I’ll be a guest in an hour or so This Week in Law with Denise Howell. The live cast starts at 11 a.m. Pacific.
See Conspiracy Libertarians, Waystation Libertarians, Activists vs. Principled Libertarians
Ah, this movement of ours. Full of conspiracy nuts, layabouts, dope heads, gun nuts, anti-evolutionists, survivalists, weird diet obsessives, adherents of homeopathy and contrarian health views and fads, “unschoolers,” self-destructive losers, doom ‘n gloomers, activists who get worked up about electoral politics every four years… Ah, me.
I was reminded of this when I stumbled across my 2006 post Omega-Chloride-Redford on my “Plagiarism”, which recounted a bizarre interaction with one James Redford, aka Count Lithium von Chloride, Tetrachordine Omega, and Tetrahedron Omega, in which he tried to argue that my view that you can’t get an ought from an is, but you can get an ought from an ought, was due to his “teachings.” Uhhhh, yeah.
As I noted in that post: over on the Mises blog, my post Don’t worry–you don’t exist: Or, why long-range planning is really impossible drew some comments from one James Redford. Now years ago he had written some good things about my theory of rights on some boards or groups. So we had some exchanges. I confess I had forgotten most of this.
In any event. On the Mises blog post he wrote in a comment that he was glad “that some of my teachings have had an effect on you.” I had no idea what he was jabbering about but had a vague recollection that he was some kind of loon or nut. He was insinuating, I thought, that I was using in my arguments something he taught me… and vaguely implying I should have given him credit. I thought this ridiculous and said so; he escalated with attempts at “proving” how I had plagiarized him and was a liar.
So I have refreshed my memory. First, as to who this dude is. I remember now: he has gone in the past, on various boards, as Count Lithium von Chloride, Tetrachordine Omega, and Tetrahedron Omega. He has written before about his various experiences with drugs, and how this has given him insight into the universe, and the “omega point,” some nonsense like this. See, e.g., my discussion of this stuff in my post God-Trips] and in this anti-state thread, where he talks about his “god-trips”. In his article Jesus is an Anarchist, he signs off thus:
Born in Austin, Texas and raised in the Leander, Texas hill country, the native-born Augustinian James Redford is a young born again Christian who was converted from atheism by a direct revelation from Jesus Christ. He is a scientific rationalist who considers that the Omega Point (i.e., the physicists’ technical term for God) is an unavoidable result of the known laws of physics. His personal website can be found here: http://geocities.com/vonchloride
Uh, yeah–the Omega Point… direct revelation of Christ via drugs which incude various so-called Levels of so-called God-Trips. Like, wow, man. I think he actually believes this stuff. Another funny comment: in our email conversation in 2000, I jokingly used the term “jelly head” to refer to stoners or those who do drugs, after he started going on about all the revelations he’d gotten from doing drugs. He didn’t know the term “jelly-head,” so I explained:
Jelly head–slang for junkie, drug head, stoner. I guess the term implies that you do so many terms it turns the brain to sludge, jelly.
His humble reply? “Well, my brain is still quite intact and functioning on an I.Q. level higher than almost all people.” Uhhh, HOkay.
And in His website shows he’s a 9/11 conspiracy nut, too. 1 And let’s not forget his various handles: Count Lithium von Chloride, Tetrachordine Omega, and Tetrahedron Omega. He reminds me a bit of Per Malloch, another smart young libertarian who also liked my estoppel theory and Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, and who also liked drugs, unfortunately a bit too much–he OD’d in college a few years ago. I wonder how long Redford will be with us. Oh well, at least he’s a “Christian,” so if he OD’s he’ll just ascend to the Jesus Omega Point, I guess, where drugs will be free and plentiful.
Anyway, he wrote in the recent Mises thread:
I’m glad that some of my teachings have had an effect on you. Ergo, your somewhat recent statement of “an ought from an ought.” (Your September 8, 2006 11:19 AM reply under “How We Come to Own Ourselves.”)
He was referring to my comment there to someone: “I agree you cannot get an ought from an is. I am not. I am getting an ought from an ought.”
Redford is implying I got this from him. Why? Here is something he wrote me long ago (which I had of course forgotten). During one of those conversations he agreed with my Humean point that you can’t derive an an ought from an is; and he said he liked my own theory because in it I derive an ought from an ought. He wrote (back in February of 2000):
One remarkable thing about your rights argument is that it seems to totally by-pass the is/ought dichotomy. Rather than simply derive an “ought” from an “is” (which alone is impossible), it derives an “ought” from an “ought”: an “ought” which any objector to libertarian punishment necessarily already holds.
Note that he here was simply agreeing with what my own theory did: that it derived an ought from an ought. Therefore avoiding the ought from an is problem, which I was of course already aware of. (It permeates my arguments; and see also p. 1432 of my 1994 review essay on one of Hoppe’s books (discussing how Hoppe’s argumentation ethics overcomes the Humean is-ought dichotomy; and p. 136 (text at n. 13) of Hoppe’s 1989 A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, which I had of course devoured by the time I wrote my estoppel theory: “In fact, one can readily subscribe to the almost generally accepted view that the gulf between “ought” and “is” is logically unbridgeable. …. On the problem of the deriveability of “ought” from “is” statements cf. W. D. Hudson (ed.), The Is-Ought Question, London, 1969; for the view that the fact-value dichotomy is an ill-conceived idea cf. the natural rights literature cited in note 4 above.”)
Now. I have used “ought from an ought” on occasion, at least in the last couple of years, as I have explained and defended my views on rights, and the problem with the is-ought dichotomy. Did I get the phrase from Redmond? I have no idea. I suppose it is possible that a phrase he used to describe my own theory stuck in my head and bubbled to the surface years later. If so, I would have no problem “admitting” it, as he charges; why not? After all, it’s just a natural way to describe what my own theory does, as he admitted way back in 2000. And although he seems proud that if you google the phrase “ought from an ought” in usenet groups his is the first one mentioned, as if he had some great achievement (in just finding a way to describe why my own “remarkable” rights argument!), as I showed him, if you google the phrase on the web, several uses of it show up, e.g. one in 1973. (Redford’s emphasis on the fact that he has the first use of the phrase on usenet, and that there are only 13 or so in a web-wide google search, is also odd: there are no doubt various ways to word the idea that you can only get an ought from an ought, other than the literal phrase “ought from an ought”, which his and my google search espicked out, so the basic insight or idea or way of putting it is probably out there many more times than that simple one search would show. Not to mention that there are tons of publications not yet searchable.)
Regarding my citing of the 1973 use of the phrase, of course I did not list that to imply that I got the phrase from that source rather than from Redford; but to show that it’s probably a natural way for people to describe this, that many people can either independently come to, or that is floating around out there and occasionally used. I think it’s likely I either read this phraseology in various places, or maybe independently came up with it myself. I mean if you say that an ought can’t come from an is, so you have to start with a presupposed ought (as Hoppe and I both argue, in a sense; even Rand, as I noted before, with her hypothetical ethics), it’s, um, natural to say that you can’t get an ought from an is, but only from an ought. Redford’s attempt grab fame for such an obvious insight is frankly bizarre. If the thought of using that simple phrase to describe my very own rights theory was put in my head by Redford’s email to me back in 2000, whoop de doo. Fine. Who cares?
So, he lists part of our email conversation from 2000 (he, um, saved it, you see [appended below as his site is now down]), to prove I’m a plagiarist and liar. Okay, so let’s recap. I think his “ought from an ought” phrase is a kind of obvious way of stating one good thing about my own rights theory. That, er, I came up with. I think it’s good Omega, er Redford, came up with it. I think many people have. I may have too; or may have remembered it from Redford’s email to me, um, 6 years ago, or maybe from seeing others’ writings on related subjects. I’m even grateful Redford was friendly to my rights theory, but I think it’s frankly bizarre of him to keep score of such minute things and to try to take credit for such a thing, or to accuse me of plagiarism, or lying. On the other hand, I guess there are worse things than being insulted by a self-admitted drug-using conspiracy-theorizing born-again Chloride-Omega Christian with Direct Revelation to God.
Latest notable terms from this and last week’s Slate Culture Gabfest (feel free to email me suggestions or leave them in the comments to the main page, which keeps a running collection of the terms from this series of posts).
The relation between the non-aggression principle and property rights: a response to Division by Zer0, Mises Blog (Oct. 4, 2011) (archived comments below)
There was an interesting exchange recently between a left-libertarian (I think that’s what he is) who goes by Divide by Zer0, and anarcho-libertarian Stefan Molyneaux. “dbzer0″ argued against property rights and the non-aggression principle in his post Why the Non-Aggression Principle is useless as a moral guideline. Molyneux replied on Youtube; dbzer0 replied in Responding to Stefan Molyneux: “Theft of time”, NAP, and common sense.
Molyneux’s response is good, though I might quibble about some of his metaphor usage–saying that stealing someone’s improved/transformed property is a theft of the “time” he put into improving/transforming the item. Such metaphors can be helpful to picturing and really grokking the nature of the crime. But one has to be careful not to take this particular metaphor too literally, as it lead to various confusions that result from the labor theory of value, which has itself partly corrupted even Lockean and classical liberal thought, not to mention the errors of Marxism, and can lead to the confused idea of intellectual property.1
I think dbzer0′s criticism is unfounded, but it is based on some confusions about the nature of libertarianism and the interrelationship between the non-aggression principle and property rights. This confusion is understandable as even many libertarians mangle this.
Many libertarians focus on the non-aggression principle as the essence of our political philosophy. Ayn Rand formulated a version of it in Atlas Shrugged: “So long as men desire to live together, no man may initiate—do you hear me? No man may start—the use of physical force against others.”2 Some, such as Rothbard, have even called it the non-aggression “axiom”:
The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the ‘nonaggression axiom.’ ‘Aggression’ is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.3
Now the word “axiom” has different meanings (see wikipedia axiom entry). In math and logic it can refer to an assumed starting point, such as the presuppositions of Euclidean geometry;4 or, as Rand uses the term, to truths that are self-evident because denying the claim leads to self-contradiction. Ayn Rand usedthe word “axiom” in this way:
An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it.
In this sense, Rand’s “axioms” resemble Misesian/Kantian “apriori” concepts the denial of which leads to self-contradiction.5 For this reason alone, it’s better to refer to the non-aggression principle instead of the non-aggression axiom.
Another reason is that it’s not clear that “non-aggression” is really the most fundamental libertarian principle. In fact, I think it’s not. I think the libertarian conception of property rights is more fundamental than aggression. If I use force to take an apple from your hand, is it aggression? Is it trespass? Well, that depends on who owns the apple. If it is my apple, and you have just stolen it from me, then it is not trespass. If it is your apple, then it is trespass, or aggression. Classifying an action as aggression or not requires knowing who owns what.
Confusion has arisen, I believe, because of failure to treat separately self-ownership and ownership of external objects. Self-ownership means one owns one’s body. As Hoppe writes, “Every person is the private (exclusive) owner of his own physical body.”6 And as I have written previously, “each person is prima facie the owner of his own body.”7 Why prima facie? Because these rights can be alienated or forfeited by committing aggression.8 Though some object to the notion of self-ownership on the grounds that it is incoherent or implies religious or mystical views, this objection is without foundation. The body is a scarce resource, and to avoid conflict over its use, either the person whose body it is owns it, or someone else does. The choice is self-ownership, versus other-ownership, i.e. slavery. The quintessential libertarian view is self-ownership. And this common sense, natural, intuitive notion is not new or hard to appreciate. As Richard Overton wrote in 1646, in An arrow Against all Tyrants: “To every individuals in nature, is given an individual property by nature, not to be invaded or usurped by any ; for every one as he is himself, so he hath a selfe propriety, else he not be himselfe”. And Locke, in 1690: “Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.”9
When we speak of interpersonal conflict between human agents, that is, interpersonal violence involving their bodies, the idea of “aggression” and “self-ownership” express the same idea. To oppose the “initiation of force”, to oppose aggression, is merely another way of stating self-ownership. They each directly imply the other. This is one things dbzer0 glimpses.
