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Der Volkswirt: gegründet 1926

Der Hoppeninator sent me this. I can’t read civilized languages, so I can only guess what this is about. From a magazine Wirtschafts Woche, apparently discussing the issue of whether state-granted patent rights are “necessary” for there to be innovation, in particular to produce a Covid-19 vaccine. It apparently references counterarguments by me and even somehow mentions Rothbard.

Geistiges Eigentum

Update: A partial translation by my friend Aaron Kahland:

“The American patent attorney, Stephan Kinsella calls for an end to state protection for intellectual property. Intellectual goods are, in contrast to physical property, not scarce goods. For example, a countless number of companies could produce medicines using the same recipe without that formula being denied to the original inventor. Therefore, in the case of idea-goods (don’t think there is a term in English for this) there is no need for property laws to prevent consumption via rivalry (of that property): Patents and copyright law are (he quotes you here) ‘cannot be justified in being protected by the state via monopoly rights to generate artificial scarcities where none existed before.’

“Furthermore, these restrict the property rights of others. For example, pharmaceutical companies cannot produce medicines protected by patents, singers are unable to make commercial use of their voices by singing songs of other artists. In short, patents and copyright rights create (quotes you again) ‘controlling and joint-ownership of the physical property of others.'”

 

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 290.

This my appearance on the Liberty412 podcast, with host Mike Cuneo. We discussed a variety of topics, from the philosophy of property rights and the problem with IP, to coronavirus, racism, the prospects of liberty and anarchy, activism, and the like. We also detour into other issues like the Fermi Paradox and theories about the Industrial Revolution.

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 289.

[Update: Transcript appended below]

This is my appearance on the Scottish Liberty Podcast from May 30, 2020, with hosts Antony Sammeroff and Tom Laird. We discussed IP and related matters, including Sammeroff’s recent debate on the topic of IP with pro-IP Randian law professor Adam Mossoff. See various links, embeds, notes below. This was the second take, and entitled “A Sober Conversation with Stephan Kinsella…,” because we had previously recorded a discussion on May 24, 2020, in which I was a bit drunk and went off on a rant. The episode was entitled “Under the Influence… of Stephan Kinsella… Against Intellectual Property”. We then recorded this current episode on May 30, 2020.

[Update: I recently (March 2021) realized I never posted the initial episode, so have just posted it as KOL326 | Scottish Liberty Podcast: Discussing the Mossoff-Sammeroff IP Debate, Take 1: Under the Influence…]

See various links, embeds, notes below.

Youtube of the current discussion:

Youtube of the initial discussion, now posted at KOL326:

Antony’s previous debate with Mossoff:

In his remarks, Mossoff mentioned this paper by Stephen Haber as supporting the empirical case for patents (funny, I thought the Objectivists had principles): Stephen Haber, “Patents and the Wealth of Nations,” 23 Geo. Mason L.Rev. 811 (2016). I have read through it as much as I can stand and provide my critical commentary here:  “The Overwhelming Empirical Case Against Patent and Copyright”–see in particular note 3 and accompanying text.

Transcript

Scottish Liberty Podcast: Discussing the Mossoff-Sammeroff IP Debate, Take 2: A Sober Conversation With Stephan Kinsella (May 30, 2020)

[Transcript of “Scottish Liberty Podcast: Discussing the Mossoff-Sammeroff IP Debate, Take 2: A Sober Conversation (May 30, 2020)]

00:00:01

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Greetings people of planet Earth.  It must be episode 156 of the Scottish Liberty Podcast with me, Antony Sammeroff, and that ranty, ranty man, Tom Laird, back with us again.

00:00:15

TOM LAIRD: Thank you.

00:00:15

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Sorry.

00:00:16

TOM LAIRD: I’m free.

00:00:17

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: He’s free.  The excellent, the extraordinary Stephan Kinsella.  Don’t mispronounce it Stephen.  Don’t be that guy.  Don’t be that guy.  Only an idiot would do that.  Thank you for joining us.

00:00:33

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Glad to be here with all four of us.  You said there was you, Antony Sammeroff, Tom, and me, so that’s four.

00:00:39

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Excellent.

00:00:41

STEPHAN KINSELLA: I only see three people though.

00:00:43

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: So we’re going to talk about – you only – for those tuning in on Facebook and YouTube see that I kind of look weird because I’m trying this digital background.  But Zoom thinks that my face is part of the background, so I look…

00:00:57

STEPHAN KINSELLA: I think you’re triggering a lot of light-epilepsy people right now.

00:01:00

TOM LAIRD: I think it’s because your head looks like a planetoid.

00:01:02

00:01:04

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: I am the moon, the orbits, the Earth.

00:01:07

STEPHAN KINSELLA: He looks like a Marvel character like Ego the Living Planet or something.

00:01:12

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: So I guess we’re going to talk about IP and stuff like that.

00:01:17

TOM LAIRD: Whoa.

00:01:17

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: That’s crazy.  As some people know, probably heard a couple of weeks ago, I was debating this Adam Mossoff guy.  And there may have been some conversation that we had once before, but we don’t talk about that anymore because…

00:01:32

TOM LAIRD: Did he laugh at any point during the…

00:01:34

00:01:37

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: But let’s just say that there were some things that could have been said in that discussion that we never speak of – we don’t talk about anymore that weren’t discussed.  So I guess a good place to start would be what – you said one of the things annoying about Adam Mossoff is he never actually defines IP. So what – how would you – how do you define IP?

00:02:02

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, so this is – all right, the definition is intellectual property refers to a set of legal rights that – it’s like an umbrella term that covers four or five different types of statutory – mostly statutory rights, which are all not really related.  So it basically just is a term that people came up with to lump together some different types of law like the patent system, which covers inventions, and the copyright system, which covers artistic and creative works, and then the trademark system, which covers sources of goods and names, brand names, things like that, and then the trade secret system, which has some rights related to keeping secrets that you want your employees not to tell other people, things like that, and then maybe one or two other special things in modern times.

00:02:57

So they’re always – in a way they’re loosely related, and the reason the term bothers me is because it’s a propaganda term.  It was a new term that was invented I think in the 1800s when these new statutory systems, which were independent, the patent system and the copyright system, say, in the US, 17—I think—90, right after the Constitution – the US Constitution was ratified in 1789.  The very next year the Congress started enacting patent and copyright laws.  And they were thought of and characterized as monopoly privilege grants, and some people were in favor and some were opposed.  But no one had any doubt that they were just special monopoly privilege grants by the state for a particular purpose to incentivize innovation or something like that, which is why they only lasted in the beginning for about 14 years, like a finite time.

00:03:59

They were temporary things sort of like infant industry protections or tariffs, how they protect local industries.  No one thinks of these things as natural rights or property rights.  So then the free market economists in the 1800s started getting alarmed at the rise over the world, in the modern world, of the prevalence of patent and copyright, these monopoly privileges.  And so the people that were entrenched in industries depending upon these by now, the publishers, inventors of light bulbs, and these kind of new industries, things like this – they started defending these systems not on the utilitarian grounds, which is really the main justification given, but saying that, oh no, they’re not artificial monopoly privileges because everyone was getting skeptical of monopolies, even natural monopolies or free market monopolies or government-granted monopolies, whatever.

00:05:06

So they didn’t want to call them monopolies.  They didn’t want to call them what they are, which is government-granted privileges.  So they started calling them – they said, no, they’re property rights, and everyone said, well, if it’s a property right, as Antony pointed out in his opening comments in the debate, there’s not a scarcity thing.  Like there’s not a possibility of conflict.  Anyone can use these ideas at the same time, so how is it a property right, and why does it only last for 17 years, 14 years?  And nowadays copyright has been extended from the original 14 years to 100+ years.  It’s crazy.

00:05:43

TOM LAIRD: Wow.

00:05:43

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Why would – if it’s a property right, why would it expire at a certain arbitrary time?  And so the counter to that was, well, it’s a property right, but it’s a special type of property right.  It’s an intellectual, so they added the word intellectual to explain why it’s different and it has to be treated differently in the law.  But they want to call it a property right, which Mossoff did repeatedly.  He just kept saying it’s a property right because you can license it.  It has an economic value.  You can sell it.  But that is just not an argument for why the law is a good idea.  I mean you could – I mean honestly you could make the same argument about child slavery in the antebellum south in America.

00:06:25

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: That’s a good example.

00:06:26

STEPHAN KINSELLA: They were – slaves were property.  They could be traded.  They had a market value.  They contributed to the operation of plantations.  And you could ask all kinds of questions like instead of coming up with an argument justifying slavery and instead of responding directly to someone who explains why slavery is immoral and wrong, you could just come up with a fake rhetorical question.  And you could say but who would pick the cotton, which is not really a sincere question because that’s not really what they’re asking.

00:07:05

If you say, but who would pick the cotton, what you’re really saying is we all take it for granted that the cotton has to be picked.  That’s our ultimate value, so whatever you propose, you’re going to have to guarantee that the cotton will be picked.  So unless you can prove to me that the – your free market system abolishing slavery is still going to result in cotton being picked, you haven’t satisfied your burden of proof to me to get rid of slavery, which is exactly what Mossoff and these guys are saying when they say things like, well, how would you have – how would a novelist make money?  How would a pharmaceutical company recoup their cost without IP law?  So they ask this question, but the question is a loaded question because it takes for granted some assumptions that I don’t share and that free market economists don’t share because we don’t think there’s a guarantee to a profit, and there’s no guarantee to recoup the costs of your investment.  I mean what the hell is that?  So one reason, and my last thing, and I’m going to stop – shut up in a second because I talked over you guys, and I ranted.  I kept changing my subject many times.  I was so irritated because…

00:08:18

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: I didn’t notice.

00:08:19

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well – he has – he poses as – he doesn’t – so he acts like we’re all friends, like we’re on the same side.  Like you and he, it’s a jolly little friendly debating club.  But it’s not – I mean the reason I got so annoyed by his laughing at the absurd examples people will say – so someone will say, well, maybe someone will use trademark, and they will get a trademark on COVID.  And then he laughs, and it’s like, yeah, but this is – you’re laughing as if you’re in on the joke.  But you’re really in support of a legal system that does lead to these absurd consequences.

00:09:13

And I gave up cataloguing on – I had a website – I had a post which I would update every few months.  It was called the Trademark, Copyright, and Patent Horror Files.  I just gave up updating it because every month there’s just another insane example, someone going to prison for uploading a Wolverine movie, people dying of Fabry’s disease because there’s only one manufacturer of the drug because they have a patent on it, the guy that invented RSS, which we’re benefiting from by podcasting and all this stuff, Aaron Swarz committing suicide because he was facing basically a life in prison for uploading some academic articles to the internet using a Columbia University internet connection.  And you can dismiss these examples, and then so Mossoff’s reply would be something like – every time you would come up with an example, Antony, he would say something like, well, there’s abuses in regular property law too.  Or it’s not perfect either, or there’s gray areas too, or the courts might get it wrong from time to time.

00:10:24

So he keeps wanting to push it back into this analogy or metaphor and to show that it’s like property rights, which is just – he’s actually kind of correct.  Lawyers are good at making money.  They will adapt to a system, and they will – and then the business people will find a way to profit off of the given legal rules.  I’m sure that people made money off of selling uniforms to the Nazi guards for the concentration camps during the Nazi German period.

00:10:57

TOM LAIRD: Yeah, Hugo Boss.

00:10:58

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Okay.

00:10:58

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: There was a…

00:11:01

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Volkswagens and chemical suppliers, Zycon, the whole deal.  It’s like…

00:11:06

TOM LAIRD: IBM.

00:11:06

STEPHAN KINSELLA: People make money.  So what?

00:11:10

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: There’s plenty of corporations and…

00:11:11

STEPHAN KINSELLA: So what?

00:11:11

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: There’s a couple of things there.  I mean a lot of things that have been considered to be public goods have been shown to be able to provide – be provided by the market.  I mean obviously people would think how is a radio station going to charge its customers, but they put ads on?  I think the argument that he might have made against your – because one of my arguments would have been I couldn’t throw it in because it was strapped for time.  But it’s like, look.  Millions of people are dying in Africa because they can’t ship generic cheap medications because of copyright and patent laws – patent laws rather.  Millions of people are dying, and I think his argument was, well, you could say the same.  There’s billionaires in the world, and we could just say millions of people are dying because we don’t shoot Jeff Bezos down to $1 billion and give the rest of his money to Africa.

00:12:10

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well not – so not just that, but if you take this argument – I mean, first of all, what is an objectivist?  Because objectivists used to be kind of principled.  They were minarchists.  Okay, let’s grant them that.  I can forgive Ayn Rand and her followers of their minarchism.  But at least they were serious minarchists except for the IP issue.  That was their big mistake I think, but they at least had principles.  But when did this principle come about that the way we evaluate whether we ought to have a law or whether it’s a good law is whether or not some policy goal is reached like enough – so, for example, you could argue, like some people do, like literally and some free-market types do.  I can send you links to this.  It’s astounding.

00:12:53

Instead of having or in addition to having – it depends upon who you talk to – instead of having a patent system, which gives some kind of property rights-like incentive system allegedly to people innovating because they’re able to recoup their costs by basically using the force of the government to stop competition for 17 years, so that’s the idea.  You could have government subsidies of innovation.

00:13:22

Now, I think even Terrence Keeley, who is a friend and pretty good on this and Boldrin and Lavine who are the kind of free market utilitarian guys who are argue the empirical argument against patent and IP in their book Against Intellectual Monopoly.  Even they sort of lean because they have these utilitarian or consequentialist leanings.  And they’ll say, well, it would be more efficient or maybe better if the government just subsidized innovation with basically a system of prizes or awards, which they do already, by the way, with the military industrial complex and with the National Science Foundation like the US.  And I mean they’re already doing that, but the point is this.  According to the theory, this utilitarian theory of IP advocates like Alex Tabarrok and Richard Epstein, these kind of guys and the – even the more mainstream guys like Stiglitz and these guys – they think that if – with no patent law, let’s say, you’d have some innovation.

00:14:31

They’re not dishonest or stupid enough to say that no one would ever invent anything, or they wouldn’t say that no one would ever, ever paint a painting or write a song or write a novel without copyright law.  What they say, the more honest ones – they’re a little bit more sophisticated – is they say that there’s a certain amount of production, but it’s an underproduction because they believe in this public goods argument, this market failure argument basically.  They think that the existence of this free rider problem and the inability to recoup your costs because people can copy – compete with you too easily because they have to copy your formula or whatever instead of making a new factory that competes with your car factory.

