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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 431.
My appearance on The Rational Egoist: Exploring Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics with Stephan Kinsella. (Spotify)
From his shownotes:
In a stimulating episode of The Rational Egoist, host Michael Liebowitz engages in a thought-provoking discussion and debate with Stephan Kinsella, a prominent libertarian writer and patent attorney, on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics. Drawing on their deep knowledge of libertarian legal theory and philosophical principles, Michael and Stephan delve into the nuances of Hoppe’s argument and its implications for understanding individual rights and property norms.
Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics serves as the focal point of this conversation, as Michael and Stephan critically examine its premises, logic, and implications. With rigorous analysis and intellectual rigor, they explore the foundational principles underlying argumentation ethics and assess its strengths and weaknesses as a framework for understanding natural rights and ethical norms.
Listeners will be treated to a dynamic exchange of ideas and perspectives, as Michael and Stephan engage in a spirited debate on key aspects of argumentation ethics, including its reliance on self-ownership, the universality of ethical principles, and its compatibility with other libertarian theories of property and justice. Through reasoned discourse and respectful disagreement, they offer listeners a comprehensive overview of the complexities involved in grappling with foundational questions of ethics and rights.
This episode is not just an intellectual exercise but also a testament to the vitality of philosophical inquiry and the importance of engaging in robust dialogue to deepen our understanding of fundamental concepts. Whether you’re a seasoned libertarian thinker, a student of philosophy, or someone curious about the intersection of ethics and political theory, this episode offers a captivating exploration of Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics and its implications for our understanding of individual freedom and moral principles.
Tune in to The Rational Egoist for an enlightening conversation with Stephan Kinsella, as we delve into the intricacies of Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics and its relevance for contemporary debates on rights, justice, and human flourishing. Whether you find yourself nodding in agreement or raising questions of your own, this episode promises to ignite your curiosity and inspire deeper reflection on the principles that underpin a free and just society.
I’ve been interested in the augmentation ethic since I heard you discussing it in Bob M<Murphy's podcast a few years ago years ago.
I just reread https://propertyandfreedom.org/paf-podcast/pfp163-hoppe-on-the-ethics-of-argumentation-pfs-2016/ to remind myself of what the AE claims
I have no trouble seeing how the AE proves that any attempt to argue in favor of the use of force must entail a performative contradiction.
However I am struggling to understand Hoppe's claim that the AE can be used to demonstrate that any argument about property rights that denies that ownership is initially established with the first appropriator must necessarily entail a performative contradiction.
He says:
"For, by definition, as the first appropriator he cannot have run into conflict with anyone else in appropriating the good in question, as everyone else appeared on the scene only later. And any late-comer, then, can take possession of the things in question only with the first-comer’s consent."
While at first glance this sounds quite reasonable – if a first comer's (F) claim on a piece of property is indeed watertight then a latecomer (L) can never justify the taking of the property by force without a a performative contradiction.
But I'm wondering if the AE can really be used to reject all other forms of deciding who owns what. A first comer would see it as a violation of his property rights for a late comer to claim it. But a communist who thinks all land should be owned collectively would correspondingly think that the first comer is violating collective property rights by his appropriating for his personal use. Its not clear to me how AE solves this issue. Hoppe says things like "Only the first appropriator of some previously un-appropriated thing can acquire this thing peacefully and without conflict" which again sounds reasonable but is not necessarily true (if for example everyone else in the community is a communist).
I'm new(ish) to the AE so its possible I've missed a step in Hoppe's logic and would be grateful for any pointers as to what it is I'm missing.
I’ve been interested in the augmentation ethic since I heard you discussing it in Bob M<Murphy's podcast a few years ago years ago.
I just reread https://propertyandfreedom.org/paf-podcast/pfp163-hoppe-on-the-ethics-of-argumentation-pfs-2016/ to remind myself of what the AE claims
I have no trouble seeing how the AE proves that any attempt to argue in favor of the use of force must entail a performative contradiction.
However I am struggling to understand Hoppe's claim that the AE can be used to demonstrate that any argument about property rights that denies that ownership is initially established with the first appropriator must necessarily entail a performative contradiction.
He says:
"For, by definition, as the first appropriator he cannot have run into conflict with anyone else in appropriating the good in question, as everyone else appeared on the scene only later. And any late-comer, then, can take possession of the things in question only with the first-comer’s consent."
While at first glance this sounds quite reasonable – if a first comer's (F) claim on a piece of property is indeed watertight then a latecomer (L) can never justify the taking of the property by force without a a performative contradiction.
But I'm wondering if the AE can really be used to reject all other forms of deciding who owns what. A first comer would see it as a violation of his property rights for a late comer to claim it. But a communist who thinks all land should be owned collectively would correspondingly think that the first comer is violating collective property rights by his appropriating for his personal use. Its not clear to me how AE solves this issue. Hoppe says things like "Only the first appropriator of some previously un-appropriated thing can acquire this thing peacefully and without conflict" which again sounds reasonable but is not necessarily true (if for example everyone else in the community is a communist).
I'm new(ish) to the AE so its possible I've missed a step in Hoppe's logic and would be grateful for any pointers as to what it is I'm missing.