But, as noted previously, when we speak of externally owned resources, a theory of property becomes primary. One first has to identify who the owner of a good is, to determine whether an action attempting to causally control the object is aggression, or just the exercise of ownership. In the case of the body, the agent, the person, himself, is the default owner of the body, so the answer is immediate and obvious (assuming he is not an aggressor). This is why in the case of interpersonal conflict, it makes sense to describe the libertarian anti-slavery, self-ownership principle by saying we oppose “initiation of force” or “aggression” (as Rand does in Galt’s speech).
And this is also why people get tripped up when they try to use the “initiation of force” language to describe why trespass–use of someone’s (non-bodily) property without their consent–is aggression. And again, this is what dbzer0 senses in his criticism of the coherence of treating external property the same as bodily-property.
The mistake lies in thinking property rights in one’s body are acquired in the same way and for the same reasons as property rights in external resources. Though they are linked, and though self-ownership is in a sense more fundamental, they are not the same. But it is a confusion to think of the basis of self-ownership as the same as the basis for ownership of external objects. We are used to thinking of Lockean homesteading–original appropriation, or initial use–as the basis for ownership of the latter. Thinking that all ownership must be of the same character and even origin, the assumption is also made that we own our bodies because we were the first users of our bodies. We try to fit self-ownership into the same framework we use to justify rights to inanimate, external objects.
As I explain in What Libertarianism Is, ownership of one’s body, and ownership of external objects, do have something in common, but it is not “first use.” It is rather that in each case, the resource in question is assigned to the person with the best link to the resource so as to avoid conflict and permit peaceful, productive use of the resource in question. This analysis draws on that the pioneering work of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, in his monumental treatise A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (esp. chs. 1, 2, 7). The institution of property arises only because of the fundamental fact of scarcity, or rivalrousness, in the world. This makes violent conflict over the use of various scarce resources–Misesian means to action–possible. For those living in society who prefer peace, prosperity, and productive use of resources instead of violent conflict, it is obvious that it is desirable to assign an owner to each such contestable resource. These resources include our bodies, and other means we use in action to causally bring about our ends. Such rules, to suffice as social rules, must be objective and fair to ever be accepted by individuals and as an improvement over a world of might makes right. Thus, the search among civilized people in society is always for objective (what Hoppe calls intersubjectively ascertainable) property assignment rules. Human bodies and other resources share in common that they are both scarce resources, and property rules are needed for each.
In the case of one’s body, the libertarian position is simply that each person is the prima facie owner of his body–not because he first used it, but because he has a better claim to it, because he has an objective link to his body: namely, his ability to directly control it, not to mention the intimate connection between each “person” or “agent” in a legal personality sense, and “his” body. It is not first use that matters here; otherwise each person would be a slave of, owned by, his mother, who had the first use. It is not “appropriation” or homesteading, since the act of homesteading property presupposes features that are simply not present in the case of body-ownership. Consider: for A to homestead an object, A already has to have and own his body; and the object is previously unowned. That is, to be a homesteader presupposes one is already a self-owner. For this reason it makes no sense to speak of homesteading one’s body and becoming a self-owner that way.
So, in my view, and in the Hoppean framework (which extends and builds on that of Mises and Rothbard), all ownership is based on the fundamental fact of scarcity, and the consequent possibility of conflict. Property in one’s body is based on the fact that each person has the best link to his body, because of his direct control over his body. Property in external objects is based on Lockean homesteading, where first use, or original appropriation (“embordering,” as Hoppe refers to it), serves as the link between agent and resource. (And the reason first use gives the first user a better link to the resource is because ownership is based on the prior-later distinction, as Hoppe explains; if the first user did not have a better claim than the second claimant, who is a latecomer with respect to him, then the second claimant would not have a better claim than a third claimant, i.e., property rights evaporate and we have only possession and might makes right, which is contrary to the entire endeavor of property allocation rules in the first place.)
But once this relationship between assignment of body rights, and of rights to previously unowned resources, is understood, along with their connection to the libertarian project of finding objectively fair rules that permit peace, prosperity, and productive, conflict-free use of resources, the confusion of what it means to “initiate force” against someone by stepping on their land disappears.
With this perspective, we can see that criticism such as that leveled by dbzer0 is simply mired in confusion. To address just a few of his comments:
“Anarcho”-Capitalists, and assorted propertarians very frequently cite the Non-Aggression principle or Zero Aggression principle (Commonly called NAP or ZAP) as a core tenet of their ideology.
First, I think it’s better, as a rule, to call ourselves anarcho-libertarians than anarcho-capitalists. Not that I agree with condemnations of “capitalism” by modern left-libertarians (I agree with their criticism of crony-capitalism, but not with the capitalist aspect of the type of advanced economic order that would doubtlessly arise in a free society), but capitalism only describes one part of the economy of a free society. Second, the scare-quotes around “anarcho” imply doubt as to whether anarcho-libertarians are genuine anarchists. To the contrary; I would say that all consistent, principled libertarians are anarchist; and any genuine anarchist has to be a libertarian–if you are not a libertarian then you are in favor of abrogations of property rights that invariably require institutional force, i.e. a state. Third, dbzer0 here assumes the NAP is the “core tenet” of libertarianism; yet as I have explained, the NAP is merely a compressed way of re-stating self-ownership, and in the case of external property it is indeed a dependent concept on the more fundamental concept of the libertarian-Lockean first-use-first-own property rights allocation rule.
But what exactly is the NAP? The specific details might differ depending on the encompassing ideology, but the central point generally seems to be that no human should aggress over another human. This is meant to mean the initial use of coercive force as well as the threat of such.
As argued above, this is a way of restating self-ownership; but in the case of acquired objects, it is a consequence, not primary.
Now, if left to this end, this is not a half-bad principle, basically saying that people shouldn’t attack or threaten to attack others. However at this stage, it is also pretty much unnecessary to be given an explicit existence as a “principle” as the generic principle of freedom already encompasses this (i.e. attacking another person would violate their freedom). Other moral theories, particularly the utilitarian variants already encompass such rules (with stipulation) as a natural consequence of their suggestions.
“Freedom” here is a murky, ill-defined concept. It is the fact that opposing interpersonal, violent, bodily aggression necessarily implies self-ownership, whether anti-propertarians want to use the correct labels, words, and concepts, or not.
But propertarians do not generally leave it at just that but rather try to sneakily expand it by linking it with private property rights. You see, the NAP is frequently derived directly from the Self-Ownership “axiom” and thus the wrongly derived property rights are treated as an extension of the self. Therefore one can then treat violation of private property rights as an act of “initated force”, even though no actual violence or threat of violence has been perpetuated. This is turn is used as a cause to use actual violence or threat of violence on the violator of property rights.
He has somewhat of a point here, as I have explained above; except that it is not “sneaky.” Rather, libertarians who favor self-ownership as well as ownership of homesteaded resources use the word “aggression” to describe not only the former, but the latter, since there are analogies and similarities. But failure to treat body and external resource ownership separately and clearly, in the context of a social theory designed to permit cooperation and productive, conflict-free use of resources, has led to some confusion, which has been adopted, or seized on, by libertarian opponents. (Not that they have any better or more coherent theory in the first place.)
While it’s easy to understand that someone “aggresses” when they steal something from another person (which is why most other moral systems do not require a NAP to label theft as wrong), things get pretty murky when one goes beyond that. Do I “initiate force” when I use a productive machine without paying rent? How about if I pay only enough rent to cover the cost of the machine? Do I “initiate force” when I toil the unused land that is owned by someone else? How about when I trespass?
A given scarce resource that is the subject of a possible contest or conflict–as the machine noted above–has an owner. It is either the worker seizing it, or the homesteader (or his contractual transferee), or the state or some collective. And this is the crux of the matter. No one, even dbzer0, can deny argumentatively the value and desirability of property rules. Argumentation is itself a civilized, conflict-free activity, and arguing about who should get to use the resource is itself a search for fair, universalizable property allocation rules (again: even if the left-libertarian stubbornly abjures the term “property rules,” that is what he is arguing for). So the only real argument people like dbzer0 can have is that they think some property assignment rule other than first-use is more objectively just, that it establishes a better link between claimant and resource. And this, he has not done, or even tried to do. He has sidestepped this problem. The other possible property assignment rules would include some type of communism, a world of everyone-owns-everyone, which, as Rothbard has shown, is of course unethical and unworkable;10 might-makes-right, which is no property rule at all; or some kind of rule, inspired by the deeply flawed labor theory of value and muddled Marxian notions of “exploitation,” that ridiculously rests on the notion that employers/capitalists “exploit” the worker by “stealing” the “social surplus product”–the difference the employer’s revenues and the value of the worker’s labor, i.e. to the extent there is capitalist profit there is exploitation.11 Of course, no coherent property assignment rule can rest on hoary, severely flawed economics and social analysis.
My view is that no non-libertarian property rule can be justified, precisely for the reasons that the libertarian, Lockean property appropriation rule is valid: only it recognizes man’s nature as an acting being that needs to employ external, previously-unowned scarce resources to act productively and successfully. For man to be able to ever use a previously unowned resource at all, much less peacefully or productively, it must be used first. Someone has to be the first to emborder it, transform it, employ it as a means. But those seeking peaceful, conflict-avoiding property assignment rules that permit such productive use of resources cannot deny the right of the first user to use the resource–otherwise it would never be employed at all. I.e., the first user has to have an ownership right. But if the first user has an ownership right, then that means latecomers have a worse claim–and that is, after all, what theft is: A owns a thing; B, a latecomer, takes it from A by violent force. To deny the importance of the prior-later distinction is to obliterate property rules, for anyone can take things from others, even if they come later, meaning we have a war of all against all, and right devolves into might–which is contrary to the very endeavor of searching for civilized norms in the first place.
- 1.See my post On the Danger of Metaphors in Scientific Discourse; also Locke, Smith, Marx and the Labor Theory of Value; Rand on IP, Owning “Values”, and “Rearrangement Rights”; Locke on IP; Mises, Rothbard, and Rand on Creation, Production, and “Rearranging”; Libertarian Creationism; this comment to “Trademark and Fraud”; Elaborations on Randian IP; Objectivists on IP.
- 2.Ayn Rand (Galt’s Speech, Atlas Shrugged, 1957).
- 3.Rothbard, For A New Liberty, p. 23; see also Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 45. See also Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 12, 7.
- 4.But see my post Hoppe on Falsificationism, Empiricism, and Apriorism and Protophysics, arguing that some basic tenets of physics, such as Euclidean geometry, may be apriori.
- 5.See my post Mises and Rand (and Rothbard).
- 6.Hoppe, State or Private-Law Society.
- 7.Kinsella, What Libertarianism Is.
- 8.See Kinsella, Punishment and Proportionality: The Estoppel Approach.
- 9.John Locke, Second Treatise of government (1690), chap V, 27.
- 10.See note 1 of my “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide”.
- 11.See Hoppe’s “Marxist and Austrian Class Analysis,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property; Kinsella, Hoppe: Marx was “Essentially Correct”; also see my post A Critique of Mutualist Occupancy.
