I was long friends with Tibor Machan (see Remembering Tibor Machan, Libertarian Mentor and Friend: Reflections on a Giant). We corresponded for years and met many times in Auburn when I would attend Mises Institute events. When I lived in Philadelphia, from 1994–97, we would occasionally get together when he was passing through. As I recall, he introduced me one time to Patrick Burke. I think we had lunch together. Burke was a nice and gentle man, from what I dimly recall, a religion professor at Temple in Philly. He has apparently passed away in the meantime, as has Tibor.

In any case, I read his book No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market (1994), which had just been published and which we had discussed at  lunch. It was decent but flawed, if earnest. I published a critical review of it in Tibor’s journal Reason Papers in 1995, Stephan Kinsella, “Book Review of Patrick Burke, No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market (1994),” Reason Papers No. 20 (Fall 1995), p. 135 (see text below). Ultimate I critique his “harm” criterion, just as I critique a similar the similar approach opposing “imposing costs” on others by J.C. (Jan) Lester in his book Escape from Leviathan: Libertarianism without Justificationism.

See, e.g,. Stephan Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) (LFFS), n.16 and accompanying text; idem, “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights,” in LFFS, at n.3 and accompanying text; idem, “‘Aggression’ versus ‘Harm’ in Libertarianism,” Mises Economics Blog (Dec. 16, 2009); and idem, “Hoppe on Property Rights in Physical Integrity vs Value,” StephanKinsella.com (June 12, 2011).

Burke’s focus on “harm” as the key principle behind rights, instead of aggression, leads him into error, for example accepting the legitimacy of blackmail and defamation law, and even laws banning dueling, since “a challenge to a duel is akin to blackmail.” His view of contracts is also flawed since it is based on the notion of detrimental reliance (which I critique in “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability,” in LFFS, at Part I.E).

No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market*

T. Patrick Burke

Justifications in support of liberty are plentiful and diverse. This is to be expected, if the libertarian ideals of free minds and free markets are true, valid principles. For if liberty is justifiable, it is only natural that libertarian principles should be supported by many different lines of reasoning, including pragmatic, utilitarian, consequentialist, rationalist, and natural-law arguments, as well as by intuition, tradition, and common sense. Each time someone comes up with another insight into why freedom works, it adds to the argumentative evidence that individual freedom is a good thing. Patrick Burke in No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market contributes to this libertarian corpus and offers yet another vantage point from which to view the virtues of freedom.

Burke’s clearly libertarian thesis is that “social justice requires market freedom.” (p.9) No Harm presents a justification of this thesis with an extended discussion of a rather simple core idea: that those who have not caused harm have a right not to be harmed Libertarians will recognize the No Harm principle as a close cousin of the non-aggression principle which prohibits the initiation of force.

In attempting to establish the No Harm principle underpinning the case for liberty and free markets, Burke does not offer a completely rigorous argument in the manner of some other libertarian theorists. Rather, he takes many things for granted, such as his position that human beings ought not to be harmed against their will, unless they have caused harm (discussed further below). Many of the premises Burke takes as true are accepted by most libertarians as well as by most ordinary people, so any conclusions he bases on these premises are still valuable. Other conclusions that Burke reaches, however, seem incorrect, perhaps because some of his foundations are not adequately defined and justified.

Before discussing the substance of the book, let me briefly make a comment about the book’s format. No Harm unfortunately contains endnotes rather than footnotes. Although some readers are annoyed by notes at the bottom of every page that “run along, like little angry dogs barking at the text,”¹ in my opinion footnotes are much more convenient to glance at than endnotes, and are thus vastly superior. It is a wonder to me that anyone in this age of computerized word processing would ever use endnotes. (I realize that the use of endnotes in books is still common, however, and I also realize that this very review utilizes endnotes rather than footnotes, but I can only plead that any blame for this lies with the editor.) No Harm also contains no detailed table of contents, i.e., one listing subsections as well as chapter headings in hierarchical form. I find that a detailed table of contents, often used in legal treatises in addition to a shorter “summary of contents,” is very helpful in understanding in outline form the conceptual organization of the ideas laid out in the book, and in looking up desired topics. But enough of this procedural quibbling and on to the substance.

Punishment and Harm

In order to establish his case for the free market, Burke attempts to show three things: (1) that those who have not caused harm have a right to not be harmed; (2) that typical market activities do not cause harm; and (3) that governmental actions which proscribe such market activities do cause harm. Libertarians would probably agree with the general thrust of these three points, if “harm” is defined as the initiation or use of force. Indeed, point (1) resembles the libertarian non-aggression principle, under which an individual has a right to do anything unless it involves the initiation of (physical) violence, i.e., aggression or coercion. Building on the non-aggression principle, libertarians can fairly easily show that market transactions, since they do not involve coercion, are not rights-violative; and that governmental laws directed at such market actions are thus themselves coercive and illegitimate. The problem that libertarians typically face is justifying the claim that the only fundamental individual right is a right to not be coerced.

Burke wants to approach this problem from a slightly different angle, by focusing on the perhaps more intuitive or more general concept of “harm” rather than solely on the concept of physical violence or aggression. Thus, instead of arguing in favor of the non-aggression principle, Burke attempts to establish that those who have not caused harm have a right to not be harmed. I must admit that I found parts of the structure and organization of Burke’s argument somewhat hard to follow. Not until chapter 5 does he really tackle what “Causing Harm” is, and not until the last three chapters, 7, 8, and 9, does he explore his “Principle of No Harm” in detail. Further, many of side-points seem clearly wrong, as I will discuss in more detail below.

