Based on KOL443 | Abortion: A Radically Decentralist Approach (PFS 2024)

Article based on this speech, prepared by Grok (not edited or reviewed by me):

Abortion: A Radically Decentralist Libertarian Solution

Only libertarians would rise early on a Sunday to debate interest rates in a hypothetical world before tackling a topic as divisive as abortion. Unlike issues like anarchy or intellectual property—where we often find consensus—abortion remains a stubborn puzzle, resisting the clarity we bring to war, taxation, or the state’s illegitimacy. As a libertarian, parent, and former Catholic altar boy, my journey on this issue has been personal: from a Randian pro-choice stance dismissing the fetus as a “clump of cells” to a nuanced sympathy for pro-life arguments, and now to a radically decentralist approach. Delivered at the 2024 Property and Freedom Society Annual Meeting in Bodrum, Turkey, this talk proposes that abortion decisions belong solely to the family, particularly the mother, until birth, free from external legal interference. Drawing on Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s insights, Loren Lomasky’s philosophy, and libertarian principles, I argue this solution respects the fetus’s unique status, avoids state overreach, and aligns with our decentralized ethos. And, Guido, forgive me for diving into this one—I was raised Catholic, after all, with twelve years in Catholic schools shaping my conscience.

Libertarian Perspectives: A Shifting Landscape

Libertarians have historically leaned pro-choice, especially Objectivists following Ayn Rand, who declared abortion a “moral right” left to the woman’s discretion (“Of Living Death,” The Objectivist, 1968). Rand argued that a “piece of protoplasm” lacks rights and that opposition to abortion ignores the burden of childbearing, though she conceded complexity in later pregnancy stages. Most libertarians echoed this, but exceptions like Doris Gordon’s Libertarians for Life challenged the norm. Gordon, a neo-Randian, posited that fetuses, as humans, possess rights—a semantic argument I find flawed. Rights stem not from “being human” but from reason and argumentation, as Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s discourse ethics suggests (A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, 1989). Tying rights to humanity alone raises absurdities: would intelligent aliens lack rights? Would animals qualify? Gordon’s logic, like many semantic arguments, oversimplifies the issue.

The libertarian landscape has shifted recently, with paleo-libertarianism and the Mises Institute amplifying pro-life voices. In 2022, the Libertarian Party’s Mises Caucus, during the “Reno Reset,” removed its pro-choice plank, arguing that candidates should adopt individual stances on this divisive issue. This move, reflecting growing conservative and religious influences, sparked backlash among pro-choice libertarians but highlighted abortion’s complexity. Another perspective, Walter Block’s “evictionism,” muddies the waters further. Block argues that fetuses, as humans, have rights but are trespassers in the mother’s body, subject to eviction by the “gentlest means possible” (Block & Whitehead, Appalachian L., 2005). Yet, most pregnancies result from voluntary acts, undermining the trespasser label. I’ve challenged Block on this, noting that conception typically “invites” the fetus, except in cases like rape. His response—that a fetus can’t be invited because it doesn’t exist pre-conception—feels like a convoluted dodge.

Block’s evictionism raises practical questions. If technology allowed safe fetal removal mid-pregnancy, would a mother be obligated to choose a C-section over a simpler abortion pill, even if the former is invasive? In a recent debate on voluntary slavery (KOL442), Block argued that a surrogate mother, having “sold” her body to a couple, could be forced to carry to term, implying that only women who enslave themselves lose abortion rights. This contradiction—permitting abortion for most but prohibiting it for surrogates—highlights evictionism’s incoherence. Other libertarian voices, like Sharon Presley’s feminist defense (Association of Libertarian Feminists, 2003) and Doug Bandow’s critique of pro-choice triumphalism (Chronicles, 2007), further illustrate the spectrum of thought, as does Murray Rothbard’s controversial framing of the fetus as an “unbidden parasite” (The Independent Review, 2024).

The Intractability of Abortion

Abortion’s resistance to resolution stems from clashing worldviews: religious pro-life arguments assert life begins at conception, feminist pro-choice claims prioritize bodily autonomy, and libertarian theories grapple with rights and dependency. Religious arguments, rooted in faith, falter in secular debates, as differing beliefs about souls or life’s onset defy rational consensus. Feminist arguments, while compelling, often concede fetal rights in later stages, complicating their absolutism. Even my reason-based approach, tying rights to rational capacity, faces rejection from those with religious or semantic axioms. As Loren Lomasky observes, this intractability is philosophically significant, suggesting no universal solution exists (Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community, 1987, p. 91). Consider a devout Catholic and a secular feminist debating abortion: their premises—divine creation versus individual liberty—are so divergent that dialogue stalls, much like trying to reconcile monarchy with anarchy.