October 4, 2011 at 4:24 pm-
zer0 indeed knows /not/ what he’s talking about:
“Why would a market come out when people get what they need whenever they need it? Of course a market would probably create inequalities, which is why I’m opposed to it, and this is one of the main sticking points between collectivist and individualist anarchists.”
http://dbzer0.com/blog/private-property-vs-possession#IDComment21595899
Subscribe to communism and Mana will start falling from the sky.
October 4, 2011 at 8:06 pm-
There are two ways to convince people to work:
1. Convince them through voluntary agreement.
2. Force them through threat of physical violence.Everywhere that pure socialism or communism has been practiced the state always ends up resorting to the latter.
Somebody needs to explain to these know-nothings is that when people work for one another under voluntary agreements, even if one financially benefits more then the other, they both gain.
That is a factory worker makes less then the factory owner, but the factory worker still makes more then he would if the factory didn’t exist or if he worked on his own… otherwise he wouldn’t be a factory worker.
Ultimately all collectivism really means is that you remove certain ‘disagreeable’ types of specialization out of the market place. It’s inefficient and you will just end up costing the workers as much as the owners in the long run.
October 4, 2011 at 9:15 pm-
“Everywhere that pure socialism or communism has been practiced the state always ends up resorting to the latter.”
This leaves the door open for something like ‘Everywhere libertarianism has been tried it leads to X’, followed by ‘Well that wasn’t true libertarianism,’ followed by ‘Well it was the closest thing ever attempted,’ followed by more recursion into the no true scotsman fallacy.
I think you’d be better pointing out how, as Mises did, no society can rationally allocate resources without prices and markets (which require private property to exist).
October 4, 2011 at 6:27 pm-
I have to ask Stephan, why do you insist on arguing with these leftists? They seem hellbent on doing nothing but redefine words. They are esentially the result of a lot of intelligence being invested in ignorance – the need for illusions is deep in them. I just don’t get why someone like yourself would devote so much time to these trolls.
October 4, 2011 at 8:02 pm-
Fascinating article and really well thought out. I’m with you all the way up until this bit:
“My view is that no non-libertarian property rule can be justified, precisely for the reasons that the libertarian, Lockean property appropriation rule is valid: only it recognizes man’s nature as an acting being that needs to employ external, previously-unowned scarce resources to act productively and successfully. For man to be able to ever use a previously unowned resource at all, much less peacefully or productively, it must be used first. Someone has to be the first to emborder it, transform it, employ it as a means.”
Now… this may simply be confusion on my part, or perhaps an overly pedantic way of looking at the problem, but it strikes me that the traditional concept of land ownership is far broader in scope than is necessary to facilitate a peaceful society. Embordering something, for instance, seems to me to be a distinction grown out of the might-makes-right ethos of a right to all that which you are capable of defending.
Transformation, or employment as means, both strike me as rights generating activities, but their scope seems to be naturally limited. For instance, it seems that one can rightfully lay claim to all oil one is able to pull up from a well, but the oil still in the earth, unmodified and unemployed, seems very clearly to be an unowned resource. If some other person were to set up a well next to the first, and tap the same oil, I can see no reason to think that theft has occurred. It seems that so long as no one destroys something created by another, and no one takes anything transformed or employed as means, then no aggression has occurred and there is nothing for a libertarian to complain about. Yet, this implies a sense of property far more limited than is commonly understood. Is there something wrong with my thinking, or is there something wrong with the current conception of property rights (especially with respect to land/natural resource ownership).
October 4, 2011 at 8:18 pm-
Embordering something, for instance, seems to me to be a distinction grown out of the might-makes-right ethos of a right to all that which you are capable of defending.
It’s not a description of a ideal, it’s a observation of reality. It answers a very basic question:
Question: How does matter become property?
Answer: Through homesteading; except for your own body.Everything that has existed on the planet Earth has always existed on the planet Earth. Always, with few exceptions. It belonged to nobody until some person at some point decided to pick up a rock or cut down a tree or plowed the earth…. then that is when it became property.
That’s all there is to it. It’s just a statement of fact. There is no ‘might makes right’ about any of it.
I think there is a lot of confusion people have because when you talk about ‘land’ in a economic sense it’s not just dirt or ground. It can be anything and everything physical. Any sort of resource.
If some other person were to set up a well next to the first, and tap the same oil, I can see no reason to think that theft has occurred.
It can and it can’t be theft. It really depends on the specifics of the situation.
Mineral rights are a complicated thing and is not something that can be discussed well in sweeping generalities.
October 4, 2011 at 9:13 pm-
I’m just having trouble figuring out what the appropriate scope of a homesteading claim is. Does intending to use something kind of near you that no one else was near enough to intend to use before give you sufficient claim? If I build a building on some land, how much of the surrounding space do I automatically acquire claim to (if it is previously unclaimed)? Can I claim every unclaimed thing I see, or do I have to do something in order to gain ownership of those things? Does marking out the boundaries of what I’ve claimed on some sort of document validate my claim?
Historically, it seems that you could get what you could defend from competing claimants through coercive forces (either legal or, ahem, more direct).
October 5, 2011 at 7:51 am
October 4, 2011 at 9:06 pm-
Thank you for this article. It has helped clarify my thinking. Where I still get confused is in the epistomology that forms the foundation for austrian economics. I’ve read the article by Hoppe where he ties together Mises’ action axiom with the a priori synthetic, and ties it to another axiom, which I can’t think of off the top of my head. Anyway, it seems like whenever you argue with someone who actually keeps an open mind, arguments lead back to epistomology and first principles. Has anyone else attempted to summarize the links from epistomology to the action axiom to the laws of austrian economics? I’d definitely be interested in works along those lines.
October 4, 2011 at 9:07 pm-
seconded! That’s a spectacular question.
October 5, 2011 at 7:48 am
October 5, 2011 at 8:55 am-
But those seeking peaceful, conflict-avoiding property assignment rules that permit such productive use of resources cannot deny the right of the first user to use the resource–otherwise it would never be employed at all.
Here’s the sticking point that /0 would probably rebut as his best argument against libertarianism: There are people that are not “seeking peaceful, conflict-avoiding property assignment rules”. Most people, as libertarians recognize, are simply looking out for themselves. The NAP, when applied to a starving man with a stubborn neighbor whose grain silos are overflowing, would be resigning to death.
Indeed I think that there is room for compromise: the NAP is the utopian vision of the individualists, the all-knowing distributive state is the utopian vision of the statists. But how about we recognize that some aggression is JUSTIFIABLE, and implore the statists to recognize that redistribution, if it is to happen at all, is best left to competing individuals?
I think that the NAP is a great PERSONAL philosophy, but no institutions could impose this philosophy onto the statists. Instead, we must acknowledge that justice is just another personal value, and as such should be left to voluntary decision makers. The more we value a certain theory of justice, the more we can spend enforcing it. Hopefully the NAP would win out in an organically evolving market, but likely there would be a minimum level of coercion/aggression left in the world because the marginal costs of eradicating the remaining injustices would outweigh the marginal benefits of getting one step closer to utopia.
October 5, 2011 at 10:37 am-
What do you mean when you say “some aggression is justifiable”? Give me an example please.
October 6, 2011 at 8:38 am-
Whether an action was “just” or not is a subjective determination. Like the extreme “life-boat” situation or the more mundane decisions like those made while driving, all actions can arguably affect other people, and there are differing opinions on what level and types of disturbances are unjust, or rights violating.
An example of generally justifiable aggression is bumping into someone while passing them in a crowded area. You meant to come into contact with their body, but you did so because that was justified by the situation.
Some people may disagree, however, and say it was unjustifiable. That’s fine, let them try to (justly) enforce a remedy. If they do so unjustly, then others are free to demand justice from the enforcers.
The NAP is a choice made by individuals, and may be used to develop a philosophy of things like laws and regulations, but in the end, what constitutes redress-able or unjust aggression is a subjective determination.
October 5, 2011 at 10:45 am-
“The NAP, when applied to a starving man with a stubborn neighbor whose grain silos are overflowing, would be resigning to death.”
These lifeboat scenarios are always interesting to me. I’ve never understood how people can get so worked up over them, when they really almost never happen. They’re always the same — a man crossing the desert needing water, a guy drowning and his erstwhile rescuer bargaining with him for a floatie, a guy bleeding to death needing surgery but the doctor makes him sign his life away first, etc. They all have a certain cartoonish quality to them.
But I don’t think that the NAP needs to be tossed out merely because its application to vanishingly rare and extreme situations is somewhat difficult.
The solution to these conundrums is to be found in examining what the appropriate remedy would be if the property right or contract in question were violated.
What is the proper remedy for someone stealing a loaf of bread, or a cup of grain from an overflowing silo? Death?
What is the proper remedy for someone trespassing on your yard? For the aggrieved owner to blast the interloper into the afterlife with a shotgun?
It’s sort of like the slavery question — do people in a free society have the right to sell themselves into slavery? Well, yes and no. People have the right to enter employment contracts. But the problem with this slavery question (another type of lifeboat scenario) is: what is the remedy for an employer when an employee violates this type of extreme (de facto slavery) employment contract? Whips and chains for life? What has the purported slave-owner really lost when his lifetime employee decides to quit and work for himself?
Under ordinary, free, contractual rules, the person who suffers a breach of contract is expected to go out into the market and get a replacement, and can only sue the breaching party for the difference. If the employer can go out and get, on balance, as good a deal from someone else, then he hasn’t really suffered a loss. If A and B have a contact to sell a car for $1,000, but the buyer defaults and fails to close the deal, but the seller goes out and sells it to the next guy for $1,005, the seller hasn’t lost a thing. It’s a breach without damages.
If a trespasser walks across your yard, yes, under the strictest property rules imaginable, the landowner has been wronged. I fully sympathize. But the remedy is not an instantaneous death penalty. It’s virtually zero damages.
The draconian employer who suffers a breach of his draconian employment contract when his de fact slave quits his job is not entitled to use chains to get him back. He should be expected to go out and hire replacement workers at the best rate he can. If people are willing to sell themselves into slavery, I imagine there are other employee bargains to be had. And what if he does that, gets an inferior bargain from the next employee, and sues his ex-slave and wins? What then? Great, he’s just won a judgment against a penniless man.
So, too, with the starving thief. If a man is in such extremis that stealing a loaf of bread is what stands between life and a permanent dirt nap, then necessity dictates that he will steal. So be it. Sure, the victim has his property right violated. Now, his remedy shall be to collect the value of one loaf of bread, and collect it from a penniless man. Good luck with that.
October 5, 2011 at 3:38 pm-
Excellent points. Yes, it’s not enough to merely consider when someone has been wronged, but to what extent they have been wronged, and what would constitute restitution for the wrongdoing. Thus, I think libertarianism implies appropriate restitution for there to be justice.
October 5, 2011 at 10:58 am-
Stephan, What constitutes ‘first use’? Also, does the first user own the property even if he stops using it?
If he uses 10,000 acres of land, puts a fence around the land, and after 1 week, he completely stops using the land. 20 years later, does he still have the right to exclude others from using it?
October 5, 2011 at 12:02 pm
October 10, 2011 at 12:06 am-
“20 years later, does he still have the right to exclude others from using it?”
This says nothing about the value that is being gained by the owner. Perhaps the land is being kept as a tract of natural ‘virginal’ countryside, to be enjoyed by the owner whenever they like. To someone else this may appear to be abandoned. Does the concept of ‘use’ involve constantly manually altering the land in some way?