In the very beginning of and throughout his discussion, Burke implicitly equates the right to not be harmed with a right to not be punished, and thus he implicitly equates harm with punishment. (p.10) Thus, to establish his point (1) (those who have not caused harm have a right to not be punished), Burke must define harm and its causation, and must also explain when punishment is deserved or justified. Regarding harm, Burke maintains that to cause harm to a person by some action, he must be “worse off’ after the action than he was before, and the action in question must have “caused” the deterioration in condition. (p.46) Burke’s conception of harm and causation are not very controversial, but do not get one very far, either, in terms of normative rights theory, since at this stage they are merely descriptive, not normative or prescriptive.

The big question that Burke must answer is “Who ought to be punished?” Burke says, “The only just answer to this question can be: those who deserve punishment.” (p.40) Even this formulation is almost tautologically true: only people who “deserve” punishment “ought” to be punished (and vice-versa). Burke’s first really synthetic proposition is the claim that only those that have caused harm deserve to be punished. In support of this contention, Burke offers three related principles of “No Harm”. The first principle, the Principle of No Harm, states that human beings ought not to be harmed against their will, unless they have caused harm. According to the Principle of No Hann II, those who deliberately cause harm to the innocent deserve to be punished proportionately. Under the Principle of No Harm III, those who do not cause harm deliberately ought not to be punished. (Chs. 7, 8, 9)

Admittedly, if the tripartite Principle of No Harm is accepted as valid, then the rest of Burke’s argument falls into place: by the Principle ofNo Harm, we may punish people only if they have caused harm; the enforcement of any law is a use of punishment and laws may thus not be passed against those who do not cause hann; actions on the free market do not cause harm; and therefore, laws may not be passed that restrict economic liberties. Ultimately, though, Burke does not offer much defense of the Principle of No Harm, crucial as it is to his argument. Instead, Burke relies on its intuitive and widespread appeal. Burke writes:

Since the large majority of people accept the concept of crime, detest crime, and support legal punishment, in that sense and to that extent they already accept the Principle of No Harm. Causing harm would seem in fact to be the quintessence of what we mean by the notion of “morally wrong.” Anyone who wishes to cast doubt on this principle has the burden of coming up with an alternative theory as to the principle on which it is wrong to commit murder or robbery. [p.181]

Taking such fundamental rights for granted, it then becomes easy to validate the Principle of No Harm, if it

is simply an unpacking or explication of what is implicit in the elementary belief that it is wrong to kill or injure an innocent person  That actions such as murder and robbery are criminal and deserve punishment is one of the most fundamental moral intuitions of mankind, and one which has the strongest claim to acceptance on its own terms. We do not need a theoretical construction to tell us that it is valid. Although theoretical considerations may be useful in clarifying this insight, as they can also muddy it, any moral theory we develop must assume its essential validity and be dependent on it. [p.182, emphasis added]

Even though Burke believes that all this is self-evident, he offers some perceptive “theoretical reflections which can lend support to the principle.” (p.182) He eschews utilitarian and egoistic theories, because these “kinds of arguments, if indulged in exclusively, would have the effect of reducing the Principle of No Harm to nonmoral factors, …. which runs counter to our ordinary conception of morality.” Instead, Burke develops a Kantian position that focuses on man’s volition, his ability to make free choices. Because each person is a self-governor, the most fundamental moral obligation is not to deprive others, by physical force, of making free choices. “Coercion, the use of physical force to deprive an adult human being of the power of self-government, is intrinsically harmful and wrong, unless he has deserved it by causing harm to others.” (p.183, endnote omitted, emphasis added)

Burke’s derivation of a right not to be harmed is thus not completely rigorous, because he relies on “the most fundamental moral intuitions of mankind” and the like, rather than justifying these bedrock principles themselves. Nor does he adequately explain why these principles are self-evident, if they are. Burke’s conclusions are nevertheless insightful and largely convincing, because most of the assumptions he makes are shared by most civilized people anyway. Given his largely sound framework, Burke does a nice job of showing that market transactions do not usually cause “harm,” and thus ought not be “punished,” i.e., outlawed or regulated.

Harm versus Aggression

 I believe that Burke’s case could have been a stronger one if he had focused more on force rather than on harm, or if he had made his definition of harm more (explicitly and consistently) dependent on force. Such a refinement of his argument would also have helped him to avoid a few missteps along the way.

Much of Burke’s argument implicitly recognizes the crucial role of force in defining rights. When, for example, Burke argues that market transactions do not usually cause “harm,” he effectively characterizes harm as the inflicting of force on others. He also characterizes the right to not be harmed as a right to not be punished, thereby equating harm with punishment, i.e. force. It is when Burke views harm as the use of force that his discussion is most persuasive, which is not surprising to libertarians, who give force such a central role. Despite this implicit equation of force and harm in these contexts, however, Burke would not appear to agree with a general equation of harm with coercion, of rights-violations with the initiation of force. For instance, Burke maintains that rights-vio­ lations are not the only circumstances in which a person can be “harmed” (p.194); and that violence is not the only way to harm someone (see, e.g., his views on blackmail (p.57), defamation (p.57), and “dueling” (p.192), discussed further below). But punishment, after all, a central concept for Burke, is not merely the causing of “harm”—it is specifically the application of force to an individual. Why does Burke focus on (physical) punishment so much, if the physical, forcible element does not necessarily need to be part of the concept of harm? Why does Burke equate a right to not be harmed with a right to not be punished, but not harm with force in the general case?

A more rigorous and consistent case may be made for liberty if the interrelationship between harm, force, rights, and punishment is made clear. Under the libertarian non-ag­ gression principle, an individual has a right to do anything other than initiate force against others; thus punishment (the use of retaliatory force) is justified only in response to aggression, and never in response to harm alone.² That is, the only punishable harm is one caused by an initiation of force. Burke’s concept of punishable harm as being broader than the mere initiation of force leads him to untrue conclusions in a few instances. First, if rights-violations or the initiation of force are not the only way that individuals are harmed (such that punishment may be visited upon the harmer), then it would follow that at least some harmful acts which are not rights-violations or violent can be legitimately punished. But if harm can follow from a non-coercive action, then this opens the door to regulate market activity, for while voluntary market activity does not involve coercion, how are we to say that it never causes “harm,” if harm can include non-coercive harm? Certainly the market, while indeed non-coercive, has many other features (e.g., it may be vulgar, crass, or amoral), and I can see no reason, and Burke offers none, that “non-coercive harm” (that nevertheless justifies punishment) is not among them.

