方式中进行选择，侵害人被禁止提出申诉，但须符合相称性要求。

In practice this means that, for example, the victim of assault and battery need not be restricted to only having the aggressor beaten—or even killed. The victim may abhor violence, and might choose to forego any punishment at all if his only option was to either beat or punish the aggressor. The victim may prefer, instead, to simply be compensated monetarily out of any—current or future—property of the wrongdoer. Or, if the victim believes he will gain more satisfaction from using force against the aggressor in a way different than the manner in which the aggressor violated the victim’s rights—for example, taking property of an aggressor who has beaten the victim—the aggressor is estopped from complaining about this as long as proportionality is satisfied.

在实践中，这意味着，举例来说，侵害和殴打行为的受害者不必局限于只能殴打侵害人——甚至杀死侵害人。受害者可能憎恶武力，如果他的唯一选择是殴打或惩罚侵害人，他可能会选择放弃任何惩罚。相反，受害者可能更愿意从不法行为人的有关财产（无论是现在的还是将来的）中获得金钱赔偿。或者，如果受害者认为，以不同于侵害人侵犯受害者权利的方式对侵害人使用武力会使他获得更多的满足——例如，剥夺殴打受害者的侵害人的财产——只要符合相称性，侵害人就i禁止对此提出申诉。

The nonequivalence of most violent crimes makes this conclusion clearer. Suppose that A, a man, rapes B, a woman. B would be entitled to rape A in retaliation or to have A raped by a professional, private punishing company. But the last thing in the world that a rape victim might want is to be involved in further sexual violence, and this alone would give her a right to insist on other forms of punishment. To limit her remedy to having A raped would be to inflict further damage on her. B can never be made whole, but at least her best remedy—in her opinion—of a variety of imperfect remedies need not be denied her. She has done nothing to justify denying her such options.

大多数武力犯罪的非等价性使这一结论更加清晰。假设某男 A 强奸了某女 B。B有权强奸A作为报复，或者让专业的私人惩罚公司强奸A。但是，强奸受害者可能最不希望的就是被卷入更多的性武力中，仅凭这一点，她就有权坚持要求其他形式的惩罚。将她的赔偿措施局限于让 A 遭受强奸，会给她造成更大的伤害。B 永远不可能得到完美补偿，但至少她认为的最好的补救办法——在各种不完善的补救办法中——不必被剥夺。她没有做任何事情来证明拒绝给予她这种选择是合理的。

And in this case there simply is no equivalent. The only remotely similar equivalent is the forcible anal rape of A, but even this is vastly different from the rape of a woman. If nothing else, a woman might reasonably consider rape much more of a violation than would a man “similarly” treated, for these acts give rise to different consequences for the victim, a point that we need not belabor. Thus, if there is no possibility of exact “eye-for-an-eye” style retaliation for a given act of aggression, such as is the case with rape, then our conclusion must be either that (1) B may not punish A, or (2) B may punish A in another manner. Clearly, the latter alternative is the correct one, for a rapist is estopped from denying the right of his victim to punish him and is also estopped from claiming a benefit because there is no equivalent punishment. Furthermore, the absence of an equivalent punishment is a direct result of A’s aggression. If B acts to mitigate the damage done to her by A—which includes not only the rape, but placing B in a situation where her remedies will all be inadequate and where there is not even an equivalent punishment possible—A is estopped from objecting. Thus, for example, B may choose, instead, to have A’s penis amputated or even his arm or leg. Or B may choose instead to have A publicly flogged, displayed, and imprisoned for some length of time or even enslaved for a time and put to work earning money for B。Alternatively, B may threaten A with the most severe punishment she has the right to inflict and allow A to buy his way out of the punishment—or reduce its severity—with as much money as he is able or willing to offer.66

在这种情况下，根本不存在等价物。唯一近似的等价物是对 A 的强行肛奸，但即便如此，这也与强奸妇女大相径庭。如果不出意外，妇女可能会合理地认为强奸比 “类似 “对待男子更严重，因为这些行为会给受害者带来不同的后果，这一点我们无需赘述。因此，如果不可能对特定的侵犯行为（如强奸）进行 “以牙还牙 “式的报复，那么我们的结论就必须是：（1）B不得惩罚A，或者（2）B可以用另一种方式惩罚A。显然，后一种选择才是正确的，因为强奸犯被禁止否认受害者惩罚他的权利，也被禁止要求获得利益，因为不存在同等的惩罚。此外，没有对等的惩罚是 A 侵犯行为的直接结果。如果 B 采取行动以减轻 A 对她造成的伤害——这不仅包括强奸，还包括将 B 置于她的赔偿措施都不充分、甚至不可能有同等惩罚的境地——A 被禁止提出异议。因此，举例来说，B 可以选择切除 A 的阴茎甚至胳膊或腿。或者，B 可以选择将 A 公开鞭打、示众、监禁一段时间，甚至奴役一段时间，让A为 B 工作赚钱。或者，B 可以用她有权施加的最严厉的惩罚来威胁 A，并允许 A 用他所能提供或愿意提供的尽可能多的金钱来换取免受惩罚——或减轻惩罚的严厉程度。[196]

Further, even if such rape of a man is somewhat equivalent to the rape of a woman, the rape of an innocent person, B, is typically much more of an offense than is a similar violation of a criminal, A, who evidently does not abhor aggression as much. A, the rapist, may even be a masochist and enjoy being beaten or sodomized, so a more or less equal amount of physical punishment of A would not really damage or truly punish A as badly as A has damaged B. Because A is a criminal, he is also likely accustomed to a lifestyle where force is used more routinely so that “equal” punishment of A would not damage A to the extent it would damage B, who is unused to such violence. For these reasons, B is entitled to inflict a greater amount of punishment on A than A inflicted on B, if only to more or less equalize the actual level of damage inflicted.67 Thus, if A permanently damages B’s arm, B may be entitled to damage both of A’s arms or even all of A’s limbs.68

此外，即使这种对男子的强奸在某种程度上等同于对妇女的强奸，但对无辜者 B 的强奸通常比对罪犯 A 的类似侵犯要严重得多，因为后者显然没有那么憎恶侵犯。强奸犯 A 甚至可能是一个受虐狂，享受被殴打或鸡奸，因此，对 A 或多或少同等程度的体罚，并不会像 A 对 B 造成的伤害那样对 A 造成真正的伤害或真正的惩罚。由于A是一名罪犯，他也很可能习惯于更经常使用武力的生活方式，因此对A的 “同等 “惩罚对A的伤害不会达到对B的伤害程度，因为B不习惯这种武力。出于这些原因，B有权对A施加比A对B施加的更大的惩罚，哪怕只是为了或多或少地平衡实际造成的损害程度。[197]因此，如果A永久性地损害了B的手臂，B可能有权损害A的两只手臂，甚至A的所有肢体。[198]

Alternatively, a victim is entitled to take by force a certain amount or portion of the aggressor’s property if this type of response to aggression would better satisfy the victim or if the victim prefers this remedy for any reason at all, including greed, malice, or sadism—the victim’s motivation is not the aggressor’s rightful concern. Of course, a mixture would be permissible as well. A woman might, in response to being raped by a man, seize all of the ravisher’s $10,000 estate and have him publicly beaten and enslaved for some number of years until his forced labor earns her $100,000 more—assuming that this overall level of punishment is roughly equivalent to the rape.

或者，如果对侵害人的这种回应能更好地满足受害者的需要，或者受害者出于某种原因（包括贪婪、恶意或虐待狂）喜欢这种赔偿措施，受害者有权强行夺取侵害人的一定数量或部分财产——受害者的动机并非侵害人的正当关切。当然，混合使用也是允许的。一名妇女在被一名男子强奸后，可以没收强奸者的全部 1 万美元财产，并将其当众殴打和奴役若干年，直到他的强迫劳动为她多赚 10 万美元——假定这种惩罚的总体水平与强奸大致相当。

Along the same lines, a property aggressor, such as a thief, may be dealt with any number of ways. The victim may satisfy himself solely out of the aggressor’s property, if this is possible, or through corporal punishment of the aggressor, if this better satisfies the victim—as discussed in further detail below. In short, any rights or combinations of rights of an aggressor may be ignored by a victim in punishing the aggressor—implying that the aggressor actually does not have these purported “rights”—as long as general bounds of proportionality are considered.

同样，对于财产侵害人，如小偷，可以有多种处理方式。如果可能的话，受害者可以只用侵害人的财产来满足自己，或者通过体罚侵害人来满足自己，如果这样做能更好地满足受害者的话——下文将进一步详细讨论。总之，受害者在惩罚侵害人时可以忽略侵害人的任何权利或权利组合——这意味着侵害人实际上并不享有这些所谓的 “权利”——只要考虑到一般的相称性界限即可。

C.因其他因素加重处罚Enhancing Punishment Due to Other Factors

Other factors may be considered that increase the amount of punishment that may be inflicted on the aggressor over and above the type of damage initially inflicted by the aggressor. As explained above with regard to rape, aggression against an innocent, peaceful person may cause more psychic damage to the victim than would an equivalent action against the aggressor. Also, as Rothbard explains, a criminal, such as thief A, has not only stolen something from victim B, but he has “also put B into a state of fear and uncertainty, of uncertainty as to the extent that B’s deprivation would go. But the penalty levied on A is fixed and certain in advance, thus putting A in far better shape than was his original victim.”69 The criminal has also imposed other damages, such as interest, and even general costs of crime prevention—for who can such costs be blamed on and recouped from if not criminals when they are caught? As Kant observed, “whoever steals anything makes the property of all insecure.”70

在侵害人最初造成的损害类型之外，还可以考虑其他因素来增加对侵害人的惩罚量。正如上文就强奸问题所解释的那样，与针对侵害人的同等行为相比，侵害无辜、和平的人可能会对受害者造成更大的精神伤害。此外，正如罗斯巴德所解释的，一个罪犯，如小偷 A，不仅偷了受害者 B 的东西，而且他 “还使 B 陷入了恐惧和不确定的状态，不确定 B 被剥夺的程度。但对 A 的处罚是固定的，事先是确定的，因此，A 的处境要比他原来的受害者好得多 “[199]。罪犯还强加了其他损失，如利息，甚至是预防犯罪的一般成本——如果罪犯被抓获后，这些成本不归咎于罪犯，又能从谁那里收回呢？正如康德所言，”无论谁偷窃任何东西，都会使所有人的财产变得不安全 “[200]。

General bounds of proportionality are also satisfied when the consequences and potential consequences to the victim that are caused by the aggression are taken into account. Thus, some crimes may be punished capitally if their consequences are serious enough—for example, stealing a man’s horse when his survival depends on it, which was capitally punished in the frontier West for the same reason.71 (This is one point on which I disagree with Rothbard, however, who argues that “it should be quite clear that, under libertarian law, capital punishment would have to be confined strictly to the crime of murder. For a criminal would only lose his right to life if he had first deprived some victim of that same right. It would not be permissible, then, for a merchant whose bubble-gum had been stolen, to execute the convicted bubble-gum thief.”72 For one could imagine rare situations where theft of bubble-gum could legitimately be punished by execution, if the theft somehow endangered the life of its owner.73)

如果考虑到侵犯对受害者造成的后果和潜在后果，也就满足了相称性的一般界限。因此，如果某些罪行的后果足够严重，就可以对其处以极刑——例如，当一个人的生存依赖于一匹马时，偷了他的马，出于同样的原因，在西部边疆地区也会受到极刑。[201] (不过，在这一点上我不同意罗斯巴德的观点，他认为 “很明显，根据自由意志主义法律，死刑必须严格限于谋杀罪。因为罪犯只有先剥夺了受害者的生命权，才会失去生命权。因此，如果一个商人的泡泡糖被偷了，那么他就不能处死被定罪的偷泡泡糖的人 “[202]。因为我们可以想象，在极少数情况下，如果偷窃泡泡糖在某种程度上危及了失主的生命，那么偷窃泡泡糖的人可以被合法地处以死刑。[203]）

D.惩罚等级Graduated Scale of Punishment

Some would object to the use of the severe penalty of capital punishment for crimes other than the most serious or heinous, such as murder, mass-murder, or genocide. Many thus favor a scale of punishment having more severe punishments for the most serious crimes with capital punishment reserved for murderers or serial-killers and the like.74 Perhaps some feel that a mass murderer, serial killer, child killer, or cop killer should be punished more harshly than a more typical murderer of one adult and that if capital punishment is “wasted” on more mundane murderers or criminals, there will be nothing more severe left to impose on the really bad guys; there will be no deterrent effect left to deter extra acts of aggression committed by those who have already placed themselves in the category of deserving the death penalty. Of course, even if such a scale with gradations of punishment would provide a “better” deterrent effect, this does not mean that one does not have the right to punish a given criminal in a certain way. Such utilitarian reasoning is beside the point. If we had to save the more severe punishments for, say, mass murderers, this in effect incorrectly attributes a right to life to other murderers who simply do not have such a right.

有些人反对对谋杀、大屠杀或种族灭绝等最严重或最令人发指的罪行以外的罪行使用死刑这一严厉刑罚。因此，许多人赞成对最严重的罪行处以更严厉的刑罚，而死刑则保留给谋杀犯或连环杀人犯等。[204] 也许有些人认为，大屠杀凶手、连环杀手、儿童杀手或警察杀手应比杀害一个成年人的典型凶手受到更严厉的惩罚，如果死刑被 “浪费 “在更普通的杀人犯或罪犯身上，那么就没有什么更严厉的惩罚可以施加在真正的坏人身上了；也就没有威慑力来阻止那些已经把自己归入应被判处死刑之列的人犯下更多的侵犯行为了。当然，即使这种分等级的惩罚尺度能够提供 “更好的 “威慑效果，也并不意味着人们无权以某种方式惩罚特定的罪犯。这种功利主义的推理并不重要。如果我们不得不将更严厉的惩罚留给比如说大屠杀凶手，这实际上是错误地将生命权赋予了其他根本没有这种权利的凶手。

Also, it should be realized that punishment of murderers is always an imperfect remedy since the victim remains murdered, so that whether the murderer remains underpunished even after being executed—like a regular murderer—or very underpunished—like a mass murderer—this is an unfortunate but simply irrelevant and inescapable fact. Furthermore, punishment actually can be made more and more severe, practically without limit, for greater and greater crimes. Death after torture is worse punishment than mere death, and a longer period or greater amount of physical pain being inflicted is more severe punishment than a shorter period or lesser amount. The severity of punishment can be varied, then, by varying the length of imprisonment, by inflicting more or less physical pain, and by many other methods. For example, for prison inmates, the severity of punishment can be adjusted by varying the size of the prison cell, temperature, and quality of food.75

此外，我们还应该认识到，对杀人犯的惩罚始终是一种不完善的补救措施，因为受害者仍然是被谋杀的，因此，无论杀人犯是像普通杀人犯那样在被处决后仍然没有受到足够的惩罚，还是像大屠杀杀人犯那样没有受到完全足够的惩罚，这都是一个不幸的、但根本无关紧要的、无法回避的事实。此外，对于越来越严重的罪行，惩罚实际上可以变得越来越严厉，几乎没有任何限制。酷刑之后的死亡比单纯的死亡是更严重的惩罚，较长时间或较大程度的肉体痛苦比较短时间或较小程度的痛苦是更严重的惩罚。因此，可以通过改变监禁时间、施加更多或更少的肉体痛苦以及许多其他方法来改变惩罚的严厉程度。例如，对于监狱中的囚犯，可以通过改变牢房的大小、温度和食物的质量来调整惩罚的严厉程度。[205]

E.财产犯罪Property Crimes

Aggression can also take the form of a property crime. For example, where A has stolen $10,000 from B, B is entitled to recoup $10,000 of A’s property. However, the recapture of $10,000 is not punishment of A but merely the recapture by B of his own property. B then has the right to take another $10,000 of A’s property, or even a higher amount if the $10,000 stolen from B was worth much more to B than to A—for example, if A has a higher time preference or less significant plans to use the money than B, which is likely, or if A has more money than B, which is unlikely.76 This amount may also be enhanced to take into account other damages, such as interest, general costs of crime prevention, and compensation for putting the victim into a state of fear and uncertainty.77 It may also be enhanced to account for the uncertainty as to what the exact amount of retaliation or restitution ought to be, as this uncertainty is A’s fault, not B’s. Alternatively, at the victim’s option, corporal punishment may be administered by B instead of taking back his own $10,000—indeed, this may be the only option where the thief is penniless or the stolen property is spent or destroyed.

侵犯也可以采取财产犯罪的形式。例如，A 从 B 处盗窃了 10 000 美元，B 有权收回 A 的 10 000 美元财产。然而，收回 10 000 美元并不是对A的惩罚，而只是B收回了自己的财产。然后，B有权从A的财产中再拿走 10 000 美元，甚至拿走更高的数额，如果从B那里窃取的 10 000 美元对B的价值远远高于对A的价值——例如，如果A比B有更高的时间偏好或使用这笔钱的计划不那么重要（这是很可能的），或者如果A比B有更多的钱，（这是不太可能的）。[206]考虑到其他损害赔偿，如利息、预防犯罪的一般费用以及使受害者陷入恐惧和不确定状态的赔偿，这一数额也可提高。[207]此外，还可以考虑到报复或赔偿的确切数额的不确定性，因为这种不确定性是A的过错，而不是B的过错。或者，根据受害者的选择，B 可以实施体罚，而不是取回他自己的 10 000 美元——事实上，如果小偷身无分文，或者被盗财产已被花掉或毁坏，这可能是唯一的选择。

F.为什么攻击、威胁和企图都是侵犯Why Assault, Threats, and Attempts Are Aggression

This method of analyzing whether a proposed punishment is proper also makes it clear just why the threat of violence or assault is properly treated as an aggressive crime. Assault is defined (in some legal systems) as putting someone in fear of receiving a battery—a physical beating— or an attempted battery.78 Suppose A assaults B, such as by pointing a gun at him or threatening to beat him. Clearly B is entitled to do to A what A has done to B—A is estopped from objecting to the propriety of being threatened or assaulted. But what does this mean? To assault is to manifest an intent to cause harm and to apprise B of this so that he believes A will inflict this harm—otherwise it is something like a joke or acting, and B is not actually in apprehension of being coerced. Now A was able to actually put B in a state of fear—of receiving a battery—by threatening B. But because of the nature of assault, the only way B can really make A fear a retaliatory act by B is if B really means it and is able to convince A of this fact. Thus, B must actually be—or be capable of being—willing to carry out the threatened coercion of A, not just mouth the words, otherwise A will know B is merely engaged in idle threats, merely bluffing. Indeed, B can legitimately go forward with the threatened action if only to make A believe it. Although A need not actually use force to assault B, because of the nature of retaliation, there is simply no way for B to assault A in return without actually having the right to use force against A. Because the very situation is caused by A’s action, he is estopped from objecting to the necessity of B using force against him.79 Likewise, if A attempts to harm B but fails, then B is entitled to “attempt” to harm A; for the attempt to be a real attempt, it must be possible for B to succeed. And so on.

用这种方法来分析所提议的惩罚是否恰当，也可以清楚地说明为什么武力威胁或殴打行为被恰当地视为侵犯性犯罪。殴打罪被定义为（在某些法律体系中）是使他人害怕受到殴打——肉体殴打——或殴打未遂。[208]假设 A 攻击了 B，比如用枪指着他或威胁要打他。显然，B有权以其人之道还治其人之身——A被禁止反对受到威胁或被攻击的正当性。但这意味着什么呢？攻击就是要表现出造成伤害的意图，并将这一意图告知B，使其相信A会造成这种伤害——否则就是类似于玩笑或演戏，而B实际上并不担心受到胁迫。现在，A通过威胁B，实际上能够使B处于害怕受到殴打的状态。但是，由于攻击的性质，只有当B确有此意并且能够让A相信这个事实时，B才能真正让A害怕B的报复行为。因此，B必须——或者说有能力——愿意对A实施威胁性的胁迫，而不仅仅是嘴上虚张声势，否则A就会知道B只是在耍嘴炮、虚张声势而已。事实上，如果只是为了让A相信，B可以合法地实施威胁的行动。尽管A不需要实际使用武力来攻击B，但由于报复的性质，B根本不可能在不实际拥有对A使用武力的权利的情况下反过来攻击A。由于这种情况是由 A 的行为造成的，因此他不得反对 B 对他使用武力的必要性。[209] 同样，如果A试图伤害B，但没有成功，那么B就有权 “试图 “伤害A；要使这种试图成为真正的试图，B就必须有可能成功。依此类推。同样，如果A试图伤害B，但没有成功，那么B就有权 “试图 “伤害A；要使这种试图成为真正的试图，B就必须有可能成功。依此类推。

G.举证责任The Burden of Proof

As seen in the preceding discussion, the victim of a violent crime has the right to select different mixtures and types of punishments. The actual extent or severity of punishment that may be permissibly inflicted, consistent with principles of proportionality and the burden of proof in this regard, is discussed in this section.

从前面的讨论中可以看出，武力犯罪的受害者有权选择不同的惩罚组合和类型。本节将根据相称性原则和相关举证责任原则，讨论可允许实施的惩罚的实际范围或严重程度。

Theories of punishment are concerned with justifying punishment, with offering decent people who are reluctant to act immorally a reason why they may punish others. This is useful, of course, for offering moral people guidance and assurance that they may properly deal with those who seek to harm them. We have established so far a prima facie case for the right to proportionately punish an aggressor in response to acts of violence, actions which invade the borders of others’ bodies or legitimately acquired property. Once this burden is carried, however, it is just to place the burden of proof on the aggressor to show why a proposed punishment of him is disproportionate or otherwise unjustified. The justice of this point is again implied by the logic of estoppel. The aggressor was not put in the position of justifying how much force he could use against the victim before he used such force; similarly, the victim should not be put in the position of justifying how much force is the appropriate level of retaliatory force to use against the aggressor before retaliating.

惩罚理论关注的是为惩罚提供正当理由，为那些不愿意采取不道德行为的正派人士提供一个可以惩罚他人的理由。当然，这是很有用的，为有道德的人提供指导和保证，使他们能够妥善处理那些试图伤害他们的人。到目前为止，我们已经初步证明，对于侵犯他人身体或合法财产的武力行为，我们有权对侵害人进行相应的惩罚。然而，一旦确立了这一责任，就应由侵害人承担举证责任，说明为什么对他的拟议惩罚不相称或没有其他正当性，这才是公正的。禁止反言的逻辑再次暗示了这一点的公正性。侵害人在对受害者使用武力之前，并没有被置于证明他可以对受害者使用多少武力才是合理的境地；同样，受害者在报复之前，也不应该被置于证明对侵害人使用多少武力才是适当的报复程度的境地。

As pointed out above, because it is the aggressor who has put the victim into a situation where the victim has a limited variety and range of remedies, the aggressor is estopped from complaining if the victim uses a type of force against the aggressor that is different from the aggressor’s use of force. The burden of proof and argument is therefore on the aggressor to show why any proposed, creative punishment is not justified by the aggressor’s aggression. Otherwise, an additional burden is being placed on the victim in addition to the harm already done him. If the victim wants to avoid shouldering this additional burden, the aggressor is estopped from objecting because it was the aggressor who placed the victim in the position of having the burden in the first place. If there is a gray area, the aggressor ought not be allowed to throw his hands up in mock perplexity and escape liability; rather, the line ought to come down on the side of the gray that most favors the victim unless the aggressor can further narrow the gray area with convincing theories and arguments, for the aggressor is the one who brings the gray into existence.

正如上文所指出的，由于是侵害人将受害者置于一种赔偿手段的种类和范围都有限的境地，因此，如果受害者对侵害人使用了一种不同于侵害人所使用的武力的武力，侵害人被禁止提出申诉。因此，侵害人有举证和论证的责任，证明为什么任何提议的、创造性的惩罚都因侵害人的侵害行为而不具有正当性。否则，受害者除了已经受到的伤害之外，还要承担额外的负担。如果受害者想避免承担这一额外负担，侵害人不得反对，因为是侵害人首先将受害者置于承担这一负担的境地。如果存在灰色地带，就不应该允许侵害人举起双手，佯装困惑来逃避责任；相反，除非侵害人能够提出令人信服的理论和论据来进一步缩小灰色地带，否则，界线应该划在灰色地带中最有利于受害者的一边，因为是侵害人使灰色地带出现的。

This is similar to the issue of proportionality itself. Although proportionality or reciprocity is a requirement in general, if a prima facie case for punishment can be established—as it can be whenever force is initiated—the burden of proof lies with the aggressor to demonstrate that any proposed use of force, even including execution, mutilation, or enslavement, exceeds bounds of proportionality. As mentioned above, in practice there are several clear areas: murder justifies execution; minor, nonarmed, nonviolent theft does not.80 Exceeding known appropriate levels of retaliation makes the retaliator an aggressor to the extent of the excess amount of force used. But there are indeed gray areas in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely delimit the exact amount of maximum permissible punishment. However, this uncertain situation, this grayness, is caused by the aggressor. The victim is placed in a quandary and might underpunish, or underutilize his right to punish, if he has to justify how much force he can use. Or he might have to expend extra resources in terms of time or money—for example, to hire a philosopher or lawyer to figure out exactly how much punishment is warranted—which would impermissibly increase the total harm done to the victim.

这与相称性问题本身类似。尽管相称性或对等性是一般性要求，但如果惩罚的初步理由成立——无论何时使用武力都是如此——则举证责任在于侵害人，侵害人必须证明任何拟议的武力使用，甚至包括处决、残害或奴役，都超出了相称性的界限。如上所述，在实践中有几个明确的领域：谋杀可以作为处决的理由；轻微的、非武装的、非武力的偷窃则不能。[210]超过已知的适当报复程度，报复者就会在过度使用武力的范围内成为侵害人。但是，确实存在一些灰色地带，在这些地带，即使不是不可能，也很难精确划定所允许的最大惩罚的确切数额。然而，这种不确定的境况、这种灰色地带是由侵害人造成的。受害者被置于两难境地，如果他必须证明自己可以使用多少武力，那么他可能会惩罚不足，或者没有充分利用自己的惩罚权。或者，他可能不得不在时间或金钱方面花费额外的资源——例如，聘请一位哲学家或律师来确切弄清楚应给予多少惩罚——这将不被不允许地增加对受害者造成的总伤害。

It is indeed difficult to determine the bounds of proportionality in many cases. But we do know one thing: force has been initiated against the victim, and thus force, in general, may be used against the victimizer. Other than for easy or established cases, any ambiguity or doubt must be resolved in favor of the victim unless the aggressor bears his burden of argument to explain why the proposed punishment exceeds his own initial aggression.81 Unless the maximum permissible level of retaliation is clearly established or persuasively argued by the aggressor, there should be no limitations on the victim’s right to retaliate. Further, suppose the aggressor is not able to show why the victim may not execute him, even for a nonkilling act of aggression, and thus the aggressor is executed. If the aggressor’s heirs should later successfully show that the type of aggression perpetrated by the aggressor did not, in fact, warrant capital punishment, still the victim has committed no aggression. To so hold would be to require victims to err on the side of underpunishing in cases of doubt in order to avoid potential liability in the future if it turns out that the aggressor could havemade a better defensive argument. For the fact that there is a doubtful question is the aggressor’s fault, and if he does not resolve it—either because of laziness, incompetence, bad luck, or tactics designed to make the victim unsure of how much he may punish—the victim should not be further harmed by this fact, which he would be if he were forced to take the risk that he might underpunish when punishing in the gray area.

在许多情况下，确实很难确定相称性的界限。但我们确实知道一点：武力是对受害者使用的，因此，一般来说，可以对侵害者使用武力。除了简单或既定的情况外，任何含糊不清或疑问都必须有利于受害者来处理，除非侵害者承担起论证的责任，解释为何拟议的惩罚超过了他自己最初的侵犯行为。[211]除非明确规定了报复的最大限度或侵害人提出了有说服力的理由，否则不应限制受害者的报复权。此外，假设侵害人无法说明为什么受害者不能处决他，即使是非杀害性的侵害行为，侵害人也因此被处决。如果侵害人的继承人后来成功地证明侵害人所实施的侵害类型实际上并不应该处以极刑，那么受害者仍然没有实施任何侵害行为。如果这样认为，就会要求受害者在有疑问的情况下偏向于轻判，以避免在将来侵害人本可以提出更合理的辩护理由时承担潜在的责任。因为存在疑问这一事实是侵害人的过错，如果他没有解决这个问题——无论是因为懒惰、无能、运气不好，还是因为旨在让受害者不确定他可以惩罚多少的策略——受害者就不应该因这一事实而受到进一步的伤害，如果他被迫承担在灰色地带进行惩罚时可能惩罚不足的风险，他就会受到伤害。

Thus, several factors may be taken into account in coming up with an appropriate punishment. Suppose that an aggressor kidnaps and cuts off the hand of the victim. The victim is clearly entitled to do the same to the aggressor. But if the victim wishes to cut off the aggressor’s foot instead—for some reason—he is, prima facie, entitled to do this. The victim would also be entitled to cut off both of the aggressor’s hands unless the aggressor could explain why this is a higher amount of coercion than his own.82 Merely cutting off one of the aggressor’s hands might actually not be as extreme as was the aggressor’s own action. For example, the victim may have been a painter. Thus, the consequence of the aggressive violence might be that, in addition to endangering the victim’s very life and causing pain, the victim suffers a huge amount of mental and financial damage. It might take cutting off all four of the aggressor’s limbs or even decapitating him to inflict that much damage on him. We know that it is permissible to employ violence against an aggressor. How much? Let the aggressor bear the burden of figuring this out.

因此，在制定适当的惩罚时，可以考虑几个因素。假设侵害者绑架并砍断了受害者的手。受害者显然有权以同样的方式对待侵害者。但是，如果受害者希望砍掉侵害者的脚——出于某种原因——他表面上有权这样做。受害者也有权砍掉侵害者的两只手，除非侵害者能解释为什么这样做的胁迫程度比他自己的要高。[212]仅仅砍掉侵害者的一只手，实际上可能还不如侵害者自己的行为来得极端。例如，受害者可能是一名画家。因此，侵犯性武力行为的后果可能是，除了危及受害者的生命和造成痛苦之外，受害者还遭受了巨大的精神和经济损失。可能要砍掉侵害者的四肢，甚至斩首，才能给他造成这么大的伤害。我们知道，对侵害者使用武力是允许的。那允许多少呢？让侵害者来承担解决问题的责任吧。

As mentioned above with respect to rape, the victim may be squeamish about violence itself and thus recoil at the idea of eye-for-an-eye. If that is the victim’s nature, the victim should not be penalized further by being forced to administer lex talionis. The aggressor must take his victim as he finds him83 and is estopped from complaining because he placed the victim in the situation where the victim’s special preferences can only be satisfied by a nonreciprocal punishment. Thus, the victim may instead choose to seize a certain portion of the aggressor’s property. The amount of the award that is “equal” to the damage done is of course difficult to determine, but, if nothing else, similar principles could be used as are used in today’s tort and criminal justice system. If the amount of damages is uncertain or seems “too high,” it must be recalled that the aggressor himself originated this state of uncertainty, and thus he cannot now be heard to complain about it.

正如上文提到的强奸问题，受害者可能对武力本身感到不安，因此对以牙还牙的想法感到后怕。如果这就是受害者的本性，那么受害者就不应该因为被迫执行 “同态复仇 “而受到进一步的惩罚。侵害者必须接受他所选择的受害者[213] ，并被禁止提出申诉，因为他将受害者置于只能通过非对等惩罚才能满足受害者的特殊偏好的境地。因此，受害者反而可以选择扣押侵害者的某部分财产。当然，与所造成的损害 “相等 “的赔偿金额很难确定，但如果不出意外，可以采用与当今侵权和刑事司法制度类似的原则。如果损害赔偿数额不确定或似乎 “过高”，那么必须记住，这种不确定状态是侵害者自己造成的，因此现在不能听从他的申述。

Alternatively, a more objective damage award could be determined by the victim bargaining away his right to inflict corporal punishment against the aggressor in return for some or all of the aggressor’s property.84 This might be an especially attractive—or the least unattractive—alternative for a person victimized by a very rich aggressor. The established award for chopping someone’s hand off might normally be, say, $1 million. However, this would mean that a billionaire could commit such crimes with impunity. Under the estoppel view of punishment, the victim, instead of taking $1 million of the aggressor’s money, could kidnap the aggressor and threaten to exercise his right to, say, chop off both of the aggressor’s arms, slowly, and with pain. A billionaire may be willing to trade half, or even all, his wealth to escape this punishment.

另外，一个更客观的损害赔偿可以由受害者讨价还价放弃对侵害人施加体罚的权利，以换取侵害人的部分或全部财产来决定。[214]对于一个被非常富有的侵害者伤害的人来说，这可能是一个特别有吸引力——或者最不具吸引力——的选择。通常情况下，砍掉某人手的既定赔偿金可能是 100 万美元。然而，这意味着亿万富翁可以肆无忌惮地犯下此类罪行。根据禁止反言的惩罚观点，受害者可以劫持侵害者，威胁行使自己的权利，比如说，慢慢地、痛苦地砍掉侵害者的两只胳膊，而不是拿走侵害者的 100 万美元。亿万富翁可能愿意用一半甚至全部财富来换取这种惩罚。

For poor aggressors, there is no property to take as restitution, and the mere infliction of pain on the aggressor may not satisfy some victims. They would be entitled to enslave the aggressor or sell him into slavery or for medical testing to yield the best profit possible.85

对于贫穷的侵害者来说，没有财产可以作为赔偿，仅仅让侵害者遭受痛苦可能无法满足一些受害者的要求。他们有权奴役侵害者，或将其卖为奴隶，或用于医学测试，以获取最大的补偿。[215]

V. 结论CONCLUSION

The ways in which punishment can be administered are rich and various, but all the typically-cited goals of punishment could be accommodated under the view of punishment set forth above. Criminals could be incapacitated and deterred, even rehabilitated, perhaps, according to the victim’s choice. Restitution could be obtained in a variety of ways, or, if the victim so chooses, retribution or revenge. Though it is difficult to precisely determine the boundaries of proportionality, justice requires that the aggressor be held responsible for the dilemma he has created as well as for the aggression he has committed.

实施惩罚的方式是丰富多样的，但根据上述惩罚观点，所有通常被引用的惩罚目标都可以实现。根据受害者的选择，罪犯会被剥夺行为能力并受到威慑，甚至可以改过自新。可以通过各种方式获得赔偿，或者，如果受害者喜欢，也可以进行报复或复仇。尽管很难准确地确定相称性的界限，但正义要求侵害者对他所造成的困境以及他所犯下的侵犯行为负责。

附录APPENDIX

回应性武力的正义性THE JUSTICE OF RESPONSIVE FORCE

In Part III.C above, I discussed the legitimacy of punishing aggressors, that is, the justice of responsive force—force that is in response to aggression, or initiated force. As noted above, the material here was originally intended to appear in footnote 44, above. Due to its length, I include this material in this appendix.

在上文第三.C 部分，我讨论了惩罚侵害者的合法性，即回应性武力——回应侵犯的武力或主动使用的武力——的正义性。如上所述，此处的材料原本打算放在上文注释 44 中。由于篇幅较长，我将其列入本附录。

As noted in “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6), “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7), and “The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism” (ch. 22), Hans-Hermann Hoppe has defended the right to self-defense and retaliatory force in his argumentation ethics. For a recent book-length treatment of ideas related to Hoppe’s argumentation ethics and my estoppel approach advanced in this chapter, see Pavel Slutskiy, Communication and Libertarianism (Springer, 2021), and further references in these chapters.

正如在《自由意志主义权利的对话论证》（第 6 章）、《捍卫论证伦理学》第 7 章）和《资本主义不可否认的道德性》（第 22 章）中所指出的，汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普在其论证伦理学中为自卫权和报复性武力辩护。关于霍普的论证伦理学和我在本章中提出的禁止反言方法的相关思想的最近一本书，请参阅帕维尔·斯卢茨基（Pavel Slutskiy）所著的《沟通与自由意志主义》(Springer, 2021)，以及这些章节中的进一步参考文献。

Others have previously recognized the justice of using force against one who has used force. Law professor Lawrence Crocker writes:

Suppose … that A and B are shipwrecked on a deserted island. A makes use of the only firearm salvaged from the wreck to force B to build him a shelter. If B gains control of the gun, it will not be unfair for B to use it to force A to return the favor.86

以前也有人承认，以武力回应武力是正义的。法学教授劳伦斯-克罗克（Lawrence Crocker）写道：

假设……A 和 B 在荒岛上遭遇海难。A使用从沉船中打捞上来的唯一一把枪，强迫B为他建造一个避难所。如果B获得了枪支的控制权，那么B用枪支胁迫A，对之还以颜色，这并不不公平。[216]

Libertarian philosopher John Hospers opined that when an aggressor initiates force, “the victim is entitled to respond according to the rule (‘The use of force is permissible’) that the aggressor himself has implicitly laid down.”87 According to Herbert Morris:

If I say the magic words “take the watch for a couple of days” or “go ahead and slap me,” have I waived my right not to have my property taken or a right not to be struck or have I, rather, in saying what I have, simply stepped into a relation in which the rights no longer apply with respect to a specified other person? These observations find support in the following considerations. The right is that which gives rise, when infringed, to a legitimate claim against another person. What this suggests is that the right is that sphere interference with which entitles us to complain or gives us a right to complain. From this it seems to follow that a right to bodily security should be more precisely described as “a right that others not interfere without permission.” And there is the corresponding duty not to interfere unless provided permission. Thus when we talk of waiving our rights or “giving up our rights” in such cases we are not waiving or giving up our right to property nor our right to bodily security, for we still, of course, possess the right not to have our watch taken without permission. We have rather placed ourselves in a position where we do not possess the capacity, sometimes called a right, to complain if the person takes the watch or slaps us.88

自由意志主义哲学家约翰·霍普斯(John Hospers)认为，当侵害者主动使用武力时，”受害者有权根据侵害者自己默认的规则（’使用武力是允许的’）作出反应 “[217]。赫伯特·莫里斯（Herbert Morris）说：

如果我说了 “把表拿走几天 “或 “来吧，打我一巴掌 “这样神奇的话，我是否放弃了财产不被没收的权利或不被殴打的权利，或者说，我在说这些话的时候，只是进入了这样一种关系，在这种关系中，这些权利不再适用于特定的另一人？这些意见在以下考虑因素中得到支持。权利是指在受到侵犯时可对他人提出合法要求的权利。这表明，权利是指使我们有权申述或使我们有权申述的干涉行为。由此看来，人身安全权应更准确地描述为 “他人未经许可不得干涉的权利”。与此相对应的是，除非得到许可，否则我们无权干涉他人。因此，当我们在这种情况下谈论免除我们的权利或 “放弃我们的权利 “时，我们并没有免除或放弃我们的财产权或人身安全权，因为我们显然依旧拥有不被擅自拿走手表的权利。而不是说，我们已把自己置于这样一种境地：如果有人拿走手表或打我们耳光，我们没有能力（有时称为权利）去抱怨。[218]

Or as Hegel wrote:

The injury [the penalty] which falls on the criminal is not merely implicitly just—as just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right; on the contrary, it is also a right established within the criminal himself, i.e., in his objectively embodied will, in his action. The reason for this is that his action is the action of a rational being and this implies that it is something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law which he has explicitly recognized in his action and under which in consequence he should be brought as under his right.89

或如黑格尔所写：

落在罪犯身上的伤害[刑罚]不仅仅是隐含的正义——因为它是正义的，它本身就是他的隐含意志，是他的自由、他的权利的体现；相反，它也是在罪犯本身内部，即在他的客观体现的意志中，在他的行动中确立的权利。这是因为他的行为是理性存在者的行为，这意味着它是普遍的东西，罪犯通过这样做制定了一条法律，他在其行为中明确承认了这条法律，因此，他应该被置于自己的权利之下。[219]

Thus, under Hegel’s philosophy, “when a criminal steals another person’s property, he is not only denying that person’s right to own that piece of property, he is denying the right to property in itself.”90

因此，根据黑格尔的哲学，”当罪犯盗窃他人财产时，他不仅否认了该人拥有该财产的权利，而且否认了财产权本身 “。[220]

Charles King, discussing the moral acceptability of using force against force, states that when another initiates force,[w]ith him we are returned to the first-stage state of nature and may use force against him. In so doing we do not violate his rights or in any other way violate the principle of right, because he has broken the reciprocity required for us to view such a principle [of rights] as binding. In this we find the philosophic grounding for the moral legitimacy of the practice of punishment. Punishment is just that practice which raises the price of violation of the principle of right so as to give us all good reason to accept that principle.91

查尔斯·金(Charles King)在讨论以武力回应武力的道德可接受性时指出，当他人主动使用武力时，我们就回到了第一阶段的自然状态，可以对他使用武力。我们这样做并没有侵犯他的权利，也没有以任何其他方式违反权利原则，因为他破坏了我们认为这种[权利]原则具有约束力所需的对等性。在这一点上，我们找到了惩罚实践的道德合法性的哲学基础。惩罚只是一种做法，它提高了违反权利原则的代价，使我们有充分的理由接受这一原则。[221]

Or as Locke writes:

In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity … and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, … every man … by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it. [A] criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security.92

或者如洛克所述：

在违反自然法则时，犯罪者宣布自己按照理性和普通公平以外的另一种规则生活……因此，他就对人类构成了危险，……每个人……根据他所拥有的保护全人类的权利，可以限制或在必要时消灭对人类有害的东西，因此，可以给予任何违反了自然法则的人以伤害，使他悔不当初。[一个]罪犯，放弃了理性，放弃了上帝赐予人类的共同规则和尺度，他对一个人实施的不公正的武力和屠杀，就等于向全人类宣战，因此，他可以像狮子或老虎一样被消灭，他是那些野蛮的野兽中的一员，人们既不能与之为伍，同时也毫无安全感。[222]

Other quotes can be listed briefly here:

Tibor Machan: “[I]f someone attacks another, that act carries with it, as a matter of the logic of aggression, the implication that from a rational moral standpoint the victim may, and often should retaliate.” 93

其他引文可在此简要列出：

蒂博尔·马钱（Tibor Machan）：”如果有人攻击他人，作为侵犯的逻辑问题，这一行为带有这样的含义，即从理性的道德角度来看，受害者可以而且往往应该进行报复”。[223]

Jan Narveson: “[T]hose who do not want peace, or want it only for others in relation to themselves rather than vice versa, are on their own and may in principle be dealt with by any degree of violence we like.”94 Rasmussen & Den Uyl, “[W]hen someone is punished for having violated others’ rights, it is not the case that the criminal has alienated or otherwise lost his rights; rather, it is the case that the criminal’s choice to live in a rights-violating way is being respected.”95

扬-纳尔维森（Jan Narveson）：”那些不希望和平的人，或者只希望别人和平而不希望自己和平的人，都是自作自受，原则上可以用我们喜欢的任何程度的武力来对付他们。”[224] Rasmussen & Den Uyl：”当一个人因侵犯他人权利而受到惩罚时，并不是罪犯异化了或以其他方式丧失了他的权利，而是罪犯选择以侵犯权利的方式生活的选择得到了尊重。”[225]

Randy Barnett: “It has been noted that one who wishes to extinguish or convey an inalienable right may do so by committing the appropriate wrongful act and thereby forfeiting it.”96

兰迪-巴尼特（Randy Barnett）：”有人指出，一个人如果想取消或转让一项不可让渡的权利，可以通过实施适当的不法行为来实现，从而丧失该权利 “。[226]

Others are collected at Kinsella, “Quotes on the Logic of Liberty.”

其他语录收录于金塞拉的《自由逻辑的引语》。

Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights

第六章自由意志主义权利的对话论证

After publishing articles on my estoppel-based theory of rights* and Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s “argumentation ethics” defense of libertarian rights† between 1992 and 1996, I published an article surveying estoppel, argumentation ethics, and similar theories in the Journal of Libertarian Studies in 1996, entitled “New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory.” †† An updated version of this article was published as “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” in The Dialectics of Liberty in 2019.§ This chapter is based on the latter piece, and is updated still further.**

在 1992 年至 1996 年间发表了关于我以禁止反言为基础的权利理论*和汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普为自由意志主义权利辩护的 “论证伦理学”†的文章之后，我于 1996 年在《自由意志义研究杂志》上发表了一篇文章，题为 “自由意志主义权利理论的新理性主义方向”，对禁止反言、论证伦理学和类似理论进行了梳理。††本文的更新版作为 “自由意志主义权利的对话论证 “发表于 2019 年的《自由辩证法》。§ 本章基于后一篇文章，并作了进一步更新。**

* Stephan Kinsella, “Estoppel: A New Justification for Individual Rights,” Reason Papers No. 17 (Fall 1992): 61–74 and the pair of articles that form the basis of “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5). See also “How I Became a Libertarian” (ch. 1) and Stephan Kinsella, “The Genesis of Estoppel: My Libertarian Rights Theory,” StephanKinsella.com (March 22, 2016).

*斯蒂芬·金塞拉，《禁止反言：个人权利的新依据》，《理性论文》第 17 期（1992 年秋季）：61 74 以及构成《自由意志主义的惩罚与权利理论》（第 5 章）基础的两篇文章。另见《我如何成为一名自由主义者》（第 1 章）和斯蒂芬·金塞拉，《禁止反言的起源：我的自由主义权利理论》，StephanKinsella.com（2016 年 3 月 22 日）。

†See “The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism” (ch. 22) and Stephan Kinsella, “Book Review: The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy by Hans-Hermann Hoppe,” The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty (November 1994; https://perma.cc/5J2V-R5R6) (each reviewing Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006 [1993]; www.hanshoppe.com/eepp)), and “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5). See also “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7). For more on argumentation ethics, see the references in note 15 to “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4).

†见《资本主义不可否认的道德性》（第 22 章）和斯蒂芬·金塞拉，“书评：汉斯赫尔曼·霍普的《私有财产的经济学与伦理学：政治经济学与哲学研究》”，《自由人：关于自由的理念》（1994 年 11 月；https://perma.cc/5J2V-R5R6）（均评论汉斯赫尔曼·霍普的《私有财产的经济学与伦理学：政治经济学与哲学研究》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，2006 年[1993 年]；www.hanshoppe.com/eepp）），以及《自由意志主义的惩罚与权利理论》（第 5 章）。另见《捍卫论证伦理学》（第 7 章）。关于论证伦理学的更多内容，请参阅《我们如何拥有自己》（第 4 章）注释 15 中的参考文献。

†† Stephan Kinsella, “New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory,” J. Libertarian Stud. 12, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 313–26. For a recent book-length exploration of some of the arguments discussed in this chapter, see Pavel Slutskiy, Communication and Libertarianism (Springer, 2021).

†† 斯蒂芬·金塞拉，《自由意志主义权利理论的新理性主义方向》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 12 卷第 2 期（1996 年秋季）：313 326 页。关于本章所讨论的一些论点的最新书籍篇幅的探索，见帕维尔·斯卢茨基，《交流与自由意志主义》（施普林格出版社，2021 年）。

Stephan Kinsella, “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights,” in Roger Bissell, Chris Sciabarra & Ed Younkins, eds., The Dialectics of Liberty (Lexington Books, 2019).
斯蒂芬·金塞拉：《自由意志主义权利的对话论证》，收录于罗杰-比塞尔、克里斯-斯基亚巴拉与埃德-尤金斯编著的《自由的辩证法》（列克星敦出版社，2019 年）。

** The term “dialogical” in my title refers to discourse, or dialogue, which features in many of the theories discussed here, including Hoppe’s discourse or argumentation ethics and many others mentionedin this chapter. As noted in “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7) and “The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism” (ch. 22), Hoppe’s discourse ethics was influenced by the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas, Hoppe’s PhD advisor, and Karl-Otto Apel. Interestingly, although Rawls says, of his own “original position,” “[l]ike Habermas’s ideal discourse situation, it is a dialogue; indeed, an omnilogue, … Habermas sometimes says that the original position is monological and not dialogical; that is because all the parties have, in effect, the same reasons and so they elect the same principles.” John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 383. For our purposes, I think the term dialogue or dialogical suffices.

** 我标题中的 “对话 “一词指的是交流或对话，这在本文讨论的许多理论中都有体现，包括霍普的对话伦理学或论证伦理学以及本章提到的许多其他理论。正如《捍卫论证伦理学》（第 7 章）和《资本主义不可否认的道德性》（第 22 章）所指出的，霍普的对话伦理学受到了霍普的博士导师尤尔根-哈贝马斯（Jürgen Habermas）和卡尔-奥托-阿佩尔（Karl-Otto Apel）的对话伦理学的影响。有趣的是，尽管罗尔斯在谈到自己的 “原初立场 “时说，”与哈贝马斯的理想话语情境一样，它是一种对话；实际上，是一种无所不包的对话，……哈贝马斯有时会说，原初立场是独白式的，而不是对式话的；这是因为所有各方实际上都有相同的理由，因此他们选择了相同的原则”。约翰·罗尔斯，《政治自由主义》扩充版（纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社，2005 年），第 383 页。就我们的目的而言，我认为“对话”或“对话式”这个词就足够了。

Classical liberals and libertarians believe that individuals have rights, even if there is debate about just why we have them or how this can be proved. Robert Nozick opened his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia with the assertion: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).”1 Yet, he did not offer a proof of this assertion, for which he has drawn criticism. It is commonly assumed that Nozick’s argument is not complete until a proof of rights is offered.2 Other theorists have offered, over the years, various reasons—utilitarian, natural law, pragmatic, and the like—why we should respect others’ rights, why we should recognize that individuals have certain rights.3

古典自由主义者和自由意志主义者皆相信个人拥有权利，尽管对于我们为什么拥有权利或如何证明这一点存在争议。罗伯特-诺齐克在《无政府、国家与乌托邦》一书中开宗明义地指出 “个人有权利，有些事情任何个人或团体都不能对他们做（而不侵犯他们的权利）”。[227]然而，他并没有为这一主张提供证明，因此招致批评。人们普遍认为，只有提供了权利证明，诺齐克的论证才算完整。[228]多年来，其他理论家提出了各种理由——功利主义的、自然法的、实用主义的等等——说明为什么我们应该尊重他人的权利，为什么我们应该承认个人拥有某些权利。[229]

For instance, an economic case can be made for respecting the liberty of others. Given that you are a decent person and generally value your fellow man and wish everyone to live a satisfying life, you will tend to be in favor of the free market and liberty, at least if you understand basic economic principles.4 But the success of arguments such as these depends on other people accepting particular premises, such as valuing the general well-being of others, without which the argument is incomplete. Skeptics can always deny the validity of the premises even if they cannot refute free-market economics.

例如，尊重他人的自由在经济上是有道理的。如果你是一个正直的人，普遍重视你的同胞，希望每个人都过上满意的生活，你就会倾向于支持自由市场和自由，只要你了解基本的经济原则的话。[230]但是，诸如此类的论证能否取得成功，取决于其他人是否接受特定的前提，比如重视他人的普遍福祉，否则论证就不完整。怀疑论者即使无法反驳自由市场经济，也可以否认前提的有效性。

There can be no doubt that a rigorous argument for individual rights would be useful. In recent years, interest has been increasing in rationalist, dialectical, or dialogical rights theories or related theories, some of which promise to provide fruitful and unassailable defenses of individual rights. These arguments typically examine the implicit claims that are necessarily presupposed by action or discourse. They then proceed deductively or conventionally from these core premises,or axioms, to establish certain apodictically true conclusions. Several such arguments are surveyed below.

毫无疑问，对个人权利进行严格的论证是有益的。近年来，人们对理性主义、辩证法或对话式权利理论或相关理论的兴趣与日俱增，其中一些理论有望为个人权利提供富有成效且无可辩驳的辩护。这些论点通常研究行动或对话必然预设的隐含主张。然后，这些论证从这些核心前提或公理出发，以演绎或约定俗成的方式得出某些符合逻辑的真实结论。下文将对几种此类论证进行考察。

论证伦理学ARGUMENTATION ETHICS

Let us first discuss Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s pathbreaking “argumentation ethics” defense of libertarian rights.5 Hoppe shows that basic rights are implied in the activity of argumentation itself, so that anyone asserting any claim about anything necessarily presupposes the validity of rights. Hoppe first notes that any truth at all (including norms such as individual rights to life, liberty, and property) that one would wish to discuss, deny, or affirm will be brought up in the course of an argumentation, that is to say, will be brought up in dialogue. If participants in argumentation necessarily accept particular truths, including norms, in order to engage in argumentation, they could never challenge these norms in an argument without thereby engaging in a performative contradiction. This would establish these norms as literally incontestable truths.

让我们先来讨论汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普开创性地为自由意志主义权利辩护的 “论证伦理学 “。[231]霍普指出，基本权利隐含于论证活动本身，因此，任何人对任何事物提出任何主张，都必然以权利的有效性为前提。霍普首先指出，人们想要讨论、否认或肯定的任何真理（包括个人的生命权、自由权和财产权等规范）都会在论证过程中被提出来，也就是说，会在对话中被提出来。如果论证的参与者必须接受特定的真理，包括规范，才能参与论证，那么他们就不可能在论证中挑战这些规范，否则就会陷入谏言冲突。这将使这些规范成为无可争议的真理。

Hoppe establishes self-ownership by pointing out that argumentation, as a form of action, implies the use of the scarce resources of one’s body. One must have control over, or own, this scarce resource in order to engage in meaningful discourse. This is because argumentation is, by its very nature, a conflict-free way of interacting, since it is an attempt to find what the truth is, to establish truth, to persuade or be persuaded by the force of words alone. If one is threatened into accepting the statements or truth-claims of another, this does not tend to get at the truth, which is undeniably a goal of argumentation or discourse. Thus, anyone engaging in argumentation implicitly presupposes the right of self-ownership of other participants in the argument, for otherwise the other would not be able to consider freely and accept or reject the proposed argument. Only as long as there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual’s property right in his or her own body can true argumentation take place. When this right is not recognized, the activity is no longer argumentation, but threat, mere naked aggression, or plain physical fighting. Thus, anyone who denies that rights exist contradicts himself since, by his very engaging in the cooperative and conflict-free activity of argumentation, he necessarily recognizes the right of his listener to be free to listen, think, and decide. That is, any participant in discourse presupposes the non-aggression principle, the libertarian view that one may not initiate force against others. Thus, according to Hoppe, anyone who would ever deny the ethics underlying the free market is already, by his very engaging in the civilized activity of discourse, presupposing the very ethic that he is challenging. This is a powerful argument because, instead of seeking to persuade someone to accept a new position, it points out to him a position that he already maintains, a position that he necessarily maintains. Opponents of liberty undercut their own position as soon as they begin to state it.

霍普指出，论证作为行动的一种形式，意味着使用一个人的身体这种稀缺资源，从而确立了自我所有权。一个人必须控制或拥有这种稀缺资源，才能进行有意义的对话论证。这是因为，就其本质而言，论证是一种无冲突的互动方式，因为它是一种试图寻找真理、确立真理、仅凭语言的力量来说服人或被人说服的方式。如果一个人受到威胁而不得不接受另一个人的陈述或真理主张，这往往不会触及真理，而真理无疑是论证或对话的目标。因此，任何参与论证的人都隐含地预设了其他参与论证者的自我所有权，否则他人就无法自由地思考以及接受或拒绝所提出的论点。只有至少隐含地承认每个人对自己身体的财产权，才能进行真正的论证。当这种权利得不到承认时，这种活动就不再是论证，而是威胁、赤裸裸的侵犯，或者赤裸裸的肢体冲突。因此，任何否认权利存在的人都是自相矛盾的，因为他在参与协同的和无冲突的论证活动时，必然承认听众有自由倾听、思考和决定的权利。也就是说，任何对话参与者都以 “互不侵犯原则 “为前提，这是自由意志主义关于一个人不得对他人使用武力的观点。因此，霍普认为，任何否认自由市场伦理的人，在参与文明的对话交流活动时，就已经预设了他所不赞同的伦理。这是一个有力的论证，因为它不是试图说服某人接受一个新的立场，而是向他指出了他已经坚持的立场，一个他必然坚持的立场。自由的反对者当他开口之始就刨掉了自己的根基。

Hoppe then extends his case for self-ownership to external resources, to show that property rights in external scarce resources, in addition to self-ownership rights, are also presupposed by discourse. As he argues, “one’s body is indeed the prototype of a scarce good for the use of which property rights, that is, rights of exclusive ownership, somehow have to be established, in order to avoid clashes.”6 As Hoppe explains,

The compatibility of this principle with that of nonaggression can be demonstrated by means of an argumentum a contrario. First, it should be noted that if no one had the right to acquire and control anything except his own body … then we would all cease to exist and the problem of the justification of normative statements … simply would not exist. The existence of this problem is only possible because we are alive, and our existence is due to the fact that we do not, indeed cannot, accept a norm outlawing property in other scarce goods next and in addition to that of one’s physical body. Hence, the right to acquire such goods must be assumed to exist.7

霍普随后将自我所有权的论证扩展到外部资源，说明除了自我所有权之外，外部稀缺资源的财产权也是以对话为前提的。正如他所论证的，”一个人的身体确实是一种稀缺物品的原型，为了避免冲突，必须以某种方式确立其使用的财产权，即排他性所有权 “。[232]正如霍普解释，

这一原则与互不侵犯原则的兼容性可以通过反证法来证明。首先，应该指出的是，如果除了自己的身体之外，任何人都无权获取和控制任何东西……那么我们都将不复存在，规范性声明的正当性问题……也就根本不存在了。这个问题之所以可能存在，只是因为我们还活着，而我们之所以存在，是因为我们不接受，事实上也不能接受这样一种规范，即除了一个人的身体之外，其他稀缺物品的财产也是非法的。因此，必须假定获取这些物品的权利是存在的。[233]

Next, Hoppe argues that the only ownership rule that is compatible with self-ownership and the presuppositions of discourse is the Lockean original-appropriation rule.8 Hoppe’s basic point here is that self-ownership rights are established just because one’s body is itself a scarce (conflictable) resource, so other scarce resources must be similarly ownable.9

接下来，霍普认为，唯一与自我所有权和对话预设相容的所有权规则是洛克式的先占规则。[234] 霍普在此提出的基本观点是，自我所有权之所以成立，只是因为一个人的身体本身就是一种稀缺（冲突）资源，因此其他稀缺资源也必须同样可拥有的。[235]

Looked at from another angle, participants in argumentation indisputably need to use and control the scarce resources in the world to survive; otherwise, they would perish. But because their scarcity makes conflict over the uses of resources possible, only norms that determine the proper ownership can avoid conflict over these scarce goods. That such norms are valuable cannot be denied, because anyone who is alive in the world and participating in the practical activity of argumentation cannot deny the value of being able to control scarce resources and the value of avoiding conflicts over such scarce (i.e., conflictable) resources.

从另一个角度看，争论的参与者无可争辩地需要使用和控制世界上稀缺的资源才能生存；否则，他们就会灭亡。但是，由于资源的稀缺性，人们有可能在资源的使用上发生冲突，因此，只有确定适当所有权的规范才能避免在这些稀缺物品上发生冲突。我们不能否认这种规范的价值，因为任何活在这个世界上并参与论证这一实践活动的人，都不能否认能够控制稀缺资源的价值，以及避免在这些稀缺资源（即冲突性资源）上发生冲突的价值。

So no one could ever deny that norms for determining the ownership of scarce goods are useful for allowing conflict-free exploitation of such resources. But, as Hoppe points out, there are only two fundamental alternatives for acquiring rights in unowned property: (1) by doing something with things with which no one else had ever done anything before, that is, the Lockean concept of mixing of labor, or homesteading; or (2) simply by verbal declaration or decree. However, a rule that allows property to be owned by mere verbal declaration cannot serve to avoid conflicts, since any number of people could at any time assert conflicting claims of ownership over any particular scarce resource. Only the first alternative, that of Lockean homesteading, establishes an objective (or, as Hoppe sometimes calls it, intersubjectively ascertainable) link between a particular person and a particular scarce resource, and thus no one can deny the Lockean right to homestead unowned resources.