October 10, 2011 at 11:52 am-
Graham
Good question, it points right at the general confusion regarding property rights in the Church of Libertarianism. The question of what constitutes “use” in regards to property rights is generally glossed over. First, the “tract of natural ‘virginal’ countryside” that you reference in your example, how did the owner acquire title to this land in the first place? If unowned land can ONLY be acquired by “first use” how did this land, that you have defined as unused, become someones property in the first place? Your example requires something other than first use as a basis for property rights. The confusion over “use” has been made worse by Pope Kinsellas sloppy and confused discussion of “scarcity” as a prerequisite for property rights. This is compounded by the conflating of “economic value” and property in most explanations. That something has no economic value (money price) does not prevent it from possibly being property. Property rights are about conflicting uses, where different uses do not conflict, or where conflicting uses are not possible there is no question of property rights. To finally answer your question, “use” as employed in the principle of “first use” as a basis for property rights means ONLY use which conflicts with someone else’s use. Standing and gazing across a tract of untouched land with awe and reverence does not convey any property rights BECAUSE it does not conflict with anyone else’s similar use.
The Heretic and Poor Lost Soul, Sy Akhplart
October 5, 2011 at 1:32 pm-
Perhaps I misunderstand what you mean by “defend”. I can’t imagine a sense of defending a claim on unused land that doesn’t ultimately rely on force. I mean, is complaining sufficient defense to validate my claim? Can I abandon something unwillingly?
I’m sorry, I’m not very well read on these issues. Perhaps I should be going through the literature you’ve mentioned instead of trying to hash things out on the forums, but I find it useful to have this sort of exchange to help me frame my questions. Thanks for continuing the conversation

October 5, 2011 at 4:00 pm-
I think all conflict resolution at least hints at resolution by force, or the threat of force, but it is a misunderstanding to think all conflict resolution requires force. I suspect a lot of people have a cartoonish vision of a property owner pointing a shotgun at trespassers and warning them to get off their property. In reality, most people are going to be much more reasonable, and merely talking to someone and explaining the situation can often resolve the issue. If not, there would still be legal and procedural means (arbitration and mediation) for resolving differences, so the actual use of coercion should be rather limited in practice.
October 5, 2011 at 3:48 pm-
Thanks for distinguishing between self-ownership and ownership of external property. They are not the same thing. The point about the context of the force used in relation to property rights is well-taken, too, but I’m not sure I see how all property rights boil down to first use/homesteading. Sure, I see how all previously unowned property had to become owned at some point, and then after that, owned property is transferred either peacefully through sale or gift, or else unpeacefully through theft or fraud. But all the details hardly seem to resolve themselves down to a simple principle, but rather treat homesteading as a first cause for property, followed by subsequent transactions, and participants get into murky transactions where we generally assume that a trade is based upon legitimate property ownership without being sure of it, unless we have a full history of the acquisition and transfer of the property.
October 5, 2011 at 8:34 pm-
Any discussion, ever, anywhere, on “non-aggression” should reference the work of Konrad Lorenz. Just because you are talking abstract economic philosophy, (which may, I agree, apply to real situations) you should not ignore cultural anthropology or consider it, even tacitly, as irrelevant.
Last time I tried to mention this, you moderated me out. Dirty pool.
October 5, 2011 at 9:09 pm-
I never moderated you.
October 5, 2011 at 10:14 pm-
Funny, we have a rather large club for people that you moderated out when you couldn’t deal with their comments. Afraid you fall a little short in the “believable” category when you deny moderating Virginia. Dirty pool is your specialty.
The Heretic and Poor Lost Soul, Sy Akhplart
October 6, 2011 at 10:40 pm-
I apologize for pointing an accusing finger at anyone specifically. It just seems that sometimes my comments get by and sometimes they do not. I shouldn’t get caught in your spam filter as I am properly registered. And, honestly, Mr. Kinsella, and I say this in my most respectful tone, I did not know you were one of the powers. I thought you were just a prolific commentator. I’m not much good at research unless it involves goldfish and grizzly bears.
October 11, 2011 at 10:57 pm-
My thoughts on the matter:
October 14, 2011 at 1:30 pm-
Yup, the whole post is the intro to the epiphany which would be the last two paragraphs. Thanks for your attention, Stephan.
Did you know that you are the *only* person who I have seen convince Stefan Molyneux that he was mistaken about something to the extent of leading him in a 180 degree turn?
It’s not because Stef is arrogant or stubborn — he is not, it’s usually the case that people who disagree with Stef are the ones who are wrong, and very amateurishly or pettily so. It’s that Stef is almost all the time correct on what he speaks about, and the people who disagree with him just present specious arguments or insults.
In contrast with that, you are the only person I’ve ever seen be so compellingly right (remember the intellectual podcast with you and him and I think Wendy McElroy?) and presenting a case so watertight, with so much intellectual closure and consistency with observable reality, that Stef just… changed his mind completely after the cast.
I had read your book Against Intellectual Property before, so I sorta expected to listen to that cast and see some lively debate between you and Stef (who until that point believed in Ayn Rand’s theory of property, thus intellectual monopolies as well). There was NO DEBATE, LITERALLY. Everyone listened to you make your very simple, very straightforward points, Stef asked you a couple of questions (politely but clearly disagreeing), you answered them, that was it. No one got angry, no one got defensive.
That’s the power of simple, correct ideas. You are the man. Respect for that.
Related:
- The Association for Objective Law (TAFOL)
- David Kelley on the Necessity of Government
- The Power to Tax and the Power to Outlaw Competition Imply Each Other
One problem with minarchism is that it makes it difficult to find a principled opposition to various state policies and actions that violate individual rights. And just as controls breed controls, 1 one compromise leads to another. Ayn Rand, for example, maintained that the subpoena power was legitimate–that state courts could legitimately compel people to show up at court to give testimony or evidence in a trial. 2 However, she argued against compulsory jury duty. But if the state courts can compel witnesses to attend trial, why can’t it compel people to serve as jurors? In fact, Rand’s “intellectual heir” Leonard Peikoff makes just this argument. 3 Some Objectivists, such as Diana Hsieh, disagree, 4 but as Peikoff’s ex-wife, Amy Peikoff, says, “What I am trying to figure out is whether the jury issue is more like the subpoena issue, or instead is the same as military service or compulsory taxation.” 5
Another issue that some minarchists waver over is eminent domain. Richard Epstein, in his book Takings, builds an entire political theory around the idea that the state is justified because it can take private property when the taking generates enough surplus proceeds to compensate the victim and thus make everyone overall better off. Ayn Rand initially favored eminent domain, as indicated in Murray Rothbard’s correspondence, because the Constitution implicitly authorized it–until around 1954, when Herb Cornuelle convinced her to oppose eminent domain. 6 Neo-Objectivist Tibor Machan still argues that eminent domain may be legitimate. 7
Then, of course, there is also Rand’s half-baked views on taxation. She claimed the minimal state was legitimate, yet she was honest and perspicacious enough to realize that compulsory taxes are illegitimate (though, if I recall, she put elimination of taxes low on the list of important reforms she would press for). 8 She opined that the state could perhaps be financed by some voluntary scheme–donations, contract fees, or a lottery. None of which make sense.
***
See also Is Taxation Theft? with Professor Richard Salsman, where Richard Salsman argues that not only is taxation justified but so is subpoena power.
I debated Salsman on whether taxation is theft:https://t.co/pHHY2gLopQ
— Michael Liebowitz (@Lieboisout) October 29, 2025
- See my post Controls breed controls, Monopolies breed monopolies.[↩]
- Ayn Rand interview with Raymond Newman: See 35:44 – 37:05 for her brief discussion of subpoenas; Rothbard’s brief mention of this in his The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult.[↩]
- Dr. Peikoff’s podcast questions on compulsory juries and subpoenas: June 7th, 2010 and July 19th, 2010; see also ARCHNblog, Do They Just Make This Stuff Up?.[↩]
- See Hsieh’s Noodlefood podcast #78; Don’t Let it Go, “Jury Duty” post.[↩]
- Amy Peikoff’s defense of compulsory jury duty; see also Association for Objective Law discussion of the subpoena power.[↩]
- See my post Ayn Rand Finally Right about the First-to-File US Patent System.[↩]
- See my post Before Vandanarchists, there were … Randanarchists![↩]
- “The question of how to implement the principle of voluntary government financing—how to determine the best means of applying it in practice—is a very complex one and belongs to the field of the philosophy of law. … Any program of voluntary government financing is the last, not the first, step on the road to a free society—the last, not the first, reform to advocate. … But still, a gradual process is required—and any program of voluntary government financing has to be regarded as a goal for a distant future.” Ayn Rand, “Government Financing in a Free Society,” in The Virtue of Selfishness. “I want to stress that I am not an advocate of public (i.e., government-operated) schools, that I am not an advocate of the income tax, and that I am not an advocate of the government’s “right” to expropriate a citizen’s money or to control his spending through tax-incentives. None of these phenomena would exist in a free economy. But we are living in a disastrously mixed economy, which cannot be freed overnight.” “The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. 1, No. 12 March 13, 1972, Tax-Credits For Education,” in The Ayn Rand Letter, Volumes I-IV 1971-1976. [↩]
In a 2004 LRC post, How Stupid are Europeans?, I noted that unless an explicit right to secede or exit from the then-proposed European Constitution were added, any countries joining would likely be prevented by force from leaving later. Happily, the EU Constitution was never finally ratified, due to the heroic stubbornness of French and Dutch citizens. (However, many of its provisions were snuck into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007.)
As noted in Greece Considers Exit from Euro Zone,
It remains unclear whether it would even be legally possible for Greece to depart from the euro zone. Legal experts believe it would also be necessary for the country to split from the European Union entirely in order to abandon the common currency. At the same time, it is questionable whether other members of the currency union would actually refuse to accept a unilateral exit from the euro zone by the government in Athens.
Never join a political union. Never centralize. It could be a one-way ratchet, as the CSA was forced to realize. Decentralization—and the Catholic idea of subsidiarity—is always to be pushed for, down to the individual level.
As I noted previously, after the lesson of the US Civil War–which is that if you want a right to secede from a “voluntary” union you better be VERY EXPLICIT—still, they have signed a draft EU Constitution that is not crystal-clear on this. True, Article 59 covers “Voluntary withdrawal from the Union”. It provides:
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention; the European Council shall examine that notification. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council of Ministers, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The representative of the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in Council of Ministers or European Council discussions or decisions concerning it.
3. The Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, decides to extend this period.
Note the bolded “weasel-word” language. If any rich state, say France, Germany, or Britain, tries to leave, a majority of poorer states could stop it by simply indefinitely “extending” the period that the EU Constitution applies to the State desiring to leave. As this article notes,
It was always the case that a member state could leave by simply repealing its own legislation [TELL IT TO SOUTH CAROLINA! –SK]. Now there is a formal procedure designed to show that the EU is a voluntary association. However a departing member would have to agree terms so there is an implied threat that it would not be that easy. This clause is presumably designed never to be used.
See also discussion of “exit clause” proposal; more comments on the “exit clause”; and Europa info page on the EU Constitution.
All I can say now is: I bet the UK is glad it never entered monetary union with the Euro; and Switzerland is glad it never entered the EU; and Germany is probably regretting it all!
Here’s an interesting series of posts back in 2004 (including an exchange with Tim Sandefur, back when he was still civil with me):
Great Idear
Courts may be stripped on pledge — discusses the attempt by some House Republicans to try to prevent the Supremes from overturning legislation related to the pledge. The idea is to simply strip the Court of jurisdiction over certain matters, using a neglected provision in the Constitution: Article III, Section II, which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;–to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;–to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;–to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;–to Controversies between two or more States;–between a State and Citizens of another State;–between Citizens of different States;–between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned , the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
This is, IMO, a very good idea. Strip away. (No offense, libertarian centralists [2, last 4 Gene Healy articles here].)Note: As explained here:
Article III, Section 2, clause 2’s reference to cases in which `a State shall be Party’ does not include suits by citizens against states. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-44 (1892) (`The words in the constitution, `in all cases . . . in which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction’ . . . do not refer to suits brought against a state by its own citizens or by citizens of other states, or by citizens or subjects of foreign states, even where such suits arise under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, because the judicial power of the United States does not extend to suits of individuals against states.’) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Amendment provides that `The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.’ U.S. Const. Amend. XI.