As Burke states,

It does not make sense to believe that a person may cause hann to another by engaging in a market exchange with him. It does not make sense to believe that even when there is no question of force or fraud, a seller may cause harm to a buyer by selling him something which he requests to buy, and an employer may cause harm to an employee by giving him a job which he applies for. [p.42]

Burke also emphasizes that “The question of law is always a question of punishment.” (p.58) As Burke seems to recognize in these comments, the element of force cannot be left out of a viable definition of harm, if “harm” is to be used to justify (forcible) punishment. Any law will direct the use of physical force against certain individuals. Burke is correct that this is a type of “harm,” and may be legitimately inflicted on others when they, too, have banned someone. But the symmetry of the argument requires that the type of “harm” being punished involve force itself. If force is to be inflicted on others, surely this can only be justified when it is in response to an initial use of force. If A merely causes “harm” to B but without inflicting force (i.e., a non-coercive type of harm), B is indeed justified in causing “harm” to A in response – but only a non-force-inflicting type of harm, and thus certainly not punishment, which necessarily involves force.³ Thus, the only sort of harm that can legitimately be punished is force-inflicting(i.e., rights-violating) harm.

If Burke must resort to the concept of physical force to get useful results from his “harm” principle, one wonders why his thesis focuses on harm rather than on force simpliciter. Burke would do better to substitute the initiation of force for harm, and seek to establish: (l’) that those who have not initiated force have a right to not have force used against them; (2′) that typical market activities do not involve the initiation of force; and (3′) that governmental actions which proscribe such market activities do initiate force. In establishing step (l’) characterized this way, it is indeed relevant to ask, “Who deserves punishment?”, since punishment, like step (l’), focuses on the use of force itself. When these issues are clarified in this way, however, it becomes clear that the vague concept of “harm” is too broad to sufficiently justify rights and market transactions.

Further Problems

Burke’s view of the concepts of harm, force, rights, and punishment causes further difficulties. For example, consider Burke’s view on blackmail. Burke considers the case of the blackmailer offering to “not to publish compromising photographs of a man with his mistress if he will pay $500.” (p.57). Disagreeing with libertarians such as Rothbard, Burke maintains that “To blackmail a person is to threaten to cause him harm. Harm is not restricted to violence or the threat of it, but includes injury to a person’s reputation by defamation, libel and slander.” (p.57, endnote omitted, emphasis omitted) Burke here cites Pennsylvania’s criminal code regarding theft by extortion, presumably as an example, but hopefully not as a justification, for surely the mere existence of a positive state law cannot justify such a law. But Burke’s reasoning is too skimpy here, and he does not provide an argument showing why (punishable) harm includes defamation, libel, and slander.⁴ The mere uttering of sounds or words does not inflict force on others, and thus simply cannot justify retaliatory force against the utterer. Burke even recognizes this in another context: “A mere statement of a belief cannot in principle be harmful to anybody, even if it mistaken, since it always rests within the power of the listener whether he is to believe it or not.” (p.213)

For the same reason that we have a right to free speechs words cannot aggress against libel and slander laws cannot be tolerated in a free society. The only rights that exist, in my opinion, are rights to tangible, corporeal, property. This is because the only reason for property rights is to assign ownership to scarce resources, and only physical property can be scarce.⁵ Ideas and reputations are mere abstractions and are not property.⁶ Burke also believes that “a challenge to a duel is akin to blackmail.” (p.192; see also p.268 n.15) The argument here is very sketchy and, I believe, unconvincing.

Burke’s view on contracts is also problematic. In attempting to justify the “enforce­ ability” of contracts, Burke draws on the traditional legal concept of detrimental reliance. According to this theory,

The binding force of the contract comes from the fact that it leads each party justifiably to expect a certain perfonnance from the other and to rely upon that expectation in such a way that if the other fails to perfonn, then the first party is harmed. [p.71]

As others have pointed out, this reasoning is circular, for reliance on performance is not “reasonable” or justifiable unless one already knows that the promise is enforceable, which begs the question.⁷ What has not been widely recognized even by many libertarians is the fact that the enforcement of promises also violates freedom of speech: if I merely utter words (e.g., “I promise to do X”) then I have not used force against you; thus you are not justified in using force against me to “enforce” the contract. Contracts may legitimately be construed only as conditional transfers or exchanges of property.⁸

Burke also offers the Principle of Double Effect as a way to determine whether we may outlaw an action that will have both bad and good effects. Burke submits the example of a terrorist who is threatening to kill a hostage unless certain demands are met:

A police sharpshooter could perhaps shoot the terrorist, but there is a risk that he might shoot the hostage by mistake. Is it morally pennissible for him to try to shoot the terrorist?

The Principle of Double Effect answers this question by providing three criteria:

1. The evil effect must not be the cause of the good effect. This rule is necessary because the end does not justify the We may not do harm in order that good may come of it.
2. The evil effect must not be deliberately
3. The harm caused must not be greater than the harm prevented, or the good done. [p.198]

There are many problems with these criteria. For example, how in the world do you weigh harms against one another, or the harm caused against the good intended? A more serious problem with this principle is that Burke simply asserts it as if it is true, without offering any justification for it, evidently relying on its somewhat intuitive appeal.

In the area of economics, Burke admirably rejects antitrust laws, but seems to accept the concept of monopoly nonetheless. “If a genuine monopoly is achieved in an industry, and the monopolist firm raises prices above the competitive level, it creates an incentive for other firms to enter the industry in competition with it.” (p.80) This ignores, however, Rothbard’s demonstration that the very concept of free-market monopoly is invalid.

