Thoughts on: Reformed Libertarians Podcast Ep. 24: Why Non-Christian Libertarians Should (And How They Can) Become Christians

I was tagged in a recent Facebook Post by Reformed Christian and Libertarian Gregory Baus about his recent video arguing that non-Christian libertarians should become Christians (and in a sense, already are “religious”). His site contains various libertarian resources. ¹

His post:

There are a number of Non-Christian fellow libertarians I’ll try tagging in comments, along with some Christian libertarians. Among the Non-Christians, I suspect some of them are more hostile or indifferent to Christianity (or their impression of it) than others.
But here’s how what we say is perhaps unlike what you may have heard before:
We explain that Non-Christian libertarians:
1. are already religious
2. base their libertarianism on religious belief
3. base their religious belief on self-evident experience of something as self-existent
4. can do several things to facilitate discovering Christianity is true.

Below is an edited set of comments I sent him, lightly edited and with some minimal quoting of him:

Instead of saying I’m already religious, why not just simplify and say I’m already Christian? I mean if you are claiming non-christian libertarians are really “already religious” without knowing it, why not just make the bolder claim that we are already Christians without knowing it?

Anyway before listening, I’m guessing at your argument—I bet it’s either (a) we have faith in libertarian principles, so… we are not against “faith” as a source of knowledge; or (b) when we criticize something as wrong or evil, we are presupposing an objective standard of good and evil, something like that. Which of courre I’ve alreayd heard many times before.

Greg’s reply:

Not exactly. It’s an argument based on what is necessarily presupposed by concepts. But you might find it similarly unpersuasive. We cover it more in depth in yet another episode. [episode 19]

Didn’t I imply that–i.e., this idea of necessary presuppositions?

I have a friend who is a hardcore Hoppean who accepts argumentation ethics but thinks similar reasoning can be used to prove there is a God because we cannot deny we know there are absolutely Evil acts (e.g. aggression, child murder) and this implies or presupposes there is a God, and so on. I am familiar with these arguments.

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FYI, I’m about halfway through that episode. It is very methodical and your definition of libertarian principles is really good. You actually get to the core thing of the four principles I point out which is self ownership (presumptive only), and then original appropriation and contract and rectification. ² You actually get this, something almost no one gets quite right.

My only problem so far is—I figured you were gonna go there—it’s basically a variant of the Thomistic argument, ³ the ontological arguments for God and this idea of necessary existence or self-existence or something like that, which is what I don’t agree with. And also you not having defined what “religious”, or implicitly defining it as believing in self-existence… and the very coherence of this concept of “self-existence”—so that’s my problem with it so far.

… Listening more: Yeah, so you define religious as belief in something that is self-existent… I don’t know why that’s the right definition for religion. I would think religion has something to do with epistemology that is a source of knowledge other than reason and evidence—in other words faith is a legitimate source of knowledge. But put that aside—my main problem is this concept of self-existence: I don’t know what it means for something to “depend” on something else. I think we know that some things exist and some scarcity exists, some material objects exist—and that’s enough political philosophy. Nobody denies this so why do I have to justify it? We don’t have to pronounce on whether they are self-existent or not since we take it for granted there are things that (for some reason; somehow) exist—in particular, scarce means of action exist, as this is implied in human action which is also a phenomenon that no one denies happens and that cannot be coherently denied in any case, as Mises would argue.

It’s the same as the Thomistic argument for ultimate cause, or similar.

His reply:

How belief in something as self-existent is religious belief, we don’t explain in that episode. But touch on more in episode 19. [See also by Roy A. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of Religious Belief in Theories]

We also distinguish our argument about self-existence from Thomistic arguments. I could elaborate.

In any case, per what it means for something to depend on something self-existent, this might be relevant: On the difference between concept and limiting idea

We don’t view faith as something apart from reason or evidence.

Well, for one thing, it seems like just an assertion. For another it seems ill defined. And for yet another it seems counterintuitive and also doesn’t explain anything. It is obvious some things “exist” but what it would mean for it to “depend” on something that is “self-existing”? This seems like pointless mumbo jumbo to me and explains nothing. It all seems to me to be part of a great tendentious argument aimed at justifying theism or worse, Christianity [worse, not in that being Christian is “worse” than being theist (though it might be), but in the sense of a stronger claim and a harder claim to support]—I’ve always felt the same about the ontological argument and related ones. It’s just a strained attempt to make your mystical/supernatural beliefs seem rational.