This is why a suit by a citizen against his own State based on a claim of violation of federal constitutional rights would not be a case where a “State is Party” and original jurisdiction. So, e.g., a lawsuit challenging the pledge, or an abortion law, or a state’s hetero-only marriage laws, even if the state is being sued, is a case of appellate, and not original, jurisdiction. It’s not a case where a “State [is] a Party” because that language refers to paragraph 1 situations, which do not include a citizen suing his own State. Therefore jurisdiction for a citizen suing his own State can only be based on a claim “arising under” federal law or the Constitution, and thus a case of appellate jurisdiction.
Related:
- The State is not the government; we don’t own property; scarcity doesn’t mean rare; coercion is not aggression
- David Kelley on the Necessity of Government
- An Objectivist IP Argument for Taxation
- Why Should the Government be Limited?
- Ayn Rand Endorses Big Government
- What It Means To Be an Anarcho-Capitalist
- The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Anarcho-Libertarianism
Mises post; archived comments below.
Why Should the Government be Limited?
{ 72 comments… read them below or add one }
September 28, 2011 at 8:02 am-
Calling her a “demonrat” in the first paragraph is either the most amazing Freudian slip of all time or the new party epithet.
September 28, 2011 at 2:48 pm-
Stephan does not slip.
September 28, 2011 at 8:25 am-
The State isn’t anything like the mall. The mall doesn’t take away 60% of your inventory if you let your rent lapse and go elsewhere nor does it continue to ask for a rental payment even though you set up in the building across the street.
September 28, 2011 at 9:53 am-
There’s a big difference here. First, a tenant signs a contract which gives them exclusive access to that particular space. This means no other business can occupy it, thus the owner of the mall is incurring risk and opportunity cost. What if the business fails? He is now out not only the rent, but the loss of a more successful firm renting. He is, in effect, loaning capital to the firm and expects a return greater than the marginal utility of liquidity.
If the business folds the owner is entitled to be compensated for his loss. Likewise, if the firm moves, the owner is also entitled to loss compensation. This is based on the necessity of contracts and contractual enforcement. Let’s just say that there is a law of some sort that prohibits such “confiscation” by a mall owner. The risk would be much greater and the rent much higher. The mall owner would know that at any time a firm could leave and he’d be out not only the rent but would incur the loss of future rent until he found a new tenant. And he’d have to incur the costs of locating a new tenant as well.
Bottom line is that the mall is peaceful and voluntary. Both parties entered into the contract of their own volition. Implicit in the contract (if not specifically stated) is that it will be open certain hours, have available and reliable utilities, facilities for customers such as restrooms and parking, et al. Let’s take the other side of the coin. You dislike the mall’s “confiscation” but what if the mall falls into disrepair, the utilities don’t work consistently, etc. Does not the firm who has incurred loss from that a right to compensation? Both sides must uphold their end of the contract. It is fundamental to a free market. And no, it’s not theft if the mall confiscates, as the firm caused the mall some loss.
The state is entirely a different issue altogether. It is one purely of force, where one party arbitrarily decides what you will pay, that you do benefit, and how much. And if you choose not to submit to the “contract”, they will imprison you. In addition, what Ms. Warren completely doesn’t get is that the government takes no risk in building roads, schools, et al. If a road fails (i.e. doesn’t provide benefits greater than costs), oh well. If a bridge collapses and kills people, bummer. If roads fall into disrepair, as the freeways in my home California have, then again, oh well. If the police break into your house and shoot and kill you because they got the address wrong, the again, oh well. If they fail to educate kids, then again, oh well. If the mall fails, it closes down. The owner loses his investment. If the owner chooses poorly in tenants, it fails and closes.
The worst error of her thinking is that she has no understanding that the wealth created by the evil thugs she despises is what allowed the government in the first place to build all that. The wealth came first. It’s why poor countries have no roads, not the other way around.
September 28, 2011 at 10:32 am-
There is no difference – you can’t continue to reside in the mall as a squatter without repurcussions. In theory the government taking risks – primarily people could leave the country and renounce their citizenship or refuse to be particularly productive bringing the country’s economy down. It’s would be little different from a shortage of mall owners and the owners are bleeding the tenants for everything they’re worth.
September 28, 2011 at 11:28 am-
@Rob Mandel September 28, 2011 at 9:53 am
…where one party arbitrarily decides what you will pay…
In the U.S., do you believe this is literally true? Does “government” or “the state” arbitrarily decide, use force to coerce compliance, and can only be opposed with violence?
September 28, 2011 at 11:21 pm-
Let me turn that around and ask you if you get to choose how much your government takes from you in taxes.
September 29, 2011 at 11:19 am-
Nate,
For me it is a two-fold problem: spending and taxation. Both are much too high.
In case you have not been following the news, that very issue is at the center of the national politcal debate taking place at the moment. Of the two positons; 1) big government, big spending, big taxes; v. 2)smaller government, spending and taxes, which do you favor?
Or do you honestly not care how it comes out because the state is so evil, it really doesn’t matter, so you are holding out for option 3), whatever that is?
September 28, 2011 at 10:29 am-
Why can’t it? If you can’t service payments on a debt then the lender can seize your assets. Alternatively, the U.S. Government doesn’t tax the non-U.S. citizens around the world.
September 28, 2011 at 10:29 am-
Normally I agree with Stephan Kinsella but in this instance I believe he has allowed Elizabeth Warren’s definition to rule his logic. Warren assumes that becuase the state supplies services it essentially has ownership of those who use those services. Kinsella takes essentially the same position but where Warren believes any government service is essential and so entitles the government to ownership, Kinsella believes no government services is justified so the government is not entitled to anything. Warren and Kinsella live in the same neighborhood but on opposite sides of the street.
But the Warren/ Kinsella basic premise is foolish. Simply because you OFFER a service to me does not give you ownership to anything I have. And using your services does not give you unlimited ownership.
Exchange is a negotiation not a right. You bargin for your interest and I bargin for my interest. If we determine that we are both better off then there is exchange, but if we do not there is no exchange. The government has a right to be a party to the negotiations just as individuals have a right. If in the negotiation I determine that a government service benefits me and the government leaders believe that providing the service benefits the ones who established the government there is no reason that services cannot be provided.
The problem with a Warren/Kinsella world is that negotiation is not an option. Warren takes it all and Kinsella takes nothing.
The brilliance of the US system of government is that it was essentially designed with enumerated powers and all other powers were reserved to the states and the people, but the enumerated powers were not chiseled in stone. Provision was made to expand the enumerated powers if the states and the people found it necessary.
Sadly the world of Warren/Kinsella has become the world we live in and the debate is about all or nothing. Negotiation where everyone wins is not longer part of the debate. Because of this everyone loses; you are either robbed of what is rightfully yours or you are robbed of using the services that best serve you. This is the wisdom and miracle of the free market.
September 28, 2011 at 11:20 am-
@Dick Fox September 28, 2011 at 10:29 am
I normally disagree with Kinsella about just about everything, but I won’t let that detract from your excellent point. I think it is true that Kinsella here has merely framed the debate as his “nothing” against the straw man “all” which he himself creates.
First, your point is correct; there is no correlation between taxation imposed ostensibly to pay for those roads, etc. and some future claim of ownership of means of production. At best, one could say that Warren’s reasoning is something like, “Since you benefited from government’s use of past tax payments, you are obligated to keep paying them.”
The direct relation between the public roads and the taxes collected to build and maintain them is where a legitimate connection exists. In this view, taxation is a means by which the desired ends can be achieved on a non-profit basis, i.e. a bureaucratic means. Mises has covered this thoroughly in his little book Bureaucracy. Whether government bureaucracy is the best means to achieve what all agree are desirable ends, free and efficient freedom of movement, is a legitimate topic of debate.
But more importantly, as is Kinsella’s style, he pretends that these taxes are being imposed by a dictator or monarch, and that the only way to view a taxpayer is as a “victim” of the state. In a government in which voters have some say, they also take some responsibility for the government they choose. There is no getting around that simple fact.
It is not necessary to agree or oppose the twisted logic of Warren to hold that there is something wrong with our level of taxation, how effectively it is being used, or even the purposes for which taxes are being used. But it is a fact that the imposition of those taxes is not by decree, and do not exist solely on the basis of violence or threat of it by a tyrant who can only be removed by violence.
It is equivocation on the concept of taxes and tyranny to assert or even imply that in all cases taxes only arise by the will of a tyrant. This is ridiculous. But it does conveniently serve as a straw man for Kinsella to attack with the same rhetoric he would use to attack the Henry the 8th, Hitler or the Mob for that matter, as he later demonstrates. It is much more convenient to his conclusion to maintain the fallacy that only a tyrant demands “protection” in the form of taxation, and naturally tyrants should be eliminated.
Tyranny is wrong, but is not the fundamental condition of our form of government in the U.S. This is a shameful rhetorical trick of an ideologue, which lacks even a modicum of scholarship.
September 28, 2011 at 11:42 am-
Nothing in the government is my own choosing. I have no control over who was elected in the past and I have more control over the flow of the Mississippi river then I do over who gets elected to congress. Nobody alive had any choice over the type of government we had. They had no voice, yet they are inflicted with the full burden of paying for it and are required to obey all laws.
Democracy is used as a veneer to create the illusion of legitimacy. They system is rigged and it is getting more and more rigged with every passing month. True democracy means that the individual has the right to choose their government… nobody in this country has that right. Not for over 200 years.
If you want to argue that the state is necessary then by all means do so. There is valid arguments to be made, but stop regurgitating the propaganda the system has force-fed you your entire life. It’s not healthy.
September 28, 2011 at 1:09 pm-
@ nate-m September 28, 2011 at 11:42 am
Yes, I’m familiar with this view. You are saying you are a victim without any recourse. Fortunately this is seldom the actual fact, and certainly not the facts here.
Even the flow of the mighty Mississippi can be altered, given sufficient cooperation.
What you are really saying here is that although everything COULD be changed, it just isn’t fair that they don’t change the way YOU think they should, just because YOU say so, and you really, really mean it.
You don’t get things you really, really want, especially when they are complicated and hard to achieve, unless you really, really work at it.
I don’t have to disagree with you that the system is getting more and more “rigged” every month to disagree with your diagnosis of the problem, and your prescribed remedy. And I don’t have to be a victim of brain-washing to hold this view.
I do argue that a state, in some form, is necessary and inevitable. Therefore it matters quite a bit to distinguish between one form and another.
Finally, if you are opposed to propaganda, check out your own. Notice the use of words of absolute certainty and finality. You seem very confident of your wisdom to know precisely the difference between right and wrong in all things.
September 28, 2011 at 1:35 pm
September 28, 2011 at 5:03 pm-
Taxation is theft regardless of who imposes it.
“But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: ‘Your money, or your life.’ And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat. The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful. The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a ‘protector,’ and that he takes men’s money against their will, merely to enable him to ‘protect’ those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful ‘sovereign,’ on account of the ‘protection’ he affords you. He does not keep ‘protecting’ you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villanies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.”
– Lysander Spooner
September 28, 2011 at 5:46 pm-
Yes, an interesting opinion from someone who wrote in wrote in the mid 1800′s, an anarchist, and whose post-office was put out of busines by the USPS monopoly.