Burke’s views on the Great Depression are baffling. He recognizes that the Great Depression was, contrary to popular belief, caused by actions of the federal government. So far, so good. According to Austrian economic theory, recessions and depressions are caused when the malinvestments of artificial booms, caused by inflation of the money supply, are liquidated. Thus, it is a federally-controlled decrease in interest rates, or the corresponding expansion of the money supply, that causes depressions.¹⁰ Burke, however, maintains that one of the actions of the federal government that caused, or prolonged, the Great Depression “was the action of the Federal Reserve in increasing interest rates and further restricting the money supply, precisely at the time when just the opposite action was needed.” (p.91, emphasis added; see also pp.33,164) The “opposite action” that Burke believes was “needed”—i.e., inflation of the money supply – is the very type of thing that caused the Great Depression. Only Milton Friedman is cited here; apparently Burke is unfamiliar with the Austrian work on the business cycle, or finds it not worth taking into account in his analysis.¹¹

In another economic misstatement, Burke says that “Far from causing harm, the seller who raises his prices in a shortage is doing just what needs to be done to reduce the shortage, he is providing an incentive for producers to produce more.” (p.95) But it seems to me that this is untrue: the raised prices provide a disincentive to prospective buyers with less urgent needs from purchasing the goods.¹²

Burke’s favorable comments regarding democracy are also somewhat naive, or at least paint too rosy a picture regarding the virtues of democracy. He maintains that representative government is an “effectual system,” and that “The idea of democracy is enshrined in two principles: majority rule, and human rights. Both of these, but especially human rights, are antipathetic to authoritarianism.” (p.23) He also maintains that “democ­ racy is the most effective means of ensuring the protection of human rights against government” (p.163), and he has “no doubt that representative democracy is the best and wisest form of government where it is capable of existing”. (p.234) Burke’s use of phrase “human rights” rather than “individual rights” is somewhat unsettling, because the term “human rights,” like the term “liberal” in American usage, has acquired a leftist or socialist tinge.¹³ Further, majority rule as a principle can resolve into mob rule, which is unlikely to favor individual rights. Indeed, democracy has systemic features which make it tend to oppress liberty.¹⁴ Democracy is not as benevolent and compatible with the free market at Burke assumes.

Useful Insights

All this is not to say that Burke does not make many perceptive points in No Harm. Although his Principle ofNo Harm could stand some refinement and is not defended with complete rigor, it is, after all, true that people should not “harm” one another, and most decent people do agree with this, stated as a general proposition. Burke has many good explanations that show why, contrary to popular wisdom, we are not harmed by market transactions, and are, conversely, harmed by government intervention. Probably the most praiseworthy aspect of Burke’s book is his extended discussion of the “harmlessness” of voluntary market transactions.

There are many fresh insights sprinkled throughout the text. One useful insight of Burke’s that had never occurred to me regards the typical leftist assertions that “the actions of a person in economic distress are not free.” (p.49) Liberals typically maintain that a person in danger of starvation is “compelled by circumstances” to accept a low-wage, dangerous, or otherwise undesirable job. As Burke notes, this

is thought to be a significant question only because it is assumed that people in distress who accept tough conditions are being harmed. It is supposed to provide an explanation for what otherwise, on this interpretation, would be bizarre and incomprehensible behavior. Given that they are causing harm to themselves, what could explain such a paradoxical action, since presumably they are not masochists? The answer is made that they have no alternative, they are compelled to take the job. It is assumed that this explanation renders comprehensible an action which otherwise would make no sense. Where it is clear that a person is benefiting from an action, however, there is no urgent need to ask whether he does so freely. A penniless beggar given a lottery ticket which turned out to win him a million dollars would be under heavy economic and psychological pressure to accept the prize, but there would be little practical point in questioning whether his acceptance was truly free. [p.49, emphasis added]

Burke also notes that some writers oppose market freedom based on alleged “market failure.” For example, a car owner, who is often mechanically ignorant, may be taken advantage of by a mechanic, who has an incentive to lie and diagnose greater problems with the car than actually exist. Since the mechanic or service station owner is supposedly “rational” in this case, this may be a case of “market failure” requiring government regulation. Burke perceptively points out that:

To call lying a case of market failure betrays an elementary misunderstanding of the concept of a free market. Deliberate deception, or fraud, is not a part of the concept of a free market. It is certainly true that the successful operation of a market economy depends on maintaining ethical behavior, and there must be legal remedies available for people who have been defrauded. Fraud, however, is not a case of the failure of the market, but of the moral failure of individuals. [p.89]

Conclusion

 All in all, No Harm presents a fresh perspective on the virtues of liberty from the viewpoint of the ubiquitous concept of harm. Burke does a good job of explaining why, in general, people are not “harmed” in a free market, and thus free market activities should not be regulated by governments, whose job is to punish those who cause harm. However, Burke’s neglect of foundational issues, justifications, and precise definitions, and his unfortunate willingness to label some non-coercive actions as punishable harms, weaken his overall case, and cause him to stray into error on a few issues. Yet Burke does offer many useful insights, and is fundamentally correct in championing freedom and pointing out its many benefits. We should always cheer when yet another voice is added to the chorus crying for freedom.

N. Stephan Kinsella,

Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Endnotes

*Page references to this book will be given parenthetically in the text.

**The author practices computer software and hardware patent law with Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, in Philadelphia. He may be reached by internet at kin­[email protected].