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Update: See their response A Reply To Kinsella’s “Thoughts On RLP Episode 24”

Facebook comments:

Taylor Drummond

Grok analysis:

Summary of Gregory Baus’s Blog Post

Gregory Baus’s blog post, titled “A reply to Kinsella’s thoughts on RLP” (Reformed Libertarian Presuppositionalism), responds to Stephan Kinsella’s critique of Christian libertarianism and presuppositional apologetics, particularly as articulated in Kinsella’s post, “Why Non-Christian Libertarians Should Be Christians.” Baus defends the Reformed Libertarian Presuppositionalist (RLP) framework, which integrates Christian theology with libertarian principles, emphasizing the necessity of God’s existence as the foundation for rationality, morality, and libertarian ethics.

Key points of Baus’s post:

• Context and Kinsella’s Critique: Baus acknowledges Kinsella’s libertarian contributions but addresses Kinsella’s skepticism about RLP, particularly his discomfort with concepts like “self-existence,” “dependence,” and “religious” as they relate to God’s necessity. Kinsella argues that non-Christian libertarians should consider Christianity for its cultural and ethical alignment with libertarianism, but he remains unconvinced by presuppositional arguments, especially those involving metaphysical claims about God’s existence.
• RLP’s Core Claim: Baus outlines RLP as rooted in the presuppositionalist view that the Christian God (specifically, the self-existent, triune God of Reformed theology) is the necessary precondition for intelligibility, rationality, and ethics. This is contrasted with secular or atheistic worldviews, which Baus claims cannot provide a coherent foundation for these.
• Response to Kinsella’s Objections:
  • Self-Existence and Dependence: Baus explains that “self-existence” (aseity) refers to God’s independent, non-contingent existence, meaning God does not rely on anything else to exist. All other entities (humans, nature, etc.) are contingent, depending on God for their existence. Baus argues this is not obscure but foundational to understanding reality.
  • Definition of “Religious”: Baus defines “religious” broadly as pertaining to ultimate commitments or presuppositions about reality, which everyone holds, whether theistic or atheistic. He suggests Kinsella’s libertarianism implicitly relies on “religious” (ultimate) assumptions, even if not explicitly Christian.
  • Necessary Existence: Baus asserts that God’s existence is necessary in the sense that without God, the preconditions for rational thought, moral norms, and libertarian principles (e.g., self-ownership) collapse into incoherence. He uses the transcendental argument, claiming that denying God’s existence undermines the very tools (logic, reason) used to deny it.
• Engagement with Kinsella’s Framework: Baus appreciates Kinsella’s praxeological approach (derived from Mises) but argues it is incomplete without a theistic foundation. He suggests that Kinsella’s commitment to causality and rationality presupposes order and intelligibility, which only the Christian God can underwrite.
• Distinction from Thomistic Arguments: Baus briefly notes that RLP’s transcendental approach differs from Thomistic ontological or cosmological arguments, which rely on empirical or causal reasoning to prove God’s existence. Instead, RLP starts with the impossibility of the contrary: no worldview except Christianity can account for rationality and ethics.
• Conclusion: Baus invites Kinsella to reconsider RLP, arguing that Christianity is not just culturally compatible with libertarianism but metaphysically necessary for its coherence. He emphasizes that this is not about blind faith but about recognizing the inescapable presuppositions underlying all reasoning.

Analysis from Stephan Kinsella’s Perspective

Kinsella’s post and his Facebook comment reveal a libertarian thinker grounded in Austrian economics, praxeology, and a skepticism of metaphysical claims lacking rigorous definitions. From his perspective, Baus’s response would likely be seen as partially engaging but ultimately unsatisfactory due to unresolved ambiguities and reliance on theological assertions. Below is an analysis of Baus’s post through Kinsella’s lens, focusing on the specific questions raised.