I hope you don’t mind that I migh take some minor issue to his thesis? For example, I would not palce the highway robber above a legitimate governement, but that’s just me.
September 28, 2011 at 6:06 pm-
Ahhh, but the government is not “legitimate”. Did you sign the Constitution? Did you agree to its terms? Did you send someone to represent you?
A one-sided, open ended contract is not a valid contract. It takes at least two, mutually agreeing parties.
I do not agree to the terms and conditions of the US Constitution. How can you justify imposing it on me?
October 1, 2011 at 6:33 pm-
“Did you sign the Constitution? Did you agree to its terms? Did you send someone to represent you? ”
I’m curious – what system exactly do you propose, one to which new born babies are able to sign up? Or when “should” children sign up and why?
If your point is that there should be nothing at all to actually sign up to, it would seem that only systems which follow logically from some assumptions can be “imposed” on new borns – there must be some argument that babies later in life once they learn to speak couldn’t possibly disagree with.
Do you agree? WOuld you care to point out what these assumptions/arguments are?
October 1, 2011 at 7:01 pm-
I’m curious – what system exactly do you propose, one to which new born babies are able to sign up? Or when “should” children sign up and why?
I decided on my terms when I started working, and bought a car, and rented a house. Actually I have a pretty significant number of social contracts and obligations that I must adhere to that I agreed to.
Didn’t need a state government for any of it.So one way they would be An-Cap style government.
Then the answer to ‘when should children sign up’ would be when are emancipated from their parents and decide to join the adult world. They then can choose to take on responsibility and adjust to society or they can deny it all together and go off and live in exile in the wilderness or whatever. (of which there is plenty of room for people that want to be hermits)
A less perfect, but probably more practical, approach would be to try to get to as close to ‘pure democracy’ as humanly possible. Which means to restrict government to the size of city-states were people have a wide variety of ‘official’ governments to choose from based on geographical location. In the case of the USA this would mean to relocate the bulk of State (as in like Nevada) and Federal power down to the county level through constitutional amendments.
The only reason the Federal government can be as terrible as it is is because it’s very difficult to escape it’s grasp. If we reduce the size of Washington DC’s influence to just Washington DC then that would solve a huge number of problems for a huge number of people.
October 2, 2011 at 11:20 am-
“Then the answer to ‘when should children sign up’ would be when are emancipated from their parents and decide to join the adult world. ”
So you agree then that parents are free to initiate at least some force against their children, without worry of any punishment, until such time as the child reaches some age (an age on which we would all no doubt disagree but lets leave that for now). Whether I agree or disagree with this is irrelevant – the question is, how does what you say follow from the NAP? Can you explain this to me please?
October 2, 2011 at 12:11 pm
October 3, 2011 at 12:05 pm-
“since they are consented to by the child (by his parental agent-guardian)”
Well that makes no sense at all. What other scenarios are there where a “guardian” can make decisions about whether you “consent” or not for you and how does this follow from the NAP? I think you’ll find that it doesn’t.
October 1, 2011 at 6:48 pm-
“wrote in wrote in the mid 1800′s”
Oh, yeah.. forgot all those people who wrote in the past should be shrugged off..“an anarchist”
Which no one chooses based on any merit in your opinion.“put out of busines by the USPS monopoly.”
This is at best incomplete, if not downright inaccurate.Congress intervened so that the USPS could compete..
http://books.google.com/books?id=wPmIGtrxXb0C&pg=PA27&dq=%22lysander+spooner%22+%22post+office%22+monopoly&hl=en&ei=fw9QTaryCcbngQfFqPnmDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22lysander%20spooner%22%20%22post%20office%22%20monopoly&f=false“above a legitimate government”
He made the argument shortly after a civil war, a war that should fairly clearly have settled the issue of whether the government really rested on consent of the governed. Clearly for a very large part of the country, it did not.
October 1, 2011 at 7:57 pm-
@Matthew Swaringen October 1, 2011 at 6:48 pm
Your points have some merit, but you assume too much about what I’m saying. I agree one could find the inferences you draw if you wanted to.
If you are asking…
No, we should not shrug off historical writers, but it can be helpful to keep in mind the historical context from which they are speaking.
I am sure anarchists see merit in their position, and reasonable people can disagree. But I think you can also agree that it is difficult sometimes to separate the ideology from one’s analysis, and that foregone conclusions have a tendency to smuggle in their favored assumptions. I think that is probably the case here.
The story about the USPS is admittedly incomplete. Thank you for the links. I was only pointing out that he was personally harmed by the system he criticizes, not that his criticisms are solely the result of his experience as a victim of state action in his business, but the again perhaps they are. There have been a number of milestones in the history of the USPS, and apparently it is not over, as they find today it is difficult to compete with private firms. I don’t claim to know the merits of the case here.
And yes, the motives for the Civil War were complex and there is much to criticize about the heavy-handed and in my view unfair actions of the north relative to trade tariffs imposed on the southern cotton exporters to the benefit of northern textile manufacturers. Not every historical event can be viewed as fair or legitimate with the benefit of hindsight. As to whether the outcome would have been for the better or worse had the south successfully seceded, we will never now. But it came with a terrible price, as all war does. Perhaps the rights of states to secede will be tested again soon. That seems like a remote possibility, but more likely today than 100 years ago.
Nonetheless, you seem to have gotten distracted by all of this, and missed my essential point, which is that anarchists have a tendency to equivocate the actions of a highway robber and governments in a very general way, and the views expressed here illustrate that observation, in my opinion.
I take your point regarding the North’s aggression on the South, but even that cannot be generalized to every single action that government has ever taken before or since.
That is too broad a brush, and reduces a complex subject to sloganeering. It is an effective metaphor, I agree, to prefer the highway robber to the conduct of government, but I object on the basis that the existence of the highway robber is one justification for the existence of the government you oppose.
It is not necessary for me to choose sides between the two. Robbery is a crime, no matter who perpetrates it. We apparently differ on whether the concept of crime applies to government in all cases and circumstances, but probably agree that it always applies to the highwayman. So I can be sure to consistently oppose the highwayman, but can oppose government only on a case by case basis. You and other anarchists seem to consider them equivalent, I do not. But that’s just me.
October 2, 2011 at 3:15 pm-
@Stephan Kinsella October 2, 2011 at 12:11 pm
No. The parent is just an agent for the child. He makes decisions for the child until the child is compos mentis.
If what Rothbard says is true, that all rights are negative rights, then how does a parent attain this right to act as the child’s agent? The theory of agency means that the agent acts with authority only within the scope of the principal’s consent to act. If the child is the principal, why would the child consent to acts of aggression in enforcing decisions contrary to the wishes of the child?
If you claim that the child is incapable of consent due to infancy, the how does the child consent to agency? If the child does not consent, what is the justification for aggression by the parent to enforce obedience?
In other words, by what principle does the child consent to parental agency, and then consent to forego the right to withdraw that consent? How does that wash with NAP?
Also, I also have to wonder how this washes with your criticism of the State for “inflicting violence on the innocent”? It is OK for “libertarians” to inflict violence in this case?
He is presumed to be the one to speak for the child, unless duties of parenthood are breached
By whom is he “presumed” to speak for the child? Who imposes the “duties of parenthood”?
If the parent uses force against the child to coerce obedience to the will of the parent, is that a breach of parental duties or is the parent’s failure to do so a breach? How do you distinguish between one kind of obedience and others? Can the parent require the child to play on the freeway?
So the parent can consent on the child’s behalf to certain manipulations and bodily touchings, so that they are not aggression, since they are consented to by the child (by his parental agent-guardian).
If a parent beats the child, then it is presumed by your rule that the child consents to this beating?
If the parent kills the child, and neither the parent or child has any living relatives, who enforces the rights of the child to his own life, or is that something he only obtains upon majority? Wouldn’t your theory ultimately imply that the child consented to his own murder?
Apparently Rothbard says that this period of agency last until the time that the child makes the voluntary choice to leave home and become independent. If a child remains in the house until 30 years old, does the parent have the right to murder the “child” with his consent? What if he is mentally disabled?
Are you saying that the parental right of agency, once established at birth, is unlimited until the child leaves home?
October 2, 2011 at 5:38 pm
October 2, 2011 at 7:20 pm-
@Stephan Kinsella October 2, 2011 at 5:38 pm
In any case, he “attains” it because when in society you have rights-bearing agents who are temporarily incapacitated, or due to their nature as developing children, people will want to know what is consented to by the child, or on the child’s behalf. So the institution of guardianship (agency) will naturally arise, and people will ask: who is this kid’s guardian?
Naturally I already understand the elementary points you are making. The question is whether positive rights exist on planet Kinsella.
Such a theory of assumed agency by right of parenthood implies that parents have the positive right to impose discipline on a child, and the child has no negative rights against aggression by parents. That is the normative rule of which you speak, correct?
Of course, the default assumption will be the parents, do to their natural connection to the child. THis is really not hard.
Nothing is hard if you assume enough. We may agree to assume that the natural candidate for guardian of an infant is the parent, and further simplify by assuming there is only one, or the two agree perfectly on everything. What I’m asking you not to assume but to state explicitly is how this guardian fulfills their role without violating NAP?
And no, Wildberry, before you take your next leap: this kind of reasoning does not justify the state or social contract theory.
This question has nothing to do, or at least I am not asserting it does have anything to do with either.
Same reason I as a husband, if I have an epileptic seizure, might be deemed to have consented to my wife’s authorizing medical personnel to secure me physically until my seizure has passed.
Yes, I agree that under these facts we may assume that if you were not incapacitated by your seizure, you would reasonably consent to restraint.
But what if a parent decides it is not in the best interest of the child to learn to read or to take medicine? Is that still OK and squares with NAP?
But unless you want to argue this [infanticide] , the infant has rights, but it obviously unable to fully exercise them, so his guardian does in his stead.
You are assuming that everyone in the “community” agrees that what the parent decides is in the “best interest” of the child. That does not present much difficulty in a discussion of the relationship of rights between the parent and child, and the operation of NAP. I am asking you to assume a negative case, where there is disagreement about what “best interest” means, and tell me how the application of NAP sorts that out. As Van Dun points out, it is a strict liability rule. If it is really not hard, walk me though it.
Really. Wildberry, this is not very difficult. And no, it does not justify the mass violent aggression of your cherished state.
meh
The state may not aggress against innocent victims, no offense you. The parent may decide for the child for things in his interest. There is no conflict.
This seems like a good rule. I am wondering how it works in this case, where we assume there IS a conflict. That is what illuminates how the NAP is applied consistently.
By those in the community.
Well, that is a rather large leap, isn’t it? In this community, I presume there is uniform adherence to NAP. I am assuming there is some conflict between what some see as being in the interests of the child, and therefore within the scope of this agency concept, and what others see as being against the child’s interests. How does NAP apply such that strict liability can be assigned to the correct party?
Are you saying that the agency powers are unlimited, or they are limited only by the most obvious standards, like murder? I am asking who seeks justice for the child who has no advocates, since obviously the child cannot hire a PDA.
Does the “community” assume the enforcement responsibilities for anyone that lives within a territory? Does the parent decide which community, and therefore what rules the child lives under based on what decisions the parent makes under its agency authority?
If the child is beaten the day before he wanted to leave home, because the parent believed it was in the best interest of the child to stay home, is that OK and within the limitations of NAP?
The parent does by becoming a parent.