因此，没有人能够否认，确定稀缺物品所有权的规范有助于在无冲突的情况下利用这些资源。但是，正如霍普所指出的，获得无主财产的权利只有两种基本选择：(1)通过对以前从未有人对之做过任何事情的事物做一些事情，即洛克式的劳动混合概念，或拓殖；或(2)仅仅通过口头声明或法令。然而，仅仅通过口头声明就可以拥有财产的规则并不能避免冲突，因为任何数量的人都可以在任何时候对任何特定的稀缺资源提出相互冲突的所有权主张。只有第一种选择，即洛克式的拓殖，在特定的人与特定的稀缺资源之间建立了客观的（或如霍普有时所说的主体间可确定的）联系，因此没有人可以否认洛克式的对无主资源的拓殖权。

论证伦理学和自然权利Argumentation Ethics and Natural Rights

Before closing this section let me emphasize that Hoppe offered his theory as an improvement on traditional natural rights arguments. For one, by focusing on argumentation instead of action,10 he seeks to avoid one weakness of previous arguments:

It has been a common quarrel with the natural rights position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far “too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law.”11

在结束本节之前，请允许我强调，霍普提出他的理论是对传统自然权利论证的一种改进。首先，他将重点放在论证而非行动上，[236] 他试图避免以往论证的一个不足：

即使是赞同自然权利的读者，也经常对自然权利的立场提出争论，认为人性的概念 “过于分散和多样，无法为自然法提供一套确定的内容 “。[237]

Hoppe is also critical of classical natural rights reasoning insofar as it violates the is-ought gap. As he writes: “[O]ne can readily subscribe to the almost generally accepted view that the gulf between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ is logically unbridgeable.”12 Argumentation ethics attempts to sidestep this issue by remaining in the realm of is-statements:

Here the praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements, and nowhere tries to derive an ought from an is. The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle— a priori true is-statement; and (c) then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement.13

霍普也对古典自然权利的推理提出批评，因为它违反了 “是 “与 “应 “之间的鸿沟。他写道：”人们很容易接受一种几乎被普遍接受的观点，即’应该’与’是’之间的鸿沟在逻辑上是不可逾越的 “[238]。论证伦理学试图通过将其停留在“是”的命题领域来规避这个问题：

在这里，自由意志主义的行动学证明的优势在于为私有财产提供了一个价值无涉的理由。它完全属于 “是 “命题的领域，不存在试图从 “是 “推导出 “应该”。论证的结构是这样的：(a) 论证是命题论证——先验正确的 “是 “命题；(b) 论证的前提是个人的身体财产和拓殖原则——先验正确的 “是 “命题；(c) 那么，任何偏离这一伦理的行为都不能被论证为是正当的——先验正确的 “是 “命题。[239]

Thus, as Hoppe writes:

The relationship between our approach and a “natural rights” approach can now be described in some detail, too. The natural law or natural rights tradition of philosophic thought holds that universally valid norms can be discerned by means of reason as grounded in the very nature of man. It has been a common quarrel with this position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far “too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law.” … Furthermore, its description of rationality is equally ambiguous in that it does not seem to distinguish between the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of nature on the one hand, and normative laws of human conduct on the other.…

因此，霍普写道：

我们的方法与 “自然权利 “方法之间的关系现在也可以详细描述了。哲学思想中的自然法或自然权利传统认为，普遍有效的规范可以通过基于人性的理性加以辨别。对这一立场的争论很普遍，即使是赞同这一立场的读者也认为，人性的概念 “过于分散和多样，无法为自然法提供一套确定的内容”…… 此外，它对理性的描述也同样含糊不清，因为它似乎没有区分理性在建立经验性自然法则和规范性人类行为法则中的作用……

In recognizing the narrower concept of argumentation (instead of the wider one of human nature) as the necessary starting point in deriving an ethic, and in assigning to moral reasoning the status of a priori reasoning, clearly to be distinguished from the role of reason performed in empirical research, our approach not only claims to avoid these difficulties from the outset, but claims thereby to be at once more straightforward and rigorous. Still, to thus dissociate myself from the natural rights tradition is not to say that I could not agree with its critical assessment of most of contemporary ethical theory; indeed I do agree with H. Veatch’s complementary refutation of all desire (teleological, utilitarian) ethics as well as all duty (deontological) ethics…. Nor do I claim that it is impossible to interpret my approach as falling in a “rightly conceived” natural rights tradition after all. What I claim, though, is that the following approach is clearly out of line with what the natural rights approach has actually come to be, and that it owes nothing to this tradition as it stands.14

我们的方法承认狭义的论证概念（而不是广义的人性概念）是推导伦理的必要起点，并赋予道德推理以先验推理的地位，这显然有别于理性在经验研究中所发挥的作用，我们的方法不仅要求从一开始就避免了这些困难，而且从而还要求更加直接和严谨。尽管如此，我这样与自然权利传统划清界限，并不是说我不同意它对大多数当代伦理学理论的批判性评价；事实上，我确实同意维奇（H. Veatch）对所有欲望（目的论、功利主义）伦理学以及所有责任（义务论）伦理学的补充性驳斥….。我也不是主张说我的方法不可能被解释为属于 “正确理解的 “自然权利传统。不过，我所主张的是，以下方法显然与自然权利方法的实际内涵不符，它对这一传统毫无贡献。[240]

And this, perhaps, part of the reason why Rothbard gave a wholehearted endorsement to Hoppe’s argumentation ethics:

In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he [Hoppe] has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist, Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison.15

这也许就是罗斯巴德全心全意支持霍普的论证伦理学的部分原因：

对于一般的政治哲学，尤其是对于自由意志主义，这是一个令人瞩目的突破。他（霍普）成功地超越了自经院哲学时代以来一直困扰着哲学体系的著名的“是/应”、“事实/价值”二分法，这种二分法曾使现代自由意志主义陷入令人厌烦的僵局。不仅如此：汉斯-霍普以一种前所未有的硬核方式为无政府资本主义和洛克式的权利确立了论据，相比之下，这让我自己的自然法/自然权利立场几乎显得微不足道。[241]

禁止反言ESTOPPEL

Another rationalist-oriented justification of rights is an argument I developed based on the common-law concept of estoppel.16 As one legal treatise explains:

The word estoppel means “not permitted to deny.” If A makes a statement of fact that B relies on in some substantial way, A will not be permitted to deny it (that is, A will be estopped), if the effect of A’s denial would be to injure the party who relies on it.17

另一个以理性主义为导向的权利正当性是我根据普通法中的禁止反言概念提出的论证。[242]正如一步法律论著所解释：

禁止反言一词的意思是 “不允许否认”。如果 A 陈述了某一事实，而 B 在某种程度上依赖该事实，那么，如果 A 的否认会对依赖该事实的一方造成伤害，则不允许 A 否认该事实（也就是说，A 将被禁止反言）。[243]

Thus, under the traditional legal principle of estoppel, a person may be prevented, or estopped, from maintaining something (for example in court) inconsistent with his previous conduct or statements. For instance, if a father promises his daughter that he will pay her college tuition for her, and the daughter relies on this promise to her detriment, for example by enrolling in college and becoming obligated to the college for her tuition, then she may be able to recover some of her expenses from her father, even if his original promise is not enforceable as a normal contract (for example, because there was no consideration).18 The father would be estopped from denying that a contract was formed, even though, technically, one was not.

因此，根据禁止反言的传统法律原则，可以阻止或禁止某人坚持（例如在法庭上）与其以前的行为或陈述不一致的东西。例如，如果父亲向女儿承诺会为她支付大学学费，而女儿依赖这一承诺并因此受到损害，例如进入大学就读并开始承担大学学费，那么即使父亲最初的承诺不能作为普通强制执行（例如，因为没有对价），女儿也可以向父亲追讨部分费用。 [244]父亲将被禁止否认的成立，即使从技术上讲，并未成立。

Drawing on this legal terminology and concept, the approach I advance may be termed “dialogical” estoppel, or simply estoppel. The estoppel principle shows that an aggressor contradicts himself if he objects to others’ enforcement of their rights. Thus, unlike Hoppe’s argumentation ethics approach, which focuses on presuppositions of discourse in general, and which shows that any participant in discourse contradicts himself if he denies these presuppositions, the estoppel theory focuses on the discourse between an aggressor and his victim about punishment of the aggressor and seeks to show that the aggressor contradicts himself if he objects to his punishment.

借鉴这一法律术语和概念，我提出的方法可称为 “对话式 “禁止反言，或简称禁止反言。禁止反言原则表明，如果侵害者反对他人行使其权利，则与自己相矛盾。因此，与霍普的论证伦理学方法不同，其侧重于一般的对话预设，并表明任何对话参与者如果否认这些预设就会自相矛盾，而禁止反言理论侧重于侵害者与其受害者之间关于对侵害者的惩罚的对话，并试图表明侵害者如果反对对他的惩罚就会自相矛盾。

What would it mean to have a right? Whatever else rights might be, certainly it is the case that rights are legitimately enforceable; that is, one who is physically able to enforce his right may not be prevented from doing so. In short, having a right allows one to legitimately punish the violator of the right or to legitimately use force to prevent another from violating the right. The only way one could be said not to have a right would be if the attempt to punish a violator of the right is for some reason unjustifiable. But clearly this problem itself can arise only when the alleged criminal objects to being punished, for if criminals consented to punishment, we would not face the problem of justifying punishing them.19

拥有权利意味着什么？不管权利是什么，权利当然是可以合法行使的；也就是说，一个人如果有能力行使自己的权利，就不能阻止他这样做。简而言之，拥有一项权利，就可以合法地惩罚权利的侵害者，或者合法地使用武力阻止他人侵犯该权利。唯一可以说一个人没有权利的情况是，试图惩罚权利侵害者的行为由于某种原因是不正当的。但很明显，只有当被指控的罪犯反对受到惩罚时，这个问题本身才会出现，因为如果罪犯同意接受惩罚，我们就不会面临惩罚他们是否正当的问题。[245]

The estoppel argument contends that we have rights just because no aggressor could ever meaningfully object to being punished. Thus, if the only potential obstacle to having a legitimately enforceable right is the unconsenting criminal, and if he is estopped from objecting to his punishment, then the right may be said to exist, or be justified, since, in effect, the criminal cannot deny this.

禁止反言的论点认为，我们之所以拥有权利，只是因为没有任何侵害者能够有意义地反对受到惩罚。因此，如果拥有一项可合法行使的权利的唯一潜在障碍是不同意的罪犯，而且如果他被禁止反对对他的惩罚，那么这项权利就可以说是存在的，或者说是正当的，因为实际上罪犯无法否认这一点。

So why is this the case? Why is a criminal estopped in this manner? Consider: if B is a violent aggressor, such as a murderer or rapist, how could he not consent to any punishment that A, the victim (or the victim’s agent), attempts to inflict? To object to his punishment, B must engage in discourse with A; he must at least temporarily adopt the stance of a peaceful, civilized person trying to persuade A, through the use of reason and consistent, universalizable principles, to provide reasons as to why A should not punish him. But to do this, B must in essence claim that A should not use force against him (B), and to do this, B must claim that it is wrong, or unjustifiable, to use force. But since he has initiated force, he has admitted that (he believes that) it is proper to use force, and B would contradict himself if he were to claim the opposite. Since contradictions are always false20 and since an undeniable goal of discourse is to establish truth, such contradictions are ruled out of bounds in discourse, since they cannot tend to establish truth. Thus, B is estopped from making this contradictory assertion, and is therefore unable to object to his punishment.

那么，情况为何会如此呢？为什么罪犯会受到这种禁止反言的限制？想想看：如果 B 是一个武力侵害者，如杀人犯或强奸犯，他怎么会不同意受害者 A（或受害者的代理人）试图对他施加的任何惩罚呢？为了反对对他的惩罚，B必须与A进行对话；他必须至少暂时采取一个和平的、文明的人的立场，试图通过使用理性和一致的、可普遍化的原则来说服A，以提供理由说明为什么A不应该惩罚他。但要做到这一点，B 本质上必须声称 A 不应对他（B）使用武力，而要做到这一点，B 必须声称使用武力是错误的，或者说是不正当的。但是，既然他使用了武力，他就承认（他相信）使用武力是正当的，如果 B 提出相反的主张，他就会自相矛盾。既然矛盾总是虚假的[246] ，既然对话的一个不可否认的目标是确立真理，那么这种矛盾就被排除在对话的范围之外，因为它们不可能趋向于确立真理。因此，B 被禁止作出这种自相矛盾的主张，因而不能反对对他的惩罚。

Under the estoppel theory, then, we may enforce our rights against violent aggressors, since they cannot object to the enforcement of rights without self-contradiction.21

那么，根据禁止反言理论，我们可以对武力侵害者实施我们的权利，因为他们无法在不自相矛盾的情况下反对权利的实施。[247]

权利怀疑主义RIGHTS-SKEPTICISM

A third type of rights argument concerns the very nature of rights themselves and shows how any rights-skeptic contradicts himself whenever he denies that rights exist. It is similar to the estoppel approach outlined above, although the discourse under examination need not involve an aggressor. Instead, this argument focuses on rights-skeptics who deny the existence of rights, rather than on actual criminals who object to being punished in particular instances for a given crime.

第三种权利论证涉及权利本身的性质，表明任何权利怀疑论者在否认权利存在时是如何自相矛盾的。它与上文所述的禁止反言方法类似，但所考察的对话不必涉及侵害者。相反，本论证侧重于否认权利存在的权利怀疑论者，而非反对在特定情况下因特定罪行受到惩罚的实际罪犯。

If any right at all exists, it is a right of A to have or do X without B’s preventing it; and, therefore, A can legitimately use force against B to enforce the right.22 A is concerned with the enforceability of his right to X, and this enforceability is all that A requires in order to be secure in his right to X. For a rights-skeptic meaningfully to challenge A’s asserted right, the skeptic must challenge the enforceability of the right, instead of merely challenging the existence of the right. Nothing less will do. If the skeptic does not deny that A’s proposed enforcement of his purported right is legitimate, then the skeptic has not denied A’s right to X, because what it means to have a right is to be able to legitimately enforce it. If the skeptic maintains, then, that A has no right to X, indeed, no rights at all since there are no rights, the skeptic must also maintain that A’s enforcement of his purported right to X is not justified.

如果有任何权利存在，它就是A在B不阻止的情况下拥有或做 X 的权利；因此，A可以合法地对B使用武力来强制行使该权利。[248]A 关注的是他对 X 的权利的可执行性，而这种可执行性正是 A 为确保他对 X 的权利所要求的一切。权利怀疑论者要想对 A 所宣称的权利提出有意义的质疑，就必须质疑权利的可执行性，而不仅仅是质疑权利的存在。除此之外，皆不可行。如果怀疑论者不否认 A 声称的对其所谓权利的行使是合法的，那么怀疑论者就没有否认 A 对 X 的权利，因为拥有一项权利的含义就是能够合法地行使它。那么，如果怀疑论者坚持主张 A 不具有 X 的权利，实际上根本就没有权利，因为完全就不存在权利，那么怀疑论者也必须坚持主张，A 对其所谓的 X 权利的行使是不正当的。

But the problem faced by the skeptic here is that he assumes that enforcement—that is, the use of force—requires justification. A, however, cares not that the rights-skeptic merely challenges A’s use of force against B. The rights-skeptic must do more than express his preference that A not enforce his right against B, for such an expression does not attack the legitimacy of A’s enforcing his right against B. The only way for the skeptic meaningfully to challenge A’s enforcement action is to acknowledge that B may use force to prevent A’s (illegitimate) enforcement action. And here the rights-skeptic (perversely) undercuts his own position, because by recognizing the legitimacy of B’s use of force against A, the rights-skeptic effectively attributes rights to B himself, the right not to have unjustifiable force used against him. In short, for anyone to meaningfully maintain that A has no rights against B on the grounds that no rights exist, he must effectively attribute rights to B so that B may defend himself against A’s purportedly unwarranted enforcement action.

但怀疑论者在此面临的问题是，他假定执行——即使用武力——需要正当理由。然而，A 并不在乎权利怀疑论者只是质疑 A 对 B 使用武力。权利怀疑论者必须做的不仅仅是表达他希望A不要对B行使权利，因为这种表达并没有攻击A对B行使权利的合法性。怀疑论者对A的强制行动提出质疑的唯一途径是承认B可以使用武力阻止A的（非法的）强制行动。在这里，权利怀疑论者（反常地）削弱了自己的立场，因为通过承认B对A使用武力的合法性，权利怀疑论者实际上将权利归于B本人，即不被对其使用不正当的武力的权利。简言之，任何人若要以不存在权利为由，有意义地坚持认为 A 对 B 没有权利，他就必须有效地将权利归于 B，以便 B 可以针对 A 的所谓无理强制行动进行自卫。

More common-sensically, this demonstration points out the inconsistency on the part of a rights-skeptic who engages in discourse about the propriety of rights at all. If there are no rights, then there is no such thing as the justifiable or legitimate use of force, but neithe is there such a thing as the unjust use of force. But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about? If individuals delude themselves intothinking that they have natural rights, and, acting on this assumption, go about enforcing these rights as if they are true, the skeptic has no grounds to complain. To the extent theskeptic complains about people enforcing these illusory rights, he begins to attribute rights to those having force used against them. Any rights-skeptic can only shut up, because hecontradicts himself the moment he objects to others’ acting as if they have rights.23

更通俗地说，这一论证指出了权利怀疑论者在讨论权利正当性时的前后矛盾之处。如果没有权利，那么就不存在正当或合法使用武力的问题，但也不存在不正当使用武力的问题。但是，如果不存在不正当使用武力的情况，那么权利怀疑论者所关心的究竟是什么呢？如果个人自欺欺人地认为自己拥有自然权利，并在这一假设的基础上把这些权利当作真的一样去实施，那么怀疑论者就没有理由抱怨。如果怀疑论者抱怨人们在行使这些虚幻的权利，那么他就开始把权利归于那些受到强制武力针对的人。任何权利怀疑论者都只能闭嘴，因为他一旦反对他人仿佛拥有权利的行为，就会自相矛盾。[249]

其他与理性主义相关的理论OTHER RATIONALIST-RELATED THEORIES

In addition to the three approaches discussed above, other arguments, which also point out the inherent presuppositions of discourse or action, are briefly discussed below.

除上述三种方法外，下文还将简要讨论其他论点，这些论点也指出了对话或行动的内在预设。

G.B. 麦迪逊以及论证伦理学相关的理论家们G.B. Madison and Argumentation Ethics-Related Theorists

One approach that is similar to Hoppe’s argumentation ethics is that of philosopher G.B. Madison. Madison argues that

the various values defended by liberalism are not arbitrary, a matter of mere personal preference, nor do they derive from some natural law.… Rather, they are nothing less and nothing more than what could be called the operative presuppositions or intrinsic features and demands of communicative rationality itself. In other words, they are values that are implicitly recognized and affirmed by everyone by the very fact of their engaging in communicative reason. This amounts to saying that no one can rationally deny them without at the same time denying reason,without self-contradiction, without in fact abandoning all attempts to persuade the other and to reach agreement.24

哲学家麦迪逊（G.B. Madison）的方法与霍普的论证伦理学相似。麦迪逊认为

自由主义所捍卫的各种价值观不是任意的，不是个人偏好的问题，也不是源于某种自然法….，相反，它们不过是交流理性本身的运作前提或内在特征与要求。换句话说，它们是每个人通过参与交流理性这一事实而隐含承认和肯定的价值。这等于说，没有人能够在不同时否定理性、不自相矛盾、不放弃说服对方和达成一致的一切努力的情况下，理性地否定这些价值。[250]

These implicitly recognized values include a renunciation of the legitimacy of violence.Thus, “it is absolutely impossible for anyone who claims to be rational, which is to say human, outrightly to defend violence.” 25

这些不言而喻的价值观包括否认武力的合法性。因此，”任何自称理性的人，也就是人类，绝对不可能公然为武力辩护”。[251]

Madison continues:

[Paul] Ricoeur writes: “… violence is the opposite of discourse.… Violence is always the interruption of discourse: discourse is always the interruption of violence.” That violence is the opposite of discourse means that it can never justify itself—and is therefore not justifiable—for only through discourse can anything be justified. As the theory of rational argumentation and discussion, liberalism amounts, therefore, to a rejection of power politics.26

麦迪逊继续说道：

[保罗-利科尔写道：”……武力是对话的反面….，武力总是对话的中断：对话总是武力的中断”。武力是对话的反面，这意味着武力永远无法自圆其说，因此也是不正当的，因为只有通过对话，任何事物才能被证明是正当的。因此，作为理性论证和讨论的理论，自由主义等同于反对强权政治。[252]

Madison, like Hoppe, argues that the fact-value gap can be bridged by an appeal to the nature of discourse:

the notion of universal human rights and liberties is not an … arbitrary value, a matter of mere personal preference.… On the contrary, it is nothing less and nothing more than the operative presupposition or intrinsic feature and demand of communicative rationality itself.27

In a sense, notes Madison, Thomas Jefferson was not so far off in calling our rights “self-evident.”

麦迪逊与霍普一样，认为可以通过诉诸对话的本质来弥合事实-价值之间的鸿沟：

普世人权和自由的概念不是……任意的价值，不是个人偏好的问题….，恰恰相反，它是交流理性本身的有效前提或内在特征与要求。[253]

麦迪逊指出，从某种意义上说，托马斯-杰斐逊称我们的权利为 “不证自明的 “并不为过。

The general thrust of Madison’s argument seems sound, although it is not as consistent or fully developed as Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. While Hoppe shows that the nonaggression principle (i.e., self-ownership plus the right to homestead external resources) itself is directly implied by any discourse or argumentation, Madison’s train of logic seems more muddled. For instance, he argues that, because discourse has “priority” over violence, this validates the Kantian claim that people ought to be treated as ends rather than means, which is the principle of human dignity. The principle of freedom from coercion then follows from the principle of human dignity. Madison does not specify in any more detail than this the libertarian principles that can be derived from such an approach,28 although, to be fair, Madison stresses that his remarks are intended only “to indicate the way in which liberalism must seek to” defend the values it advocates.29

麦迪逊论证的总体主旨似乎是合理的，尽管它不像霍普的论证伦理学那样连贯一致或充分展开。霍普表明，任何对话或论证都直接隐含着互不侵犯原则（即自我所有权加上拓殖外部资源的权利）本身，而麦迪逊的逻辑思路似乎稍显混乱。例如，他认为，由于对话 “优先于 “武力，这就证明了康德关于人应被视为目的而非手段的主张是正确的，这就是人的尊严原则。因此，从人的尊严原则引申出了免于强制的原则。麦迪逊并没有更详细地说明从这种方法中可以得出的自由意志主义原则，[254] 不过，公平地说，麦迪逊强调，他的言论只是为了 “表明自由主义必须设法 “捍卫其所倡导的价值观。[255]

Frank van Dun similarly suggests that part of “the ethics of dialogue” is that we ought to respect the “dialogical rights of others—their right to speak or not to speak, to listen or not to listen, to use their own judgment.”30 Van Dun argues that “principles of private property and uncoerced exchange” are also presupposed by participants in discourse and later defended Hoppe’s argumentation ethics.31 Jeremy Shearmur also proposes32 that a Habermasian argument may be developed to justify individual property rights and other classical liberal principles, although this argument is different in approach from that of Hoppe, Madison, and Van Dun, and is, in my view, much weaker than Hoppe’s approach.33

弗兰克-范-邓恩同样认为，”对话伦理 “的一部分是我们应该尊重 “他人对话的权利——他们说话或不说话的权利，倾听或不倾听的权利，使用自己判断的权利 “[256]。范-邓恩认为，”私有财产和无胁迫交换原则 “也是对话参与者的前提，并随后为霍普的论证伦理学辩护。[257]杰里米·希尔默(Jeremy Shearmur)也提出，[258]可以用哈贝马斯式的论证来证明个人财产权和其他经典自由主义原则的正当性，尽管这种论证在方法上与霍普、麦迪逊和范-邓恩的论证不同，而且在我看来，比霍普的方法要弱得多。[259]

Other theories that are briefly worth mentioning here include Paul Chevigny’s theorythatthe nature of discourse may be used to defend the right to free speech34 and Tibor Machan’s view that discourse in general and political dialogue in particularrest on individualist prerequisites or presuppositions.35

在此值得简要提及的其他理论包括保罗-切维尼（Paul Chevigny）的理论，即对话的性质可用于捍卫言论自由权[260]，以及蒂博尔·马钱（Tibor Machan）的观点，即一般的对话，尤其是政治对话，都建立在个人主义的前提或预设之上。[261]

Murray Rothbard, who was very enthusiastic about Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, was also hopeful that Hoppe’s argumentation ethics or axiomatic approach could be further extended. As Rothbard stated:

A future research program for Hoppe and other libertarian philosophers would be (a) tosee how far axiomatics can be extended into other spheres of ethics, or (b) to see if and how this axiomatic could be integrated into the standard natural law approach.36

默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）对霍普的论证伦理学赞赏有加，他也希望霍普的论证伦理学或公理化方法能够得到进一步的扩展。正如罗斯巴德所说：

霍普和其他自由意志主义哲学家未来的研究计划将是：(a) 看看公理论在多大程度上可以扩展到伦理学的其他领域，或者 (b) 看看这种公理论是否以及如何能够融入标准的自然法方法中。[262]

The various perspectives of Hoppe, Madison, Van Dun, and others on a similar theme indicate that Rothbard may indeed be correct that this type of rationalist thinking can be further extended in libertarian or ethical theory.37

霍普、麦迪逊、范-邓恩等人关于类似主题的各种观点表明，罗斯巴德可能确实是正确的，这种理性主义思维可以在自由意志主义或伦理理论中得到进一步扩展。[263]

克罗克的道德禁止反言理论Crocker’s Moral Estoppel Theory

In a theory bearing some resemblance to the estoppel theory discussed above, law professor Lawrence Crocker proposes the use of “moral estoppel” in preventing a criminal from asserting the unfairness of being punished in certain situations. Crocker’s theory, while interesting, is not rigorous, and Crocker does not seem to realize the implications of estoppel for justifying only the libertarian conception of rights. Rather than focusing on the reciprocity between the force used in punishment and the force of an aggressive act by a wrongdoer, Crocker claims that a person who has “treated another person or the society at large in a fashion that the criminal law prohibits” is “morally estopped” from asserting that his punishment would be unfair.38 However, Crocker’s use of estoppel is too vague and imprecise, and relies on a legal positivist conception of law, for just because one has violated a criminal law does not mean that one has committed the aggression that is necessary to estop him from complaining about punishment. A breached law must first be legitimate (just) for Crocker’s assumption to hold, but as the estoppel theory indicates, a law is legitimate only if it prohibits aggression. Crocker’s theory seems to assume that any law is valid, even those that do not prohibit the initiation of force.

法学教授劳伦斯-克罗克（Lawrence Crocker）的理论与上文讨论的禁止反言理论有几分相似，他提出使用 “道德禁止反言 “来阻止罪犯在某些情况下主张受到惩罚的不公平。克罗克的理论虽然有趣，但并不严谨，克罗克似乎并没有意识到禁止反言最适合证明自由意志主义权利概念的正当性的意涵。克罗克并没有把重点放在惩罚所使用的武力与不法行为者侵犯行为的武力之间的对等关系上，而是声称一个 “以刑法禁止的方式对待他人或整个社会 “的人 “在道德上被禁止 “声称对他的惩罚是不公平的。[264]然而，克罗克对禁止反言的使用过于模糊和不精确，而且依赖于法律实证主义的法律概念，因为一个人违反了刑法并不意味着他实施了禁止反言对惩罚提出申诉所必需的侵害行为。被违反的法律必须首先是合法的（公正的），克罗克的假设才能成立，但正如禁止反言理论所指出的，法律只有在禁止侵犯时才是合法的。克罗克的理论似乎假定任何法律都是有效的，即使是那些不禁止使用武力的法律。

皮隆和格维斯论通用一致性原则Pilon and Gewirth on the Principle of Generic Consistency

Another rights theory that bears mention here is that of Roger Pilon. Pilon has developed a libertarian version of the theory propounded by his teacher Alan Gewirth.39 Although he disagrees with the non-libertarian conclusions that Gewirth draws from his own rights theory, Pilon builds “upon much of the justificatory groundwork he [Gewirth] has established, for I believe he has located, drawn together, and solved some of the most basic problems in the theory of rights.”40

另一个值得一提的权利理论是罗杰-皮隆（Roger Pilon）的理论。皮隆对其老师阿兰•格维斯（Alan Gewirth）提出的理论进行了自由意志主义的发展。[265]虽然皮隆不同意格维斯从自己的权利理论中得出的非自由意志主义的结论，但皮隆建基于”他（格维斯）所建立的许多合理性基础之上，因为我相信他已经找到、汇集并解决了权利理论中一些最基本的问题 “。[266]

To determine what rights we have, Pilon (following Gewirth) focuses on “what it is we necessarily claim about ourselves, if only implicitly, when we act.”41 Pilon argues that all action is conative, that is, an agent acts voluntarily and for purposes which seem good to him. Pilon argues that the prerequisites of successful action are “voluntariness and purposiveness,” the so-called generic features that characterize all action. Thus, an agent cannot help valuing these generic features and even making a rights-claim to them, according to Pilon/Gewirth. From this conclusion, it is argued that all agents also necessarily claim rights against coercion and harm. And since it would be inconsistent to maintain that one has rights for these reasons without also admitting that others have these rights too (since the reasoning concerning the nature of action applies equally to all purposive actors), such rights-claims must be universalizable.42 As Gewirth writes, the

voluntariness and purposiveness which every agent necessarily has in acting, and which he necessarily claims as rights for himself on the ground that he is a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes, he must also, on pain of self-contradiction, admit to be rights of his recipient.43

为了确定我们拥有哪些权利，皮隆（继格维斯之后）将重点放在 “当我们行动时，我们必然对自己提出主张，哪怕只是隐含的主张 “。[267] 皮隆认为，所有行动都是合目的性的，也就是说，行动人的行动是自愿的，而且是为了他认为是好的目的。皮隆认为，成功行动的先决条件是 “自愿性和目的性”，即所有行动的所谓一般特征。因此，根据皮隆/格维斯的观点，行动人不得不重视这些一般特征，甚至对其提出权利主张。从这一结论出发，我们可以认为，所有的行动主体也必然会主张不受胁迫和伤害的权利。如果主张一个人由于这些原因而享有权利，但不承认其他人也享有这些权利(因为关于行动性质的推理同样适用于所有有目的的行动人)，这是不一致的，因此，这种权利主张必须是普遍适用的。[268]正如格维斯所写，

每个行动人在行动时必然具有自愿性和目的性，以及他作为一个想要实现其目的的有预期的行动人而必然主张的权利，他也必须承认是其接受者的权利，否则就会自相矛盾。[269]

Thus, an agent in any action makes a rights-claim to be free from coercion and harm, since such rights are necessary to provide for the generic features of action, which an agent also necessarily values, and the agent also necessarily grants these rights to others because of the universalizability requirement.

因此，行动人在任何行动中都提出了免受胁迫和伤害的权利主张，因为这种权利是行动的一般特征所必需的，而行动人也必然重视这些特征，而且由于普遍化的要求，行动人也必然将这些权利赋予他人。

From this point, Pilon/Gewirth develops a sort of modern categorical imperative, which is called the “Principle of Generic Consistency” (PGC). The PGC is: “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself,” and “Recipients are those who stand opposite agents, who are ‘affected by’ or ‘recipients of ’ their actions.”44 Under Pilon’s libertarian working of the PGC:

[T]he PGC does not require anyone to do anything. It is addressed to agents, but it does not require anyone to be an agent who has recipients. An individual can “do nothing” if he chooses, spending his life in idle contemplation. Provided there are no recipients of this behavior, he is at perfect liberty to perform it. And if there are recipients, the PGC requires only that he act in accord with the generic rights of those recipients, i.e., that he not coerce or harm them.45

从这一点出发，皮隆/格维斯提出了一种现代的绝对命令，即 “通用一致性原则”（PGC）。该原则是：“你的行为要符合接受方和你自己的一般权利”，并且“接受方是那些与行动人相对立的人，他们是其行动的‘受影响者’或‘接受者’。” [270]根据皮隆对 PGC 的自由意志主义解释：

通用一致性原则（PGC）不要求任何人做任何事。它是针对行动人的，但并不要求任何人成为有接受者的行动人。如果个人愿意，他可以 “什么也不做”，在无所事事的沉思冥想中度过一生。只要这种行为没有接受者，他完全可以自由地进行这种行为。如果有接受者，PGC 只要求他的行动符合这些接受者的一般权利，即他不得胁迫或伤害他们。[271]

Pilon extends his reasoning and works the PGC to flesh out more fully just what (primarily libertarian) rights we do have.

皮隆扩展了他的推理，并通过 PGC 更全面地阐述了我们确实拥有哪些（主要是自由意志主义的）权利。

All this is well done, except for one crucial error. As Hoppe points out, it is argumentation, not action, that is the appropriate starting point for such an analysis, because:

[F]rom the correctly stated fact that in action an agent must, by necessity, presuppose the existence of certain values or goods, it does not follow that such goods then are universalizable and hence should be respected by others as the agent’s goods by right.… Rather, the idea of truth, or of universalizable rights or goods only emerges with argumentation as a special subclass of actions, but not with action as such, as is clearly revealed by the fact that Gewirth, too, is not engaged simply in action, but more specifically in argumentation when he wants to convince us of the necessary truth of his ethical system.46

所有这一切都做得很好，除了一个关键的错误。正如霍普所指出的，这种分析的适当出发点是论证，而不是行动，因为：

行动人在行动中必然要预设某些价值观或财产的存在，这一事实是正确的，但这并不意味着这些价值观和财产就具有普适性，因而理所当然地作为行动人的财产而受到他人的尊重……相反，真理的概念，或普遍化的权利或财产的概念，只有在作为行动的一个特殊子集的论证中才会出现，而不是在行动本身中出现，这一点从格威斯（Gewirth）想要说服我们相信他的伦理体系是必然真理时，他不仅仅是在行动，而更确切地说是在论证这一事实中就清晰地显现了出来。[272]

It is possible that, despite this error, much of Pilon’s work is salvageable by, in effect, moving it to an argumentation context, such as is done in the estoppel approach where an aggressor must engage in argumentation to object to his punishment and is therefore subject to the unique constraints of argumentation. In other words, the weak link in Pilon’s PGC chain may be able to be repaired by considering claims made about prior actions when the agent later objects to punishment, for an objection to being punished requires the agent to enter into the special subclass action of argumentation, to which criteria such as universalizability do apply.

尽管存在这一错误，但皮隆的许多研究成果还是可以弥补的，方法实际上就是将其转移到论证语境中，正如禁止反言方法中的做法，即侵害者必须参与论证才能反对对他的惩罚，因此要受到论证的独特限制。换句话说，皮隆的 PGC 链中的薄弱环节也许可以通过考虑行动人后来反对惩罚时对先来行为提出的主张来修复，因为反对被惩罚要求行动主体进入论证这一特殊的行动子集，而普片化准则确实适用于这一行动子集。

结论CONCLUSION

Under the three theories outlined above—argumentation ethics, estoppel theory, and the self-contradictions of rights-skeptics—we can see that the relevant participant in discourse cannot deny the validity of individual rights. These rationalist-oriented theories offer very good defenses of individual rights, defenses that are more powerful than many other approaches, because they show that the opponent of individual rights, whether criminal, skeptic, or socialist, presupposes that they are true. Critics must enter the cathedral of libertarianism even to deny that it exists. This makes criticism of libertarian beliefs hollow: for if someone asks why we believe in individual rights, we can tell them to look in the mirror and find the answer there.

根据上文概述的三种理论：论证伦理学、禁止反言理论和权利怀疑论者的自我矛盾，我们可以看到，对话的相关参与者不能否认个人权利的有效性。这些以理性主义为导向的理论为个人权利提供了很好的辩护，这些辩护比许多其他方法更有力，因为它们表明，个人权利的反对者，无论是罪犯、怀疑论者还是社会主义者，都预先假定个人权利是真实的。批评者必须进入自由意志主义的大教堂，甚至要否认它的存在。这使得对自由意志主义信仰的批评变得空洞：因为如果有人问我们为什么相信个人权利，我们可以告诉他们照照镜子，在那里找到答案。

Defending Argumentation Ethics

第七章捍卫论证伦理学

This chapter is based on an article originally published in 2002 on the now-defunct site Anti-state.com, as a response to an article by Robert P. Murphy and Gene Callahan (hereinafter, MC), on the same forum, which was critical of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics.*

本章基于 2002 年发表在现已关闭的网站 Anti-state.com 上的一篇文章，作为对罗伯特-墨菲（Robert P. Murphy）和吉恩-卡拉汉（Gene Callahan，以下简称 MC）在同一论坛上发表的一篇批评霍普论证伦理学的文章的回应*。

I intend here to provide a short guide to the relevant literature followed by a limited response to MC’s critique of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics.

我打算在此提供一份相关文献的简短指南，然后对 MC 对汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）的论证伦理学的批评做出有限的回应。

* My article was “Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan,” Anti-state.com (Sept. 19, 2002), which is thesis of this chapter. It was a response to Robert P. Murphy & Gene Callahan, “Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethic: A Critique,” Anti-state.com (Sept. 19, 2002; archived at https://tinyurl.com/5n62x6zc and https:// perma.cc/D395-3JSW). The original links for both our pieces are bad (as this was a libertarian publication, ‘natch) but MC later published a substantially similar version of their article as “Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethic: A Critique,” J. Libertarian Stud. 20, no. 2 (Spring 2006; https://mises.org/library/hans-hermann-hoppes-argumentation- ethic-critique): 53–64. In the later version of their paper they did not respond to my critique. As their earlier paper is no longer online, in this chapter I will reference the later article for quotes and page citations, and sometimes with inline citations.

我的文章是《为论证伦理学辩护：回应墨菲和卡拉汉》，发布于 Anti-state.com 网站（2002 年 9 月 19 日），这是本章的主题。这是对罗伯特·P·墨菲和吉恩·卡拉汉的《汉斯赫尔曼·霍普的论证伦理学：一篇评论》的回应，也发布于 Anti-state.com 网站（2002 年 9 月 19 日；存档于 https://tinyurl.com/5n62x6zc 和 https:// perma.cc/D395-3JSW）。我们两篇文章的原始链接都失效了（因为这是一份自由意志主义的出版物，当然啦），但 MC 后来发表了他们文章的一个基本相似的版本，题为《汉斯赫尔曼·霍普的论证伦理学：一篇评论》，发表于《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 20 卷第 2 期（2006 年春季；https://mises.org/library/hans-hermann-hoppes-argumentationethic-critique）：53 64 页。在他们的后期版本中，他们没有回应我的批评。由于他们早期的文章不再在线，在本章中，我将引用后期的文章来引用和标注页码，有时还会使用行内引用。

I later debated my longtime friend Bob Murphy, whose work I greatly respect and admire, on this topic. See Kinsella, “KOL278 | Bob Murphy Show: Debating Hans Hoppe’s ‘Argumentation Ethics,’” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Nov. 24, 2019).

后来，我就这个话题与我的老朋友鲍勃·墨菲进行了辩论，我非常尊重和钦佩他的工作。见金塞拉的《KOL278 | 鲍勃·墨菲秀：辩论汉斯·霍普的“论证伦理学”》，金塞拉自由播客（2019 年 11 月 24 日）。

See also various responses to MC and other criticisms of Hoppe, cited in “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6), n.15, including Frank van Dun, “Argumenta- tion Ethics and the Philosophy of Freedom,” Libertarian Papers 1, art. no. 19 (2009; www. libertarianpapers.org); Marian Eabrasu, “A Reply to the Current Critiques Formulated

Against Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics,” Libertarian Papers 1, art. no. 20 (2009; www. libertarianpapers.org); Walter Block, “Rejoinder to Murphy and Callahan on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics,” J. Libertarian Stud. 22, no. 1 (2011; https://mises.org/library/ rejoinder-murphy-and-callahan-hoppes-argumentation-ethics): 631–39; and Norbert Slenzok, “The Libertarian Argumentation Ethics, the Transcendental Pragmatics of Language, and the Conflict-Freedom Principle,” Analiza i Egzystencja 58 (2022), 35–64. Hoppe re-presented his argument and responded to a variety of critics in his 2016 speech, at “PFP163 | Hans Hermann Hoppe, ‘On The Ethics of Argumentation’ (PFS 2016),” The Property and Freedom Podcast, ep. 163 ( June 30, 2022) (which includes a transcript).

还可参考对 MC 以及其他针对霍普的批评的各种回应，这些在《自由意志主义权利的对话论证》（第 6 章）的注释 15 中有提及，包括弗兰克·冯·顿的《论证伦理学与自由哲学》，发表于《自由意志主义论文》第 1 卷，第 19 号文章（2009 年；www.libertarianpapers.org）；玛丽安·埃布拉苏的《对当前针对霍普论证伦理学所提出批评的回应》，发表于《自由意志主义论文》第 1 卷，第 20 号文章（2009 年；www.libertarianpapers.org）；沃尔特·布洛克的《对墨菲和卡拉汉针对霍普论证伦理学的回应》，发表于《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 22 卷第 1 期（2011 年；https://mises.org/library/rejoinder-murphy-and-callahan-hoppes-argumentation-ethics）：631 639 页；以及诺伯特·斯伦佐克的《自由意志主义论证伦理学、语言的先验语用学和无冲突的自由原则》，发表于《分析与存在》第 58 期（2022 年），35 64 页。霍普在他 2016 年的演讲中重新阐述了他的论点，并回应了各种批评家，演讲题为“PFP163 | 汉斯·赫尔曼·霍普，‘关于论证伦理学’（PFS 2016）”，《财产与自由播客》，第 163 期（2022 年 6 月 30 日）（其中包括文字记录）。

背景BACKGROUND

Hoppe published several pieces expounding his “argumentation ethics” defense of libertarian rights, including “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic” in Liberty magazine in 1988,1 which resulted in a large number of commentaries from several libertarian thinkers.2 Over the next few years, Hoppe’s theory was intensely debated and commented on by several libertarians. Several replies and reviews, for example, were published in Liberty and elsewhere, by libertarians such as Murray Rothbard, David Gordon, Tibor Machan, David Friedman, Loren Lomasky, David Osterfeld, Sheldon Richman, Leland Yeager,David Ramsay Steele, Douglas Rasmussen, David Conway, and others. Hoppe responded to many of these pieces at length.3

霍普发表了几篇文章，阐述了他为自由意志主义权利辩护的 “论证伦理学”，其中包括 1988 年在《自由》杂志上发表的《私产伦理的终极证成》[273] ，引起了几位自由意志主义思想家的大量评论[274]。例如，默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）、大卫-戈登（David Gordon）、蒂博尔-马坎（Tibor Machan）、大卫-弗里德曼（David Friedman）、洛伦-洛马斯基（Loren Lomasky）、大卫-奥斯特菲尔德（David Osterfeld）、谢尔顿-里奇曼（Sheldon Richman）、利兰-耶格尔（Leland Yeager）、大卫·拉姆齐·斯蒂尔（David Ramsay Steele）、道格拉斯-拉斯穆森（Douglas Rasmussen）、大卫-康威（David Conway）等自由意志主义学者在《自由》等刊物上发表了多篇回复和评论。霍普对其中许多文章做了详尽的回应。[275]

Several of the replies to Hoppe were unusually nasty and unfair. Some were shocked anyone would argue for “untrammeled anarchism” and others were turned off by the idea that libertarian rights could be rigorously proved.4 Others badly misconstrued Hoppe’s argument. Still others, like Rothbard, recognized that Hoppe’s theory was a revolutionary advance in libertarian theory, as have a growing number of adherents over the years. As Rothbard wrote:

In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he [Hoppe] has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had broughtmodernlibertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed toestablish the case for anarcho-capitalist, Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison.5

对霍普的一些回复异常尖刻和不公平。一些人对有人主张 “不受约束的无政府主义 “感到震惊，另一些人则对自由意志主义的权利可以得到严格证明的观点感到反感。[276]还有一些人严重曲解了霍普的论点。还有一些人，比如罗斯巴德，认识到霍普的理论是自由意志主义理论的革命性进步，多年来越来越多的追随者也认识到了这一点。罗斯巴德写道：

对于整个政治哲学，尤其是自由意志主义来说，他（霍普）成功地超越了著名的是/应该、事实/价值二分法，这是一个振奋人心的突破。不仅如此：汉斯-霍普以一种前所未有的硬核方式为无政府资本主义和洛克式的权利确立了论据，这让我自己的自然法/自然权利立场与之相比显得几乎微不足道。[277]

Since the original article upon which this chapter is based was published, there have been many more contributions expanding on and defending Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. In the years since Hoppe’s theory was first published, several scholars have worked to defend, clarify and extend it.6 I have also commented and built on Hoppe’s work in my own writing.7

自本章所依据的原始文章发表以来，又有许多文章对霍普的论证伦理学进行了扩展和辩护。自霍普的理论首次发表以来，已有多位学者对其进行了辩护、澄清和扩展。[278]我在自己的文章中也对霍普的著作进行了评论和阐释。[279]

To fully appreciate Hoppe’s argument and to fairly evaluate MC’s critique, I suggest reading Hoppe’s own work8 and various secondary sources.9

为了充分理解霍普的论点并公正地评价 MC 的批评，我建议阅读霍普本人的著作[280] 和各种二手资料。[281]

自由意志主义的权利LIBERTARIAN RIGHTS

The central question here is: does Hoppe’s theory establish that there are libertarian rights?

这里的核心问题是:霍普的理论是否确立了自由意志主义权利的存在?

Scarce (conflictable) resources are those things over which there can be conflict; two or more individuals may want to use or control a given scarce resource at the same time, but only one of them can, because use by one excludes use by the other. Thus, as Hoppe explains, a theory of interpersonal ethics must be a theory of property rights,“a theory of the assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce means.”10 The purpose of rights is to specify which individual has the right to control a given scarce resource, so that conflicts may be avoided. The person who has the right to control a given scarce resource—its owner—is the person who is justified in using the resource, in excluding others, and in enforcing this exclusion against non-owners who would act in disregard of the owner’s property rights.

稀缺（冲突性）资源是指那些可能发生冲突的东西；两个或更多的人可能想同时使用或控制某一稀缺资源，但只有其中一个人可以使用，因为一个人的使用排除了另一个人的使用。因此，正如霍普所解释的，人际伦理学理论必须是一种财产权理论，“一种对稀缺资源的排他性控制权的分配理论”。[282] 权利的目的是明确规定哪个人有权控制特定的稀缺资源，从而避免冲突。有权控制特定稀缺资源的人——资源所有者——是有正当理由使用该资源、排除他人、并对无视所有者财产权的非所有者实施这种排除的人。

Everyone has at least an implicit view of rights. An aggressor—or at least one who would try to justify his aggression—maintains that he is entitled to a given scarce resource “because” he is strong enough to take it. Others, such as socialists, believe that the state is entitled to the means of production “because”—well, because they are the state, “because” capitalists “exploit” workers, and so on. Mainstream liberal-democratic types believe that, for example, the poor are entitled to property formerly owned by the not-poor, “because” the property is transferred from the latter to the former by means of a democratic process, which is “legitimate.” Everyone assigns each disputed scarce resource to some owner—whether to a thief, the state, or a relatively-poor “needy” person—for some reason.

每个人至少都有一种隐含的权利观。一个侵害者——至少是一个试图为自己的侵害行为辩护的人——主张他有权获得某种稀缺资源，”因为 “他足够强大，可以夺取它。其他人，比如社会主义者，认为国家有权获得生产资料，”因为”——嗯，因为他们是国家，”因为 “资本家 “剥削 “工人，等等。主流的自由民主派则认为，例如，穷人有权获得以前由非穷人拥有的财产，”因为 “这些财产是通过民主程序从后者转让给前者的，而民主程序是 “合法的”。每个人都会出于某种原因，将每种有争议的稀缺资源分配给某个所有者——无论是小偷、国家，还是相对贫穷的 “需要帮助 “的人。

The libertarian view is that each person presumptively owns his own body, and for other, previously-unowned resources, the owner is determined in accordance with the principles of original appropriation and contractual title transfer. Thus, under libertarianism, an individual has (a) a right to the exclusive control of the scarce resource of his body, sometimes called “self-ownership”; and (b) a right to the exclusive control of other, previously-unowned scarce resources that are originally appropriated by the individual or by his ancestor-in-title.11

自由意志主义认为，每个人都假定拥有自己的身体，而对于其他先前的无主资源，则根据先占原则和的所有权转让原则确定所有人。因此，根据自由意志主义，个人拥有（a）对其身体这一稀缺资源的排他性控制权，有时称为 “自我所有权”；（b）对其他先前无主的稀缺资源的排他性控制权，这些资源是由个人或其权属祖先所先占的。[283]

So the question is, does Hoppe’s theory establish that the libertarian view of rights, as opposed to competing views, is the correct one?

那么问题来了，霍普的理论是否确立了自由意志主义的权利观，而不是与之相对的观点，才是正确的呢？

霍普的理论：让我们再试一次HOPPE’S THEORY: LET’S TRY AGAIN

I do not intend here to restate Hoppe’s entire argument, as I believe it has been adequately explicated and defended already by Hoppe in the literature referenced above. And he has already replied to numerous criticisms, including arguments similar to those leveled by MC.12 Instead, I will try to show, as simply as possible, why Hoppe succeeds. I’ll then address, in view of this, a few of MC’s concrete critiques, but it should be clear by this point why I think their criticism is off base.

我不打算在这里重述霍普的全部论点，因为我相信霍普已经在上文提到的文献中对其进行了充分的阐释和辩护。而且，他已经回答了许多批评意见，包括类似于 MC 所提出的论点。[284]相反，我将尽可能简单地说明霍普为什么成功。有鉴于此，我接下来会谈谈 MC 的一些具体批评，但到此为止，应该已经很清楚，为什么我认为他们的批评是不正确的了。

Hoppe starts by noting that if any proposed theory of rights is going to be justified, it has to be justified in the course of an argument (discourse). As Hoppe writes:

Whether or not persons have any rights and, if so, which ones, can only be decided in the course of argumentation (propositional exchange). Justification—proof, conjecture, refutation—is argumentative justification. Anyone who denied this proposition would become involved in a performative contradiction because his denial would itself constitute an argument. Even an ethical relativist must accept this first proposition, which has been referred to as the a priori of argumentation.13

霍普首先指出，任何提议的权利理论若要证明其合理性，就必须在论证（对话）过程中证明其合理性。霍普写道：

人是否具有权利，如果有，是哪些权利，只能在论证（命题交换）过程中决定。证明、猜测、反驳构成了论证过程，这种证成是论证性的。任何否认这一命题的人都会陷入谏言冲突，因为他的否认本身就构成了论证。即使是伦理相对主义者也必须接受此第一个命题，它被称为论证的先验性。[285]

I fail to see how MC can disagree with this without falling into contradiction. It follows that if any norms, ethics, facts, or rules of discourse are necessarily presupposed by participants in argumentation simply by virtue of arguing, then no theory that contradicts these presupposed facts or norms could ever be justified. By contrast, any proposed theory that is consistent with, indeed implied by, these presuppositions, would have to be seen as irrefutably justified. This type of reasoning is called the “apriori of communication and argumentation,” and was pioneered by German philosophers Jürgen Habermas (Hoppe’s PhD advisor) and Karl-Otto Apel, although, unlike Hoppe’s approach, this method was applied by them to reach non-libertarian (social-democratic) results.

我看不出 MC 如何能在不陷入矛盾的情况下反对这一点。由此可见，如果论证的参与者仅仅因为论证而必然预设了某些规范、伦理、事实或话语规则，那么任何与这些预设的事实或规范相矛盾的理论都不可能是正当的。与此相反，任何与这些预设相一致，甚至是由这些预设所暗示的拟议理论，都必须被视为无可辩驳的正当性理论。这种推理方法被称为 “交流与论证的先验论”，由德国哲学家尤尔根-哈贝马斯（霍普的博士生导师）和卡尔-奥托-阿佩尔首创，但与霍普的方法不同的是，他们运用这种方法得出的是非自由意志主义（社会民主主义）的结果。

And there certainly are norms presupposed by argumentative justification as such. As Hoppe writes,

rguing never just consists of free-floating propositions claiming to be Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. But given that truth claims are raised and decided upon in argumentation and that argumentation, aside from whatever is said in its course, is a practical affair, it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist—precisely those which make some action an argumentation—which have special cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of objectivity and truth.

当然，论证性的证成其本身必然预设了一些规范。正如霍普所写：

论证绝不仅仅是自称为真的自由浮动的命题构成。相反，论证始终都是一种行动。但是，鉴于真理的主张是在论证中提出和决定的，而论证，除了在其过程中所说的任何内容之外，是一种实践活动，因此，必然存在着主体间有意义的规范——正是那些使某种行动成为论证的规范——它们具有特殊的认知地位，因为它们是客观性和真理的实践前提。

Hence, one reaches the conclusion that norms must indeed be assumed to be justifiable as valid. It is simply impossible to argue otherwise, because the ability to argue so would in fact presuppose the validity of those norms which underlie any argumentation whatsoever. 14

因此，我们得出的结论是，规范必须被假定为是正当的、有效的。否则根本无法论证，因为这样的论证能力实际上预设了这些规范的有效性，而这些规范正是任何论证的基础。[286]

Again, I fail to see how MC can disagree with any of this, in general. Rather, the disagreement is over what norms are actually implicit in the activity of argumention—that is, over what participants in discourse must presuppose to be true in order to participate in argumentation. Whatever these presuppositions are, they rule out of court any proposed norms inconsistent with them. And, any such normative presuppositions, or norms deduced from these presuppositions, would have to be considered to be ultimately and irrefutably justified, as their validity could never be coherently denied.

同样，总的来说，我也看不出MC如何会不同意这一点。相反，分歧在于论证活动中实际上隐含着哪些规范——也就是说，对话的参与者必须预设哪些规范为真才能参与论证。无论这些预设是什么，它们都将任何与之不符的拟议规范排除在外。而且，任何此类规范性预设，或从这些预设中推导出的规范，都必须被认为是最终且无可辩驳地合理正当的，因为它们的有效性永远不可能被逻辑一致地否认。

普适性UNIVERSALIZABILITY

So let’s see what Hoppe contends. First, any norm proposed in argumentation is presumed to be universalizable. Writes Hoppe:

让我们来看看霍普的论点。首先，在论证中提出的任何规范都被假定为是可普遍化的。霍普写道：

人们通常认为，论证意味着一个命题主张具有普遍可接受性，或者说，如果它是一个规范建议，它是 “可普遍化的”。应用于规范建议，这就是在伦理学的黄金法则或康德的绝对命令中提出的观点，即只有那些可以被表述为对每个人都无一例外有效的一般原则的规范才是正当的。[287]

In other words, any proposed norm—that is, an attempted justification for a given action—is not justified if it is not universalizable. This rule is presupposed by the very attempt to argumentatively justify something, because “argumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force.” Because the universalizability priniciple is an inherent feature of argumentation in general, “the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as grounded in the wider ‘apriori of communication and argumentation.’”16 I.e., no one can deny that only universalizable norms can be justified.17

换句话说，任何拟议的规范，即试图为某一行为辩护的理由，如果不能普遍化，就不具有正当性。这一规则是由试图论证某事正当性的尝试本身所预设的，因为 “论证意味着，每个能够理解论证的人原则上都必须能够仅仅因为其论证力而被说服”。由于普适性原则是一般论证的固有特征，”伦理学的普适性原则现在可以被理解和解释为立足于更广泛的’交流和论证的先验'”。[288]也就是说，没有人能否认只有可普遍化的规范才是正当的。[289]

So, we have our first presupposition: that only universalizable ethics canbepossiblecandidates for being justified.18 By the same token, so-called “particularizable” norms are not justifiable. However:

因此，我们有了第一个预设前提：只有可普遍化的伦理才有可能成为正当化的候选项。 [290]同样道理，所谓的 “特殊化 “规范也是不可证明为正当的。然而：

[T]he universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality. To be sure, checked against this criterion all proposals for valid norms which would specify different rules for different classes of people could be shown to have no legitimate claim of being universally acceptable as fair norms, unless the distinction between different classes of people were such that it implied no discrimination, but could instead be accepted as founded in the nature of things again by everyone. But while some norms might not pass the test of universalization, if enough attention were paid to their formulation, the most ridiculous norms, and what is of course even more relevant, even openly incompatible norms could easily and equally well pass it. For example, “everybody must get drunk on Sundays or be fined” or “anyone who drinks alcohol will be punished” are both rules that do not allow discrimination among groups of people and thus could both claim to satisfy the condition of universalization.

普适性原则只是为道德提供了一个纯粹的形式标准。可以肯定的是，根据这一标准，所有为不同阶级的人制定不同规则的有效规范提案，都可以被证明不具有作为公平规范而被普遍接受的合法主张，除非不同阶级的人之间的区别是这样的：它并不意味着歧视，可以认为是建立在事物本质之上的区别而又一次被每个人接受。不过，尽管有些规范可能无法通过普适性的检验，但如果对其制定给予足够的重视，那么最荒谬的规范，当然还有更相关的，甚至是公开不相容的规范，都可以很容易地、同样很好地通过普适性的检验。例如，”每个人在星期天都必须喝醉，否则将被罚款 “或 “任何饮酒的人都将受到惩罚”，这两条规则都不允许对不同人群进行歧视，因此都可以声称符合普适性的条件。

Clearly then, the universalization principle alone would not provide one with any positive set of norms that could be demonstrated to be justified.19

因此，仅凭普适性原则显然无法为我们提供任何一套可以被证明是正当的实证规范。[291]

But even though universalizability is merely a formal requirement, it does eliminate many proposed norms, such as those underlying most versions of socialism which amount to “I can hit you but you cannot hit me” particularizable rules.

不过，尽管普适性只是一种形式上的要求，但它确实剔除了许多拟议中的规范，例如大多数社会主义版本的基本规范，这些规范相当于 “我可以打你，但你不能打我 “的特殊性规则。

[T]he property theory implicit in socialism does not normally pass even the first decisive test (the necessary if not sufficient condition) required of rules of human conduct which claim to be morally justified or justifiable. This test, as formulated in the so-called golden rule or, similarly, in the Kantian categorical imperative, requires that in order to be just, a rule must be a general one applicable to every single person in the same way. The rule cannot specify different rights or obligations for different categories of people (one for the red-headed, and one for others, or one for women and a different one for men), as such a “particularistic” rule, naturally, could never, not even in principle, be accepted as a fair rule by everyone. Particularistic rules, however, of the type “I can hit you, but you are not allowed to hit me,” are … at the very base of all practiced forms of socialism.20

[社会主义所隐含的财产理论通常甚至无法通过人类行为规则所要求的第一个决定性检验（必要条件，如果不是充分条件的话），而这些规则声称在道德上是合理的或正当的。正如所谓的 “黄金法则 “或康德的 “绝对命令 “所阐述的那样，这一检验要求规则必须是以同样方式适用于每一个人的普遍规则，这样才是公正的。规则不能为不同类别的人规定不同的权利或义务（一种是红头发的，一种是其他人的，或者一种是女人的，一种是男人的），因为这样的 “特殊主义 “规则自然永远不会，甚至原则上也不可能被所有人接受为公平的规则。然而，”我可以打你，但你不可以打我 “这种特殊规则……恰恰是所有社会主义实践形式的根本。[292]

Thus universalizability acts as a first-level “filter” that weeds out all particularistic norms. This reduces the universe of possibly justified normative claims but does not finish the job since many incompatible and unethical norms could be reworded in universalizable ways.

因此，普适性就像一个第一级 “过滤器”，剔除了所有特殊性规范。这减少了可能正当的规范性主张的范围，但并没有完成这项工作，因为许多不相容和不道德的规范可以用普适性的方式重新措辞。

It is for this reason that Hoppe next examines other, more substantive, presuppositions inherent in argument itself. These are then used in a second filtering process to reject additional proposed norms, those that are universalizable but incompatible with the other presuppositions of discourse. And, because some of these presuppositions turn out to be presupposed norms, Hoppe then shows that the libertarian conception of rights can be deduced from these presupposed norms and facts.

正是出于这个原因，霍普接下来考察了论证本身所固有的其他更实质性的预设前提。然后，这些预设在第二个过滤过程中被用来拒绝其他拟议的规范，即那些可普遍化但与对话的其他预设前提不相容的规范。而且，由于其中一些预设前提变成了预设规范，霍普随后表明，自由意志主义的权利概念可以从这些预设规范和事实中推导出来。

论证中预设的实质性事实和规范SUBSTANTIVE FACTS AND NORMS PRESUPPOSED IN ARGUMENTATION

The universalization principle filters out many possible norms, but many possible, mutually incompatible, and nonlibertarian candidates remain (“anyone who drinks alcohol will be punished”).

普适性原则过滤掉了许多可能的规范，但仍有许多可能的、互不相容的、非自由意志主义的候选规范（”任何饮酒者都将受到惩罚”）。

However, there are other positive norms implied in argumentation aside from the universalization principle. In order to recognize them, it is only necessary to call three interrelated facts to attention. First, that argumentation is not only a cognitive but also a practical affair. Second, that argumentation, as a form of action, implies the use of the scarce resource of one’s body. And third, that argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting.21

然而，除了普适性原则之外，论证中还隐含着其他实证的规范。为了认识它们，只需提请注意三个相互关联的事实。第一，论证不仅是一种认知活动，也是一种实践活动。其次，论证作为一种行动形式，意味着使用身体这一稀缺资源。第三，论证是一种无冲突的互动方式。[293]

Participants in discourse cannot deny the existence of scarcity (discourse is a form of action, after all, and action implies scarce resources, in one’s body and in external objects or means of action) nor the possibility of conflict over these scarce resources. They also value the ability to participate in argument (they are engaging in it, after all) and thus its practical preconditions, namely the ability to actually use scarce resources in order to survive (for argumentation is not possible without survival). And because argumentation/discourse is a cooperative, civilized, peaceful activity, and because “justifying means justifying without having to rely on coercion,”22 participants in discourse necessarily value being able to use scarce resources in a conflict-free way. One adopting a civilized, peaceful stance and trying to justify a norm cannot coherently advocate non-peaceful norms. In fact, the very attempt to justify a resource allocation norm is an attempt to settle conflicts with regard to the use of that resource. Thus, a participant in discourse could never justify the proposition that there is no value to being able to use resources, or that conflict should not be avoided, or that cooperation and peacefulness are bad things. Valuing the avoidance of conflicts also presupposes the value of attempting to find rules that make conflict avoidance possible. I.e., property rules.

对话的参与者既不能否认稀缺性的存在（毕竟对话是一种行动的形式，而行动意味着使用稀缺资源，包括个人身体和外部对象或行动的手段），也不能否认为争夺这些稀缺资源而发生冲突的可能性。他们还重视参与论证的能力（毕竟他们是在参与论证），因此也重视论证的实践前提，即为了生存而实际使用稀缺资源的能力（因为没有生存就不可能有论证）。由于论证/对话是一种合作、文明、和平的活动，又由于 “论证意味着论证而无需依靠强制胁迫”，[294]22 参与对话的人必然重视能否以无冲突的方式使用稀缺资源。一个人如果采取文明、和平的立场，试图为一项规范辩护，就不可能连贯一致地倡导非和平的规范。事实上，为一项资源界定规范论证辩护的企图本身就是企图解决有关使用该资源的冲突。因此，对话参与者永远不可能证明以下命题是正当的：能够使用资源没有价值，或者不应该避免冲突，或者合作与和平是坏事。珍视避免冲突的价值也预设了着试图找到使避免冲突成为可能的规则的价值，即财产规则。

Accordingly, participants in discourse, in particular those seeking to justify proposed norms, implicitly recognize the value and legitimacy of assigning specified property owners to specified scarce resources—for reasons that are universalizable and that make conflict-avoidance possible. However, property rights make conflict avoidance possible by establishing perceivable boundaries to resources indicating the resource’s borders and who the owner is, and by basing the assignment on universalizable rules that could be accepted as fair by all potential participants in discourse, in argumentative justification. For this reason, the assignment of property rights has to be based on some objective link between the claimant and a particular resource.23

因此，对话的参与者，尤其是那些试图证明所拟议规范的正当性的人，隐含承认了特定的财产所有者赋予特定稀缺资源的价值与合法性——出于普适性且能够避免冲突的原因。然而，财产权通过为资源划定可感知的界限，指明资源的边界和所有者是谁，并将分配建立在可被所有潜在的对话参与者、证成性的论证的参与者都能公平接受的普适性的规则基础之上，从而使避免冲突成为可能。因此，财产权的分配必须基于权利主张者与特定资源之间的某种客观联系。[295]

What all this means is that anyone ever attempting to (argumentatively) justify any norm is already presupposing a host of norms and argumentative rules. The substantive presupposed norms rule out many proposed norms, even if they are universalizable. For example, a rule such as “no one should ever be able to use any scarce resource” could never be justified. It is incompatible with the speaker’s evident value for the ability to use scarce resources, because he has to (be able to) use the scarce resource of his body in order to engage in any activity, including argumentation. And he, or someone, had to be able to use other scarce resources such as food, shelter, etc., so that the arguers are alive and able to argue (remember, discourse is a practical affair, and requires the speakers to be alive, to have control of their bodies and their standing room, etc.).

这一切意味着，任何试图（论证性地）证明任何规范合理性的人，都已经预设了一系列规范和论证规则。这些实质性的预设规范排除了许多拟议的规范，即使它们是可普遍化的。例如，”任何人都不应该使用任何稀缺资源 “这样的规则就永远无法成立。它不符合说话者对使用稀缺资源能力的明显价值，因为他必须（能够）使用身体这一稀缺资源才能从事任何活动，包括论证。而且，他或某个人还必须能够使用其他稀缺资源，如食物、住所等，只有这样，论证者才能活着，才能进行论证（请记住，对话论证是一件实际的事情，需要论证者活着，才能控制自己的身体和站立的空间等）。

In addition, a rule specifying that all resources, or even some resources, should have no owner at all, simply does not allocate ownership in the scarce resources at issue, i.e., it does not fulfill its function of conflict-avoidance. Unless property rights are allocated to someone, conflict over each scarce resource is possible; that is the nature of scarcity. (As a practical matter, most such rules also imply that if a given resource should not be “owned,” then some person or agency is authorized to prevent others from using the thing. In which case the rule is, in reality, assigning ownership to the agency with control and would need to be justified. For example, the public forests are said (by some libertarians) to be “unowned,” but the federal government prevents homesteaders from moving in. Clearly here the federal government is asserting ownership. The necessity of justifying this cannot be avoided by the fiction that the property is not owned.)