1. Does Baus Clearly Define “Religious” and Justify This Definition?

• Baus’s Definition: Baus defines “religious” as encompassing ultimate presuppositions about reality, suggesting that everyone, including atheists, holds such commitments. He argues that Kinsella’s libertarianism rests on implicit “religious” assumptions (e.g., the reliability of reason or moral norms), which align with Christian presuppositions.
• Kinsella’s Likely Response: Kinsella, as seen in his Facebook comment, demands “clear, rigorous explanations and definitions” for terms like “religious.” He would likely find Baus’s definition overly broad and vague, as it equates atheism or secular libertarianism with religious commitment without specifying what makes a presupposition “ultimate” or “religious.” Kinsella might argue that his libertarianism is grounded in praxeological axioms (e.g., human action, self-ownership), which are self-evident and require no theological underpinning. Baus’s attempt to frame libertarianism as “religious” could seem like a rhetorical move to force Christianity into the discussion, rather than a justified categorization.
• Evaluation: Baus provides a functional definition of “religious” but does not rigorously justify why all presuppositions should be labeled as such. He assumes that ultimate commitments must be theistic to be coherent, but Kinsella, as a skeptic, would likely reject this as question-begging, demanding empirical or logical evidence that secular axioms are insufficient.

2. Does Baus Clearly Define “Necessary Existence” and “Dependence”?

• Baus’s Explanation:
  • Necessary Existence: Baus describes God’s existence as necessary in a transcendental sense: without God, rationality, morality, and libertarian principles lack a coherent foundation. He argues that God’s necessity is not about empirical causation but about being the precondition for intelligibility.
  • Dependence: Baus contrasts God’s self-existence (aseity) with the contingency of all else, stating that everything except God depends on Him for existence. This dependence is metaphysical, not merely causal, meaning God sustains the conditions for reality itself.
• Kinsella’s Likely Response: Kinsella’s Facebook comment explicitly states confusion about “self-existence” and “depends on,” indicating a need for precise definitions. He accepts causality as a praxeological category but finds metaphysical notions of dependence obscure. From Kinsella’s perspective, Baus’s explanations might seem circular or dogmatic, as they assert God’s necessity without demonstrating why secular foundations (e.g., logic as a human convention or self-ownership as an axiom) are incoherent. Kinsella would likely press Baus to clarify what “dependence” means beyond theological assertion—e.g., is it logical, ontological, or something else? Similarly, “necessary existence” might strike Kinsella as an unproven claim, especially since Baus relies on the transcendental argument, which Kinsella might see as sidestepping direct evidence.
• Evaluation: Baus offers a theological framework for “necessary existence” and “dependence,” rooted in Reformed presuppositionalism, but these terms are not defined with the analytical rigor Kinsella demands. For example, Baus does not provide a step-by-step argument showing why rationality collapses without God, nor does he clarify “dependence” in non-theistic terms (e.g., logical entailment or causal priority). Kinsella, as a libertarian focused on clear axioms, would likely find these concepts insufficiently grounded.

3. Does Baus Adequately Distinguish RLP from Thomistic Ontological Arguments?

• Baus’s Distinction: Baus briefly notes that RLP’s transcendental approach differs from Thomistic arguments, which use causal or empirical reasoning (e.g., Aquinas’s Five Ways) to prove God’s existence. RLP, following Cornelius Van Til, argues that God’s existence is presupposed by the possibility of rational thought, not deduced from observation or causality.
• Kinsella’s Likely Response: Kinsella’s post criticizes traditional theistic arguments, including ontological ones, as unconvincing, and his skepticism extends to metaphysical claims about God’s necessity. He would likely appreciate Baus’s attempt to distance RLP from Thomism, as Kinsella is critical of causal arguments (e.g., first cause). However, Kinsella might argue that the transcendental argument is just as problematic, as it assumes what it seeks to prove: that God is the only possible foundation for rationality. Kinsella could see this as a reformulated ontological argument, where God’s necessity is asserted rather than proven, failing to meet his demand for rigorous definitions and evidence.
• Evaluation: Baus correctly identifies a formal distinction between RLP’s presuppositionalism and Thomistic arguments, as the former is transcendental (starting with the conditions for knowledge) and the latter is evidential. However, he does not elaborate on this distinction sufficiently to address Kinsella’s skepticism. Kinsella, wary of metaphysical leaps, might view the transcendental argument as functionally similar to ontological arguments, as both rely on a priori claims about God’s necessity without empirical grounding. Baus’s failure to engage Kinsella’s critique of such arguments directly weakens his response.