1. S.M. Crothers, “That History Should be Readable”, in The Gentle Reader 172 (1903; repr. 1972), quoted in Bryan A. Gamer, The Elements of Legal Style 92 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
2. On the definition of “aggression” and the libertarian non-aggression principle, see Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Liber­ tarian Review Foundation, reprint ed., 1985), 23. See also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics 139-41, 237 n.17 (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989) (arguing that property rights protect the physical integrity of property, but not the value of property).
3. See my articles “Estoppel: A New Justification for Individual Rights”, Reason Papers No. 17 (Fall 1992), p. 61, and “Punishment and Proportionality; the Estoppel Approach”, J. Libertarian Studies (forthcoming), for a theory focusing on this sort of symmetry.
4. On the illegitimacy of libel and slander (defamation) laws, see Rothbard, supra note 2, at 96-97; idem, The Ethics of Liberty 126-27 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982) and Walter Block, Defending the Undefendab/e: The Pimp, Prostitute, Scab, Slumlord, Libeler, Moneylender, and Other Scapegoats in the Rogue’s Gallery of Ameri­ can Society (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1991). [See also Kinsella, “Defamation as a Type of Intellectual Property.”]
5. For a discussion of the necessity of the concept of “scarcity” to a proper definition of goods or property, see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics 93, 235-36, 528 (Chicago: Contemporary Books, Inc., 3d rev’d ed. 1966); Murray N. Roth­ bard, 1 Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles 4 (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1962); and Hoppe, supra note 2, at 8-10, 134 et seq.
6. On libel laws, see supra note 4. For a discussion of intellectual property rights, see Rothbard, supra note 2, at 123-24; idem, supra note 5, at 652-60; Tom G. Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” “The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects,” 13 J. Law & Pub/. Poly 817 (1990), as well as other articles in same issue (No. 3, Summer 1990) and in Vol. 13, issue no. 1 (Winter 1990) of this journal; Tom G. Palmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach11, 12 Hamline L. Rev. 261 (1989); Wendy J. Gordon, “An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: “The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory”, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343 (1989).
7. See, g., Randy E. Barnett,”A Consent Theory of Contract”, 86 Columbia L. Rev. 269, 274-76 (1986); Randy E. Barnett and Mary E. Becker, “Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Fonnalities, and Misrepresentation”, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 443, 446-47, 452 (1987). For further discussion of these and related issues, see Williamson M. Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts”, 1 J. Libertarian Stud. 3 (1977); Randy Barnett, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights”, 4 Social Phil. & Poly 179 (1986); Rothbard, supra note 4, chapter 19;
8. For insightful discussions into the nature of contracts, see Evers, supra note 7; Rothbard, supra note 4, chapter 19, “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts”; and Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract”, supra note 6. These formulations are not, however, without problems. I plan to discuss this issue at further length in a future article.
9. Rothbard, supra note 5, at chapter 10, pp. 604-14; Hoppe, supra note 2, at chapter 9, esp.pp. 180-85.
10. See Murray N. Rothbard, America’s Great Depression (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 2d 1972); idem, supra note 5, at ch. 12, 11; Mises, supra note 5, at ch. XX.
11. In a discussion of the “business cycle,” Burke notes that the two chief explanations for this phenomenon are that it is due to excessive investment; or to governmental policies, such as “control of the money supply.” (p.94) Burke cites neither Mises’s nor Rothbard’s work on the Austrian theory of the business cycle. See supra note 10.
12. See, g., Murray N. Rothbard, “Government and Hurricane Hugo: A Deadly Combi­nation,” in The Economics of Liberty at 137 (Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1990) (first published in The Free Market, vol. 7, No. 12 (December 1989)); and George Reisman, The Government Against the Economy, ch. II, sec. 2, p. 42, et passim (Ottawa, Ill.: Jameson Books, 1979).
13. See, g., the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 217A (III) (1948), at articles 22-26 (reciting, for example, human rights to “social security” and to “free” education).
14. For perceptive articles discussing this point, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, ‘Time Preference, Government, and the Process of De-Civilization From Monarchy to Democracy”, 5 des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 319 (1994). Interestingly, Frank Knight made a similar point back in 1929. In his essay Freedom as Fact and Criterion, Knight stated:

We say that the victim of a highwayman is coerced, not because the character of his choice between the alternatives presented is different from any other choice, but because we think the robber does “wrong” in making the alternatives what they are.

In no other sense is it possible to speak of coercion. No human being can ever literally “force” another to do anything (though one may of course forcibly prevent another from acting)….[T]he threat of violence… as a means of controlling the conduct of a human being has only a figurative kinship with the action of a physical force in changing the state of rest or motion of a mass of matter. It is interesting to note that when conduct is influenced by an offer to improve one’s condition, instead of a threat of worsening it, we do not call it force or duress.

Frank H. Knight, Freedom and Reform: Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy 17 (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982).

My book Legal Foundations of a Free Society concerns justice. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe writes in his Foreword, “The question as to what is justice and what constitutes a just society is as old as philosophy itself. Indeed, it arises in everyday life even long before any systematic philosophizing is to begin.” In ch. 2 (n.3), I quote the classic formulation from Justinian: “Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due.… The maxims of law are these: to live honestly, to hurt no one, to give every one his due.”

I came across a nice quote about justice from esteemed Louisiana federal judge Alvin Rubin (2) (1920–91), from the case U.S. v. McDaniels, 379 F.Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974): [continue reading…]

Related:

That’s why Godel came up with his theorem, to advance his Platonist philosophy of mathematics over and against formalists who thought mathematics is a formal game humans made up.

— Rapid Rar (@rapid_rar2) February 16, 2026

Dear Mr. Kinsella,

I hope this message finds you well. I have a question regarding the use of performative contradiction in argumentation ethics. I’d really appreciate it if you could share your thoughts.

My question is, without using performative contradiction, self-ownership is naturally true in argumentation since argumentation presupposes self-ownership. It is like Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem that Gödel found a way of allowing mathematics to talk about itself. It is self-referential. In the case of argumentation, if A owns B, there is no need for an argumentation between A and B over the ownership of C, A would just own C by default. In this case, in order to have an argumentation, A and B must be self-owned. [continue reading…]

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 437.