此外，规定所有资源，甚至某些资源都不应该有所有者的规则，根本没有对所讨论的稀缺资源分配所有权，也就是说，它没有履行其避免冲突的功能。除非将财产权分配给某个人，否则每种稀缺资源都有可能发生冲突；这就是稀缺性的本质。(实际上，大多数此类规则还意味着，如果某项资源不应被 “拥有”，那么某些人或机构就有权阻止他人使用该资源。在这种情况下，该规则实际上是将所有权赋予了拥有控制权的机构，因此需要说明其正当性。例如，（一些自由意志主义者）说公共森林是 “无主的”，但联邦政府却阻止拓殖者迁入。很明显，联邦政府在这里主张所有权。证明这一点的必要性不能用 “财产是无主 “的虚构来避免）。

There is no way any norm can be justified that does not seek to assign ownership of every scarce resource to particular owners, based on an objective link between the owner and the owned resource. No rule could ever be justified if it refrains from deciding who owns a particular resource or if it specifies that no one owns a resource. And any justification offered has to be universalizable. The reasons for all these requirements should be clear by now, as discussed above. Particular owners must be assigned to each and every scarce resource—this is what any theory of property—any ethic—has to do. There must be an objective link between the owner and the resource, so that conflicts can be avoided, and also to comply with universalizability. “Every” scarce resource must be owned by someone, for conflict-avoidance and other reasons given above.

任何规范，如果不是试图根据所有者与所拥有资源之间的客观联系，将每种稀缺资源的所有权分配给特定的所有者，都是不正当的。如果一项规则不决定谁拥有某项资源，或者规定没有人拥有某项资源，那么它就不可能是正当的。而且提出的任何理由都必须具有普适性。如上文所述，所有这些要求的理由现在应该很清楚了。必须为每一种稀缺资源指定特定的所有者——这是任何财产理论——任何伦理——都必须做到的。所有者与资源之间必须存在客观联系，这样才能避免冲突，同时也符合普适性原则。出于避免冲突和上述其他原因，”每一种 “稀缺资源都必须由某个人所有。

To this point the case is fairly general, and only establishes the framework for examining various competing norms. The libertarian insistence on objective links between resources and owners, and its particular view of what constitutes such objective links, is what completes the case.

在这一点上，理由是相当笼统的，只是为研究各种相互竞争的规范建立了框架。自由意志主义坚持资源与所有者之间的客观联系，以及它对构成这种客观联系的特殊观点，才使理由更加完整。

客观联系：首次使用、口头主张与先来后到的区别OBJECTIVE LINKS: FIRST USE, VERBAL CLAIMS, AND THE PRIOR-LATER DISTINCTION

So now we come to libertarianism. It turns out that libertarianism is the only theory of rights that satisfies the presuppositions of discourse, because only it advocates assigning ownership by means of objective links between the owner and the resource in question.

因此，我们现在来谈谈自由意志主义。事实证明，自由意志主义是唯一满足对话预设的权利理论，因为只有它主张通过所有者与相关资源之间的客观联系来分配所有权。

Hoppe first establishes property rights in bodies. As noted above,24 argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting, and justifying means justifying without having to rely on coercion. In other words, the nonaggression principle is presupposed in argumentation. Thus, in the case of one’s own body, the rule of “self-ownership” is implied, since saying that a participant in discourse is not permitted to aggress against the body of other participants is tantamount to recognizing a property right in each participant’s body. The nonaggression principle and self(body-) ownership are just different ways of expressing the same idea. The objective link here is each person’s control over and identification with his own body.25

霍普首先确立了身体的财产权。如上所述[296] ，论证是一种无冲突的互动方式，而论证意味着无需依靠强制胁迫就能进行论证。换言之，互不侵犯原则是论证的前提。因此，就一个人自己的身体而言，”自我所有权 “规则是隐含的，因为说不允许对话论证的参与者侵犯其他参与者的身体，就等于承认每个参与者的身体都有财产权。互不侵犯原则和自我（身体）所有权只是表达同一观点的不同方式。这里的客观联系是每个人对自己身体的控制和认同。[297]

As for previously-unowned, external scarce resources, the objective link that is relevant to property rights is first use, or original appropriation. Only the norm assigning ownership in a thing to its first user, or his transferee in title, could fulfill this requirement, or the other presuppositions of argumentation.

至于先前无主的外部稀缺资源，与财产权相关的客观联系是首次使用或先占。只有将一物的所有权赋予其首次使用者或其所有权受让人的规范才能满足这一要求，或满足论证的其他预设前提。

There is clearly an objective link between the person who first begins to use something, and emborders it, and all others in the world. Everyone can see this. No goods are ever subject to conflict unless they are first acquired by someone. The first user and possessor of a good is either its owner or he is not. If he is not, then who is? The person who takes it from him by force? If forcefully taking possession from a prior owner entitles the new possessor to the thing, then there is no such thing as ownership, but only mere possession.26 But such a rule—that a later user may acquire something by taking it from the previous owner—does not avoid conflicts, it rather authorizes them. It is nothing more than mights-makes-right writ large. This is not what peaceful, cooperative, conflict-free argumentative justification is about.

显然，在第一个开始使用某物并对其加以限制的人与世界上所有其他人之间存在客观联系。每个人都能看到这一点。任何物品，除非首先被某人获得，否则就不会发生冲突。物品的第一个使用者和拥有者要么是物品的所有者，要么不是。如果他不是，那么谁是呢？用武力从他手中夺走物品的那人吗？如果强行从先前的所有者手中夺走物品，新的所有者就有权拥有该物品，那么就不存在所谓的所有权，而只是单纯的占有。[298]但这样一条规则，即后来的使用者可以通过从先前的所有者手中夺取某物而获得该物，并不能避免冲突，反而会授权冲突的发生。这不过是 “强权即公理 “的放大版。这不是和平、合作、无冲突的论证性的证成。

What about the person who verbally declares that he owns the good that another has appropriated? Again, this rule is not justifiable because it does not avoid conflicts—because everyone in the world can simultaneously decree that they own any thing. With multiple claimants for a piece of property, each having an “equally good” verbal decree, there is no way to avoid conflict by allocating ownership to a particular person.

那么，口头宣称自己拥有他人占有的物品的人呢？同样，这条规则也是不能被证明为正当的，因为它无法避免冲突——因为世界上每个人都可以同时宣布自己拥有任何一件物品。如果一件财产有多个权利主张者，每个人都有 “同等有效 “的口头声明，那么就无法通过将所有权分配给某个特定的人来避免冲突。

No way, other than an objective link, that is, which again shows why there must be an objective link between the claimant and the resource.

没有其它方式，除了客观联系，也就是说，这再次说明了为什么主张者和资源之间必须存在客观的联系。

As Hoppe states:

Hence, the right to acquire such goods must be assumed to exist. Now, if this is so, and if one does not have the right to acquire such rights of exclusive control over unused, nature-given things through one’s own work, i.e., by doing something with things with which no one else had ever done anything before, and if other people had the right to disregard one’s ownership claim with respect to such things which they had not worked on or put to some particular use before, then this would only be possible if one could acquire property titles not through labor, i.e., by establishing some objective, intersubjectively controllable link between a particular person and a particular scarce resource, but simply by verbal declaration; by decree.… The separation is based on the observation that some particular scarce resource had in fact—for everyone to see and verify, as objective indicators for this would exist—been made an expression or materialization of one’s own will, or, as the case may be, of someone else’s will.27

正如霍普所指出的：

因此，必须假定获得这些物品的权利是存在的。现在，如果情况确实如此，如果一个人无权通过自己的劳动，即通过对别人从未做过任何事情的东西进行操作处理，来获得对未使用过的、自然赋予的东西的这种排他性控制权，而且如果其他人有权无视一个人对这些他们以前未曾操作过或未曾用于某种特定用途的东西的所有权要求，那么，只有当一个人不是通过劳动，即不是通过在特定的人与特定的稀缺资源之间建立某种客观的、主体间可控的联系，而是仅仅通过口头主张，通过法令来获得财产所有权时，这种情况才有可能发生……这种分离是基于这样的观察：某些特定的稀缺资源实际上——每个人都能看到并核实，因为会有这方面的客观指标——已经成为某人自己意志的表达或具体化，或者，视情况而定，成为其他人意志的表达或具体化。[299]

As Hoppe notes, assigning ownership based on verbal decree would be incompatible with the “nonaggression principle regarding bodies,” which is presupposed due to the cooperative, peaceful, conflict-free nature of argumentative justification. Moreover, it would not address the problem of conflict avoidance, as explained above.

如霍普所指出的那样，根据口头命令分配所有权将与“关于身体的互不侵犯原则”不相容，而该原则是论证性证成的合作性、和平性和无冲突性所预设的。此外，如上所述，这也无法解决避免冲突的问题。

Thus, Hoppe is correct, when he writes:

Hence, one is forced to conclude that the socialist ethic is a complete failure. In all of its practical versions, it is no better than a rule such as “I can hit you, but you cannot hit me,” which even fails to pass the universalization test. And if it did adopt universalizable rules, which would basically amount to saying “everybody can hit everybody else,” such rulings could not conceivably be said to be universally acceptable on account of their very material specification. Simply to say and argue so must presuppose a person’s property right over his own body. Thus,only the first-come-first-own ethic of capitalism can be defended effectively as it is implied in argumentation. And no other ethic could be so justified, as justifying something in the course of argumentation implies presupposing the validity of precisely this ethic of the natural theory of property.28

因此，霍普是正确的，他写道:

因此，我们不得不得出这样的结论：社会主义伦理是一个彻底的失败。在其所有的实践版本中，它并不比 “我可以打你，但你不能打我 “这样的规则好多少，甚至都无法通过普遍化的检验。而且，如果它确实采用了普适性的规则，基本上等同于说 “每个人都可以打别人”，那么这种规则由于其非常具体的规定而不能被说成是普遍接受的。这样说和这样论证的预设前提必须是一个人对自己身体的财产权。因此，只有先到先得的资本主义伦理才能得到有效的辩护，因为它隐含在论证中。没有任何其他伦理能够被证明是正当的，因为在论证过程中为某一主张辩护意味着预设了这种自然财产权理论的有效性。[300]

In other words, cognition and truth-seeking as such have a normative foundation, and the normative foundation on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of private property rights.29

换句话说，认知和寻求真理本身都有一个规范基础，而认知和寻求真理所依赖的规范基础就是对私有财产权的承认。[301]

墨菲和卡拉汉的评论MURPHY’S & CALLAHAN’S CRITIQUE

I am really at a loss as to where MC would part company with this theory. Do they deny, for example, that there is scarcity in the world or that conflicts are possible? I doubt it. Do they deny that universalizability is a requirement for justified norms? I doubt it, unless they are also ethical skeptics, in which case I wonder why they consider themselves libertarians.30 Do they deny that rights have to be justified, and that justification has to occur during argument? Such a denial would be a neat trick, as it would itself be an argument. Do they maintain that participants in discourse do not presuppose any truths?—or do they just say that none of these are normative? Or do they think that argumentation is not a conflict-free way of interacting?—in which case they would seem to think bashing someone over the head or stealing their wallet is also a form of peaceful, cooperative discourse.

我真的不知道MC是在何处与这一理论分道扬镳。比如说，他们否认世界上存在稀缺或冲突的可能性吗？我对此表示怀疑。他们否认普适性是正当性规范的必要条件吗？我对此表示怀疑，除非他们也是伦理怀疑论者，假如是这种情况，我想知道他们为何以自由意志主义者自诩。[302] 他们是在否认权利必须是正当的而且其正当性必须在论证过程中发生？这种否认只不过是一种拙劣的伎俩，因为它本身就是一种论证。他们是否认为对话的参与者不预设任何真理?——或者，他们只不过认为这些都不是规范？或者，他们认为论证并不是一种无冲突的互动方式？——如果是这样的话，他们似乎认为敲打别人的脑袋或偷别人的钱包也是一种和平、合作的对话形式。

Or, do they think it is coherent for a participant in the peaceful, cooperative activity of discourse, while searching with the other for a universalizable, conflict-avoiding property allocation rule, to advocate socialism, or any other non-libertarian approach? If they are libertarians surely there must be some advantage to libertarian rights that would factor in to such a generalized argumentative justification context. Or, would MC seriously maintain that a norm could be argumentatively justified, if the norm, if followed, would render human life, and thus argumentative justification itself, impossible?31

或者说，他们是否认为，一个和平、合作的对话活动的参与者，在与他人一起寻求一种普适性的、避免冲突的财产分配规则时，与鼓吹社会主义或任何其他非自由意志主义的方法是一致的？如果他们确实是自由意志主义者，那么自由意志主义的权利肯定会有一些优势，会在这种普遍的论证性证成的背景中起作用。如果一种规范被遵循，会导致人类生活因此也是论证过程的证成本（argumentative justification）身彻底不可能，那么MC会严肃地主张这种规范可以被证成吗？[303]

MC do not do attempt to debunk argumentation ethics in general, or, alternatively, to show just what ethics are implied in argumentation (and why these are not the ones that Hoppe proposes). Do they believe any norms are implied in argumentation? If not, they would seem to reject the entire edifice of work in this regard, including work by Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Frank van Dun, G.B. Madison, Alan Gewirth, Roger Pilon, Tibor Machan, and others discussed in “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6).

MC 并没有试图从总体上驳斥论证伦理学，或者，也没有试图说明论证中隐含着哪些伦理（以及为什么这些伦理不是霍普所提出的伦理）。他们认为论证中隐含着某些规范吗？如果不是，他们似乎就拒绝了这方面的全部努力，包括尤尔根-哈贝马斯（Jürgen Habermas）、卡尔-奥托-阿佩尔（Karl-Otto Apel）、弗兰克-范-邓恩（Frank van Dun）、G.B. 麦迪逊（G.B. Madison）、艾伦-格维斯（Alan Gewirth）、罗杰-皮隆（Roger Pilon）、蒂博尔-马坎（Tibor Machan）以及《自由意志主义权利的对话论证》（第 6 章）中讨论的其他人的努力。

On the other hand, if they accept that argumentation implies some norms, which are they? Do these norms support libertarianism? Socialism? Or are they only non-rights-related interpersonal norms, like “be nice” or “don’t lie”?32 Are these argumentatively-presupposed norms at least consistent with libertarianism? MC write:

Hoppe next invokes the “ethics of argumentation,” which was developed by Habermas and Apel…. They contend that whenever people are engaged in debate, they have implicitly agreed to a certain set of norms, for example, that they will restrict themselves to peaceful means in their efforts to persuade other participants of their contentions. [54]

另一方面，如果他们承认论证意味着某些规范，那么这些规范是什么？这些规范是否支持自由意志主义？还是社会主义？抑或它们只是与权利无关的人际关系的规范，如 “与人为善 “或 “不撒谎”？[304] 这些论证所预设的前提规范是否至少与自由意志主义相一致？MC写道：

霍普接下来援引了哈贝马斯和阿佩尔提出的 “论证伦理学”……哈贝马斯和阿佩尔主张，每当人们参与辩论时，他们就默认了一套规范，例如，他们在努力说服其他参与者接受自己的观点时，将仅限于采用和平手段。[54]

It is not clear whether MC are merely paraphrasing this basic insight or whether they agree with it. If they do, are there no implications to be drawn from this? Does it place no constraints whatsoever on the legitimacy of norms propositionally advanced in the course of (peaceful!) argument? After all, later they say “Hoppe has shown that bashing someone on the head is an illogical form of argumentation.” (p. 58) Does this concede that argumentation does presuppose some norms? It’s not clear.

不清楚MC只是在转述这一基本观点，还是同意这一观点。如果他们同意，难道没有从中悟出任何蕴含吗？难道它对在（和平的！）论证过程中提出的命题规范的合法性没有任何限制吗？毕竟，他们后来说：”霍普已经证明，敲打别人的脑袋是一种不合逻辑的论证方式。”(第 58 页）这是否承认论证确实以某些规范为前提？目前还不清楚。

It seems to me that if MC accept any form of argumentation ethics as valid—that is, if there are some norms implied in discourse—then, as libertarians who believe libertarian norms are (somehow) justified, they would have to believe that the argumentative norms are at least compatible with, if not the grounding for, libertarian rights. That is, if you accept that there are some norms presupposed by argumentative justification, and if you yourself accept libertarian norms, you must believe that the norms of argumentation ethics are at least compatible with, and possibly relevant to, the greater set of libertarian norms.

在我看来，如果 MC 承认论证伦理学的形式是有效的——也就是说，如果有一些规范隐含在对话中——那么，作为相信自由意志主义规范（在某种程度上）是正当的自由意志主义者，他们就必须相信论证规范即使不是自由意志主义权利的基础，也至少与之相容。也就是说，如果你接受论证性的证成预设了一些规范，如果你自己也接受自由意志主义规范，你就必须相信论证伦理学的规范至少与更大的自由意志主义的规范是相容的，并且也可能是相关的。

普适性Universalizability

What about universalizability? I am not sure if MC really reject the universalizability requirement—but if they do, I fail to see how they can themselves adhere to any notion of rights; rejecting universalizability means that any norm whatsoever can be proposed by simply making up a particularistic reason for it. Without the universalizability principle, literally “anything goes,” which of course leads to ethical relativism and/or skepticism. I will assume that MC are not ethical relativists or skeptics and thus do not reject universalizability. But I am not sure they fully appreciate this principle.

普适性又如何呢？我不确定MC是否真的拒绝普适性这个必要条件——但如果是这样的话，我就不明白他们自己如何能够坚持任何权利概念；拒绝普适性意味着，只要编造一个特殊的理由，就可以提出任何规范。如果没有普适性原则，字面意思就是 “什么都可以提出”，这当然会导致伦理相对主义和/或怀疑主义。我假定 MC 不是伦理相对主义者或怀疑论者，因此不拒绝普适性。但我不确定他们是否完全理解这一原则。

Consider this comment by MC:

To simply declare that ownership rights must be “universalizable” is no help, either; after all, communists could cite the same principle to “prove” that everyone should have equal shares to all property. [59 n.3]

请看 MC 的评论：

简单地宣称所有权必须具有 “普适性 “也无济于事；毕竟，共产主义者可以引用同样的原则来 “证明 “每个人都应平等地分享所有财产。[59 n.3]

MC write here as if they are totally unaware that Hoppe has explicitly stated that “the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality.”33 Of course, even if socialism’s principles were reformulated in a completely universalizable way, it will still be inconsistent with other norms presupposed in argumentation, as noted above.

MC在这里写道，他们似乎完全没有意识到霍普曾明确指出，”普适性原则只是为道德提供了一个纯粹的形式标准 “。[305]当然，即使以完全可普适性的方式重新表述社会主义的原则，如上所述，它仍然会与论证中预设的其他规范不一致。

And regarding universalizability, MC also state:

Our final point in this section is to note that, even setting aside all of the above difficulties, it’s still the case that Hoppe has only proven self-ownership for the individuals in the debate. This is because, even on Hoppe’s own grounds, someone denying the libertarian ethic would only be engaging in contradiction if he tried to justify his preferred doctrine to its “victims.”

For example, so long as Aristotle only argued with other Greeks about the inferiority of barbarians and their natural status as slaves, then he would not be engaging in a performative contradiction. He could quite consistently grant self-ownership to his Greek debating opponent, while denying it to those whom he deems naturally inferior…. Aristotle need only contend [that] barbarians [] are not as rational as Greeks. [58, 59]

而关于普适性，MC 也指出：

我们在本节的最后一点是要指出，即使撇开上述所有难点不谈，霍普仍然只是为辩论中的个人证明了自我所有权。这是因为，即使根据霍普自己的理由，否认自由意志主义伦理的人如果试图向其 “受害者 “证明他所偏爱的学说的正当性，那也只是在自相矛盾。

例如，只要亚里士多德只是与其他希腊人争论蛮族的劣等和他们作为奴隶的自然地位，那么他就不会陷入谏言冲突。他可以始终如一地赋予他的希腊辩论对手以自我所有权，而同时剥夺那些他认为天生低人一等的人的自我所有权……亚里士多德只需主张[说]野蛮人[]不如希腊人理性。[58, 59]

Do MC think that merely “deeming” or “contending” something to be so is automatically compatible with universalizability? I believe they are simply misapplying the universalizability principle here (or, rather, failing to apply it). For Aristotle to grant rights to himself and Greeks, but not to other individuals, would simply be particularistic. He would have to show that there is some reason, objectively grounded in the nature of things, that justifies rights in Greeks but not in other people identical to Greeks in all respects except for their Greekness. Again, either the universalizability requirement is taken seriously, or it is not. If not, the door to ethical skepticism is opened wide.34

MC是否认为，仅仅 “认为 “或 “主张”某事如此，就自动符合普适性？我认为他们只是在这里错误地运用了普适性原则（或者更确切地说，没有运用这一原则）。亚里士多德只赋予自己和希腊人权利，而不赋予其他个人权利，这根本就是一种特殊主义。他必须证明，有某种客观存在于事物本质中的理由可以证明希腊人享有权利是正当的，而其他与希腊人在除希腊性之外的所有方面都相同的人却不享有权利也是正当的。同样，要么认真对待普适性要求，要么不认真对待。否则，伦理怀疑主义的大门就会敞开。[306]

Moreover, I would assume MC themselves do not agree that one can mount a viable argument that Greeks have rights (for some reason) but other humans do not. So why would they think it’s “consistent” to make such an argument, when even they would (presumably) disagree with such an argument?

此外，我想MC自己也不同意可以提出如下可行的论点，即希腊人有权利（出于某种原因），而其他人没有。那么，即使是在他们（大概）也不同意这样的论点情况下，为什么他们却会认为提出这样的论点是 “一致的”呢？

整个身体与部分身体Entire Body vs. Parts of the Body

One criticism MC make is the argument that Hoppe has not succeeded in arguing for ownership of one’s entire body, but, at best, only parts of it:

At best, all Hoppe has proven is that it would be a performative contradiction for someone to deny in an argument that his debating opponent (and perhaps those in the same “class”) own the body parts (such as eyes, brain, and lungs) necessary for debate, for the duration of the debate. This is a far cry from showing that it would be a contradiction for someone to deny the case for libertarianism. In particular, a collectivist could argue that people can rightfully be forced to give up a kidney, or go to war, if such actions would help the rest of society. [60]

MC提出的一个批评是，霍普并没有成功地论证一个人对整个身体的所有权，充其量只是论证了身体的一部分：

霍普充其量只是证明了，如果有人在辩论中否认他的辩论对手（或许还有同 “类 “的对手）在辩论期间拥有辩论所需的身体部分（如眼睛、大脑和肺），这将是一个谏言冲突。这与表明某人否认自由意志主义的理由是自相矛盾的，相去甚远。特别是，集体主义者可以辩称，如果人们的行动有助于社会的其他成员，那么就可以理所当然地强迫他们放弃肾脏或参战。[60]

Hoppe has subsequently responded to this type of argument:

Some critics have argued that this does not demonstrate a person’s ownership of his entire body, but at best only of parts of it. Why? Because to argue it is not necessary to use all body parts. And true enough, you do not need two kidneys, two eyes or an appendix to argue. Indeed, you also do not need your body hair or even arms and legs to argue. And hence, according to such critics, you cannot claim to be the lawful owner of your two kidneys or eyes, your legs and arms. Yet this objection does not only appear silly on its face—after all, it implies the recognition of these “un-necessary” parts as natural parts of one unitary body rather than as separate, stand-alone entities. More importantly, it involves, philosophically speaking, a category mistake. The critics simply confuse the physiology of argumentation and action with the logic of argumentation and action. And this confusion is particularly surprising coming from economists, and even more so from economists familiar also with praxeology. For the fundamental distinction made in economics between “labor” and “land” as the two originary means of production, which corresponds exactly to the distinction made here between “body” and “external world,” is also not a physiological or physicalistic distinction, but a praxeological one.

霍普随后对这类论点做出了回应：

一些评论家认为，这并不能证明一个人拥有整个身体的所有权，充其量只能证明他拥有部分身体的所有权。为什么呢？因为论证并不需要使用身体的所有部分。的确，你不需要两个肾脏、两只眼睛或一个阑尾就可以进行论证。事实上，你也不需要用你的体毛甚至胳膊和腿来论证。因此，根据这些批评者的观点，你不能声称自己是两个肾脏或两只眼睛、双腿和双臂的合法所有者。然而，这种反对意见仅仅是表面上显得愚蠢——毕竟，它意味着承认这些 “非必要 “的部分是一个整体的自然部分，而不是独立的个体。更重要的是，从哲学角度看，这涉及到一个范畴错误。批评者只是混淆了论证和行动的生理学与论证和行动的逻辑学。这种混淆出自经济学家之口，更出自熟悉行动学的经济学家之口，尤其令人惊讶。因为经济学对作为两种原始生产资料的 “劳动 “和 “土地 “所作的基本区分，与这里对 “身体 “和 “外部世界 “所作的区分完全一致，也不是生理学或物理学的区分，而是行动学的区分。

The question to be answered is not: which body parts are physiologically necessary requirements for one person arguing with another person. Rather, the question is: which parts of my body and which parts of your body can I or you argumentatively justify as my or your lawful possessions. And to this a clear and unambiguous answer exists. I am the lawful owner of my nature-given body with everything naturally in it and attached to it, and you are the lawful owner of your entire nature-given body. Any argument to the contrary would land its proponent in a performative or dialectic contradiction. For me to say, for instance, in an argumentation with you, that you do not rightfully own all of your nature-given body is contradicted by the fact that in so arguing, not fighting, with you, I must recognize and treat you as another person with a separate body and recognizably separate physical boundaries and borders from me and my body. To argue that you do not lawfully own your entire natural body, which you actually possess and have peacefully taken into possession before I could have possibly done so indirectly by means of my natural body, is to advocate conflict and bodily clash and hence contrary to the purpose of argumentation: of peacefully resolving a present conflict and avoiding future conflict.35

要回答的问题不是：一个人与另一个人争论时，哪些身体部位是生理上的必要条件。相反，问题是：我身体的哪些部分和你身体的哪些部分，我或你可以论证为我或你的合法财产。对此，我们有一个清晰明确的答案。我是我与生俱来的身体的合法拥有者，我的身体以及自然附着于它的一切，而你是你与生俱来的整个身体的合法拥有者。任何与此相反的论点都会使其支持者谏言冲突或辩证的矛盾之中。例如，在与你争论时，如果我说你并不合法地拥有你的自然赋予的全部身体，那么与此相矛盾的是，在与你争论（而不是争斗）时，我必须承认并将你视为另一个拥有独立的身体的人，与我和我的身体有着可识别的独立物理界限和边界。在我可能通过我的自然身体间接占有你的自然身体之前，你就已经和平地占有并实际拥有了你的整个自然身体，如果说你不能合法地拥有你的自然身体，那就是鼓吹冲突和身体冲撞，从而违背了论证的目的：和平解决当前的冲突并避免未来的冲突。[307]

与你的奴隶论证Arguing With Your Slave

MC introduce supposed “counterexamples” of God and slavery. Take the slavery case. They recognize that

Hoppe and Rothbardian libertarians in general do not believe in universal self-ownership. In particular, they believe that criminals may be rightfully enslaved to pay off their debts to victims (or their heirs). [62]

MC 介绍了上帝和奴隶制的所谓 “反例”。以奴隶制为例。他们承认

霍普和罗斯巴德式的自由意志主义一般不相信普遍的自我所有权。特别是，他们认为罪犯可以被合法地奴役，以偿还他们欠受害者（或其继承人）的债务。[62]

Well, of course! Hoppe is a libertarian. To advocate self-ownership means that a person has the right to control his body, as a default or prima facie matter. But if someone commits aggression, of course the victim now is a partial “owner” of the aggressor’s body, because he has a right to use force against it. So consider a man who now “owns” an aggressor who, say, murdered the man’s wife. Of course, the owner could engage in debate with the slave, but only by granting the slave the right to use his body for purposes of argument. But how does this change the fact that no one can argumentatively deny the normative presuppositions that imply libertarianism? Let’s assume the owner is libertarian. He believes in the need for property rules and conflict-avoidance. He believes any norms have to be universalizable. If he advocated socialism, his argument would be incompatible with necessary argumentative presuppositions of peace, prosperity, and conflict-avoiding prosperity— because socialist rules are either not universalizable or are not based on objective links between owner and resource.

当然了，霍普是一个自由意志主义者。主张自我所有权意味着一个人有权控制自己的身体，作为默认的或初步的问题。但如果有人实施侵犯，受害者现在当然就是侵害者身体的部分 “所有者”，因为他有权对侵害者的身体使用武力。因此，请考虑一个人现在 “拥有 “一个侵害者，比方说，这个侵害者谋杀了这个人的妻子。当然，主人可以与奴隶进行辩论，但前提是赋予奴隶使用其身体进行论证的权利。但是，这又如何改变没有人能从论证上否认蕴含自由意志主义的规范性预设这一事实呢？让我们假设所有者是自由意志主义者。他相信财产规则和避免冲突的必要性。他认为任何规范都必须具有普适性。如果他主张社会主义，那么他的论证就不符合和平、繁荣和避免冲突的论证的必要的预设前提——因为社会主义规则要么不具有普适性，要么不是基于所有者和资源之间的客观联系。

But his claim that he has a right to wield force against the slave is perfectly justified. It is universalizable, because the different treatment of the slave-aggressor and the master-victim is not arbitrary but is grounded in the objective fact of the act of aggression. It is compatible with objectively assigning property rights, because it is a way of enforcing objectively assigned property rights that are violated.36

但是，他主张自己有权对奴隶使用武力是完全正当的。这一主张具有普适性，因为奴隶侵害者和主人受害者的不同待遇不是任意的、武断的，而是基于侵害行为的客观事实。它与客观分配的财产权是一致的，因为它是一种强制执行被侵犯的客观分配的财产权的方式。[308]

And another way to look at this issue is this. As pointed out in chapter 4 (n.17), and as alluded to by Hoppe in the quote at note 35, above, and also his comments in the Foreword, the reasons for the self-ownership norm is that a person’s direct control over his own body has logical-temporal priority over the control by another person which must be indirect. Since the person always maintains direct control,another person attempting to control the person’s body by indirect control (basically, coercion) will always, necessarily, generate conflict. But the purpose of property norms is to reduce conflict or allow conflict to be avoided. So one of the reasons the slavery-norm cannot be accepted as justified is that it generates conflict. (There are other, interrelated reasons as well, such as: someone claiming ownership of another by indirect control claims ownership of his own body due to direct control; so it is contradictory to deny the same right to the other person.)

我们还可以从另一个角度来看待这个问题。正如第 4 章（注 17）所指出的，霍普在上文注 35 的引文中以及他在前言中的评论所提到的，自我所有权规范的理由是，一个人对自己身体的直接控制在逻辑上-时间上优先于他人的控制，而后者必定是间接的。由于人始终保持着直接控制，另一个人试图通过间接控制（基本上是胁迫）来控制人的身体，总是必然会产生冲突。但财产规范的目的是减少冲突或避免冲突。因此，奴隶制规范不能被接认为是正当的原因之一就是它产生了冲突。(还有其他一些相互关联的原因，例如：某人通过间接控制对他人主张所有权，并通过直接控制对自己的身体主张所有权；因此，否认他人同样的权利是自相矛盾的）。

Now when the victim of a crime seeks to enslave the criminal, it is true that this will be a conflict: the indirect control of the victim will clash with the direct control of the criminal over his own body. Yet it is too late to avoid conflict; the criminal’s criminal act was already an act of conflict. So now we do not have two peaceful people seeking a conflict-reducing norm to allow them to live peacefully together. Now we have a victim of aggression and conflict who seeks to obtain some kind of rectification from the aggressor, even if that involves violently coercing or dominating the aggressor, overwhelming his direct control with indirect control via coercion. So there is no contradiction in Hoppe’s theory in opposing the slavery-norm as being contradictory and granting the legitimacy of a type of slavery in limited situations. In the first case, Hoppe is observing that a property norm aimed at reducing conflict cannot be justified if it sets up conflict. In the second case, conflict has already happened and now the victim is not seeking to avoid conflict but is instead seeking restitution.37

现在，当犯罪的受害者试图奴役罪犯时，这确实将会产生一种冲突：受害者的间接控制将与罪犯对自己身体的直接控制发生冲突。然而，要避免冲突为时已晚；罪犯的犯罪行为已经是一种冲突行为。因此，我们现在看到的不是两个和平的人在寻求一种减少冲突的规范，使他们能够和平共处。现在，我们看到的是一个侵犯和冲突的受害者，他试图从侵害者那里获得某种补偿，即使这涉及到武力胁迫或支配侵害者，通过胁迫的间接控制来压倒他的直接控制。因此，在霍普的理论中，赞成奴隶制规范是自相矛盾的，而在有限的情况下承认一种奴隶制的合法性，这两者并不矛盾。在第一种情况下，霍普是在指出，如果一种旨在减少冲突的财产规范导致了冲突，那么它就不可能是正当的。在第二种情况下，冲突已经发生，现在受害者并不寻求避免冲突，而是寻求报复赔偿。[309]

作为奴隶主的上帝God as Slaveowner

As for God—you can’t just posit that God owns everyone and “therefore” we are not self-owners. Moreover, even if God does own us, then this would be because God has some objective link that gives him a better claim or title to a person’s body than this person has—some kind of logical-temporal priority that takes precedence over the person’s own claims to own his body because of his direct control of his body. If we are positing this kind of magic, then God himself might have a sort of “super” direct control over our bodies that gives him a better claim. For example, as Hoppe points out (note the text I have italicized):

The answer to the question what makes my body “mine” lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do we say “this is my body”? For this a twofold requirement exists. On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will. If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my body” would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”).38

至于上帝，你不能假设上帝拥有每个人，”因此 “我们不是自我拥有者。此外，即使上帝确实拥有我们，那也是因为上帝拥有某种客观联系，使他对一个人的身体拥有比这个人更合理的要求权或所有权——某种逻辑上-时间上的优先权，这种优先权优先于这个人自己对自己身体的主张，因为他直接控制着自己的身体。如果我们假定存在这种魔力，那么上帝本身就可能对我们的身体拥有某种 “超级 “直接控制权，从而使他拥有更合理的权利主张。例如，正如霍普所指出的（注意我斜体标注的文字）：

是什么让我的身体成为 “我的”？这个问题的答案就在于一个显而易见的事实：这不仅仅是一个断言，而且对于每个人来说，这的确是事实。我们为什么要说 “这是我的身体”？这需要两方面的条件。一方面，被称作 “我的 “身体必须确实（以主体间可确定的方式）表达或 “客观化 “我的意志。就我的身体而言，这一点很容易证明：当我宣布我现在要抬起胳膊、转过头、在椅子上放松（或其他什么），而这些宣布随后变成了事实（得到了实现），那么这就表明，做出这些动作的身体确实被我的意志所占有。相反，如果我的宣布与我身体的实际行为没有系统的联系，那么 “这是我的身体 “这个命题就必须被视为一个空洞的、客观上毫无根据的断言；同样，如果在我宣布之后，不是我的手臂抬起来，而是穆勒、迈尔或舒尔茨的手臂抬起来（在这种情况下，人们更可能倾向于认为穆勒、迈尔或舒尔茨的身体是 “我的”），那么这个命题就会被视为不正确而遭到否定。[310]

Now Hoppe’s italicized example here is not intended to be realistic, anymore than the hypothetical construct of the “evenly rotating economy,” or ERE, employed by Mises and Rothbard; or the magical world of the Garden of Eden or the Land of Cockaigne (or Schlaraffenland), in which there is no scarcity or conflict possible, but in which human action is also virtually inconceivable.39 (This is unlike Robinsonades, which analyze the economic implications of the actions of Crusoe alone on his island, which is not unrealistic at all, just highly simplified.)40

现在，霍普在这里用斜体标出的例子并不打算写实，就像米塞斯和罗斯巴德所使用的 “均匀旋转经济”（ERE）的假构一样；或者是伊甸园或科克加涅国（或施拉拉芬国）的魔幻世界，在那里不可能存在稀缺或冲突，但在那里人的行动也几乎是不可想象的[311]。 (这与《鲁滨逊漂流记》不同，后者分析的是克鲁索一个人在孤岛上的行动对经济的影响，这并非完全不现实，只是被高度简化了而已）[312]。

It was merely a way to emphasis the crucial centrality of direct control with a somewhat unrealistic and whimsical hypothetical. Likewise, until someone can prove there is a God, and that he owns us, I fail to see the relevance of this example. In any case, as Locke argues, God “gave” self-ownership to each person, “manumitting” them in a sense.41 Notes Van Dun in this regard:

Assume that Murphy and Callahan refer to a theist in the Judeo-Christian tradition: Would God claim justifiable possession or control of a creature that He put out of his Garden when He discovered that it was capable of reason and free will? What does all the biblical talk about Covenants mean if we are asked to consider a covenant between an owner and his property?42

这只是用一个有点不切实际、异想天开的假设来强调直接控制的关键核心地位。同样，在有人能够证明存在上帝并且他拥有我们之前，我看不出这个例子有什么意义。无论如何，正如洛克所言，上帝 “赋予 “了每个人自我所有权，在某种意义上说是 “解放”了他们[313]。范-邓恩（Van Dun）在这方面指出：

假设墨菲和卡拉汉指的是犹太-基督教传统中的有神论者：当上帝发现某种生物具有理性和自由意志时，他是否会主张对其进行正当的占有或控制？如果我们被要求考虑一个所有者与其财产之间的，那么《圣经》中关于的所有论述又意味着什么呢？[314]

Van Dun also observes that MC

fail to note the difference between arguing about God and arguing with God. The question of God’s ownership would have to be decided in an argumentation with God, not with any self-proclaimed representative of God, who would have a hard time proving his credentials anyway—so much so that it is doubtful that he would ever get to discuss the question of God’s ownership itself. The same applies to discussions about Society or The People’s having ultimate ownership of our bodies or other things.43

范-邓恩还指出，MC

没有注意到关于上帝的争论和与上帝争论之间的区别。上帝的所有权问题必须在与上帝的争论中决定，而不是与任何自称为上帝代表的人争论，因为无论如何他都很难证明自己的资格——以至于他是否有机会讨论上帝的所有权问题本身都是个问题。这同样适用于关于社会或人民对我们的身体或其他事物拥有最终所有权的讨论。[315]

Moreover, the purpose of property rights and human law is to govern interpersonal behavior among human beings, here on earth. Even if there is a God out there that has some kind of super-ownership claim over us, as his subjects or creations, within the human realm and among other humans, we are still self-owners vis-à-vis each other. As Walter Block observes, “libertarianism is a theory that concerns the relationship between man and man, not between man and God.”44

此外，财产权和人类法律的目的是规范地球上人类之间的人际行为。即使有上帝在那里，对作为他的臣民或创造物的我们有某种超级所有权主张，在人类领域和其他人类之间，我们仍然是彼此的自我所有者。正如沃尔特-布洛克所言，”自由意志主义是一种涉及人与人之间关系的理论，而非人与神之间的理论 “[316]。

Thus, the positing of a hypothetical God in no way refutes the conclusion that only the libertarian norms, including especially self-ownership, can be argumentatively justified amongst fellow humans.

因此，假想上帝的存在丝毫不能反驳这样一个结论，即只有自由意志主义准则，尤其包括自我所有权，才能在人类同胞中被论证性的证成。

仅在论证时提出的主张Claims Made During Argumentation Only

MC try to make much of their notion that propositions advanced “during” argument are not subject to the presuppositions of argument if the rule is designed to be applied in a non-argumentative context. But propositions can only be justified during argumentation. A participant in discourse cannot deny that conflict-avoidance is good. When he seeks to justify something, it is always some action he seeks to justify. The justification takes place at one time; the action to be justified, at another. So what? Are MC saying that no action can ever be justified, other than argument itself ? Consider an act of theft, or property acquisition, or rape: all non-argumentative actions. Obviously, these actions are not justifying-actions, because they are not arguments. The only time they could possibly be justified, or criticized, is at another time, during argument. In any event, this critique seems to miss the point. As Hoppe notes: “In the same way as the validity of a mathematical proof is not restricted to the moment of proving it, so is the validity of the libertarian property theory not limited to instances of argumentation. If correct, the argument demonstrates its universal justification.”45

MC试图充分发展他们的理念，即如果该规则旨在应用于非论证语境，那么 “在 “论证过程中提出的命题就不受论证前提的限制。但是，命题只能在论证过程中得到正当的论证。对话的参与者不能否认避免冲突是好的。当他试图证明某事正当的时候，他试图证明的总是某种行为。关于正当性的论证发生在某一时刻，需被正当化的行动则发生在另一时刻。所以呢？MC是说除了论证本身，没有任何行动是需要正当的吗? 考虑一下偷窃行为、财产获取行为或强奸行为：所有这些行为都是非论证行动。显然，这些行为都不是论证行为，因为它们不是论证。他们唯一可能被正当化或批评的时候，是在另一个时候，在争论中。无论如何，这种批评似乎没有抓住重点。霍普指出 “正如数学证明的有效性并不局限于证明它的时刻一样，自由意志主义财产理论的有效性也不局限于论证的实例。如果是正确的，论证就证明了它的普遍正当性 “[317]。

Thus, if two people seek to agree upon a fair, universalizable rule for assigning property rights in scarce resources to individuals in a way that would allow conflict to be avoided and the resources to be used—of course the rule they are considering will be applicable to future property disputes. I am baffled at how they could think otherwise.46

因此，如果两个人试图商定一个公平的、普适性的规则，将稀缺资源的财产权分配给个人，从而避免冲突并使用资源——他们正在考虑的规则当然将适用于未来的财产纠纷。我不明白他们怎么会不这么想。[318]

第三辑 PART III

自由意志主义的法律理论

LIBERTARIAN LEGAL THEORY

Causation and Aggression

第八章因果关系与侵犯

In 2001, I presented a paper entitled “Reinach and the Property Libertarians on Causality in the Law” at a Mises Institute symposium on Adolf Reinach and Murray Rothbard.* I later collaborated with Patrick Tinsley on an article based on this paper, published in 2004 in a related symposium issue in The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics.† This chapter is a substantially revised version of that article.††

2001 年，我在米塞斯研究院关于阿道夫·赖纳赫和默里-罗斯巴德的研讨会上提交了一篇题为《赖纳赫和财产自由意志主义论法律中的因果关系》的论文*。后来，我与帕特里克·廷斯利（Patrick Tinsley）合作，在这篇论文的基础上撰写了一篇文章，并于 2004 年发表在《奥地利经济学季刊》（The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics）的相关研讨会刊物上。†本章是那篇文章的实质性修订版本。††

* “Reinach and Rothbard: An International Symposium,” Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala. (March 29–30, 2001; https://perma.cc/396W-HJEL). The other presenters were Walter Block, Guido Hülsmann (also the director), Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Larry J. Sechrest, and Barry Smith.

《赖纳赫和罗斯巴德：国际研讨会》，路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，阿拉巴马州奥本市（2001 年 3 月 29-30 日；https://perma.cc/396W-HJEL）。其他发言人包括沃尔特·布洛克、吉多·许尔斯曼(也是研究院院子)、汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普、拉里·j·塞克雷斯特和巴里·史密斯。

† Stephan Kinsella & Patrick Tinsley, “Causation and Aggression,” Q. J. Austrian Econ. 7, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 97–112. Then a law student, and a former student of Walter Block’s at Holy Cross, Tinsley is now a practicing attorney at Fletcher Tilton, PC (https://perma. cc/8LS5-AGN4). This article was included in a symposium issue (vol. 7, no. 4, Winter 2004), on “Austrian Law and Economics: The Contributions of Reinach and Rothbard,” which contained contributions based mainly on the papers presented at the 2001 symposium. For other articles in that issue, see note 66, below—I’ve moved them to the end to avoid awkward formatting issues. Also: when “we” is used in this chapter, it is retained from the original article.

斯蒂芬·金塞拉（Stephan Kinsella）和帕特里克·廷斯利（Patrick Tinsley），《因果关系与侵犯》，《奥地利经济学季刊》第 7 卷第 4 期（2004 年冬季）：97 112 页。当时还是法律系学生、曾是沃尔特·布洛克（Walter Block）在圣十字学院的学生的廷斯利，现在是 Fletcher Tilton, PC 的执业律师（https://perma.cc/8LS5-AGN4）。这篇文章被收录在一个专题期刊（第 7 卷第 4 期，2004 年冬季）中，主题是《奥派法律与经济学：赖纳赫和罗斯巴德的贡献》，其中包含的文稿主要基于 2001 年专题研讨会上提交的论文。关于该期的其他文章，请参见下文注释 66——我已将它们移至末尾以避免格式问题。另外：在本章中使用“我们”时，是保留自原文。

†† My co-author Tinsley has reviewed the changes made in this chapter and fully agrees with them.

For an application of the causation ideas in this chapter to related issues, see Kinsella, “Corporate Personhood, Limited Liability, and Double Taxation,” The Libertarian Standard (Oct. 18, 2011); Kinsella, “KOL100 | The Role of the Corporation and Limited Liability In a Free Society” (PFS 2013); also Kinsella, “KOL382 | FreeTalkLive at PorcFest: Cor porations, Limited Liability, and the Reno Reset,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast ( June 23, 2022); idem, “KOL354 | CDA §230, Being “Part of the State,” Co-ownership, Causation, Defamation, with Nick Sinard,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Aug. 3, 2021).

For other related material published after the original article, see idem, “Intellectual Property and the Structure of Human Action,” StephanKinsella.com ( Jan. 6, 2010); idem, “KOL021 | ‘Libertarian Legal Theory: Property, Conflict, and Society, Lecture 4: Causation, Aggression, Responsibility’ (Mises Academy, 2011),” Kinsella On Liberty Podcast (Feb. 21, 2013 [Feb. 21, 2011]).

††我的合著者廷斯利已经审查了本章所做的修改，并完全同意这些修改。

关于本章中的因果关系理念在相关问题上的应用，请参阅金塞拉的《公司人格、有限责任和双重征税》，《自由意志主义标准》（2011 年 10 月 18 日）；金塞拉的《KOL100 | 公司和有限责任在自由社会中的作用》（PFS 2013）；还有金塞拉的《KOL382 | 在 PorcFest 上的 FreeTalkLive：公司、有限责任和里诺重置》，金塞拉自由播客（2022 年 6 月 23 日）；同上，《KOL354 | CDA§230，“作为国家的一部分”、共同所有权、因果关系、诽谤，与尼克·西纳德》，金塞拉自由播客（2021 年 8 月 3 日）。

关于原始文章发表后出版的其他相关材料，请参阅同上的《知识产权与人的行动结构》，StephanKinsella.com（2010 年 1 月 6 日）；同上，《KOL021 | “自由意志主义法律理论：财产、冲突与社会，讲座 4：因果关系、侵犯、责任”（米塞斯学院，2011 年）》，金塞拉自由播客（2013 年 2 月 21 日[2011 年 2 月 21 日]）。

行动学与法律分析：行动VS. 行为PRAXEOLOGY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS: ACTION VS. BEHAVIOR

For libertarians, the purpose of a legal system is to establish and enforce rules that facilitate and support peaceful, conflict-free interaction between individuals, i.e., property rights. In short, the law should prohibit aggression—the unconsented-to use of someone’s owned resources, or “property”—by identifying and protecting private property rights.1 Because aggression is a particular kind of human action—action that intentionally violates or threatens to violate the physical integrity of another person or another person’s property without that person’s consent2 —it can be successfully prohibited only if the law is based on a sound understanding of the nature of human action more generally.3

在自由意志主义看来，法律制度的目的是建立和执行规则，促进和支持个人之间和平、无冲突的互动，此规则即为财产权。简而言之，法律应通过确认和保护私有财产权来禁止侵犯行为——未经同意使用他人拥有的资源或 “财产”[319]。由于侵犯是一种特殊的人的行动——在未经他人同意的情况下故意侵犯或威胁侵犯他人人身安全或他人财产的行为[320]——只有当法律建立在对人的行动本质更普遍的正确理解的基础上，才能成功地禁止侵犯。[321]

Praxeology, the general theory of human action, studies the universal features of human action and draws out the logical implications of the undeniable fact that humans act.4 Praxeology is central to Austrian economics, the “hitherto best elaborated part” of the science of praxeology.5 However, other disciplines can benefit from the insights of praxeology. Hans-Hermann Hoppe has already extended praxeology to the field of political ethics.6 The related discipline of legal theory, which also concerns ethical implications of human action, can also benefit from the insights of praxeology.7

行动学是关于人的行动的一般理论，它研究人的行动的普遍特征，并从人的行动这一不可否认的事实中得出逻辑推论。[322] 行动学是奥派经济学的核心，经济学是行动学这门科学 “迄今为止阐述得最好的部分 “。[323]当然，其他学科也可以从行动学的见解中获益。汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）已将行动学扩展到政治伦理学领域。[324]与之相关的法律理论学科也涉及人的行动的伦理意义，也可以从行动学的见解中获益。[325]

In the context of legal analysis, one important praxeological doctrine is the distinction between action and mere behavior. The difference between action and behavior boils down to intent. Action is an individual’s intentional intervention in the physical world, via certain selected means, with the purpose of attaining a state of affairs that is preferable to the conditions that would prevail in the absence of the action. Mere behavior, by contrast, is a person’s physical movements that are not undertaken intentionally and that do not manifest any purpose, plan, or design. Mere behavior cannot be aggression; aggression must be deliberate, it must be an action.8

在法律分析中，一个重要的行动学原则是区分行动和单纯的行为。行动与行为的区别归根结底在于意图。行动是一个人通过某些选定的手段对物质世界进行的有意干预，其目的是达到一种优于没有行动时的状态。与此相反，单纯的行为是指一个人的肢体动作，这些动作并非有意为之，也不体现任何目的、计划或意图。单纯的行为不可能是侵犯；侵犯必须是蓄意的，必须是一个行动。[326]

In order to better understand this distinction between action and behavior, we may focus on the role of causality in explaining each. Human action involves two-fold causality. On the one hand, human action requires that time-invariant causal relations govern the physical world. Otherwise, a given means could not be said to achieve a desired result. “As no action could be devised and ventured upon without definite ideas about the relation of cause and effect, teleology presupposes causality.” 9

为了更好地理解行动与行为之间的这种区别，我们可以重点讨论因果关系在解释两者时所起的作用。人的行动涉及两方面的因果关系。一方面，人的行动要求非时变的因果关系支配的物理世界。否则，就不能说特定的手段能够达到预期的结果。”如果没有关于因果关系的明确观念，就不可能设计和冒险采取任何行动，因此目的论以因果关系为前提”。[327]

And on the other hand, human action requires that those time-invariant causal relations can be understood and exploited by an individual whose actions are not themselves subject to time-invariant causal relations. Otherwise, there would be nothing to distinguish human action from blind natural forces. In such a world, laws and norms would be pointless, because no one could be considered responsible for his actions—human beings would not be actors but passive conduits for mechanical processes.10

而另一方面，人的行动又要求这些非时变的因果关系能够被个人理解和利用，而个人的行动本身并不受非时变因果关系的制约。否则，人的行动与盲目的自然力量就没有什么区别了。在这样的世界里，法律和规范将毫无意义，因为没有人会被视为对自己的行动负有责任——人不是行动人，只不过是机械过程的被动管道。[328]

To some extent, of course, human beings are just that. Not everything we do is intentional; we also exhibit what is mere (i.e., non-purposeful) behavior. Our hearts beat, our eyes blink, and we fall asleep—all without any intention on our part. In these cases, we can understand the behavior in terms of time-invariant physical causes. There is no need to apply the concept of an actor deliberately choosing and employing means for the purpose of attaining a desired end. We can understand human behavior exactly the same way we can understand any nonhuman natural (i.e., nonteleological) process. But unlike most natural processes, human beings are capable of more than mere behavior; they are capable also of action, of purposeful behavior.

当然，在某种程度上，人类就是这样。我们所做的一切并非都是有意为之，我们也会表现出一些单纯的（即非目的性的）行为。我们的心脏跳动、眼睛眨动、入睡——所有这些都没有任何意图。在这些情况下，我们可以从非时变的物理原因的角度来理解这些行为。没有必要适用行动人故意选择和使用手段以达到预期目的的概念。我们理解人类行为的方式与理解任何非人类自然过程（即非耳学过程）的方式完全相同。但与大多数自然过程不同的是，人的行为不仅仅是单纯的行为，他们还能够行动，有目的的行为。

As legal theorists, therefore, we cannot accept an entirely mechanistic picture of the world. Legal theorizing is concerned with the ethical or normative implications of action.11 It asks whether an actor should be held responsible for the consequences of his actions and what rights to respond his actions give rise to on the part of the recipients of his action. And to hold someone responsible for the consequences of his actions is implicitly to invoke the two-fold concept of causality expressed above. For there even to be consequences in the first place, the physical world must be governed by time-invariant causal relations. And to hold an actor responsible for those consequences, we must determine that they can be traced back to his own deliberate use of means to achieve a desired result: his “action” cannot itself be a merely mechanical response to physical stimuli; he is the author, or “cause,” of the results achieved.12 In other words, like Austrian economics, legal theory must presuppose both time-invariant causation (an actor could not employ means to attain his goal otherwise) and agent-causation in which the actor himself is the cause of results that he intended to achieve by the use of certain means (the actor is not acting otherwise).

因此，作为法律理论家，我们不能接受完全机械化的世界图景。法律理论研究关注的是行动的伦理或规范意义。[329]它询问行动人是否应对其行动的后果负责，以及他的行动会给其行动的接受者带来哪些回应的权利。让某人对其行动的后果负责，就是暗中援引上文所述的因果关系的双重概念。首先，物理世界必定受非时变的因果关系的支配，才能产生后果。而要让行动人对这些后果负责，我们必须确定这些后果可以追溯到他为达到预期结果而故意使用的手段：他的 “行动 “本身不能仅仅是对物理刺激的机械反应；他才是所取得结果的始作俑者或 “原因 “。[330]换句话说，与奥派经济学一样，法律理论必须同时预设非时变的因果关系（否则行动人不可能使用手段达到目的）和代理因果关系，在代理因果关系中，行动人本身就是他使用某些手段意图达到的结果的原因（否则行动人就不是在行动）。

The law, therefore, in prohibiting aggression, is concerned with prohibiting aggressive action—nonconsensual violations of property boundaries that are the product of deliberate action. Analyzing action in view of its praxeological structure is essential.

因此，法律在禁止侵犯时，关注的是禁止侵犯行动——未经同意地侵犯财产边界，这是蓄意行动的产物。从行动学结构的角度分析行动是必不可少的。

侵犯与隐含的因果概念AGGRESSION AND THE IMPLICIT CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY

Hitting someone without permission is an example of the kind of aggression libertarians oppose. If it is illegal to hit someone, however, this means that it is illegal to cause another person to be hit; that is to say, it is illegal to use physical objects, including one’s fist, in a way that will cause unwanted physical contact with another person. Therefore, if A does intentionally (and uninvitedly) hit B, he can be held responsible for the action—the aggression can be imputed to him and he can be lawfully punished for it—because A’s decision to hit his victim was not itself conditioned by strictly physical laws. It was volitional. A—not some impersonal force of nature, and not some other person—was the cause of the aggression against B. A’s aggression is an action.13

未经许可打人就是自由意志主义所反对的那种侵犯行动的一个例子。然而，如果打人是违法的，这就意味着导致他人被打也是违法的；也就是说，使用有形物体（包括拳头）造成他人不必要的身体接触也是违法的。因此，如果 A 真的故意（不请自来）打了 B，他必须对这一行动负责——侵犯可以归咎于他，他也可以因此受到合法的惩罚——因为 A 打他的受害者的决定本身并不受严格的物理法则的制约。它是自愿的。A——而不是某种非个人的自然力，也不是其他人——是侵犯 B 的原因。A的侵犯是一个行动。[331]

The general question facing libertarians, then, is whether a particular actor, by his action, intentionally caused the prohibited result—an uninvited border-crossing. Implicitly, the libertarian prohibition on the initiation of force is a prohibition on willfully causing an unwanted intrusion.

因此，自由意志主义者面临的普遍问题是，某个行动人的行动是否故意造成了被禁止的结果——不请自来的越境。毫不客气地讲，自由意志主义对使用武力的禁止就是对故意造成不受欢迎的入侵的禁止。

Where A’s action—not mere behavior—is the cause of aggression against B, we might simply say that “A killed B.” But if we unpack this statement, we will usually find that A did not directly kill B; some intermediate means was employed to achieve that end (hence the causal aspect of action). Action is not just intentional; it is the intentional use of means toattain a desired end. For example, A deliberately loaded his gun, deliberately pointed the gun at B and then deliberately squeezed the trigger, causing a bullet to discharge into B’s heart. Why say that A killed B? Why not say that the bullet killed B, whereas A merely squeezed a trigger? Why connect A’s action of squeezing a trigger with the resulting harm to B? In some contexts, of course, A’s action would be irrelevant. To a medical examiner conducting an autopsy, for instance, the bullet is the cause of B’s death, and who fired it and why is beside the point. But that does not change the fact that in a legal and normative context we trace the chain of causation back to A’s intentional action of squeezing the trigger. There is, after all, a causal connection between the immediate action and the means employed on the one hand, and the harmful consequence on the other hand.14

如果A的行动——而不仅仅是行为——是侵犯B的原因，我们可以简单地说 “A杀死了B”。但是，如果我们把这句话拆开来看，通常会发现A并没有直接杀死B，而是采用了某种中间手段来达到目的（因此行动具有因果的一面）。行动不仅仅是有意为之，而是有意使用手段来达到预期目的。例如，A 故意将枪上膛，故意将枪口对准 B，然后故意扣动扳机，导致子弹射入 B 的心脏。为什么说 A 杀了 B？为什么不说子弹杀死了 B，而 A 只是扣动了扳机？为什么要把 A 扣动扳机的行动与 B 因此受到的伤害联系起来呢？当然，在某些情况下，A 的行动是无关紧要的。例如，对于进行尸检的法医来说，子弹是导致 B 死亡的原因，至于是谁开的枪，为什么开的枪，都无关紧要。但这并不能改变一个事实，即在法律和规范的语境中，我们将因果关系的链条追溯到 A 扣动扳机的故意行动。毕竟，一方面是立即行动与使用的手段，另一方面是有害的后果，这二者之间存在因果关系。[332]

In praxeological terms, we can say that A’s goal or end was to kill B; he selected a means—the gun—calculated and designed, according to known laws of cause and effect in the physical world (the causal realm), to achieve that goal. A’s action was intended to cause B’s death, and the action employed means that did, in fact, result in B’s death. As shorthand we say that A killed B, but implicit in this account is that A undertook an intentional action employing means and exploiting causal laws (causal realm) to achieve his desired result (teleological realm).15

用行动学的术语来说，我们可以说，A 的目标或目的是杀死 B；他选择了一种手段——枪——根据物理世界（因果领域）中已知的因果法则进行计算和设计，以实现这一目标。A 的行动旨在造成 B 的死亡，而该行动所使用的手段事实上确实造成了 B 的死亡。简言之，我们说 A 杀死了 B，但这一说法中隐含的意思是，A 采取了一项有意的行动，运用各种手段并利用因果律（因果领域）来实现他所期望的结果（目的论领域）。[333]

At this point, we might want to revisit the issue of intent. Why should we concern ourselves with A’s intent? If we objectively determine that A’s actions caused the death of B, what should it matter what A intended to do—or whether A intended to do anything at all?

此时此刻，我们不妨重新审视一下意图问题。我们为什么要关心 A 的意图呢？如果我们客观地认定 A 的行动造成了 B 的死亡，那么 A 打算做什么——或者 A 是否打算做什么事情——又有什么关系呢？

Intent matters because without intent there is no action and without action there is no actor to whom we may impute legal responsibility. If A did not intend to do anything at all, then we cannot determine that A’s actions caused the death of B—because A took no action. Intent is a necessary ingredient in human action; if there is no intent, then there is no action, only behavior: involuntary physical movements guided by deterministic (or perhaps random) causal relations.

意图之所以重要，是因为没有意图就没有行动，没有行动就没有我们可以归咎其法律责任的行动人。如果 A 根本没有打算做任何事情，那么我们就不能确定 A 的行动造成了 B 的死亡——因为 A 没有采取任何行动。意图是人的行动的必要组成部分；如果没有意图，那么就没有行动，而只有行为：在确定性（或许是随机的）因果关系主导下的不自主的身体运动。

The role of law in a free society is to protect the rights of nonaggressors and, where those rights are violated, to compensate the victims and punish the aggressors. But aggression must be intentional—otherwise, there is no reason to attribute it to a particular human actor instead of an impersonal natural force. For person A to be the cause of B’s death, B must have died as the result of a series of events initiated by A’s willful action. If, on the other hand, B dies as the result of a thoroughly deterministic process unconnected with any willful action, then there is no one to punish; no one caused B’s death. To punish A’s unintentional bodily movement would be like punishing lightning for destruction of property or punishing a flood for assault. A can murder B, whereas lightning (or a flood, or a cougar, or an involuntary human reflex) cannot.

在自由社会中，法律的作用是保护非侵害者的权利，并在这些权利受到侵害时，赔偿受害者并惩罚侵害者。但是，侵犯必须是有意的——否则，就没有理由将其归咎于特定的人的行动者，而不是非人的自然力量。如果 A 人是 B 死亡的原因，那么 B 的死亡必定是由 A 的有意的行动引发的一系列事件的结果。另一方面，如果B的死亡是一个完全确定的过程的结果，与任何有意的行动无关，那么就没有人需要受到惩罚；没有人造成了B的死亡。惩罚A的非自主的身体运动就好比惩罚闪电破坏财产或惩罚洪水袭击。A能够谋杀B，而闪电（或洪水，或美洲狮，或人的非自主的条件反射）却不能。

惩罚侵犯PUNISHING AGGRESSION

There is another, closely related reason why intent matters for the assessment of criminal guilt. A guilty criminal—that is, an aggressor—may be lawfully punished. Or, to put it another way, an aggressor cannot meaningfully object when his aggression is met with physical force in response. After all, his aggressive actions conclusively demonstrate that he does not find nonconsensual physical force objectionable. In common law terms, we may say that by virtue of his own violence against others, an aggressor is “estopped” from objecting to (proportional) violence against himself.16 But to punish someone is to engage in an intentional act. As an intentional act, punishment is only justified in response to an intentional act of violence; this is the elegant symmetry of libertarian ethics. Neither an unintentional movement, nor an intentional act of nonaggression, can justify the use of force. We may punish A if he intentionally strikes B, but not if B is struck by lightning; and we may punish A if he intentionally shoots B with a gun, but not if he shoots B with a camera. If we do punish A for nonaggression, we become aggressors ourselves—because nonaggressive action cannot estop A from mounting a coherent objection to the use of violence against him. Thus we can say that when an aggressor intentionally and uninvitedly attempts to (or does) impair the physical integrity of another’s person or property, he gives his victim the right to punish him, because he can no longer withhold his consent to physical force in response to his initiatory force.17

另一个与此密切相关的原因是，为什么意图对于刑事犯罪的评估非常重要。有罪的罪犯——即侵害者——可能会受到合法的惩罚。或者换一种说法，当一个侵害者的侵害行为遭到武力回应时，他就不能提出有意义的反对。毕竟，他的侵犯行动确凿无疑地表明，他并不认为未经同意的身体武力是应该反对的。用普通法的术语来说，我们可以说，由于侵害者自己对他人使用武力，他 “被禁止 “反对对自己使用（相称的）武力。[334]但是，惩罚某人是一种有意的行动。作为一种有意的行动，惩罚只有在回应有意的武力行动时才是正当的；这就是自由意志主义伦理学精妙的对称性。无论是无意的动作，还是有意的非侵犯行动，都不能成为使用武力的正当理由。如果A故意殴打B，我们可以惩罚A，但如果B被雷击中，我们就不能惩罚A；如果A故意用枪射击B，我们可以惩罚A，但如果A用照相机射击B，我们就不能惩罚A。如果我们真的因为A的非侵犯行动而对A进行惩罚，我们自己就成了侵害者——因为非侵犯行动不能禁止A对使用武力侵害他的行动提出连贯一致的反对意见。因此，我们可以说，当侵害者有意且不请自来地试图（或确实）损害他人人身或财产的完整性时，他就赋予了受害者惩罚他的权利，因为侵害者不能再拒绝同意使用武力来回应他发起的武力。[335]

自由意志主义的反对意见LIBERTARIAN OBJECTIONS

Virtually no one has a quarrel with the notion that an actor is the “cause” of a result if he employs nonhuman means to attain this result. However, as indicated above, some, including some libertarians, assume that if another person is employed as the means, somehow the “chain” of causation is “broken.” For example, A somehow persuades C to plant a bomb under B’s car, which kills B. Some libertarians maintain that, while C is responsible for B’s murder, A is not, because C’s actions were undertaken with “free will,” thereby “breaking the chain of causation.” They argue that what C did was commit murder, while A committed a mere speech act, which does not in and of itself aggress against anyone’s person or property. Similar arguments are made for someone inciting a mob to lynch someone—“mere incitement” is not, according to this view, and never can be, a crime. You are not responsible for what a mob does, even if they act on your instructions, since its members have free will.