OK, let’s agree; the parent assumes the duty of guardian/agent by the act of becoming impregnated and delivering a child. Let’s assume that child turns out to be mentally deficient, and will never reach an age of competence. The parent decides that it is in the best interest of the child to stay locked up in the basement. Can the “community” trespass on the land of the parent and take the child against the will of the parent? Whose rights prevail, the agency rights of the parent, or the individual rights of the child?
Whatever agency would defend the rights of unrepresented people.
OK, what agency in the Ancap world protects the rights of underrepresented people? I have given an example; a murdered child who has no relatives other than the murdering parent. Who protects that “underrepresented person”? I think Kathleen Touchstone has argued pretty persuasively that under Ancap, there is no such agency.
But perhaps she is wrong? You have an explanation? If you have an answer, I would be interested in the reason such an agency would endeavor to seek justice for a victim who cannot pay, and how the expense of such an agency is funded through market forces.
Of course there could be other penalties imposed on the parents here–ostracism etc.
Of course, but I am not raising the question of methods or effectiveness of various forms of coercion.
BUt in most cases there are other people standing in line to take the child from the abusive parent: uncles and aunts, grandparents, older siblings, cousins, even close family freinds, or rescue charities.
Again, yes we can assume that, but it is not the case I am presenting. I’m asking what happens with the child who has no advocates that depend on these types of motivations. It is reasonable to assume that relatives or even childless couples would seek to intervene on the child’s behalf. That is the easy case. I am asking you for some explanation of the more difficult case, where the child has no relative save the wrongdoer. Does the child have a right and a cause of action only if some advocate steps forward? What is the strict liability case, where wrongdoing as defined by the legal rule holds the actor strictly liable for their acts.
If the parent is the agent of the child, and the child cannot consent, and the parent exercises her right to act is a way that raises the question of prevailing rights between the parent and child, how does NAP work to provide for justice under a strict liability rule?
To put it another way, if positive rights do not exist, the parent has a free hand? Or can the rights of the child can be expressed in terms that result in retribution even if there is no advocate to pay for it, and even if the victim cannot be compensated for their loss.
If positive rights do exist, then a violation of those rights is aggression and violates NAP. But Rothbard says there are only negative rights; i.e. freedom from aggression. How are the marginal cases of parental discretion interpreted such that I can understand how to apply the strict liability rule?
It should be easy to demonstrate to a neutral forum that the child would not consent any more to guardianship by the abusive parents, and would consent to the next one in line instead. Again: this is not difficult;
Yes, I agree that a neutral forum (how does the child with no relatives or assets pay for that, especially if dead or disabled?) would find it easy to recognize murder and similar cases of abuse. But what about the marginal case that I’ve raised, like the right to read, or to take drugs, or the rights of someone mentally incompetent? I’m not saying there is not an answer; I’m just asking what it is?
and, again: no, Wildberry, none of this justifies the state.
I agree, but that is not my question. In fact if I can understand how the NAP works in this case, I think it is a strong argument that the state, at least in this instance, is not necessary to the administration of justice.
No. The parent’s guardian authority is limited by the duty to care for the child.
OK, so the parent has a duty to satisfy the positive rights of the child to receive “proper care”? That conflicts with Rothbard, I think. Also, any need to define “proper” so that strict liability applies? If not, then how do you deal with the ambiguities of facts in the application of NAP?
If I loan you my car does this mean I consent to you running me over with it? No, of course not. He authority is circumscribed by purpose and context–again, no offense, you.
Yes I agree. You are an adult and competent (for the sake of argument) and if you survived, you would be able to argue that your consent for me to use your car did not include consent to run you down with it. If you didn’t survive, are you assuming that one of your relatives or friends would put up the cash to come after me with a PDA?
It is exactly the “purpose and context” that I’m asking about. It is trivial to understand this when the facts present an obvious case. If we assume vehicular manslaughter, it is not difficult to apply strict liability. If however we assume some marginal case, where the distinction between aggression and non-aggression is beyond the third-grade level, like say a parent’s use of corporal punishment for a child’s choice of clothes, reading material, or music, then it becomes a little harder to say what is aggression and what is not. I’m asking you to help me see the light.
No worries, I am well conditioned to not be offended by you.
October 2, 2011 at 8:43 pm-
And what happens when the child initiates violence? I know it is very very rare but it might happen.
Wildberry, there is a wonderful interview with Tibor Machan here:
http://www.thedailybell.com/3020/Anthony-Wile-Tibor-Machan-on-Private-Morality-Versus-Government-Perfectionism-and-Who-Wins-
September 28, 2011 at 11:21 am-
The problem is that the state does not just ‘offer’ services. Some services are ‘offers’ others are completely involuntary. And what is more the payment for these services are completely involuntary… you are forced to pay for the services whether you use them or not. That’s the fundamental problem with Warren’s logic here. The government does not ‘own’ services it ‘offers’… It uses violence to get what it wants. It’s not a voluntary exchange. There is no market going on here and the rules of peers in a society do not apply because of the use of violence.
The relationship that the government has with society is much more akin to mafia extorting shop owners then a business or individual offering garbage collection or lawn care.
If you do not pay the state for their ‘protection’ and their ‘services’ they ‘offer’ they will send gangs of armed men to your house to seize your property. They will ruin your livelihood, destroy all your relationships, and if you resist they will throw you in a cage like a animal. If you resist strongly enough they will simply gun you down in the street.
Having the desire and ability to use violence to get what you want is fundamentally corrupting. It doesn’t really matter who is in government, or what a piece of paper from 200 years ago says, or if it’s a democracy or not… the state is going to do evil things because it’s made up of enough selfish people who sole purpose in life is to attempt to gain much with little work. They use violence because they can and because it’s profitable. It’s fundamentally corrupt. Not just corrupting… the corruption is necessary for it to even exist.
Maybe it’s true we need to use evil to counteract evil. But lets never pretend that the state is our friend or that it chooses to exists for our benefit. It’s a rabid dog on a lose leash at the best of times.
September 28, 2011 at 11:38 am-
@nate-m September 28, 2011 at 11:21 am
Which “offers are “completely involuntary”? Is the standard you use that say, if you don’t use a road, you should be excused from the tax bill to the extent that taxes are used for roads?
Also, what is it that the “government wants” and is willing to use violence to get it?
Also, your analogy to the Mafia is also misplaced. One distinction between the Mafia and government (at leas a democratic form) is that the only way to get rid of the Mafia is by superior force. To the extent that is also true for the form of government you oppose, I might agree. This is the problem being faced by those participaing in the Arabian Spring.
But how does your view change if you distinguish a form of government subject to fair elections? Any difference?
September 28, 2011 at 1:41 pm
September 28, 2011 at 1:55 pm-
I’m curious to know about a form of government subject to “fair” elections. Every state in the U.S. has restrictions on independent and third party candidates, some more restrictive than others. Is this fair? And even if it is, is it fair that a majority of voters get to force their will upon the minority?
Exactly how are “fair” elections supposed to protect freedom, and not just the will of the majority or a powerful minority?And if you want to actually vote on an issue, and not just on a candidate, ballot initiative petitions are as difficult to put up as third parties, or worse. What does it matter if you can vote if someone else controls who or what you are voting on?
September 28, 2011 at 4:41 pm-
@ Michael A. Clem September 28, 2011 at 1:55 pm
First, you are holding up a system that is twisted and contorted and corrupted beyond recognition of the fundamental principles I reference, and then challenge me to defend it. That is not what I’m about. What we have sucks, despite all the whining Kensella does about me being a “tool”.
I can agree with you about all of these things you say, and still not hold that the US design for government is equivalent to the mafia or Libya.
Exactly how are “fair” elections supposed to protect freedom, and not just the will of the majority or a powerful minority?
In theory or in practice? Even with a flawless theory, determined special interests can hijack the means for their own selfish ends. That is the basis for mercantilism, etc.
As to the will of the majority, do you acknowledge that we have limits of individual liberty that cannot be infringed by a majority? If so, then you have to temper your rhetoric to accommodate to that fact. This is the classic “tyranny of the majority” problem that Kinsella thinks is the concept of a “howdy doody civics class stooge”. I happen to disagree.
And if you want to actually vote on an issue, and not just on a candidate, ballot initiative petitions are as difficult to put up as third parties, or worse. What does it matter if you can vote if someone else controls who or what you are voting on?
I agree with you. The question I am asking about is not whether you support everything you see around us, I am asking about the ideal, and the principles of that ideal. I do not think we need a blank piece of paper to fix things, to evolve beyond the mess we find ourselves in. Thank God for that!
I do think we need to be clear about what our ideals are and why we hold them. I have ideals concerning the concepts of self-government. My ideals are not tied to an unshakable commitment to “hate the state”, especially when, at least among the small population that occasions Mises.org, there is such diversity of meanings applied to the word “state”.
September 28, 2011 at 4:56 pm-
The “ideal” of democracy is majority rule–simple as that. To provide protections for the minority means to diminish or dilute democratic ideals. Admittedly, the U.S. was not strictly intended to be a democracy, but a constitutional republic. But alas, the ideals of a constitutional republic are a bit more hazy, as there seems to be no particular principle that it adheres to.
September 28, 2011 at 5:04 pm
October 1, 2011 at 8:16 pm-
Michael and Stephan,
I think you illustrate perfectly my point to Matthew.
Certainly, the ideal of self-government based on principles of equal representation does not rest on the purpose of “initiating violence against innocents”.
Likewise the ideals of a constitutional republic do not exist as means to that end.
A constitutional republic rests on the ideal “of the people, by the people, for the people” which in a very general sense, is a fully a libertarian ideal. You are simply objecting on the basis that it fails to achieve that end. I say that to the extent it serves that purpose, to empower the governed to govern themselves, it is legitimate means to a legitimate end. To the extent is does not, it should be opposed.
One way to view wisdom is the ability to distinguish one thing from another. Wisdom is much harder to attain and act upon than mere sloganeering.
The blanket statement that “government initiates violence against innocents” is better suited to a bumper sticker than anything else.
September 28, 2011 at 1:26 pm
September 28, 2011 at 11:36 am-
Yup, it is an all-too-common argument to morally justify taxation is that public services (schools, roads, libraries, etc.) enable people to make a living. For instance, Bill Gates benefited from many of those government services.
The problem with this argument is that it has no logical limit, it proves too much. It would justify that government owns all your labor and even your life.
Fundamentally, because those tax-funded services are “free” (no price tag), it is impossible to determine what you owe, therefore you can never be done and clear.
Instead you have a “pact with the devil”, for which you cannot opt-out.
September 28, 2011 at 2:58 pm-
You, Stephan Kinsella private citizen, do not have the right to unilaterally refuse to pay a tax that has been legally imposed. You Stephan Kinsella citizen/activist, DO have a right to organize your supporters and repeal that same tax, if you can.
Seriously? It’s morally okay as long as it’s legal? That’s your argument?
September 28, 2011 at 3:27 pm
September 28, 2011 at 4:50 pm-
@Michael A. Clem September 28, 2011 at 2:58 pm
Seriously? It’s morally okay as long as it’s legal? That’s your argument?
No. That is not my argument. Morality is matter of opinion. A law may both be legal and immoral.
In my opinion, in the face of an immoral law, like slavery, the citizenry is morally bound to abolish it. If there are legal means for doing so, bloodshed may be avoided or at least minimized. If there is no legal means, the only way to change is through violence.
Therefore, a system of government which provides for legal means to change its own laws is more consistent with principles of peace and liberty than one that does not.
If you live in such a government system, and to not avail yourself of the legal means to achieve your objectives, based on your personal moral convictions, you have no one to blame but yourself.
That is my argument.