My appearance on The Rational Egoist: Debating the Moral Status of Intellectual Property with Stephan Kinsella. We focused here mostly on property rights and other precursor concepts. We plan to have a followup discussion to get into the nitty gritty of the application of these more basic concepts and principles to the topic of IP. (Spotify)

Shownotes:

In this episode of The Rational Egoist, host Michael Liebowitz engages in a thought-provoking discussion and debate with Stephan Kinsella, a libertarian writer and patent attorney, on the moral status of intellectual property. The complexity of the issue sparks a deep dive into the ethical and legal dimensions of IP rights, leading to a conversation so rich that it had to be continued in a future episode.

DETAILED GROK SHOWNOTES:

YOUTUBE TRANSCRIPT

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 436.

I was interviewed today by Kelly Patrick of the Kelly Patrick Show ep. 777. I fielded questions from his The Kelly Patrick Show Political Chat facebook group, mostly questions from nonlibertarians or people critical of libertarianism. We discussed the prospects of liberty, activism, why people are not persuaded by libertarian arguments, the prospects of the Libertarian Party, intellectual property, anarchism, and so on.

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Q:

Hello prof. Kinsella. I would like to ask you a quick question. Do you consider libertarian as synonymous with anarcho-capitalist? Obviously there are many libertarians who are more classical liberals, but a libertarian consistent with his premises should be an anarchist, in this sense would he be a synonym for anarcho-capitalist? [continue reading…]

[From my Webnote series]

See also, on reasons law cannot be fully deduced:

• The Universal Principles of Liberty
• On Pushing the Button–the problem with magic
• The Limits of Armchair Theorizing: The case of Threats
• Roman Law and Hypothetical Cases
• Libertarian Answer Man: Corporations, Trusts, HOAs, and Private Law Codes in a Private Law Society
• KOL359 | State Constitutions vs. the Libertarian Private Law Code (PFS 2021)
• KOL345 | Kinsella’s Libertarian “Constitution” or: State Constitutions vs. the Libertarian Private Law Code (PorcFest 2021)

same reason esperanto failed. Or as Holmes said, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience”

More seriosly, for the same reason most hypos are not answerable–because not enough context. https://t.co/NaXh7F8GDO https://t.co/wVzBgzjNpL . to decide a dispute…

— Stephan Kinsella (@NSKinsella) June 26, 2025

Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), ch. 11:

Those types of arguments and reasons are not justifications. There has to be an objective best link.^[15] So how does that work out? In Western private law and in libertarianism, which is a far more consistent working out of this, there are basically two types of links—the type of link applied to your body, which is a unique scarce resource; and the type of link applied to external resources in the world, which were previously unowned scarce resources. For the body, the link is a self-ownership link. You own your body, and the reason is because of your direct control over it, which I will get to in a minute.

And then for scarce resources in the world, they’re always owned first by someone first using them from their unowned state. That’s called homesteading or original appropriation. And then ownership can be transferred for two reasons: contractually—that’s a voluntary transfer of your ownership title of the resource to someone else, either by sale or by gift; or for purposes of rectification, which can be seen as a subset of contract because it’s also a transfer of title from an owner to someone, but it’s because the owner committed a tort against the victim and thus gave him a right to recover some of the aggressor’s property as damages. ¹

So original appropriation, contract, and rectification are basically the only three principles to determine ownership of external resources in case of a dispute. So these four principles—body-ownership due to direct control, with an exception made for forfeiture of this right due to committing aggression,^[16] plus the three principles for external resources—are how we determine the best link, and this is the core of all property rights, and of all just law. A developed body of private law, to be just, has to be based on these core principles, and just entails working out the details as the law develops.^[17] And every socialist system, and every law not based on these core principles, including IP law, always ends up deviating from these core private property law principles in one way or another.

^[15] See “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4).

^[16] See “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith” (ch. 10) and note 18, below. See also the Libertarian Party Platform language quoted in note 27, below.

^[17] See “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13), in general, and “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law” (ch. 19), the section “Abstract Rights and Legal Precepts.” See also Hoppe’s pithy summary of these basic rules, in “A Realistic Libertarianism,” LewRockwell.com (Sept. 30, 2013; https://www.hanshoppe.com/2014/10/a-realistic-libertarianism/) and in “Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization,” at pp. 85–87, and the LP Platform language mentioned in note 27, below. As Hoppe writes in “A Realistic Libertarianism”:

But who owns what scarce resource as his private property and who does not? First: Each person owns his physical body that only he and no one else controls directly (I can control your body only in-directly, by first directly controlling my body, and vice versa) and that only he directly controls also in particular when discussing and arguing the question at hand.… [A]s for scarce resources that can be controlled only indirectly (that must be appropriated with our own nature-given, i.e., un-appropriated, body): Exclusive control (property) is acquired by and assigned to that person, who appropriated the resource in question first or who acquired it through voluntary (conflict-free) exchange from its previous owner. For only the first appropriator of a resource (and all later owners connected to him through a chain of voluntary exchanges) can possibly acquire and gain control over it without conflict, i.e., peacefully.

For elaboration of the basis for the property acquisition rules, see Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years: Looking Back and Looking Forward, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), n. [42] and accompanying text, including references such as: Kinsella, “How To Think About Property,” StephanKinsella.com (April 25, 2021); Kinsella, “The Limits of Libertarianism?: A Dissenting View” (citing Roderick Long and Robert Nozick); also idem, “KOL345 | Kinsella’s Libertarian “Constitution” or: State Constitutions vs. the Libertarian Private Law Code (PorcFest 2021),” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (June 26, 2021); and “Nobody Owns Bitcoin,” StephanKinsella.com (April 21, 2021). See also Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society (Cambridge, 2012), at ch. 2.E, pp. 64–65 , et seq., elaborating on the “baseline possessory rules” corresponding to original appropriation and contractual title transfer.