00:15:14

They have to – all they have to do is copy the formula, which is not true by the way.  This is not – you can’t just compete with someone by copying what they did.  This is also all false.  But the point is they think that there’s a suboptimal amount of production of intellectual goods in a state of nature, let’s say, or even in a minarchist government with no IP law.  But you can go – you can increase that amount by having a reasonable amount of patent and copyright protection.  But if you go beyond that, then you start hurting it.  So they think of this bell curve idea, and there’s an optimum, and most of them have this intuitive sense that we’re too far on the wrong side of it.

00:15:52

If you ask Mossoff, he probably would admit that 130 years for copyright term when it used to be 14 is maybe a little bit too long.  He might say that.  He might even admit that 17 years for a patent is too long for some industries.  But he probably doesn’t want to cede the ground right now, and some people in his camp are so consistent and principled they basically advocate infinite or perpetual terms.  But they’re the ones that are consistent like Lysander Spooner and some Randians that I know.  They actually advocate – and J. Neil Schulman, my friend who died last year.  They advocated basically infinite terms at least for copyright if not for patent.

00:16:36

TOM LAIRD: But it would seem absurd to me.  For example, I could decide that I’m going to go out tomorrow and I’m going to sell a whole load of sandwiches.  So I sit in my house.  I buy the bread, and I buy everything, and I make a whole shitload of sandwiches.  I go out in the street.  I set up my stall, and lo and behold, who’s just set up a stall 10 yards down the road from me?  Oh it’s Sammeroff, and he’s managed to source his bread cheaper than I did, and he managed to source his ham cheaper than I did, and he’s selling the sandwiches cheaper than I did, and suddenly I’m at a loss because nobody is buying my sandwiches.  Somebody should have to recoup.  How do I recoup the cost of making all those sandwiches?

00:17:16

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Right.

00:17:16

TOM LAIRD: Or you don’t.

00:17:17

STEPHAN KINSELLA: And the honest answer to that question is when you say this people think you’re being a smartass or you’re being – but the answer is you’re business – your failed business model is not my problem.  I mean…

00:17:30

TOM LAIRD: Correct.

00:17:30

STEPHAN KINSELLA: The point of law and justice in libertarian theory is to favor a set of conditions that give everyone security of property rights that would generate a free market and probably capitalism of some type if it was allowed to flower.  And then within that system, it’s up to you to figure out how to make a profit.  Let me finish that thought, but let me return to one thing I forgot to finish.

00:17:57

So the point I was making about this bell curve idea is that even according to the best interpretation of these utilitarians, which I think Mossoff really is even though – so Richard Epstein is more like an honest advocate of IP law from a utilitarian perspective and Alex Tabarrok, these kind of guys.  But Mossoff pretends like he think it’s a right or a natural right, which is, by the way, dishonest and wrong.  It’s wrong. I won’t say it’s dishonest.  His interpretation of Jefferson and Locke – I think if you look at the scholarship.  There’s a guy named Ronan Deazley.  He may be Scottish.  I’m not sure.  But the literature is pretty clear that no one thought of IP rights as natural rights.  And just because you can call them a property right and then – that doesn’t mean it is.

00:18:45

But here’s my point.  Even the best interpretation of this argument that we need to have some limited term of monopolistic protection of your ideas so you can recoup your cost and so there’s a bell curve.  It’s the maximum.  The point is – so imagine this pharmaceutical example that they keep throwing out.  And that was the whole impetus of the debate was about the development of drugs, and let’s get back to that too in a second.  Let me keep – I need a device that can help me unstack my stuff like in a reverse Polish notation, fourth language or something.  I can remember where I left off and recourse myself.

00:19:23

But the – so the point is according to, say, Mossoff’s theory and all of his colleagues’ theory, you’d have an underproduction of, say, innovation in pharmaceuticals if you don’t have a patent system because there are just some drugs that are too expensive to do R&D on that you might lose money on.  And if you – at the margin, if you can’t get a few extra hundred million dollars because of – with a patent protection safety valve plus this – what did you call it, Antony?  Green – something green feeling or green.

00:20:00

TOM LAIRD: Evergreen.

00:20:01

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Evergreening.

00:20:02

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Evergreening.  By adding new improvements or using the FDA system itself to sort of extend your patent even when the patent is expired.  Like that drug patent that this guy got in the US about three years ago, and he raised the price by 10,000%.  Everyone accused patents of that, but it was already off of patents, but it was still protected by an FDA monopoly, which is like the patent.  So there’s ways of basically you’re right.

00:20:28

Anyway, the point is even according to Mossoff’s theory, there are some pharmaceutical innovations at the margin even with a patent reward being added on that won’t get made.  So logically the government should come in and have a trillion-dollar bonus system to give people rewards, which the government is flirting with doing right now with all these companies searching for vaccines.  They’re talking about, well, we have to incentivize them, and so in other words, what if the incentive provided by the patent system, which is at best an extra incentive on top of the free market incentive, what if that’s not enough?  So there’s always innovations that we’re missing out on because the government is just not doing enough to tweak things in the failures of market – free-market capitalism.  But, to be honest, does that sound like an argument Ayn Rand would be making?  I mean she was the ultra capitalist.  What the hell is this stuff, this market failure stuff?

00:21:31

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: The same sword slices both ways as well because you can say, well, without the guarantee of a patent who’s putting up the money to research that drug.  But the same argument goes the other way.  Well, whether patent, who’s going to bother to put up the money to research that drug when someone might just beat them by a couple of weeks?

00:21:52

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, that was the thing…

00:21:54

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: That’s a deterrent.

00:21:54

STEPHAN KINSELLA: So you brought that up, and he didn’t address – so…

00:21:58

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: He squirmed out of that kind of by saying, well…

00:22:01

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Yeah.  So right now, we have, what, 200 companies around the world, maybe more.  They’re all searching for a vaccine.  Now, why are they doing it?  I don’t know.  Is it humanitarian?  Is it eleemosynary?  Is it for profit?  Is it in the hopes that they will be the first and get a patent?  I mean I’m not actually even clear, but the point is, like you said, what if there’s the 201st company that’s like fuck it.  I’m not even going to try because even if I put all this money into it, if someone else files the patent first then I won’t be able to do even what I’ve invented.  And so it clearly – you can imagine cases where it dissuades innovation.  But back to, Tom, your example about the sandwich shop or something, so here’s the essence I think of one of the mistakes that’s made by the IP guys.

00:22:54

And see, here’s what annoys me is that they – people like them will call people like me a commie or a socialist.  If you’re against IP, it’s because you’re for idea communism and because you don’t appreciate the importance of the intellect and all this stuff.  It’s like, you know, I don’t believe that I should own my wife or my son’s love for me or the memories of my grandfather.  But because I don’t think I should own them doesn’t mean I think they’re not important.  It’s just – there’s a – so that’s number one.  Just because something is not an ownable, tradable good doesn’t mean that you don’t value it.  I mean we value – I mean the Randians value abstract philosophy and physics research, but those things are not covered by the patent system.  Or mathematics, right?  Oh so does that mean that because they would agree that the patent system doesn’t cover mathematical algorithms, the laws of physics and philosophical research, because they’re too abstract to be covered, does that mean that they don’t value philosophy, math, and physics?  No.  So the whole – that whole premise is ridiculous.

00:24:01

But – so here’s the fundamental point.  The example you gave is normal free market competition, and what we sometimes forget is that, yeah, we all cheer on a harmonious system of rules that allows us to live in society with each other.  And then it generates the possibility of cooperation, living in civilization with other people, the division of labor, trade, and yes, competition and the possibility of profit and rising standards of living, all that kind of stuff.  But one thing that we can sort of lose sight of is that profit is an unnatural thing because the natural rate of profit, the market is always tending towards some kind of equilibrium.

00:24:46

It’s never reached because it’s always changing.  It’s dynamic, but whenever you make a profit that’s like an unnatural thing.  Anything that’s above the natural rate of interest is sort of unnatural, and what you’re doing is you’re sending a signal out by the price system to the world because everything you do is public when you have a market.  It’s all public.  Hey, this guy has a sandwich shop or a pizza delivery shop or a new way of doing A, B, or C making vehicles that are self-powered, something like that.  If it’s profitable, that means that you’re pleasing your customers, which is a good thing.

00:25:23

But everyone knows that this is short-lived.  You can’t rely upon a God-given right to have this 28% profit margin for the next 1000 years because there are going to be competitors that will see what you’re doing.  And they will mimic you, and they will start, what we call it, competing with you.  And we’re all used to that, but the thing is we all think – we all see a certain amount of friction in that process because, for someone to – Antony to come up with a competing sandwich shop, he has to hire people, come up with a design, rent the shop, come up with the capital to do it.  It might take him a couple of years, so for awhile you have sort of this – it’s easier for you to make a higher profit than it will be later.  That’s just the way it works.

00:26:14

TOM LAIRD: Kind of mating season I believe they call it.

00:26:16

STEPHAN KINSELLA: But what the IP guys think is that for some industries, a much heavier percentage of your – of the value proposition that you’re counting on is based upon a simple design or a replicable pattern or information as opposed to scarce resources that are part of your capital goods and machinery.  So in other words, if you’re a millionaire because you sell Harry Potter novels, then it’s true that the value of the paper on the books is pretty small compared to what you can sell the impatterned book for.  That is, a book with the ink arranged in a certain way to spell certain words that people want to buy.

00:26:58

And the ideas – so here’s the idea that the IP guys are saying.  They’re saying that in the normal free market competition can be tolerated because it’s not that easy to compete with people, and so you have a resting period.  You can make a new idea, and if it works you can make some profit for awhile, and you can just take a breath and sigh and relieve yourself and just I can make money for awhile before I have to worry about these irritating competitors.  But if you’re making something that is easier to replicate like a pharmaceutical allegedly, which again is not that easy to replicate, or a book or a song, something that other people can easily compete with, they get nervous.

00:27:48

In other words, they think if it gets too easy to compete with you then the government needs to come in and slow down competition.  They need to put barriers – this is exactly why they – the more honest ones, they call this IP law is the imposition of artificial scarcity.  So in real property and in scarce things, tangible objects, there is actual scarcity, and it results in this slower competition process and results in the jerky world that we live in where profit is possible.  You can maintain it for awhile, but then gradually your profit margins get eroded down to the natural rate of interest, and people compete with you, and you have to keep innovating and pleasing your customers and staying on top of things.  But for goods that are more intellectual-based or pattern-based, it’s just too easy.  That’s just intolerable.  It’s just too easy for people to compete with us, so we need to impose a scarcity where none exists in the realm of ideas to make it work more like the tangible world of trade that we’re used to.

00:28:58

TOM LAIRD: Well, even with…

00:28:58

STEPHAN KINSELLA: So they’re basically trying to take half of human action.  Human action is the use of scarce resources, which are naturally scarce and we have to economize, and the use of ideas and information that makes us more profitable and use things more efficiently over time.  They’re trying to hamper the second part, which is naturally infinite and abundant.  They’re trying to intentionally hobble it just so that it resembles the other, which is why Mossoff says that it’s a property right.  He’s right.  The government has treated it like a property right.  It’s possible for the government to do that.  Congratulations.

00:29:37

TOM LAIRD: But that’s kind of actually – kind of also creeps in on what you call physical trade and everybody’s job is suddenly – oh mine’s special.  Yeah, I get it.  We should have a free market, but when it comes to this particular thing that I do, that’s kind of different and I need tariffs to protect myself.  Everything else – everybody else’s job I understand.  Definitely there should be competition.  But in what I do, that’s really special, and that needs protected.  And I think it’s just an extension of that to artistic types, and the artistic types have got their special thing that you don’t understand and that needs to be protected.  It’s different.  And I think Ayn Rand was one of them.  Because she was a writer, she was – she wanted her books to be protected, and because Ayn Rand said it, the objectivists believe it.  It’s really that simple because whatever Ayn Rand said is the word of God.

00:30:41

STEPHAN KINSELLA: I mean what if – let me ask.  What if a poet told Adam Mossoff right now because do you think poets make any money now under a copyright system?  Poets don’t make any money.  Everyone knows that.  Okay, maybe they do, but do you know how they do?  By becoming songwriters or something.  They basically use their skills in another – they find a way.  They leverage it.  But the point is copyright law doesn’t guarantee that everything is going to be successful.

00:31:07

Okay, if I write a book of poetry, I can use copyright law to sue someone and use the power of the court to prevent them from copying it, like anyone really wants to anyway.  But copyright law doesn’t guarantee that poets make any income.  So what if some hippy-dippy poet guy told Mossoff, well, under the system right now of western capitalism where everything is profit-oriented and people only care about blah, blah, blah, your copyright system doesn’t guarantee me an income.  But you don’t think poetry is not important, do you?  So why don’t we have the National – I don’t even know, the National Endowment for Humanities should give grants to deserving poets and people of merit so that this work is not lost for the ages, blah, blah, blah.  I mean…

00:31:57

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Don’t give them ideas, Stephan.

00:31:59

STEPHAN KINSELLA: You know what?  Everything I say they actually already say, so I’ve got a couple I’ve thought of, and I’m afraid of posting some of them because I might give them my ideas.

00:32:08

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: So it’s particularly interesting from the Randians because Atlas Shrugged is absolutely full of examples of inferior businessmen running to the government to get protections on their industry.  One of the interesting things is after the debate someone posted to me on Twitter most charitably, hey, Antony, if you don’t believe in intellectual property, why do you have books on Amazon?  I didn’t give the question an honest answer because I didn’t think it was an honest question.  I think the guy was…

00:32:42

STEPHAN KINSELLA: It’s not.  It’s not.  It was confused at best.

00:32:42

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: The guy was just kind of being a dick.  But – well, it doesn’t look very good to me if I don’t have books on Amazon.  That’s one of the main places where people search your name, but hey, people don’t actually know how hard it is to get your books to people.  If someone is going to fucking forge copies of Universal Basic Income – For and Against and go and sell them like they do in – where I was in India, lots of copies of well-known books stacked up to sell people.  They reprint them.  Hey, that was good for me.  I’d like the word to get out to as many people as possible.  I – Nine Inch Nails managed to make a profit when this whole Napster started – thing started by connecting with fans, and they just released (indiscernible_00:33:31) released a dual-case box set thing.  And if you were a super fan, you could get an exclusive performance for a couple of grand and stuff like that.  So people find ways to…

00:33:43

TOM LAIRD: They just have to box a bit more clever.