几乎没有人反对这样的观点，即如果行动人使用非人类的手段来达到某一结果，那么他就是该结果的 “原因”。然而，如上所述，包括一些自由意志主义者在内的一些人认为，如果另一个人被用作手段，那么因果关系的 “链条 “就会 “断裂”。例如，A 以某种方式说服 C 在 B 的车下放置炸弹，导致 B 死亡。一些自由意志主义者认为，虽然 C 要对 B 的谋杀负责，但 A 却不需要，因为 C 的行动是以 “自由意志 “进行的，从而 “打破了因果关系链”。他们认为，C 所做的是谋杀，而 A 所做的只是言论行动，其本身并没有侵犯任何人的人身或财产。类似的论点也适用于煽动暴徒对某人施以私刑的人——根据这种观点，”单纯的煽动 “不是犯罪，也永远不可能是犯罪。即使暴徒按照你的指示行事，你也不必对他们的所作所为负责，因为他们的成员有自由意志。

Consider, for example, Walter Block’s approach to these issues.28 Block follows Rothbard in maintaining categorically that “inciting” others to commit a crime (such as a riot) is simply not a crime. Rather, as Rothbard maintains, “‘Inciting to riot’ … is a pure exercise of a man’s right to speak without being thereby implicated in a crime.”29 Block points out that the rioters have “free will”30—unlike an inanimate object such as a bullet—and therefore the inciter is not responsible for the riot. This reasoning can be extended to absolve various mob bosses, political leaders, and the like, who merely instruct underlings or intermediaries to engage in aggressive acts. Hence the libertarian joke that Hitler’s defense to war crimes would be, “I just gave orders.”31

例如，考虑一下沃尔特-布洛克处理这些问题的方法。[336]布洛克追随罗斯巴德，断然认为 “煽动 “他人犯罪（如暴乱）根本就不是犯罪。更确切的说，正如罗斯巴德所坚持的那样，”‘煽动暴乱’……纯粹是行使一个人的言论权利，而不会因此牵连到犯罪 “。[337]布洛克指出，暴乱者有 “自由意志 “[338]——与子弹等无生命的物体不同——因此煽动者不应对暴乱负责。这一推理可以延伸到为各种暴徒头目、政治领袖等开脱责任，因为他们只是指示下属或中间人从事侵犯行为。因此，自由意志主义开玩笑说，希特勒为战争罪辩护时会说：”我只是下达了命令 “。[339]

Rothbard and Block are assuming here that the rioter cannot be the means of the inciter, because the rioter has free will; they assume that having another human in the chain of causation breaks the chain. But as explained above, there is no reason other humans cannot serve as means for one’s action.

罗斯巴德和布洛克在这里假定，暴乱者不可能成为煽动者的手段，因为暴乱者有自由意志；他们假定，因果链中有另一个人，因果链就中断了。但正如上文所解释的，其他人没有理由不能作为一个人行动的手段。

情况变得复杂：因果关系、合作和人的手段COMPLICATING THE PICTURE: CAUSATION, COOPERATION, AND HUMAN MEANS

Compared to many real-world cases of murder, the above example in which A deliberately shoots B is simple and straightforward. After all, A’s chosen means of carrying out his aggression against B was a gun—an inanimate object enmeshed in a web of causal relations but incapable of initiating a causal sequence on its own. As the well-known slogan goes, guns don’t kill people, people kill people. There is little difficulty in laying the moral and legal responsibility for the murder on A, therefore, because only A engaged in an action. Only A made a choice to which moral and legal blame could attach. The means that A employed—the gun and its ammunition—were physical objects completely bound by causal laws.

与现实世界中的许多谋杀案相比，上述例子中 A 故意射杀 B 的情节简单明了。毕竟，A 选择的对 B 实施侵犯的手段是一把枪——一个被卷入因果关系网中却无法独立启动因果序列的无生命之物。正如一句众所周知的口号：枪不杀人，人杀人。因此，将谋杀的道德和法律责任归咎于 A 并不困难，因为只有 A 参与了行动。只有 A 做出了道德和法律责任可以归咎的选择。A 所使用的手段——枪支及其弹药——是完全受因果法则约束的物理对象。

What about actions that involve other humans? As Mises observed:

A means is what serves to the attainment of any end, goal, or aim. Means are not in the given universe; in this universe there exist only things. A thing becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and human action really employs it for this purpose. Thinking man sees the serviceableness of things, i.e., their ability to minister to his ends, and acting man makes them means.… It is human meaning and action which transform them into means.18

那么涉及其他人的行动呢？正如米塞斯所言：

手段是实现目的、目标或意图的方式。手段不存在于既定的宇宙中；在这个宇宙中只存在事物。当人的理性计划利用某一事物来达到某种目的，而人的行动也确实利用这一事物来达到这一目的时，该事物就成为手段。会思考的人看到了事物的有用性，即它们为他的目的服务的能力，而会行动的人则使它们成为手段….是人的意图和行动将它们变成了手段。[340]

Now in these comments Mises is primarily concerned with the use of nonhuman scarce resources as the things employed as means. But there is no reason that other humans cannot also be one’s means, in a sense. What else does it mean to “employ” a worker, or to cooperate with others to produce wealth? In fact, as Mises commented in Socialism:

[I]n the means of production men serve as means, not as ends. For liberal social theory proves that each single man sees in all others, first of all,only means to the realization of his purposes, while he himself is to all others a means to the realization of their purposes; that finally, by this reciprocal action, in which each is simultaneously means and end, the highest aim of social life is attained—the achievement of a better existence for everyone.19

在这些评论中，米塞斯主要关注的是使用非人类的稀缺资源作为手段。但从某种意义上说，其他人没有理由不能成为自己的手段。“雇用 “工人或与他人合作生产财富还意味着什么？事实上，正如米塞斯在《社会主义》一书中所评论的那样：

[在生产资料中，人是作为手段而不是目的而存在的。因为自由主义的社会理论证明，每个人首先在其他人身上看到的只是实现其目的的手段，而他自己对其他人来说也是实现其目的的手段；最后，通过这种互惠的行动（在这种行动中，每个人既是手段又是目的），社会生活的最高目标就达到了——为每个人实现更好的生存。[341]

There is no doubt that cooperative, productive action is possible, in which case multiple actors cooperate with each other and, in a sense, employ each other as means to achieve mutual and/or separate goals. But not all cooperative action is productive and peaceful. It is also possible for multiple actors to collaborate or conspire together to trespass against others’ property rights.

毫无疑问，合作性的生产性行动是可能的，在这种情况下，多个行动人相互合作，并在某种意义上相互利用，作为实现共同和(或)单独目标的手段。但并非所有的合作行动都是生产性的且和平的。多个行动人也可能串通或合谋侵犯他人的财产权。

In analyzing action through the lens of the praxeological means-ends structure to determine if it amounts to aggression, we ask if the actor employed means to achieve the end of invading the borders of another’s property or body—in other words, we ask if he caused the border invasion or trespass. The means employed can be inanimate or nonhuman means governed solely by causal laws (a gun), or it can include other humans who are employed (used) as means to achieve the illicit end desired. The latter category includes both innocent humans that one employs to cause a border invasion as well as culpable humans that one conspires (cooperates) with to achieve the illicit end.

在通过行动学手段-目的结构的视角来分析行动以确定其是否构成侵犯时，我们会问，行动人是否运用了手段以达到侵犯他人财产或身体边界的目的——换句话说，我们会问，他是否造成了对边界的侵犯或入侵。所使用的手段可以是无生命的或完全受因果法则支配的非人类手段（枪支），也可以包括其他人，他们被雇佣(使用)作为实现非法目的的手段。后一类既包括被人利用来造成边界入侵的无辜的人，也包括为达到非法目的而与人共谋（合作）的有罪的人。

Consider the following case in which an aggressor employs an innocent human as one of his means. A terrorist builds a letter-bomb and mails it to his intended victim via courier. The courier has no idea that the package he is delivering contains a lethal device. When the addressee dies in an explosion after he opens the package, whom should we hold responsible? The obvious answer is: the terrorist. Why not the courier? Or the victim himself ? After all, the courier is causally connected to the killing, as is the victim. The courier delivered the package; the victim opened it. But because he did not know he was carrying a bomb, the courier did not have the intent to aggress against the victim. Instead, he was connected to the killing only as a means. When the bomb exploded, it was the terrorist’s action, not the courier’s, that was completed. The courier simply handed over a package. The terrorist, by contrast, intentionally used means—the bomb materials, but also the unwitting courier—to cause his victim’s death. It is no different than if the terrorist used a nonhuman robot or drone to deliver the bomb. This case would be similar to the gun example, but not significantly different from the case in which a human courier was employed. From the point of view of both the victim, and the terrorist, whether the means employed was an innocent human or a nonhuman mechanistic delivery mechanism is irrelevant. The victim opposes being harmed in both cases; and the terrorist achieves his end, in both cases.20

请看以下案例，侵害者利用无辜者作为其手段之一。一名恐怖分子制造了一个邮件炸弹，并通过快递寄给他的目标受害者。快递员并不知道他所递送的包裹中装有致命装置。当收件人打开包裹后死于爆炸时，我们应该追究谁的责任？答案显而易见：恐怖分子。为什么不是快递员？还是受害者本人？毕竟，快递员和受害者一样，都与谋杀事件有因果关系。快递员送来了包裹，受害者打开了包裹。但由于快递员不知道自己携带的是炸弹，所以他并没有侵犯受害者的意图。相反，他只是作为一种手段与谋杀有关。当炸弹爆炸时，完成的是恐怖分子的行动，而不是快递员的行动。快递员只是投递了一个包裹。相比之下，恐怖分子有意地使用各种手段——炸弹材料，还有不知情的快递员——造成受害者死亡。这与恐怖分子使用非人类机器人或无人机运送炸弹并无不同。这种情况类似于枪支的例子，但与雇佣人类快递员的情况并无明显区别。从受害者和恐怖分子的角度来看，所使用的手段是无辜的人类还是非人类的机械运送装置并不重要。在这两种情况下，受害者都反对受到伤害；而恐怖分子在这两种情况下都达到了目的。[342]

In fact, the victim’s own actions play a role in this scenario—after all, he opens the package, “causing” it to explode. We would not hesitate to say that the terrorist killed the victim, even though there is a significant time lag between the terrorist’s initial actions and the ensuing result, and even though the victim’s own volitional actions were part of the chain of events. So why not blame the victim? After all, he is the one who set off the bomb by opening the package. But this is obviously absurd. The victim did not intend to kill himself!

事实上，受害者自己的行动在这一情景中也起了作用——毕竟，他打开了包裹，”导致 “包裹爆炸。我们会毫不犹豫地说，是恐怖分子杀死了受害者，尽管恐怖分子最初的行动与随后的结果之间存在着明显的时间差，尽管受害者自己的自愿行动也是事件链条的一部分。那么，为什么不责怪受害者呢？毕竟是他打开了包裹，引爆了炸弹。但这显然是荒谬的。受害者并没有自杀的意图！

It is true that the positive law has long recognized that one accused of a crime or tort is not responsible if the damage was really caused by an “intervening act” that breaks the chain of causal connection” between the actions of the accused and the damage that occurred.21 The idea is that the intervening act is the true cause of the harm caused. But this is the case only if the event is superseding cause—that is, an unforeseeable intervening cause. In other words, an intervening force only breaks the chain of causal connection when it is unforeseeable. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides, “The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor’s … conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about.” 22

诚然，实在法早已承认，如果损害确实是由 “介入行动 “造成的，而该 “介入行动 “打破了 “被告的行动与所发生的损害之间的因果联系链，则被控犯罪或侵权的人无需承担责任。[343] 这种观点认为，介入行动是造成损害的真正原因。但只有当该事件是替代原因——也就是说，一个不可预见的介入原因时——情况才会如此。换句话说，介入力量只有在不可预见的情况下才会打破因果联系链。正如《侵权法重述（第二版）》所规定的那样，“对于由行动人……的行动所造成的情形所导致的一种正常力量的介入，不是行动人该行动在造成伤害方面起了实质性作用的替代原因。”[344]

But it is simply not the case that when an actor (whom we may in general refer to as a “boss” or “inciter”) induces another human to aggress against a victim, that the act of aggression is “unforeseeable” merely because the intermediary has free will.23 When a terrorist uses a courier to deliver a letter bomb, it is not unforeseeable that the victim will receive it; and it is not unforeseeable that the victim will open it. If I hire a hit-man to kill someone, I am doing so because I hope and expect the victim to be killed. If I send my underling to rob a bank, I am doing it to have the bank robbed. If a woman persuades her lover to murder her husband, and he does, she gets the result she wanted; can we really say the outcome was “unforeseeable”?24 Thus, the fact that there are other humans with free will who are part of the chain of events does not excuse the instigator. This is, admittedly, how the positive law reasons, but I think this is reasonable and compatible with libertarian-based principles of rights, causation, and responsibility.

但是，当一个行动人（我们可以笼统地称其为 “头目 “或 “教唆者”）诱使另一个人侵犯受害者时，仅仅因为中间人有自由意志，侵犯行为就 “不可预见”，这是不可能的。[345] 当恐怖分子利用快递员递送邮件炸弹时，受害者收到邮件炸弹并非不可预见；受害者打开邮件炸弹也并非不可预见。如果我雇佣杀手杀人，我这样做是因为我希望并预料到受害者会被杀害。如果我派我的下属去抢银行，我这样做是为了让银行被抢。如果一个女人劝说她的情人谋杀她的丈夫，而她的情人也真的杀了她的丈夫，她得到了她想要的结果；我们真的能说这个结果是 “不可预见的 “吗？ [346]因此，即使有其他具有自由意志的人参与到事件链中，也不能成为教唆者的借口。诚然，这就是实在法的推理方式，但我认为这是合理的，也符合基于自由意志主义的权利、因果关系和责任原则。

We submit that the case of an intentional border-crossing being carried out in part through human actors as opposed to through exclusively inanimate or nonhuman means poses no special praxeological problems. Whether the terrorist handed the bomb to his victim directly or through an innocent third party, the legal analysis remains the same. We look to see who intentionally employed means to cause an unwanted invasion against another. The means can be nonhuman or inanimate means, or another human, whether innocent or acting in coordination with the actor. In this case, the (innocent) courier was the terrorist’s means of killing the victim. It is simply confused to claim, as some do, that the terrorist in this case is not a cause of the killing because the chain of causation is “broken” by the “intervening” acts of another human (the courier) with free will. The acts of the courier do not absolve the terrorist; to the contrary, they implicate him, since he used the courier and his actions to cause damage to the victim.

我们认为，部分通过行动人而非完全通过无生命或非人类手段实施的蓄意越境行为并不构成特殊的行动学问题。无论恐怖分子是直接还是通过无辜的第三方将炸弹交给受害者，法律分析都是一样的。我们要看的是，是谁故意使用手段对他人造成了不想要的侵犯。手段可以是非人或无生命的手段，也可以是另一个人，无论是无辜的还是与行动人协同行动的。在本案中，（无辜的）快递员就是恐怖分子杀害受害者的手段。如果像某些人所说的那样，在这种情况下，恐怖分子不是杀害的原因，因为因果关系链被另一个有自由意志的人（快递员）的 “介入 “行动 “打断 “了，这简直是混淆视听。快递员的行动并不能免除恐怖分子的责任；相反，这些行动都与恐怖分子有牵连，因为他利用快递员及其行动对受害者造成了伤害。

In the cases mentioned above, only innocent parties—the courier, or the victim himself—are employed as the malfeasor’s means of committing aggression. Although here we find the terrorist alone responsible for the killing, it will not always be the case that an act of aggression “belongs” to just one person. For example, consider a bank heist in which there are several participants. One of them drives the getaway car; another handles crowd control; a third directs the action by walkie-talkie; and a fourth actually steals the money. The one who takes by force money that does not belong to him is clearly guilty of robbery. But most libertarians would agree that his companions are no less guilty. Most libertarians would recognize this as a “simultaneous” criminal conspiracy that renders all of its participants independently and jointly responsible. And that is our conclusion as well. But how can we justify that conclusion, inasmuch as only one person actually took possession of the stolen money?

在上述案例中，只有无辜者——快递员或受害者本人——被不法分子利用作为实施侵犯的手段。虽然在这里我们发现只有恐怖分子要对杀人负责，但侵犯行动并不总是“只属于”一个人。例如，考虑一下有几个人参与的银行抢劫案。其中一个人开车逃跑；另一个人负责控制人群；第三个人通过对讲机指挥行动；第四个人实际上在偷钱。用武力抢走不属于自己的钱的人显然犯了抢劫罪。但大多数自由意志主义者都会同意，他的同伴们也同样有罪。大多数自由意志主义者都会认为这是一个 “同时发生 “的犯罪阴谋，所有参与者都要独立和共同承担责任。这也是我们的结论。但是，既然只有一个人实际占有了赃款，我们又如何证明这一结论是正确的呢？

The key is causation. Each of these actors had the goal that the bank’s and customers’ property be seized and each intentionally used means—including one another—to attain this goal. In other words, each bank robber that was part of the conspiracy was a cause of the robbery. Each had intent to achieve, and employed means to attain, the illicit end.25

关键在于因果关系。这些行动人中的每个人都有抢夺银行和客户财产的目标，并且每个人都有意地使用包括彼此在内的手段来实现这一目标。换句话说，每个参与共谋的银行劫匪都是抢劫案的起因。每个人都有达到非法目的的意图，并使用了达到非法目的的手段。[347]

Consider the following example: A purchases a remote-controlled tank. With the remote control he can steer the tank and fire its cannon. He directs the tank to blow down the walls of a neighbor’s house, destroying the house and killing the neighbor. No one would deny that A is the cause of the killing and is guilty of murder and trespass. However, after the rampage, a hatch opens in the tank, and an evil midget jumps out. It turns out, you see, that the midget could see on a screen which buttons were pressed on the remote control, and he would operate the tank accordingly. We submit that A is equally liable in both cases. From his point of view, the tank was a “black box” that he used to attain his end, regardless of whether there was a human will somewhere in the chain of causation. No one can plausibly argue that we cannot determine A’s liability until we know whether there was a midget, or mere machinery, in the tank. (Of course, the evil midget, if there is one, is also liable.)26 In general, one can be liable for acts commited by another, if one is employing them as means to commit aggression. As Frank van Dun argues,

Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, and their likes were not innocent practitioners of free speech at a time when a lot of their compatriots were blowing up towns and villages and people. The general who, in his search of scapegoats for a defeat, sends a handful of privates to the firing-squad is not exonerated by the fact that some other privates actually fired the shots that killed their convicted colleagues.27

请看下面的例子： A 购买了一辆遥控坦克。通过遥控器，他可以操纵坦克并发射大炮。他指挥坦克炸毁了邻居家的墙壁，摧毁了房子并杀死了邻居。没有人会否认 A 是杀人的罪魁祸首，他犯有谋杀罪和非法侵入罪。然而，肆虐过后，坦克上的舱门打开了，一个邪恶的侏儒跳了出来。原来，侏儒可以从屏幕上看到按下了遥控器上的哪个按钮，并据此操作坦克。我们认为，在这两种情况下，A 都负有同样的责任。从他的角度来看，坦克是一个 “黑盒子”，他用它来达到自己的目的，而不管在因果链的某个环节上是否存在人的意志。没有人可以振振有词地说，在我们知道坦克里是有一个侏儒，或仅仅是一个机械之前，我们无法确定 A 的责任。(当然，如果有邪恶的侏儒，他也要承担责任。）[348] 一般来说，如果一个人利用他人的行动作为实施侵犯的手段，他可以对他人的行动承担责任。正如弗兰克·冯·顿所说，

希特勒、丘吉尔、罗斯福、斯大林以及他们的同类，在他们的许多同胞正在炸毁城镇、村庄和人民的时候，并不是言论自由的无辜实践者。一位将军在为战败寻找替罪羊时，把少数几个二等兵送进了行刑队，但其他一些二等兵开枪打死了他们被定罪的同事，这并不能为他开脱罪责。[349]

In other words, the simple fact that a person’s actions are mediated through other persons does not mean he should not be held liable for them. The driver of the getaway car is responsible for the robbery because he is intentionally engaged in a “simultaneous” criminal conspiracy to commit the heist. The mob boss who orders a crime is liable for his underling’s actions. The political leader who orders military actions is responsible for them. People can conspire—collaborate, cooperate—to commit crimes.

换句话说，一个人的行动是通过其他人作为中介的这一简单事实，并不意味着他不应该为这些行动负责。逃跑车辆的司机要对抢劫负责，因为他有意参与了 “同时 “实施抢劫的犯罪共谋。下令犯罪的黑帮头目要对其下属的行动负责。下令采取军事行动的政治领导人要对军事行动负责。人们可以共谋——协作、配合——犯罪。

Moreover, the conspiracy or joint action need not even be simultaneous. In the terrorist example, the bomb did not detonate until long after the terrorist had handed it over to the courier. Nevertheless, he used the courier as an unwitting “partner” in a temporal “conspiracy” to kill the intended victim. In situations such as these, other human actors (including the victim) can be means to an end. It should be emphasized, of course, that this is a general rule; the analysis in each situation must be case-specific and take relevant facts and context into account. Whether a given person is considered to be “in” or “out” of the conspiracy—an intentional actor or an unwitting dupe—will depend on the circumstances surrounding the particular case.

此外，共谋或联合行动甚至不必是同时进行的。在恐怖分子的例子中，炸弹是在恐怖分子将其交给快递员很久之后才引爆的。然而，他利用快递员作为一个不知情的 “伙伴”，在时序上 “共谋 “杀害预定的受害者。在这种情况下，其他行动人（包括受害者）可能是达到目的的手段。当然，应当强调的是，这只是一般规则；对每种情况的分析都必须针对具体案件，并考虑到相关事实和背景。某个人被认为是 “参与 “或 “不参与 “共谋——是蓄意的行动人还是不知情的受骗者——将取决于特定案件的具体情况。

Generally, however, the libertarian position is that what is impermissible—and properly punishable—is action that is aggression. This means action characterized by the following structure: the actor intentionally employs some means (which can be mere objects but could also include other actors, whether innocent or not) calculated to cause an invasion of the physical borders of a nonaggressor’s person or property.

不过，一般而言，自由意志主义的立场是，不允许的——而且应受到适当惩罚的——是侵犯行动。这是指具有以下结构特征的行动：行动者故意使用某种手段（可以是单纯的物体，也可以包括其他行动人，无论其是否无辜），以造成对非侵害者的人身或财产的实际边界的侵犯。

特别例外Ad Hoc Exceptions

Understandably, libertarians who advance such views are uncomfortable with the implications—with the idea that presidents and political leaders, mob bosses, people who hire hit men, and so on, are not liable. To avoid these difficulties, they advance various ad hoc exceptions to their “incitement is never a crime, it’s just free speech” or “the free will of the intermediary breaks the chain of causation” arguments.32 Walter Block, for example, argues that the “instigator” of actions directly committed by an intermediary can be liable if (a) he threatens or coerces the intermediary to commit the crime,33 (b) he contractually pays the intermediary money to commit the crime,34 (c) he “orders” the intermediary to commit the crime,35 or (d) he is “in” a “criminal conspiracy with” the other person, whatever that means.36 So if you coerce someone, or pay them, or “order” them, or “conspire with” them, you are liable for the intermediary’s crimes. With so many exceptions to the rule that one is simply not responsible for the actions of others,the rule itself is questionable. Moreover, there is no clear reason given for any of these exceptions; they are all apparently supposed to be intuitively obvious cases, but there is no unifying theme between them. These exceptions are ad hoc and not based on any general theory.37

可以理解的是，提出这种观点的自由意志主义者对其中的含义——总统和政治领袖、黑帮头目、雇佣杀手的人等等都不负有责任——感到不舒服。为了避免这些困难，他们在 “煽动从来不是犯罪，只是言论自由 “或 “中间人的自由意志打破了因果关系链 “的论点之外，提出了各种特别例外。[350] 例如，沃尔特-布洛克（Walter Block）认为，通过中间人直接实施行动的 “教唆者 “在以下情况下可能要承担责任：(a) 他威胁或胁迫中间人实施犯罪，[351] (b) 他通过向中间人支付钱财以实施犯罪，[352] (c) 他 “命令 “中间人实施犯罪，[353] 或 (d)他或者 “他人 “共谋犯罪”，不管这意味着什么。[354]因此，如果你胁迫某人，或付钱给他，或 “命令他“他”，或与他 “共谋”，你就要为中间人的罪行负责。由于 “不对他人的行动负责 “这一规则有如此多的例外，该规则本身就值得商榷。此外，这些例外情况都没有给出明确的理由；它们显然都应该是直观上显而易见的情况，但它们之间并没有统一的主题。这些例外都是特例，没有任何一般理论作为依据。[355]

For example, if an instigator is usually off the hook for actions committed by an intermediary, because the intermediary has free will, why does coercion or monetary payment make a difference? If you coerce someone, or pay him, he still has free will. Whether the instigator threatens, or merely persuades, the intermediary, he still does not “determine” the intermediary’s actions, since in both cases, he has free will.38 In fact, legal systems do not absolve someone from liability for crime just because they are coerced, in recognition of the fact that even coerced agents have choice and culpability.

例如，如果煽动者通常对中间人的行动免责，因为中间人有自由意志，那么胁迫或金钱支付为何会产生差异？如果你胁迫某人，或付钱给他，他仍然有自由意志。无论煽动者是威胁还是仅仅劝说中间人，他仍然没有“决定”中间人的行动，因为在这两种情况下，中间人都有自由意志。[356] 事实上，法律制度不会仅仅因为某人受到胁迫就免除其犯罪责任，因为人们认识到即使是受胁迫的行动人也有选择和罪责。

Furthermore, why is contractual, monetary payment some special exception? What about other types of contract, such as a contract for services, or other forms of inducement, such as the promise of sex or getting in the instigator’s good graces? We cannot understand why paying someone to murder a victim makes the payer responsible, while there is categorically no responsibility for inducing or persuading someone to commit the murder. Focusing on monetary payment as a special exception seems contrary to the Rothbardian view of contracts as mere title transfers (in which money is just one type of thing that can contractually be transferred), and also contrary to the Austrian view of the subjective nature of value (because people can be motivated by things other than title transfers; the end of action need not be obtaining ownership of something).

此外，为什么性的金钱支付属于特殊例外？其他类型的，如服务，或其他形式的引诱，如性承诺或获得教唆者的好感，又该如何呢？我们无法理解，为什么付钱给某人谋杀受害者，付钱人就要承担责任，而诱导或说服某人实施谋杀却完全没有责任。把金钱支付作为一个特殊的例外，似乎有悖于罗斯巴德关于仅仅是所有权转让的观点（其中金钱只是可以通过转让的一种物品），也有悖于奥派关于价值主观性的观点（因为人们的动机可以是所有权转让以外的东西；行动的目的不一定是获得某物的所有权）。

As for the former point: a contract is simply alienation to property: it is simply a property title transfer. It is not a “binding obligation.”39 Yet Block does seem to rely on the conventional view of contracts as “binding obligations” or promises, instead of as mere transfers of title to alienable owned resources (Rothbard’s view, which Block elsewhere seems to support), to support his ad hoc “incitement-by-monetarypayment” exception. As he writes:

However, if Van Dun paid me for this information, e.g., the hikers paid and therefore contractually obligated the local yokel to tell the truth, then we would have entirely a different matter. Then he would be guilty of a contract violation that resulted in death, a very serious matter indeed.40

至于前一点：只是财产的让渡：它只是财产所有权的转让。它不是 “有约束力的义务 “[357]。然而，布洛克似乎确实依赖于将视为 “有约束力的义务 “或承诺的传统观点，而不仅仅是对可让渡的拥有资源的所有权转让（罗斯巴德的观点，布洛克在其他地方似乎也支持这种观点），来支持他特设的 “货币支付煽动 “例外。他写道：

然而，如果冯·顿为此信息向我付费，例如，徒步旅行者付费了，因此根据有义务让当地土著说实话，那么我们就会面临完全不同的情况。那么他就会因违反导致死亡的而有罪，这确实是一件非常严重的事情。[358]

Block’s use of the language “contractually obligated” indicates he is not here viewing a contract as a mere transfer of ownership of a resource, but rather as some kind of promise giving rise to a legally-enforceable or binding obligation—contrary to the Rothbard-Evers title-transfer theory of contract.

布洛克使用了 “义务 “这一措辞，这表明他在这里并不是将仅仅视为资源所有权的转让，而是将其视为某种承诺，这种承诺会产生一种可依法强制执行或具有约束力的义务——这与罗斯巴德-埃弗斯（Rothbard-Evers）的——所有权转让理论恰恰相反。

As for the latter point: paying someone is simply one means of inducing them to do something—to obtain money that they subjectively value. They could be induced or persuaded by giving them other things they value, such as gratitude, or a service. Whether a woman pays a hitman money to kill her husband or persuades him to do so for sexual favors should not make a difference. To focus on the payment of money, or coercion, as exceptions, is simply ad hoc and also ignores the Rothbardian view of contracts, as well as the Austrian view of the subjective nature of value.41

至于后一点：付钱只是诱使某人做某事的一种手段——获得他们主观上看重的金钱。诱导或说服他们的方式还可以是给予他们其他他们看重的东西，比如感激或服务。一个女人是给杀手钱去杀她的丈夫，还是为了性利益而说服他去杀她的丈夫，这两者并没有什么区别。把支付金钱或胁迫作为例外情况，简直是临时起意，也忽视了罗斯巴德的观，以及奥派关于价值主观性的观点。[359]

As for Block’s view that an instigator can be liable for the intermediaries actions if he “orders” him, it is not clear what the rationale is, although Block’s comments suggest he means here an order coupled with a threat, in which case this exception collapses into the first.42 Why can’t the person who incites the mob be characterized as “ordering” them to lynch someone, if ordering does not require threats? If ordering does not require threats, then why would this reasoning not apply to an inciter?

至于布洛克认为，如果煽动者 “命令 “中间人行动，他就可以对中间人的行动承担责任，其理由是什么并不清楚，尽管布洛克的评论表明他在这里指的是命令加上威胁，在这种情况下，这种例外情况就会与第一种例外情况相抵触。[360]如果命令不需要威胁，为什么不能把煽动暴徒的人定性为 “命令 “他们对某人施以私刑？如果命令不需要威胁，那么为什么这个推理不适用于煽动者呢？

As for the final exception—liability in the case of being part of a criminal conspiracy—there is no definition provided and no clear explanation of why this makes one culpable.43 No reason is given as to why we can’t characterize the person inciting a lynch mob as being part of a criminal conspiracy with the lynchers.

至于最后的例外——作为犯罪共谋一部分的责任——没有给出定义，也没有清楚解释为什么这会使人有罪。[361] 也没有给出任何理由说明为什么我们不能将煽动私刑暴徒的人与私刑执行者描述为犯罪共谋的一部分。

As noted above with the Hitler example, even with these exceptions, many “instigators” would not technically be culpable for actions taken by their subordinates.44 Block attempts to find a way out of absolving a Hitler or other political leader, or mob boss, army general, and the like from liability for actions of their subordinates by simply assuming or positing that they are always, necessarily, threatening their subordinates, so that the first exception applies. As he writes:

[T]he libertarian legal code proscribes not only invasive acts, but also intimidation. Hitler, Stalin, et al. were not merely engaging in their free speech rights. Rather, they were issuing orders to their subordinates to maim and kill innocent people. Implicit in these commands was the threat that if they were not obeyed, those who failed to carry out these orders would be summarily dealt with.45

如上文希特勒的例子所述，即便有这些例外情况，许多“煽动者”在技术层面上也不应为其下属所采取的行动负责。[362]布洛克试图通过简单地假设或断定希特勒或其他政治领袖、黑帮头目、军队将领之类的人总是必然地威胁其下属，从而使第一个例外情况适用，来为他们免除对下属行为的责任寻找出路。正如他所写：

“自由意志主义的法律规范不仅禁止侵犯行为，还禁止恐吓行为。希特勒、斯大林等人不仅仅是在行使他们的言论自由权利。相反，他们向其下属下达残害和杀害无辜民众的命令。这些命令中暗含着一种威胁，即如果不服从命令，那些未能执行这些命令的人将被立即处置。” [363]

But this is simply a convenient, yet false, assumption. First, not every underling is literally threatened with physical punishment if he does not obey orders. Second, even if the underling is threatened, the threat does not necessarily come from the boss, but rather from others in the hierarchy or organization. Did Hitler literally, personally threaten any of his generals or subordinates himself? Did President Truman threaten his generals or, indirectly, the airmen who dropped nuclear bombs on Japan? Simply assuming every leader or boss is necessarily “threatening” the underlings is unrealistic and just too convenient of an assumption to let one wriggle out of the uncomfortable consequences of this ad hoc theorizing. (And, again, even when the underling is threatened, this still does not mean his actions were “determined”; he still has the same free will that a non-coerced intermediary has.) We would argue that the leaders in these social or institutional hierarchies are responsible for the crimes committed by subordinates, even if they don’t threaten them.

但这仅仅是一个方便却错误的假设。首先，并非每个下属在不服从命令时都会受到体罚的切实威胁。其次，即便下属受到威胁，这威胁也不一定来自上司，而可能来自层级或组织中的其他人。希特勒真的亲自威胁过他的将军或下属吗？杜鲁门总统威胁过他的将军，或者间接地威胁过向日本投放原子弹的飞行员吗？简单地假设每个领导或头目必然“威胁”下属是不切实际的，而且这只是一个过于方便的假设，让人能够逃避这种临时理论带来的令人不安的后果。（而且，再次强调，即便下属受到威胁，这也并不意味着他的行动是“被决定的”；他仍然拥有和未受胁迫的中间人相同的自由意志。）我们会认为，在这些社会或制度层级中的领导者应对下属所犯罪行负责，即便他们没有威胁下属。

In sum, it is a mistake to conclude that someone can be responsible for the actions of others only in the cases of the exceptions of coercion, monetary payment, orders + threats, or criminal conspiracy. It makes more sense to scrutinize actions in terms of the more generalizable praxeological means-end framework set forth above. This framework easily justifies all the “exceptions” noted above, and more. In each case, the malfeasor (wrongdoer) had a prohibited end in mind (some type of property invasion), and employs means that attain this end. The fact that the means in these examples were other people simply does not prevent the action from being classified as aggression.

总之，得出只有在胁迫、金钱支付、命令+威胁或犯罪共谋等例外情况下，某人才能对他人的行动负责的结论是错误的。从上述更具普遍性的人类行动学的手段-目的框架来审视行为更有意义。这个框架很容易为上述所有“例外”以及更多情况提供正当理由。在每种情况下，违法者（作恶者）心中都有一个被禁止的目的（某种类型的财产侵犯），并采用了实现这一目的的手段。在这些例子中，手段是其他人这一事实并不能阻止该行动归类为侵犯行动。

责任的固定份额与连带责任Fixed Pie of Responsibility and Joint and Several Liability

The reluctance to attribute responsibility to the instigator of a crime, unless one of the exceptions is met, may be due to confusion about the nature of responsibility for torts or crimes. First, as noted above, some believe that the intermediary or underling’s free will breaks the chain of causation so that the instigator is not liable. But since cooperative action (for good or evil) is possible, and humans can employ other humans as means to accomplish ends, this is not a tenable objection.

除非符合其中一种例外情况，否则不愿意将犯罪煽动者归责，这可能是由于对侵权或犯罪责任的性质存在混淆。首先，如上所述，有些人认为中间者或下属的自由意志会打破因果链，从而使煽动者无需承担责任。但由于合作行动（无论好坏）是可能的，并且人类可以利用其他人作为实现目的的手段，这并不是一个站得住脚的反对理由。

In addition, some libertarians seem to believe that holding the instigator or inciter liable would relieve the underling or henchman of responsibility, which they understandably oppose. We may refer to this as the “fixed pie of responsibility” fallacy. For example, libertarian author Jack Lloyd seems to implicitly adopt such reasoning; note the use of the word “rather” here: “In this Steel-Man-case scenario, Hitler would not be culpable for an initiation of force. Rather, the people who did the actual initiations and threats of force would be culpable.…”46 The word “rather” implies it has to be either Hitler, or his underlings, that is responsible. But why can’t it be both?

此外，一些自由意志主义者似乎认为，让煽动者或教唆者承担责任会减轻下属或走狗帮凶的责任，他们这种反对是可以理解地。我们可以将此称为“责任固定份额”的谬误。例如，自由主意志义作家杰克·劳埃德（Jack Lloyd）似乎含蓄地采用了这种推理；请注意这里使用的“而是”一词：“在这个强化后的情景中，希特勒对于武力的发起不应承担罪责。而是，实际发起武力和进行武力威胁的人应承担罪责。……” [364] “而是”这个词暗示要么是希特勒，要么是他的下属负责。但为什么不能两者都负有责任呢？

Block also seems to implicitly accept such an approach. He writes:

Van Dun tries to make an analogy between the triggerman and the bullet, on the one hand, and the inciter and the rioter, on the other. He argues that the gunman is really responsible for the murder, not the bullet that actually kills, because the former came first in the causal chain, and so was responsible for the effect of the latter. This conclusion is true enough. But then he maintains that precisely the same relationship obtains between the inciter and the rioter who murders. To do so, however, he would have to say that, after all, the inciter, too, is responsible for the murder, not the rioter who actually kills, because the former came first in the causal chain, and was thus responsible for the effect of the latter.

When put in this way, the problems with the analogy are apparent. First, no one in his right mind would hold the bullet guilty of anything. It is an inanimate object, for all of its destructive power. Yet, it would be the rare analyst, even one as intent upon incarcerating the inciter as is Van Dun, who would allow the rioter off scot-free, as he would the bullet. That is, no one would even think to “punish” the bullet for its evil deed.47

布洛克似乎也隐性地接受了这样一种方法。他写道：

冯·顿试图在一方面将枪手和子弹进行类比，另一方面将煽动者和暴徒进行类比。他认为，枪手实际上要对谋杀负责，而不是实际杀人的子弹，因为前者在因果链中处于首位，所以要对后者的效果负责。这个结论足够正确。但随后他坚称，煽动者和实施谋杀的暴徒之间恰恰存在着相同的关系。然而，要这样说的话，他就不得不说，毕竟，煽动者也要对谋杀负责，而不是实际杀人的暴徒，因为前者在因果链中处于首位，因此要对后者的效果负责。

以这种方式来看，这种类比的问题就很明显了。首先，头脑正常的人都不会认为子弹有任何罪过。尽管它具有破坏力，但它是一个无生命的物体。然而，即使是像冯·顿那样一心想要监禁煽动者的罕见分析家，也不会像放过子弹那样让暴徒逍遥法外。也就是说，甚至没有人会想到要因为子弹的恶行而“惩罚”它。[365]

Note the language “he would have to say that, after all, the inciter, too, is responsible for the murder, not the rioter who actually kills” (emphasis added) and the criticism that by holding the inciter responsible, the rioter would have to be let off “scot-free.” But there is no basis for this contention. Just because the inciter or instigator is culpable does not mean the rioter or underling is off the hook. It is perfectly possible to hold them both fully liable; this is what joint and several liability means.48

请注意“他就不得不说，毕竟，煽动者也要对谋杀负责，而不是实际杀人的暴徒”（重点为后加）这样的表述，以及那种认为让煽动者负责，暴徒就必须被无罪释放的批评。但这种论点没有依据。仅仅因为煽动者或教唆者有罪，并不意味着暴徒或下属就可以脱身。完全有可能让他们双方都承担全部责任；这就是连带责任的含义。[366]

With this “fixed pie of liability” assumption, some might object that each malfeasor is responsible only for his pro-rata “part” of the crime. Maybe the instigator is 60% responsible and the underling 40% responsible. And so on. These critics mistakenly assume that there is some fixed 100 percent bucket of liability for a crime, which cannot be shared jointly by multiple parties. They thus are leery of attributing some responsibility to the boss because they think that this would reduce the liability of the underling. But there is no conceptual problem with having multiple parties each fully liable for the same act of aggression, under the notion of joint and several liability. It is not clear why my opponents here do not realize that this doctrine can play a useful role as part of the analysis of collective action. As an example, suppose A and B jointly borrow money from C. If A is unable to pay his share later, it is not as if C can only pursue B for half the amount owed; he can pursue each debtor for 100% of the amount owed (barring contractual terms to the contrary).49

基于这种“固定责任份额”的假设，有些人可能会反对说，每个违法者只对其按比例的犯罪“部分”负责。也许煽动者承担 60%的责任，下属承担 40%的责任，等等。这些批评者错误地认为，对于一项犯罪存在某种固定的 100%的责任份额，不能由多方共同分担。因此，他们对将部分责任归于上司持谨慎态度，因为他们认为这会减轻下属的责任。但是，在连带责任的概念下，让多方对同一侵犯行动各自承担全部责任在概念上没有问题。不清楚为什么我的对手在这里没有意识到这一原则可以作为集体行动分析的一部分发挥有用的作用。例如，假设 A 和 B 共同向 C 借钱。如果 A 后来无法支付其份额，并不是说 C 只能向 B 追讨欠款的一半；他可以向每个债务人追讨欠款的 100%（除非条款另有规定）。[367]

Likewise, just as one criminal can harm multiple victims and be unable to be punished by, or render full restitution to, each victim—so multiple criminals can each be fully—jointly and severally—liable for the damage done to the victim. There is simply no reason to maintain that there is a finite “pie” of “criminal harm” that has to be distributed piecemeal to multiple criminals who collaborate to harm someone. It is the victim’s rights that matter most, not that of individual criminals.50 Suppose two criminals cooperate to rob someone of $10,000 worth of property and then they spend the money. Suppose they are later apprehended; the first is penniless and the second has assets. The second should be forced to pay the victim the full $10,000 owed,51 not only half on the grounds that his partner owes the other $5,000 to the victim. Why should the victim, as opposed to the bankrupt criminal’s partner in crime, be left holding the bag? Thus it is just to hold both the mob boss, and his henchman, fully liable and responsible for a murder committed by the henchman but ordered by the boss.

同样，正如一名罪犯可以伤害多名受害者，但却无法受到每名受害者的惩罚或向每名受害者提供全额赔偿一样，多名罪犯也可以各自对受害者受到的伤害承担全部连带责任。根本没有理由坚持认为存在一个有限的”犯罪伤害 “的 “份额 “，必须零散地分配给多个合伙伤害他人的罪犯。最重要的是受害者的权利，而不是个别罪犯的权利。[368] 假设两名罪犯合作抢劫了某人价值 1 万美元的财物，然后他们花掉了这笔钱。假设他们后来被抓获；前者身无分文，后者拥有财产。第二个人应该被强迫向受害者全额支付所欠的 10 000 美元，[369]而不是仅仅支付一半，理由是他的同伙欠受害者另外 5 000 美元。为什么要让受害者而不是破产罪犯的同伙来承担债务呢？因此，对于小喽啰所犯但由老大下令的谋杀案，让黑帮老大和他的小喽啰都承担全部责任是公正的。

“单纯的 “言论和因果关系“Mere” Speech and Causation

Related to the above-noted arguments is the notion that “mere” speech cannot be aggression since it does not actually invade others’ property borders. It is true that a speech act per se is not an act of aggression: it does not intentionally cause the person or property of another to be physically and nonconsensually infringed upon.52(Shooting a gun, orswinging your first, is also not per se an act of aggression!) But some speech acts can be classified as acts of aggression in the context in which they occur because they constitute the speaker’s use of means calculated to inflict intentional harm, and because of the social and institutional hierarchies involved. One clear example of this is threats of force. The threat to stab someone does not actually pierce the victim’s skin; it is a “mere” speech-act, but it is still regarded as aggression. Offering to pay money to someone to assassinate someone would be another example. But these are not mere ad hoc exceptions; they are the result of the application of the more general means-end analysis.53

与上述论点相关的观点是，”单纯的 “言论不能构成侵犯，因为它没有实际侵犯他人的财产边界。诚然，言论行动本身并不是侵犯行动：它并没有蓄意导致他人的人身或财产受到物理和非自愿的侵犯。[370]（开枪或挥舞你的拳头本身也不是侵犯行为！）。但是，有些言论行动在其发生的语境中可以被归类为侵犯行动，因为它们构成了说话者使用蓄意伤害的手段，而且还涉及社会和制度等级。武力威胁就是一个明显的例子。威胁刺伤某人实际上并没有刺破受害者的皮肤；这只是一种 “单纯的 “言论行动，但它仍被视为侵犯。另一个例子是付钱给某人去暗杀某人。但这些并非只是特殊的例外情况；它们是应用更一般的手段-目的分析的结果。[371]

In other cases, the act of speaking—communicating—and the other people with whom the speaker communicates serve as one’s means to achieve a certain end. The firing squad commander who yells “Fire!” is as responsible for the ensuing execution as the riflemen themselves.54 This is not because his spoken word was physically the cause of the victim’s death. His voice did not propel the bullets forward—and it did not have to. Instead, the firing squad commander is responsible for the execution because of what the command “Fire!” signifies in the context and social hierarchy in which it was uttered; it signifies that the commander intends for the victim to die and is choosing to employ efficacious means— his firing squad—calculated to achieve that goal. The firing squad commander isn’t “merely” speaking; he is intentionally colluding with the shooters for the purpose of killing the victim. Likewise the American president who orders a bomb be dropped is causing the bombing; he is employing the pilot and other underlings as his means. By being part of a certain organization or hierarchy and having certain relationships with other people, as a practical matter he is in a position to use other people to achieve his ends.55

在其他情况下，言论行动——交流——以及说话者与之交流的其他人，都是一个人达到某种目的的手段。行刑队指挥官大喊一声 “开火！”，与步枪手本身一样要对随后的处决负责。[372]这并不是因为他所说的话是造成受害者死亡的实际原因。他的声音并没有推动子弹向前——其实也不必如此。相反，行刑队指挥官要对行刑负责，因为 “开火！”的命令在当时的语境和社会等级中是有含义的；它意味着指挥官打算让受害者死亡，并选择使用有效的手段——他的行刑队——来实现这一目标。行刑队指挥官并不 “仅仅 “是在说话，他是有意与枪手勾结，以达到杀死受害者的目的。同样，下令投掷炸弹的美国总统也是造成爆炸的原因；他雇用飞行员和其他下属作为他的手段。由于他是某个组织或等级制度的一部分，与其他人有一定的关系，因此实际上他可以利用其他人来达到自己的目的。[373]

Consider the car-bomb scenario discussed above. When A persuades C to plant the bomb, his words do not physically cause B’s car to explode. And they do not even physically cause C to plant the bomb—C voluntarily chooses to do so. The fact that C’s action was voluntary, however, does not mean that A’s action—persuading someone to plant a car-bomb—cannot itself be considered aggression. To the contrary, A is an aggressor because his actions demonstrated the intent to kill B and the use of means calculated to do just that. So what if his chosen means included another person and his intervening will?

请看上文讨论的汽车炸弹情景。当 A 说服 C 安放炸弹时，他的话并没有实际导致 B 的汽车爆炸。而且，这些话甚至也没有实际导致 C 安放炸弹——C 是自愿选择这么做的。然而，C 的行动是自愿的这一事实并不意味着 A 的行动——劝说他人安装汽车炸弹——本身不能被视为侵犯。恰恰相反，A 是一个侵害者，因为他的行动表明他有杀害 B 的意图，并使用了蓄谋已久的手段。那么，如果他选择的手段包括另一个人和他的介入意愿呢？

Let us return to the incitement example. In order to determine whether the inciter is responsible, we ask whether the inciter used the mob as his means to attain the violent acts committed by the rioting mob. For the inciter’s action to be considered aggression, he would have to intend the prohibited result; and he would have to have chosen means that resulted in the rioting. We do not maintain that the inciter is necessarily responsible in every case; the question turns on many specific facts and the context. What we maintain is that the inciter is not off the hook merely because the rioters had free will. The question to be answered is: was the mob the means of the inciter? Was the inciter a cause of the mob rioting, or of their ensuing havoc?

让我们回到煽动的例子。为了确定煽动者是否负有责任，我们要问煽动者是否利用暴徒作为他的手段，以达到暴徒实施暴力行动的目的。要将煽动者的行动视为侵犯，他就必须有意造成被禁止的结果；而且他必须选择导致暴乱的手段。我们并不认为煽动者在任何情况下都必须承担责任；这个问题取决于许多具体的事实和背景。我们主张，煽动者不能仅仅因为暴乱者有自由意志而不承担责任。需要回答的问题是：暴徒是煽动者的手段吗？煽动者是暴徒暴动的原因，还是他们随后的破坏的原因？

As Van Dun keenly observes:

Who should take credit for the poem: the blind poet, or his girlfriend who lovingly typed the manuscript (which she could have refused to do)? And if the blind poet really is the author of the poem, why should the rabble-rousing demagogue not be the author of the riots he incites?

Why should we require libertarian judges to turn a blind eye to real processes of “social causation” when we know that advertisers, educators, politicians, and agitators are very much aware of them—and willing to use them for their purposes? It is not just in a libertarian world that each person is responsible for his own acts; it is true in every world. However, we should not take that as an excuse for disregarding the complex causal processes that go on in the real world, whatever legal code is in force. A libertarian judge has to confront the facts. Reality does not yield to theory. It is all right for a judge to remind a man charged with participating in a violent mob that he is responsible for his own actions, but only after he has determined what the man’s own actions—not merely his bodily movements—really were. If the man was forced (coerced, compelled) by another to participate, we have one sort of case. If he got paid to smash windows, we have another sort of case. If he was manipulated in any other way, surely we cannot just pretend that then everything was the same as if he was not manipulated in any way—and treat the manipulator as if he was just an innocent bystander.56

正如冯·顿敏锐地观察到的：

这首诗应该归功于谁：是盲人诗人，她很有爱心地打印了这首诗的手稿(她本可以拒绝这么做)？如果盲诗人真的是这首诗的作者，那么为什么煽动暴乱的蛊惑者就不是他所煽动的暴乱的始作俑者呢？

既然我们知道广告商、教育家、政客和煽动者都非常清楚 “社会因果关系 “的真实过程，而且愿意利用这些过程达到自己的目的，为什么我们还要要求自由意志主义的法官对这些过程视而不见呢？不只是在自由意志主义的世界里，每个人都要为自己的行动负责；在任何世界里都是如此。然而，我们不应以此为借口，无视现实世界中复杂的因果过程，无论现行法律规范如何。自由意志主义的法官必须直面事实。现实不会屈服于理论。法官可以提醒一名被控参与暴徒的暴力行动的人，他要为自己的行动负责，但前提是他必须确定该男子自己的行动——而不仅仅是他的身体动作——到底是什么。如果这个人是被他人强迫（胁迫、强制）参与的，这是一种情况。如果他拿了报酬之后砸窗，那就是另一种情况。如果他被人以其他方式操纵，我们当然不能假装一切都是一样的，好像他没有被任何方式操纵，把操纵者当作一个无辜的旁观者。[374]

The same question is asked in a variety of situations: did the general kill people, using his troops as means to this end? Did the manager use his employee as a means to attain some end? Did the wife kill her husband by using her lover (or a hired hit-man) as the means to attain this goal? If someone votes in favor of socialism (or speaks out in favor of it), are they a cause of the ensuing acts of aggression by state agents? If a witness lies on the witness stand, resulting in a criminal defendant wrongly being imprisoned, has he caused harm to the defendant, through means of jurors, jailers, and the judicial system?57 In other words, was the first party a cause of the result that was actually committed by an intermediate person?

在各种情况下都会提出同样的问题：将军是否利用他的部队作为手段达到杀人的目的？经理是否利用他的雇员作为达到某种目的的手段？妻子是否利用情人（或雇佣的杀手）作为手段达到杀害他的丈夫这一目的？如果有人投票支持社会主义（或发表支持社会主义的言论），他们是否是随之而来的国家机构实施侵犯行动的原因？如果证人在证人席上撒谎，导致刑事被告被错误监禁，那么他是否通过陪审员、狱卒和司法系统作为手段对被告造成了伤害？ [375]换句话说，第一方当事人是否是中间人实际造成结果的原因？

Although there will be easy cases, we do not suggest that merely formulating the issue in this manner makes the correct answer easy to find in every situation. Such questions must take into account relevant facts and the context, custom, social hierarchies and realities, and depend on the sense of justice of the judge or jury—of the community. Looking at actions from the praxeological point of view, however, helps us look in the right place and ask the right questions. No doubt, in cases where the intermediate actor is coerced, or paid, by the first party, it is easier to see that the first party is the cause of the threatened or remunerated action.58 But it is simply arbitrary to restrict cause to cases where the intermediate actor is threatened, or paid cash.

尽管会有一些简单的案例，但我们并不是说，仅仅以这种方式提出问题，就能在任何情况下都很容易找到正确的答案。这类问题必须考虑到相关事实和背景、习俗、社会等级和现实，并取决于法官或陪审团的正义感——社会的正义感。然而，从行动学的角度来审视行动，有助于我们找对地方，提出正确的问题。毫无疑问，在中间行动者受到第一方胁迫或被第一方付钱的情况下，更容易看出第一方是中间行动者受威胁或有偿行动的原因。[376] 但将原因仅仅局限于中间行动者受到威胁或获得现金报酬的情况，这无疑是武断的。

事实原因、近因和行动CAUSE-IN-FACT, PROXIMATE CAUSE, AND ACTION

Before turning to Reinach’s views on causation, a brief discussion of the contrast between conventional legal theories and that laid out here is in order. In general, in the common law, to be responsible, an actor needs to be both the cause-in-fact (or “but-for” cause) of a prohibited result, and also the “proximate” (or “legal”) cause (referred to as “culpability” in continental legal systems).59 Both need to be satisfied. One is a causein-fact of a result if “but for” the person’s actions, the result would not have occurred. There are various tests for proximate cause, but basically the idea is that the results had to be intended, or somewhat foreseeable to the actor, and not too “remote” (hence “proximate,” meaning near or close) from the person’s action. It is sometimes said that the result had to follow as a natural, direct, and immediate consequence of the action, with no “intervening cause” breaking the connection between the action and the result. For example, a murderer’s mother is a causein-fact of the murders he commits, for without her actions (giving birth to him) the murders would not have been committed. Yet she is not a proximate cause of the murders and therefore not responsible.

在讨论赖纳赫（Reinach）关于因果关系的观点之前，有必要简要讨论一下传统法律理论与本文所阐述的法律理论之间的对比。一般来说，在普通法中，要承担责任，行动人既要成为被禁止结果的事实原因（或 “若非 “原因），又要成为 “近因”（或 “法定 “原因）（在大陆法系中称为 “罪责”）。[377]此两个条件皆需满足。如果 “若非 “某人的行动，结果就不会发生，那么该人就是结果的事实原因。关于近因的检验标准有多种，但基本的观点是，结果必须是行动人有意为之或在某种程度上可以预见的，并且与行动人的行动不太 “遥远”（因此是 “近因”，意为靠近或接近）。有时也有人说，结果必须是行动的自然、直接和即时的后果，没有 “介入原因 “打破行动与结果之间的联系。例如，杀人犯的母亲是他所犯谋杀罪的事实原因，因为如果没有她的行动（生下他），谋杀就不会发生。然而，她并不是谋杀的近因，因此不承担责任。

In our case, when we ask if someone was the cause of a certain aggression, we are asking whether the actor did choose and employ means to attain the prohibited result. For there to be “cause” in this sense, obviously there has to be cause-in-fact or “but-for” causation— this is implied by the notion of the means employed “attaining” or resulting in the actor’s end. Intentionality is also a factor, because action has to be intentional to be an action (the means is chosen and employed intentionally; the actor intends to achieve a given end).60

在我们的案例中，当我们问某人是否是某种侵犯的原因时，我们是在问行动人是否确实选择和使用了手段来达到被禁止的结果。显然，要有这种意义上的 “原因”，就必须有事实上的原因或 “若非 “的因果关系——所使用的手段 “达到 “或导致行动人的目的这一概念就隐含了这一点。意图也是一个因素，因为行动必须是有意图的才是行动（手段是有意地选择和使用的；行动者意图达到特定目的）。[378]

赖纳赫与因果关系REINACH AND CAUSATION

Reinach provides a framework for the analysis of legal causation which, although it employs different terminology, is largely compatible with the Austrian-praxeological view presented above.61 Reinach states:

Every action which is a condition for an outcome is, in relation to the intentional crime, a cause of this outcome in the sense of the criminal law. … Disregarding exceptional cases of the law, the characterized principle is fully valid. It is then also to be said: if the action is a sound [zurechnungsfähigen] condition of an unlawful outcome, and if an intention is also given in relation to this outcome, then the agent is customarily punished. … That an outcome is brought about means that it is brought about by an action which sets a condition for the outcome; to bring about intentionally means to bring about via an action that sets a condition. The latter condition brings about the outcome. Intention is a striving for an outcome via an action, or mediated by an action. This outcome itself can of course be a means to another outcome. The death of a human being can be striven for in order to obtain the things left behind which the murderer subsequently is entitled to. But the outcome is “striven” for, also when it is not a final goal, but in that case is “striven” for as a means towards a final goal. There are however several kinds of strivings: one can hope for, desire [ersehnen], or fear for [befürchten] a result. These are all “strivings” for a result, but not a striving in our sense. It is a striving “in relation to that to which it is applied”; for us it is a matter of striving for an outcome with the awareness that something can be contributed [such as to control] to its occurrence. Such a striving is called an act of will [Wollen]. To cause something intentionally means to set a condition for an outcome through a voluntary action such that this condition of course in combination with other conditions brings about the outcome.… Intention is to will an outcome.62

赖纳赫提供了一个分析法律因果关系的框架，虽然使用了不同的术语，但在很大程度上与上文介绍的奥派行动学的观点是一致的。[379]赖纳赫指出：

每一个行动作为结果的条件，就故意犯罪而言，都是刑法意义上导致结果的原因。…… 撇开法律的例外情况不谈，定性原则是完全有效的。因此，也可以说：如果行动是非法结果的合理[zurechnungsfähigen]条件，如果也有与这一结果有关的意图，那么行动人通常会受到惩罚。…… 结果的产生是指通过为结果设定条件的行动而产生；有意的产生是指通过设定条件的行动而产生。后一个条件带来了结果。意图是通过行动或以行动为中介来争取一种结果。当然，这种结果本身可以是实现另一种结果的手段。一个人的死亡可能是为了获得凶手随后有权获得的遗留物。但是，当结果不是最终目标时，它也是 “努力争取 “到的，但在这种情况下，它是作为实现最终目标的手段而 “努力争取 “到的。不过，”努力争取 “也有几种：人们可以希望、渴望[ersehnen]或担心[befürchten]某个结果。这些都是对结果的 “努力争取”，但不是我们意义上的努力。它是一种 “与它所适用的事物相关 “的努力；对我们来说，它是一种努力争取结果的行动，同时意识到可以为结果的发生做出一些贡献[如控制]。这种努力被称为意志行动[沃伦]。有意造成某事是指通过自愿行动为结果设定条件，使这一条件当然与其他条件相结合，从而带来结果….，意图就是对结果的意愿。[380]

This analysis is strikingly compatible with the Austrian understanding of action. Reinach’s use of “cause” and “condition” is similar to the proximate cause and “cause-in-fact” test discussed above. Reinach maintains that an action that intends the outcome to occur (i.e., desires a given end or goal), and “causes” this outcome to occur by an action (i.e., employs a means to attain this goal), then the actor should be punished for the action, which is a crime.

这一分析与奥派对行动的理解惊人地一致。赖纳赫对 “原因 “和 “条件 “的使用类似于上文讨论的近因和 “事实原因 “检验。赖纳赫主张，一个行动如果意图发生结果（即渴望达到某一特定的目的或目标），并通过行动 “造成 “了这一结果的发生（即采用某种手段达到这一目标），那么行动人就应该因这一行动而受到惩罚，这一行动就是犯罪。

Using Reinach’s causal analysis, one would, as in the analysis presented above, not necessarily absolve someone of responsibility simply because another human is used to help “cause” the unlawful end. Reinach’s paper is full of interesting and illuminating examples and applications of causation framework. In one colorful example, A sends B into a forest in the hopes that he will be struck by lightning.63 Reinach contrasts this case with one in which A is able to calculate precisely where and when a tree will be struck by lightning, and, with malicious intent, sends B to be at the fateful place where lightning strikes. In both cases, Reinach argues, A is the “cause” (our “cause-in-fact”) of B’s death, since B’s death would not have occurred but for A’s having sent him into the forest. Nevertheless, Reinach concludes that A may be punished only in the second case and not in the first. The difference hinges upon A’s intent. In the first case, A hoped for B to die, but it was simply wishful thinking: he had no control over the lightning, and no knowledge of any objective likelihood that it would strike where it did.

使用赖纳赫的因果分析法，人们就会像上述分析一样，并非仅仅因为利用了另一人帮助 “造成 “了非法结局，就可以免除某人的责任。赖纳赫的论文中充满了有趣而富有启发性的例子，以及因果关系框架的应用。有一个生动的例子，A 将 B 送入森林，希望他被闪电击中。[381]赖纳赫将这一案例与以下案例进行了对比：A 能够精确计算出何时何地一棵树会被闪电击中，并怀着恶意将 B 送到会被闪电击中的致命地点。赖纳赫认为，在这两种情况下，A都是B死亡的 “原因”（我们的 “事实原因”），因为如果不是A派B进入森林，B就不会死亡。然而，赖纳赫的结论是，只有在第二种情况下，A才应该受到惩罚，而在第一种情况下则不应该。区别在于A的意图。在第一种情况下，A希望B去死，但这只是他一厢情愿的想法：他无法控制闪电，也不知道闪电击中目标的客观可能性。

In praxeological terms, A’s action in the first case cannot be construed as “killing” B, because he did not really intend B to die and did not employ any means expected to attain such a goal, any more than a rain dance causes it to rain or sticking pins in a voodoo doll harms the “victim.” A’s action is not calculated to cause harm to B; in fact, A does not expect and has no reason to expect that B will die as a result of going into the forest. As Reinach puts it, “the intention fails if the outcome is only hoped for, but the intention is present if it is expected with certainty.”64 Thus the praxeological view and Reinach’s framework are consistent in this case.