Lomasky’s framework deepens this analysis. He argues that rights are not grounded in a single “essential property” but vary by context. Adult humans, as “project pursuers,” claim rights through reason, while dependents like children “piggyback” on social relations with rational agents (p. 40). Fetuses, fully dependent and pre-social, lack the identifiability of born individuals. Birth, Lomasky contends, marks a “quantum leap” in moral status, transitioning the fetus from anonymity to public standing (pp. 197–98). This discontinuity explains why law and morality treat abortion differently from infanticide, despite pro-life claims equating the two. For example, a born child can be protected by homicide laws without invasive policing, but monitoring abortions would require surveillance of private pregnancies—imagine authorities interrogating a woman who miscarries after drinking wine or tripping. Such intrusions highlight abortion’s unique challenge, distinct from other crimes.

The Unique Status of the Fetus

The fetus’s dependency complicates legal intervention. Unlike born children, who Hoppe describes as body-owners and actors post-birth (1989), fetuses rely entirely on the mother, existing outside the moral community. Lomasky notes that rights for dependents are “urged on their behalf by others,” not self-claimed, requiring justification for legal protection (p. 6). Policing abortion as murder, especially late-term, would demand unprecedented privacy violations. How would authorities detect a pregnancy if a woman stays home? Should she face liability for a miscarriage caused by poor health habits? These scenarios burden mothers unduly, as seen in cases where women have been arrested under abortion laws for alleged miscarriages. The family—mother, father, doctor—is best equipped to navigate pregnancy’s complexities, not distant legislators or courts.

My view, shaped by fatherhood, acknowledges a moral continuum: early-term abortions seem less troubling, but late-term ones approach infanticide’s gravity. Rights, I argue, emerge from reason and argumentation, not mere humanity. Early fetuses, lacking developed cognition, have only potential rights, while late-term fetuses resemble infants, suggesting stronger moral claims. Yet, even if late-term fetuses have rights, they are not trespassers, contra Block, but invited through voluntary conception. This act, like pushing someone into a lake, incurs positive obligations—parents must support their helpless child, including not killing it if it holds rights (Legal Foundations of a Free Society, 2023, chs. 2, 4, 23). This perspective supports civil law doctrines like forced heirship, prioritizing parental duty over state welfare.

A Decentralist Solution

Given abortion’s intractability and the fetus’s unique status, I propose a radically decentralist solution: until birth, the family, particularly the mother, holds jurisdiction over abortion decisions, free from external legal interference. This idea crystallized after a 1995 phone call with Hoppe, who urged me to tackle abortion, suggesting the family, not the state or community, should decide (KOL158 | “The Social Theory of Hoppe: Lecture 6: Political Issues and Applications; Hoppe Q&A”). In 2011, teaching at the Mises Institute in Romania, Hoppe reiterated that abortion is a family matter, questioning who—beyond the family—could claim victimhood to justify intervention. This aligns with libertarian principles rejecting unchosen obligations and limited jurisdictional reach—Texas doesn’t dictate California’s abortion laws, nor should external systems override family sovereignty.

This solution avoids the police state required to enforce abortion bans. Policing infanticide mirrors homicide investigations, but abortion would demand monitoring pregnancies, interrogating miscarriages, or penalizing lifestyle choices. Families permitting late-term abortions may face criticism, as one might critique China’s policies, but external legal systems lack jurisdiction until birth, when homicide laws apply. This approach, explored in works like Christos Armoutidis’ “Preargumentation Ethics and the Issue of Abortion” (J. Libertarian Stud., 2024) and Oscar Grau’s chapter in A Life in Liberty (Papinian Press, 2024), respects the fetus’s pre-social status and prioritizes privacy. It also reflects my 1994 discussions with Murray Rothbard, whose influence, alongside Hoppe’s, shaped my libertarian journey.

Conclusion

No abortion solution will satisfy everyone—pro-life advocates may see this as too permissive, pro-choice proponents as overly nuanced. Yet, its intractability demands pragmatism. Vesting jurisdiction in the family until birth minimizes state overreach, respects the fetus’s unique dependency, and aligns with libertarian decentralization. My Catholic roots, twelve years in parochial schools, and altar boy days lend this issue personal weight, but reason, not faith, guides my conclusion. Having tackled abortion, I’ll turn to lighter challenges—like exempting Bitcoin from capital gains tax. In a free society, the family’s sovereignty over such intimate decisions remains paramount, a principle libertarians must champion.