00:33:45

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: People – yeah, people need to find ways to monetize things.  They found ways to monetize the radio era waves.  If you’ve written a great book and lots of people read it, you can crowd fund it and say, do you know what?  Realistically I need 80 grand to take the – to take a year and a half off to write this book, and people will find ways.

00:34:05

STEPHAN KINSELLA: There’s a great quote by Francis Ford Coppola who’s – the – is he The Godfather guy or one of these guys.

00:34:13

TOM LAIRD: He’s The Godfather and Apocalypse Now.

00:34:15

STEPHAN KINSELLA: So he’s got this kind of offhand comment about when you try to make it as a new young hustler or artist, maybe you wake up at 4 in the morning and you write your novel for three hours.  And then you go to work for your day job.  And so basically he was saying that maybe one method is just be your own benefactor.  I mean that’s what I do.  Everything I – like this podcast.  I’m not getting paid for this.  Why am I doing this?

00:34:43

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Why the fuck are we doing it?

00:34:44

00:34:46

STEPHAN KINSELLA: But that’s the point.  This should be impossible according to these guys that think everything has to be – it’s part of – everyone has a complex life, and they support their own values.  They go to church or they go to museums, or they go to an art show, and they basically have a job doing this during the day, and they make – and they combine their activities.  And they basically subsidize things that they like.  There’s a breakdown between consumption and leisure.

00:35:14

But let me go back to your Atlas example because this is interesting.  For some reason The Fountainhead is the first book I read that sort of got me on this road.  But now I can’t stand The Fountainhead because everything about it drives me nuts.  It’s not libertarian.  It’s basically a weird, narcissistic guy who hates his clients and won’t listen to what they want and quasi-rapes a woman and also engages in intellectual property terrorism.  He blows up this – someone else’s property.  Okay, granted it’s a state-sponsored project, but he was involved in it, so if anything, he’s guilty.  I mean – but so the whole thing is not libertarian at all.

00:36:01

TOM LAIRD: I think Antony’s friend called it the book in which everybody in it’s a dick for no apparent reason.

00:36:06

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Right.  I mean the only thing about it is it does teach some young people who are looking for some excuse to be – to stand up for themselves and to be individual.

00:36:19

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: The best review I saw on Amazon was someone who’s like, I’m an architect, and due to this shitty book there’s so many people that commented in the architecture field willing to do whatever they want.  And it’s just drawn a bunch of assholes to become architects.  There’s also parts that I love in The Fountainhead.   But I still don’t see why Howard Roark couldn’t have just built one or two shitty buildings to make himself a millionaire.  And then he could make all the crazy modern art that he wanted.  It’s really funny because Ayn Rand hated Schoenberg, the atonal composer.  She just hated atonal music.  But if she had actually taken the time to study the philosophy of atonal music when it came out, it was literally the philosophy of Howard Roark.  It was like all…

00:37:07

STEPHAN KINSELLA: That’s interesting.

00:37:08

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Their ideology was all about that not staying where the movements – not stagnating in music, moving things forward.  Their music was like Howard Roark’s crazy buildings that no one liked because they’re literally monstrous.

00:37:27

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, to her credit and to her followers’ credit, they’re a little bit vague about – they’re not insistent that her aesthetic theory is like an ironclad part of her – like her core philosophy is just the formative branch as you know: ethics, metaphysics, what, epistemology, and politics.  But aesthetics, sort of like her romantic realism and all this stuff, they sort of admit that that was more of her opinion than really…

00:37:55

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Yeah, but I mean I saw her in an interview saying something – I think it was realism.  It wasn’t art.  And she said, and I can explain to you why it’s not art.  So she did actually believe that.  I think romantic…

00:38:07

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, no.  She did think that – she thought art was a selective recreation of reality, so I guess realism would be if there’s nothing selective about it, you’re not selecting anything.  Like a photograph – some people argue that photographs shouldn’t have had copyright protection because you’re just depicting a fact about the universe.  But then people started saying, well, there’s some original skill involved in selecting the angle and the lighting and the shutter speed and the film grain or whatever.  I think it’s all nonsense, but no.  So let me just – but on Atlas, Atlas is way better I believe.

00:38:44

It’s got a few pro-patent themes, but they’re kind of muted, and they’re not dominant.  Atlas is way more libertarian and a way better book from our point of view I think than Fountainhead.  But there’s a couple of interesting things about it.  So she does have a couple things where the government is portrayed as evil because they’re taking Rearden’s patents for his Rearden medal.  But – and that echoes what Mossoff was sort of saying about the – some of the pharmaceutical patent issues.  But when he was talking about the Wright Brothers example and he was trying to say that that example has been debunked, and we can get into that if you want.  I think is entire explanation for that is just fallacious.

00:39:33

00:39:36

TOM LAIRD: You can expand on that if you want.

00:39:38

STEPHAN KINSELLA: It’s a loaded – so what Antony pointed out was this commonly given example that the US aviation industry was delayed and impeded for a decade or two.

00:39:52

TOM LAIRD: As was the car industry.

00:39:53

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Right because of patent battles by the Wright Brothers and things like that.  And by the time of World War I, the French and I think he even mentioned the Turks, which I didn’t know about, they had already been more advanced because they weren’t subject to US patents, you see, so it’s a regional system.  It’s a national system.  Anyway, so – and then apparently what I’m gathering – I don’t know the history in detail of this, and the guy is talking on it like Antony and Mossoff are not really deep patent law experts.

00:40:23

So I’m not sure exactly, but I think what you were saying – I think what happened was probably around World War I or something after that, Roosevelt or whoever was in charge – they came together and they had some regulation or some law where they basically forced what is like a compulsory patent license on the industry until the ‘70s.  Okay, and Mossoff sort of refers to that as like, oh so the Roosevelt administration, which was socialist, came up with this fake story to justify taking their property.  But you understand that the government has been granting these patent privilege monopolies, and if the government restricts their scope, that’s not taking a property.

00:41:09

It’s reducing an unjustified privilege they had granted before.  And furthermore, he mentioned right after that that – like the US aviation industry continued to be the pioneer of the world for decades.  Presumably I think he means after World War I until the ‘70s, but that was during the period where the patents were, according to him, obliterated.  So it’s like, well, how could the US industry be so innovative for 40 years, 50 years if the patents had been hobbled by Roosevelt?  It’s like the whole story makes no sense.

00:41:48

But on Atlas let me just say one thing.  You have at the end, if you remember, this Judge Narragansett writing – he’s basically writing the new constitution for the free world, for Galt’s Gulch, which is kind of minarchist, which is always glossed over by Randians.  But it’s basically he’s taking the American constitution and he’s editing it, like striking out a word here or there.  But that would be copyright infringement according to strict Randians.  You’d be stealing someone else’s property, number one.  And number two, by the way, by that same logic, if you are such an America-phile like Rand was and you think that the US constitutional system was so genius and gave us these – this brilliant system of government that has allowed us to be wealthy – well, theoretically the founding fathers or whoever the guys you want to give credit for coming up and basically inventing this new system, they own it.  They have a copyright or a patent in that system, and they have a right to charge everyone who’s using it a royalty, which we would normally call taxes.

00:42:59

So basically the entire Randian idea on copyright could justify taxes because government gives us all these great things.  Why should the government – by the way, why should the government be nonprofit?  The whole idea is stupid.  Why should the government be a minimalist government that just takes in barely enough to survive?  Why shouldn’t they charge the going rate for their services because they own it?

00:43:20

And the other thing was, if you remember, in Atlas Shrugged, remember the whole little mid-story with Dagny and Hank, and they hired that physicist guy who eventually left and got recruited by Galt, the younger guy, because they found Galt’s old machine in that abandoned 20th century motorcar.  And they paid him to try to reverse engineer it, which, by the way, would be another violation of intellectual property or patent rights according to Rand’s stuff because they’re taking an invention that Galt created and they’re just tinkering with it, and they’re learning from him.  They don’t have the right to do that.  So there’s a lot of examples in Atlas Shrugged where she just – if she was applying her own IP law consistently, you couldn’t have even had that plot to dice.

00:44:06

TOM LAIRD: It’s not like Dagny Taggart invented railways.

00:44:10

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: If there was IP on railways then Dagny Taggart wouldn’t have been allowed to make her own rail lines.  It’s a weird idea that just because one person comes up with something everyone else suddenly needs to alter their behavior.  We’re not allowed to – it’s like – it’s a weird view.  So everyone else is not allowed to use their own property the way they see fit because someone did something first.

00:44:38

STEPHAN KINSELLA: And the argument I hear often, which drives me insane – so first of all, let’s just talk about patents because copyright is different because it is true that most copyrighted works are – they’re original because – in other words, it would be unlikely someone would write exactly the same novel later.  However, everything is influenced over everything else, so nothing is 100% original.  But copyrighted works I would say are original.  But for patented works, most inventions come about when their time has come, and they’re basically inevitable, and they can only come about at a certain time in history when the preconditions are ready for it.

00:45:18

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: The material forces of production are sufficiently mature as Mark Twain said.

00:45:24

STEPHAN KINSELLA: You couldn’t have a transistor invented by the Greeks, but in 1950, someone is going to invent the transistor.

00:45:31

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Right.

00:45:33

STEPHAN KINSELLA: So – and this is a good thing about human society, by the way.  But what drives me nuts is if you say something like, well, what’s wrong with – what’s wrong if I learn from other people and imitate them and compete with them and use a similar design that they’re doing like for a smartphone or for the idea of a four-wheeled automobile or a four-legged stool, whatever, a kite, an airplane, light bulb?  The answer will be this kind of snarky, smartass retort, and they’ll say something like just come up with your own idea.  And I’m like, well, is that a directive?  Is that supposed to be an argument?  Is it a question?  Is it serious?  I mean the question is what is wrong with copying what you learn from other people that they basically broadcast to you by making their ideas public?  What’s wrong with it?  And the answer, just come up with your own idea, is not an answer.

00:46:36

I mean if you just think about the implications of this it would basically kill human life.  Like what if only Ford and his heirs could have a four-wheeled car or Mercedes or whoever came up with it first?  And so everyone else just come up with your own car.  Just make one with six wheels, or if the railroads now have a certain width of their wheel spacing because of the Roman chariots from 2000 years ago, just come up with your own system.  So then all the railroads in the world would have different spacings, and they would not be compatible with each other.  You – everyone has to have a different size of cargo crates, the ship containers that they put on the ships because you can’t use exactly what I did.  Just come up with your own.  It’s like, well, it’s not even an argument.

00:47:28

TOM LAIRD: Well, I mean the automobile one is a good one because I know Henry Ford was locked up in court for about 20 years trying to get his vehicle onto the market because some asshole had just – it was just – he looked at carriages, and he thought – and he looked at steam engines.  And he thought, well, somebody some day is going to put the steam engine and the carriage together, and you’re not going to need horses anymore.  So he basically scribbled down – I can’t remember the guy’s name.  He basically just scribbled down his idea of a horseless carriage, which there was nothing behind.  He had no idea how to make it.  He had just done this drawing and patented it, and Ford and other automobile manufacturers had to pay this guy loads of money just so that he would release.

00:48:21

STEPHAN KINSELLA: And people don’t – they don’t understand.  I mean capitalism is so – and the free market is so powerful that we’re surviving even now with the hundreds of millions of people that we’ve just artificially unemployed because of the COVID lockdown crap.  There’s all these regulations and these implicit taxes people pay, and the little people don’t see it.  They don’t understand all the royalties and all the buyoffs and all the regulatory fees and higher costs at Apple and motor companies that they have to pay just to stay in existence.  And people just get used to it.  They absorb the costs.  They’re paying the cost of course because the price of their goods is higher, or the innovation is lower, one way or the other.

00:49:07

But if you just imagine also every year, every month probably, at least every few years, there’s an innovation like in automobiles or trains or airplanes, something that is pro-safety oriented, like the idea of these windshields that have this plastic layer in the middle that doesn’t shatter or just seatbelts or…

00:49:28

TOM LAIRD: Airbags.

00:49:29

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Airbags, anti-lock brakes.  A lot of these things are actually patented, and for awhile, your competitors – they literally cannot put that innovation into their own car because it would be illegal, and therefore, some people die.

00:49:48

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: It’s funny.  You probably technically can’t even put it in your own car.

00:49:55

STEPHAN KINSELLA: No, you can’t.  This is the – and this is more because of copyright than patent because right now you have people – because everything is computerized now.  So if you buy a tractor or something or a big truck it comes with software, and that’s protected by copyright.

00:50:09

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Oh geez.

00:50:10

STEPHAN KINSELLA: And so now the manufacturers like John Green –or not – John Deere tractors.  They’ve been suing people that modify their own tractors just to keep them up to date with the latest techniques or something like that because they’re basically violating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which – as an anti-circumvention procedure, which means that you can’t use a technology device to reverse engineer some copyrighted code even if it’s not copyright infringement.  So that’s how crazy it is.  Even if it’s not copyright infringement for you to do what you’re doing because it’s fair use or something like that, you still can’t circumvent the protection that was built in to try to stop copyright infringement.  And you have crazy things like that, and you have – who’s the big – Monsanto or it’s the big agricultural company in the US.  They sue people for – like if you’re a farmer and your neighboring farmer has some seeds that are patented seeds that he planted and he bought.

00:51:15

TOM LAIRD: It’s Monsanto.

00:51:16

STEPHAN KINSELLA: And the wind carries some of those seeds onto my property, and so my property is now growing some of these genetically modified patented seeds from Monsanto.  They can send the government goons out and burn your fields down or force – it’s insane.  It’s totally insane.

00:51:36

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: So…

00:51:37

STEPHAN KINSELLA: And this is what these guys support.  This is what gets me.  This is what they support.  I mean – and these are not just anomalies.  These are not just hard cases.  This is the essence of what IP law means.  It means that you can stop someone from using their own private resources as they wish even though they’re not committing a tort against anyone else.  And this is the dishonest argument that – I don’t know if Adam raised that in his debate with you.  But his type will always say – they’ll say, well, you’re objecting to IP law because it limits what you can do with your own property.

00:52:14

But all property rights do that.  That’s the next argument that they always use.  So in other words, and then they’ll come up with the tired refrain.  Well, my property – your property right and your fist ends where my nose begins.  But that is sort of a dishonest or at least it’s a mistaken argument because the whole argument assumes property rights.  It assumes you have a property right in your nose.  What that argument really means is that you do have the right to use your resources as long as you don’t invade other people’s property rights.