从行动学的角度来看，A在第一种情况下的行动不能被解释为 “杀死 “B，因为他并没有真正想要B死，也没有采用任何预期达到这一目的的手段，就像祈雨舞会导致下雨或在巫毒娃娃上插针会伤害 “受害者 “一样。A的行动并不是蓄意要对B造成伤害；事实上，A并不指望也没有理由指望B会因为进入森林而死亡。正如赖纳赫所说，”如果结果只是希望的，那么意图就失败了，但如果结果是确定预期的，那么意图就存在 “。[382]因此，在这个案例中，行动学的观点和赖纳赫的框架是一致的。

In the second case, A has more than an empty wish: he has certain knowledge that sending B into the forest will result in B’s being struck by lightning. Here Reinach finds A to have the intent necessary to be held responsible for B’s death. Likewise, praxeologically, A’s action now becomes more than simply “dispatching B into the forest.” With the knowledge that sending B into the forest will cause his death, A’s action rises to the level of “intentionally killing B.” This is because, if A knows for certain that sending B into the forest will result in B’s death by lightning, then A has the requisite intent to attain the goal of B’s death, and his action employs means (namely, sending B into the forest) that do attain this goal.

在第二种情况下，A 不仅仅是空想：他肯定知道把 B 送进森林会导致 B 被闪电击中。在这里，赖纳赫认为A具有对B的死亡负责的必要意图。同样，行动学认为，A 的行动现在已不仅仅是 “将 B 送入森林 “那么简单了。在知道将 B 送入森林会导致其死亡的情况下，A 的行动上升到了 “有意地杀害 B “的程度。这是因为，如果A确知将B送入森林会导致B被雷电击毙，那么A就具有实现B死亡这一目标的必要意图，而他的行动所采用的手段（即将B送入森林）也确实达到了这一目标。

This example can be a useful tool for separating criminal aggressors from their noncriminal sympathizers. Earlier we pointed out that the rule that allows one person to be responsible for another person’s aggressive actions is a general one that must be applied cautiously and on a case-bycase basis, taking context and circumstances into account. The lightning example can help clarify our intuitions about which actions are aggressive and which are not. It is aggression when one person intentionally uses another as a means to cause an unwanted property violation; it is not aggression when one person merely hopes for a property violation to occur but does not intentionally use means to accomplish it. The Israeli government, for example, recently assassinated Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin.65

这个例子可以成为有用的工具将犯罪侵害者与其非犯罪同情者区分开来。前面我们指出，考虑一个人为另一个人的侵犯行动负责的规则是一个一般性的规则，必须根据个案的具体情况，结合背景和环境谨慎适用。闪电的例子可以帮助我们澄清直觉，哪些行动是侵犯性的，而哪些行动不是。如果一个人有意地利用另一个人作为手段，造成不必要的财产侵占，这就是侵犯；如果一个人只是希望发生财产侵占，却并未有意地使用手段来达到目的，这就不是侵犯。例如，以色列政府最近暗杀了哈马斯创始人谢赫-艾哈迈德-亚辛（Sheik Ahmed Yassin）。[383]

Putting aside the question of whether Yassin was an innocent victim or a deserving target, we can surely acknowledge that there are many people—especially in the United States and Israel—who wanted to see Yassin killed. But only a very small number of these people intended to kill Yassin themselves or to assist his killers in any way. The lesson of Reinach’s lightning example is that the people who simply hoped that Yassin would die, or who rejoiced when he was killed, are not responsible for his killing. They gave his killers silent support and sympathy, but they did not intentionally act with the purpose of killing him. The team of assassins themselves, and the Israeli government that sponsored them, are responsible for the killing, but not the citizens who opinion polls show approve of the assassination.

姑且不论亚辛是无辜的受害者还是理应成为攻击目标，我们无疑可以承认，有许多人——尤其是在美国和以色列——希望看到亚辛被杀。但这些人中只有极少数人打算亲手杀死亚辛或以任何方式协助凶手。赖纳赫所举闪电的事例给我们的启示是，那些只是希望亚辛死，或者在他被杀时欢欣鼓舞的人，并不应对亚辛被杀负责。他们给予了凶手无声的支持和同情，但他们并为杀害亚辛这个目的采取有意的行动。暗杀小组本身以及支持他们的以色列政府要对这起杀人事件负责，而不是那些民意调查显示赞成暗杀的公民。

This result is compatible with the framework advocated herein. The subtle insights, analysis, and examples provided in Reinach’s century-old paper are clearly still useful in constructing a praxeologically sound theory of legal causation today.66

这一结果与本文所倡导的框架是一致的。赖纳赫这篇百年前的论文中所提供的精妙见解、分析和例子，对于今天构建一个行动学上健全的法律因果关系理论明显依然有用。[384]

A Libertarian Theory of Contract:Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability

第九章自由意志主义的理论：所有权转让、具有约束力的承诺和不可让渡性

While in law school in Louisiana (the only civil law state in the US), I was introduced to the Roman and civil law* and also to contract law and theory.

It was during my first-year contracts class, in 1988, that I conceived of my “estoppel” based theory of rights.† I also became interested in the Rothbard-Evers title-transfer theory of contract.†† I presented a paper on this topic in 1999, integrating the views of Rothbard and Evers with various concepts from the civil law and the common law.§ I later published an article on this in the Journal of Libertarian Studies, upon which this chapter is based.**

在路易斯安那州（美国唯一的大陆法系州）就读法学院期间，我开始接触罗马法和大陆法*，以及法和理论。

正是在 1988 年的第一年法的课堂上，我构想了基于 “禁止反悔 “的权利理论。† 我还对罗斯巴德-埃弗斯（Rothbard-Evers）的所有权转让理论产生了兴趣。†† 1999 年，我就这一主题发表了一篇论文，将罗斯巴德和埃弗斯的观点与大陆法和普通法的各种概念融为一体。§ 后来，我在《自由意志主义研究期刊》上发表了一篇文章，本章就是在此基础上撰写的。**

Introduction 204
1. Property and Contract 204
2. Overview of Contract 207
3. Speech, Promises, and

Libertarianism 210

Consideration 212
Promissory Estoppel and

Detrimental Reliance 214

The Title-Transfer Theory

of Contract 216

Evers-Rothbard Title-Transfer

Theory 216

Conditional Transfers of Title 218
Enforcement of Promises 221

Clarifications and Applications 224
1. Transfer of Title to Homesteaded Resources 224
2. Property in the Body 228
3. Rothbard on Inalienability 229
  1. Addendum: Rothbard’s

Mistake? 232

Theft and Debtors’ Prison 233
Fraud 236

Conclusion 239

* Discussed in “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13).

* 在《自由社会中的立法与法律发现》（第 13 章）中讨论。

† See “How I Became a Libertarian” (ch. 1), n.6 and accompanying text; “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5).

† 见《我如何成为一名自由意志主义者》（第 1 章），注释 6 及相关文本；《自由意志主义的惩罚与权利理论》（第 5 章）

†† See Murray N. Rothbard, “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts,” in The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998; https://mises.org/library/property- rights-and-theory-contracts); and Williamson M. Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts,” J. Libertarian Stud. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1977; https://mises.org/library/toward-reformulation-law-contracts): 3–13. See also Kinsella, “Justice and Property Rights: Rothbard on Scarcity, Property, Contracts…,” The Libertarian Standard (Nov. 19, 2010), discussing the origins of the Rothbard-Evers contract theory.

†† 见默里·N·罗斯巴德（Murray N. Rothbard），《财产权与理论》，收录于《自由的伦理》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1998 年；https://mises.org/library/property-rights-and-the-theory-contracts）；以及威廉姆森·M·埃弗斯（Williamson M. Evers），《重建法》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 1 卷，第 1 期（1977 年冬季；https://mises.org/library/toward-reformulation-law-contracts）：3-13 页。另见金塞拉（Kinsella），《正义与财产权：罗斯巴德论稀缺、财产、……》，《自由意志主义标准》（2010 年 11 月 19 日），讨论了罗斯巴德-埃弗斯理论的起源。

Stephan Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Contracts,” Austrian Scholars Conference, Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala. (April 17, 1999); also idem, “The Theory of Contracts,” Rothbard Graduate Seminar, Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala. ( July 28–Aug. 2, 2002; https:// perma.cc/RQ5Z-S2GE).
斯蒂芬·金塞拉（Stephan Kinsella），《自由意志主义的理论》，奥地利学派学者会议，米塞斯研究院，阿拉巴马州奥本（1999 年 4 月 17 日）；以及同上，《理论》，罗斯巴德研究生研讨会，米塞斯研究院，阿拉巴马州奥本（2002 年 7 月 28 日至 8 月 2 日；https:// perma.cc/RQ5Z-S2GE）。

** Stephan Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Contracts: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability,” J. Libertarian Stud. 17, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 11–37. Related articles or discussions published after the original article include “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11); and various Kinsella on Liberty Podcast episodes, e.g.: “KOL225 | Reflections on the Theory of Contract (PFS 2017)” (Sep. 17, 2017); “KOL197 | Tom Woods Show: The Central Rothbard Contribution I Overlooked, and Why It Matters: The Rothbard-Evers Title-Transfer Theory of Contract” (Dec. 3, 2015); “KOL146 | Interview of Williamson Evers on the Title-Transfer Theory of Contract” (Aug. 5, 2014); “KOL020 | “Libertarian Legal Theory: Property, Conflict, and Society: Lecture 3: Applications I: Legal Systems, Contract, Fraud” (Mises Academy, 2011)” (Feb. 21, 2013).

** 斯蒂芬·金塞拉（Stephan Kinsella），《自由意志主义的理论：所有权转让、有约束力的承诺和不可让渡性》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 17 卷，第 2 期（2003 年春季）：11-37 页。原始文章发表后的相关文章或讨论包括《并不意味着所有权，反之亦然：一个剖析》（第 11 章）；以及各种金塞拉的自由播客剧集，例如：“KOL225 | 对理论的思考（PFS 2017）”（2017 年 9 月 17 日）；“KOL197 | 汤姆·伍兹秀：我忽视的罗斯巴德的核心贡献，以及其重要性：罗斯巴德-埃弗斯的所有权转让理论”（2015 年 12 月 3 日）；“KOL146 | 对威廉姆森·埃弗斯关于所有权转让理论的访谈”（2014 年 8 月 5 日）；“KOL020 | “自由意志主义的法律理论：财产、冲突和社会：讲座 3：应用 I：法律制度、、欺诈”（米塞斯学院，2011 年）”（2013 年 2 月 21 日）。

I. 简介INTRODUCTION

A. 财产和Property and Contract

A system of property rights specifies how to determine which individuals own—have the right to control—particular scarce resources. By having a just, objective rule for allocating control of scare resources to particular owners, resource use conflicts may be reduced. Nonowners can simply refrain from invading the borders of the owned resources—that is, avoid using the thing without the owner’s consent.1 Using a property rights scheme, it is at least possible for conflict to be avoided or reduced. This is the very purpose and function of property rights: to respond to the practical problem of conflict in a world of multiple actors.2

财产权制度规定了如何确定哪些人拥有——有权控制——特定的稀缺资源。通过一个公正、客观的规则，将稀缺资源的控制权分配给特定的所有者，可以减少资源使用方面的冲突。非所有者只需避免侵犯所拥有资源的边界，即避免在未经所有者同意的情况下使用资源。[385] 利用财产权制度，至少有可能避免或减少冲突。这正是财产权的目的和功能所在：在一个存在多个行动人的世界中解决冲突这一实际问题。[386]

Under the libertarian approach, people are self-owners, that is, they own their bodies. As for external resources, that is, previously-unowned conflictable resources, the first to use an unowned scarce resource— the homesteader—becomes its owner.3 This is called original appropriation or, sometimes, usually in the case of real (immovable) property,homesteading. The first possessor has better title in the resource than any possible challenger, who is always, with respect to him, a latecomer.4

根据自由意志主义的观点，人们是自我所有者，即他们拥有自己的身体。至于外部资源，即先前无主的冲突性资源，最先使用无主的稀缺资源的人——拓殖者——成为其所有者。 [387]这就是所谓的先占，有时，通常是指不动产（不可移动的财产）的拓殖。与任何可能的挑战者相比，第一个占有者对资源拥有更合理的所有权，而挑战者对他来说总是一个后来者。[388]

But property rights are not only acquired; they may be lost or transferred to others. For example, the owner may abandon the thing so that it once more becomes unowned and available for appropriation by a new homesteader. Likewise, the owner may give or sell the resource to another. The owner might also commit a crime or tort,thereby forfeiting his rights to the resource, in favor of the victim.5

但财产权不仅是获得的，也可能丧失或转让给他人。例如，所有者可以放弃该物，使其再次成为无主物，供新的拓殖者占有。同样，所有者也可以将资源赠与或出售给他人。所有者也可能实施犯罪或侵权行为，从而丧失对资源的权利，让受害者受益。[389]

Property theory concerns not only the initial acquisition of propertyrights in conflictable resources, but also their loss and transfer. Tort and punishment theory, as subsets of general property theory, describe how acts of aggression or negligence change ownership rights to scarce resources.6 Contract theory specifies how rights are transferred as the result of voluntary agreement between the owner and others. While some voluntary agreements are said to be “enforceable,” others are not. The question for libertarians concerns when and why agreements are legally enforceable. In other words, how are (property) rights voluntarily (consensually) transferred?

财产理论不仅涉及冲突性资源财产权的初始获取，还涉及财产权的丧失和转让。侵权理论和惩罚理论作为一般财产理论的子集，描述了侵犯或疏忽行为如何改变稀缺资源的所有权。[390] 理论说明了权利是如何在所有者与他人自愿协议的基础上发生转让的。虽然有些自愿协议被认为是“可执行的”，但其它的则不能。自由意志主义的问题在于，协议何时以及为何可依法强制执行。换句话说，（财产）权利是如何自愿（一致同意地）转让的？

B. 概述Overview of Contract

Contracts are used in exchange—from simple barter to complex exchanges such as loans and employment contracts. In economics, exchange has to do with the motivations of the actor and his view of opportunity costs. In the positive law, in both the common law and civil law, a contract is seen a relation between two or more parties which includes legally enforceable obligations between them.

用于交换——从简单的以物易物到复杂的交换，如贷款和雇佣。在经济学中，交换与行动人的动机及其对机会成本的看法有关。在实在法中，无论是普通法还是大陆法，都被视为两个或两个以上当事人之间的关系，其中包括他们之间在法律上可强制执行的义务。

Contracts result from agreement or promises between the parties, e.g., one party promises to another to do (or not do) something, or to give some (owned or ownable) thing to the other party. The promise may be made in exchange for things given or promised by the second party. The promises may be future-oriented and based on certain conditions. Agreements may be simple or complex; contemporaneous or future-oriented; unilateral donations or bilateral and reciprocal.

源于当事人之间的协议或承诺，例如，一方向另一方承诺做（或不做）某事，或给予另一方某些（拥有或可拥有的）东西。承诺可能是为了换取第二方给予或承诺的东西。承诺可能是面向未来的，并基于某些条件。协议可以是简单的，也可以是复杂的；可以是当时的，也可以是未来的；可以是单边捐赠，也可以是双边互惠的。

Not all agreements or promises result in a binding contract or legally enforceableobligations. Only those meeting certain criteria are, depending on the legal system.7 For example, in the common law, there must be consideration; in the civil law, there must be cause. The parties must have capacity. And so on. If the promises or agreement made results in a contract, the force of law can be brought to bear to enforce the contract—the agreement may be “enforced.” In modern legal systems, when one party breaches the contract (fails to render the agreed-upon performance), the other party may sue to have appropriate “remedies” awarded. The remedies usually include an award of money, called damages.

并非所有的协议或承诺都会形成具有约束力的或可依法强制执行的义务。根据不同的法律体系，只有符合特定标准的协议或承诺才具有约束力。[391]例如，在普通法中，必须有对价；在大陆法系中，必须有原因。当事人必须具备行为能力。等等。如果做出的承诺或达成的协议形成了，就可以利用法律的力量来强制执行——协议可以 “强制执行”。在现代法律体系中，当一方违约（未能履行约定的义务）时，另一方可以提起诉讼，要求给予适当的 “补救”。补救措施通常包括金钱赔偿，即损害赔偿。

Under the positive law, contractual obligations may be classified as obligations to do, not to do, or to give.8 An obligation to give may be viewed as a transfer of title to property, as it is an obligation to give ownership of a thing to another. An obligation to do is an obligation to perform a specific action, such as an obligation to sing at a wedding or paint someone’s house. It is significant for our purposes that courts usually will not order specific performance (forcing the breaching or unwilling party to perform the contract), on thegrounds that the plaintiff can usually be adequately compensated with money damages.9 Further, money damages do not impose a heavy burden on the court to supervise performance, while specific performance would. Specific performance would often be counterproductive. Consider a singer who refuses to perform a promised contract, for example. If ordered to perform, the singer might well give a shabby performance. For these and other reasons, in such cases, the singer would be ordered to pay monetary damages to the other party instead of ordered to sing.

根据实在法，义务可分为 “做 “的义务、”不做 “的义务或 “给予 “的义务。[392] 给予义务可被视为财产所有权的转让，因为它是将某物的所有权给予他人的义务。履行义务是指履行特定行动的义务，如在婚礼上唱歌或粉刷某人房屋的义务。对于我们的目的来说，重要的是法院通常不会命令具体履行（强迫违约方或不愿意履行的一方），理由是原告通常可以通过金钱赔偿得到充分补偿。[393]此外，金钱赔偿不会给法院带来监督履约的沉重负担，而具体履约则会。具体履约往往会适得其反。例如，一位歌手拒绝履行承诺的。如果命令其履行，该歌手的表演很可能会很拙劣。由于这些原因和其他原因，在这种情况下，该歌手将被勒令向另一方支付金钱赔偿，而不是被勒令演唱。

Even an agreement to sell a piece of property, such as a barrel of apples or a car, will usually not be enforced with specific performance; instead, the court would order the promisor (obligor) to pay the promisee (obligee) a sum of money.

即使是出售一项财产（如一桶苹果或一辆汽车）的协议，通常也不会通过具体履行来执行；相反，法院会命令承诺人（债务人）向被承诺人（债权人）支付一笔钱。

So-called “specific performance” is typically granted only in the case of unique property, such as a particular portrait, or in the case of real estate, because each parcel of land is unique. But note that, even in this case, specific performance results in the transfer of title to the unique property from the owner to the other party, which supports the Rothbard-Evers title-transfer theory of contract advocated below.

所谓的 “具体履行 “通常只适用于独特的财产，如一幅特定的肖像画，或者适用于不动产，因为每块土地都是独一无二的。但要注意的是，即使在这种情况下，具体履行的结果也是独特财产的所有权从所有者转让到了另一方，这就支持了下文所主张的罗斯巴德-埃弗斯的所有权转让理论。

Thus, in modern positive law,“breach of contract”—failing to render the contractual obligations—results in a transfer of property—sometimes unique goods such as real property, but usually money—from the breaching party to the promisee. Contracts are enforced today not by forcing a party to perform the promised action but by threatening to transfer some of the promisor’s owned resources to the promisee if the promisor does not perform. For an agreement to be enforceable under modern legal systems means that some of one party’s owned resources (whether money or some other owned good, usually a unique good such as land or a painting) can be forcibly transferred to the other party.

因此，在现代实在法中，”违约”——未能履行义务——导致财产——有时是独特的物品，如不动产，但通常是金钱——从违约方转让到受许诺方。如今，的强制执行不是通过强迫一方履行承诺的行动，而是通过威胁如果承诺人不履行义务，就将承诺人拥有的部分资源转让给被承诺人。在现代法律制度下，协议的强制执行意味着一方拥有的部分资源（无论是金钱还是其他物品，通常是独特的物品，如土地或绘画）可以被强制转让给另一方。

What this means is that, in reality, in modern contract law, there are really no contractual obligations “to do” anything. It also means contract breach is really impossible, as contracts are not enforceable obligations to do things. There are only obligations to transfer title to resources, either directly (agreement to pay a sum of money) or as a consequence of failure to perform a promised action (a conditional obligation to pay a sum of money if the promised performance does not occur).

这意味着，实际上，在现代法中，确实不存在 “做”任何事情的义务。这也意味着违约实际上是不可能的，因为并不是可强制执行的做事义务。只有直接转让资源所有权的义务（同意支付一笔钱），或者因未履行承诺的行动而产生的义务（如果承诺的履行没有发生，则支付一笔钱的条件义务）。

It should be noted that, despite the lack of a legal compulsion to perform a contract, the institution of contract is alive and well. The legal threat of transfer of some of the promisor’s resources (commonly called “property”) in the event of default, combined with reputation effects, is apparently sufficient to render contracting a useful institution.

应该指出的是，尽管法律上没有强制履行的规定，但制度依然存在且运行良好。一旦违约，承诺人的部分资源（俗称 “财产”）就会被转让，这种法律威胁加上声誉影响，显然足以使成为一种有用的制度。

At a minimum, contract theory purports to justify the transfer of title to the property of parties to a contract. And in the case of specific performance, debtors’ prison, and voluntary slavery, contract theory must justify the use of force against the parties. Not surprisingly, then, a variety of arguments have been set forth attempting to explain why agreements may be enforced.10

理论至少要证明当事人财产所有权的转让是正当的。而在具体履行、债务人监禁和自愿为奴的情况下，理论必须证明对当事人使用武力是正当的。因此，人们提出了各种各样的论点，试图解释为什么协议可以强制执行，这也就不足为奇了。[394]

C. 言论、承诺与自由意志主义Speech, Promises, and Libertarianism

The question especially interests libertarians. By endorsing a given theory of contract, we are, in effect, supporting the transfer of property rights from the owner to others, in certain circumstances.

自由意志主义者对这个问题尤其感兴趣。我们赞同某种理论，实际上就是支持在某些情况下将财产权从所有者手中转让到他人手中。

Why does making a promise or agreeing or “committing” to do something result in a transfer of rights from the promisor to the promisee? To many—even to many libertarians—it seems to be elementary and obvious: if you promise to do something, you may be forced to do it. Some libertarians and laymen assume that an individual has some power or ability to legally “bind” or obligate himself by simply promising to do something. However, this assumption is groundless. Not all promises are enforceable, nor should they be.

为什么许诺、同意或 “承诺 “做某事会导致权利从承诺人转让到被承诺人？对许多人来说——甚至对许多自由意志主义者来说——这似乎是基本的且显而易见的：如果你承诺做某事，你就可能被迫去做。一些自由意志主义者和外行人假定，一个人只要承诺做某事，就有某种权力或能力对自己进行法律上的 “约束 “或使自己承担义务。然而，这种假设是毫无根据的。并非所有承诺都可以强制执行，也不应该强制执行。

As a general matter, libertarians hold that the use of force is permissible only in response to initiated force. Or, more generally, an owner of a resource is entitled to use force to defend his ownership rights in his body and in resources he or she owns. Ownership of an external resource means that the owner can withhold consent (exclude) others or invite them to use the resource.

一般而言，自由意志主义认为，只有在回应主动施加的武力时才允许使用武力。或者，更一般地说，资源的所有者有权使用武力来捍卫其对自身身体以及其所拥有资源的所有权。对外部资源的所有权意味着所有者可以不同意（排除）他人或邀请他人使用该资源。

In other words, viewed in property terms, a resource may be used only with the consent of its owner. Unprovoked aggression against another is a use of his resource (or his body) without his consent and is therefore prohibited. As a result of the act of aggression, the victim becomes entitled to use the aggressor’s property (or body) for, e.g., purposes of punishment. That is, by committing aggression—using a victim’s property without consent—some or all of the aggressor’s property rights are transferred to the victim. Because the aggressor used the victim’s property as if it were his own (although it is not), the victim may use the aggressor’s property as if it is his own.11 This is why initiated force (aggression) is impermissible, while responsive force—force in response to aggression—is not.

换句话说，从财产的角度来看，资源只有在其所有者同意的情况下才能使用。无端侵犯他人是未经其同意而使用其资源（或身体），因此是被禁止的。由于实施了侵害行动，受害者有权为惩罚等目的使用侵害者的财产（或身体）。也就是说，通过实施侵害——未经同意使用受害者的财产——侵害者的部分或全部财产权被转让给了受害者。由于侵害者将受害者的财产当作自己的财产使用（尽管并非如此），因此受害者可以将侵害者的财产当作自己的财产使用。[395] 这就是为什么主动使用武力（侵犯）是不允许的，而回应性武力——对侵犯做出回应的武力——则是允许的。

It is impermissible to use force in response to non-invasive actions, since this would be itself initiated force. Speech is (generally) nonaggressive, for example, because it does not invade others’ property borders, so it does not justify the use of responsive force.12 Libertarians oppose censorship and recognize a free-speech right because speech, per se, does not aggress (usually). The recipient of noxious or unwanted speech is free to ignore it and go about his business. The boundaries of his body and property are not invaded byspeech, and his actions are not physically restrained by the mere words of others.

对非侵犯性行动使用武力是不允许的，因为这本身就是主动使用武力。例如，言论（一般来说）是非侵犯性的，因为它没有侵犯他人的财产边界，所以使用回应性武力是不正当的。[396]自由意志主义反对审查制度，承认言论自由权，因为言论本身（通常）不侵犯他人。恶毒或不受欢迎的言论的接受者可以置之不理，桥归桥、路归路。他的身体和财产界限不受言论的侵犯，他的行动也不会因他人的只言片语而受到人身限制。

The same holds true of promises, at least at first glance. As even mainstream contract theorists have pointed out, a “mere promise” is not sufficient to create a binding contractual obligation.13

至少初步来看，承诺也是如此。甚至主流理论家也指出，”单纯的承诺 “不足以产生具有约束力的义务。[397]

For example, consider a budding singer who asks his famous actor friend to attend the singer’s concert. The famous actor says, “I’ll be there.” The singer is pleased, hoping that the actor’s fame will add publicity to the event. To the singer’s disappointment, though, the actor fails to show up. Did the actor violate any of the singer’s rights? Of course not. What if the actor had said, “I promise to attend your concert”? The actor told,or promised, the singer that he would go to the concert, but he did not by these speech-acts aggress against the singer or his property.

例如，设想一位新晋歌手邀请他的著名演员朋友参加他的演唱会。这位知名演员说：”我会去的。歌手很高兴，希望演员的名气能为演唱会增光添彩。然而，令歌手失望的是，该演员没有到场。演员是否侵犯了歌手的任何权利？当然没有。如果该演员说 “我保证参加你的演唱会 “呢？演员告诉或承诺歌手他会去听音乐会，但他并没有通过这些言语行动侵犯歌手或其财产。

A promise, then, would seem to be unenforceable unless it somehow gives rise to or involves an act of aggression, that is, it somehow causes an uninvited use—invasion of the borders—of another’s property. But a promise seems to be merely a speech-act; it does not appear to aggress against anyone.

那么，一个承诺似乎是不可强制执行的，除非它以某种方式引起或涉及侵犯行动，也就是说，它以某种方式导致未经邀请地使用——侵犯——他人的财产。但一个承诺似乎仅仅是一种言语行动；它似乎并不侵犯任何人。

If promises are not aggression, then the only other way that promises could be enforceable is if the promise resulted in a transfer of property rights from the promisor to the promisee. Then the promisee could “enforce” the contract by simply using the (former) property of the promisor, title to which has transferred to the promisee.

如果承诺不是侵犯行动，那么承诺能够被强制执行的唯一其他方式是，如果承诺导致财产权从承诺者转让到受诺者。然后，受诺者可以通过简单地使用承诺者的（以前的）财产来“执行”，因为该财产的所有权已经转让给了受诺者。

However, to state that promises transfer property title begs the question that contract theory asks: Why does a promise serve to transfer title?

然而，如果说承诺转让了财产所有权，那就引出了理论提出的问题：为什么承诺具有转让所有权的作用？

D. 对价Consideration

Many theories have been set forth in an attempt to explain or justify why the law enforces contracts, and why it makes some promises “binding” or enforceable. It is only a special type of promise, or a promise plus something else, that results in a legally binding contract under today’s legal systems.

人们提出了许多理论，试图解释或说明为什么法律强制执行，以及为什么法律使某些承诺具有 “约束力 “或可强制执行。在当今的法律体系下，只有特殊类型的承诺，或者承诺加上其他东西，才会形成具有法律约束力的。

Under the common-law doctrine of bargained-for consideration, (an enforceable) contract requires a promise and consideration—something of value received in exchange for the promise.14 This is why a dollar, or ten dollars, is often given (or stated to be given) by one party who is receiving something from another party. The consideration may be another promise or something else of value. For example, in a bilateral contract, the parties obligate themselves reciprocally so that each one’s promised obligation serves as the consideration for the other’s promise.15 The value of the consideration given need not match the value of the thing received. In fact, even consideration as small as a “peppercorn” will suffice.16

根据普通法的约因原则，（可执行的）需要有承诺和对价——为换取承诺而收到的某种有价值的东西。[398] 这就是为什么一方从另一方收到某种东西时，往往会给出（或声明给出）一美元或十美元。对价可以是另一个承诺或其他有价值的东西。例如，在双边中，双方对等地承担义务，因此每一方承诺的义务都是另一方承诺的对价。[399]所给对价的价值不必与所收物品的价值相匹配。事实上，即使是小到 “胡椒粒 “的对价也足够了。[400]

Yet the antiquated doctrine of consideration has long been criticized.17 It would prevent a contract from being formed in some situations that it seems they should be, such as gratuitous (gift) promises and even some commercial promises.18 Further, if a mere promise (naked promise, or nudum pactum) is not enforceable, why does it become enforceable just because the promisee gives something small in return? Given that only a token amount of consideration—a “mere peppercorn”—is sufficient to make a promise enforceable, doesn’t the doctrine of consideration elevate form over substance? Why can we not dispense with the formality and make mere promises, or at least promises with some kind of sufficient formality, enforceable? Further, under Austrian value theory, how can we say the thing given in return “has a value” to the recipient?19 Maybe he accepts it only as a formality to satisfy the courts.

然而，古老的对价原则长期以来一直受到批评。[401]它将使在某些似乎应该成立的情况下无法成立，例如无偿（赠与）承诺，甚至某些商业承诺。[402] 此外，如果单纯的承诺（赤裸裸的承诺，或无约因的）不能强制执行，那么为什么仅仅因为被承诺人给予了一些小的回报，承诺就变得可以强制执行了呢？鉴于只有象征性的对价——“一粒胡椒籽”——就足以使一个承诺可执行，对价学说难道不是形式重于实质吗？为什么我们不能摒弃形式，使单纯的承诺，或至少具有某种足够形式的承诺具有可执行性呢？此外，根据奥派价值理论，我们怎么能说作为回报给予的东西对接受者“有价值”呢？[403]也许他接受它只是作为一种满足法院要求的形式。

From the libertarian point of view, receiving consideration for a promise does not turn the promise into an act of aggression, nor is it clear how it causes the promise to effectuate a transfer of title any better than a naked promise would.

从自由意志主义的观点来看，因承诺而收到对价并不会使该承诺变成侵犯行动，也不清楚它如何能比裸诺更好地使该承诺实现所有权的转让。

E. 承诺禁止反言和致害依赖Promissory Estoppel and Detrimental Reliance

The requirement of consideration can sometimes lead to seemingly harsh results, because some promises will be unenforceable if there is no consideration, but they will be relied upon by the promisee. A classic example is the grandfather who promises his granddaughter he will pay her tuition if she goes to college. However, in exchange, she gives nothing of legally recognized value, so there is no consideration and, thus, no binding contract. Halfway through her college career, the old man may change his mind and stop paying. What is the granddaughter to do? Can she sue to enforce the promise to pay for her tuition? Under the standard theory of contract, she cannot prevail, because consideration is missing.

对价要求有时会导致看似苛刻的结果，因为如果没有对价，有些承诺将无法执行，但被承诺人却会依赖这些承诺。一个典型的例子是，祖父承诺如果孙女上大学，他将为她支付学费。然而，作为交换，她并没有提供任何法律认可的价值，因此不存在对价，也就不存在有约束力的。孙女的大学生涯进行到一半时，老人可能会改变主意，停止支付学费。孙女该怎么办？她可以起诉要求履行支付学费的承诺吗？根据标准的理论，她无法胜诉，因为缺少对价。

The equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel is used in common law systems to form an alternative basis for enforcement of contracts.20 This doctrine seeks to protect the “expectations” or “reliance interest” of the promisee.21 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, for example, provides:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.22

在普通法体系中，承诺禁止反言的衡平法理论是执行的另一种依据。[404]这一理论旨在保护被承诺人的 “期望 “或 “依赖利益”。[405]例如，《法重述（第二版）》规定：

“承诺人应合理预期会促使被承诺人或第三人采取行动或作出克制的承诺，如果只有通过执行该承诺才能避免不公正，则该承诺具有约束力，而且该承诺确实会促使被承诺人或第三人采取这种行动或作出这种克制。对于违反承诺的赔偿，可视乎正义的需要而加以限制。[406]

Similarly, the Louisiana Civil Code provides:

A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisee’s reliance on the promise.23

同样，《路易斯安那民法典》规定：

当一方知道或应当知道其承诺会导致另一方依赖该承诺而使其遭受损害，且另一方的依赖是合理的，该方可能因该承诺而承担义务。赔偿可能仅限于因受诺人对该承诺的依赖而产生的费用或遭受的损害。[407]

If there is “detrimental reliance,” promissory estoppel can be invoked to enforce the promise. Even though there is technically not a valid contract, because, for example, the promisee gave no consideration, the promisor is “estopped” to deny this because this would work a hardship on the promisee.24 In the case of the granddaughter, she can prevail in court under this theory. In this way, detrimental reliance is used as an alternative ground for contract enforcement. The idea of protecting the expectations or reliance interests of promisees is also sometimes seen as the primary justification for enforcing contracts.

如果存在 “致害依赖”，则可以援引承诺禁止反言来强制执行承诺。即使技术上不存在有效，例如因为被承诺人没有给予对价，承诺人也被“禁止”否认这一点，因为这会给受承诺人造成困难。[408]在孙女的案例中，根据这一理论，她可以在法庭上胜诉。通过这种方式，致害依赖被用作执行的替代依据。保护被承诺人的期望或依赖利益的理念有时也被视为执行的主要理由。

The theory of detrimental reliance rests on the notion that a promise sets up an “expectation” of performance in the mind of the promisee which induces him to act because he “reasonably relies” on this expectation. But this is confused. Every time someone acts, he is “relying” on some understanding of reality. This reliance might be quite ridiculous or unreasonable. Thus, all detrimental reliance theories and doctrines inevitably qualify the theory by saying that a promise is enforceable only if the promisee reasonably or justifiably relied on the promise.25 If the reliance is not reasonable, it is not really the promisor’s “fault” that the promisee relied. The promisor could not have anticipated outlandish reliance.

致害依赖理论基于这样一种观念，一项承诺在被承诺人的心目中树立了一种对履行承诺的 “期望”，这种期望诱使他采取行动，因为他 “合理地依赖 “这种期望。但这种说法是混乱的。每当一个人采取行动时，他都在 “依赖 “对现实的某种理解。这种依赖有可能是非常荒谬或不合理的。因此，所有致害依赖理论和原则都不可避免地对该理论加以限定，即只有当被承诺人合理或正当地依赖于承诺时，该承诺才可强制执行。[409]如果信賴並非合理，则被承诺人信賴该承诺并非真的是承诺人的过错。承诺人不可能预料到会有如此离奇的依赖。

One major problem with this doctrine, however, is its circularity. In deciding whether to rely on a given promise, a reasonable person would take into account whether promises, in a given legal system, are enforceable. If promises without consideration are known to be unenforceable, for example, it would be unreasonable to rely on them because it is known that the promisor is not obligated to keep his promise. Thus, reliance depends on enforceability. Yet, the detrimental reliance doctrine makes enforceability itself depend on reliance, hence the circularity.26 As such, conventional theories of contract enforcement are defective.

然而，这一原则的一个主要问题是其循环性。一个通情达理的人在决定是否依赖某项承诺时，会考虑到在特定的法律体系中，承诺是否可以执行。例如，如果众所周知没有对价的承诺是不可执行的，那么依赖这些承诺就是不合理的，因为众所周知承诺人没有义务信守承诺。因此，依赖取决于可执行性。然而，致害依赖理论使可执行性本身取决于依赖，因此出现了循环论证。[410]正因如此，传统的执行理论是有缺陷的。

For the libertarian, another problem with detrimental reliance is that it is not explained why a person’s “reliance” on the statements or representations of another gives the relying person a right to rely on them. Why can a person be forced to perform or liable for failure to perform a promise just because it is “relied on” by another? The default assumption for the libertarian is that you rely on the statements of others at your own risk.

对自由意志主义者来说，致害依赖的另一个问题是，它没有解释为什么一个人对另一个人的陈述或表述的“依赖”赋予了依赖者依赖它们的权利。为什么一个人可以仅仅因为被他人 “依赖 “而被迫履行承诺或为不履行承诺承担责任呢？自由意志主义的默认假设是，你依赖他人的陈述，风险自担。

As we see, then, the mainstream theories proposed to date that are purported to justify and explain the institution of contract have been, by and large, inconsistent and unsatisfying.

因此，我们看到，迄今为止提出的旨在证明和解释制度的主流理论，总的来说，是不一致的也是无法令人满意的。

II. 所有权转让的理论THE TITLE-TRANSFER THEORY OF CONTRACT

A. 埃弗斯-罗斯巴德所有权转让理论Evers-Rothbard Title-Transfer Theory

A much better grounding for contract law is found in the writings of libertarian theorists Murray Rothbard and Williamson Evers, who advocate a title-transfer theory of contract.27 As Rothbard and Evers point out, a binding contract should be considered as one or more transfers of title to (alienable) property, usually title transfers exchanged for each other. A contract should have nothing to do with promises, which at most serve as evidence of a transfer of title. A contract is nothing more than a way to give something you own to another.

自由意志主义理论家默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）和威廉姆森-埃弗斯（Williamson Evers）的著作为法提供了更合理的依据，他们主张的所有权转让理论。[411]正如罗斯巴德和埃弗斯所指出的，有约束力的应被视为（可转让）财产所有权的一次或多次转让，通常是相互交换的所有权转让。应与承诺无关，承诺最多只能作为财产权转让的证据。不过是将自己拥有的东西给予他人的一种方式。

Title may be conveyed without ever promising anything. I can, for example, manually give you a dollar in payment for a soda. No words need be exchanged. Or I can simply state my intention to give you something I own: “I hereby give you my car,” or even “I hereby give you my car in three days.” There need be no “promise” involved. In general, title is transferred by manifesting one’s intent to transfer ownership or title to another.28 A promise can be one way of doing this, but it is not necessary. Rothbard and Evers seem to have a fixation on the word “promise” and do not agree that a promise can convey title. They appear to think that because a promise is not enforceable, it therefore cannot serve to transfer title to property.29 However, a promise can be intended and understood to convey title, and thus can operate to do so. In certain contexts, the making of a promise can be one way to manifest one’s intent to transfer title. Contracts always involve communication and some type of language, when the owner of a resource communicates his consent to allow someone else to use or have his resource. Language is always contextual. There is no reason that use of the word “promise” cannot be intended to signify an intent to give contractual permission or consent.

所有权可以在不做出任何承诺的情况下转让。例如，我可以亲手给你一美元，作为一杯汽水的报酬。无需言语交流。或者，我可以简单地表明我打算把我拥有的东西给你： “我在此将我的车给你”，甚至 “我在此三天后把我的车给你”。无需涉及 “承诺”。一般来说，所有权的转让是通过表明自己有意将所有权或财产权转让给他人来实现的。[412] 承诺可以是一种方式，但并非必要。罗斯巴德和埃弗斯似乎对 “承诺 “一词情有独钟，不同意承诺可以转让所有权。他们似乎认为，由于承诺是不可强制执行的，因此它不能起到转让财产所有权的作用。[413] 但是，承诺可以有意图并被理解为转让所有权，因此可以起到转让所有权的作用。在某些情况下，作出承诺是表明转让所有权意图的一种方式。当资源所有者表示同意他人使用或拥有其资源时，总是涉及沟通和某种类型的语言。语言总是有上下文的。使用 “承诺 “一词没有理由不表示授予许可或同意的意图。

Ultimately, contracts are enforceable simply by recognizing that the transferee, instead of the previous owner, is the current owner of the property. If the previous owner refuses to turn over the property transferred, he is committing an act of aggression (trespass, use of the property of another without permission) against which force may legitimately be used.

归根结底，只要承认受让人而非前所有者是财产的现任所有者，就可以执行。如果前所有者拒绝交出转让的财产，他就是在实施侵犯行动（非法侵入，未经许可使用他人财产），可以合法地对其使用武力。

B. 有条件的所有权转让Conditional Transfers of Title

The simplest title transfers are contemporaneous and manual. For example I hand a beanie baby to my niece as a gift. However, most transfers are not so simple, and are conditional. Any future-oriented title transfer in particular is necessarily conditional, since the future is uncertain. For example, before dinner, I tell my niece that she gets the beanie baby after dinner if she behaves during dinner. The transfer of title is future-oriented and conditional upon certain events taking place. If my niece behaves, then she acquires title to the beanie baby. Future transfers of title are usually expressly conditioned upon the occurrence of some future event or condition.

最简单的所有权转让是当时的手动转让。例如，我把一个豆豆宝宝作为礼物送给我的侄女。然而，大多数转让并不那么简单，而是有条件的。尤其是任何面向未来的所有权转让都必须是有条件的，因为未来是不确定的。例如，晚饭前，我告诉侄女，如果她在吃饭时表现好，晚饭后她就能得到小豆豆。所有权转让是面向未来的，以某些事件的发生为条件。如果我的侄女表现好，那么她就获得了小豆豆的所有权。所有权的未来转让通常明确以某些未来事件或条件的发生为条件。

In addition, because the future is not certain,30 all future-oriented title transfers are necessarily conditioned upon the item to be transferred existing at the designated time of transfer. Title to something that does not exist cannot be transferred. Consider the situation where I own no hamster but tell my niece, “Here, I give this hamster to you.” In this case, “this hamster” has no referent so no title is transferred. Likewise, the future beanie baby transfer is conditional not only on the expressly stated condition—the niece performing the specified action (behaving)—but also on the unstated condition that the beanie baby exists at the designated future transfer time. During dinner, the cat might destroy it, or it might be lost, or consumed by fire. In this case, even if the niece behaves, there is no beanie baby left for her to acquire. In effect, when agreeing to a future title transfer, the transfer is inescapably accompanied by a condition: “I transfer a thing to you at a certain time in the future—if, of course, the thing exists.”

此外，由于未来是不确定的，[414] 所有面向未来的所有权转让必然取决于待转让的物品在指定的转让时间存在。不存在的东西的所有权是不能转让的。考虑这样一种情况：我并不拥有仓鼠，但我告诉我的侄女：”来，我把这只仓鼠给你”。在这种情况下，”这只仓鼠 “没有参照物，因此所有权没有转让。同样，未来的豆豆宝宝的转让不仅取决于明确的条件——侄女履行指定的行动（表现良好）——而且取决于未说明的条件，即豆豆宝宝在指定的未来转让时间存在。在晚餐时，猫可能会毁坏它，也可能会丢失或被火烧掉。在这种情况下，即使侄女乖巧听话，也没有豆豆宝宝留给她了。实际上，在同意未来所有权转让时，转让不可避免地附带了一个条件： “我在未来某个时间将某物转让给你——当然，前提是该物存在”。

Like future title transfers, title exchanges are also necessarily conditional. This is true even of a simple, contemporaneous exchange. I hand you my dollar and you hand me your chocolate bar. Because it is an exchange rather than two unrelated transfers, the title transfers are each conditional. I give my dollar to you only on the condition that you give your chocolate bar to me, and vice-versa. Exchange contracts quite often involve at least one future title transfer which is given in exchange for either a contemporaneous or future title transfer by the other party. In this case, each title transfer is conditional upon the other title transfer being made. Also, any future title transfers are conditional upon the future existence of the thing to be transferred.

与未来的所有权转让一样，所有权交换也必然是有条件的。即使是简单的即时交换也是如此。我把我的一美元递给你，你把你的巧克力棒递给我。因为这是一次交换，而非两次无关的转让，所以每次的财产权转让都是有条件的。我把美元给你的条件是你把巧克力棒给我，反之亦然。交换通常至少涉及一项未来的财产权转让，以换取另一方同时或未来的财产权转让。在这种情况下，每一次财产权转让都以另一次财产权转让为条件。此外，任何未来的财产权转让都以被转让物的未来存在为条件。

Many types of contracts can be formed by imposing various conditions on the title transfers involved. For example, suppose that we make the following wager: If the horse Starbucks finishes first, then I transfer to you $100; otherwise, the $10 you gave me remains mine to keep. In this case, you transferred title to $10 to me at the moment of the wager, conditioned on my agreeing, at the moment of the wager, to a future, conditional transfer of $100 to you. I transferred title to $100 to you in the future, on two conditions: the explicit condition that Starbucks wins, and the implied condition that I have title to $100 at the designated future payment time (and that we both exist!).

通过对相关所有权转让施加各种条件，可以形成许多类型的。例如，假设我们下了如下赌注：如果赛马 “星巴克 “获得第一名，那么我将 100 美元转让给你；否则，你给我的 10 美元仍归我所有。在这种情况下，你在下注时将 10 美元的所有权转让给我，条件是我在下注时同意将来有条件地将 100 美元转让给你。我在未来将 100 美元的所有权转让给你，取决于两个条件：明确的条件是“星巴克”获胜，隐含的条件是在未来指定的付款时间我拥有 100 美元的所有权（而且我们都存在！）。

In a loan contract, the creditor conveys title to money (the principal) to the debtor in exchange for a present agreement to a future transfer of money (principal plus interest) fromthe debtor to the creditor. For example, Jim borrows $1000 now from Bank to be repaid in a year with $100 interest. Analyzed in terms of title transfers, Bank transfers title to $1000 of its money to Jim in the present in exchange for (conditioned on) Jim contemporaneously agreeing to a title transfer to future property; and Jim’s future title transfer is executed in exchange for the contemporaneous $1000 title transfer.31

在贷款中，债权人向债务人转让金钱（本金）的所有权，以换取债务人向债权人转让金钱（本金加利息）的现时协议。例如，吉姆现在向银行借款 1000 美元，一年后连本带利偿还 1100 美元。从财产权转让的角度分析，银行在当前将其 1000 美元资金的财产权转让给吉姆，以换取（基于）吉姆同时同意未来财产的所有权转让；而吉姆未来所有权转让的执行是以同时进行的 1000 美元所有权转让为交换条件的。[415]

A contract in which payment is to be made for the performance of a service, such as an employment arrangement, is not an exchange of titles, because the employee does not transfer any title. Although it may be referred to as an exchange of title for services, such a contract is better viewed as a conditional, future transfer of title to the monetary payment, conditioned upon the specified services being performed. That is, if you mow my lawn, then title to this gold coin transfers to you. Again, the transfer of title in this case is both expressly conditional and future-oriented. Title to the coin transfers only if the lawn is mowed, and if I still own the coin.32

为提供服务而付款的，如雇用安排，不是所有权交换，因为雇员没有转让任何所有权。虽然它可以被称为服务所有权交换，但这种最好被视为有条件的、未来的货币支付所有权转让，以履行指定的服务为条件。也就是说，如果你帮我修剪草坪，那么这枚金币的所有权就会转让给你。同样，这种情况下的所有权转让既是明确有条件的，也是面向未来的。只有在草坪修剪完毕且我仍然拥有这枚金币的情况下，金币的所有权才会转让。[416]

Also, as evident in the beanie baby example above, the title-transfer theory of contract permits gift contracts (donations) as well as exchanges. The common law is reluctant to enforce gift contracts because of the lack of consideration. Under the rubric of “hard cases make bad law” (such as the grandfather promising to pay his granddaughter’s tuition), such systems use the circular theory of promissory estoppel to enforce such contracts.

另外，正如上文豆豆宝宝的例子所示，所有权转让的理论允许赠与（捐赠）以及交换。普通法系不赞成执行赠与，因为缺乏对价。在 “难案造就恶法”（如祖父承诺支付孙女的学费）的名义下，此类系统使用承诺禁止反言的循环理论来执行此类。

The title-transfer theory of contract, on the other hand (like the civil law), does not discriminate between gratuitous and onerous contracts33—between donations (gifts) and mutual exchanges. The owner of property may convey title to another, for any reason, whether pecuniary, charitable, or arbitrary, by manifesting and communicating his intent to do so. Gifts of property or title exchanges are all operative and, thus, enforceable.

另一方面，所有权转让的理论（与大陆法一样）并不区分无偿和有偿[417]33——捐赠（赠与）和相互交换。财产所有者可以出于任何原因，无论是金钱、慈善或任意原因，通过表明和传达其意图，将所有权转让给他人。财产的赠予或所有权的交换都是有效的，因此也是可执行的。

C. 履行承诺Enforcement of Promises

Although a variety of contractual arrangements can be constructed using conditional transfers of title, there would seem to be no way to compel someone to perform an agreed-upon action, such as a service— the promise “to do” or “not to do” as opposed to the promise “to give.” The only way to actually enforce a promise to perform a given action is to have the right to inflict, well, physical force, as either punishment or inducement to perform, on the defaulting party’s body. A promise to paint a house or sing at a party, for example, can be enforced only by threatening to use force against the promisor to force him to perform, or by punishing him afterwards for failing to perform.

虽然可以利用有条件的所有权转让来构建各种安排，但似乎没有办法迫使某人履行约定的行动，例如服务——即“去做”或“不做”的承诺，而非“授予”的承诺。要想真正强制某人履行某一指定行动的承诺，唯一的办法就是有权对违约方的身体施以暴力，无论是作为惩罚还是作为履行承诺的诱因。例如，要履行粉刷房子或在晚会上唱歌的承诺，只能通过威胁对承诺人使用武力迫使他履行，或事后惩罚他不履行。

However, under libertarian theory, there are only three ways that it is permissible to use force against the body of another: if he consents to the force, if he is committing or has committed aggression, or if his body is owned by someone else.

然而，根据自由意志主义理论，只有在三种情况下才允许对他人的身体使用武力：假如他同意使用武力，假如他正在或已经实施侵犯，或者假如他的身体为他人所有。

As noted above, the making of a promise is not the commission of aggression. At most, promises are evidence of an intent to transfer title. Therefore, there is no aggression to justify the enforcement option. Assuming the promisor does not consent to being punished, the second option is likewise unavailable. The third option assumes that the promisor has, in effect, transferred his rights in his body to the promisee, i.e., sold himself into slavery. However, although one may be considered to be a self-owner, one’s body is inalienable.34

如上所述，作出承诺并不是实施侵犯。承诺充其量只能证明转让所有权的意图。因此，不存在能证明强制手段是正当的侵犯。假设承诺者不同意接受惩罚，那么第二种选择同样不可行。第三种选择假定承诺人实际上已将自己身体的权利转让给了被承诺人，即把自己卖为奴隶。然而，尽管一个人可以被视为自我所有者，但他的身体是不可让渡的。[418]

Therefore, contracts involve only conditional transfers of title to scarce resources external to the body. Promises cannot actually be enforced. The inability of the title-transfer theory to enforce promises might be seen, by some, as a defect of the theory. These critics predict chaos and the loss of the ability to have binding commitments. However, as noted above, even in modern legal systems, there is almost never enforcement of contractual obligations “to do” things. The primary enforcement mechanism utilized is to order the party in breach of contract to pay money damages to the other party, not to perform the promised service. The inability to “enforce” promises in today’s legal system has not resulted in the death of contract. The same result can be obtained under the title-transfer theory of contract by using conditional title-transfers to provide for “damages” to “enforce” promises to perform. When a contract to do something is to be formed and the parties want there to be an incentive for the specified action to be performed, the parties agree to a conditional transfer of title to a specified or determinable sum of monetary damages, where the transfer is conditional upon the promisor’s failure to perform.35

因此，只涉及身体之外的稀缺资源所有权的有条件转让。承诺实际上无法强制执行。所有权理论无法强制执行承诺，可能会被一些人视为该理论的缺陷。这些批评者预言会出现混乱，并失去作出有约束力承诺的能力。然而，如上所述，即使在现代法律体系中，也几乎从未强制执行过 “做”事情的义务。所利用的主要强制执行机制是命令违约方向对方支付金钱赔偿，而不是履行承诺的服务。在当今的法律体系中，无法 “执行 “承诺并没有导致的死亡。在所有权转让的理论下，利用有条件的所有权转让规定 “损害赔偿 “来 “强制 “履行承诺，也可以得到同样的结果。当要订立做某事的时，当事人希望有一种激励机制来促使指定的行动得到履行，双方就会同意有条件地转让所有权，以获得一笔指定的或可确定金额的货币损害赔偿，而转让的条件是承诺人不履行义务。[419]

This provides a result similar to today’s system where the party who fails to perform owes monetary damages to the other party.

这提供了一种类似于当今制度的结果，即未能履约的一方应向另一方支付金钱损害赔偿。

For example, if Karen wants to “hire” Ethan to paint her house, she agrees to pay Ethan $3,000 on a specified future day X if he has painted her house by that day. In other words, Karen makes the following conditional conveyance of title: “I hereby transfer title to $3,000 to Ethan on day X if he has painted my house (and if I own $3,000).” But such a unilateral arrangement only obligates Karen. She may want to give Ethan an extra incentive to perform (in addition to the prospect of payment and his promise-keeping reputation). For example, she may be planning an important business-related poolside party at her house, for which it is important that various promisors perform certain actions, such as mowing the lawn, cleaning the house and the pool, and showing up to serve as waiters and chefs. She would like to be able to obtain damages from Ethan in the event of nonperformance, and can, thus, contract with him so that he agrees to pay a specified or determinable sum of money in the event that he does not perform.

例如，如果凯伦想 “雇用 “伊森粉刷她的房子，她同意在未来特定的 X 日付给伊森 3 000 美元，条件是伊森在这一天之前粉刷完她的房子。换句话说，凯伦做出了如下有条件的所有权转让： “如果伊森粉刷了我的房子，我特此在 X 日将 3000 美元的所有权转让给他（如果我拥有 3000 美元）”。但这种单方面的安排只对凯伦有约束力。她可能希望给伊森一个额外的激励来促使他履行义务（除了付款前景和他信守承诺的声誉之外）。例如，她可能正在她的房子里计划一个重要的与业务相关的池畔派对，对于这个派对，各种承诺者履行某些行动很重要，比如修剪草坪、打扫房子和泳池，以及到场充当服务员和厨师。她希望在伊森不履行的情况下能够从他那里获得损害赔偿，因此可以与他订立，让他同意在未履行时支付一笔规定的或可确定的金额。

In sum, conditional title transfers can be used to provide for damages payable upon nonperformance of a promised service. This provides for almost the same type of enforcement mechanism used in modern legal systems today, in which contracts are widely used and relied upon. Indeed, although this approach to contracts seems odd to those used to the conventional “binding promises” view of contract, it is not really new. As Randy Barnett observes:

Viewing contract law as part of a more general theory of individual entitlements that specifies how resources may be rightly acquired (property law), used (tort law), and transferred (contract law) is not new.36

总之，有条件的所有权转让可以用来规定不履行承诺服务时的损害赔偿金。这就提供了与当今现代法律制度中使用的几乎相同的执行机制，在现代法律制度中，被广泛使用和依赖。事实上，虽然这种方法对于那些习惯于传统的 “有约束力的承诺 “观的人来说似乎有些奇怪，但它其实并不新鲜。正如兰迪-巴尼特（Randy Barnett）所言：

将法视为更普遍的个人权利理论的一部分，该理论规定了如何正确地获取资源（财产法）、使用资源（侵权法）和转让资源（法），这并不是什么新的观点。[420]

III. 澄清与应用CLARIFICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

A. 拓殖资源的所有权转让Transfer of Title to Homesteaded Resources

The title-transfer theory of contract assumes that the property owner can transfer title in the property to others, by manifesting his intent to do so. The theory takes for granted that ownership of homesteaded property is alienable by the will of the owner. Writes Rothbard: “The right of property implies the right to make contracts about that property: to give it away or to exchange titles of ownership for the property of another person.”37

所有权转让的理论假定，财产所有人可以通过表明自己的意图，将财产所有权转让给他人。该理论想当然地认为，拓殖财产的所有权可以按照拥有人的意愿进行转让。罗斯巴德写道 “财产权意味着有权就该财产订立：将其赠与他人或以所有权交换他人的财产 “。[421]

Yet, we must ask, why does manifesting one’s intent to transfer title actually do it? Why does the owner have the power or capacity to do this? This power is implied by several interrelated aspects of the ownership of homesteaded property. First, note that the owner, who has the sole right to control the resource, can permit others to use it. For example, he can lend his car or hammer to his neighbor. This highlights the distinction between ownership and possession. The owner has rights to a thing even if he does not possess it. Note also that “permitting” others to use one’s property is done by manifesting (communicating) one’s consent to the borrower. The manifested consent of the owner of a good to permit its use by others is what distinguishes a licit use (such as a loan) from an illicit act (such as theft); it is what distinguishes invited guests from trespassers. In short, because the owner of property has the right to control it, he can, through a sufficiently objective manifestation or communication of his consent, permit others to possess the thing while he maintains ownership. In this way, “contract” is just a consequence or application of ownership rights; the owner has the right to exclude or deny permission to others to use the owned resource, or he can consent to it. This must somehow be communicated by language.

然而，我们必须要问，为什么表明转让所有权的意图就能真正实现转让呢？为什么所有者有这种权力或能力这么做？这种权力隐含在拓殖财产所有权的几个相互关联的方面。首先要注意的是，拥有资源唯一控制权的所有者可以允许他人使用资源。例如，他可以把自己的汽车或锤子借给邻居使用。这突出了所有权和占有之间的区别。所有者即使不占有某物，也拥有该物的权利。还要注意的是，”允许 “他人使用自己的财产是通过向借用人表示（传达）自己的同意来实现的。物品所有者明确表示同意允许他人使用物品，是合法使用（如借用）与非法行为（如盗窃）的区别所在；也是受邀客人与非法侵入者的区别所在。简言之，由于财产所有人有权控制财产，因此他可以通过充分客观地表明或传达他的同意，允许他人在他保持所有权的同时占有该物。这样，” “只是所有权的结果或应用；所有者有权排除或拒绝允许他人使用所拥有的资源，或者他可以同意他人使用。这在某种程度上必须通过语言来传达。

Second, homesteaded property was at one time acquired. It can, therefore, also be abandoned. One is not stuck with something forever just because one once homesteaded it. But acquiring and abandoning both involve a manifestation of the owner’s intent. Recall that the very purpose of property rights in scarce resources is to prevent conflicts over the use of resources. Thus, property rights have an unmistakably public aspect: the property claimed has boundaries visible (manifested) to others.38 One essential aspect of property is that it publicly demarcates one’s bounds of ownership so others can avoid using it. If the bounds are secret or unknowable, conflicts cannot be avoided. To know that a thing is owned by another and to avoid uninvited use of the other’s property, the property’s borders must be publicly known.

其次，拓殖财产曾被一度获得。因此，它也可以被放弃。一个人不会因为曾经拓殖过某物就永远与之纠缠不清。但是，获取和放弃都涉及所有者意图的体现。回想一下，稀缺资源财产权的目的就在于防止资源使用上发生冲突。因此，财产权具有明确无误的总所周知的一方：所主张的财产的边界对他人而言是可见的（表明的）。[422] 财产的一个重要方面是它公开划定了一个人的所有权边界，这样他人就可以避免使用它。如果界限是秘密的或不可知的，就无法避免冲突。要知道某物为他人所有，并避免他人擅自使用其财产，财产的边界必须公开可知的。

In fact, one reason that the first possessor of a scarce resource acquires title to it is the need for borders to be objective and public. The result of using a thing—either by transforming the thing in an apparent way up to certain borders or by setting up a publicly discernible border around the property—can be objectively apparent to others. This is why Hoppe refers to acts of original appropriation as “embordering” or “produc[ing] borderlines for things.”39

事实上，稀缺资源的首位占有人获得所有权的一个理由是，需要边界是客观的和公开的。使用某物的结果——无论是以明显的方式改变该物直至达到某些边界，还是在该财产周围设置一个公众可辨别的边界——都可以客观地为他人所知晓。这就是为什么霍普将先占称为“划定边界”或“为事物划定边界线”。[423]

Acquiring is an action by which one manifests intent to own the thing by setting up public borders.40 Likewise, property is abandoned,and title thereto is lost, when the owner manifests an intent to abandon and, thereby, to relinquish ownership. This intention is not manifested merely by suspending possession or transferring it to another, since possession can be suspended without losing ownership. Thus, a farmer who leaves his homesteaded farm for a week to buy supplies in a far away city does not thereby lose ownership, nor has he manifested any intent to abandon his farm. For these reasons, an owner of acquired property does not abandon property merely by not-possessing it, but he does have the power and the right to abandon it by manifesting his intent to do so.

获取是一种行动，通过这种行动，一个人通过设置公共边界来表明拥有该物的意图。[424]同样，当所有者表明放弃的意图并因此放弃所有权时，财产被放弃，其所有权也随之丧失。这种意图不仅仅通过暂停占有或将其转让给他人来表明，因为占有可以暂停而不失去所有权。因此，一个农民离开他拓殖的农场一周，去一个遥远的城市购买生活用品，并不因此丧失所有权，他也没有表现出放弃农场的意图。基于这些原因，既得财产的所有人不会仅仅因为不占有财产而放弃财产，但他确实有权力和权利通过表明放弃财产的意图而放弃财产。

Ownership of acquired property includes the right to use the property, to permit (license) others to use it (maintain ownership while giving possession to another), and toabandon ownership by manifesting the intent to do so. Combining these aspects of ownership, it is clear that an owner of property can transfer title to another by “abandoning” the good in favor of a designated new owner. If one can abandon title to property to the world in general, then a fortiori one can do “less” and simply abandon it “in favor” of a given person.41

对已获得财产的所有权包括使用该财产的权利、允许（许可）他人使用该财产的权利（在将占有权交给他人的同时保持所有权）以及通过表明放弃所有权的意图而放弃所有权的权利。结合所有权的这些方面，很明显，财产所有者可以通过“放弃”该物品而支持指定的新所有者来将所有权转让给他人。如果一个人可以将财产所有权普遍地放弃给世界，那么更不用说，一个人可以 “做得更少 “一点，直接将其放弃给 “指定的 “某个特定的人。[425]

Consider the case where the owner abandons the property outright. In this case, it once more becomes unowned and available for appropriation by a new homesteader, i.e., the next person to possess it. For example, suppose one lends his car or hammer to a neighbor and then abandons the item. In this case, the neighbor at first has possession, but not title, to the object. When the owner abandons it, the car, or hammer, becomes unowned again. As an unowned resource, it is now subject to re-appropriation by the next possessor, who happens to be the neighbor who is already in possession.42 By combining the power to permit others to use property with the power to abandon—both rights or powers of owners—it is possible to transfer title to a particular transferee.