4. Broader Critique from Kinsella’s Perspective

• Kinsella’s Framework: Kinsella’s post advocates for Christianity’s cultural and ethical compatibility with libertarianism (e.g., its emphasis on individual dignity and property rights) but resists metaphysical commitments. He grounds his libertarianism in praxeology and secular axioms, viewing theological arguments as unnecessary or unclear. His Facebook comment reinforces this, emphasizing clarity and rigor over theological assertions.
• Points of Contention:
  • Transcendental Argument: Kinsella would likely reject Baus’s core claim that only Christianity provides a foundation for rationality and ethics, as he sees praxeological axioms (e.g., action implies purpose) as sufficient. He might argue that Baus’s argument is dogmatic, assuming Christianity’s truth without engaging secular alternatives on their terms.
  • Libertarian Coherence: Kinsella might concede that Christianity aligns with libertarian values but dispute Baus’s claim that it’s metaphysically necessary. He could argue that self-ownership and non-aggression are justifiable without invoking God, using reason and human experience.
  • Clarity and Rigor: Kinsella’s demand for clear definitions is not fully met, as Baus relies on theological terminology (aseity, necessity) that assumes familiarity with Reformed theology. Kinsella, as a non-Christian, would likely find this inaccessible or unpersuasive.
• Potential Agreement: Kinsella might appreciate Baus’s engagement with his work and the acknowledgment of libertarian common ground. He could also find the cultural argument for Christianity (its historical support for liberty) compelling, as this aligns with his post’s thesis.

Conclusion

Baus’s post offers a thoughtful defense of RLP, arguing that the Christian God is the necessary foundation for rationality, morality, and libertarianism. However, from Kinsella’s perspective, Baus falls short in several ways:

• His definition of “religious” is broad but lacks justification for equating secular axioms with religious commitments.
• His explanations of “necessary existence” and “dependence” are theologically coherent but not rigorously defined in terms Kinsella would accept (e.g., logical or empirical).
• While Baus distinguishes RLP from Thomistic arguments, he does not sufficiently address Kinsella’s broader skepticism of metaphysical claims, leaving the transcendental argument vulnerable to accusations of circularity.

Baus’s response engages Kinsella’s critique but does not bridge the gap between theological presuppositionalism and Kinsella’s demand for secular, axiomatic clarity. Kinsella would likely remain unconvinced, viewing RLP as an interesting but unproven framework that imposes unnecessary metaphysical baggage on libertarianism.

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Taylor Drummond We know some things exist. We know the universe exists. I am not sure we can know or need to know how or why they do exist, knowing that they exist is enough for politcal philosophy. If someone has a good explanation for how the universe exists or got her or why a given thing exists, I’m all ears, but saying “well they need some other thing that is self-existent that they depend on” does not seem to me like a reasonable explanation. So until I hear one, I am fine saying “I don’t know” to the question “but why do things exist” or “why is there existence.” We live in the world and have various practical problems. If I know I need to catch fish to live, I can do that, without knowing ultimate causes etc. If I know there are scarce means and this leads to conflict and that property rights are one good social response to this, fine–this knowledge does not depend on knowing these deeper things. That is how I see it anyway. Further all this seems to me to be trying too hard to come up with an argument people should accept there is God etc., even enough though asserting this solves nothing and is not really an answer to anything.

1. I gave him some suggestions: Here are some ideas to consider: Property and Freedom Podcast; ⁩Hoppe, Anarcho-Capitalism: An Annotated Bibliography; several key works by Hoppe here; Kinsella, The Greatest Libertarian Books. [↩]
2. Aggression and Property Rights Plank in the Libertarian Party Platform; On the Core Principles of Libertarian Property Rights [↩]
3. See Tom Woods episode, No, You’re Not a Dummy For Believing in God. [↩]