See also Gary Chartier, “Intellectual Property and Natural Law”; The Essence of Libertarianism? “Finders Keepers,” “Better Title,” and Other Possibilities

Update: Simon Guenzl, “Public Property and the Libertarian Immigration Debate,” Libertarian Papers, 8(1) (2016): 153–177, at p. 165 & n.15, writes:

Pursuant to Rothbardian philosophy, property can only come to be justly owned in one of three ways.

First, someone can homestead previously unowned property using legitimate means. Here, the individuals who compose the state cannot be held to have properly homesteaded state-claimed land because they used illegitimate means (at a minimum, stolen income) and the taxpayers have not performed any homesteading acts of their own.

Second, a person can receive property through consensual transfer from a prior legitimate owner (such as through a gift or purchase). In this case, neither individuals within the state nor the taxpayers received the state-claimed land from a prior legitimate owner, because there was none.

Third, a victim may exercise remedial claims, by force if necessary, to an aggressor’s legitimately-owned property. Here, the aggressors (individuals within the state) do not legitimately own the state-claimed land, and thus the victims’ (the taxpayers’) rights cannot extend to such property (nor can the aggressors offer the victims such property or any benefits arising from it in lieu of other enforcement action).¹⁵

^15. This method of acquiring legitimate ownership of property is not commonly articulated as the third limb of Rothbardian property rights theory, except perhaps by Kinsella (for instance, Kinsella [2014]). This may be because Kinsella has written extensively on both property rights and punishment, and thus has been able to integrate the two fields. Note that the libertarian literature characterizes remedial rights in various ways. See for instance, Randy Barnett (1977), Roger Pilon (1978), Kinsella (1997; 1998-99), and Rothbard (2002, chapter 13). In all cases, however, the literature is clear that the victim’s enforcement rights are against only the aggressor’s legitimate property (or person). Note also that the reason these remedial rights can be characterized as a third means of acquiring legitimate title to property is because, unlike homesteading and consensual transfer, this method relies on force—the aggressor would not normally yield his property rights absent the threat of force from the victim—with the distinction being that such force in response to initiated aggression is justified.

It is true that most libertarian commentators are not explicit about this “third limb,” and in recent years I have been explicit about this. But this insight is not original to me. For example:

Nozick:

The subject of justice in holdings consists of three major topics. The first is the original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things. This includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held, the process, or processes, by which unheld things may come to be held, the things that may come to be held by these processes, the extent of what comes to be held by a particular process, and so on. We shall refer to the complicated truth about this topic, which we shall not formulate here, as the principle of justice in acquisition. The second topic concerns the transfer of holdings from one person to another. By what processes may a person transfer holdings to another? How may a person acquire a holding from another who holds it? Under this topic come general descriptions of voluntary exchange, and gift and (on the other hand) fraud, as well as reference to particular conventional details fixed upon in a given society.

… If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.

… Not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the two principles of justice in holdings: the principle of justice in acquisition and the principle of justice in transfer. Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of transition from one situation to another. And some persons acquire holdings by means not sanctioned by the principle of justice in acquisition. The existence of past injustice (previous violations of the first two principles of justice in holdings) raises the third major topic under justice in holdings: the rectification of injustice in holdings. If past injustice has shaped present holdings in various ways, some identifiable and some not, what now, if anything, ought to be done to rectify these injustices? What obligations do the performers of injustice have toward those whose position is worse than it would have been had the injustice not been done? Or, than it would have been had compensation been paid promptly? How, if at all, do things change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not the direct parties in the act of injustice, but, for example, their descendants? Is an injustice done to someone whose holding was itself based upon an unrectified injustice? How far back must one go in wiping clean the historical slate of injustices? What may victims of injustice permissibly do in order to rectify the injustices being done to them, including the many injustices done by persons acting through their government? I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such issues.² Idealizing greatly, let us suppose theoretical investigation will produce a principle of rectification. This principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them (as defined by the first two principles of justice and rights against interference), and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in the society. The principle of rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate of subjunctive information about what would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description of holdings turns out not to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded must be realized.^*

^2. See, however, the useful book by Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (New York: Random House, 1973).

^* If the principle of rectification of violations of the first two principles yields more than one description of holdings, then some choice must be made as to which of these is to be realized. Perhaps the sort of considerations about distributive justice and equality that I argue against play a legitimate role in this subsidiary choice. Similarly, there may be room for such considerations in deciding which otherwise arbitrary features a statute will embody, when such features are unavoidable because other considerations do not specify a precise line; yet a line must be drawn. ²

Roderick Long (citing Nozick): Libertarian property rights are, famously, governed by principles of justice in initial appropriation (mixing one’s labour with previously unowned resources), justice in transfer (mutual consent), and justice in rectification (say, restitution plus damages). ³

Gary Chartier also elaborates on the “baseline possessory rules” corresponding to original appropriation and contractual title transfer. ⁴ In a separate section he argues in favor of restitution in the case of injuries resulting from aggression. ⁵

***

Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), ch. 9:

“In other chapters I argued that rights in our bodies stem from the fact of our direct control of our bodies, drawing on Hoppe’s arguments, while property rights in external, previously unowned resources arise from original appropriation or title transfer from a previous owner by contract or for purposes of rectification.51

51. See “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4) and “Goods, Scarce and Nonscarce” (ch. 18). See also Hoppe’s pithy summary of these basic rules, in “A Realistic Libertarianism,” LewRockwell.com (Sept. 30, 2013; https://www.hanshoppe.com/2014/10/a-realistic-libertarianism/) and in idem, “Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization,” pp. 85–87.”

The Problem with Intellectual Property, Part II.C:

The purpose of property rights is to support actors in the pursuit of their goals by enabling them to employ resources, including their own bodies, free of physical conflict and interference from other actors. Property rights are inherently practical. For this reason legal systems and their corresponding property rights from time immemorial have always exhibited certain core features in the private law, to one degree or another: self-ownership, original appropriation, contractual transfer, and transfers for rectification.

Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), ch. 2:

“The libertarian view is that individual rights—property rights—are assigned according to a few simple principles: self-ownership, in the case of human bodies; and, in the case of previously-unowned external things (conflictable resources), in accordance with principles of original appropriation, contractual title transfer, and rectification.11”

Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), ch. 4:

“FIRST USE AND HOMESTEADING OF UNOWNED RESOURCES”,

ch. 4:

“The libertarian view is that individual rights—property rights—are assigned according to a few simple principles: self-ownership, in the case of human bodies; and, in the case of previously-unowned external things (conflictable resources), in accordance with principles of original appropriation, contractual title transfer, and rectification.”

note 11:

also

“ “KOL259 | ‘How To Think About Property,’ New Hampshire Liberty Forum 2019,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Feb. 9, 2019).”

“Aggression and Property Rights Plank in the Libertarian Party Platform,” StephanKinsella.com (May 30, 2022);”

1. The term “solatium,” “compensation for emotional rather than physical or financial harm,” is sometimes used as a synonym for or in connection with restitution or rectification, and in connection with eminent domain takings. Scotland: Damages Act, §4(3)(B): “The sums of damages are–– (a) such sum as will compensate for any loss of support which as a result of the act or omission is sustained, or is likely to be sustained, by the relative after the date of A’s death together with any reasonable expenses incurred by the relative in connection with A’s funeral, and (b)such sum, if any, as the court thinks just by way of compensation for all or any of the following–– (i) distress and anxiety endured by the relative in contemplation of the suffering of A before A’s death, (ii)grief and sorrow of the relative caused by A’s death, (iii)the loss of such non-patrimonial benefit as the relative might have been expected to derive from A’s society and guidance if A had not died.” Explanatory notes: “These damages are in addition to the damages that a victim is entitled to claim under the general principles of the common law of delict or under statute for solatium, that is damages for the pain and suffering that the victim endures as a result of the injuries, and for patrimonial loss that such a victim has suffered or is likely to suffer in the period up to the expected date of death.” South Africa: “a solatium is “[a]n award for non-financial deprivation, irrespective of what form it takes”. Outside the context of restitution, an award of a solatium is similarly defined as an award for sentimental damages that is “intended to neutralise the wounded feelings of the plaintiff of having to suffer a wrongful act.” Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa [2014] ZACC 22, n.8; see also Shah and Others v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform and Others (LCC93/2014) [2024] ZALCC 41 (6 December 2024), p.9: “Solatium is compensation awarded for injury to the feelings.” Re eminent domain takings: India: SC Upholds Retrospective Application of 2019 Ruling on Solatium; Umamaheswari and Latha, “Doctrine of Eminent Domain in India,” International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics 120, no. 5 (2018): 1771–1780. [↩]
2.  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), ch. 7, §1, pp. 150–153. [↩]
3. See my post The Limits of Libertarianism?: A Dissenting View; Long, Why Libertarians Believe There is Only One Right. [↩]
4. Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society (Cambridge, 2012), at ch. 2.E, pp. 64–65, et seq. [↩]
5. Ibid., ch. 5.I, 5.C.1, 5.C.2, pp. 263, 265, 266 et seq. [↩]

Against Intellectual Property has been translated into Farsi (Persian):  کینسلا، استفن (۱۴۰۱). علیه مالکیت فکری. ترجمه محمد جوادی. تهران:‌ نشر آماره. ۱۸۸.

Trans. Mohammad (Amir) Javadi, Alayh-e Malekiat-e Fekri (Tehran: Amareh Press, 2022). (online) [continue reading…]

Interesting post by Jake Desyllas. See below.

Update: see also A Critique of Stephan Kinsella’s Approach To Rights Theory August 6, 2025. Quick comment: he criticizes my approach to rights in ch. 4 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society, but it’s not clear what he disagrees with in my conclusion. Does he thinks that we do not have rights at all, or that we never acquire them? I’d be curious to see where he thinks my motivated reasoning was wrong, or what about it is incorrect other than how I got there.

I think a case can be made for rights, that they have to do with our nature as rational agents, and so on. I was talking to libertarians who already accept humans (a) have rights, and that (b) they must have them for some reason, and thus, (c) they must arise at some point. If you want to deny humans have rights, that rights can be justified, or that aggression can be justified, or that we have right but never acquire them or that we have them for no reason at all…. okay, let’s see it. Have at it. It seems uncontroversial to me to ask when and why we have rights, taking for granted that normal adult humans do have rights, when talking to people who already agree that adult humans have rights. But I obviously do not object to arguments about why rational adult human actors have rights, as I argue elsewhere (e.g. ch. 5, 6, etc. of Legal Foundations of a Free Society).

I do not know what he means that rights are inherent. Inherent in what? In being human? What about other forms of intelligent life? See:

• • KOL443 | Abortion: A Radically Decentralist Approach (PFS 2024)
  • Block, “Does Trespassing Require Human Action? Rejoinder to Kinsella and Armoutidis an Evictionism”
  • KOL465: Sheldon Richman on Corporations, Limited Liability, Price Controls, Thickism, Abortion, Pipes

h/t John Riganti

Dear Mr. Kinsella:

[continue reading…]

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 435.

I was interviewed by Daniel Morena Vitón and Luis Abram for a Spanish libertarian podcast, as he initially told me: “The interview is about some legal questions of libertarianism, for a new libertarian association in Spain founded by Jesús Huerta de Soto, the ‘Austrian Libertarian Association.'” I believe there were technical problems with the recording of the first question or two, so I was asked to repeat my answer near the end; sure how they ended stitching this together or editing this.

From their shownotes (Google autotranslate):

Stephan Kinsella will give the keys regarding various topics from intellectual issues that concern libertarianism such as intellectual property and the challenges that it entails, as well as more current topics such as libertarians in politics or the current libertarian parties that the political landscape houses.

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