考虑所有权人彻底放弃财产的情况。在这种情况下，它再次成为无主物，可被新的拓殖者（即下一个拥有它的人）占有。例如，假设一个人把自己的汽车或锤子借给了邻居，然后放弃了该物品。在这种情况下，邻居起初对物品拥有占有权，但没有所有权。当物主将其放弃时，汽车或锤子又变成了无主物。作为一种无主资源，它现在可以被下一个占有人重新占有，而这个人恰好就是已经占有该物品的邻居。[426]通过将允许他人使用财产的权力与放弃财产的权力——所有人的两种权利或权力——结合起来，就有可能将所有权转让给特定的受让人。

Another way to look at it is to consider the general rule that the first possessor has better title in the property than other challengers who are, compared to the first possessor, latecomers. If property is abandoned conditionally in favor of a particular transferee, then the transferee has “better title” because, as between these parties, the previous owner has abandoned it, and, thus, does not have better title. And as between the transferee and any third party, the transferee benefits from the prior title of the previous owner because, from the point of view of the third parties, the transferee is a licensee of the prior owner and/or an earlier possessor than the third parties.43

另一种看待它的方式是考虑一般规则，即第一个占有者在该财产上比其他挑战者拥有更合理的所有权，与第一个占有者相比，其他挑战者是后来者。如果财产有条件地被放弃以支持特定的受让人，那么受让人拥有“更合理的所有权”，因为在这些当事人之间，先前的所有者已经放弃了它，因此，不再拥有更合理的所有权。并且在受让人与任何第三方之间，受让人受益于先前所有者的先前所有权，因为从第三方的角度来看，受让人是先前所有者的被许可人，并且/或者比第三方更早占有。[427]

As an analogy, consider a person sitting in a tree with his loaf of bread. Below him, others occasionally pass. He can eat the bread if he wishes, or hold onto it, or, if he wants, he can just drop it, abandoning it to whichever passerby seeks to pick it up. This would be analogous to outright abandonment. Or he can toss it to a particular friend in the crowd, thus abandoning it and “guiding it” to a desired recipient at the same time, who can then re-homestead it.

打个比方，一个人拿着面包坐在树上。在他下面，偶尔会有其他人经过。如果他愿意，他可以吃掉面包，也可以拿着面包不放，或者，如果他愿意，他可以把面包扔掉，任由路人捡起。这类似于直接放弃。或者，他也可以把它扔给人群中的某位朋友，这样，在放弃它的同时，也把它 “引导 “给了心仪的接受者，而后者则可以重新拓殖它。

This is the reason why an owner can transfer title to others: scarce unowned resources are acquired and can be abandoned. Property that can be abandoned by manifesting’s one’s consent to undo or cease a previous acquisition can be given to particular others.

这就是所有人可以将所有权转让给他人的原因：稀缺的无主资源被获得并可以被放弃。通过表示同意撤销或停止先前的获取而可以被放弃的财产可以转让给特定的其他人。

B. 身体财产Property in the Body

Under libertarian principles, an individual has the sole right to control his body as well as scarce resources originally appropriated by the individual or by his ancestor in title. Since ownership means the right to control (to exclude), an individual may be said to own his body and homesteaded resources he has acquired. He is a “self-owner” as well as an owner of acquired resources.

根据自由意志主义原则，个人对自己的身体以及由个人或其先辈先占的稀缺资源拥有唯一的控制权。由于所有权意味着控制权（排除权），因此可以说个人拥有自己的身体和他所获取的拓殖资源。他是 “自我所有者”，也是所获资源的所有者。

Now, in the case of acquired resources, the rights of ownership include the right to transfer title to others because one can abandon, by manifested intent, a previously unowned resource that was acquired by manifested intent. In other words, rights in acquired resources may be alienated at will because of the way in which they come to be owned.

现在，就所获取的资源而言，所有权的权利包括将所有权转让给他人的权利，因为一个人可以通过明示的意图放弃之前通过明示的意图获得的无主资源。换句话说，由于所获取资源的获取方式，对这些已获取资源的权利可以随意转让。

By contrast, although one may be said to own—rightfully control— one’s body, the same reasoning regarding acquisition, abandonment, and alienability does not apply. The act of acquisition presupposes that there is an individual doing the acquiring and an unowned thing acquired by possessing it. But how can someone “acquire” his body? One’s body is part of one’s very identity. The body is not some unowned resource that is acquired by the intentional embordering action of some external, already existing acquirer. Or as Professor Hoppe points out, “any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one’s directly controlled ‘own’ body must already be presupposed as justified.”44

相比之下，虽然可以说一个人拥有——理所当然地控制——自己的身体，但关于获取、放弃和可让渡性的相同推理并不适用。获取行动的前提是有一个进行获取的个人和一个通过占有而获取的无主物。但一个人如何 “获取”自己的身体呢？一个人的身体是其身份的一部分。身体不是某种无主的资源，它是通过某个外部的、已经存在的获取者的有意的嵌入行动而获取的。或者正如霍普教授所指出的，”一个人对物品的任何间接控制都以这个人对自己身体的直接控制为前提；因此，为了使稀缺物品能够被正当的占有，对一个人直接控制’自己的’身体的占有必须已经被预先假定为是正当的 “。[428]

Because the body is not some unowned resource that an already existing individual chooses to acquire, it makes little sense to say that it can be abandoned by its owner. And since alienation of property derives from the power to abandon it, the body is inalienable. A manifestation of intent to “sell” the body is without effect because a person cannot, merely by an act of will, abandon his or her body. Title to one’s body is inalienable, and it is not subject to transfer by contract.

因为身体并非某种无主资源，不是已存在的个体选择去获取的，所以说它能被其所有者放弃是没有意义的。既然财产的让渡源于放弃财产的权力，那么身体就是不可让渡的。表明 “出售 “身体的意图是无效的，因为一个人不能仅凭意志行动就放弃自己的身体。一个人的身体所有权是不可让渡的，它不能通过转让。

C. 罗斯巴德论不可让渡性[429]Rothbard on Inalienability45

Rothbard, viewing contracts as transfers of title to alienable property, rejected the enforceable-promises view of contracts, with mere promises being unenforceable. He also maintained that rights to control—i.e., one’s ownership of, or title to—one’s body were inalienable.

罗斯巴德将视为可让渡财产所有权的转让，他反对可执行承诺的观，认为单纯的承诺是不可执行的。他还认为，控制权——即一个人对自己身体的拥有权或所有权——是不可让渡的。

These views are not unrelated. In fact, promises being unenforceable necessarily implies the inalienability of the body, and vice versa. If promises were enforceable, then one could be punished or coerced into performing the action that had been promised, implying some rights in the body had been alienated merely by making the promise. Likewise, if one could alienate title to one’s body by an act of will, this would mean that promises could be enforceable. For example, one could make a conditional transfer of title to one’s body if one does not perform a specified service. This would justify punishment or coercion against the promisor’s body, which is now owned by the promisee. Thus, alienability of the body and the enforceable promises view of contract go hand in hand. One implies the other.

这些观点并非毫无关联。事实上，承诺不可强制执行必然意味着身体的不可让渡性，反之亦然。如果承诺可以强制执行，那么一个人就可能受到惩罚或被胁迫去执行所承诺的行动，这就意味着仅仅通过做出承诺，身体的某些权利就已经被转让了。同样，如果一个人可以通过意志行动让渡自己身体的所有权，这就意味着承诺可以强制执行。例如，如果一个人未履行特定的服务，就可以有条件地转让自己身体的所有权。这将成为对承诺人的身体进行惩罚或胁迫的正当的理由，因为身体现在归被承诺人所有。因此，身体的可让渡性与可强制执行的观点是相辅相成的。二者缺一不可。

So Rothbard, in rejecting the enforceable-promises theory of contract, has to also reject body alienability. As he does. However, this conclusion is apparently inconsistent with other strands of his rights theory. Rothbard wrote that “[t]he right of property implies the right to make contracts about that property.”46 Since he also views individuals as “self-owners,” meaning that one owns one’s body, then one has “the right to make contracts about that property,” according to his earlier pronouncement. (This is, in fact, Walter Block’s view.)47 To avoid accepting body alienability, Rothbard must find a reason why the body, although owned, is not alienable—even though the owner of property “can make contracts about it.”

因此，罗斯巴德在否定的可执行承诺理论时，也必须否定身体的可让渡性。正如他所做的那样。然而，这一结论显然与他的权利理论的其他方面不一致。罗斯巴德写道：”财产权意味着就该财产订立的权利。”[430] 既然他也将个人视为 “自我所有者”，即一个人拥有自己的身体，那么根据他早先的表述，一个人就有 “就该财产订立的权利”。(事实上，这也是沃尔特-布洛克的观点。）[431] 为了避免承认身体的可让渡性，罗斯巴德必须找到一个理由，说明为什么身体虽然被拥有，却不可让渡——即使财产所有者 “可以就身体订立”。

What argument does he produce to show that our bodies are not alienable? Like other libertarians, Rothbard, in essence, argues that slavery or other personal service contracts are not enforceable because there is some sort of logical impossibility involved in voluntarily alienating one’s rights to one’s body.48 He reasons that it is literally impossible to transfer one’s actual will to another, so a promise to do so is null and void; title thereto cannot be transferred. It is like contracting to sell the sun to someone. Such a contract, having an impossible object, would be null and void from the outset.

他提出了什么论据来证明我们的身体是不可让渡的呢？与其他自由意志主义学者一样，罗斯巴德实质上也认为，奴役或其他个人服务是不可执行的，因为自愿让渡自己对身体的权利在逻辑上是不可能的。[432] 他的理由是，将一个人的实际意志转让给另一个人实际上是不可能的，因此这样做的承诺是无效的，其所有权不能转让。这就好比签订将太阳卖给某人。这样一个有着不可能目标的从一开始就是空洞无效的。

The problem with this view is that it assumes that a person’s will has to be transferred in order for him to become a slave, or for others to have the right to control his body. But this is not necessary. Rather, the slave owner need only have the right to use force against the recalcitrant slave. It is true that one cannot alienate direct control of his body; one person can only have indirect control of another’s body. Yet, we own animals, even though the animals retain direct control over their actions. The owner exerts indirect control over the animal’s actions, e.g., by coercing or otherwise manipulating the animal to get the animal to do what the owner desires.

这种观点的问题在于，它假定一个人的意志必须转让，他才能成为奴隶，或者他人才有权控制他的身体。但这是不必要的。相反，奴隶主只需有权对顽抗的奴隶使用武力。的确，一个人不能转让对自己身体的直接控制权；一个人只能间接控制他人的身体。然而，我们拥有动物，尽管动物保留了对其自身行为的直接控制。主人对动物的行为实施间接控制，例如，通过胁迫或以其他方式操纵动物，让动物按照主人的意愿行事。

Likewise, aggressors may be jailed or punished—in short, “enslaved”—by the victim or his agent or heirs.49 In effect, the aggressor’s body is owned by his victim. This is despite the fact that the jailed aggressor still retains a will and direct control of his body; the jailer can only exert indirect control over him. The “impossibility” of an aggressor alienating his will does not prevent him from alienating title to his body—giving someone else the right to exert (admittedly indirect) control over his body—by committing an act of aggression.

同样，侵害者也可能被受害者或其代理人或继承人监禁或惩罚，简而言之，即被 “奴役”。 [433]实际上，侵害者的身体归受害者所有。尽管被囚禁的侵害者仍保留着意志和对其身体的直接控制，狱卒只能对其进行间接控制。侵害者 “不可能 “让渡其意志，但这并不妨碍他通过实施侵害行为让渡其身体的所有权——赋予他人对其身体实施（诚然是间接的）控制的权利。

It would seem, therefore, that the impossibility of alienating one’s will does not prevent a person from being owned by others, or others from having rights to control the person’s body. Thus, the impossibility of alienating the will should not be a barrier to making contracts regarding the right to control one’s body.

因此，无法让渡自己的意愿似乎并不妨碍一个人被他人拥有，也不妨碍他人有权控制这个人的身体。因此，无法让渡意志不应成为就控制自己身体的权利订立的障碍。

Rothbard’s error was to presume that ownership implies the power to transfer the property’s title: the owning-implies-selling fallacy. This necessitated the convoluted and flawed impossibility-of-the-will argument in favor of body-inalienability. The modified title-transfer theory proposed here recognizes that the body is “owned” only in the sense that a person has the sole right to control the body and repel invasions of its borders. But the body is not homesteaded and acquired, and cannot be abandoned by intent in the same way that homesteaded property can.

罗斯巴德的错误在于假定所有权意味着转让财产所有权的权力：拥有蕴含出售的谬误。这就需要提出迂回曲折、漏洞百出的 “不可让渡的意志 “论证，以支持身体的不可让渡性。这里提出的修改后的所有权转让理论承认，只有当一个人拥有控制身体和抵御身体边界入侵的唯一权利时，身体才被 “拥有”。但身体并不是拓殖获取的，不能像拓殖财产那样通过意图而遗弃。

1. 补遗：罗斯巴德的错误？Addendum: Rothbard’s Mistake?

As pointed out in note 45, above, in the years since I published the original article upon which this chapter is based, I have rethought some of my criticism of Rothbard’s take on inalienability. In this chapter, I have retained my original criticism, above, from the original article, and will now try to explain my current perspective.50

正如上文注释 45 所指出的，在我发表本章所依据的原文之后的几年里，我重新思考了我对罗斯巴德不可让渡的观点的一些批评。在本章中，我保留了我在原文中提出的上述批评，现在我将试图解释我目前的观点。[434]

In other chapters I argued that rights in our bodies stem from the fact of our direct control of our bodies, drawing on Hoppe’s arguments, while property rights in external, previously unowned resources arise from original appropriation or title transfer from a previous owner by contract or for purposes of rectification.51 I have a better claim to my body than others since I have direct control over it, which gives me a more objective link to the resource of my body than to anyone else, who compared to me can at best have only indirect control of my body. Now when someone commits an act of aggression, he therefore, in effect, gives irrevocable permission to the victim to use force against the aggressor’s body for purposes of self-defense or proportionate retaliation or rectification.

在其他章节中，我借鉴霍普的论点，认为对我们身体的权利源于我们对自己身体的直接控制，而对外部的、先前无主的资源的财产权则源于先占或通过或出于纠正的目的从先前的所有者那里转让的所有权。[435]与其他人相比，我对自己的身体有更优的权利主张，因为我可以直接控制自己的身体，这使我与自己身体这一资源的联系比与其他任何人都更客观，因为与我相比，其他人最多只能对我的身体进行间接控制。因此，当某人实施侵犯行动时，他实际上不可撤销地允许受害者出于自卫或相称的报复或纠正的目的，对侵害者的身体使用武力。

But in the case of an attempted voluntary slavery contract, the promisor, by saying, “I promise to be your slave,” or “I give my body to you” does not commit an act of aggression. It does not create any victim who has a right to retaliate against him. So if the would-be slave decides to renege on his promise and run off, the would-be master has no right to use force to stop him. It is always current consent that matters. If a girl promises a kiss at the end of the date and the boyfriend an hour later kisses her, she cannot claim it was nonconsensual. In effect, she communicated her consent, she set up a standing presumption that is reasonable to rely on—until and unless she changes her mind. If at the end of the date she announces she no longer wants a kiss, it is that consent that matters. It is always the most recent consent that matters since this is the best evidence for what was consented to. There is nothing in libertarianism that says people cannot change their minds. To simply state that you can make an irrevocable, binding promise is just question-begging since it is just another way of sneaking in the assumption that our bodies are alienable, even though our rights to our body do not stem from homesteading or acquisition but rather from our direct control of them.

但是，在试图签订自愿为奴的情况下，承诺人说 “我答应做你的奴隶 “或 “我把身体给你”，并不构成侵犯行为。它并没有造成任何有权对他进行报复的受害者。因此，如果想成为奴隶的人决定背弃诺言逃跑，想成为主人的人无权使用武力阻止他。重要的永远是当前的同意。如果一个女孩答应在约会结束时亲吻，而男朋友在一小时后亲吻了她，她不能声称这是非自愿的。实际上，她已经表达了自己的同意，并建立了一个可依赖的合理推定——直到且除非她改变主意。如果在约会结束时，她宣布她不再想要接吻，那么她的同意才是最重要的。重要的永远是最新的同意，因为这是对同意内容的最佳证明。自由意志主义并没有说人们不能改变主意。简单地说你可以做出一个不可撤销的、有约束力的承诺，这只是在诱导问题，因为这只是以另一种方式偷偷地引入我们的身体是可以让渡的这一假设，尽管我们对身体的权利并不是源于拓殖或获取，而是源于我们对它们的直接控制。

In other words, the fundamental argument against the enforceability of voluntary slavery contracts is that ownership of bodies is based on the person’s direct control over their body. But this is similar to the “will” that Rothbard relies on in his opposition to voluntary slavery. So, as noted in the section above, when Rothbard says voluntary slavery contracts are illegitimate since it is impossible to alienate one’s will—he is basically right. Without committing an act of aggression, that is. And promising to be a slave is not an act of aggression.52

换句话说，反对自愿为奴的可执行性的基本论点是，身体的所有权是基于人对自己身体的直接控制。但这与罗斯巴德反对自愿为奴所依赖的 “意志 “类似。因此，正如上文所述，当罗斯巴德说自愿为奴是不合法的，因为不可能让渡一个人的意志——他基本上是对的。也就是说，在不实施侵犯行动的情况下。而承诺为奴并不是一种侵犯行动。[436]

D. 盗窃与监禁债务人Theft and Debtors’ Prison

Although he rejects the enforceability of voluntary slavery contracts, Rothbard inconsistently views failure to pay a debt or other agreed upon future title transfer as “implicit theft.” Writes Rothbard:

The debtor who refuses to pay his debt has stolen the property of the creditor. If the debtor is able to pay but conceals his assets, then his clear act of theft is compounded by fraud. But even if the defaulting debtor is not able to pay, he has still stolen the property of the creditor by not making his agreed-upon delivery of the creditor’s property.53

尽管罗斯巴德反对自愿为奴的可执行性，但他却前后矛盾地将不偿还债务或其他约定的未来所有权转让视为 “隐性盗窃”。罗斯巴德写道：

拒绝偿还债务的债务人盗窃了债权人的财产。如果债务人有能力偿还债务，但却隐瞒了自己的财产，那么他的明显盗窃行动就会因欺诈而变得更加严重。但是，即使债务人没有能力偿还债务，他不按约定交付债权人的财产，仍然是盗窃了债权人的财产。[437]

Rothbard is partly correct here. If, on the due date, the debtor is able to pay, then refusal to pay is theft. This is because the title to some of the money held by the debtor transferred to the creditor on the due date. At that moment, the debtor is in possession of the creditor’s property. Failure to turn it over is tantamount to theft or trespass—it is a use of the creditor’s property without his permission.

罗斯巴德在这里说得部分正确。如果在到期日，债务人有能力支付，那么拒绝支付就是盗窃。这是因为债务人持有的部分金钱的所有权在到期日转让给了债权人。在那一刻，债务人占有了债权人的财产。不交出这些钱就等同于盗窃或非法侵入——这是在未经债权人允许的情况下使用其财产。

But Rothbard’s view that it is theft “even if the defaulting debtor is not able to pay” is confused. Rothbard senses that this could justify debtors’ prison, which is tantamount to voluntary slavery, which he has already rejected. So he tries to avoid this result by arguing that imprisoning a defaulting debtor goes “far beyond proportional punishment” and, thus, is “excessive.”[438] But why? If failure to pay a debt is “implicit theft,” why can’t the “thief ” be treated as such and punished?

但罗斯巴德认为，”即使拖欠债务者无力偿还 “也是盗窃，这种观点令人困惑。罗斯巴德意识到，这可能会为监禁债务人提供正当理由，而监禁债务人无异于自愿为奴，这是他已经反对的观点。因此，他试图避免这种结果，辩称监禁债务人”远远超出了相称的惩罚”，因而是 “过度的 “54 。如果欠债不还是 “隐性盗窃”，为什么不能将 “小偷 “视为 “隐性盗窃 “并加以惩罚呢？

One reason Rothbard has to come up with a convoluted argument to avoid the voluntary slavery implicit in debtor’s prison is that he didn’t follow his own contract theory to its logical conclusion. He writes:

[W]hen a debtor purchases a good in exchange for a promise of future payment, the good cannot be considered his property until the agreed contract has been fulfilled and payment made. Until then, it remains the creditor’s property, and nonpayment would be equivalent to theft of the creditor’s property.55

罗斯巴德之所以要想出一个复杂的论点来避免监禁债务人所隐含的自愿为奴，原因之一就是他没有按照自己的理论得出合乎逻辑的结论。他写道：

[当债务人以交换未来付款的承诺购买财货时，在约定的得到履行并付款之前，该财货不能被视为他的财产。在此之前，货物仍然是债权人的财产，不付款就等于盗窃债权人的财产。[439]

This is the mistake that leads him to also classify failure to repay a debt as “implicit theft.” Suppose creditor-lender A loans $1000 to debtor-borrower B in exchange for B paying $1100 (principal plus interest) to A in a year. Now the very purpose of loaning money is to enable the borrower to spend it on some project. For example, B needs to pay C for supplies to start his snow-cone stand business. The hope is that the business is successful, B makes a profit, and is able pay A $1100. But for B to use or spend the money, to pay C, he has to fully own the money, unconditionally. In this bilateral and mutual arrangement, there are two title transfers: a present, unconditional transfer of $1000 now; a future, uncertain, and conditional payment of $1100 in the future. Why is the second transfer unconditional? Because the future is uncertain. Future things don’t yet exist. They might never come to exist. B’s business may fail. He may be dead. He may be bankrupt. A is well aware of this and, in fact, this is one reason he charges interest.

正是由于这个错误，他也把不偿还债务归类为 “隐性盗窃”。假设债权贷款人 A 借给债务借款人 B 1000 美元，条件是 B 在一年内向 A 支付 1100 美元（本金加利息）。现在，贷款的目的正是让借款人能够将其用于某个项目。例如，B 需要向 C 支付开办雪糕摊生意所需的物资款。期望的是生意成功，B 赚取利润，并能向 A 支付 1100 美元。但是，B 要使用或花费这笔钱来支付 C，就必须无条件地完全拥有这笔钱。在这种双边互惠的安排中，存在着两次所有权转让：一次是现在的、无条件的 1000 美元转让；一次是将来的、不确定的、有条件的 1100 美元支付。为什么第二次转让是有条件的？因为未来是不确定的。未来的事情还不存在。它们可能永远不会存在。B 的生意可能会失败。他可能会死。他可能会破产。A 非常清楚这一点，事实上，这也是他收取利息的原因之一。

Rothbard has lost sight here of the necessity that any property rights schema be able to answer the question of who can use what resource now, rather than waiting for some future information, otherwise people would not be able to survive because they could not use resources to produce and consume in the present.56 So the idea of implicit theft leads Rothbard to assume that debtor’s prison is in principle justifiable, which then forces him to wriggle out of it by simply declaring it to be disproportionate punishment. The entire concept of “implicit theft” must be rejected as hopelessly muddled and incompatible with libertarian principles of property rights and justice.

罗斯巴德在这里忽略了一个必要条件，那就是任何财产权模式都必须能够回答谁现在就可以使用什么资源的问题，而不是等待未来的某些信息，否则人们就无法生存，因为他们无法使用资源在当下进行生产和消费。[440] 因此，”隐性盗窃 “的概念导致罗斯巴德假定监禁债务人在原则上是正当的，这就迫使他通过简单地宣称监禁是不相称的惩罚来摆脱这一困境。整个 “隐性盗窃 “的概念必须被摒弃，因为它无可救药地混淆视听，与自由意志主义的财产权和正义原则格格不入。

Fortunately, we do not need such a convoluted argument to condemn debtor’s prison. The real reason the defaulting debtor may not be punished is that he is simply not a thief at all. If the debtor is bankrupt, there is no property to steal. The debtor is not “refusing” to turn over “the” money owed. There is no money to be turned over. How can there be theft of a non-existent thing? As discussed above, all future title transfers are necessarily conditioned on the thing’s existing at the specified transfer time. Failure to transfer something that does not exist cannot be theft; rather, one of the conditions for the title transfer has simply not been satisfied.57

幸运的是，我们不需要这样一个如此复杂的论证来谴责监禁债务人。拖欠债务者可能不会受到惩罚的真正原因是，他根本就不是小偷。如果债务人破产，就没有财产可偷。债务人并不是 “拒绝 “交出所欠的“那笔 “的钱。根本就没有钱可交。不存在的东西怎么会被盗呢？如上所述，所有未来的所有权转让都必然以该物在指定的转让时间存在为条件。未转让不存在的东西不可能是盗窃；相反，只是所有权转让的条件之一根本没有得到满足。[441]

Of course, contracts would normally contain default or explicitly spelled out ancillary title transfers to address the unavoidable possibility of future default. For instance, a default title transfer that is ancillary to the main title transfers might be that the debtor also transfers title to $1100 plus accrued interest at any time after the original due date if he is unable to repay on the due date, if and when he gets a paycheck or otherwise comes into money. Such ancillary provisions can be explicit in written contracts or be assumed as default provisions in accordance with custom and context.

当然，通常会包含违约条款或明文规定的附属所有权转让条款，以应对未来不可避免的违约可能。例如，附属于主所有权转让的违约所有权转让可能是：如果债务人在到期日无法偿还，在他拿到工资或以其他方式进钱时，债务人也会在原到期日之后的任何时间转让 1100 美元及应计利息的所有权。这类附属条款可以在书面中明确规定，也可以根据习惯和上下文假定为默认条款。

E. 欺诈Fraud

As noted earlier,58 libertarians often claim to believe in the nonaggression principle, or NAP, and that the NAP prohibits not only the initiation of force against the person of someone else (self-ownership) but also prohibits the use of force against the property of someone else—or threats thereof, or fraud.59 But including owned resources under the NAP rubric is somewhat awkward, since aggression would seem to literally refer to physically attacking another’s body. And then threats and fraud are just tacked on. As I previously noted, using the NAP as a shorthand for this cluster of relative rights is fine as long it is kept in mind that the justifications for these are different. I argued in chapters 2, 4, and elsewhere that self-ownership rights (and thus the prohibition on aggression) stem from each person’s direct control of his body; but that actors also acquire property rights in external, previously-unowned resources by original appropriation or contractual acquisition from a previous owner. I argued in chapter 5 (section IV.F) why threats are also types of aggression under libertarian principles.

如前所述，[442] 自由意志主义者经常声称自己信奉互不侵犯原则（NAP），认为 NAP 不仅禁止对他人的人身使用武力（自我所有权），而且禁止对他人的财产使用武力——或以武力相威胁，或欺诈。[443] 但将拥有的资源纳入互不侵犯原则的范畴有些突兀，因为从字面上看，侵犯似乎是指对他人身体的物理攻击。而威胁和欺诈则是附加的。正如我之前所指出的，只要记住这些权利的正当性是不同的，将 NAP 用作这一系列相对权利的简称是可以的。我在第 2 章、第 4 章和其他章节中论证过，自我所有权（从而禁止侵犯）源于每个人对自己身体的直接控制；但行动人也可以通过先占或通过从先前的所有者那里获得外部的、先前无主的资源的财产权。我在第五章（第四.F 节）中论证了为什么威胁也是自由意志主义原则下的侵犯类型。

The theory of contract espoused here demonstrates that fraud is properly viewed as a type of theft, if defined properly. The problem is that even some libertarians use the term loosely, which leads to error. Sometimes it is just used to mean dishonesty; other times in support of the idea of “implicit theft,” a concept I have criticized above.60 But because of the sloppy use of the term, failure to provide clear definitions, and lack of appreciation of Rothbard’s and Evers’s groundbreaking title-transfer theory of contract elaborated, refined, and extended in this chapter, libertarian theory is left vulnerable to criticism, such as that of James Child and others, discussed below.

这里所信奉的理论表明，如果定义得当，欺诈被正确地视为盗窃的一种。问题是，即使是一些自由意志主义者也不严格地使用这一术语，从而导致错误。有时它只是用来指不诚实；有时则用来支持 “隐性盗窃 “的观点，我在上文对这一概念进行了批评。[444] 但是，由于对该术语的草率使用，未能提供明确的定义，以及缺乏对罗斯巴德和埃弗斯在本章中阐述、完善和扩展的开创性的所有权转让理论的理解，自由意志主义理论很容易受到批评，例如下文将讨论的詹姆斯-柴尔德（James Child）等人的批评。

The only type of “fraud” that can count as a violation of libertarian principles, is when it amounts to a type of theft. The Rothbard-Evers title-transfer of contract (after being pruned of its confused “implicit theft” branches) can help to make this clear. Suppose Karen buys a bucket of apples from Ethan for $20.61 Ethan represents the things in the bucket as being apples, in fact, as apples of a certain nature, that is, as being fit for their normal purpose of being eaten. Karen conditions the transfer of title to her $20 on Ethan’s not knowingly engaging in “fraudulent” type activities, like pawning off rotten apples. (Good faith is also a default background interpretative condition to the contractual title transfers.)62 If the apples are indeed rotten and Ethan knows this,then he knows that he does not receive ownership of or permission to use the $20, because the condition “no fraud” is not satisfied. He is knowingly in possession of Karen’s $20 without her consent, and is, therefore, a thief.

唯一可以算作违反自由意志主义原则的 “欺诈”，是当它构成一种盗窃时。罗斯巴德-埃弗斯（Rothbard-Evers）的所有权转让（在删去其混乱的 “隐性盗窃 “分支之后）可以帮助我们明确这一点。假设凯伦以 20 美元的价格从伊森那里买了一桶苹果。[445] 伊森表示桶里的东西是苹果，事实上，是具有某种性质的苹果，也就是说，是适合于正常食用目的的苹果。凯伦将其 20 美元的所有权转让给伊森的条件是，伊森不得故意从事 “欺诈 “类活动，如出售烂苹果。(诚信也是所有权转让的默认背景解释条件。）[446] 如果苹果确实是烂的，而且伊桑知道这一点，那么他就知道他没有获得 20 美元的所有权或使用许可，因为 “无欺诈 “的条件没有得到满足。他在未经凯伦同意的情况下明知故犯地占有了凯伦的 20 美元，因此他是一个小偷。

This is akin to the legal notion of larceny by trick:

Under common law, larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent to steal. Larceny by trick is distinguishable in that a defendant who commits larceny by trick obtains only possession of the personal property of another, not title of that property. Also, the defendant who commits larceny by trick obtains possession of the property by intentionally making a false statement to the victim.63

这类似于法律上“欺诈盗窃”的概念：

根据普通法，“盗窃罪 “是指以偷窃为目的，非法占有并携带他人个人财产的行为。欺诈盗窃的区别在于，实施欺诈盗窃的被告仅获取了他人个人财产的占有权，而非该财产的所有权。此外，实施欺诈盗窃的被告是通过故意向受害者作出虚假陈述来获取财产的占有权。[447]

This libertarian take on fraud is also more or less compatible with conventional legal doctrines: “In law, fraud is intentional deception to secure unfair or unlawful gain, or to deprive a victim of a legal right.”64

这种关于欺诈的自由意志主义观点或多或少也与传统的法律原则相兼容：“在法律上，欺诈是故意欺骗以获取不公平或非法的利益，或者剥夺受害者的合法权利。” [448]

The reason this conception of fraud follows from libertarian property rights principles and the title-transfer theory of contract is that ownership of a resource (including one’s body) gives one the right to exclude others from using the resource. The owner can grant permission or deny permission by communicating his consent to others. In the case of alienable, owned things, the owner can allow someone to use the thing temporarily (loaning my car to a friend for a day), give it outright (a gift), or agree to give up title to it in exchange for some act or other title transfer from the other party. This is what contracting is: the exercise of property rights by the owner communicating his consent about who can use the property and under what conditions. If I loan you my car, you are the temporary possessor, not the owner. Possession and ownership are distinct. I can transfer ownership but not possession, or vice-versa; or both; or neither. In the example above, when Ethan takes possession of Karen’s $20, he only has possession,not ownership, since Karen made the transfer of title to the money conditional upon the apples being genuine.65

这种欺诈概念之所以源于自由意志主义的财产权原则和所有权转让的理论，是因为对资源（包括自己的身体）的所有权赋予了一个人排除他人使用该资源的权利。所有者可以通过向他人表示同意来授予许可或拒绝许可。就可让渡的所有物而言，所有者可以允许他人临时使用该物（把我的车借给朋友一天）、直接赠送（礼物），或者同意放弃该物的所有权，以换取对方的某种行动或其他所有权转让。这就是：所有者行使财产权，就谁可以使用财产以及在什么条件下使用财产传达他的同意。如果我把车借给你，你是临时占有人，而不是所有者。占有权和所有权是不同的。我可以转让所有权，但不能转让占有权，反之亦然；或者两者都转让；或者两者都不转让。在上面的例子中，当伊森占有凯伦的 20 美元时，他只有占有权而没有所有权，因为凯伦转让这笔钱的所有权取决于苹果是真的。[449]

Once understood this way, the criticisms of libertarianism for being unable to justify fraud law can be seen as confused and flawed. James W. Child, for example, is wrong in asserting that “the basic moral principles of libertarianism do not support a prohibition of fraud.”66 Benjamin Ferguson argues that Child is correct that libertarianism does not prohibit fraud, but that we can oppose fraud by “appealing to an external theory of moral permissibility.”67 Ferguson is also incorrect, like Child, in his first point, so the second part of his thesis is unnecessary; libertarianism already prohibits fraud and does not need patching with external theories.

一旦以这种方式理解，那些认为自由意志主义无法为欺诈法提供正当理由的批评就可以被视为混乱和有缺陷的。例如，詹姆斯·W·柴尔德声称“自由意志主义的基本道德原则不支持禁止欺诈”是错误的。[450]本杰明·弗格森认为柴尔德关于自由意志主义不禁止欺诈的观点是正确的，但我们可以通过“诉诸外部的道德许可理论”来反对欺诈。[451]弗格森和蔡尔德一样，在他的第一点上也是错误的，所以他论文的第二部分是不必要的；自由意志主义已经禁止欺诈，不需要用外部理论来修补。

IV. 结论CONCLUSION

The title-transfer theory of contract avoids the problems of detrimental reliance and consideration-based defenses of contract. It permits gratuitous contracts without inventing arcane doctrines or burdensome formalities and provides a conceptually elegant theory of contract that can provide damages for breach of promises to perform, similar to modern legal systems.

所有权转让的理论避免了致害依赖和基于对价的抗辩问题。它允许无偿，而无需创造晦涩难明的理论或繁琐的形式，并提供了一种概念上优雅的理论，可为违反履行承诺提供损害赔偿，与现代法律制度类似。

This view of contract also solves the problems of voluntary slavery contracts and debtors’ prison and avoids convoluted arguments for inalienability. Finally, the framework presented herein provides a justification for outlawing fraud.

这种观还解决了自愿为奴和监禁债务人问题，避免了不可让渡性的复杂论证。最后，本文提出的框架将欺诈定为非法提供了正当理由。

Inalienability and Punishment:A Reply to George Smith

第十章不可让渡性与惩罚：对乔治•史密斯的回应

George H. Smith published “A Killer’s Right to Life” in Liberty magazine in 1996, making various arguments and claims about inalienability.* I responded in the Journal of Libertarian Studies,† in a piece which complements and supplements my previous articles on the inalienability and punishment issues, now chapters 5 and 9 in the present volume. Despite my disagreements with Smith on this issue, I respect and have learned from his work, such as his great essay “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market.”††

乔治-H-史密斯 1996 年在《自由》杂志上发表了 “一个凶手的生命权 “一文，对不可让渡性提出了各种论点和主张。* 我在《自由意志主义研究杂志》†上发表了一篇文章，对我以前关于不可让渡性和惩罚问题的文章（即本书的第 5 章和第 9 章）进行了补充和完善。尽管在这个问题上我与斯密有分歧，但我尊重他的工作，并从他的工作中学习，诸如他的名篇《自由市场中的正义的企业家精神》††。

* George H. Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” Liberty 10, no. 2 (Nov. 1996; https:// perma.cc/8U8C-ZTAR): 49–54 & 68–69.

* 乔治·H·史密斯，《凶手的生命权》，《自由》第 10 卷，第 2 期（1996 年 11 月；https://perma.cc/8U8C-ZTAR）：49-54 页及 68-69 页。

† Stephan Kinsella, “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith,” J. Libertarian Stud. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998–99): 79–93. Smith’s article was also criticized in the May 1997 issue of Liberty. See John C. Goodman, “Do Inalienable Rights Outlaw Punishment?”, Liberty 10, no. 5 (May 1997; https://perma.cc/4TMF-2S5R): 47–49; Timothy Virkkala, “The Hollow Ring of Inalienability,” Liberty 10, no. 5 (May 1997; https://perma.cc/4TMF- 2S5R): 49–50. Smith’s response was “Inalienable Rights?,” Liberty 10, no. 6 ( July 1997; https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK): 51–56; Virkkala’s response was “The Stilted Logic of Natural Rights,” Liberty 10, no. 6 ( July 1997; https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK): 56.

† 斯蒂芬·金塞拉，《不可让渡性与惩罚：对乔治·史密斯的回应》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 14 卷，第 1 期（1998-1999 年冬季）：79-93 页。史密斯的文章在 1997 年 5 月的《自由》杂志上也受到了批评。见约翰·C·古德曼，《不可让渡的权利是否将惩罚视为非法？》，《自由》第 10 卷，第 5 期（1997 年 5 月；https://perma.cc/4TMF-2S5R）：47-49 页；蒂莫西·维尔卡拉，《不可让渡性的空洞之环》，《自由》第 10 卷，第 5 期（1997 年 5 月；https://perma.cc/4TMF-2S5R）：49-50 页。史密斯的回应是《不可让渡的权利？》，《自由》第 10 卷，第 6 期（1997 年 7 月；https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK）：51-56 页；维尔卡拉的回应是《自然权利的生硬逻辑》，《自由》第 10 卷，第 6 期（1997 年 7 月；https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK）：56 页。

†† George H. Smith, “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market,” in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1991). Smith, who passed away in 2022, was a thoughtful and provocative libertarian theorist. See, for example, idem, Atheism: The Case Against God (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1979); idem, Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies.

†† 乔治·H·史密斯，《自由市场中的正义的企业家精神》，收录于《无神论、安·兰德及其他异端邪说》（纽约州布法罗：普罗米修斯图书，1991 年）。史密斯于 2022 年去世，他是一位深思熟虑且具有启发性的自由意志主义理论家。例如，可参见他的《无神论：反对上帝的理由》（纽约州布法罗：普罗米修斯图书，1979 年）；同上，《无神论、安·兰德及其他异端邪说》。

It can reasonably be argued that capital punishment is immoral or problematic because of the danger of executing an innocent person by mistake.1 George Smith, in a recent Liberty magazine article in which he argues against capital punishment, does not take this approach. Instead, Smith states that capital punishment is never permissible, even where “reasonable doubt is impossible and where the crimes have been especially heinous.”2 In other words, even if we know beyond all doubt that someone has committed murder, it is impermissible to execute him (and also, presumably, to inflict less severe punishment). Smith bases his argument on the concept of “inalienable rights,” rights that “cannot be transferred, surrendered, or forfeited.”3 The argument runs roughly as follows. Libertarians must adopt one of two positions: (1) everyone has inalienable rights, in which case even a (known) murderer may not be executed; or (2) certain crimes may be punished with death, in which case the theory of inalienable rights must be abandoned. In Smith’s opinion, position (2) “would be catastrophic, for we cannot construct a libertarian theory of justice except on a foundation of inalienable rights.” 4

可以合理地认为，死刑是不道德或存在问题的，因为存在误杀无辜者的危险。乔治-史密斯（George Smith）在《自由》杂志最近发表的一篇反对死刑的文章中并没有采取这种观点。[452]相反，史密斯指出，死刑是绝对不允许的，即使是在 “合理怀疑不可能存在，且罪行极其恶劣的情况下 “。[453]换句话说，即使我们毫无疑问地知道某人犯下了谋杀罪，也不允许对他执行死刑（大概也不允许处以较轻的刑罚。史密斯的论点基于 “不可让渡的权利 “这一概念，即 “不可转让、交出或放弃的权利 “。[454]论证大致如下。自由意志主义必须采取两种立场中的一种：（1）每个人都有不可让渡的权利，在这种情况下，即使是（已知的）杀人犯也不可被处死；或者（2）某些罪行可以处以死刑，在这种情况下，不可让渡的权利理论必须被放弃。在史密斯看来，立场（2）”将是灾难性的，因为除非建立在不可让渡的权利的基础上，否则我们无法构建自由意志主义的正义理论”。[455]

Smith’s entire argument, then, rests on the notion that libertarianism and justice require inalienable rights. There are either “inalienable” rights, or there are no rights at all. Yet Smith’s arguments for why libertarianism requires that rights be inalienable are unpersuasive.

因此，史密斯的整个论证都建立在这样一个概念之上，即自由意志主义和正义需要不可让渡的权利。要么有 “不可让渡的 “权利，要么根本没有权利。然而，史密斯关于为什么自由意志主义要求权利不可让渡的论证是没有说服力的。

长期威胁STANDING THREATS

One of Smith’s approaches is to provide an argument for capital punishment based on the notion of self-defense and then to attack this argument as insufficient. Smith writes:

Some years ago during a summer conference, Randy Barnett and I sat down to see whether we could manufacture a defense of capital punishment. The best we could come up with was the notion of a “standing threat.” This is based on John Locke’s treatment of reparation and restraining, which “are the only reasons, why one Man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment.”5

史密斯的方法之一是根据自卫的概念为死刑提供论据，然后攻击这一论据不足。史密斯写道：

几年前，在一次夏季会议上，兰迪-巴尼特和我坐下来研究我们能否为死刑辩护。我们所能想到的最好的办法就是 “长期威胁 “的概念。这是基于约翰-洛克对赔偿和限制的处理，”这是一个人可以合法地伤害另一个人的唯一理由，也就是我们所说的惩罚 “。[456]

Thus, according to Locke, we may kill an aggressor in self-defense, since he has placed the victim and aggressor in a “state of war.” Similarly, a case could be made that a convicted aggressor may be executed, on the grounds that he is a “standing threat” to others.

因此，根据洛克的观点，我们可以出于自卫杀死侵害者，因为他使受害者和侵害者处于 “战争状态”。同样，我们也可以以侵害者对他人构成 “长期威胁 “为由，将被定罪的侵害者处死。

Rejecting this argument, Smith notes:

To kill someone as a “standing threat” in the name of self-defense may amount to little more than a surreptitious effort to smuggle capital punishment in through the back door of libertarian theory, having denied it entrance through the front.6

史密斯在驳斥这一论点时指出：

以自卫的名义将某人作为 “长期威胁 “加以杀害，可能只不过是在拒绝死刑从前门进入之后，偷偷地从自由意志主义理论的后门将其偷运进来而已。[457]

Smith is correct here: it is not for reasons of self-defense that a victim has a right to punish an aggressor.7 However, this does not mean punishment (retribution or retaliation) is impermissible, only that self-defense is not sufficient to justify punishment.

史密斯在这里是正确的：受害者有权惩罚侵害者并不是出于自卫。[458]然而，这并不意味着惩罚（报应或报复）是不允许的，只是说自卫不足以成为惩罚的正当理由。

巴尼特论惩罚BARNETT ON PUNISHMENT

Let me briefly note the following. Smith states:

For years [Barnett] has brilliantly elaborated on the pure theory of restitution as the only acceptable model of libertarian punishment, and he recognizes that the death penalty cannot be incorporated within this model.”8

请允许我简要说明如下。史密斯说：

多年来，[巴尼特]出色地阐述了纯粹的赔偿理论，将其作为唯一可接受的自由意志主义惩罚模式，并且他认识到死刑不能纳入这一模式 “。[459]

Admittedly, Barnett does appear to believe that even guilty aggressors have a right against punishment. But he does not claim to have justified such a right in his writings on restitution. In his published works on this issue, Barnett opposes a punishment-based system because hebelie ves it may deter crime less than would a restitution-based system, and also because the unavoidable possibility of error can lead to “infliction of harm on the innocent.”9 He does not, however, provide a strong argument that punishing an actual aggressor violates his rights. Indeed, in his book The Structure of Liberty, Barnett states: “this analysis cannot conclusively prove that no combination of compensation or punishment can ever address effectively the compliance problem.”10 And further: “I do not claim to have completely demonstrated this proposition [that justice requires restitution, not punishment] either in my earlier writings, or in this book.”11

诚然，巴尼特似乎确实认为，即使有罪的侵害者也有不受惩罚的权利。但他并没有主张自己在有关赔偿的著作中证明了这种权利的正当性。在已出版的有关著作中，巴尼特反对以惩罚为基础的制度，因为他认为这种制度对犯罪的威慑力可能小于以赔偿为基础的制度，还因为不可避免的错误可能导致 “对无辜者造成伤害”。[460]然而，他并未提供有力的证据来证明惩罚侵害者是侵犯了侵害者的权利。事实上，巴尼特在其《自由的结构》一书中指出：“这一分析并不能最终证明，任何补偿或惩罚的组合都不能有效地解决合规问题。” [461]10 而且，“无论是在我早期的作品中，还是在本书中，我都没有声称已经完全证明了这一命题[正义需要补偿，而不是惩罚]”。[462]

Thus, although Barnett opposes punishment for a variety of reasons,12 those that are given to buttress his case in favor of restitution do not rest on viewing rights as inalienable and, in my view, Barnett has never demonstrated that rights are inalienable in the sense usedby Smith.13

因此，尽管巴尼特由于各种原因反对惩罚，[463] 但为支持他赞成赔偿的观点所给出的那些理由并非基于将权利视为不可让渡的观点，而且在我看来，巴尼特从未证明权利在史密斯所使用的意义上是不可让渡的。[464]

自卫、赔偿和不可让渡性DEFENSE, RESTITUTION, AND INALIENABILITY

Another problem with Smith’s assertion that rights are inalienable is just that: it is merely an assertion. Simply labeling rights over and over again with the modifier “inalienable” doesnot make it so.14 Libertarians do not typically view rights as “inalienable” in Smith’s sense, or put much weight on this concept. In fact, viewing rights as alienable is perfectly consistent with—indeed, implied by—the libertarian non-aggression principle.15

史密斯关于权利是不可让渡的论断的另一个问题在于：这仅仅只是一个论断。一遍又一遍地用“不可让渡的”这个修饰词来描述权利，并不能使其成为事实。[465] 自由意志主义通常不认为权利是史密斯意义上的 “不可让渡的”，也不重视这一概念。事实上，将权利视为可让渡的，与自由意志主义的 “互不侵犯 “原则是完全一致的，也是被原则所隐含的。[466]

Under this principle, only the initiation of force is prohibited; defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory force—more generally, “responsive” force—is not. One does alienate or forfeit certain rights by committing acts of aggression.16 This is exactly why it is permissible to use force to defend against or punish aggression, or to obtain restitution. One has a natural, not inalienable, right to be free from aggression.

根据这一原则，只有首先使用武力是被禁止的；防御性的、赔偿性的或报复性的武力——更广泛地说，“回应性的”武力——则不是。一个人通过实施侵犯行动确实会放弃或丧失某些权利。[467]这正是为什么使用武力来抵御或惩罚侵犯，或获得赔偿是被允许的。一个人拥有不受侵犯的自然权利，而非不可让渡的权利。

Both defensive and restitutive force, like punitive (retributive or retaliatory) force, imply some alienation of rights. This is just why defensive or restitutive force is considered to be permissible: because the aggressor has alienated his right to be free of such force. If one is opposed to punishment on inalienability grounds, how can one then endorse defensive or restitutive force? As John Goodman correctly notes, Smith’s argument against the death penalty is an argument against punishment as such, and even against defensive or restitutive force.17 Thus, to be consistent, Smith has to either object to any use of force against an aggressor, including even self-defense, or admit that rights are not truly inalienable.18

防卫性武力和赔偿性武力与惩罚性（报应性或报复性）武力一样，都意味着某种权利的让渡。这正是防卫性武力或赔偿性武力被认为是允许的原因：因为侵害者已经让渡了不受这种武力侵害的权利。如果一个人以不可让渡的理由反对惩罚，那么他又怎么能赞同防卫性或赔偿性武力呢？正如约翰-古德曼正确指出的那样，史密斯反对死刑的论点是反对惩罚本身的论点，甚至是反对防卫性或赔偿性武力的论点。[468]17 因此，为了保持一致，史密斯要么反对对侵害者使用任何武力，甚至包括自卫，要么承认权利并非真正不可让渡的。[469]

So which is it? Is Smith inconsistent, or does he consistently object to all force? Smith has apparently flip-flopped on this issue. At first, he seems to acknowledge that rights are not really inalienable: “I agree with Locke that reparation (restitution) and restraint (self-defense) are the only justified uses of violence in a free society.”19 But a justified use of violence implies some alienation of rights. Yet later, Smith appears to change his mind:

Goodman argues that my case against capital punishment, if consistently applied, would militate against all forms of punishment, such as fines and imprisonment. I freely concede that this is a major problem for the libertarian theory of restitution.… Can we imprison someone and compel him to work off his debt? … These and other questions have not been adequately examined, much less answered, by libertarians, and I remain uncertain about how to deal with them.20

那么到底是哪种情况？史密斯是前后不一致，还是他一贯反对所有武力？史密斯在这个问题上显然态度反复。起初，他似乎承认权利并非真正不可让渡：“我同意洛克的观点，即补偿（赔偿）和约束（自卫）是自由社会中使用暴力的唯一正当合理的方式。”[470] 但正当合理地使用暴力意味着一定程度的权利让渡。然而后来，史密斯似乎改变了想法：

古德曼认为，如果一贯适用，我反对死刑的观点会对所有形式的惩罚，如罚款和监禁产生不利影响。我欣然承认这对自由意志主义的赔偿理论来说是一个重大问题……我们能监禁某人并强迫他工作以偿还债务吗？……这些以及其他问题自由意志主义者尚未进行充分研究，更不用说回答了，我亦仍然不确定如何处理它们。[471]

Smith’s view of the inalienability of rights has clearly led him down a dead end. If he is consistent, he must condemn all uses of force, even defensive and restitutive. (Such a position might be referred to as “stupid,” or, perhaps, “Darwinian,” pacifism.)21 If, however, he admits that defensive and restitutive force are permissible, he has admitted rights are not inalienable, and thus, he cannot oppose punishment on grounds of inalienability.

史密斯关于权利不可让渡的观点显然使他陷入了死胡同。如果他始终如一，他就必须谴责所有武力的使用，甚至包括自卫和赔偿性的武力。（这样的立场可称之为“愚蠢的”，或者也许是“达尔文式的”和平主义。）[472] 然而，如果他承认防御性和赔偿性的武力是允许的，他就承认了权利并非不可剥夺的，因此，他不能基于不可让渡性来反对惩罚。

相称惩罚的权利THE RIGHT OF PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT

As I have argued at greater length elsewhere,22 an individual has a right to use force against an aggressor in response to aggression. This right to use force can be utilized for a variety of purposes: for self-defense during or before the act of aggression, for revenge, to obtain restitution (or rectification), to prevent the aggressor from committing further crimes, or to deter others from committing crimes. What the victim wants to use the right for is his business. But the reason why a victim has a right to retaliate or defend against an aggressor is that the aggressor cannot coherently withhold his consent to retaliatory, defensive, or restitutive force (these may be considered different types of responsive force, that is, non-initiated force, force which is in response to initiated force). To use related legalterminology, the aggressor is “estopped,” or precluded, from denying the victim’s right to use (proportional) responsive force, since such a denial would contradict the aggressor’s view that the use of force is permissible (the view ineluctably demonstrated by the act of aggression).23

正如我在其他地方详细论述的那样，[473] 个人有权对侵害者使用武力，以应对侵害。这种使用武力的权利可用于多种目的：在侵犯行为期间或之前进行自卫、复仇、获得赔偿（或纠正）、防止侵害者进一步犯罪或阻止他人犯罪。至于受害者想利用这项权利做什么，那是他自己的事。但是，受害者之所以有权对侵害者进行报复或防卫，是因为侵害者不能前后一致地拒绝同意报复性、防卫性或赔偿性武力（这些可被视为不同类型的回应性武力，即非主动性武力，是对主动性武力的回应）。使用相关的法律术语，侵害者被”禁止反言 “或被排除否认受害者使用（相称的）回应性武力的权利，因为这种否认将与侵害者允许使用武力的观点相矛盾（侵害行动不可避免地证明了这一观点）。[474]

Thus, eye-for-an-eye type proportional punishments are legitimate in response to aggression. A murderer, therefore, is estopped from objecting to his own capital punishment. He can no longer claim a right to be free from such treatment. Since he previously had such a right, the right that he previously had must have evaporated. We may say, then, that his right to not have force used against him has been alienated (or forfeited, waived, abandoned, relinquished, surrendered, or lost; the terminology is not important).24

因此，以眼还眼式的相称惩罚对于回应侵犯是合法的。因此，一个杀人犯不能反对对他自己执行死刑。他不能再主张免受这种处罚的权利。尽管他之前拥有这样的权利，但他之前拥有的权利如今必然已经消失。那么，我们可以说，他不被使用武力对待的权利已经被剥夺或丧失、放弃、抛弃、让渡、交出或失去；术语并不重要）。[475]

惩罚的效用THE UTILITY OF PUNISHMENT

There are further errors in Smith’s article. Consider, for example, Smith’s view that restitution is superior to punishment as a basis for criminal justice. Smith argues that punishing an aggressor “does not restore or equalize rights; it simply wipes out another set of rights,” and that allowing retaliation only provides, at most, “a sense of emotional balance” to the victim. Several responses to this argument can be made. First, Smith here begs the question of whether rights are inalienable by assuming that the aggressor has a set of rights to be violated. If the aggressor’s rights were alienated, proportionally punishing him does not “wipe out his rights,” as he had none left to wipe out.

史密斯的文章中还有其他错误。例如，史密斯认为，作为刑事司法的基础，赔偿优于惩罚。史密斯认为，惩罚侵害者 “并不能恢复或均衡权利；它只是抹杀了另一套权利”，允许报复最多只能给受害者提供 “一种情感上的平衡感”。对这一论点可以做出几种回应。首先，史密斯在此提出了权利是否不可让渡的问题，他假定侵害者有一套权利要被侵犯。如果侵害者的权利被让渡了，那么对他进行相称的惩罚并不能 “消灭他的权利”，因为他已经没有权利可以消灭了。

Second, just because punishment does not restore rights, it is not clear why restitution is automatically superior, since restitution does not restore rights either. It is true that the consequences and fact of an act of aggression can never be undone. The indignity will always have been suffered. Any response by a victim, including restitution and retribution, will always be an imperfect remedy. Indeed, this is one reason why aggression is impermissible: because the harm done thereby is literally undoable, incalculable, and not subject to an adequate remedy.25 A victim will always remain, to some extent, a victim.

其次，仅仅因为惩罚不能恢复权利，不清楚为什么赔偿就自动具有优越性，因为赔偿也不能恢复权利。诚然，侵犯行为的后果和事实永远无法挽回。侮辱伤害永远都会存在。受害者的任何反应，包括赔偿和报复，永远都是不完美的补救措施。事实上，这也是不允许侵犯的原因之一：因为侵犯造成的伤害实际上是无法弥补、无法估量的，也没有适当的补救办法。[476]受害者在某种程度上永远都会是受害者。

This does not, however, dictate that the victim should be artificially restricted in choosing among various imperfect remedies. Admittedly, both inflicting punishment on an aggressor (retribution) and extracting monetary damages from him (restitution) are imperfect remedies. But why not let the victim decide which one, or which combination of these, he prefers?26 After all, the victim did not ask to be made a victim. He did not ask to be put in the position of having only two imperfect possible remedies available to him. If a victim prefers to torture his torturer, who is Smith to say that the victim’s preference is not rational? Unlike Smith, I am not so unwilling to allow victims to attempt to attain “a sense of emotional balance,” if that is all that is possible to them. (Like Barnett, however, I am concerned about the unavoidable possibility of mistakenly punishing the innocent, and thus admit the appeal of a restitution-based system in order to avoid punishing innocents, but not for reasons of inalienability.)27

然而，这并不意味着受害者在选择各种不完善的补救办法时受到人为的限制。诚然，对侵害者实施惩罚（报复）和向其索取金钱损害赔偿（赔偿）都是不完善的补救办法。但是，为什么不让受害者决定他更喜欢哪一种或哪一种的组合呢？[477]毕竟，受害者并没有要求成为受害者。他并没有要求被置于只有两种不完美的可能补救办法可供他选择的境地。如果受害者宁愿折磨折磨他的人，史密斯有什么资格说受害者的选择不理性呢？与史密斯不同的是，我并不那么不愿意让受害者试图获得 “一种情感的平衡感”，如果这对他们来说是唯一可能的话。(然而，与巴尼特一样，我也担心不可避免地会错误地惩罚无辜者，因此承认以赔偿为基础的制度的吸引力，以避免惩罚无辜者，但不是出于不可让渡的原因）。[478]

The right to inflict (proportional) punishment on one’s aggressor can be useful in other ways as well. Most significantly, perhaps, it may be utilized to reach a more objective determination of the proper amount of restitution. For example, the victim may trade all or part of his right to retaliate for a payment (“ransom”) or other service by the aggressor, i.e., the aggressor buys his way out of punishment.28 A serious aggression leads to the right to inflict more severe punishment on the aggressor, which would thus tend to be traded for a higher average amount of ransom or restitution than for comparatively minor crimes. Further, a victim especially offended or traumatized by aggression (and thus subjectively “damaged” more severely) will tend to bargain for a higher ransom. Also, richer aggressors will tend to be willing to pay more ransom to avoid the punishment the victim has a right to inflict.29 Thus, allowing punishment to be traded for damages solves the so-called millionaire or billionaire problem faced under a pure restitution system, where a rich man may commit crimes with impunity, since he can simply pay easily-affordable restitution after committing the crime.

对侵害者实施（相称的）惩罚的权利在其他方面也是有用的。最重要的也许是，它可以用来更客观地确定适当的赔偿数额。例如，受害者可以用其全部或部分报复权来换取侵害者的付款（”赎金”）或其他服务，即侵害者用自己的方式摆脱惩罚。[479] 严重的侵害导致侵害者有权受到更严厉的惩罚，因此，与相对较轻的犯罪相比，受害者往往会用更高的平均赎金或赔偿金额来交换。此外，如果受害者受到侵犯或创伤特别严重（因此主观上 “受损 “更严重），则会倾向于讨价还价，以换取更高的赎金。另外，更富有的侵害者往往愿意支付更多的赎金，以避免受害者有权施加的惩罚。[480]29 因此，允许以惩罚换取损害赔偿，就解决了在纯粹的赔偿制度下所面临的所谓百万富翁或亿万富翁问题，在这种制度下，富人可能犯罪而不受惩罚，因为他只需在犯罪后支付容易负担得起的赔偿金即可。

For these reasons, allowing the option of punishment can help arrive at a more objective measure of restitution damages.30 And even if punishment is banned and is not an actual option—because of the possibility of mistakenly punishing innocents, say—an award of restitution can be based on the model of punishment. E.g., a jury could be instructed to award the victim an amount of money it believes he could bargain for, given all the circumstances, if he could threaten to punish the aggressor. This can lead to more just and objective restitution awards than would result if the jury is simply told to award the amount of damages it “feels” is “fair.”31

出于这些原因，允许选择惩罚有助于达成更客观的赔偿损害衡量标准。[481] 而且，即使惩罚被禁止并且它不是一个实际的选项——例如，因为存在会错误地惩罚无辜者的可能性——赔偿裁决也可以基于惩罚模式。例如，可以指示陪审团向受害者判给一笔金额，如果考虑到所有情况，陪审团认为在受害者能够威胁惩罚侵害者的情况下，受害者能够协商得到这笔金额。这能够带来比仅仅告知陪审团判给其“感觉”“公平”的损害金额更为公正和客观的赔偿裁定。[482]

The right to retaliate could also be used to justify “enslaving” the aggressor and putting him to work for a time to generate income for the victim (restitutionists like Barnett support this use of force against the aggressor, but do not consider it to be punitive, but rather necessary to enforce restitution).32 Or suppose an aggressor is very poor and otherwise unable to pay monetary damages to the victim. In this case, the threat of inflicting severe punishment on the aggressor may induce the aggressor’s relatives or friends to pay off the victim to spare the aggressor from being punished. The victim would thereby be compensated even though the aggressor is penniless, whereas the victim would be totally uncompensated if no threat of punishment were available to motivate the aggressor’s relatives to chip in. (In a restitution-based system, a poor aggressor who is imprisoned in a work-facility designed to generate income payable to the victim may also find friends and relatives to pay off part of his debt to have him released earlier. However, as the aggressor in this case faces only a limited and usually temporary form of “slavery” and not more severe punishment, the motivation for others to bail him out would probably be reduced.)33

报复权也可以用来证明 “奴役 “侵害者并让他工作一段时间为受害者创收是合理的（像巴尼特这样的赔偿主义真支持对侵害者使用武力，但并不认为这是惩罚，而是执行赔偿所必需的）。[483]或者假设侵害者非常贫穷，没有能力向受害者支付金钱赔偿。在这种情况下，对侵害者施以严厉惩罚的威胁可能会诱使侵害者的亲戚或朋友赔偿受害者，使侵害者免受惩罚。这样，即使侵害者身无分文，受害者也会得到补偿，而如果没有惩罚的威胁促使侵害者的亲属出钱，受害者则完全得不到补偿。(在一个以赔偿为基础的制度中，一个贫穷的侵害者如果被关在一个旨在为受害者创造收入的工作场所，他也可以找到朋友和亲戚来偿还他的部分债务，使他早日获释。不过，由于在这种情况下侵害者面临的只是有限的、通常是暂时的 “奴役”，而不是更严厉的惩罚，其他人保释他的积极性可能会降低。[484]

不可让渡性INALIENABILITY

The theory of inalienability has been plagued by confusion, vagueness, and inconsistency. The concept is typically applied to the issue of whether a non-aggressor can alienate his rights by a mere contract or promise, i.e., by a peaceful action. For example, may one sell oneself into slavery or enter into a binding, enforceable contract to perform services? Libertarians come down on both sides of this question, but tend to say that rights are “inalienable,” i.e., one may not sell oneself into slavery.34 Most libertarians hold this view of inalienability, which I will refer to as the standard or “limited” view of inalienability, since adherents of this view usually also maintain that acts of aggression do alienate rights.35 In this view, only violent actions serve to alienate rights. Smith has used the label “inalienability” in an idiosyncratic way to mean that even aggressive actions do not alienate rights.

不可让渡性的理论一直受到混乱、模糊和不一致的困扰。这个概念通常适用于非侵害者是否可以仅仅通过或承诺，即通过和平行动来让渡其权利的问题。例如，一个人是否可以自卖为奴或签订有约束力、可强制执行的服务？自由意志主义者在这个问题上有不同的看法，但倾向于说权利是“不可让渡的”，即一个人无法自卖为奴。[485]大多数自由意志主义者持有这种不可让渡性的观点，我将其称为不可让渡性的标准或“有限”观点，因为这种观点的拥护者通常也认为侵害行动会让渡权利。[486]在这种观点中，只有暴力行动会导致权利的让渡。史密斯以一种特殊的方式使用“不可让渡性”这个标签，意思是即使是侵犯行动也不会让渡权利。

What, then, is the correct, libertarian view of inalienability and rights? Consent is the crucial element to focus on here. If a person consents to an action that would otherwise violate his rights, there is no rights violation. Boxers in a ring, or duelers dueling, do not have their rights violated when struck by fist or bullet. This is because they consented to these exchanges of force.36 To alienate one’s right means that one is unable to withhold consent to some action that would otherwise infringe the right if there were no consent. Thus, a right is alienated by somehow rendering it impossible to object to the action that the alienated right would otherwise prohibit. One does something now that prevents one from withholding consent in the future, thereby effectively alienating the relevant right. To alienate a right, then, is to irrevocably grant the relevant consent to another.