00:52:51

And if you do, then that’s the tort that you’re committing.  And the problem is what you’re doing is your action.  So the fact that I can’t swing my fist at your nose is not a limitation on the property rights in my first.  It’s a respect for the property rights in your nose, and it means that there are some actions I can’t commit.  So when you look at it like that, then the question would be, okay, if I see someone doing something like making a better mousetrap or making an airplane or making a pharmaceutical and if I use my own resources to duplicate something similar to that and sell it on the market, what action did I commit that violated the borders or committed a trespass against any of your property?

00:53:36

And you can’t find anything because there’s no – that’s why the legislation had to invent these things because there weren’t parts before.  That’s why patent and copyright didn’t come out of the common law.  And then the retort will be something like, well, it is a violation of your property.  It’s a violation of your intellectual property rights.  So you can see that their whole argument is circular because their question is to show why they should be regarded as a property right.  You can’t just say the government defines it as a property right, and therefore, it’s a trespass which justifies calling it a property right in the first place.  Their whole argument is totally circular and loaded.

00:54:15

00:54:17

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: So real quick before we finish up, I guess I’ve got two questions.

00:54:21

TOM LAIRD: Hey, I haven’t told my Lynyrd Skynyrd story yet, so anyway, get on with it.

00:54:25

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Well, we’ll save that for the end, everyone who wants to hear his Lynyrd Skynyrd story.  First one is I guess you said to me in a private chat that Rothbard’s views on copyright were confused as on IP.  It would be interesting to hear just a little bit about that.  And the other question, as you said, that the debate wasn’t really a conducive environment to explore these issues.  So second question is if it was a – if I were in a conducive environment, is there anything that you’d add that you haven’t already that I could have said that I didn’t?

00:55:03

STEPHAN KINSELLA: I mean I’ve – so I’ve meandered over the years with debating and discussing and talking, say, for the last 20 years.  And so I’ve stumbled across different ways of approaching the issue or formulating it, and it depends upon the audience of course.  But the only way you can really do it is to summarize the principled case.  You have to explain what are we doing here.  What’s the whole purpose of this endeavor to why do we care about justice?  What is justice?  What are property rights?  Why do we have them?  What is their nature?  Think about it, think about it, and think about it.  And then what are IP rights?  Think about what they really are, which most people don’t quite understand because they’re not specialists, and this is an arcane area of law.

00:55:52

So have to explain that, and then you say, okay, now think about the original purpose of law that we talked about?  Does this make sense?  Can it be justified?  No.  So you have to build a systematic case, and that’s hard to do in 10 minutes.  You can do a sketch of it in 10 minutes.  But most people’s eyes glaze over, and they don’t understand half the terms you’re using.  So the only way to do it is to have an hour-long or a three-hour-long or six-hour-long.  So it’s difficult.  So I guess the best thing to do is to shoot holes in the case of other people and to try to make it clear who the burden of proof is on.  I thought you did a reasonably good job of that in what you were doing because you at least focused upon the distinction between scarce resources and non-scarce.

00:56:41

And so that was the fundamental point, and again, he never addressed that point, and he never did address the COVID point, like well, what if there are people that are not looking now?  Or what if there are people that are shut out that are looking now, and they find something because someone else gets a patent first?  I guess his answer was this Mayflower answer that, well, whoever gets to the New World first should get it.  That’s just part of capitalism, but that’s not a justification for this system.

00:57:10

Now, on the Rothbard question, so if you view IP rights as a unitary whole, which I do not because I think they’re all distinct.  And this is – again, part of the problem is you have to explain what’s wrong with the patent system, what’s wrong with the copyright system, what’s wrong with the trade secret system, what’s wrong with the trademark system, what’s wrong with defamation law.  They all have their own distinct – it’s like just because I’m against the drug war doesn’t mean that I’m also against having an American-type foreign policy.  They’re – you have to analyze each issue separately.

00:57:49

But because our opponents have lumped these things together, we have no choice but to use their term and then to try to find common features, which they’ve done, and to try to say, well, here’s what’s wrong in general.  But then that makes your case more abstract.  So I believe defamation law, which is not typically regarded as – by law professors as a type of IP law.  It should be because it’s very similar to trademark law.  They both are about protecting reputation rights.  They both are protecting some kind of intangible value that is not a scarce resource, your reputation.  So – and not coincidentally, the Randians support defamation law as well as trademark law and other types of IP law.

00:58:37

Now, Rothbard, to his credit, was completely against defamation law.  I think if he had been more consistent, he would have seen that this would also be a good argument against trademark law.  Now, trademark law is not one of the two big evils, so I don’t think he ever focused on trademark law.  He mostly talked about patent and copyright.

00:58:57

Now, on patent law, he said he opposed it.  His reasons were a little bit – they weren’t horrible reasons, but they weren’t the main issue.  But basically he thought patents distorted the – or he called it – I think he used the word skewed.  It skewed the – it skewed innovation and research like from protectable inventions to – or I’m sorry.  From unprotectable inventions like abstract ideas in physics or mathematics to practical gizmos that you could protect.

00:59:28

And there’s probably something to that.  So it has a distorting effect on the research and development industry just like the trademark and the copyright industry have a distorting effect upon culture because, for example, you can’t protect fashion rights exactly like in purses.  So what does Louis Vuitton do and Christian Dior?  They put their logos on their designs because that’s protectable by trademark.  So you see the Louis Vuitton logo, and you’ll see the Christian Dior logo on their purses and their dresses because – now, maybe that’s a good idea.  Maybe it’s not.  But I have a suspicion that these things like this happen in response to the legal system itself.  Like designers think how can we stop these knockoffs?  We can’t stop them with any kind of fashion copyright because it doesn’t exist.

01:00:22

So anyway, all these things distort society, and that – distortion means it changes things, and it makes things more inefficient and makes us more impoverished, and it harms us in one way or the other.  So Rothbard did see that problem with patents.  I don’t – he never did quite identify the ultimate problem with patents, which was the scarcity argument, and I’m not sure why.  I think it’s probably – so to simplify things, my three great thinkers would be Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe.

01:00:54

So Mises was this genius with Austrian economics and praxeology.  And he did emphasize scarcity, although he didn’t emphasize knowledge too much.  But he recognized it, but if he had focused more on the role of knowledge as the other half of action, I think even he was skeptical of patents, but he sort of was mainstream on that issue.

01:01:14

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Wrong reading liberalism.  It sounds like – it sounded like liberalism, that Mises was against patents.  He mentions them as something that could prevent normal competition.

01:01:27

STEPHAN KINSELLA: He saw the drawbacks of patents, but he also admitted that, okay, on the other hand, there’s these other arguments.  And so I think he was a little bit vague.  Now, Hayek was even slightly better on this.  He saw the danger of impeding the spread of knowledge, which is what IP does, especially patents.  He has this great phrase.  Oh, I’m forgetting the phrase.  It’s in one of my blog posts, a fund of experience or something like that, like this amazing depth of technical and causal and engineering and other knowledge that we have inherited as humans from past generations.  And it makes us richer because the set of recipes and knowledge and ideas that we can dive into to make our use of scarce resources more efficient always increases over time.

01:02:20

I think actually this is the explanation of human progress, which is why I am so adamantly opposed to IP because one-half of human action is something that’s an infinitely spreadable resource that can keep building over time and can spread instantaneously across the globe.  Hayek even recognizes that it’s one explanation for why what we call developing or backwards societies can catch up so quickly—China or whatever—because all they have to do is just replicate the ideas that we have that some other country pioneered first: Europe or Britain or the West, America.

01:03:01

And so it didn’t take China that long to start catching up because now they can make iPhones, and they can make supersonic jets and things like that because they have the recipes.  And we use things that Chinese inventors invented 2000, 5000 years ago too.  But Rothbard’s problem was he had this cursory – I think it’s his chapter in Ethics of Liberty.  It’s called “Knowledge” – I think it’s called “Knowledge: True and False” where he attacks defamation law.  But then he goes into copyright and patents, and what he does is he basically – he redefines the word copyright to mean what he calls common law copyright.  But he redefines it in a way that is basically based on contract, but it would include what patents cover.

01:03:53

So it’s – Rothbard’s word, copyright, means what in his mind is a contractual system among people where they agree to sell something to someone else, which could be an invention, not just a copyrighted work, so some kind of device with a pattern in it, which I guess could be a book.  But I think the example he gives is a mousetrap, which is an invention.

01:04:16

But – and then you reserve the right to copy it, so it’s this kind of contorted contract argument, which doesn’t work in the end.  But the point is in the actual law there is actually such a thing as common law copyright even though I earlier said copyright had to be invented by statue and by legislation – not invented.  But it only arose because of legislation, which is true.  Copyright is based upon the Statue of Anne of 1710 and then the US constitution and then western – European systems after that.

01:04:51

However, there was some doctrine called common law copyright, but it had nothing to do with contract, and it had nothing to do with what Rothbard thinks.  It was basically a type of trade secret right.  It basically was this kind of right that said if you had a manuscript in your desk drawer of an unpublished work that you have written and someone else steals that piece of paper and they publish – they try to publish it first, you could go to court and get an order against them to stop it.  Now, that’s not what copyright law is, and that’s not what Rothbard meant by common law copyright.

01:05:29

And you could justify that by saying that, well, if you steal someone’s piece of paper, then it’s a type of trespass, or it’s a violation of contract or some kind of breach of trust, something like that.  And anyway, that refers to a world before things were digital anyway.  People don’t have manuscripts in their desk drawers anymore that aren’t published, and people publish their – so the whole idea is totally convoluted.  So Rothbard ends up saying that you could justify what he calls common law copyright, and that would include inventions.  But you couldn’t justify modern copyright and patent statutes.

01:06:06

TOM LAIRD: Right.

01:06:06

STEPHAN KINSELLA: So he just didn’t really drill down to solve this problem completely, and the problem is the way he worded it.  Nothing he says is really that wrong except for his reservation of rights idea and the way he thinks you can extend contract to get some kind of quasi-property right in patterns of information.  That’s his mistake I think.  That’s a mistake – a genuine mistake he makes.  And I think it’s basically incompatible with his other argument in the same book against reputation rights.  So it was just – he just didn’t see it because I mean he wasn’t a legal – he wasn’t a lawyer.  He wasn’t a legal scholar, and he only could go so far.  It’s not – I mean for me this is not a bashing or criticism of Rothbard at all.  The problem is you have other people that say even Rothbard, your anarchist hero, supported copyright.

01:06:57

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Well, that’s…

01:06:58

STEPHAN KINSELLA: And I’m like, no, he didn’t.

01:06:59

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Right.  And that’s not even an argument because people can make – people like to say, well, Adam Smith said these non-free market things.  And it’s like, yeah, Adam Smith didn’t have the benefit of Adam Smith.

01:07:12

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Exactly, exactly.

01:07:13

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: To improve on his ideas.  Hoppe – has Hoppe accepted your views on – has he adopted your views on copyright?  Has he adopted your views?

01:07:24

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Yeah, he has, and he – that’s what I was going to say.  My three greatest thinkers are Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe, and Hoppe was able to build upon Rothbard’s radicalism and his radical libertarianism and his own extension of Mises’ economics and Mises’ own praxeology and Mises – like the – probably the one advantage Mises has over Rothbard is that Mises did focus more on scarcity than Rothbard seems to in Rothbard’s writings.  And Hoppe picked up on that and integrated the scarcity part in his – so Hoppe is like a more neo-Kantian, Misesian, scarcity-emphasizing, Austrian like Mises combined with Rothbard’s improvements on and more radical political stuff.  So it’s the combination of that.

01:08:23

So Hoppe, like in 1988 – this was quite interesting.  I didn’t really come to my own views until around 1993 or 1994 when I was a brand new baby IP lawyer.  In 1988, there was a panel discussion at Mises Institute event, and I think on the panel was Rothbard, Hoppe, who was newly arrived to the US, and Rothbard’s new – what’s the opposite of mentor?  Mentee?  Protégé?

01:08:55

TOM LAIRD: I call it…

01:08:56

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Protégé.  Let’s say protégé.  And David Gordon and I think Leland Jaeger.  I think those four were up there.  And someone asked a question of Hoppe – now this is before IP was even an issue because this is before – the internet – as you guys know, the internet basically started in 1995, something like that.  And that’s when digital information started being tradable and shareable, and that’s when everyone started freaking out about copyright, like thinking it’s more important or starting worrying about it, one way or the other.  No one was paying attention to IP law before that.  It was just like this arcane thing that – like tax law or states law or immigration law.

01:09:35

So this is before this even – was even a topic.  I mean Rothbard had only barely mentioned this in that little chapter I mentioned in The Ethics of Liberty, which I think was published in ’82 the first time.  So Hoppe was certainly aware of what Rothbard had written, and Rothbard was sitting right next to him.  And someone asked him – they said something like what about property rights in ideas?  And Hoppe just like off the cuff said, well, if it’s an idea, then it’s not – if you can copy it, it informs your action, and you’re not trespassing on anyone’s property, so that’s it.  He instantly saw to the core of the issue.

01:10:17

And that’s because he had a really clear focus on basically praxeology and the importance of scarcity, like its role in human action.  Scarcity means that what you’re doing in an action is you’re employing a scarce means, but the employment and the decisions about what to do is guided by knowledge.  So he recognized instantly and intuitively that these are distinct things and that – so basically his answer was no.  So he’s written explicitly since then that he agrees 100% with what I’ve written, which was basically built upon his stuff and Mises and other people’s writings.  So he is 100% on board with my views on all of this.

01:11:02

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Excellent.  Last question of the day.  Tom, tell your Lynyrd Skynyrd story.

01:11:10

TOM LAIRD: Well, as you can see, I’m wearing my Skynyrd t-shirt, which I bought about – I don’t know – a long time, over 20 years ago now.  It was in the 90s at the Royal Concert Hall in Glasgow, and I wanted to buy a t-shirt after.  The gig was great.  Hughie Thomasson of The Outlaws was playing guitar with them back then.  I think he’s dead now; Rickey “Rattlesnake” Medlocke from Blackfoot.  So it was a great gig, and I wanted to buy a t-shirt.  So I go back to where the official t-shirts are.  And they’re lousy.  They are really boring, overpriced t-shirts.  They don’t even have tour dates on them.  They’re just generic t-shirts, and then you’re talking mid ‘90s at about 25 bucks – the equivalent of 25 bucks a t-shirt.