September 28, 2011 at 5:05 pm
September 28, 2011 at 5:12 pm-
It is too late to work within the system, and too soon to shoot the bastards
– Claire Wolfe, 101 Things to do Until the Revolution
September 28, 2011 at 5:22 pm-
So if a law is legal and immoral, why do you consider it wrong to disobey it? Can’t disobedience be a part of the process of abolishing it? And if not, how many people must suffer the injustice of obeying an immoral law or be prosecuted for disobeying it while one goes through the tedious and expensive process of abolishing it (worse if the special interests who had it created are more powerful than those who wish to abolish it)?
September 28, 2011 at 6:56 pm-
@Michael A. Clem September 28, 2011 at 5:22 pm
Sure, why not? Civil disobedience is a long and honorable tradition.
If those with a moral conviction find that they face more powerful forces, they have to figure out a way to prevail. That is the history of liberty.
Doing that while holding to higher principles, like non-violence, (unlike the quote here offered by Mr. Whipple), makes it a tricky problem.
September 29, 2011 at 1:03 am-
Are you going to complain when you get caught or are you going to take it on the chin?
September 29, 2011 at 3:24 pm-
If one were to get caught disobeying an immoral law, I would think that that would be an excellent time to take advantage of the media attention to make one’s case against the law. That is, IF one is disobeying as part of a strategy to abolish the law, and one is not complaining merely because they didn’t get away with it.
September 28, 2011 at 6:48 pm-
I’m surprised it has not been stated here yet. The obvious and most ridiculous error made by Warren is that she has the proverbial cart before the horse. She argues that private individuals and businesses generated their wealth because of the facilities and contrivances “provided” by the government. It is precisely the opposite. It was the wealth generated by private individuals and businesses which enabled the government(through taxation[read: theft]) to “develop” those “public services” that she lauds.
(I must tip my hat to Peter Schiff as he is the one I first heard make this point on his radio show last week.)
September 28, 2011 at 9:11 pm-
Wildberry: “In my opinion, in the face of an immoral law, like slavery, the citizenry is morally bound to abolish it. If there are legal means for doing so, bloodshed may be avoided or at least minimized. If there is no legal means, the only way to change is through violence.”
Wild, IMHO, you are wrong in your assumption that the alternatives are legal means or violence and bloodshed. Unquestionably the most effective tool against the repressive State–all States are repressive–is nonviolent, adamant resistance (peaceful persistent lawbreaking), such as was advocated and successfully practiced by MLK, Gandhi, Welesa, Mandela, those resisting E. Germans and resisting Russians, to name only a few. As you say, people are morally bound to abolish immoral laws like slavery and taxation, and with the abolition of forcible taxation the State, as we know it. is doomed. Of course, as we witnessed during the “Arab spring,” civil disobedience can and often does result in violent repression by the State, which is to be expected from such an evil institution, but if those resisting remain peaceful their prospects of success are greatly enhanced.
BTW, what difference do you see between State-sanctioned slavery and State-sanctioned taxation?
The State itself is an immoral (viz., evil) construct because its immunizes its agents from the just consequence of their actions, which, in many instances, are blatantly criminal, including such heinous crimes as murder and extortion. Without their State-granted immunity, every IRS agent would be doing time, and the congresscreeps, bureaucritters, presidents, and judges who conspire in the illicit act would be convicted as accessories before the act, and citizens who shared in the loot would be found guilty as accessories after.
September 29, 2011 at 11:11 am-
@Ned Netterville September 28, 2011 at 9:11 pm
Wild, IMHO, you are wrong in your assumption that the alternatives are legal means or violence and bloodshed.
Yes, you are right. I meant to convey that in my earlier comment regarding civil disobedience. True, those are not “legal means” in all cases, but such non-violent protest is a legitimate means, and often within legal bounds.
However, I want to remind you that in the cases you cite there were not state-established and sanctioned means to bring about peaceful revolution, including the abolishment of immoral or even unpopular laws, or to replace even the system of governance. That is an important distinction, don’t you think?
As you say, people are morally bound to abolish immoral laws like slavery and taxation, and with the abolition of forcible taxation the State, as we know it. is doomed. Of course, as we witnessed during the “Arab spring,” civil disobedience can and often does result in violent repression by the State, which is to be expected from such an evil institution, but if those resisting remain peaceful their prospects of success are greatly enhanced.
Of course, but how does your argument accommodate a state that provides for a peaceful means for its own demise?
BTW, what difference do you see between State-sanctioned slavery and State-sanctioned taxation?
Slaves do not have the means, at least legal means, to vote for their own freedom. That is a crucial distinction.
The State itself is an immoral (viz., evil) construct because its immunizes its agents from the just consequence of their actions, which, in many instances, are blatantly criminal, including such heinous crimes as murder and extortion. Without their State-granted immunity, every IRS agent would be doing time, and the congresscreeps, bureaucritters, presidents, and judges who conspire in the illicit act would be convicted as accessories before the act, and citizens who shared in the loot would be found guilty as accessories after.
You seem to be lumping all states in a big pile, and make no distinction between Stalin and FDR. Look, you did not personally vote for speed limits, right? Are you saying that anyone who drives should be immune from them unless they personally vote to support them? At some point that position becomes ridiculous.
I understand you think all forms of government are just well organized conspiracies to oppress the citizens. But I don’t think you are stupid or dishonest because you hold this view. I think you are wrong, but reasonable people can disagree.
It seems to me that a government based on a principle that reasonable people who have disagreements can peacefully coexist is not all bad, in every circumstance, absolutely.
September 29, 2011 at 2:59 pm-
Don Boudreaux also picks apart Warren’s broken logic: http://cafehayek.com/2011/09/still-unwarrented.html
As most of my libertarian friends and readers know, I’ve published for a number of years books and articles in the area of political and legal theory. I’ve also engaged over the years in more practical legal writing, from law review articles to authored and edited books (I maintain a separate website, KinsellaLaw.com, for my legal practice). My legal writing has primarily covered intellectual property and patent law, and international law topics. I started writing in both areas–libertarianism and law–at the beginning of my legal career, in the early 1990s.
The way I got into legal publishing may be of some interest to aspiring legal scholars and law students. Some of my early legal writing was based in part on some of the international business law I learned during my LL.M. at University of London–many of these were published in the Russian Oil & Gas Guide and other fora, while I was an associate practicing oil & gas law at Jackson Walker in Houston, at the encouragement of my boss and mentor, Lanier Yeates.
These were all co-authored with my friend and colleague Paul E. Comeaux. We put a lot of this together into a more comprehensive law review article, “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance (original version), 15 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (1994). This piece was scholarly yet practical. Shortly after the piece came out, we were approached by Susan DeMaio, a project editor at Oceana Publications, an international law publisher. Susan suggested we turn the article into a book. Paul and I did this, resulting in Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Oceana Publications, 1997). Years later, I co-authored International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford University Press, 2005), a successor volume to the 1997 book. This was published with Oxford which had by then acquired Oceana; my co-author was Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris.
Shortly after the 1997 book, Paul and I were approached by Oceana to see if we wanted to take over the editorship of one of their multi-volume treatises, Digest of Commercial Laws of the World. Unlike a lot of professors and academics that legal publishers work with, who are often late, we had turned in the manuscript for the 1997 book on time, and were young and had lots of energy and ambition. This led to my co-editorship of other Oceana (later Oxford) treatises, namely World Online Business Law, Online Contract Formation, and Trademark Practice and Forms.
I co-edited the Digest for a number of years with Paul, then later by myself.
This year West/Thomson Reuters purchased these three treatises treatise from Oxford. So now I’ll have yet another publisher. I decided to bow out of World Online Business Law, and to team up with my friend and fellow Austro-libertarian legal scholar Patrick Tinsley, to co-edit Digest. Pat, a lawyer with Avery, Dooley, Post & Avery in Belmont, Massachusetts, and I had co-authored a few law review and other articles previously. I had already gotten a trademark lawyer I know, Terry Tucker, to co-edit the Trademark treatise with me a couple years ago. I was just too busy with other pursuits to be a solo editor any more.
Another recent book also resulted from early legal writing. In 1994 I published the article “A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary” in the Louisiana Law Review. A couple years ago another Austro-libertarian legal scholar friend of mine, the young lawyer Gregory Rome, now of Williams and Rome, and I teamed up to expand that article. This resulted in the recently published book Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary (Quid Pro Books, 2011).
Nowadays, of course, legal blogging is a widespread phenomenon, so this is another possible outlet for lawyers who want to write. I did start one of the earlier law blogs (see KinsellaLaw re-launches…), but now tend to blog more on libertarian topics, and publish more conventional articles and books for legal topics.
I’ve enjoyed the money, experience, and contacts I’ve gained from all this. It can also help with client development, and with making yourself stand out at a law firm–the partners know your name if you are a prolific and respected scholar. For law students and young lawyers with an interest in scholarship or publishing, or even teaching, take advantage of publishing opportunities when you can, even–especially–early in your career.
Update: I found some old pix from 1997 of me with my first and then-recently published book, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk, see below:
I’ll be appearing tomorrow on Agora I/O? The Liberty Unconference, at 2pm EDT, at the channel “Open Source Agorism: Prosper Without Patents or Copyrights.” Tune in!
Update: Just finished. The video(s) are below. Here is what is amazing. I was set to do the show, using Justin.tv, but for some reason neither of my MacBooks would work with the Justin.tv interface. I saw an option for “mobile device.” It was 5 minutes to showtime. I quickly downloaded Justin.tv app on my iphone, got out a little iPod tripod I had never used, signed in, hit the record button, and walla–I was on Justin.tv streaming live, using my iphone. I was using my MacBook to watch it live, and to monitor questions typed on a facebook stream by the 45 or so participants. Quite amazing. (There are three videos b/c I had a couple of glitches/crashes and had to re-start my iPhone stream twice.)
Watch live video from Agora I/O: Peaceful Evolution on Justin.tv
Watch live video from Agora I/O: Peaceful Evolution on Justin.tv
Watch live video from Agora I/O: Peaceful Evolution on Justin.tv
This Friday, Sept. 23, at 6pm Easter time, I’ll be teaching a Mises Academy Webinar discussing the America Invents Act, signed into law last Friday by President Obama. I discuss this webinar in a Mises Daily article today: Obama’s Patent Reform: Improvement or Continuing Calamity?.
In the webinar, I will:
- summarize the basic problem with patent law from a free-market perspective;
- present a series of real patent reforms that could make significant improvement in patent law (short of abolition);
- explain and critique the relevant changes made by the America Invents Act;
- briefly summarize other imminent IP legislation and treaties on the horizon; and
- respond to questions from attendees.
As both proponents and opponents of patent law recognize, these issues are of crucial importance for innovation and our economy. If you are interested in learning about the current direction of patent policy, you may find this class of interest.
P.s.: If you are interested in taking this course but cannot afford it, please email me at [email protected].
This weekend I came across an old journal I kept as a boy, when I was 8 to 10 years old, and was reading its goofy entries to my own 8 year old, to his delight. I came across an entry from November, 1975, when I was 10, and it strikes me now that it has elements of my later libertarian views on the non-aggression principle and how aggression is simply not argumentatively justifiable:
I made up a little poem today. Would you like to hear it? I thought so, here goes:
If a person kills another person for no reason, no matter how much land he has, it’s not enough to stand on.
Well, it’s not a poem, but anyway. Since Hoppe was at this point still a lefty (if memory serves), I think I kinda beat him to Hoppeanism! (For more on my libertarian origins, see How I Became A Libertarian, December 18, 2002, LewRockwell.com, published as “Being a Libertarian” in I Chose Liberty: Autobiographies of Contemporary Libertarians.)












{ 56 comments }