那么，什么才是正确的、自由意志主义的不可让渡性和权利观呢？同意是这里需要关注的关键因素。如果一个人同意一项本来会侵犯其权利的行动，那么他的权利就不会受到侵犯。拳击场上的拳击手或决斗者决斗时，如果被拳头或子弹击中，他们的权利不会受到侵犯。这是因为他们同意这些武力交换。[487]让渡权利是指一个人无法不同意某些行动，而如果不同意，这些行动就会侵犯权利。因此，权利的让渡是指以某种方式使人无法反对被让渡权利本应禁止的行动。一个人现在做了一些事情，使他将来无法拒绝同意，从而有效地让渡了相关的权利。因此，让渡权利就是不可撤销地将相关同意权授予他人。

Is it possible to irrevocably grant consent? Smith, an advocate of what may be called the “strong” view of inalienability, would say it is not possible under any circumstances (except, perhaps, for defensive or restitutive force). Proponents of the limited view of inalienability, by contrast, hold that it is possible to do this by aggressing, but not by merely making an agreement or promise. (Those rare libertarians, like Walter Block, who believe rights may be alienated even by a non-violent action like agreement, hold what may be viewed as a “weak” view of inalienability.)37

是否有可能不可撤销地授予同意？史密斯是不可让渡性 “强 “观点的倡导者，他会说，在任何情况下都不可让渡的（也许，防卫性或赔偿性武力除外）。相反，有限不可让渡观的支持者则认为，通过侵犯是可以做到这一点的，但仅仅通过协议或承诺是不行的。(那些极少数的自由意志主义者，如沃尔特-布洛克，认为即使通过协议这样的非暴力行动，权利也可能被让渡，他们所持的不可让渡性观点可被视为 “弱 “观点。[488]

Let us examine the three ways that consent possibly could be irrevocably granted: by physical means, by aggression, and by voluntary agreement. The physical, or physiological, means refers to a person voluntarily undergoing some process that literally places him under the power of another (e.g., drugs, surgery, technology).38 This is akin to committing an act of suicide or “zombicide,” and is not of particular interest, since after the zombicide is complete, the zombie presumably does not even try to run away or withhold consent from his master.

让我们研究一下同意可能被不可撤销地授予的三种方式：物理手段、侵犯方式和自愿同意。物理或生理手段是指一个人自愿接受某种程序，将其置于他人的权力之下（如药物、手术、技术）。[489]这类似于自杀或 “弑尸 “行为，并不特别引人关注，因为在 “弑尸 “行为完成后，大概这个“僵尸”甚至不会试图逃跑或拒绝其主人。

Committing an act of aggression is a clear-cut means for alienating (some of ) one’s rights. As explained above,39 an aggressor is estopped from withholding consent to the victim’s proposed use of (proportional) retaliatory force, since such a denial would contradict the aggressor’s view that the use of force is permissible. An act of aggression is a way of irrevocably granting consent to punishment. This is exactly why an act of aggression serves to alienate rights: because the act of aggression conclusively demonstrates the aggressor’s view that aggression is proper, thus precluding him from consistently objecting to the victim’s use of (proportional) retaliatory force. The strong view of inalienability (Smith’s view) is, for this reason, untenable.40 So which view is correct, the limited view or the weak view?

实施侵犯行动是让渡(部分)个人权利的明确手段。如上文所述，[490]39 侵害者被禁止拒绝同意受害者使用(相称的)报复性武力的提议，因为这种拒绝将与侵害者认为可以使用武力的观点相矛盾。侵犯行动是一种不可撤销地同意惩罚的方式。这正是侵犯行动导致权利让渡的原因：因为侵犯行动确凿无疑地表明了侵害者认为侵犯是正当的，从而使他无法始终如一地反对受害者使用（相称的）报复性武力。因此，不可让渡的强势观点（史密斯的观点）是站不住脚的。[491] 那么，有限观点和弱势观点哪个正确呢？

This depends on the answer to the following question: Can one irrevocably grant consent by voluntary agreement, such as a promise or contract to be another’s slave? Barnett recognizes the importance of consent here:

The crucial question … is whether Ann’s current consensual choices can limit her right to revoke her consent in the future. Having consented to let Ben touch her or to enter the [boxing] ring with him, may she be forced to carry through with her commitment after she has changed her mind?”41

这取决于对以下问题的回答：一个人能否通过自愿协议（例如承诺或签订成为他人的奴隶）不可撤销地授予同意？巴尼特认识到这里同意的重要性：

“关键问题……是安当前基于同意的选择能否限制她未来撤销同意的权利。在同意让本触碰她，或与他一起进入（拳击）场之后，如果她改变了主意，她是否会被迫履行承诺？”[492]

This is a difficult and complicated question. Some argue that a contract is a contract, and may be enforced.42 This view is based on the theory that one is a self-owner, entitled to full control of all of one’s property, including one’s body, and that this control comprises the ability to sell one’s body.43 Most libertarians, however, seem to hold the limited view of inalienability, whereby aggression does alienate rights, but promising to be someone’s slave does not. Advocates of this view typically argue that such contracts are not enforceable because there is some sort of logical impossibility involved in voluntarily alienating all of one’s rights in this manner.44 For example, some argue that it is literally impossible to transfer one’s actual will to another, and thus a promise to do so is null and void; title thereto cannot be transferred. It is like contracting to sell the sun to someone. Such a contract, having an impossible object, would be null and void from the outset.

这是一个困难且复杂的问题。有人认为，就是，可以强制执行。[493]这种观点的理论基础是，一个人是自我所有者，有权完全控制自己的所有财产，包括自己的身体，而这种控制包括出售自己身体的能力。[494]然而，大多数自由意志主义人士似乎都持有不可让渡的有限观点，即侵犯确实会让渡权利，但承诺成为某人的奴隶却不会。这种观点的支持者通常认为，这种是不可执行的，因为以这种方式自愿让渡自己的所有权利在逻辑上是不可能的。[495]例如，有些人认为，将一个人的实际意愿转让给另一个人实际上是不可能的，因此这样做的承诺是无效的；其所有权不能转让。这就好比签订将太阳卖给某人。这样一份目标无法实现的从一开始就是无效的。

My view is that the impossibility reasoning typically given to argue that consent cannot be irrevocably granted is fallacious and has helped to muddle the issue of inalienability. For example, if the “impossibility” of literally alienating one’s will means that it is impossible to be bound by contract to act as someone’s slave, why is it not “impossible” to imprison an aggressor to enforce restitution? After all, even a convicted aggressor still has a will. Why is it not “impossible” to defend oneself with force? And yet it is not impossible for consent to be irrevocably granted, as we have seen; this condition exists for a justly imprisoned aggressor. Recipients of defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory force all retain a will, which is overwhelmed with some type of responsive force.

我的观点是，通常为论证同意不可能是不可让渡的而给出的 “不可能 “推理是谬误的，而且助长了对不可让渡问题的混淆。例如，如果字面上让渡个人意志的 “不可能性 “意味着不可能受约束充当某人的奴隶，那么为什么监禁侵害者以强制恢复原状就不是 “不可能 “的呢？毕竟，即使是被定罪的侵害者也还是有意志的。为什么用武力自卫不是 “不可能 “的呢？然而，正如我们所看到的那样，不可撤销地授予同意并非不可能；对于被公正监禁的侵害者来说，这一条件是存在的。防卫性武力、赔偿性武力或报复性武力的接受者都保留着意志，而这种意志会被某种反应性武力所压倒。

The key here is to focus on force and consent, for to keep someone as a slave, it is not necessary that the will be physically alienated. Rather, in order to enslave someone, the slave-owner must be entitled to use (justified in using) force against the slave if the slave disobeys or tries to run away. The impossibility of actually alienating one’s faculty of volition is irrelevant. It is the legitimacy of using force that matters, and this depends on consent.

这里的关键在于武力和同意，因为要使某人成为奴隶，并不一定要从肉体上剥夺其意志。相反，为了奴役一个人，奴隶主必须有权在奴隶不服从或试图逃跑时对其使用（有理由使用）武力。不可能真正剥夺一个人的意志力是无关紧要的。重要的是使用武力的合法性，而这取决于同意。

Putting the issue this way,however,provides a different argument why consent cannot irrevocably be granted by mere agreement or promise— why the prospective slave may change his mind in the future and withdraw his consent. If A promises (or contracts, or agrees; the terminology is not important) to be B’s slave, this is no doubt an attempt to consent now to force inflicted in the future. If A later changes his mind and tries to run away, may B at that point use force against A?

然而，以这种方式来讨论这个问题，提供了一个不同的论点，为什么同意不能通过单纯的协议或承诺而不可撤销地授予——为什么未来的奴隶可能会在未来改变主意并撤回他的同意。如果A承诺(或，或同意；术语并不重要)成为B的奴隶，这无疑是一种现在同意在未来施加强迫的尝试。如果A后来改变主意，试图逃跑，彼时B是否可以对A使用武力?

This is the crucial question. If the answer is yes, this means that A has no right to object and has effectively alienated his rights. I would say no, however, simply because there is no reason why A cannot withdraw his consent. Libertarianism does not say one cannot change one’s mind. When we ask about consent, it is the most recent expression of consent that is most relevant. Unlike the case of aggression, where the aggressor’s prior aggression estops him from objecting to the use of retaliatory force, A has not committed aggression against B. Thus it is not inconsistent for A to later object to the use of force. All A did previously was utter words to B such as “I agree to be your slave.” But this does not aggress against B at all, any more than does uttering the insult, “You are ugly.” Words per se do not aggress, which is one reason there is a (derivative, not independent) “right” to free speech. In a nutshell, a would-be slave-owner must be entitled to use force against the would-be slave in order for the slavery agreement to be enforceable and for rights to be alienated in this manner; but the would-be slave has simply not initiated force against the would-be slave-owner. The would-be slave-owner is thus not entitled to use force against the slave; hence no rights were alienated.45

这是关键问题。如果答案是肯定的，这意味着A无权反对，并且实际上已经让渡了他的权利。然而，我会说不，仅仅是因为A没有理由不能撤回他的同意。自由意志主义并不意味着一个人不能改变主意。当我们谈及同意时，最相关的是最近表达的同意。与侵犯的情况不同,在侵犯中,侵害者之前的侵犯行动使其被禁止反对使用报复性力量，A并没有侵犯B。因此，A后来反对使用武力并不矛盾。A之前所做的只是对B说了诸如“我同意做你的奴隶”之类的话，但这根本没有侵犯B，就像说”你很丑”这样的侮辱性话语一样。言语本身并不构成侵犯，这也是存在（衍生的、非独立的）“言论自由”权利的一个原因。简而言之，要使奴隶制协议可执行并且以这种方式让渡权利，未来的奴隶主必须有权对未来的奴隶使用武力；但未来的奴隶根本没有对未来的奴隶主发起武力。因此，未来的奴隶主无权对奴隶使用武力；所以没有权利被让渡。[496]

Thus, I conclude that a slavery agreement is not enforceable. Rights are not completely inalienable, as Smith contends, for aggression can alienate rights. We must reject the strong view of inalienability. However, rights are inalienable in the limited (and more conventional) sense that one cannot irrevocably grant consent to aggression in the future by way of a mere promise or agreement. This is not because of any impossibility in alienating one’s will, but because a promisor has not committed aggression. One retains the right to change one’s mind, absent special circumstances.46 The limited view of inalienability seems to be the most sensible.

因此，我得出结论，奴隶制协议无法执行。权利并非如史密斯所主张的那样完全不可让渡，因为侵犯可以让渡权利。我们必须拒绝不可让渡性的强观点。然而，权利在有限（且更传统）的意义上是不可让渡的，即一个人不能仅仅通过承诺或协议就不可撤销地授权同意未来的侵犯。这并非是因为让渡个人意志存在任何不可能性，而是因为作出承诺的人并未实施侵犯。在没有特殊情况的前提下，一个人保留改变主意的权利。[497]不可让渡性的有限观点似乎是最明智的。

The right to alienate external resources is not limited, however, because of crucial differences between rights pertaining to one’s body and rights of ownership in previously-unowned, homesteaded resources. The right to appropriate external resources is derivative of and distinct from the basic right against non-aggression (self-ownership). External scarce resources are appropriated and acquired, and held by intention (it is this that distinguishes ownership from possession),47 and thus can be abandoned or alienated by a sufficient expression of intention, e.g., a contract or act of abandonment. For this reason, under the libertarian title-transfer theory of contract, one can alienate particular property titles, i.e., titles to external (homesteadable) scarce resources. In this sense there isadistinction between title to property, which is alienable by mere contract; and rights related to one’s body, which are not alienable by promise or contract (speech act) but are alienable by acts of aggression.48

然而，让渡外部资源的权利是不受限制的，这是因为与自身身体相关的权利和对先前无主、拓殖获取的资源的所有权之间存在关键差异。占有外部资源的权利是由基本的互不侵犯的权利（自我所有权）衍生而来并且与之不同。外部稀缺资源是通过意图占有、获取和持有（正是这一点将所有权与占有区分开来），[498]因此可以通过充分表达意图，例如或放弃行动来放弃或让渡。出于这个原因，在自由意志主义的财产权转让的理论下，人们可以让渡特定的财产权，即对外部（拓殖的）稀缺资源的权利。从这个意义上说，财产权（可以通过单纯的让渡）和与自身身体相关的权利[不能通过承诺或（言语行动）让渡，但可以因侵犯行动而让渡]之间存在区别。[499]

To summarize, then, one may object to certain acts of aggression; or one may grant consent to allow the otherwise-prohibited action to take place. The right against aggression may be alienated, but only by irrevocably granting consent, which may be done only by committing an act of aggression. A non-violent action such as a promise or agreement to do something with one’s body, on the other hand, does not alienate rights, because the consent may be withdrawn at any time in the future, with certain exceptions. This is because a promise now to consent in the future to violence does not commit aggression against the promisee, and because a future change of mind revokes the consent.

因此，概括地说，人们可以反对某些侵犯行动；也可以表示同意，允许采取本应禁止的行动。反对侵犯的权利可以让渡，但只有通过不可撤销地授予同意才能让渡，即只有通过实施侵犯行动才能让渡。而非暴力行动，如承诺或同意用自己的身体做某事，则不会让渡权利，因为除某些例外情况外，同意可以在将来的任何时候撤回。这是因为现在承诺将来同意使用暴力并不侵犯被承诺者，而且将来改变主意也会撤销同意。

结论CONCLUSION

If Smith is right that even a murderer has a right to not be killed, then it is wrongful aggression to kill the aggressor, just as it is wrongful aggression for a murderer to kill the victim. Then it is no longer the initiation of force that is impermissible; it is force in general, even retaliatory, defensive, or restitutive force. Without a right to respond to aggression, the non-aggression principle goes out the window, as does the distinction between aggressor and victim. Smith’s defense of the strong version of inalienable rights thus undermines what is surely the heart of libertarianism, the non-aggression principle.

如果史密斯的观点是正确的，即使是杀人犯也有不被杀的权利，那么杀死侵害者就是不法侵犯，就像杀人犯杀死受害者是不发侵犯一样。那么，不允许的就不再是发动武力，而是一般的武力，甚至是报复性、防御性或赔偿性的武力。如果没有对侵犯作出回应的权利，互不侵犯原则就不复存在，侵害者与受害者之间的区别也不复存在。因此，史密斯对不可让渡的权利的强版本的辩护破坏了自由意志主义的核心——互不可侵犯原则。

附录APPENDIX

勒菲弗尔的和平主义LEFEVRE’S PACIFISM

As noted above, the material here was originally intended to appear in footnote 21, above. Due to its length, I include this material in this appendix.

如上所述，此处的材料原本打算放在上文注释 21 中。由于篇幅较长，我将其列入本附录。

As noted in the text, the consistent pacifist must condemn all uses of force, even defensive and restitutive, and that libertarian Robert LeFevre has been accused of holding such views. However, as alluded to above, it is not clear that LeFevre took his pacifism so far. As LeFevre writes:

正如文中所指出的，一贯的和平主义者必须谴责一切使用武力的行为，即使是防卫性的和赔偿性的，自由意志主义的罗伯特·勒菲弗尔（Robert LeFevre）就曾被指责持有这样的观点。然而，正如上文所提到的，并不清楚勒菲弗尔是否将他的和平主义奉为圭臬。正如勒菲弗尔写道：

Protection is what we do prior to the commission of a criminal act which does, in fact, prevent such an act from occurring.…

Protection, because of the fact that it prevents a trespass from occurring, is always moral.…

Defense, on the other hand, is what we do during an attack by someone else. It is what takes place in what is called the “hot encounter.” You are walking down the street and a man comes up to you, sticks a gun in your face, and demands your money. Now you are face to face with an attacker. You cannot protect yourself (i.e., prevent the attack); it is too late for that. Now you must defend yourself (i.e., ward off the attack).

As long as your actions are for the sole purpose of warding off the attack, you would not be guilty of an immoral act yourself. But if your actions serve the purpose of attacking the criminal, you are guilty of a trespass even though the other man initiated the attack.…

Suppose, in the situation outlined above, the other man takes a swing at you. Clearly, you can raise your arm to ward off his blow. This is defense. If, however, you then bring your arm down upon his head and begin attacking him, you are no longer defending yourself, but attacking the other man. This would be immoral, as it is a trespass upon the other person.49

保护是我们在实施犯罪行动之前所做的事情，它实际上防止了犯罪行动的发生….

保护，因为它阻止了侵犯的发生，所以始终是道德的….

另一方面，防卫是我们在受到他人攻击时所采取的行动。它发生在所谓的 “激烈冲突”中。你走在大街上，一个男人走过来，用枪指着你的脸，向你索要钱财。现在，你正与一名攻击者面对面。你无法保护自己（即阻止攻击），因为为时已晚。现在你必须自卫（即抵御攻击）。

只要你的行动只是为了抵御攻击，你自己就不会犯下不道德的行为。但是，如果你的行动是为了攻击罪犯，那么即使是对方主动进攻，你也犯有侵犯罪….。

假设在上述情况下，对方向你挥拳。显然，你可以举起手臂抵挡他的攻击。这就是防御。但是，如果你将手臂伸向他的头部并开始攻击他，你就不再是在自卫，而是在攻击对方。这将是不道德的，因为这是对他人的侵犯。[500]

Although I disagree with this pacifist view, it seems some libertarians mischaracterize LeFevre as opposing violence in self-defense. E.g., writes Rothbard:

If every man has the absolute right to his justly-held property it then follows that he has the right to keep that property—to defend it by violence against violent invasion. Absolute pacifists who also assert their belief in property rights—such as Mr. Robert LeFevre—are caught in an inescapable inner contradiction: for if a man owns property and yet is denied the right to defend it against attack, then it is clear that a very important aspect of that ownership is being denied to him. To say that someone has the absolute right to a certain property but lacks the right to defend it against attack or invasion is also to say that he does not have total right to that property.50

虽然我不同意这种和平主义观点，但似乎有些自由意志主义者把勒菲弗尔错误地描述为反对自卫时使用暴力。例如，罗斯巴德写道：

如果每个人都对其正当持有的财产拥有绝对的权利，那么他就有权保有该财产——以暴力抵御暴力入侵。绝对和平主义者如果也坚持他们对财产权的信仰——比如罗伯特·勒菲弗尔先生——就会陷入一个无法回避的内在矛盾：因为如果一个人拥有财产，却被剥夺了保卫财产不受侵犯的权利，那么很明显，他的所有权的一个非常重要的方面被剥夺了。如果说某人拥有对某一财产的绝对权利，但却没有保护财产不受攻击或侵犯的权利，这也就意味着他对该财产没有完全的权利。[501]

This implies LeFevre opposes the right to self-defense, to “defend … against attack.” See also the comments of Todd Lewis:

While most libertarians view the right to use lethal force to defend one’s body and physical property as naturally flowing from a strict reading of the Non-Aggression Principle, there is at least one little-known libertarian, the late great Robert LeFevre, who took an even more radical position on violence. Not only did he eschew the initiation of violence; he also eschewed the use of violence in one’s own self-defense.51

这意味着勒菲弗尔反对自卫的权利，反对“抵御……攻击”。也可参见托德·刘易斯的评论：

虽然大多数自由意志主义者认为，根据对互不侵犯原则的严格解读，使用致命武力来保卫自己的身体和真实财产的权利是自然而然的，但至少有一位鲜为人知的自由意志主义者，已故的伟大的罗伯特·勒菲弗尔，对暴力采取了更为激进的立场。他不仅避免发起暴力；他还避免在自卫中使用暴力。[502]

Neither Rothbard nor Lewis provide any citations to LeFevre to back up this characterization of his views on violence used in self-defense.52 Thus, in the absence of any further writing by LeFevre on this subject (which may well exist), I have to conclude that the accusations of him adopting such an extreme pacifist view are unfounded.

罗斯巴德和刘易斯都没有提供勒菲弗尔的任何引文来支持他们对勒菲弗尔关于自卫中使用暴力的观点的这种描述。[503]因此，在没有勒菲弗尔关于这个主题的任何进一步著作（可能确实存在）的情况下，我不得不得出结论，对他采取这种极端和平主义观点的指责是没有根据的。

Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection

第十一章出售并不意味着所有权，反之亦然：一个剖析

I delivered this speech at the Property and Freedom Society’s 16th Annual Meeting, in Bodrum, Turkey, in 2022.* It takes aim, in part, at some of my friend Walter Block’s views on voluntary slavery and body-alienability, a topic we’ve disagreed about for a long time.† The transcript was lightly edited for clarity and to add some headings, references, and links, but the colloquial and informal tone has largely been preserved. I published it on my old, mostly defunct site The Libertarian Standard, to which Walter responded in due course.†† This chapter is a lightly-edited version of that article.§

2022 年，我在土耳其博德鲁姆举行的财产与自由协会第 16 届年会上发表了这篇演讲。*它部分针对的是我的朋友沃尔特·布洛克（Walter Block）关于自愿为奴和身体可让渡性的一些观点，这是我们长期存在分歧的一个话题。†为了清晰起见，对演讲稿进行了轻微编辑，并添加了一些标题、参考文献和链接，但口语化和非正式的语气在很大程度上得以保留。我将其发表在我那大多已停用的旧网站“自由意志主义标准”（The Libertarian Standard）上，沃尔特随后也做出了回应。†† 本章是该文章的略微编辑版本。§

* Kinsella, “KOL395 | Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dis- section (PFS 2022),” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Sept. 17, 2022).

* 金塞拉，“KOL395 | 出售并不意味着拥有所有权，反之亦然：一个剖析（2022 年财产与自由协会）”，《金塞拉谈自由》播客（2022 年 9 月 17 日）。

† See Kinsella, “KOL004 | Interview with Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery and Inalienability,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast ( Jan. 27, 2013).

† 参见金塞拉，“KOL004 | 与沃尔特·布洛克关于自愿为奴和不可让渡性的访谈”，《金塞拉谈自由》播客（2013 年 1 月 27 日）。

†† Kinsella, “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection,” The Libertarian Standard (Oct. 25, 2022). Walter’s response: “Rejoinder to Kinsella on Ownership and the Voluntary Slave Contract,” Management Education Science Technology Journal (MESTE) 11, no. 1 ( Jan. 2023; https://perma.cc/H3AL-WBQJ): 1-8. See also idem, “Toward a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Bar- nett, Gordon, Smith, Kinsella and Epstein,” J. Libertarian Stud. 17, no. 2 (Spring 2003; https://perma.cc/79AC-34BZ): 39–85.

†† 金塞拉，《出售并不意味着拥有所有权，反之亦然：一个剖析》，《自由意志主义标准》（2022 年 10 月 25 日）。沃尔特的回应：《对金塞拉关于所有权和自愿为奴的反驳》，《管理教育科学技术杂志》（MESTE）第 11 卷第 1 期（2023 年 1 月；https://perma.cc/H3AL-WBQJ）：1-8 页。另见同上，《迈向不可让渡性的自由意志主义理论：对罗斯巴德、巴尼特、戈登、史密斯、金塞拉和爱泼斯坦的批判》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 17 卷第 2 期（2003 年春季；https://perma.cc/79AC-34BZ）：39-85 页。

Some of this material is also discussed in “Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years: Looking Back and Looking Forward” (ch. 15), Part IV.G.
其中一些内容也在《二十年后反对知识产权后：回顾与展望》（第 15 章），Part IV.G中有所讨论。

两个相关的谬论TWO RELATED FALLACIES

I want to explore two related beliefs, which I think are fallacious, and they stem from confusions about core libertarian principles and confusions introduced by the sloppy use of language and overuse of metaphorical thinking. And, by the way, I did touch on this topic in less detail at the PFS [Property and Freedom Society] here in 2011, when I talked about a bunch of libertarian misconceptions, and also in a “Libertarian Controversies” lecture from Mises Academy about 10 years ago.1

我想探讨两个相关的信念，我认为它们都是谬误，它们源于对自由意志主义核心原则的混淆，以及对语言的草率使用和过度使用比喻思维所带来的混淆。顺便说一句，2011 年我在这里，在 PFS [财产与自由学会]上曾经较详细地谈到过这个话题，当时我谈了一堆自由意志主义的误解，大约 10 年前，我还在米塞斯学院的一次 “自由意志主义争议 “讲座中谈到过这个话题。[504]

So, the first fallacy: Ownership implies selling. Walter Block uses this a lot. In fact, I heard him say it explicitly last week again in Nashville at the Libertarian Scholars Conference. So the idea is this: if you own yourself—that is, you own your body—you should be able to sell it. So, a voluntary slavery contract should be enforceable. And if the legal system does not permit voluntary slavery, then it means you really don’t own yourself. So the implicit assumption behind this argument is that one inherent aspect of ownership is the right or ability to sell.2 In other words, it is assumed that “ownership” necessarily includes the ancillary “right to sell.” It’s taken for granted that “if you own something, you can sell it.” This is a mistaken assumption, as I shall explain presently.

那么，第一个谬误：拥有意味着出售。沃尔特·布洛克经常使用这个观点。事实上，上周在纳什维尔的自由意志主义学者研讨会上，我又听到他明确地这么说。这个观点是这样的：如果你拥有自己——也就是你拥有自己的身体——你应该能够出售它。所以，自愿为奴的应该是可执行的。如果法律制度不允许自愿为奴，那就意味着你实际上并不拥有自己。所以这个论点背后的隐含假设是，所有权的一个固有方面是出售的权利或能力。[505] 换句话说，它假定“所有权”必然包括辅助的“出售权”。人们想当然地认为“如果你拥有某物，你就可以出售它”。这是一个错误的假设，我马上就会解释。

Fallacy two: Selling implies ownership. So, some contracts that we’re used to are exchanges of owned things. Consider some simple ones: an apple for an orange, 10 chickens for a pig, 1 ounce of gold for a horse, or $3 for a cup of coffee. Now, we also have labor contracts, where it’s considered to be a sale of a service, which implies that you “own your labor” because, after all, you “sold” it. And also there’s the sale of knowledge, information, or know-how—like teachers who get paid to give information, publishers, speakers, contracts for transfer of knowhow, and so on. And this argument is also used to argue for intellectual property. People say, “Well, if you can sell your idea, you must have owned it, so intellectual property is a legitimate concept.” Similarly with Bitcoin: people say that Bitcoin can be possessed, and sold, so Bitcoins must be owned and ownable things.3

谬误二：出售意味着所有权。所以，我们习以为常的一些是对所拥有之物的交换。考虑一些简单的例子：一个苹果换一个橙子，十只鸡换一头猪，一盎司黄金换一匹马，或者 3 美元买一杯咖啡。现在，我们还有劳动，它被认为是一种服务的出售，这意味着你“拥有你的劳动力”，因为毕竟你“出售”了它。还有知识、信息或技术诀窍的出售——比如教师因提供信息而获得报酬、出版商、演讲者、技术诀窍转让等等。这种论点也被用于论证知识产权。人们说：“好吧，如果你能出售你的想法，那你一定拥有它，所以知识产权是一个合理的概念。”比特币也是如此：人们说比特币可以被拥有和出售，所以比特币一定是可拥有和能被拥有的东西。[506]

稀缺性和财产权SCARCITY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Now, let’s revisit some elementary categories of libertarian thought. So first of all, action is when humans in the world employ means or scarce resources as tools to help achieve their ends or goals. When there’s society—other human actors—there’s a possibility of conflict in the use of these resources. Now, it’s good that we live in society, because we have the division and specialization of labor, trade, and intercourse with other people. But there can also be conflict among human actors in the use of these scarce resources, including our bodies, because of the nature of these resources.

现在，让我们重新审视一些自由意志主义思想的基本范畴。首先，行动是指人类在世界上使用手段或稀缺资源作为工具来帮助实现其目的或目标。当存在社会——其他人类行动人——在使用这些资源时就有可能产生冲突。现在，我们生活在社会中是好的，因为我们有劳动分工与专业化、贸易以及与他人的往来。但由于这些资源的性质，在使用包括我们的身体在内的这些稀缺资源时，人类行动人之间也可能产生冲突。

So what this means is the scarce resources, which we employ as human actors in a purely economic sense, are precisely things over which there can be conflicts. So sometimes, to avoid confusion, I will refer to these things as rivalrous, or contestable or conflictable resources.4 They are the types of things over which there can be conflict. I find I sometimes need to emphasize this aspect and avoid the term “scarce resources” because, quite often, an intellectual property proponent will say something like, well, “I don’t know about you, but good ideas is pretty scarce.” They can’t easily say that good ideas are conflictable (or rivalrous), though. The point is information is not the type of thing that can be subject to property rights or ownership.5

因此，这意味着我们作为行动人所使用的纯经济意义上的稀缺资源，恰恰是可能发生冲突的东西。因此，有时为了避免混淆，我会把这些东西称为具有竞争性、争议性或冲突性资源。[507]它们是可能发生冲突的事物类型。我发现，我有时需要强调这一方面，避免使用 “稀缺资源 “一词，因为知识产权的支持者常常会说，”我不知道你怎么想，但好点子是非常稀缺的”。不过，他们不会轻易说好点子是可引发冲突的（或竞争性的）。问题的关键在于，信息并不是可以归属于财产权或所有权的那一类事物。[508]

财产权Property Rights

Now, in civilized society, property or ownership rights are assigned to reduce this conflict.6 So what are property rights? All rights are human rights, and all human rights just are property rights,7 because the very purpose of property rights is to avoid conflict over scarce (rivalrous, conflictable) resources. So ownership means property rights. To own a thing is to have a property right in the thing. So it’s actually better to refer to property as the relationship between a person and a thing, although, over time, we sometimes are careless with language, and we will refer to the thing itself as property. Like we’ll say, “That car is my property.” But precise language would be, “I have a property right in that thing, in that car,” or “I own that car.”8

现在，在文明社会中，财产权或所有权的分配是为了减少这种冲突。[509]那么，何为财产权？所有的权利都是人权，所有的人权都是财产权，[510]7 因为财产权的根本目的是避免稀缺资源（竞争性、冲突性）的冲突。因此，所有权就意味着财产权。拥有一件东西就是对这件东西拥有财产权。因此，把财产说成是人与物之间的关系其实更好，不过，随着时间的推移，我们有时会不小心用词不当，把物本身说成是财产。比如我们会说 “那辆车是我的财产” 但准确的说法应该是：”我对那件东西、那辆车拥有财产权 “或 “我拥有那辆车 “。[511]

All right: so, ownership and property rights. A property right in a thing gives the owner the right to use it. This is what property rights are. Now, to be more precise, which is—this precision is not necessary for today’s discussion, but—owning a thing actually does not literally give you the right to use it, but it gives you the right to prevent others from using it. It’s an exclusionary right.9 As a practical matter, that usually gives you the ability to use the thing. So, for example, if you own a gun, that means you can prevent anyone else from using the gun. But it doesn’t mean you have the unlimited right to use the gun, because other people have property rights, and their property rights proscribe your actions. So I can’t use the gun to shoot someone.

好的：那么，所有权和财产权。对一件东西的财产权赋予所有者使用它的权利。这就是财产权的含义。现在，更准确地说——这种精确性对于今天的讨论并非必要，但是——拥有一件东西实际上并非字面上赋予你使用它的权利，而是赋予你阻止他人使用它的权利。这是一种排他性权利。[512]9 实际上，这通常使你能够使用这件东西。例如，如果你拥有一把枪，这意味着你可以阻止任何人使用这把枪。但这并不意味着你拥有无限制使用这把枪的权利，因为其他人也有财产权，他们的财产权限制了你的行动。所以我不能用这把枪射击某人。

财产权作为行动的限制Property Rights as Limits on Action

Now, most people make the mistake of saying, well, this shows that property rights are limited. But this is actually incorrect. The reason I can’t shoot the gun at my neighbor is because he has a property right in his own body. His property rights are a limitation on what actions I can perform. They are not a limitation on my property rights in my gun. In fact, if I had a stolen gun, which I didn’t own, I still couldn’t shoot my neighbor. Ownership of the gun—the means employed— has nothing to do with why am prohibited from shooting him. So the ownership of the gun is not limited by property rights. I can’t shoot an innocent person with a gun that I own or with a stolen gun. The innocent person’s property rights in his body limit what actions I can perform, with whatever causally efficacious scarce means, whether it’s a resource I own or not. It’s a limit on my actions, not on property rights. Because the essence of a property right is the right to exclude others, not the right to use.

现在，大多数人都会错误地说，这说明财产权是有限的。但这其实是不正确的。我之所以不能向邻居开枪，是因为他对自己的身体拥有财产权。他的财产权是对我可以采取的行动的限制。他的财产权并不限制我对枪支的财产权。事实上，如果我有一把偷来的枪，而我并不拥有这把枪，我仍然不能向我的邻居开枪。枪的所有权——使用的手段——与我为什么被禁止向他开枪毫无关系。因此，枪的所有权不受财产权的限制。我不能用自己的枪或偷来的枪射杀无辜的人。无辜者对其身体的财产权限制了我可以用任何具有因果效力的稀缺手段实施的行动，无论这是否是我所拥有的资源。这是对我行动的限制，而不是对财产权的限制。因为财产权的本质是排除他人的权利，而不是使用权。

This mistake is used also to argue for intellectual property because people will say—well, I’ll point out that intellectual property rights restrict other property rights, so they’re actually an infringement of property rights because they’re effectively a nonconsensual negative servitude because, if I have a patent, I can prevent you from using your factory to make iPhones. So that’s a limitation on your use of your property.10

这种错误也被用来为知识产权辩护，因为人们会说——好吧，我指出知识产权限制了其他财产权，所以它们实际上是对财产权的侵犯，因为它们实际上是一种未经同意的消极地役权，因为，如果我拥有一项专利，我就可以阻止你用你的工厂生产苹果手机。因此，这是对你使用自己财产的限制。[513]

And the response will be, “Well, all property rights limit other people’s property rights.” The implicit argument here is that just because patents limit property rights, that’s no problem to patents being genuine property rights, because all property rights limit other property rights.11 But that’s not true. Property rights limit only actions. And the owner of a factory making iPhones is not committing any action that invades the borders of anyone else’s property. So that’s why that’s another fallacy. It’s a related fallacy but not the one I’m addressing directly today.

对此的回应会是：“好吧，所有的财产权都会限制他人的财产权。”这里暗含的论点是，仅仅因为专利限制了财产权，这对于专利成为真正的财产权来说不是问题，因为所有的财产权都会限制其他财产权。[514]但这不是真的。财产权仅限制行动。而生产苹果手机的工厂所有者并没有采取任何侵犯他人财产边界的行动。所以这就是另一个谬论。这是一个相关的谬论，但不是我今天直接要讨论的那个。

So: libertarianism and property rights. The purpose of property rights is to permit conflicts over the use of scarce resources to be avoided. So they assign these exclusive rights so that others can avoid the conflict.

所以：自由意志主义和财产权。财产权的目的是避免在稀缺资源的使用上产生冲突。所以他们确定这些排他性权利，以使其他人能够避免冲突。

财产权和客观联系Property Rights and Objective Link

So how does this work? The property rights are assigned in accordance with whichever actor has the best link or connection to the resource.12 This is the only way you can have a workable system of property rights, because any system of property rights has to be voluntarily respected, and for it to be voluntarily respected, it has to be seen as objectively fair, which means it can’t be based upon arbitrary differences like “I have the right to rule you, and you don’t have the right to rule me because I’m me, and you’re you.” That’s a particularistic rule.13 Or “I have the right to your land because I’m stronger.”

那么，这是如何运作的呢？财产权被确定给与资源有最佳联系或关系的行动人。[515]这是建立可行的财产权制度的唯一途径，因为任何财产权制度都必须得到自愿尊重，而要得到自愿尊重，就必须被视为客观公平，这意味着它不能建立在 “我有权统治你，你无权统治我，因为我是我，你是你 “这样的武断差异之上。这是一种特殊主义的规则。[516]或者 “我有权占有你的土地，因为我更强大”。

Those types of arguments and reasons are not justifications. There has to be an objective best link.14 So how does that work out? In Western private law and in libertarianism, which is a far more consistent working out of this, there are basically two types of links—the type of link applied to your body, which is a unique scarce resource; and the type of link applied to external resources in the world, which were previously unowned scarce resources. For the body, the link is a self-ownership link. You own your body, and the reason is because of your direct control over it, which I will get to in a minute.

这些论点和理由都不是理由。必须有一个客观的最佳联系。[517]那么，如何实现这一点呢？在西方私法和自由意志主义中，基本上有两类联系（后者对此有更为一贯的推导）——一类是与你的身体的联系，你的身体是独一无二的稀缺资源；另一类是与世界上的外部资源的联系，这些资源以前是无主的稀缺资源。对于身体来说，这种联系是一种自我所有权的联系。你拥有自己的身体，原因在于你对它的直接控制，这一点我稍后会讲到。

And then for scarce resources in the world, they’re always owned first by someone first using them from their unowned state. That’s called homesteading or original appropriation. And then ownership can be transferred for two reasons: contractually—that’s a voluntary transfer of your ownership title of the resource to someone else, either by sale or by gift; or for purposes of rectification, which can be seen as a subset of contract because it’s also a transfer of title from an owner to someone, but it’s because the owner committed a tort against the victim and thus gave him a right to recover some of the aggressor’s property as damages.

然后对于世界上的稀缺资源，它们总是首先由某人从无主状态通过首次使用而被拥有。这就是所谓的拓殖或先占。所有权的转让有两种原因：一是——即通过出售或赠与的方式，自愿将资源的所有权转让给他人；二是出于纠正的目的，这可以看作是的一个子集，因为这也是所有权从所有者向他人的转让，但这是因为所有者对受害者实施了侵权行为，从而使其有权收回侵害者的部分财产作为损害赔偿。

So original appropriation, contract, and rectification are basically the only three principles to determine ownership of external resources in case of a dispute. So these four principles—body-ownership due to direct control, with an exception made for forfeiture of this right due to committing aggression,15 plus the three principles for external resources—are how we determine the best link, and this is the core of all property rights, and of all just law. A developed body of private law, to be just, has to be based on these core principles, and just entails working out the details as the law develops.16 And every socialist system, and every law not based on these core principles, including IP law, always ends up deviating from these core private property law principles in one way or another.

因此，先占、和纠正基本上是在发生争议时确定外部资源所有权的仅有的三项原则。因此，这四项原则——因直接控制而产生的身体所有权，以及因实施侵犯而丧失这一权利的例外情况，[518]加上外部资源的三项原则——就是我们确定最佳联系的方式，这是所有财产权的核心，也是所有公正法律的核心。一套完善的私法要想实现公正，就必须以这些核心原则为基础，而公正则需要在法律发展的过程中不断完善细节。[519]每一种社会主义制度，每一种不以这些核心原则为基础的法律，包括知识产权法，最终都会以这样或那样的方式偏离私有财产法的核心原则。

自我所有权Self-Ownership

Now, so we commonly use the term “self-ownership.” This is another phrase that can be misleading because you can have people object to it and say, well, how can you own yourself, because that’s a religious view because it implies that your “self ” is different than your body or something like that, and they’ll criticize it that way.17

现在，我们通常使用 “自我拥有 “这个词。这是另一个可能会引起误解的短语，因为可能会有人反对它，说，你怎么能拥有自己，因为这是一种宗教观点，因为它暗示你的 “自我 “不同于你的身体或类似的东西，他们会这样批评它。[520]

So to be precise, self-ownership is just a shorthand for body ownership, because your body is a scarce resource. Your “self ” is not a scarce resource. The notion of “self ” is bound up with the concept of personality and the person that you are, your identity as a person in the world, as an actor, as an agent. So every person is the presumptive owner of his body. That’s the basic libertarian rule. We don’t need to get into controversial metaphysics to understand this basic norm or rule.

所以准确地说，自我所有权只是身体所有权的一种简略表述，因为你的身体是一种稀缺资源。你的“自我”不是稀缺资源。“自我”的概念与人格以及你这个人的概念、你在世界上作为一个人的身份、作为一个行动人、作为一个主体的身份紧密相连。所以每个人都被假定为其身体的所有者。这是基本的自由意志主义规则。我们无需陷入有争议的形而上学来理解这一基本规范或规则。

Now, by the way, I say “presumptive” because it’s not absolute; it’s defeasible. The self-ownership right can be lost by committing aggression, because the victim has the right to defend himself during a crime or to retaliate after.18 And when they do that, they’re using the body of the aggressor without his consent.19 So he’s, in a sense, lost ownership of his body to the extent that the victim needs to be able to use force against him to obtain justice.

顺便说一句，我之所以说 “假定的”，原因在于这不是绝对的，而是可以被推翻的。自我所有权会通过实施侵犯行动而丧失，因为受害者有权在犯罪过程中自卫或在犯罪后报复。[521]而当他们这样做时，他们是在未经侵害者同意的情况下使用他的身体。[522]因此，从某种意义上说，侵害者在受害者为了获得正义而需要对其使用武力的范围内，丧失了对自己身体的所有权。

So the basis here of self-ownership, or body-ownership, is not homesteading, but it’s the direct control over your body. This is the best link between the given actor and the resource of his human body. And actually, I think the first person who explicitly recognized this was Professor Hoppe in a German publication in 1987.20 You actually weren’t explicit about this in your later English book, but it’s implicit in there.21 And if you remember, you told me about that passage, and you translated it for me for my article.

所以，这里的自我所有权，或者说身体所有权的基础不是拓殖，而是对自己身体的直接控制。这是特定行动人与其人体资源之间的最佳纽带。实际上，我认为第一个明确意识到这一点的人是霍普教授，他于 1987 年在德国的一份出版物上发表了这一观点。[523] 在你后来的英文著作中，你实际上并没有明确提出这一点，但其中隐含了这一点。[524]如果你还记得，你告诉过我这段话，并为我的文章翻译了它。

And so Hoppe’s argument is that you own your body because you directly control it. So this gives each person or actor logical-temporal priority or precedence as compared to anyone’s indirect control. What that means is, if you were to enslave someone or claim to own their body, the only way to control that body is by coercion, by directing threats of force to get them to act the way you want them to act. But in that case, they’re the ones still directly controlling it, and that always has precedence, and it’s a better link than the indirect control I can exert over you by coercion. Not to mention that the coercer himself would be in contradiction because he claims ownership of his body for the purpose of being the one who can punish you or threaten you.

因此，霍普的论点是，你拥有自己的身体，因为你直接控制着它。因此，与任何人的间接控制相比，这赋予了每个人或行动人逻辑-时间上的优先性或优先权。这意味着，如果你要奴役一个人或声称拥有他的身体，控制他身体的唯一方式就是胁迫，通过武力威胁让他按照你希望的方式行事。但在这种情况下，他们仍然是直接控制自己身体的人，这一点始终具有优先权，而且这是比我通过胁迫对你施加间接控制更佳的联系。更不用说，胁迫者本人也会自相矛盾，因为他声称对自己的身体拥有所有权，目的是成为可以惩罚你或威胁你的人。

So this is what the best link means here. It’s not homesteading, although people think it’s homesteading. It can’t be homesteading because to homestead means you’re an actor in the world, already a self-owner, or body-owner, and you find an unowned resource, and you appropriate it to yourself. But this presupposes there’s already a person with a body, so it’s impossible to imagine that you homestead your body unless you have some religious view where the soul goes down there and grabs it. But that’s not the domain of science as I think Guido [Hülsmann] and Mises would agree.22 We could make an analogy. We could say that when a child “wakes up” at the moment when he becomes sapient enough to be said to have rights, he homesteads himself. But it’s really a loose analogy. It just means that’s the point in time in which he’s a person with rights. It’s not like his body was unowned, and he just homesteaded it.

所以这就是此处“最佳联系”的含义。这不是拓殖，尽管人们认为这是拓殖。之所以不可能是拓殖，原因在于拓殖意味着你是世界上的一个行动人，已经是一个自我所有者或身体所有者，然后你发现一个无主资源，并将其占有。但这预先假定已经存在一个拥有身体的人，所以无法想象你拓殖自己的身体，除非你有某种宗教观点，认为灵魂降落到那里并抓住它。这不是科学的范畴，但我认为吉多[许尔斯曼]和米塞斯会同意。[525]我们可以做一个类比。我们可以说，当一个孩子在变得足够明智以至于可以说拥有权利的那一刻“醒来”，他就拓殖了自己。但这实际上是一个不严谨的类比。这只是意味着那是他成为拥有权利的人的时间点。并不是说他的身体之前是无主的，然后他只是拓殖了它。

外部资源External Resources

Now, as for external resources, these are things that were previously unowned. This is a key point, and they’re external to the human body, so they’re not part of people’s bodies. So in this case, as I said earlier, the best link is determined by the three principles. First, we have original appropriation or homesteading. What this means is you possess something, which is an economic category. It means to be able to use or manipulate. Mises—I’ll get to this later, but Mises calls it catallactic or sociological ownership, but what he really means is possession, which is—and this is important—an economic category. So mere possession, like Crusoe on an island—in a Robinsonade—he can never “own” anything because there’s no society to have norms with respect to. He controls, and he uses things. He possesses these things as means, he exercises “factual authority” over these things—but he doesn’t own them.23

现在，至于外部资源，这些都是之前无主的东西。这是一个关键点，它们是人体的外部资源，因此不是人们身体的一部分。因此，在这种情况下，正如我之前所说，最佳联系由三项原则决定。首先，我们先占或拓殖。这意味着你拥有某样东西，这是一个经济学范畴。它意味着能够使用或操纵。米塞斯——我稍后会讲到这一点，但米塞斯称之为交换学或社会学的所有权（catallactic or sociological ownership），但他真正的意思是 “占有”（possession），这很重要——是一个经济学范畴。因此，单纯的占有，就像荒岛上的克鲁索——在鲁滨逊式的情境中——他永远不能“拥有”任何东西，因为没有社会来制定相关规范。他控制并使用东西。他把这些东西当作手段占有，对这些东西行使“实际的权力”——但他并不拥有它们。[526]

In society, where there are property rights norms, you can also do the same thing. You can just possess something and not intend to own it—you pick up a stick and throw it away. Or you can possess it with the intent to own, and you take certain steps to transform it or to put a barrier up around it, or to, as Hoppe calls it, emborder it, which basically means to put up a visible public link between you and the thing demonstrating to everyone that this thing is no longer unowned, to say, “I’m claiming ownership of it.”24

在存在财产权规范的社会中，你也可以做同样的事情。你可以仅仅占有某物而无意拥有它——你捡起一根棍子然后扔掉。或者你可以怀着拥有的意图占有它，并且你采取某些步骤来改造它或者在它周围设置障碍，或者像霍普所说的那样，为它划定边界，这基本上意味着在你和该物品之间建立一个可见的公开联系，向所有人表明此物不再是无主的，即表示：“我宣称对它拥有所有权。”[527]

This requires the merger or the combination of actual possession or transformation or embordering—with then intent to own.25 So thosetwo things are essential to owning a thing that was previously unowned. And then, once you own a thing, you can contractually transfer it to someone by your intent, your consent, and I’ll get to the mechanics of that in a moment. And then, again, there can also be a transfer as rectification—if you have to transfer something to someone to compensate them for damages you caused them by a tort (an uninvited use of their property).

这需要将实际占有、改造或划定界限与拥有的意图相结合。[528] 因此，这两点对于拥有一个先前无主的东西至关重要。然后，一旦你拥有了一件东西，你就可以通过你的意图、你的同意，以的形式将其转让给他人，我稍后会讲到其中的机制。同样，也可以以纠正的方式进行转让——如果你必须将某物转让给他人，以补偿你因侵权行为（未经许可使用他人财产）给他人造成的损失。

Okay. Oh, and by the way, this formulation of rights that I just went through, this way of looking at the best link and the breakdown between the body, I’m happy that I was able to help the Mises Caucus in the US get this basic formulation put into the Libertarian Party Platform26 last May at the “Reno Reset,” as we call it. Up until this time, there was no definition of aggression in the Libertarian Party platform. It was just implied.27

好的。哦，顺便说一下，我刚才所讲的这种权利的表述，这种看待身体之间的最佳联系和分解的方式，我很高兴我能够帮助美国的米塞斯核心小组在去年五月的 “里诺重启”（Reno Reset，我们称之为 “里诺重启”）上将这一基本表述写入自由意志主义党纲[529]。在此之前，自由意志主义党纲中没有关于侵犯的定义。仅仅只是有过暗示。[530]

，出售和所有权：外部的稀缺资源Contract, Selling and Ownership: External Scarce Resources

Getting back to the problem of confusing selling and ownership, of thinking there’s a necessary relationship between them. How do we sell an external resource that we own, like the contractual title transfer we talked about early? So: when you own a resource, because the ownership requires the merger of possession and the intent to own, you can lose ownership by losing the intent to own, by making it clear you no longer intend to own the resource. This is abandonment. So if you acquire a thing, you can “unacquire” it, so to speak. And because of this, it gives you the ability to sell because you can basically abandon it “in favor” of someone else.28

回到混淆出售与所有权的问题，即认为它们之间存在必然联系的问题。我们如何出售我们所拥有的外部资源，比如我们之前谈到的式所有权转让？所以：当你拥有一种资源时，由于所有权需要占有和拥有意图的结合，你可能会因为失去拥有意图而失去所有权，即明确表示你不再打算拥有该资源。这就是放弃。所以，如果你获得了一件东西，可以说你也能够“放弃获得”它。正因如此，这赋予了你出售的能力，因为你基本上可以为了他人而放弃它。[531]

Imagine you’re in a tree, and you have an apple, and there’s people walking by, below you. You can kind of toss the apple to whoever you want. You can drop it so that whoever you want will catch it. You can direct this—you can direct the re-homesteading, in effect. So if I have an apple and I give it to you to hold temporarily, you’re the possessor, but you’re not the owner. I’m the owner, but I’m not the possessor. So ownership and possession are distinct concepts and statuses. But if you’re holding my apple, and if I then abandon it, now you’re holding an unowned apple, and you can just re-homestead it right away. So that’s the mechanics, the juristic or legal mechanics, of why and how you can sell things.29 So the way that we come to own unowned resources is the reason why they can be sold. So it’s not an incident or aspect of ownership per se. It’s an aspect of the way external things come to be owned.

想象一下，你在一棵树上，手里有一个苹果，树下有人走过。你可以把苹果扔给任何你想给的人。你可以把它扔下去，让任何你想给的人接住。实际上，你可以引导这一过程——你可以引导重新拓殖。所以，如果我有一个苹果，我让你暂时拿着，你是占有者，但你不是所有者。我是所有者，但我不是占有者。所以所有权和占有是不同的概念和状态。但是如果你拿着我的苹果，如果我随后放弃它，现在你拿着的就是一个无主的苹果，你可以马上重新拓殖占有它。这就是为什么以及如何能够出售物品的机制，是法理学或法律上的机制。[532]所以我们获得无主资源的方式，也是它们能够被出售的原因。所以这本身不是所有权的附带特权或方面。这是外部事物如何被拥有的一个方面。

谬论1：你可以出售你的拥有物Fallacy 1: You Can Sell What You Own

Now, what about selling yourself, your “self,” i.e., your body, like Walter Block thinks we can do? Keep in mind: external things can be sold because they were previously unowned and acquired by an actor-owner who is already a self-owner, and he can abandon it. But your body rights don’t arise by homesteading or by your intent to own yourself. They arise because of the best link based upon your direct control.

现在，像沃尔特-布洛克认为我们可以做的那样，卖掉你自己，你的 “自我”，即你的身体，又如何呢？请记住：外部事物之所以可以出售，是因为它们之前是无主的，由已经是自我所有者的行动主体获得，他可以放弃它。但你的身体权并不是因为拓殖或你意图拥有自己而产生的。它们产生的原因是基于你直接控制的最佳联系。

So if I try to make a contract, “I promise to sell” or “I promise to be your slave forever,” those words do not change the fact that I still have the best link to my body. And because my words are not an act of aggression—which is the only way to come to own someone else’s body, by them forfeiting their rights by committing a crime—then promising to be someone’s slave is simply not enforceable because it doesn’t transfer any title to anything. You still own your body because you still have direct control and thus the better link. You can always change your mind, in other words.

因此，如果我试图订立，”我承诺出售 “或 “我承诺永远做你的奴隶”，这些话并不能改变我仍然与我的身体有着最佳联系的事实。而且由于我的这些话语并不是一种侵犯行动——通过他人犯罪而丧失权利从而获得他人身体的所有权，这是唯一途径——所以承诺成为他人的奴隶根本无法执行，因为它并没有转让任何所有权。换句话说，你仍然拥有自己的身体，因为你仍然能直接控制它，从而保持着更好的联系。换句话说，你可以随时改变主意。

So Rothbard seems to notice this in his kind of convoluted arguments in his contract theory. But it’s implied, perhaps unknowingly, and later clarified by Hoppe. In any case, Rothbard wrote:

It is true that man, being what he is, cannot absolutely guarantee lifelong service to another under a voluntary arrangement. Thus, Jackson, at present, might agree to labor under Crusoe’s direction for life, in return for food, clothing, etc., but he cannot guarantee that he will not change his mind at some point in the future and decide to leave. In this sense, a man’s own person and will is “inalienable,” i.e., cannot be given up to someone else for any future period.30

所以罗斯巴德在他的理论中那种迂回曲折的论证中似乎注意到了这一点。但这或许是在不知不觉中暗示的，后来霍普对此进行了澄清。。无论如何，罗斯巴德写道：

诚然，人的本性决定了他无法绝对保证在自愿安排下为他人终身服务。因此，杰克逊目前可能同意终身都在克鲁索的指挥下劳动，以换取食物、衣服等，但他不能保证自己不会在将来的某个时候改变主意，决定离开。从这个意义上说，一个人自身和意志是 “不可让渡的”，即不能在未来的任何时期让渡给他人。[533]

So I think the reason he focuses on the fact that the will is inalienable is that Rothbard senses that that’s the reason you own your body, although he never quite says it explicitly, but he gets really close. I mean, what’s the relevance of the fact that your will is inalienable to the legitimacy or enforceability of a voluntary slavery contract? The only relevance could be that your direct control, or your will, is the reason you own your body.31

因此，我认为他之所以把重点放在 “不可让渡的意志 “这一事实上，是因为罗斯巴德感觉到，这就是你拥有自己身体的原因，尽管他从未明确说过，但他已经非常接近。我的意思是，你的意志不可让渡的事实与自愿为奴的合法性或可执行性有什么关系？唯一的关联可能在于，你的直接控制，或者说你的意志，是你拥有自己身体的原因。[534]

Okay, so again, after you promise to be a slave, you still have direct control, so you’re still the owner, and you have not committed aggression, so you can always change your mind (in contrast to an aggressor who, as noted above, has irrevocably granted consent, since he cannot undo the historical fact of the aggression).

好的，所以再次强调，在你承诺成为奴隶之后，你仍然拥有直接控制权，所以你仍然是所有者，而且你没有实施侵犯行动，所以你总是可以改变主意（这与上述的侵害者形成对比，因为侵害者不可撤销地授权了同意，因为他无法改变侵犯行动这一历史事实）。

谬论2：你拥有你的出售物Fallacy 2: You Own What You Sell

Okay, now what about the other fallacy—owning what you sell? In a simple exchange, for two material resources that are both owned by two different people like an apple for an orange or an apple for a silver coin, the sellers do own what they sell. There are two title transfers: The orange changes ownership, and the apple changes ownership.

好的，那么另一个谬论——拥有你所出售的东西呢？在一个简单的交换中，对于两个不同的人所拥有的两种物质资源，比如一个苹果换一个橙子或者一个苹果换一枚银币，卖家确实拥有他们所出售的东西。这里存在两个所有权的转让：橙子的所有权发生了变更，苹果的所有权也发生了变更。

But in a “sale” of service, labor, or information, the contract in legal terms32 only involves one title transfer. This is in legal terms—whatever is “paid” to the person performing the service. So if I give you a chicken to pay you for giving me a haircut, the title to the chicken transfers to you. But you don’t transfer title to any labor to me. It’s not like there’s a bucket of labor, which I’m handing over to you. So these are actions, not things that can be owned.33 So labor or services or actions are what we do with things that we own like our bodies or other owned resources. They’re not themselves owned resources. So you don’t really sell labor, in a legal sense. So why do we describe it this way?

但在服务、劳务或信息的 “销售 “中，从法律术语[535]上讲，只涉及一次所有权转让。这在法律上是指 “支付 “给提供服务者的任何东西。因此，如果我给你一只鸡，以支付你给我理发的费用，这只鸡的所有权就转让了给你。但你并没有把任何劳动的所有权转让给我。这不像有一桶劳动，我从你那里接过来。所以这些是行动，不是可以拥有的东西。[536] 因此，劳动、服务或行动是我们利用我们所拥有的东西，比如我们的身体或其他拥有的资源所做的事情。它们本身并不是被拥有的资源。因此，从法律意义上讲，你并不能真正出售劳动。那么，我们为什么要这样描述劳动呢？

经济分析领域与规范分析领域：所有权与占有Economic vs. Normative Realms of Analysis: Ownership vs. Possession

Now, here’s what I think is the reason for the confusion. There are different modes of understanding for different realms of phenomena and different conceptual frameworks. So, for example, in the teleological versus causal realms, we have human action and purposive behavior on the one hand versus causal laws of nature on the other. We have praxeology versus the empirical method, the scientific method. We have apodictic or a priori versus tentative or contingent knowledge. We also have normative or juristic, legal, types or realms of understanding versus factual. And human laws and norms versus empirical facts.

现在，以下是我认为造成困惑的原因。对于不同领域的现象和不同的概念框架，有不同的理解模式。例如，在目的论和因果论的领域中，一方面是人的行动和有目的的行为，另一方面是自然的因果法则。我们有行动学和经验方法，科学方法。我们有绝对的或先验的知识和尝试性的或偶然的知识。我们也有规范的或法学的，法律的，理解的类型或理解的领域与事实性的。人类的法律和规范与经验事实。

I’m getting to the point. So, now, Mises was careful to distinguish the juristic or the legal or the should from the factual, but he used the word “ownership” in both, which is potentially confusing. So he said: “Regarded as a sociological category”—this was in Socialism in 1922, he changed the word to catallactic later, probably because he hadn’t come up with the term catallactics yet. I don’t know. But he calls it the sociological or economic category of ownership, which is the power to use a good. Now, that’s possession. That’s what we would call possession or control.34 The “factual authority” mentioned previously.

我就要说到重点了。现在，米塞斯小心翼翼地做了区分，一方面是法理的、法律的、应然的，另一方面是实然的，但他在两者中都使用了 “所有权 “一词，这可能会造成混淆。所以他说：“被视为一个社会学范畴”——这是在 1922 年的《社会主义》中说的，他后来把社会学一词改成了交换学，可能是因为当时他还没有想出交换学这个术语。我不知道。但他称之为所有权的社会学或经济学范畴，即使用物品的权力。这就是占有。这就是我们所说的占有或控制。[537] 也就是前面提到的 “事实权力”。

And then he says the sociological and juristic (by which he means legal or normative) concepts of ownership are different. “Ownership” (really: possession) from the sociological (economic; descriptive) point of view is the having of a good. It’s just what Crusoe could do. So that’s natural or original “ownership,” and it’s a purely physical relationship of man to goods. But the legal is the “should have.” Who should have it? Who has a right to it? This is where property rights and law come in. And later in Human Action, he goes on in a similar vein.35

然后他说社会学和法学（他指的是法律或规范）的所有权概念是不同的。从社会学（经济；描述性）的角度来看，“所有权”（实际上是占有）是对一件物品的拥有。这正是克鲁索能够做的。所以这是自然或原始的“所有权”，它是人与物品之间纯粹的物理关系。但从法律角度来说，是“应当拥有”。谁应当拥有？谁有拥有的权利？这就是财产权和法律的介入之处。后来在《人的行为》中，他以类似的思路继续阐述。[538]

So as I said earlier, it’s better to distinguish ownership and possession, to use those words rather than two senses of the word ownership, because it could be potentially confusing because people say they own Bitcoins, but what they really mean is they possess Bitcoins. People say they own their minds, but your mind is just an epiphenomenon of your physical brain—you own your brain; you can change your mind, but you can’t change your brain. They’re different concepts. A dead body has a brain, but it doesn’t have a mind. The brain weights three pounds; the mind doesn’t weigh anything.

因此，正如我之前所说，最好区分所有权和占有权，使用这两个词，而不是所有权这个词的两种含义，因为这有可能造成混淆，因为人们说他们拥有比特币，但他们真正的意思是他们占有比特币。人们说他们拥有自己的思想，但你的思想只是你物理大脑的附带现象——你拥有你的大脑；你可以改变你的思想，但你不能改变你的大脑。它们是不同的概念。一具尸体有大脑，但没有思想。大脑有三磅重，思想却没有任何重量。

There’s a well-known Roman law, civil law scholar who passed away a couple years ago, from Greece, but he was a Louisiana law professor,A.N. Yiannopolous. And he defines, and the Louisiana Civil Code also defines, possession as actual control or the “factual authority” a person has over a corporeal or a material thing.36 I like these phraseologies. And again, calling Bitcoin possession “ownership” is one reason for the confused idea that it’s ownable. So if you say I possess a Bitcoin, that’s fine. But it doesn’t imply that you own it. Plus, Bitcoins can be sold, and so people think if you sell something, you must own it, so that’s why they make that mistake. But they are referring to the economic description of the actions—saying I “sold” a bitcoin is a way of describing why the buyer gave me money: to obtain possession of “my” bitcoin—not to the juristic nature of the transaction, which is a one-way title transfer (of the money).37

有一位著名的罗马法、大陆法学者几年前去世了，他来自希腊，但曾是路易斯安那州的法学教授，大名叫A.N. 扬诺普洛斯。他对占有进行了定义，路易斯安那州民法典也有定义，占有指的是实际控制或一个人对有形或物质事物所拥有的“实际权力”。[539]我喜欢这些表述。再说一遍，将比特币的占有称为 “所有权 “是造成比特币可被拥有这一混乱观点的原因之一。所以，如果你说“我占有一个比特币“，这很好。但这并不意味着你拥有它。另外，比特币是可以出售的，所以人们认为如果你出售了某样东西，你就一定拥有它，这就是他们之所以犯错的原因。但他们指的是对行动的经济描述——说我 “卖出 “了一个比特币，是在描述买方给我钱的原因：获得 “我的 “比特币的占有权——而不是指交易的法律性质，这是单向的所有权转让（货币）。[540]

Yiannopolous also points out something I mentioned earlier—that the accurate use of the word property should be the designation of rights people have with respect to things. In other words, property is not the thing itself. It’s the relationship between you and the thing.38 I have a property right in the thing. I’m the owner of the thing.39 (And by thing I mean an ownable, conflictable resource.)