01:11:56

So that was really expensive.  So fuck that.  I’m not buying a t-shirt.  I don’t care.  I’m not paying that, almost the same price as the concert ticket.  So I went outside, and there’s a guy standing with these knockoffs, and they were great.  It had the cover the Twenty’s album on it, and on the back it’s got the Lynyrd Skynyrd with all the tour dates on it.  And there were 5 – it was £5 a t-shirt.  I don’t know how the guy made any profit, but that’s not my problem, for his £5 a t-shirt.

01:12:24

And it’s lasted for years.  And the question is, what did Lynyrd Skynyrd lose out of that?  Well, first of all, fuck them.  If they couldn’t be bothered to provide a quality product for their fans, I’d have paid a premium but not that much for a premium.  Secondly, how did they lose?  If I didn’t buy the official t-shirt—I was never going to do that—and I didn’t buy the knockoff, they’ve lost twice because now I’m not going everywhere advertising Lynyrd Skynyrd on my t-shirt and telling myself about the great gig.  So they haven’t lost anything in that interaction whatsoever.  They were never going to make any money because I wasn’t going to buy that t-shirt at that price.  So that’s my knockoff story.

01:13:12

STEPHAN KINSELLA: That’s – so – go ahead.

01:13:15

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: So you did forget about the part of the story where you went out on tour playing Lynyrd Skynyrd songs at the same setting and the same night as them and everyone stopped coming out to see Lynyrd Skynyrd and started to see your band instead.

01:13:26

TOM LAIRD: That would have been consumer fraud if I pretended that I was Lynyrd Skynyrd.

01:13:30

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, that’s the other thing.  Cover bands don’t hurt their – I mean I don’t know if you’ve noticed this.  You seem to be even more of a live music and rock fan than I am, and I like all that stuff too.  But it seems to me that like in the beginning of the internet and cell phones and all this, all these artists freaked out, and they had all these signs up banning people from recording their shitty 28 kbps recordings from an iPhone in the audience.  But it seems to me like in the last 10 years they’ve relaxed a little bit because they’ve realized it really doesn’t…

01:14:07

TOM LAIRD: Bands bootleg their own gigs now.

01:14:10

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, that’s what I’m saying.  I mean you always had a few outliers like the Grateful Dead that always encouraged it, or they didn’t give a crap.  But the official initial response was kind of a panic and a freak-out, and then all these bands say no video cameras allowed.  And now everyone’s got a video camera in their pocket, and they’re like – they’ve given up, and they know it doesn’t really hurt them.

01:14:31

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: And it’s good if people are posting it to their Instagram Story or their Facebook.

01:14:36

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, yeah.

01:14:36

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: It’s free…

01:14:39

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, there’s a guy named…

01:14:38

TOM LAIRD: People who bought bootlegs bought the albums anyway.  Fans bought the stuff anyway.

01:14:45

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Well, I think that’s true, although I think that argument probably can tail off after awhile because…

01:14:51

TOM LAIRD: Okay.

01:14:52

STEPHAN KINSELLA: That was more true in the – like nowadays no one buys – I don’t think people like – that was probably true 7 years ago or 10 years ago when people were still buying CDs, and they still buy merch – merchandise and all that.  But I think nowadays people don’t – I don’t think people buy music.  I don’t think they even pirate music anymore because who wants to carry around a thumb drive with 17 petabytes of all the world’s music when you can just stream everything from Spotify?

01:15:17

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: Yeah, and people listen on YouTube, and they’ve found a way to monetize that because they put ads on the – ads – which is really annoying when you get a 15-second ad on a 3-minute song.  It’s like fuck you.

01:15:28

STEPHAN KINSELLA: They – and I think a lot of that is, again, the cultural distortion cause of a copyright.  A lot of these models would be different I believe without copyright because the reason YouTube can get away with that is because they can strike – they strike down videos that are unauthorized and that don’t agree to the advertising stuff.  And they do that because of the six strikes law, and that’s because of the copyright law, and that’s because the artist ultimately – like without copyright law, you’d probably have lots of free alternatives that just ignored all this crap.  And they wouldn’t do that, but they probably wouldn’t be as good or as curated, so you would pay something for something that’s fine and clean and simple.  But what’s interesting about I think what you’re pointing out is I think that the emergence of digital copying basically—torrenting, encryption, the internet, file sharing—basically has made copyright almost unenforceable.

01:16:36

So there is copyright now.  It does have a big effect on the big players, but there’s – everyone can pirate movies and songs and paintings, and everyone knows this, and you can’t stop it.  It’s just like – it’s like playing whack-a-mole.  So copyright ultimately is unenforceable because of technology, which to me is a good thing.  It would be like if there’s a way to evade taxes or to get marijuana or cocaine or something with complete impunity from the government, like totally hidden from their purview.  That would be a good thing.

01:17:10

TOM LAIRD: Bitcoin.

01:17:10

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Bitcoin.  Now, in the field of the production of physical goods, I think that something like that might be happening that will undermine patents, sort of like digital technology has undermined copyright.  So the ability of making one-of-a-kind – like just-in-time delivery or like your shirts, the t-shirts, you can just print a book from Amazon, or you can get a shirt made from – with only 10 copies made.  It’s not a big deal.  And in the future I think 3D printing will become more and more sophisticated.

01:17:51

And so as 3D printing becomes more of a real force, I think that’s going to undermine the patent system because then people will be able to have a printer in their basement or down at their co-op’s house down the street.  And they’ll be able to get a pirated file of a design of something and just go print whatever they hell – they can print their own iPhone or something eventually.  And they won’t need permission, and the patent holders won’t be able to stop it.  So I think that those are two good things is that the ways the international trade and the just-in-time delivery system and manufacturing on demand and 3D printing and torrenting and encryption and file sharing and maybe Bitcoin to some degree.  It’s all helping to undermine these horrible, archaic, wealth-destroying systems.

01:18:36

ANTONY SAMMEROFF: All right, well, thank you for re-joining us on the show for round two, great speaking to you and you guys at home.  Tune in soon for more.

01:18:47

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“The Monopoly on Violence” Documentary

A new libertarian documentary was released yesterday by Stateless Productions (with a talented team including Peter R. Quinones, of the Libertarian Institute, Robert Beeler, Chris Cofer, and others): The Monopoly on Violence. It was released for streaming and download yesterday, May 31, 2020, and is available on Youtube etc. (see embeds below).

[Update: now available on Amazon Prime]

The documentary features a number of anti-state thinkers (many of them Austrian anarcho-capitalists), including Ron Paul, Tom Woods, Dave Smith, and yours truly.

Teaser trailer:

Full documentary:

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Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law

Note: An updated and revised version of this article is included as chap. 19 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023).  Text from ch. 13 appended below.

***

Stephan Kinsella, “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law” (review essay of Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty), Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 49–71 [pdf].

The second edition of Barnett’s book, published in 2014, concedes one of my criticisms (of his use of liberal instead of libertarian and several instead of private property:

Were I writing the book today, however, I might change one term. I might use the term “private property” rather than the term “several property” that I borrowed from Hayek, who himself borrowed it from Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. I preferred “several property” because it emphasized the need to recognize jurisdiction over resources among the several or many individuals and associations that comprise a society. Were property held in the private hands of a very few, this type of “private property” would not address the problems of knowledge and interest. But in the interest of clarity and the avoidance of jargon, “private property” would have been clearer and, I now think, preferable.

TEXT FROM CHAPTER 19

19

Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law

 

Originally published as Stephan Kinsella, “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law,” Q. J. Austrian Econ. 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 49–71, a review essay of Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). In this chapter, I have updated the references to refer to the second edition, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), hereinafter cited as Structure (apparently no changes were made to the main text, so the page numbers between the first and second editions are in most cases the same).

 

PERVASIVE SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Libertarian theorists have made significant contributions to the fields of economics, politics, and philosophy. Intimately bound up with libertarian and political theory is the question of what laws and legal systems are appropriate. Law and legal theory, therefore, have also been subjected to libertarian scrutiny. One might even say libertarianism is all about law: which laws are just, which are not. The writing in this area, however, is usually focused on narrow legal topics, such as contract or constitutional law.[1] Moreover, many libertarian authors are economists or philosophers who are not sufficiently familiar with the workings of real legal systems; others are not completely or consistently libertarian in their approaches.[2] Jurisprudence has yet to receive the attention it deserves from libertarians (and, one might say: vice-versa).

The publication of Randy Barnett’s latest book, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, helps to fill this lacuna. Barnett, as a former criminal prosecutor and now law professor at Boston University School of Law,[3] is intimately familiar with the operation of the American legal system and also with the arcana of academic jurisprudence. His libertarian credentials are also impeccable: he has published important libertarian-oriented works on topics as diverse as contract law, constitutional theory and natural rights, restitution and criminal law, and drug prohibition.[4] Barnett was thus well-positioned to write The Structure of Liberty, the first broad and systematic treatise on legal theory written from a thoroughly libertarian perspective.

Barnett’s aim in this ambitious book is to determine the type of legal system, laws, and rights which are appropriate given the widely-shared “goal of enabling persons to survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in society with others.”[5] Happiness, peace, and prosperity are fine principles to select and quite compatible with libertarianism, but Barnett does not attempt to try to justify these basic norms or values. His argument is thus hypothetical and consequentialist, though not, he maintains, utilitarian.[6]

According to Barnett, the goals of social happiness, peace, and prosperity cannot be achieved unless society’s politico–legal system somehow solves certain problems which stand in the way of this happy state. These are “the serious and pervasive social problems of knowledge, interest, and power.”[7] Libertarianism enters the picture because the libertarian (Barnett prefers the term “liberal”) conceptions of justice and the rule of law provide the “structure of liberty” that addresses these problems. These principles include the “natural background rights to acquire, possess, use, and dispose of scarce resources (and other rights as well).”[8] Barnett’s argument thus proceeds by showing how and why libertarianism is the best way to overcome the problems of knowledge, interest, and power.[9]

THE FIRST-ORDER PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Parts 1, 2, and 3 of the book respectively describe the three fundamental problems and how they are solved by libertarian rights and institutions. Barnett’s first topic, discussed in Part 1, is the problem of knowledge, which is broken down into separate first-order, second-order, and third-order aspects.

The first aspect—basically the Hayekian “knowledge problem”[10]—concerns how individuals make “knowledgeable” use of physical resources.[11] This analysis starts out by presuming that an individual needs to “be able to act on the basis of [his] own personal knowledge,” and “when so acting [he] must somehow take into account the knowledge of others.”[12]

Alas, this is difficult to achieve, because such knowledge is “dispersed” or “fragmented,” and each individual has “ever-changing and potentially conflicting personal and local knowledge of potential resource use.”[13] Each person is thus rendered “hopelessly ignorant” of the “knowledge of others.” So the alleged problem is this: given the dispersed, often inaccessible, and potentially “conflicting” nature of such knowledge, how can individuals act on the basis of their own knowledge while avoiding conflicts over resource use? And how can they take into account the knowledge of others?[14]

According to Barnett, libertarian rights are necessary because they facilitate the sharing and dissemination of knowledge.[15] They include the natural rights of “several” property (Hayek’s term for private property), Lockean first possession (homesteading), and freedom of contract.[16] If individuals are accorded these rights, the first-order problem of knowledge is solved. One of the main ways this happens is that prices arise under such a private-property order, and prices themselves convey, in “condensed” form, personal and local knowledge.

Knowledge vs. Calculation

There is, unfortunately, much to be desired in Hayek’s emphasis on the role of knowledge in the economy, as opposed to Ludwig von Mises’s stress on the more fundamental role of money prices in economic calculation.[17] Hayek’s and Mises’s differing views have been improperly conflated,[18] and Barnett makes the same error by attributing to Mises Hayek’s views on the information-conveying role of prices.[19]

What, then, are the differences between Mises and Hayek on the role of prices in the economy? Hans-Hermann Hoppe has ably summarized Mises’s original calculation argument as follows:

If there is no private property in land and other production factors, then there can also be no market prices for them. Hence, economic calculation, i.e., the comparison of anticipated revenue and expected cost expressed in terms of a common medium of exchange (which permits cardinal accounting operations), is literally impossible. Socialism’s fatal error is the absence of private property in land and production factors, and by implication, the absence of economic calculation.[20]

The theories of Hayek on which Barnett and others have relied, however, downplay calculation and appraisement in favor of communication of knowledge. For Hayek, as Hülsmann notes:

… the impossibility of socialism stems from its inability to communicate dispersed knowledge…. [I]nformation about the particular circumstancesof time and place can never be centralized. It necessarily exists in dispersed form and yet it can be communicated by the market prices of capitalist societies. Only capitalism is thus capable of solving the knowledge problem.[21]

But any informational function of prices is, at best, only secondary in comparison to the primary role of private property and money prices. The fundamental economic role of private property, along with money prices arising from exchanges of such property, as Mises showed, is to permit economic calculation. And, socially speaking, private-property rights serve to prevent conflict over resources. This is why private-property rights serve Barnett’s goals of peace and prosperity: private property rights permit conflicts to be avoided (peace) and allow genuine, free-market money prices to form which can be used for economic calculation and hence rational resource allocation (prosperity). Concentration on the information-conveying role of prices instead of calculation obscures this role.[22] For example, Hayekians claim that prices “contain” economic information in “condensed” (or encrypted, encoded, or abridged) form.[23] Barnett follows the Hayekians when he states that “the knowledge-disseminating function of prices is largely unknown … the knowledge embedded in prices is not explicit…. It is encoded knowledge.”[24]

There are several problems with viewing prices as encoding information. For one thing, concepts such as encoding, encryption, and the like imply an encoder—a person who actively and consciously encodes information in some communication medium, in accordance with some encoding scheme (i.e., the code). Yet there is clearly no intentional encoding of whatever knowledge may be embedded in prices; there is no encoding scheme and no way to decode the information. I buy a car for $30,000 because I think it is worth it, not to convey some secret message to someone.[25] Knowledge that I paid this price for the car does not reveal any information about the underlying objective conditions that give rise to this price (e.g., the intensity of my demand or the relative scarcity of the car). Such knowledge reveals only that I valued the car more than $30,000, and the seller had the opposite valuation.

Prices result from the subjective evaluations of goods by seller and buyer, but prices are exchange ratios. Besides these ratios, what other information could money prices communicate? What information can a mere price ratio convey? Take Hayek’s famous tin example, which assumes:

… that somewhere in the world a new opportunity for the use of some raw material, say, tin, has arisen, or that one of the sources of supply of tin has been eliminated. It does not matter for our purpose—and it is significant that it does not matter—which of these two causes has made tin more scarce. All that the users of tin need to know is that some of the tin they used to consume is now more profitably employed elsewhere and that, in consequence, they must economize tin. There is no need for the great majority of them even to know where the more urgent need has arisen, or in favor of what other needs they ought to husband the supply. If only some of them know directly of the new demand, and switch resources over to it, and if the people who are aware of the new gap thus created in turn fill it from still other sources, the effect will rapidly spread throughout the whole economic system and influence not only all the uses of tin but also those of its substitutes and the substitutes of these substitutes, the supply of all the things made of tin, and their substitutes, and so on; and all this without the great majority of those instrumental in bringing about these substitutions knowing anything at all about the original cause of these changes.[26]

In this example, what information, exactly, is supposed to be conveyed by prices? Let us explore the possibilities. Can the original cause of the price increase (i.e., the change in demand or supply) itself be conveyed via prices? Well, no. Prices are the result of action. Thus, action that changes the prices must already be informed by knowledge.[27] Entrepreneurs first see the changed conditions and then bid prices up or down. They do not learn about the changed conditions from the resulting prices. Rather, they cause the prices to change, based on their appraisement of tin and knowledge or judgment of underlying conditions. Hayek seems to recognize that those entrepreneurs who “know directly of the new demand, and switch resources over to it” do not learn from prices, but rather help to form prices based on their own preferences, knowledge, evaluations, and judgments.

What about users of tin who merely observe the change in prices paid for tin—do these persons learn anything, from observed past prices, about the underlying conditions or “original cause” of the change in prices? No, because any of a variety of causes results in higher or lower prices (e.g., changes in demand by buyers or sellers, decrease in supply, changes in demand for money on the part of sellers or buyers, etc.). For these reasons, Hayek says that mere users of tin do not know “anything at all about the original cause of these changes.”

Then what possible information can prices convey? Hayek writes: “All that the users of tin need to know is that some of the tin they used to consume is now more profitably employed elsewhere and that, in consequence, they must economize tin.”[28] But the users do not need to know this; if tin is scarcer, there is less of it to go around.[29] Whether the prospective users know of the increased scarcity or not, they cannot use what does not exist. Their plans will have to conform, sooner or later, to this increased unavailability of tin.

At most, one could argue that the existence of prices enables prospective users to recognize the good’s relative scarcity somewhat earlier than they would in the absence of prices (that is, sooner rather than later). And even this cannot be stated to be true as an economic law, simply because all prices are speculative and based on entrepreneurial judgments and anticipations about future (uncertain) conditions. An entrepreneur, for example, may bid the price of a good up based on a mistaken judgment about relevant future conditions, such as supply and demand. What do prices then convey in such a case—misinformation?

In any event, even granting that observers can learn of relative scarcity of a good from prices, emphasis on this aspect of prices distracts from the crucial role that prices play in economic calculation. That is, even if prices do tend to help users to become aware of a good’s relative scarcity somewhat earlier than they would otherwise, it is not this function of prices which addresses the insurmountable problems of production and human action that are faced in the absence of private property. The fundamental problem faced by acting man is not the fact that information is dispersed.[30] Rather, it is deciding how to rationally allocate resources in the face of an uncertain future and given the subjective nature of value, which makes it impossible to compare alternative projects or plans in the absence of a cardinal set of prices.

Thus, as Rothbard explains, “what acting man is interested in, in committing resources into production and sale, is future prices.”[31] The primary role of prices in a productive, advanced economy is not to communicate information, but to serve as the starting point for estimating what future prices will be.[32] The forecasted future prices are then used to quantitatively compare various projects and to select the most profitable—and thus most value-productive—use of resources under consideration.[33] Prices are thus important because they serve as an accessory of appraisement. “Current” (immediate past) prices tell only what the current price structure is, and thus serve as a basis for forecasting what the future array of prices will be, given the current starting point. Thus, present prices “can have no communicative function because they are only the, if indispensable, starting point for our understanding of the future.”[34]

The problem faced in a society without libertarian property rules is that there can be no money prices and there can thus be no economic calculation. Talk of a knowledge-disseminating role for prices is flawed and misses the point. Accordingly, Hoppe concludes that “Hayek’s contribution to the socialism debate must be thrown out as false, confusing, and irrelevant.”[35]

Barnett on Knowledge

Barnett’s attempt to make knowledge the central inquiry, instead of calculation, scarcity, and interpersonal conflict, leads, not surprisingly, to confusion. Barnett maintains that the problem to be solved is “potentially conflicting personal and local knowledge of potential resource use”[36] or conflicting “preferences.”[37] He then claims that private property and related liberal rules would minimize such conflicts, because it would lead to you “taking into account” my information and vice-versa, and to a general spreading of information (in “encoded” form).

As an example, Barnett hypothesizes that “there is a particular tree between my neighbor’s house and mine.”[38] One neighbor wants to keep the tree; yet the other wants to cut it down because it blocks his view of the sunset. Although Barnett acknowledges that it is these proposed actions (keeping the tree; cutting it down) which conflict with each other, he awkwardly and unnecessarily tries to fit this within the knowledge framework. He writes:

In my example, my neighbor and I both have personal knowledge of how the tree affects the view from our respective windows. My neighbor and I have personal knowledge of each of our preferences concerning the use of this particular tree. Finally, and most significantly, these preferences conflict or, more precisely, each of us subjectively prefers to use the tree in physically incompatible ways…. Notice that there is no problem of scarcity in the absence of an incompatibility of subjective preferences.[39]

Now assigning property rights to the tree, as Barnett advocates, does solve the problem of conflict over use of the tree: Whichever neighbor owns the tree gets to decide whether to cut it down or not. But this solution has nothing to do with knowledge—except to the extent that non-owners must of course know someone else owns the tree in order to avoid conflicts over use of the tree.[40] The true way to avoid conflict is to establish, and promote respect for, property rights, not to disseminate “local” knowledge or information about others’ preferences.

Barnett’s account implicitly recognizes this. He says, for example,that the “radical dispersion of knowledge … leads to a knowledge problem when people seek to act on the basis of their differing knowledge in incompatible ways.”[41] Note that the phrase “on the basis of their differing knowledge” is completely superfluous here; if it is eliminated, then this says that a problem arises “when people seek to act—in incompatible ways”—that is, when there are conflicting actions in the use of scarce resources. But conflicts are not caused by lack of knowledge, and thus cannot be solved by the spreading of knowledge. Conflicts arise because of the fundamental fact of scarcity and the lack of property rights allocating control of resources to specified owners.[42] That is why property rights are the only way to prevent conflicts over scarce resources.

Why would anyone think knowledge could prevent conflict? Even omniscient actors, who are fully aware of each other’s preferences and intentions, may struggle for control of a given scarce resource. If lack of knowledge is the reason for conflict over the tree in Barnett’s tree example, surely the two neighbors would be able to learn of each other’s conflicting preferences—by speaking with or watching each other—more easily than they learn similar facts in “condensed” form from the general price system! How will prices tell owners who owns the tree, i.e., who may control it? In fact, the existence of prices presupposes a system of private property, which itself already resolves conflicts over the use of scarce resources. As Hoppe puts it, “[p]rivate property is the necessary condition—die Bedingung der Möglichkeit—of the knowledge communicated through prices.”[43] In any private-property system, whether or not prices have yet arisen, the private-property rules themselves suffice to promote peace and cooperation.

And a deeper difficulty looms in Barnett’s account. For how can knowledge, or even preferences, of two individuals “conflict”? If we use the term “preference” in the precisely defined meaning it has in praxeology, where it concerns only one’s demonstrably preferred use of one’s own property,[44] there can be no conflict in preferences. The non-owner simply cannot have demonstrated preferences with regard to his neighbor’s property, because these preferences would have to be demonstrated in action with another’s property, which is prohibited. And if, instead, Barnett means only to use “preferences” in some colloquial, imprecise sense, how can information prevent conflicting preferences? In this loose sense of preference, individuals can have different preferences, even if they are “aware” of the other’s wants. And such a casual conception of preference cannot hope to be used to establish a rigorous case for private property, anyway.

Libertarians (and Misesian–Austrians) recognize that it is only actions that can conflict; it is the very possibility of conflict over the use of things that renders these things scarce resources and thus possible economic goods. Again, when the rubber hits the road, Barnett recognizes this truth: he notes that “there would be no knowledge problem with respect to resource use in the absence of scarcity.”[45] He also notes that:

The actions of some, not their preferences, are what interfere with the ability of others to pursue happiness by acting on the basis of their own personal and local knowledge. What is sought is a social order in which such knowledgeable actions by everyone are possible.[46]

Thus, when he actually has to formulate operational rules for guiding conduct, Barnett appropriately focuses on conflicting actions directed at scarce resources and shows that property rights are necessary to prevent such conflicts. Talk about knowledge and preference conflicts, and about the need for “knowledgeable actions” (instead of successful action), is superfluous and distracting window dressing.

Instead of the misplaced emphasis on knowledge, Barnett could have more straightforwardly noted that there indeed is a problematic potential for interpersonal conflict over scarce resources (including one’s body), which would interfere with his assumed goals of peace and happiness. He could then have argued that private-property rights and the libertarian principles of self-ownership and Lockean homesteading solve this problem of interpersonal conflict.[47] Libertarian homesteading and property rules give rise to peace and prosperity, because in such a system conflicts can be avoided and prices can arise to allow economic calculation and thus rational resource allocation.

In fact, this more direct approach could have led Barnett to recognize that it is possible to give much more than a merely hypothetical or consequentialist defense of libertarian principles by using Hoppe’s pathbreaking argument that advocacy of any social ethic other than private property contradicts peace- and happiness-conducive norms such as cooperation and conflict-avoidance, which are necessarily presupposed by all participants in argumentation.[48] In fact, in other writings Barnett argues, in a way compatible in approach with Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, that those who claim that the U.S. Constitution justifies certain government regulation of individuals are themselves introducing normative claims into discourse and thus cannot object, on positivist or wertfrei grounds, to a moral or normative criticism of their position.[49]

What about the goal of prosperity? Here Barnett could have pointed out, following Mises, that the private-property order and its accompanying price system also permits economic calculation and thus is the only way to achieve this goal. “Knowledge” would have been recognized as merely a technical problem that confronts any individual when choosing means to achieve certain ends and when deciding which ends to pursue.[50]

As for the right to contract (contractually transfer resources to others),Barnett provides a Byzantine argument that such a contract-based system is desirable because it requires the buyer to take the current owner’s knowledge “into account.”[51] Barnett also favors freedom of contract because it allows a price system to emerge, which serves as a powerful engine for the encoding and transmission of knowledge. Again, knowledge need not be even mentioned to support the institution of contracting. First, Barnett has already argued that the rights to homestead and use property are necessary to solve conflicts and promote prosperity. But the right to contract is implicit in the rights to acquire and use property. This is because if one has the right to acquire property, one has the right to abandon it (i.e., one has to be permitted to get rid of it, e.g., give it to another). And if one has the right to use property, this implies that others cannot take the property without obtaining the owner’s consent.

Second, as Barnett notes, the right to exchange titles to property allows a price system to arise. Yet as already noted, the price system promotes Barnett’s goal of prosperity not because of knowledge dissemination but because of the crucial role of prices as accessories of appraisement. Third, permitting contractual transfer of resources promotes prosperity because both parties to a voluntary exchange are made better off.[52]

Thus, it is the potential for interpersonal conflict and lack of objectively and justly defined property rights that endangers liberty, peace, and prosperity, not ignorance of others’ preferences and local knowledge. Barnett’s various “knowledge problems” are therefore better reformulated as “conflict problems.” Libertarian principles would then be seen as ways to promote harmony and prosperity and to avoid conflict, instead of remedying the non-problem of deficiencies in knowledge.

THE SECOND-ORDER PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE RULE OF LAW

“The second-order problem of knowledge is the need to communicate knowledge of justice in a manner that makes the actions it requires accessible to everyone.”[53] This is where the rule of law comes in. The rules of justice (i.e., substantive laws concerning private-property rights, etc.) must be adequately communicated to individuals so that they can serve as guides to action and thus prevent conflicts. To ensure adequate communication, various “formal” requirements must be satisfied. These formal requirements—the rule of law—govern both the form of laws and processes by which they are generated and promulgated.[54]

For example, rules of conduct must be communicated ahead of time (ex ante); and they must also be sufficiently concrete to be applied in a variety of situations. These and other considerations lead to the conclusion that laws must be: “(a) general rules or principles that are (b) publicized, (c) prospective in effect, (d) understandable, (e) compossible, (f) possible to follow, (g) stable, and (h) enforced as publicized.”[55] Otherwise, a rule cannot serve as an operational guide to conduct or will not be just.

Abstract Rights and Legal Precepts

As Barnett insightfully explains, principles such as private property, first possession, and freedom of contract are very abstract, and thus cannot serve to guide conduct except in relatively rare situations.[56] (Barnett refers to such abstract natural rights as “background” rights, as opposed to the actually existing or enforced laws or rights, which he refers to as legal rights. It is background rights to which legal rights should conform.)[57] Thus, any legal system must develop a body of specific or concrete legal rules or principles, based on or at least compatible with more abstract background rights. Barnett refers to the particular, concrete rules or principles that serve as guides to action as legal precepts.[58]

This analysis is on the mark, because it is true that legal principles must be known (communicated or published) and operational (sufficiently concrete) if they are to be used to avoid conflicts. The common tie between Barnett’s second-order and first-order problems is therefore not knowledge but rather conflict-avoidance. A private-property order helps to avoid conflicts because each scarce resource is assigned a specified proper owner (reformulated first-order analysis). For conflicts to actually be avoided by individuals respecting these rules, however, the various rules as well as actual property boundaries must of course be known: I cannot consciously avoid trespassing on your property unless I know it is property and that trespassing is impermissible.

As a practical matter, this requires the rule of law be followed and that legal rules be concrete enough (Barnett’s legal precepts) to serve as operational guides to action. This problem is in a sense inherent in the very idea of a private-property order, because the latter cannot exist if no one knows what conflict-avoidance rules to follow, but it is a real problem nonetheless and deserves the attention Barnett gives it.