扬诺普洛斯还指出了我之前提到的一点——“财产”一词的准确用法应当是指人们对事物所拥有的权利的确定。换句话说，财产不是事物本身。而是你与事物之间的关系。[541] 我对该事物拥有财产权。我是该事物的所有者。[542]（这里所说的事物，指的是可拥有的、会引发冲突的资源。）

So: why do we refer to a sale of labor or information when, as I already pointed out, there’s only a one-way title transfer of the payment made to the labor performer? Why do we call it that? What happens is, just like in the way the word ownership is used in both senses sometimes to mean possession or economic “ownership,” or juristic ownership or real ownership, we use the word sale in that way too. Sometimes we use it as economists to describe the structure of a given human action; and sometimes we use it as lawyers to describe the rights that are transferred.40

那么：正如我已经指出的，向劳动付出者支付的报酬只有单向的所有权转让，为什么我们要称之为劳动力或信息的出售呢？我们为什么要这样称呼它呢？就像 “所有权 “一词有时在两种意义上都被用来指占有或经济上的 “所有权”，或法律上的所有权或实际所有权一样，我们也以这种方式使用 “出售 “一词。有时我们作为经济学家用它来描述特定的人的行动的结构；有时我们作为律师用它来描述转让的权利。[543]

So in (libertarian) law, “sell” refers to transferring title to an owned thing. So you don’t literally sell your labor. You just perform your labor. You perform some action. But in economics, it can be used to describe or characterize an action. So all action from an economic point of view involves an actor using scarce means to pursue some goal or purpose. So when we try to describe what someone does, we try to discern their goals and purposes, and also the means that they’re using.41 So that’s what history does as well, right, which Guido was mentioning earlier.42 We try to understand or characterize the actions of people within a means-ends (praxeological) framework.

所以在（自由意志主义的）法律中，“出售”指的是将所拥有之物的所有权转让。所以严格来说，你并没有出售你的劳动。你只是付出劳动。你执行了某些行动。但在经济学中，它可以被用来描述或刻画一种行动。所以从经济角度来看，所有行动都涉及行动者使用稀缺手段来追求某个目标或目的。因此，当我们试图描述某人的所作所为时，我们会尝试辨别他们的目标和目的，以及他们所使用的手段。[544]这也是历史所做的，对吧，就像吉多之前提到的。[545] 我们试图在手段-目的（行动学）框架内理解或描述人们的行动。

So when we say as an economist, “A sold his labor to B,” this is just a concise way of explaining the praxeological nature of that action. We’re explaining why A performed the action, his labor. Well, he performed it to get money from B. So we’re describing his goal. His goal was to get money from B. That’s why he engaged in the means of using his body to perform an action, which he knew would satisfy B. And why did B transfer ownership of his money to A—he actually did legally sell his money to A because he transfers title to the money to A—to induce him to perform an action. So there’s only one title transfer.

因此，当我们以经济学家的身份说：”A把他的劳动力卖给了B “时，这只是解释该行动的行动学性质的一种简明方式。我们要解释的是，A为什么要做这个行动，付出他的劳动。他这样做是为了从 B 那里得到钱，所以我们是在描述他的目标。他的目标就是从 B 那里得到钱。这就是为什么他要用自己的身体来完成一个行动，他知道这个行动会让 B 满意。而为什么 B 要把他的钱的所有权转让给 A——他实际上是合法地把他的钱卖给了 A，因为他把钱的所有权转让给了 A，以诱使他完成一个行动。所以这里只有一次所有权的转让。

So in this case, the economic and the juristic uses of the word “sell” are different because, in legal terms, B transfers money to A conditional on him performing an action. There’s only one title transfer—the money that was transferred. But in economic terms, A sells his labor to B “in exchange” for money, and B sells his money to A “in exchange” for A’s action. So we can use selling (or exchange) in an economic sense, but we should be careful. Otherwise, you might end up justifying intellectual property.43

Thank you very much.

因此，在这种情况下，”出售 “一词的经济学用法和法学用法是不同的，因为从法律上讲，B 把钱转让给 A 是以他执行一项行动为条件的。只有一次所有权转让——被转让的钱。但在经济术语中，A 将他的劳动 “出售”给 B，以换取金钱；B 将他的金钱 “出售”给 A，以换取 A 的行动。因此，我们可以在经济学意义上使用 “出售”（或 “交换”），但我们应该谨慎小心。否则，你最终可能会为知识产权辩护。[546]

非常感谢。

Reply to Van Dun: Non-Aggression and Title Transfer*

第十二章对冯·顿的回复：互不侵犯和所有权转让*

In a recent issue of The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Fran van Dun commented on myviews on intellectual property and Walter Block’s views on blackmail.1 In this reply, I will concentrate on two aspects of Van Dun’s comments: the non-aggression principle andlibertarianism, and trademark and contract.

在最近一期的《自由意志主义研究杂志》上，弗兰克·冯·顿（Fran van Dun）对我关于知识产权的观点以及沃尔特·布洛克（Walter Block）关于敲诈勒索的观点发表了评论。[547]在这篇回复中，我将集中讨论冯·顿评论的两个方面：互不侵犯原则和自由意志主义，以及商标和。

* Originally published as Kinsella, “Reply to Van Dun: Non-Aggression and Title Transfer,” J. Libertarian Stud. 18, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 55–64.

* 最初以金塞拉的《对冯·顿的回复：互不侵犯原则与所有权转让》发表于《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 18 卷第 2 期（2004 年春季）：55-64 页。

互不侵犯原则和自由意志主义THE NON-AGGRESSION PRINCIPLE AND LIBERTARIANISM

Van Dun criticizes Block and me for using “the so-called Rothbardian non-aggression rule as the foundation or axiom for libertarian jurisprudence.” For although “[n]on-aggression is an important and valid rule of libertarian jurisprudence,” it is “inadequate from a libertarian point of view.” Rather than being the foundation of libertarian theory, Van Dun argues, it is only an implication of the libertarian philosophy of law.2

冯·顿批评布洛克和我把 “所谓的罗斯巴德式的互不侵犯规则作为自由意志主义法学的基础或公理”。因为尽管 “互不侵犯是自由意志主义法学的一条重要而有效的规则”，但 “从自由意志主义的观点来看，它是不充分的”。冯·顿认为，与其说它是自由意志主义理论的基础，不如说它只是自由意志主义哲学的一个可能的推论。[548]

After such a claim, one might expect Van Dun to provide a critique or denial of the principle of non-aggression followed by an explanation of the contours of the proper theory of law. However, Van Dun seems to accept the non-aggression rule. He uses the concept of “aggression in the traditional sense of a physically invasive, non-defensive use of force (violence) against another person or his property,”3 just as Rothbardians do. He writes:

I have no problem with the thesis that, in a libertarian legal order, no individual or group—least of all those who are engaged in the administration of justice—should aggress against any person or any person’s property. Aggression, in the libertarian sense of the word, is the physical invasion of another person’s domain without that person’s consent and without lawful justification. As such, aggression is unlawful and should therefore be illegal in a libertarian legal order (because such an order is intended to be as true to law as is humanly possible). Nor do I have a problem with the thesis that violent border crossings are lawful and therefore legally permissible if and only if they are committed in self-defence, to bring a criminal to justice, or to exact restitution or compensation for an unlawfully inflicted harm. They are permissible to the extent that they are themselves compatible with the requirements of justice.4

在提出这样的主张之后，人们可能会期待冯·顿对互不侵犯原则进行批判或否定，然后解释正确的法律理论的轮廓。然而，冯·顿似乎接受了互不侵犯原则。他使用了 “传统意义上的侵犯概念，即对他人或其财产使用武力（暴力），而非防御性的人身侵犯”，[549] 正如罗斯巴德主义者所做的那样。他写道：

在自由意志主义的法律秩序中，任何个人或团体——尤其是那些从事司法管理的人——都不得侵犯任何人或任何人的财产，我对这一论点没有异议。从自由意志主义的意义上讲，侵犯是指未经他人同意，在没有合法理由的情况下，对他人领域的物理入侵。因此，侵犯是非法的，因此在自由意志主义的法律秩序中应该是违法的（因为这种秩序的目的是尽可能地忠实于法律）。我也不反对这样的论点，即暴力越境行动是合法的，因此在法律上是允许的，但前提是也只有是，它们是为了自卫、将罪犯绳之以法或对非法造成的伤害进行补偿或赔偿。只要暴力越境本身符合正义的要求，就是允许的。[550]

However:

It does not follow from those theses that defensive use of force is justified or lawful only in response to aggressive violent invasions of persons or property. It does not follow that only aggression against another person or his property is unlawful. There may be unlawful acts that are not invasions of a person’s physical domain, yet justify the defensive use of force to prevent, stop, or exact compensation for such acts.5

然而：

从这些论点并不能得出这样的结论：只有在对人员或财产的侵犯性暴力的入侵做出回应时，使用武力进行防御才是正当的或合法的。也不能得出只有对他人或其财产的侵犯才是非法的结论。可能存在并非对一个人的物理领域入侵的非法行动，但为了防止、制止此类行动或为此类行动索取赔偿而使用武力进行自卫是正当的。[551]

Van Dun goes on to state even more explicitly his view of the relation between aggression and what is properly regarded as “unlawful”:

Block and Kinsella proceed with their arguments on the supposition that such acts are not unlawful because they are not aggressions. Accordingly, they also suppose that the use of force in retaliation against such acts must itself be an aggression, and therefore unlawful. In their system of thought, the dichotomy of aggression and non-aggression coincides with the logical opposition between unlawful and lawful acts.6

冯·顿继续更明确地阐述他对于侵犯和被恰当地视为“非法”之间关系的观点：

布洛克和金塞拉在他们的论证中基于这样的假设，即这些行动不是非法的，因为它们不是侵犯。因此，他们还假设，针对这些行动进行报复性地使用武力本身一定是一种侵犯，因此是非法的。在他们的思想体系中，侵犯与非侵犯的二分法与非法和合法行动之间的逻辑对立是一致的。[552]

As Van Dun explains in a brief outline at the end of the paper, in his view, libertarian theory tells us what should be unlawful, by which term he seems to mean a rights violation or against natural law.7 For Van Dun, “unlawful” means the type of conduct that should be made illegal (against positive law). As he writes, “aggression is unlawful and should therefore be illegal in a libertarian legal order.”8 Thus, libertarianism is concerned with what is lawful and unlawful, or with what should be made illegal.

正如冯·顿在论文末尾的一个简短提纲中所解释的那样，在他看来，自由意志主义理论告诉我们什么应该是非法的，他似乎用这个术语来表示权利侵犯权或者违反自然法。[553]对冯·顿来说，“非法”意味着那种应该被制定为违法（违反实在法）的行为类型。正如他所写的，“侵犯是非法的，因此在自由意志主义的法律秩序中应该是违法的。”[554]因此，自由意志主义关注的是合法与非法，或者是应该被视为违法的东西。

Van Dun states that while physical aggression is one type of unlawfulness, it is not true “that only physical invasions of another’s person or property are unlawful.”9 Because aggression is only one type of unlawfulness, he writes, other unlawful things may also be made illegal. Such things include trademark infringement, libel, or blackmail.

冯·顿指出，虽然身体上的侵犯是一种非法类型，但“只有对他人人身或财产的物理侵犯才是非法的”这种说法并不正确。[555]因为侵犯只是非法的一种类型，他写道，其他非法的事情也可能被制定为违法。这些事情包括商标侵权、诽谤或敲诈勒索。

I hope that I have accurately summarized this aspect of Van Dun’s thought. Now I do not deny that the non-aggression principle might not be an “axiom” in the Randian sense and that it might be the result of, or dependent on, more basic truths or reasons.10 But a given theory of law either is or is not compatible with the rule. It seems that Van Dun wants to have it both ways. He is quite correct that, as Block and I see it, “the dichotomy of aggression and non-aggression coincides with the logical opposition between unlawful and lawful acts.”11 The reason for this is that to declare something “unlawful” means it should be made illegal, meaning that force may be used to oppose the unlawful action. The libertarian believes, I submit, that the only case in which force is justified is if it is in response to an initiated act of force. Otherwise, the outlawing of the conduct is itself an initiation of force.

我希望我已经准确地概括了冯·顿思想的这一方面。现在，我并不否认，互不侵犯原则可能并不是兰德意义上的 “公理”，它可能是更基本的真理或理由的结果，或依赖于更基本的真理或理由。[556]但是，特定的法律理论要么与该规则相容，要么不相容。冯·顿似乎想两全其美。他说得很对，在布洛克和我看来，”侵犯和不侵犯的二分法与非法行动和合法行动的逻辑对立是一致的 “。[557]究其原因，宣布某事 “非法 “就意味着应将其定为违法，意味着可以使用武力来反对非法行动。我认为，自由意志主义相信，武力唯一正当的理由是，它是对主动的武力行动的回应。否则，将该行动定为非法本身就是一种武力的主动使用。

Van Dun, though, says that the category of unlawful conduct is broader than aggression. This means conduct other than aggression may be—nay, should be—outlawed. Which means that violence should be wielded against innocent people who have not engaged in aggression. However, since it is not in response to aggression, this is initiated force. For this reason, I fail to see how one can admit that aggression should be unlawful but maintain that things other than aggression are also unlawful. If aggression is unlawful, then nothing else can be, because outlawing non-aggression is itself aggression.

然而，冯·顿表示，非法行动的类别比侵犯更广泛。这意味着除了侵犯之外的行为可能——不，应该——被定为非法。这意味着应该对没有进行侵犯的无辜人员使用暴力。但是，由于这不是对侵犯的回应，这就是主动使用武力。出于这个原因，我不明白怎么能承认侵犯应该是非法的，却又主张认为除了侵犯之外的其他事情也是非法的。如果侵犯是非法的，那么其他任何事情都不可能是非法的，因为将非侵犯定为非法本身就是侵犯。

In my view, Van Dun cannot really agree with the non-aggression principle if he is going to adhere to his “broader” view of unlawfulness. Rather, to follow this line of reasoning, it would be more consistent to state that many, even most, acts of aggression are unlawful, but that some types of aggression are not unlawful—namely, the violent suppression of some types of non-aggressive conduct (e.g., libel). But then it would be plain that this theory supports, at least in some cases, the infliction of violent force against those who have not themselves initiated force. This does not seem very libertarian.

在我看来，如果冯·顿要坚持他对非法性的“更广泛”的观点，他就不可能真正认同非侵犯原则。相反，按照这种推理思路，更一致的说法应该是，许多甚至大多数侵犯行动是非法的，但某些类型的侵犯确不是非法的——即对某些非侵犯性行为（例如诽谤）的暴力压制。但那样的话，很明显这个理论至少在某些情况下支持对那些自身没有主动使用武力的人施加暴力。这看起来不太像自由意志主义。

Before I turn to Van Dun’s critique of some of my intellectual property views, a brief digression. Van Dun states:

A libertarian legal theory must be founded on a sound philosophy of law if it is to have any chance of holding its ground in serious intellectual debate. Block and Kinsella do not provide such a philosophy. They assume instead that it can be found in Rothbard’s writings.12

在我开始讨论冯·顿对我的一些知识产权观点的批评之前，有一个简短的题外话。冯·顿说：

如果自由意志主义的法律理论要在严肃的知识辩论中有立足之地，它必须建立在健全的法律哲学基础之上。布洛克和金塞拉没有提供这样的哲学。他们反而假定可以在罗斯巴德的著作中找到。[558]

However, Van Dun continues, “Rothbard explicitly warned his readers that he himself was merely presupposing the validity of the theory of natural law and would not attempt ‘a full-scale defense of that theory.’”13 Now, just as Van Dun cannot set forth his entire legal theory in his article, so I did not in mine, but I did not and do not rely only on Rothbard. To the contrary, I cited my own work and that of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, which elsewhere set forth a defense of the non-aggression principle.14 Hoppe’s argumentation or discourse ethics approach, in particular, is a powerful defense of the standard non-aggression-based libertarian view. And it is one Van Dun and I both agree with.

然而，冯·顿接着说：”罗斯巴德明确警告他的读者，他本人只是预设了自然法理论的有效性，而不会试图’为该理论进行全面辩护’。”[559]现在，正如冯·顿在他的文章中无法阐述他的整个法律理论一样，我在我的文章中也没有，但我过去没有、现在也不只是依赖罗斯巴德。相反，我引用了我自己的作品和汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）的著作，后者在其他地方为互不侵犯原则作了辩护。[560]尤其是霍普的论证或对话伦理学方法，是对以互不侵犯为基础的标准自由主义观点的有力辩护。而且这是冯·顿和我都同意的一点。

If I am right, Van Dun must reject the non-aggression principle in favor of his view that unlawfulness is not based on or equated with aggression, so that not only aggression may be outlawed. But what I find a bit puzzling is that Van Dun himself employs discourse ethics, in a way similar to Hoppe, to show that “principles of private property and uncoerced exchange” are also presupposed by participants in discourse.15 In other words, as Hoppe argues, the non-aggression principle does have a justification in the nature of peaceful discourse; it is not simply an arbitrary “axiom.” Therefore, it is unclear to me why Van Dun refuses to embrace the non-aggression principle and opposes building a foundation on it. It seems that his own “dialogue ethics” theory, like that of Hoppe, also shows that the non-aggression rule is, in fact, justified and correct.

如果我是对的，冯·顿就必须摒弃互不侵犯原则，转而支持他的观点，即非法性并非基于或等同于侵犯，这样一来，不仅仅是侵犯行为可能被视为非法。但让我感到有点困惑的是，冯·顿自己以一种类似于霍普的方式运用对话伦理学，以表明“私有财产和非强制交换的原则”也被话语参与者预先假定。[561]换句话说，正如霍普所主张的，互不侵犯原则在和平话语的本质中确实有其合理性；它并非仅仅是一个任意的“公理”。因此，我不清楚为什么冯·顿拒绝接受互不侵犯原则并反对在此基础上建立理论。似乎他自己的“对话伦理学”理论，像霍普的一样，也表明互不侵犯规则实际上是合理和正确的。

商标和TRADEMARK AND CONTRACT

Van Dun seems to agree with the main portion of my paper on intellectual property, that patent and copyright laws are unlibertarian. However,he takes issue with my comments with respect to trademark, the relevant portions of which are provided here:

Suppose some Lachmannian changes the name on his failing hamburger chain from LachmannBurgers to RothbardBurgers, which is already the name of another hamburger chain. I, as a consumer, am hungry for a RothbardBurger. I see one of the fake RothbardBurger joints run by the stealthy Lachmannian, and I buy a burger. Under current law, Rothbard, the “owner” of the RothbardBurgers trademark, can prevent the Lachmannian from using the mark RothbardBurgers to sell burgers because it is “confusingly similar” to his own trademark. That is, it is likely to mislead consumers as to the true source of the goods purchased. The law, then, gives a right to the trademark holder against the trademark infringer.

In my view, it is the consumers whose rights are violated, not the trademark holder’s. In the foregoing example, I (the consumer) thought I was buying a RothbardBurger, but instead got a crummy LachmannBurger with its weird kaleidoscopic sauce. I should have a right to sue the Lachmannian for fraud and breach of contract (not to mention intentional infliction of emotional distress and misrepresentation of praxeological truths). However, it is difficult to see how this act of fraud, perpetrated by the Lachmannian on me, violates Rothbard’s rights. The Lachmannian’s actions do not physically invade Rothbard’s property. He does not even convince others to do this; at most, he may be said to convince third parties to take an action within their rights, namely, to buy a burger from the Lachmannian instead of Rothbard. Thus, it would appear that, under libertarianism, trademark law should give consumers, not trademark users, the right to sue trademark pirates.16

冯·顿似乎同意我的论文中关于知识产权的主要部分，即专利法和版权法是非自由意志主义的。不过，他对我关于商标的评论有异议，相关部分在此提供：

假设某个拉赫曼主义者把他失败的汉堡连锁店的名字从 “拉赫曼汉堡”（LachmannBurgers）改为 “罗斯巴德汉堡”（RothbardBurgers），而这已经是另一家汉堡连锁店的名字了。作为消费者，我渴望吃到”罗斯巴德汉堡”。我看到由隐蔽的拉赫曼人经营的假冒”罗斯巴德汉堡”店，就买了一个汉堡。根据现行法律，”罗斯巴德汉堡”商标的 “所有者 “罗斯巴德可以阻止拉赫曼人使用”罗斯巴德汉堡”商标销售汉堡，因为该商标与他自己的商标 “混淆性相似”。也就是说，该商标有可能在所购财货的真正来源方面误导消费者。因此，法律赋予了商标持有人针对商标侵权者的权利。

在我看来，被侵权的是消费者，而不是商标持有人。在上述例子中，我（消费者）以为自己买到的是”罗斯巴德汉堡”，但买到的却是带着怪异万花筒酱汁的难吃的拉赫曼汉堡。我应该有权起诉拉赫曼人欺诈和违约（更不用说故意造成精神痛苦和歪曲行动学的真理了）。然而，很难说拉赫曼人对我实施的这一欺诈行动如何侵犯了罗斯巴德的权利。拉赫曼人的行为并没有实际侵犯罗斯巴德的财产。他甚至没有说服其他人这样做；充其量，他可以说是说服了第三方采取其权利范围内的行动，即从拉赫曼人那里而不是从罗斯巴德那里购买汉堡。因此，根据自由意志主义，商标法似乎应赋予消费者而非商标使用者起诉商标盗版者的权利。[562]

Van Dun maintains that “it is … difficult to see how trademark piracy could violate the consumer’s rights if it was not a violation of the trademark holder’s right.”17 Van Dun mounts an escalating series of criticisms of the alleged implications of my trademark views. Most seem to rest on his conclusion that, under my theory, one cannot say that the consumer has a fraud or breach of contract claim. He reasons:

According to Kinsella, the consumer supposedly is defrauded because the L-Burger chain misrepresented itself to the consumer. The latter therefore should have a right to sue the L-Burger chain for “fraud and breach of contract.” That is a strange conclusion, for it is not at all clear what contract L-Burger breached. The consumer presumably got what he paid for: a burger. If L-Burger acted within its legal rights under the Kinsella Code in using the R-Burger trademark, the consumer should know that a trademark carries no legally relevant information. Kinsella’s argument—the consumer thought he bought an R-Burger, but instead got a crummy L-Burger—is simply irrelevant. The consumer’s expectations would have been equally frustrated if he had bought at R-Burger when, unbeknownst to him, that chain had hired another chef with the same tastes as his counterpart at L-Burger or had changed its production processes or suppliers. Should any of these things also constitute a violation of the consumer’s rights?18

冯·顿认为，”……如果商标盗用不是对商标持有人权利的侵犯，那么很难理解商标盗用怎么会侵犯消费者的权利。”[563] 冯·顿对我的商标观点的所谓影响提出了一系列不断升级的批评。大多数批评似乎都基于他的结论，即根据我的理论，不能说消费者有欺诈或违约索赔权。他的理由是：

根据金塞拉的观点，消费者之所以受到欺诈，是因为 L-汉堡连锁店误导了消费者。因此，消费者有权以 “欺诈和违约 “为由起诉 L-汉堡连锁店。这是一个奇怪的结论，因为根本不清楚 L-汉堡违反了什么。消费者大概得到了他所支付的东西：一个汉堡。如果 L-汉堡根据《金赛拉法典》在其合法权利范围内使用 R-汉堡商标，那么消费者就应该知道商标不包含任何法律相关信息。金塞拉的论点——消费者以为他买的是 R-汉堡，但得到的却是一个糟糕的 L-汉堡——是完全不相关的。如果消费者在 R-汉堡购买了汉堡，而他并不知道这家连锁店雇用了另一名厨师，其口味与 L-汉堡的厨师相同，或者这家连锁店改变了生产工艺或供应商，那么消费者的期望同样会落空。这些情况是否也构成对消费者权利的侵犯？ [564]

I acknowledge the reasoning was somewhat compressed. In a 53-page paper devoted primarily to patent and copyright, I devoted only three paragraphs to the issue of whether trademark law can be justified. My view that the consumer has a fraud or breach of contract claim is obviously based on a theory of contract contained in an article published after the intellectual property article.19I believe Van Dun is incorrect that my non-aggression-principle-compatible legal theory cannot support a fraud or breach of contract claim in the context noted above.

我承认推理过程有些简略。在一篇长达 53 页的主要论述专利和版权的论文中，我只用了 3 个段落来论述商标法是否正当的问题。我认为消费者可以提出欺诈或违约索赔的观点显然是基于在知识产权文章之后发表的一篇文章中所包含的理论。[565]我认为冯·顿说我的互不侵犯原则兼容法律理论不能支持上述语境下的欺诈或违约索赔是不正确的。

As explained more fully in my contract theory chapter, libertarianism maintains that the owner of a scarce resource has the right to use the resource and to dispose of it. The owner is the first possessor (homesteader) or someone who legitimately acquired the property from the first possessor (contract). Having the right to use property implies one may choose to exclude others from it, permit them to use or borrow it, give or sell title to another, or abandon it. If you own something, you can use it, hoard it, share it, destroy it (abuse), sell it (alienate) or give or lend it to another, or abandon it. One’s choice whether to sell something or lend it, for example, obviously must be manifested in some way. Clearly, social interaction and property exchanges presuppose the ability of the parties to communicate with each other.

正如我在理论一章中更全面地解释的那样，自由意志主义主张稀缺资源的所有者有权使用和处置该资源。所有者是指第一个占有者（拓殖者）或从第一个占有者那里合法获得财产的人（）。拥有财产使用权意味着可以选择将他人排除在外、允许他人使用或借用、将所有权转让或出售给他人，或者放弃该财产。如果你拥有某样东西，你可以使用它、囤积它、分享它、毁坏它（滥用）、出售它（让渡）或将它给予或借给他人，或者放弃它。例如，一个人选择出售还是借出某样东西，显然必须以某种方式表现出来。显然，社会交往和财产交换的前提是双方能够相互沟通。

It is the owner’s consent that distinguishes permitted use from trespass. If my neighbor walks to my front door to borrow a cup of sugar, she has implied permission to use my sidewalk and doorknocker for this purpose because of default rules in the community that can be relied on if not contradicted. This is how language and communication work. But if I tell her she is not welcome on my property, then she is a trespasser if she steps on it. Clearly, the manifested or communicated consent of the owner is relevant as to whether the use of property is permissible—whether it is a form of trespass or theft.

正是所有者的同意将被允许的使用与非法侵入区分开来。如果我的邻居走到我家门口借一杯糖，她就默示允许为此目的使用我的人行道和门把手，因为社区有默认的规则，如果没有被反驳的话，这些规则是可以信赖的。这就是语言和交流的作用。但是，如果我告诉她我的地盘不欢迎她，那么她如果踏上这方土地，那就是非法侵入。很明显，所有者明示或传达的同意与对财产的使用是否被允许息息相关——即这是否是一种非法侵入亦或是盗窃。

This is also true for loans and exchanges of title. If I lend my car to someone, the permission must be communicated to him somehow. For example, I can lend my car to my brother. His use is not trespass since I consented to it. If a random stranger takes my car and uses it, we call that theft because I did not consent to it.

贷款和财产权交换也是如此。如果我把车借给别人，必须以某种方式将许可传达给他。例如，我可以把车借给我弟弟。他的使用不属于非法侵入，因为我同意了。如果一个陌生人随意拿走并使用我的车，我们称之为盗窃，因为我并未同意。

But since consent is communicated and can be withheld, it need not be all or nothing—a loan need not be a permanent gift. The consent given to others to use one’s property can be conditional. For example, it can be limited in time or in other ways. If I lend my car to my brother to go to lunch and he drives off to Canada in it for a month-long vacation, he is now using my car without my consent, and he knows this. At this point, he is identical to the thief or other trespasser. The question to be asked is always: Did the owner consent to the other’s use of the property? If so, it is permissible and rightful, since an owner can allow others to use his property. But if not, it is a type of theft or trespass. And clearly, determining whether consent was granted presupposes the possibility of communication.

但是，既然同意是可以传达的，也可以保留的，那么同意就不一定是全部或全无——借用不一定是永久性的赠与。同意他人使用自己的财产可以是有条件的。例如，可以在时间上或以其他方式加以限制。如果我把车借给弟弟去吃午饭，而他开着车去加拿大度假一个月，那么他现在就是在未经我同意的情况下使用我的车，而且他也知道这一点。在这一点上，他和小偷或其他非法侵入者是一样的。要问的问题始终是车主是否同意他人使用财产？如果同意，则是允许的、合法的，因为所有者可以允许他人使用他的财产。但如果没有，则属于盗窃或非法侵入。显然，确定是否同意的前提是有可能进行交流。

Now, when someone sells or buys an item, the sale or purchase can be, and usually is, conditional. For example, if I buy a candy bar for a shilling from a vendor, I transfer title to my shilling to the vendor, and he transfers title to the candy to me. Other customary assumptions are viewed as implied conditions on the title transfers, but they can also be made explicit or they can contradict default assumptions (sometimes called suppletive law). I might state that the title to my coin transfers only if the candy bar has such-and-such property (e.g., it is unopened or fresh, or not laced with poison; although these would probably be default or implied conditions anyway). Therefore, the vendor receives my consent to use and take title to the coin only if these conditions are met.If the vendor knowingly sells me a five-year-old piece of chocolate, then the condition for transferring title to the coin to him has simply not been met, and he is aware of this. So the vendor would be aware that he does not have the right to use or keep the coin—just as, in the example above, my brother knows he may use my car to go to lunch, but that he has no right to use it to drive to Canada.

现在，当某人出售或购买一件物品时，买卖可以是有条件的，通常也是有条件的。例如，如果我花一先令从小贩那里买了一块糖果，我就把我的先令的所有权转让给了小贩，而小贩则把糖果的所有权转让给了我。其他习惯假设被视为所有权转让的默示条件，但也可以明示，或者与默认假设相矛盾（有时称为补充法）。我可能会声明，只有当糖果具有这样或那样的属性（例如，糖果未开封或新鲜，或未掺有毒药；尽管这些可能是默认或默示条件）时，我的硬币的所有权才会转移。因此，只有在这些条件得到满足的情况下，小贩才能得到我的同意，使用并取得硬币的所有权。如果小贩明知故犯地卖给我一块五年前的巧克力，那么将硬币的所有权转让给他的条件就根本没有得到满足，而且他也知道这一点。因此，小贩知道他无权使用或保留这枚硬币——就像在上面的例子中，我哥哥知道他可以开我的车去吃午饭，但他无权用它开去加拿大一样。

Likewise, in the R-Burger/L-Burger example I gave, I assumed a hypothetical situation in which the customer wanted an R-Burger. That is, he wanted a burger having certain characteristics—it is fresh, has meat and bread, and was made by a certain, identifiable company (the R-Burger chain). When he paid for the fake R-Burger, then title to his coin transfers to the vendor only if the conditions are met. They are not met, because the burger was not made by the R-Burger chain, and that was one of the customer’s conditions. Therefore, the L-Burger chain is taking and using his coin without his consent. It is for this reason that he should have a claim against them for trespass (which may be couched in fraud, breach of contract, or theft terms).20

同样，在我举的 R-Burger/L-Burger 的例子中，我假定顾客想要的是 R-Burger。也就是说，他想要的汉堡具有某些特征——新鲜、有肉、有面包，而且是由某家可识别的公司（R-汉堡连锁店）生产的。当他为假冒的 R-Burger 付账时，只有在满足这些条件的情况下，他的硬币所有权才会转移给供应商。但条件并未满足，因为汉堡并非由 R-Burger 连锁店生产，而这正是顾客的条件之一。因此，L-汉堡连锁店是在未经他同意的情况下拿走并使用了他的硬币。因此，他应该以非法侵入为由向他们索赔（可以用欺诈、违反或盗窃的措辞）20。同样，在我举的 R-Burger/L-Burger 的例子中，我假定顾客想要的是 R-Burger。也就是说，他想要的汉堡具有某些特征——新鲜、有肉、有面包，而且是由某家可识别的公司（R-汉堡连锁店）生产的。当他为假冒的 R-Burger 付账时，只有在满足这些条件的情况下，他的硬币所有权才会转移给供应商。但条件并未满足，因为汉堡并非由 R-Burger 连锁店生产，而这正是顾客的条件之一。因此，L-汉堡连锁店是在未经他同意的情况下拿走并使用了他的硬币。因此，他应该以非法侵入为由向他们索赔（可以用欺诈、违反或盗窃的措辞）。[566]

Van Dun might argue that it is not possible to identify the R-Burger chain if it does not have a trademark right and that the L-Burger chain can just rename itself “R-Burgers” too, so that when the customer asks for an R-Burger (i.e., conditions the title transfer to the money on it being made and sold by R-Burger), he is actually getting one. He is just getting it from the second R-Burger company, not the first R-Burger company.

冯·顿可能会说，如果 R-汉堡连锁店没有商标权，就不可能识别出它的身份，而 L-汉堡连锁店也可以把自己改名为 “R-汉堡”，这样，当顾客要求购买 R-汉堡时（即，将货币所有权转让的条件设定为它由 R 汉堡制作和销售），他实际上买到的就是 R-汉堡。他只是从第二家 R-Burger 公司而不是第一家 R-Burger 公司买到了汉堡。

However, this response would be easy to overcome. It need only be possible for the customer to adequately identify what the condition is. Language is not infinitely malleable, and communication is (undeniably) possible. If pressed, the customer could specify that the purchase is conditioned on the current store he is in being owned by the same R-Burger company first started at such and such date and address, and so on. There is no reason it would be impossible to identify a given vendor without traditional trade mark law, just as it is not impossible to identify fellow humans, despite the fact that we do not usually havetrademarks on our names (in fact, humans often have identical names, e.g., John Smith).

不过，这种反应很容易被驳倒。顾客只需要能够充分明确条件是什么即可。语言并不是无限可塑的，沟通交流（不可否认）是可能的。如果有必要，顾客可以明确指出，购买的条件是，他现在所在的商店是由在某年某月某日某地址首次开业的同一家 R-Burger 公司所有，等等。没有理由在没有传统商标法的情况下无法识别某个特定的供应商，就像识别其他人并非不可能一样，尽管我们的名字通常没有商标（事实上，人类的名字通常是相同的，如约翰-史密斯）。

Van Dun’s implicit assumption here is really that communication and identification of individuals or entities is literally impossible in the absence of trademark rights. I believe this is one of his central mistakes here. Van Dun seems to be so accustomed to the positive law’s trademark framework being relied on by modern businesses and consumers that he seems to believe accurate communication is impossible without it. This is obviously absurd.21

冯·顿在这里隐含的假设实际上是，如果没有商标权，个人或实体的交流和识别实际上是不可能的。我认为这是他的核心错误之一。冯·顿似乎已经习惯了现代企业和消费者所依赖的实在法商标框架，以至于他似乎认为没有这个框架就不可能进行准确的交流。这显然是荒谬的。[567]

Accordingly, I submit that Van Dun is incorrect. Under libertarian principles, property owners are free to condition the transfer of title to their property. In a typical exchange, there are many implied conditions, and others may be expressly added or changed. These conditions specify when the other party has the right to take and use the property to be transferred, just as when one lends property or invites a guest to one’s home, the manifested consent of the owner governs which uses by the invitee are permissible and which are tantamount to trespass. From here, it is easy to see how selling an item to a customer with a falsely-labeled characteristic can result in title to the monetary payment not passing due to failure of one of the conditions. If title does not pass, then the vendor does not have a right to take, use, or spend the money; it is still the property of the customer.

因此，我认为范盾的观点是错误的。根据自由意志主义原则，财产所有人可以自由地对其财产所有权的转让附加条件。在典型的交换中，有许多默示条件，其他条件也可以明确添加或更改。这些条件规定了另一方何时有权取得和使用将要转让的财产，就像一个人借出财产或邀请客人到家中做客一样，财产所有者的明示同意决定了被邀请者的哪些使用是允许的，哪些使用等同于非法侵入。从这里我们不难看出，向顾客出售带有虚假标签特征的物品，会导致货币付款的所有权因不符合其中一个条件而无法转移。如果所有权没有转移，那么卖方就无权获取、使用或花费这笔钱；它仍然是顾客的财产。

Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society

第十三章自由社会中的立法与法律发现

Introduction 295
Centralized and Decentralized Legal Systems 296
1. Civil Law and Common Law 296
2. Civil Law, Rationalism, and Libertarianism 298

Law, Legislation, and Liberty 301
1. Anarcho-Capitalism 302
2. Certainty 303
  1. Certainty, the Rule of Law, and Legislation 303
  2. Decentralized law-finding

systems 306

Limits of Courts’ Decisions: Jurisdiction, Scope of

Decision, and Precedent 306

Government Courts: Extra-Market Powers and

Disguised Legislation 308

Civil Codes 310
1. The “Special” Status of a

Civil Code 310

Diluting Effect of Special Statutes 311

Negative Effects of Uncertainty 312
1. Sanctity of Contract 312
2. Time Preference and the Structure of Production 313
3. Time Preference and Crime 315

Central Planning and Economic Calculation 316
1. Central Planning and the Impossibility of Socialism 318
2. Legislation as Central Planning 320
3. Special Interests and the Unrepresentative Character

of Legislation 324

Decentralized Law-Finding Systems 325

The Proliferation of Laws 327

Naive Rationalism and

The Primacy of Legislation 329

The Role of Legislation

and Codification 332

The Role of Legislation 332
1. The Secondary Role of

Legislation 332

Alleged Deficiencies of Decentralized Law-Finding Systems 334
Structural Safeguards to Limit Legislation 338

The Role of Commentators

and Codes 340

Common Law Civil Law 345

Conclusion 350

Appendix: Legislative Supremacy

in the Civil Code 350

Originally published in the Journal of Libertarian Studies in 1995, this was one of my earliest scholarly publications and my first in that journal, written just a year after I had met Hans-Hermann Hoppe and Murray Rothbard; Hoppe was then the new editor of the JLS after Rothbard’s passing in January 1995.*

此文最初发表于 1995 年的《自由意志主义研究杂志》，是我最早的学术出版物之一，也是我在该杂志上发表的第一篇文章，写于我认识汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）和默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）仅仅一年之后；罗斯巴德于 1995 年 1 月去世后，霍普成了《自由意志主义研究杂志》的新编辑。*

I had become fascinated with the Roman/civil law (the law of Louisiana and continental Europe) and the English common law and its possible connections to libertarian political and legal philosophy. I conceived of this project in law school (1988–91) at LSU, a civil-law law school, when I was still more under the thrall of Ayn Rand and her type of rationalism. At first I thought the more “rationalist” civil law was more compatible with a reasonand deductivist-based approach to politics and law than was the common law. One of my law professors, John Devlin, suggested I read Oliver Wendell Holmes’s The Common Law to counterbalance some of these views. This helped me gain an appreciation of the English common law and decentralized legal systems in general. I ended up concluding that decentralized legal systems—the original Roman law, and its offspring, European civil law and the later English common law—were more compatible with natural principles of justice favored by libertarianism than legislated law.

我对罗马法/大陆法（路易斯安那州和欧洲大陆的法律）和英国普通法及其与自由意志主义政治和法律哲学的可能联系非常着迷。我是在路易斯安那州立大学法学院（1988-91 年）（一所大陆法系法学院）学习时构思这个项目的，当时我还更多地受安-兰德（Ayn Rand）及其理性主义的影响。起初，我认为更加 “理性主义 “的大陆法比普通法更符合以理性和演绎法为基础的政治和法律方法。我的一位法学教授约翰-德夫林（John Devlin）建议我阅读奥利弗-温德尔-霍姆斯（Oliver Wendell Holmes）的《普通法》（The Common Law），以平衡我的一些观点。这让我对英国普通法和一般的分权法律体系有了更深的了解。我最终得出结论，去中心化的法律体系——最初的罗马法及其产物欧洲大陆法和后来的英国普通法——比立法法更符合自由意志主义所主张的自然正义原则。

This article was an attempt to highlight what is good in these ancient systems of law and what we can draw on and use in our libertarian theorizing.†

本文试图强调这些古老法律体系中的优点，以及我们在自由意志主义理论研究中可以借鉴和使用的内容。†

* Stephan Kinsella, “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society,”J. Libertarian Stud. 11, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 132–81. See “How I Became a Libertarian” (ch. 1) for further details.

* 斯蒂芬·金塞拉，《自由社会中的立法与法律发现》，《自由主义研究杂志》第 11 卷，第 2 期（1995 年夏季）：132-181 页。详见《我如何成为一名自由意志主义者》（第 1 章）。

† I later studied and wrote about international law and have also written and spoken about aspects of international law of interest to libertarians. See, e.g., Noah D. Rubins, Thomas N. Papanastasiou & Stephan Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2020); Kinsella, “KOL250 | International Law Through a Libertarian Lens (PFS 2018),” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Sep. 26, 2018); idem, “International Law, Libertarian Principles, and the Russia-Ukraine War,” StephanKinsella.com (April 18, 2022).

† 后来，我研究并撰写了有关国际法的文章，也撰写并讲述了自由意志主义者感兴趣的国际法方面的问题。例如，参见诺亚·D·鲁宾斯（Noah D. Rubins）、托马斯·N·帕帕纳斯塔西乌（Thomas N. Papanastasiou）和斯蒂芬·金塞拉，《国际投资、政治风险和争议解决：从业者指南（第二版）》（牛津大学出版社，2020 年）；金塞拉，“KOL250 | 从自由意志主义视角看国际法（PFS 2018）”，《金塞拉谈自由》播客（2018 年 9 月 26 日）；同上，《国际法、自由意志主义原则和俄乌战争》，StephanKinsella.com（2022 年 4 月 18 日）。

For a condensed version of this chapter, see “Legislation and Law in a Free Society,” Mises Daily (Feb. 25, 2010). For later talks based on the content of this chapter, see “KOL001 | “The (State’s) Corruption of (Private) Law” (PFS 2012),” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast ( Jan. 11, 2013), “KOL221 | Mises Brasil: State Legislation Versus Law and Liberty,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (May 17, 2017), and “KOL020 | “Libertarian Legal Theory: Property, Conflict, and Society: Lecture 3: Applications I: Legal Systems, Contract, Fraud” (Mises Academy, 2011),” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Feb. 21, 2013).

The original author’s note thanked “Professor Saúl Litvinoff and Jack Criss, Jr. for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.”

关于本章的精简版，请参见《自由社会中的立法与法律》，《米塞斯日报》（2010 年 2 月 25 日）。有关本章内容的后续讲座，请参阅 “KOL001 | “（国家）对（私）法的腐蚀”（PFS 2012），”《金塞拉谈自由》播客（2013 年 1 月 11 日），”KOL221 | 米塞斯巴西：国家立法Versus Law and Liberty》，Kinsella on Liberty Podcast（2017年5月17日），以及 “KOL020 | “自由意志主义的法律理论：财产、冲突与社会：第 3 讲：应用 I：法律制度、、欺诈”（米塞斯学院，2011 年），”《金塞拉谈自由》播客（2013 年 2 月 21 日）。

原作者的注释感谢 “索尔·利特维诺夫教授（Saúl Litvinoff）和小杰克·克里斯（Jack Criss, Jr.）对本文早期草稿提出的有益意见”。

Justice must stand quite still, or else the scales will waver and a just verdict will become impossible.

—Franz Kafka1

正义必须稳如泰山，否则天平就会摇摆不定，公正的裁决也就无从谈起。

——弗朗茨-卡夫卡[568]

I. 简介INTRODUCTION

Libertarians’ devotion to individual rights, and to laws in support of those rights, is unquestionable. Most of the laws favored by libertarians can be shown to be consistent with our individual rights—unlike the blatantly illegitimate laws advocated by socialists. Despite this, however, many libertarians overlook important procedural or structural requirements that must accompany any legal system in which substantively justifiable law can develop and last.

自由意志主义对个人权利以及支持这些权利的法律的虔诚是毋庸置疑的。自由意志主义所支持的大多数法律都可以证明与我们的个人权利是一致的——不像社会主义者所主张的那些公然违法的法律。然而，尽管如此，许多自由意志主义者却忽视了重要的程序性或结构性要求，而这些要求是任何法律体系都必须具备的，只有在这样的法律体系中，实质正当的法律才能得以发展和延续。

In particular, the danger and futility of making law by legislation is too often ignored, even by libertarians (other than anarcho-capitalists, who oppose the existence of any government on principle, including its legislature).2 Libertarians often, for example, advocate that the legislature enact this or that law, or they at least support many statutes that are already in force, such as statutes prohibiting murder. The concept of separation of governmental powers into the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, which many libertarians support, implies that legislation can be a valid function of a libertarian government. But as Italian legal theorist Bruno Leoni noted in 1961:

It is … paradoxical that the very economists who support the free market at the present time do not seem to care to consider whether a free market could really last within a legal system centered on legislation.3

Leoni argued that legislation as such is incompatible with freedom. If this is correct, then even statutes that seem to embody libertarian principles simultaneously subvert those principles.

尤其是，通过立法制定法律的危险和徒劳常常被忽视，即使是自由意志主义者（无政府资本主义者除外，他们原则上反对任何政府的存在，包括其立法机构）也是如此。[569]例如，自由意志主义者常常主张立法机构制定这样或那样的法律，或者他们至少支持许多已经生效的法规，如禁止谋杀的法规。许多自由意志主义者支持政府权力分为立法、行政和司法三个部门的理念，这意味着立法可以成为自由意志主义政府的一项有效职能。但正如意大利法律理论家布鲁诺-莱奥尼在 1961 年指出的那样：

“……吊诡之处在于，那些目前支持自由市场的经济学家似乎并不愿意思考，在一个以立法为中心的法律体系中，自由市场是否真的能够持久存在。”[570]

There is another way of forming law, however—in which law is “found” or discovered, rather than “made”—which does not depend on legislation or legislators. This is the way of decentralized legal systems such as customary law, Roman law, and the English common law.

然而，还有另一种形成法律的方式——法律是 “发现 “或揭示的，而不是 “制定 “的——它不依赖于立法或立法者。这就是习惯法、罗马法和英国普通法等去中心化的法律体系的形成方式。

In this chapter I will examine the two ways of forming law—centralized (i.e., legislation-based) and decentralized—and will argue that only the latter is compatible with libertarian principles. I will also examine the proper role for legal codification in light of this conclusion.

在本章中，我将探讨法律形成的两种方式——中心化方式（即基于立法的）和去中心化方式——并将论证只有后者才符合自由意志主义原则。根据这一结论，我还将探讨法律编纂的适当作用。

II.中心化和去中心化的法律体系CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED LEGAL SYSTEMS

A. 大陆法和普通法Civil Law and Common Law

In modern times the two dominant legal systems in the world are the common law and the continental civil law. Based on the body of English case law that developed gradually over the centuries, the common law spread to English colonies and commonwealths like America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Modern civil law systems are based in part on Roman law, which, like the common law, developed many of its important legal principles in the accumulated decisions of jurists in thousands of cases over centuries (and which predates the common law by centuries).4 Virtually all of Europe and many other jurisdictions, including Louisiana, Puerto Rico, Quebec, Scotland, and Latin America, have a civil-law system. The civil law systems are usually based on civil codes, such as in Japan. The earliest of these codes was the French Napoleonic Code of 1804.

在现代，世界上两大主流法律体系是普通法和大陆法系。普通法以英国几个世纪以来逐渐发展起来的判例法为基础，传播到英国的殖民地和英联邦国家，如美国、加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰和印度。现代民法体系部分以罗马法为基础，与普通法一样，罗马法的许多重要法律原则也是在法学家几个世纪以来对成千上万案件的裁决中积累形成的（比普通法早几个世纪）。[571]几乎所有欧洲国家和许多其他司法管辖区，包括路易斯安那、波多黎各、魁北克、苏格兰和拉丁美洲，都实行大陆法系。大陆法体系通常以民法典为基础，如日本。最早的民法典是 1804 年的《法国拿破仑法典》。

In the common law and Roman law, there eventually evolved very sophisticated bodies of legal principles, concepts, methodology, and precedents. Because the classical common law and Roman law developed the large bulk of their legal principles through the decision and discussion of cases, they serve as rough examples of decentralized systems of “judge-found” law, as do largely private customary law systems like the Law Merchant.5

在普通法和罗马法中，最终演变形成了非常复杂的法律原则、概念、方法和先例体系。由于古典普通法和罗马法的大部分法律原则是通过案件的裁决和讨论发展而来的，它们大致可作为“法官发现”法的去中心化法律体系的粗略例子，就像很大程度上的私人的习惯法体系，如商法一样。[572]

Unlike Roman law and the common law, however, modern civil law principles are embodied in a statute called a Civil Code, and the civil law enshrines legislation as the primary source of law. 6 In these systems, legal scientists elegantly codify the preceding body of legal principles developed mostly in a decentralized fashion (via the Roman law) and customary European law, but then the legislature enacts this code as a statute and makes legislation the primary source of law. The modern civil law is thus a good example of an explicitly centralized legal system, even though much of the substantive provisions of civil codes are based on legal principles discovered in decentralized fashion in Rome many centuries ago. Roman law thus has more in common with the common law and customary law than with the Roman law’s offspring, modern civil law, since the former were decentralized law-finding systems, while the latter are centralized, legislation-based law-making systems.7 Today’s common law, while based on the classical and mostly decentralized Anglo-American common law, is also coming to be more and more dominated by legislation and, to that extent, is gradually being centralized as well.

然而，与罗马法和普通法不同，现代民法原则体现在称为《民法典》的法规中，民法将立法奉为法律的主要来源。[573] 在这些体系中，法律学家优雅地编纂了之前主要以去中心化的方式（通过罗马法）发展起来的法律原则体系和欧洲习惯法，但随后立法机关将此法典颁布为成文法，并将立法作为法律的主要渊源。因此，现代民法是明确的中心化法律体系的一个很好的例子，尽管《民法典》的许多实质性条款都是基于许多世纪前罗马以去中心化的方式发现的法律原则。因此，罗马法与普通法和习惯法的共同点比与罗马法的后裔——现代民法——更多，因为前者是去中心化的分散式的法律发现体系，而后者是中心化的、基于立法的法律制定体系。[574] 如今的普通法，虽然基于古典且大多分散的英美普通法，但也越来越多地受到立法的主导，在这种程度上，也逐渐走向了中心化。

Thus, previously, law was thought of as a body of true principles ripe for discovery by judges, not as whatever the legislator decreed. Nowadays, however, legislation has become such a ubiquitous way of making law that “the very idea that the law might not be identical with legislation seems odd both to students of law and to laymen.”8 And, one might add, to many libertarians. As discussed below, however, a legislative system is incompatible with libertarian principles and destroys true Law. This holds true for all legislation-based legal systems, even civil law systems, which typically embody fairly libertarian principles, much as the original body of common law does. Although the civil codes of civil law systems codify, in elegant form, principles developed in the relatively decentralized Roman legal system, civil codes are still merely statutes in a system in which legislation is the primary source of law. Thus even civil codes, the most elegant and liberal exemplars of centralized legislation, are subject to the general criticism of legislation presented in this chapter.

因此，以前人们认为法律是由法官发现的真正原则，而不是立法者颁布的任何法令。但如今，立法已成为一种无处不在的制定法律的方式，以至于 “法律可能与立法不一致这一观点，无论是对法律学生还是外行人来说，都显得很奇怪 “。[575]而且，我们还可以补充说，对许多自由意志主义者来说也是如此。然而，正如下文所讨论的，立法体系与自由意志主义原则格格不入，并破坏了真正的法律。这一点适用于所有以立法为基础的法律体系，即使是大陆法系也不例外，因为大陆法系通常体现了相当的自由意志主义原则，就像最初的普通法体系一样。尽管大陆法系的《民法典》以优雅的形式编纂了在相对去中心化的罗马法律体系中形成的原则，但在一个以立法为主要法律来源的体系中，《民法典》仍然只是法规。因此，即使是《民法典》这种最优雅、最自由的中心化的立法典范，也受到本章对立法的一般性批评。

B. 大陆法，理性主义和自由意志主义Civil Law, Rationalism, and Libertarianism

Before concluding this section and proceeding to general criticisms of legislated law, I want to briefly note the tendency of civilians to regard the civil law as a great “rationalist” system.9 Civilians consider modern civil law to be “rational” or even “rationalistic” for various reasons, including the views that civil law: is rationally and systematically codified,10 rather than “unscientifically” developed in an uncoordinated fashion by decentralized judges; is “certain” and clear because the rules are written;11 and is proclaimed by the legislator. Civil law systems such as the Louisiana and French systems are also praised as being drafted “in the spirit of the Enlightenment,”12 and as resting on an ideological commitment to democracy,13 economic liberalism,14 private property,15 freedom of contract,16 individualism,17 natural law,18 and justice.19

在结束本节并开始对立法法进行一般性批评之前，我想简要地指出民法学者将民法视为一个伟大的 “理性主义 “体系的倾向。[576]民法学者认为现代民法是 “理性的 “甚至是 “理性主义的”，原因有很多，其中包括这样一些观点：民法是理性地、系统地编纂成法典的，[577] 而不是由去中心化的法官以不协调的方式 “不科学地 “发展出来的；民法是 “确定的”、清晰的，因为规则是成文的；[578] 并且是由立法者颁布的。路易斯安那州和法国等地的民法体系也被赞誉为是 “本着启蒙精神 “[579] 起草的，建立在对民主、[580] 经济自由主义、[581] 私有财产、[582] 自由、[583]个人主义、[584]自然法[585]和正义[586]的意识形态承诺之上。

Most libertarians would agree that such virtues are genuinely justifiable and thus ought to be supported by any legitimate legal system.Moreover, civilians are also correct that these liberal principles are consistent with rationalism, because libertarian principles can also be justified with rationalist arguments.20

大多数自由意志主义者都会同意，这些美德是真正合理的，因此应该得到任何合法法律制度的支持。此外，民法学者认为这些自由意志主义原则符合理性主义也是正确的，因为自由意志主义的原则也可以用理性主义的论据来证明。[587]

Under the libertarian conception of individual rights, the virtues typically cited in favor of the civil law are certainly necessary requirements of a just legal system. The virtues of economic liberalism, private property, freedom of contract, individualism, natural law, and justice are really only secondary derivations of the basic individual rights to person and property. Natural law is nothing more than the objective truth that each individual has certain rights—i.e., to own himself and to homestead unowned property or acquire it by contractual transfer. Justice is nothing more than giving a person his due, but what a person’s “due” is depends upon what his rights are.21 Individualism has meaning and validity, because it is individuals that have rights. Economic liberalism, private property, and freedom of contract are only the playing out of the fact that individuals have a right to own, and thus trade, private property, and indeed have a right to do anything that is not aggression. Economic liberalism is only a consequence of the government’s lack of authority to hamper free trade and association between individuals.22

在自由意志主义的个人权利概念下，通常被引用来支持民法的美德当然是公正的法律制度的必要条件。经济自由主义、私有财产、自由、个人主义、自然法和正义等美德实际上只是基本的个人人身权和财产权的次级衍生。自然法无非是每个人都有某些权利的客观事实，即拥有自己的权利和拓殖无主财产或通过转让获得财产的权利。正义不过是给予一个人他应得的东西，但一个人的 “应得 “是什么，取决于他的权利是什么。[588]个人主义具有意义和有效性，因为拥有权利的是个人。经济自由主义、私有财产和自由只是个人有权拥有并因此交易私有财产这一事实的体现，事实上，个人有权做任何非侵侵犯性的事情。经济自由主义只是政府无权阻碍个人之间自由贸易和结社的结果。[589]

Any system of law must be compatible with the rights that individual humans have, and, to that extent, law should be “certain”—that is, we should be certain that law will protect our rights and will not infringe them. The more general goal of “certainty” in the law is merely an aspect of the rule of law, which is necessary for any civilization to survive. Without certainty and the rule of law, individuals are not able to predict the results of their actions and are thus unable to rationally plan for the future.

任何法律体系都必须与人类个体所拥有的权利相一致，在这种程度上，法律应当是 “确定的”——也就是说，我们应当确信法律将保护我们的权利，并且不会侵犯这些权利。法律的 “确定性 “这一更为普遍的目标只是法治的一个方面，而法治是任何文明存续的必要条件。没有确定性和法治，个人就无法预测其行动的结果，从而也无法理性地规划未来。

In Part III, below, I argue that centralized legal systems like the civil law and, increasingly, the legislation-dominated common law systems are antithetical to the values of justice, natural law, individual rights, and certainty. Civilians generally support these values, yet they also support the idea of the primacy of legislation which will tend to destroy these values. But how can the civil law be the great system of reason and rationalism, how can it support economic liberalism and individualism, if the civil law is based on legislation, which undercuts these things? Although worshipers of legislation claim to be rationalists, only a naive sort of rationalism, the same naivety that is behind the desire of socialists to “scientifically” plan market activity, can underlie such claims.23

在下文第三部分中，我将论证中心化的法律体系，如大陆法系，以及越来越多的以立法为主导的普通法系，是与正义、自然法、个人权利和确定性等价值观背道而驰的。民法学者普遍支持这些价值观，然而他们也支持立法至上的理念，而立法至上将倾向于摧毁这些价值观。但是，如果民法以立法为基础，而立法又削弱了这些东西，那么民法又怎么能成为理性和理性主义的伟大体系，又怎么能支持经济自由主义和个人主义呢？尽管立法的崇拜者自称是理性主义者，但只有一种天真的理性主义，与社会主义者希望 “科学地 “规划市场活动背后的那种天真相同，才是这种主张的基础。[590]

Civilians are correct that reason and even rationalism justify the tenets of individualism, individual rights, economic liberalism, private property, and natural law. Contrary to claims of civilians, however, it is a completely private, decentralized law-finding system that is compatible with and that fosters such virtues and principles. Therefore, as will be shown, it is non-legislative, decentralized law-finding systems that are imbued with the spirit of reason and true rational

Legal Foundations of a Free Society in Chinese

自由社会的法律根基

目录

前言

致 谢

第一辑PART I

自由意志主义

第一章 我如何成为一名自由意志主义者

第二章 何为自由意志主义

财产，权利与自由

自由意志主义的财产权LIBERTARIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS

身体财产PROPERTY IN BODIES

自我所有和避免冲突SELF-OWNERSHIP AND CONFLICT AVOIDANCE

关于外部事物的财产权PROPERTY IN EXTERNAL THINGS

一致性和原则CONSISTENCY AND PRINCIPLE

附录 I APPENDIX I

“财产”——概念和术语“PROPERTY”—CONCEPT AND TERMINOLOGY

”财产“的概念与定义Concept and Definition of “Property”

“物”“Things”

作为排他性权利的财产Property as a Right to Exclude

财产是人与人之间的一种权利Property as a Right between People

冲突性与稀缺性Conflictable vs. Scarce

附录 II APPENDIX II

互相占有MUTUALIST OCCUPANCY

第三章 无政府资本主义意味着什么？

第二辑PART II

权利

第四章 我们如何拥有自己

无主资源的首次使用和拓殖FIRST USE AND HOMESTEADING OF UNOWNED RESOURCES

父母是第一所有人PARENTS AS FIRST OWNERS

两难问题的可能解决方案POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEMMA

客观联系： 真正的试金石OBJECTIVE LINK: THE REAL TOUCHSTONE

人的身体Human Bodies

直接控制Direct Control

总结Summary

回到孩子这个话题Returning to the Child

附录APPENDIX

直接控制和客观联系DIRECT CONTROL AND OBJECTIVE LINKS

第五章 自由意志主义的惩罚与权利理论

I. 简介 INTRODUCTION

II. 惩罚与许可PUNISHMENT AND CONSENT

III. 惩罚和禁止反言PUNISHMENT AND ESTOPPEL

A. 法律上的禁止反言Legal Estoppel

B. 对话式的禁止反言Dialogical Estoppel

C. 惩罚侵犯行为Punishing Aggressive Behavior

D. 对侵犯的潜在防卫Potential Defenses by the Aggressor

1. 侵犯的概念The Concept of Aggression

2. 普适性Universalizability

3. 时间Time

E. 惩罚非侵犯行为Punishing Nonaggressive Behavior

F. 财产权Property Rights

IV. 惩罚类型与举证责任TYPES OF PUNISHMENTS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A. 相称的惩罚Proportional Punishment

B. 受害者的选择The Victim’s Options

C.因其他因素加重处罚Enhancing Punishment Due to Other Factors

D.惩罚等级Graduated Scale of Punishment

E.财产犯罪Property Crimes

F.为什么攻击、威胁和企图都是侵犯Why Assault, Threats, and Attempts Are Aggression

G.举证责任The Burden of Proof

V. 结论CONCLUSION

附录APPENDIX

回应性武力的正义性THE JUSTICE OF RESPONSIVE FORCE

第六章 自由意志主义权利的对话论证

论证伦理学ARGUMENTATION ETHICS

论证伦理学和自然权利Argumentation Ethics and Natural Rights

禁止反言ESTOPPEL

权利怀疑主义RIGHTS-SKEPTICISM

其他与理性主义相关的理论OTHER RATIONALIST-RELATED THEORIES

G.B. 麦迪逊以及论证伦理学相关的理论家们G.B. Madison and Argumentation Ethics-Related Theorists

克罗克的道德禁止反言理论Crocker’s Moral Estoppel Theory

皮隆和格维斯论通用一致性原则Pilon and Gewirth on the Principle of Generic Consistency

结论CONCLUSION

第七章 捍卫论证伦理学

背景BACKGROUND

自由意志主义的权利LIBERTARIAN RIGHTS

霍普的理论：让我们再试一次HOPPE’S THEORY: LET’S TRY AGAIN

普适性UNIVERSALIZABILITY

论证中预设的实质性事实和规范SUBSTANTIVE FACTS AND NORMS PRESUPPOSED IN ARGUMENTATION

客观联系： 首次使用、口头主张与先来后到的区别OBJECTIVE LINKS: FIRST USE, VERBAL CLAIMS, AND THE PRIOR-LATER DISTINCTION

墨菲和卡拉汉的评论MURPHY’S & CALLAHAN’S CRITIQUE

致谢

第一章我如何成为一名自由意志主义者

第二章何为自由意志主义

第三章无政府资本主义意味着什么？

第四章我们如何拥有自己

客观联系：真正的试金石OBJECTIVE LINK: THE REAL TOUCHSTONE

第五章自由意志主义的惩罚与权利理论

第六章自由意志主义权利的对话论证

第七章捍卫论证伦理学

客观联系：首次使用、口头主张与先来后到的区别OBJECTIVE LINKS: FIRST USE, VERBAL CLAIMS, AND THE PRIOR-LATER DISTINCTION

第八章因果关系与侵犯

第九章自由意志主义的理论：所有权转让、具有约束力的承诺和不可让渡性

1. 补遗：罗斯巴德的错误？Addendum: Rothbard’s Mistake?

第十章不可让渡性与惩罚：对乔治•史密斯的回应

第十二章对冯·顿的回复：互不侵犯和所有权转让*

第十三章自由社会中的立法与法律发现