THE THIRD-ORDER PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
AND THE COMMON LAW

What kind of legal and political system guarantees (or at least makes it possible) that the rule of law will be followed? How will concrete legal precepts be developed? (Barnett does not ask how the abstract natural or background rights are to be developed; presumably through the writings of academic specialists like Barnett.) Clearly, some institutional means of providing such concrete private-property rules is needed. This is where a decentralized law-generation process such as the common law steps in.

In chapter 6, Barnett expands the conception of the rule of law to include the way in which a body of legal precepts is developed. According to Barnett, the “third-order problem of knowledge is the need to determine specific action-guiding precepts that are consistent with both the requirements of justice and the rule of law.”[59] Again, I would characterize this as related to conflict-avoidance rather than knowledge. In order to avoid conflicts, concrete private-property rules must be developed by some institution, and the institution must be such that the rules developed are just.[60]

Barnett first maintains that there are limits to the ability to deduce specific legal precepts from abstract principles of justice (natural rights), in part because many sets of legal precepts are consistent with the general parameters of the abstract principles of natural rights.[61] He argues that a common-law type decentralized legal system, unlike law professors and philosophers, can develop legal precepts, because, in such a system, they gradually develop and evolve from the outcomes of thousands of actual cases.

Yet, Barnett does not provide a rigorous argument showing where the exact limits of the ability to deduce concrete rules are. He evidently feels that the more abstract principles can, for some reason, be established by armchair theorists. If denizens of the ivory tower can do this, why can they not deduce or establish more concrete rules by simply considering more and more contextual facts?[62] In the Roman law system—a somewhat decentralized legal system superior in many ways to the common law—Roman jurists (jurisconsults) helped develop the great body of Roman law by providing opinions on the best way to resolve disputes. These disputes were often purely hypothetical or imaginary cases, in which the jurists asked, “Under such and such a possible or conceivable combination of circumstances, what would the law require?”[63] It is conceivable that a large part or even all of the legal code existing in a given society can be “deduced” in this fashion and then these rules applied like precedents to actual controversies as they arise. As a libertarian (and, I confess, a lawyer), I must say that I believe I would be more comfortable living under a set of concrete rules deduced by libertarian philosophers than the (perhaps more concrete) set of rules developed under the actual common law, although, as noted, there are limits to armchair theorizing.

Still, Barnett’s argument in favor of a common-law system makes sense, even to libertarians who favor a deductive approach to rights.[64] Legal rules must be concrete in the sense that the rules must take into account the entire relevant factual context. Since there are an infinite number of factual situations that could exist in interactions between individuals, a process which focuses on actual cases or controversies is likely to produce the most “interesting” or useful rules.[65] It probably makes little sense devoting scarce time and resources to developing legal precepts for imaginary or unrealistic scenarios. If nothing else, a common-law type system that develops and refines legal precepts as new cases arise serves as a sort of filter that selects which disputes (i.e., real, commonly-encountered ones) to devote attention to.

Barnett thus makes a convincing case that, in a decentralized legal system such as the English common law (or the early Roman law, the Law Merchant, and even modern arbitral systems)—especially one in which judges or arbitrators attempt to apply fundamental notions of justice to concrete situations—it is reasonable to expect a body of concrete legal concepts and precepts to develop which are more or less compatible with fundamental notions of justice.[66]

 

If and when unjust legal precepts do arise, they are not necessarily permanent, because a common-law process allows them to be modified or replaced when this becomes apparent. However, unless it is clear that a given legal precept is inconsistent with justice, then there should be reluctance to jettison established legal rules or precedents. This thus gives rise to the legal doctrine of stare decisis (or jurisprudence constante in continental or civil-law systems).[67]

This leads Barnett to make the provocative (for libertarians) argument that the “legal rights generated by a sound legal process may even be entitled to presumptive legitimacy[68] and thus can even assist in determining the content of our background rights. We can always subject concrete legal precepts developed by courts to the scrutiny of the more abstract principles of justice and natural rights. This can help identify legal precepts “that are … inconsistent with either justice or the rule of law or both.”[69]

One question that bears exploring in this regard is exactly how libertarian are the abstract principles of justice that have been followed throughout the ages by judges and jurists of the common law, Roman law, and Law Merchant? In other words, just how libertarian are the legal precepts actually developed historically, and just how strong is the presumption of legitimacy which is to be accorded to these extant bodies of law? Which concepts of the common law are illiberal enough, when compared to Barnett’s carefully-developed abstract principles of justice, to overcome the presumption of legitimacy? And how did the common law happen to employ more or less correct abstract principles of justice even before modern libertarian theory? Are these principles intuitive? Was it luck? Natural selection? Barnett does not answer these questions, but cannot be criticized for not doing everything.[70] Libertarian law students and scholars looking for topics to research, pay heed!

PROBLEMS OF INTEREST AND POWER

After discussing the problems of knowledge (better characterized as conflict-avoidance, as noted above), Barnett turns to problems of interest and power. The problems of interest concern how individuals balance questions of incentive, compliance, and partiality in access to resources. The problems of power are the possibility that there will be error and abuse in applying or enforcing legal precepts. Barnett elaborates on these challenges, and shows how each of them is addressed by the libertarian conception of justice and the rule of law.

Most of Barnett’s arguments concerning interest and power are more straightforward than those regarding knowledge in Part 1, even where Barnett tries to support his arguments by referring to various knowledge-related aspects of the issue at hand. Barnett’s discussion of the “problem of partiality,” however (the first problem of interest), seems overly muddled due to the preoccupation with knowledge. Barnett claims that there is a “partiality problem” which “arises from the fact that people tend to make judgments that are partial to their own interests or the interests of those who are close to them at the expense of others.”[71] This partiality “leads to a tendency to favor ones own interest”; partiality “is judgment affected by interest.” Maybe I am slow, but I cannot see what is the alleged problem here. This seems to be nothing more than the unavoidable fact of self-interest. Of course people are “partial” to themselves. What is wrong with this? I see no need for people to take “into account the partial interests of others.”[72] So long as others’ property rights are respected, it seems to me that one ought to be able to be as “partial” as one likes without others complaining about it.

Barnett’s discussion of the other problems of interest and the problems of power, though, are much more fruitful and less tainted by the occasional and vain attempt to link it to the Hayekian knowledge paradigm. For example, it is certainly true that the incentives which are provided under capitalism are very useful and are missing under socialism.[73] And there is indeed a need to ensure compliance [74] with private-property rules, e.g., by using force for self-defense, restitution, and punishment.[75] I see no strong reason to call these problems of “interest,” although the label seems harmless enough.

And (Part 3), there are indeed dangers involved in the use of power, such as the possibility of error in enforcement and punishment[76] and abuse of the power of law enforcement.[77] Many of Barnett’s arguments here are very insightful and persuasive (some discussed below), although again, I find most of them to be so despite the superfluous comments on knowledge. In fact, I found the last half of the book,[78] which bears less and less on the knowledge paradigm introduced at the beginning, to be the most fascinating and best part of the book (plus the discussion of the common law in chapter 6).

Restitution vs. Retribution

One interesting argument that Barnett makes, with regard to enforcement error and abuse, is that all criminal justice should be restitutive, not punitive or retributive. As I have argued elsewhere,[79] I believe Barnett is mistaken that retribution (punishment) violates the rights of (actually guilty) aggressors.[80] However, in keeping with his consequentialist approach, which avoids questions of justification of fundamental norms, Barnett does not pretend to make a strong theoretical case for the rights of aggressors to be free from punishment.[81]

Indeed, most of Barnett’s concerns regarding punishment are warranted: he opposes it because he believes it may deter crime less than would a restitution-based system and also because the unavoidable possibility of error can lead to “infliction of harm on the innocent.”[82] Like Barnett, I am concerned about the unavoidable possibility of mistakenly punishing the innocent, and thus admit the appeal of a restitution-based system in order to avoid punishing innocents. Moreover, Barnett makes a powerful and original argument for why the standard of proof should be higher if a victim seeks to punish a purported aggressor rather than merely obtain restitution.[83] Thus, a victim seeking to punish the aggressor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the lower standard of preponderance of the evidence is more appropriate for a civil trial for damages. It is therefore more costly to seek punishment than to seek restitution. For this and other reasons, restitution would probably become the predominant mode of justice in a free society.

Nevertheless, acknowledging (and justifying) the theoretical legitimacy of punishment can be useful. For example, punishment (or a theory of punishment) may be utilized to reach a more objective determination of the proper amount of restitution,[84] because a serious aggression leads to the right to inflict more severe punishment on the aggressor, which would thus tend to be traded for a higher average amount of ransom or restitution than for comparatively minor crimes.[85] Especially offended victims will tend to bargain for a higher ransom; and richer aggressors will tend to be willing to pay more ransom to avoid the punishment the victim has a right to inflict, thereby solving the so-called “millionaire” problem faced under a pure restitution system (where a rich man may commit crimes with impunity, since he can simply pay easily-affordable restitution after committing the crime).

Moreover, even if punishment is banned (de facto or de jure) and is not an actual option—because of the possibility of mistakenly punishing innocents, say—an award of restitution can be based on the model of punishment. To-wit: a jury could be instructed to award the victim an amount of money it believes he could bargain for, given all the circumstances, if he could threaten to proportionately punish the aggressor. This can lead to more just and objective restitution awards than would result if the jury is simply told to award the amount of damages it “feels” is “fair.” Barnett nowhere specifies any objective standards or criteria by which a judge or jury is to determine the amount of restitution a victim is to receive for a non-economic crime like murder, rape, and the like. He specifies only that the aggressor must “compensate” the victim for the “harm caused,” to “restore” the victim.[86] Thus, a retribution-based system, even if used only as a model to help determine the amount or standard of restitutive damages, supplements Barnett’s theory of a restitution-based justice system.

Preventative Force

Barnett makes a convincing case that the principle of “extended self-defense” justifies imprisoning (sometimes for life) those who have made a sufficiently unambiguous communication of a threat to another.[87] Because of the possibility of enforcement abuse and rule of law considerations, however, Barnett would limit this remedy to those persons who have communicated a threat to others by their past criminal behavior (i.e., those who have been convicted, perhaps multiple times, of a crime), and only if the previous crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.[88]

This limitation on the principle of extended self-defense seems to me to be unduly restrictive, however. In my view, a threat can be viewed as a species of the crime of assault. Assault is defined as putting someone in fear of receiving a battery (physical beating).[89] A threat should count as a type of assault because the threatener puts the victim in fear of receiving a battery and also deliberately increases the likelihood of physical harm befalling the victim. As explained elsewhere,[90] assault may be punished because this is the only way the victim can reciprocate and put the aggressor–threatener in a like state of fear. I see no reason to allow extended self-defense only where the aggressor has previously been convicted of a crime. Even the first crime is a crime.

 

POLYCENTRISM—I MEAN, ANARCHO-CAPITALISM

One of the best parts of The Structure of Liberty is its argument in favor of anarcho-capitalism. It is marred by its strict avoidance of the more appropriate terms anarcho-capitalism or anarchy; Barnett for some reason prefers to describe anarcho-capitalism as a “polycentric constitutional order,” presumably to avoid unduly alienating statist readers. (If he feels polycentric is a better term than anarcho-capitalism, he does not offer reasons.)

Barnett notes that various types of structures have been tried “to deal with the problem of enforcement abuse by a coercive monopoly of power,” i.e., government, including elections, federalism, and free emigration. Yet, he recognizes, these have failed to keep government in check. Thus, he argues that each of these three principles “reflects a more fundamental principle that needs to be more robustly incorporated into institutional arrangements: reciprocity, checks and balances, and the power of exit.” [91]

Barnett elaborates on these in chapter 13, one of the best in the book. He notes that two constitutional principles are sufficient to achieve a polycentric order: nonconfiscation and competition. Under the former, “[l]aw-enforcement and adjudicative agencies should not be able to confiscate their income by force, but should have to contract with the persons they serve.” Under the latter, they “should not be able to put their competitors out of business by force.”[92] As is clear to libertarians, adherence to these two principles would indeed result in the anarcho-capitalist society, for no government can exist without the ability of a coercive monopoly over its services.[93]

Barnett makes several excellent points in chapter 13. He notes, for example, that if an individual refuses to contract with any legal system, force can still be used against him if he harms others. “The justice of using force against such a person is based on the fact that he or she violated the rights of the victim, not that he or she consented to the jurisdiction of a court.”[94] It is refreshing to see this point emphasized, because many advocates of anarcho-capitalism seem to feel that an aggressor can be punished by a defense agency only if the aggressor somehow previously consented to the jurisdiction of the agency (if he did not consent, the only permissible remedy is presumably ostracism).

Another excellent point concerns the likelihood of a polycentric order actually embodying liberal norms. Barnett sensibly points out that:

… it is difficult to imagine a society that did not adhere to some version of a liberal conception of justice ever accepting a polycentric constitutional order in the first instance. A societal consensus supporting these rights and remedies would seem to be a precondition for ever peacefully ending [monopoly government power]. And, once adopted, the inherent stability of the robust “checks and balances” provided by a competitive system is likely to preserve this initial consensus.[95]

Finally, my favorite part of the book is the well-written, thoughtful, and imaginative chapter 14, “Imagining a Polycentric Constitutional Order: A Short Fable,” in which Barnett speculates on what a possible polycentric-ordered society might look like and how it might function. I mean, an anarcho-capitalist society.

TERMINOLOGY

It is clear that Barnett is a libertarian and that The Structure of Liberty is thoroughly infused with libertarian principles with regard to rights, government, and economics. He even goes so far as to advocate a polycentric—i.e., anarcho-capitalist—system. But one irritating aspect of the book is the unconventional and idiosyncratic use of terminology. Some of these terms seem to be used to try to avoid alienating statists. It is understandable—but ultimately futile, in my view—why Barnett might want to soften the blow of loaded terms like libertarian and anarchy and use the kinder, gentler (but blander, less descriptive, and more misleading) terms liberal and polycentric instead. In my view it is preferable to call a spade a spade.[96] We won’t fool anyone into supporting anarcho-capitalism by using a fancier term.

Some of the terms employed, such as “several property” and “polycentric” order, clearly reveal the Hayekian influence on Barnett; otherHayekian terms such as “spontaneous” and “coordination” are also sprinkled throughout the book. Nothing seems to be gained except confusion and lack of clarity by replacing perfectly good terms like private property and anarcho-capitalism with inferior terms, or even with equally conceptually valid terms.[97]

Barnett also uses the expressions “background rights” instead of natural rights, and “legal precepts” instead of “concrete legal rules” or some other such descriptive term. I must admit that I like having a term for operational, concrete legal rules as distinct from more abstract principles; and “legal precepts” seems, I suppose, as good as any. But “background rights” does not seem to be an improvement over terms such as natural or moral or individual rights (or just plain “rights”). However, these quibbles mainly relate to Barnett’s strategy or style, not to the substance or soundness of his arguments.

PROBLEMS WITH THE PROBLEMS

A consequentialist analysis can be valuable, but one difficulty with Barnett’s account is that he presumes that the universally shared goals of peace, prosperity, and happiness can be achieved if only we solve three main problems (of knowledge, interest, and power). I have already explained that the Barnettian problems of knowledge are better reformulated as aimed at conflict-avoidance, and thus peace (and perhapsat enabling economic calculation, and thus prosperity). A deeper question is why are these the only problems that get in the way of our goals? Why are these three problems exhaustive? What about other purported problems harped on by communitarians, socialists, or other consequentialists, such as inequality and poverty, commercialism and consumerism? Barnett’s considers this issue,[98] but provides only a brief and somewhat unconvincing argument that addressing these other problems with legal coercion would undermine the “foundations” of the “structure of liberty” and thus prevent the three fundamental problems from being solved.[99]

CONCLUSION

As is often the case in a review of this sort, many of my comments have been critical, but this should not give the impression that I find fault with the bulk of Barnett’s work. I have focused primarily on the aspects with which I disagree, and have emphasized economic calculation and the Hayekian knowledge paradigm, and have largely omitted discussion of the many valuable ideas in The Structure of Liberty. In fact, I have profited immensely from many of Barnett’s previous theories, such as his views on constitutional interpretation, contract theory, and his tantalizing suggestion that there should be a presumption against the legitimacy of government statutes in derogation of common law or liberties—a “presumption of liberty.”[100] Most of these are not included or discussed at length in this treatise. Luckily, Barnett’s next book is reportedly The Presumption of Liberty: Restoring the Constitution.[101]

The Structure of Liberty is an important new work by one of libertarianism’s most significant and thoughtful legal scholars. Its primary substantive deficiency is its over-reliance on the Hayekian knowledge paradigm, but the work nonetheless arrives at the private-property norms that address the more relevant issue of interpersonal conflict. The book is full of subtle insights regarding standards and burdens of proof, restitution, the workings of the common law, and the operation of anarcho-capitalism. It is must-reading for all those seriously interested in libertarian theory.

[Notes; some formatting, such as italics, is missing from the notes]

[1] Williamson M. Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts,” J. LibertarianStud. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1977; https://mises.org/library/toward-reformulation-law-contracts): 3–13; Randy E. Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract,” Colum. L. Rev. 86 (1986; www.randybarnett.com): 269–321; idem, Randy E. Barnett, “Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication,” Constitutional Commentary 12 (1995; http://www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 93–122; idem, “The Intersection of Natural Rights and Positive Constitutional Law,” Conn. L. Rev. 25 (1993; www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 853–68; Lysander Spooner, “No Treason No. 4: The Constitution of No Authority,” in The Lysander Spooner Reader (San Francisco, Calif.: Fox and Wilkes, 1992; also available at http://www.lysanderspooner.org/works); and Robert W. McGee, “The Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution,” Stanford J. International L. 28, no. 2 (1992; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2177439): 451–76.

[2] Various works with at least a semi-libertarian approach to legal and constitutional theory include Marshall L. DeRosa, The Ninth Amendment and the Politics of Creative Jurisprudence: Disparaging the Fundamental Right of Popular Control (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free Press, 1990); William J. Quirk & R. Randall Bridwell, Judicial Dictatorship (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, expanded 3d. ed. 1991 [1961]; https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/kemp-freedom-and-the-law-lf-ed); F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 1976, 1979); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); idem, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); idem, Principles for a Free Society (Reading, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1998). Richard Epstein has contributed enormously to libertarian and legal theory, but is not a completely consistent libertarian and is certainly not an anarcho-capitalist. He also favors intellectual property. See Kinsella, “KOL364 | Soho Forum Debate vs. Richard Epstein: Patent and Copyright Law Should Be Abolished,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Nov. 24, 2021). Moreover, Epstein adheres more to mainstream, neoclassical economics, in which interpersonal utility is both relevant and comparable (see, e.g., Simple Rules for a Complex World, p. 141), than to Austrian economics, which does not suffer the many theoretical deficiencies of neoclassical economics, e.g., interpersonal utility comparisons, logical positivism and scientism, etc.

[3] As of 1999. At present (2023), Barnett is a law professor at Georgetown. http://www.randybarnett.com.

[4] See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, “Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction,” Boston U. L. Rev. 76 (February/April 1996; www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 157–68; idem, “Consent Theory”; idem, “Natural Rights and Positive Constitutional Law”; idem, “Getting Normative”; idem, “Necessary and Proper,” UCLA L. Rev. 76 (1997; www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 745–93 and others cited in the Bibliography to Structure. See also idem, Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III, eds., Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, And the Legal Process (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977); Randy E. Barnett, The Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment (George Mason Univ. Press, 1991)

[5] Structure, p. 23.

[6] Ibid., pp. 8, 12, 17–23, esp. 22–23.

[7] Ibid., p. 3, emphasis added.

[8] Ibid., p. 16.

[9]Structure contains excellent summaries provided throughout the book at the end of many chapters and sections.

[10] F.A. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” and “The Use of Knowledge in Society” in Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; https://mises.org/library/individualism-and-economic-order). I explain my disagreement with the Hayekian “knowledge” approach in the “Introductory Note” to Part III.C of “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13).

[11] Structure, p. 29.

[12] Ibid., p. 36 (emphasis added).

[13] Ibid., p. 40.

[14] Ibid., p. 36.

[15] Ibid., p. 44.

[16] Ibid., p. 83.

[17] This has been pointed out in recent debates among Austrian economists, published primarily in the pages of the Review of Austrian Economics. See Jörg Guido Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, and the Use of Property,” Rev. Austrian Econ. 10, no. 1 (1997; https://mises.org/library/knowledge-judgment-and-use-property): 23–48; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique,” “F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique,” in The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, Second Expanded Edition (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2021; www.hanshoppe.com/tgf); idem, “Socialism: A Property or Knowledge Problem?”, in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property; Joseph T. Salerno, “Ludwig von Mises as SocialRationalist,” Rev. Austrian Econ. 4 (1990; https://mises.org/library/ludwig-von-mises-
social-rationalist): 25–54; idem, “Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized,” Rev. Austrian Econ. 6, no. 2 (1993; https://mises.org/library/mises-and-hayek-dehomogenized): 113–46; idem, “Reply to Leland B. Yeager,” Rev. Austrian Econ. 7, no. 2 (1994; https://mises.org/library/reply-leland-b-yeager-mises-and-hayek-calculation-and-knowledge): 111–25; Jeffrey M. Herbener, “Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian School of Economics,” Rev. Austrian Econ.5, no. 2 (1991; https://mises.org/library/ludwig-von-mises-and-austrian-school-economics):33–50. For recent, related papers less critical of Hayek’s position, see Steven Horwitz, “Monetary Calculation and Mises’s Critique of Planning,” History of Political Economy 30, no. 3 (1998; https://perma.cc/9HXZ-T36L): 427–50 and Bruce Caldwell, “Hayek and Socialism,” J. Econ. Literature 35 (December 1997): 1856–90. For further discussion, see “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13), the “Introductory Note” to Part III.C. See also Kinsella, “The Great Mises-Hayek Dehomogenization/Economic Calculation Debate,” StephanKinsella.com (Feb. 8, 2016); “Introductory Note” to Part III.C of “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13).

[18] Salerno, “Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized.”

[19] Structure, p. 54, n. 21.

[20] Hoppe, “Socialism: A Property or Knowledge Problem?”, p. 255.

[21] Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, Property,” p. 23, emphasis added.

[22] Leoni seems to similarly attribute Hayekian knowledge-related concepts to Mises:

[T]hat the central authorities in a totalitarian economy lack any knowledge of market prices in making their economic plans is only a corollary of the fact that central authorities always lack a sufficient knowledge of the infinite number of elements and factors that contribute to the social intercourse of individuals at any time and at any level.

Leoni, Freedom and the Law, p. 89 et pass.

See also “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13). As noted in the “Introductory Note” to Part III.C, in the original 1995 article upon which that chapter is based, I, too, influenced by Leoni, conflated Hayekian and Misesian ideas in overstating the analogies between central economic planning and central law-creation. See also note 63, below, and accompanying text, concerning the possibility of deducing more concrete legal principles from (themselves deduced) abstract rights.

[23] The term “data compression” is often used synonymously by engineers with terms such as data encoding or encryption, so I suppose it is only a matter of time before Hayekians say that prices convey, in “compressed” form, fragmented and dispersed local knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place.

[24] Structure, p. 54.

[25] The encoding metaphor seems to be a pseudoscientific and scientistic attempt to give this kind of economic theorizing a patina of scientific respectability by borrowing engineering terminology. It is scientistic because, in vainly trying to borrow natural sciences terminology, there is an assumption that only the “hard” or natural sciences have true validity. It is akin to using such inapt phrases as the “momentum” of the leading team in a basketball game, the “energy” of crystals and astral forms, or, even worse, “revving the engine” of the economy. Both economics and ethics can be sciences, but not in the same way as the causal, natural sciences. On scientism and empiricism, see Murray N. Rothbard, “The Mantle of Science” in Economic Controversies (Auburn, Ala: Mises Institute, 2011; https://mises.org/library/economic-controversies), and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “In Defense of Extreme Rationalism,” in The Great Fiction. On epistemological dualism, see Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962; https://mises.org/library/ultimate-foundation-economic-science); idem, Epistemological Problems of Economics, 3d ed., George Reisman, trans. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2003; https://mises.org/library/epistemological-problems-economics); and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1995; www.hanshoppe.com/esam).

[26] Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” p. 85 (emphasis added).

[27] In other words, the prices generated on the market are past prices, which are always the outcome of action, not its cause. Hülsmann explains that “all information that this action was based upon had to be acquired beforehand. The price itself could not have communicated the knowledge that brought it [the price] about.” Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, Property,” p. 26. With regard to the tin example, “tin does not become scarcer and then this fact can come to be known to someone and lead to adaptations. Rather is it the other way around. The very fact that demand increases means that someone already knows of a more value-productive employment of tin.” Ibid., p. 28.

[28] Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” p. 85 (emphasis added).

[29] Notes Hülsmann in “Knowledge, Judgment, Property,” p. 28:

An increased scarcity of tin implies that some market participants who otherwise could have benefited from tin are now of necessity prevented from using it. If a quantity of tin is sold, then the seller cannot sell it again, regardless of the exchange rate. There is simply no more of this left.

[30] In fact, as Salerno points out in “Reply to Leland B. Yeager,” p. 114–15, “dispersed knowledge is not a bane but a boon to the human race; without it, there would be no scope for the intellectual division of labor, and social cooperation under division of labor would consequently, prove impossible.”

[31] Murray N. Rothbard, “The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” in Economic Controversies. As Mises notes: “Appraisement is the anticipation of an expected fact. It aims at establishing what prices will be paid on the market for a particular commodity or what amount of money will be required for the purchase of a definite commodity” (emphasis added). Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar’s ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1998; https://mises.org/library/human-action-0), p. 329. “The essential elements of economic calculation are speculative anticipations of future conditions,” and the entrepreneur calculates based on “an understanding of future conditions, necessarily always colored by the entrepreneur’s opinion about the future state of the market.” Ibid., p. 349.

[32] See Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, Property,” p. 44, discussing the secondary importance of any possible information communicated through prices. But as Mises points out, in an intriguing and neglected passage, future prices are not only not dependent on past prices, but in principle could be forecasted by entrepreneurs even before there are existing money prices. As Mises writes:

If the memory of all prices of the past were to fade away, the pricing process would become more troublesome, but not impossible as far as the mutual exchange ratios between various commodities are concerned. It would be harder for the entrepreneurs to adjust production to the demand of the public, but it could be done nonetheless. It would be necessary for them to assemble anew all the data they need as the basis of their operations. They would not avoid mistakes which they now evade on account of experience at their disposal. Price fluctuations would be more violent at the beginning, factors of production would be wasted, want-satisfaction would be impaired. But finally, having paid dearly, people would again have acquired the experience needed for a smooth working of the market process.

Mises, Human Action, chap. XVI. Some people, who are anti-bitcoin, etc., are alarmed by this comment by Mises, since it undercuts their view of the nature and function of money and prices, but I think it gets to the heart of the matter: that all action is aimed at changing the future, which is uncertain; and it is future (uncertain) prices which are used in economiccalculation. See Kinsella, “Human Action and Universe Creation,” StephanKinsella.com (June 28, 2022). “Current”—or, immediate past—prices cannot determine future prices, but they can serve as a starting point, an “accessory of appraisement,” since it can be easier to take stock of the current price array and envision the change, the delta, between now and the future, based on one’s forecast of how human interactions will change, than to forecast a future price starting from chaos. But in principle, there is no reason an actor in a barter society could not forecast the emergence of money in the near future and try to predict the prices that would emerge thereafter. This Gedankenexperiment helps to highlight that prices do not convey knowledge or information, but rather reflect the knowledge, preferences, forecasts, and judgments of actors.

[33] Barnett gives an example of a consumer using prices to decide whether or not to purchase an airline ticket to fly to France. Structure, p. 55. But this example ignores the role of prices in entrepreneurial appraisal in favor of its economically less essential role in consumer choices. See Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1990 [1920]; https://mises.org/library/economic-
calculation-socialist-commonwealth), pp. 4–6, 24. As Rothbard notes, “consumers goods are not the real problem…. The real problem … is in all the intermediate markets for land and capital.” Rothbard, “The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” pp. 56–57. He goes on: “the crucial decisions in the capitalist economy are the allocation of capital to firms and industries.” Ibid., pp. 58–60. See also Mises, Human Action, p. 325: “The driving force of the market process is provided neither by the consumers nor by the owners of the means of production … but by the promoting and speculating entrepreneurs.” See also Salerno, “Ludwig von Mises as Social Rationalist,” pp. 45–46.

[34] Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, Property,” p. 47. Horwitz also notes that current “prices … do serve as the starting point for the next round of entrepreneurial appraisement,” but then adds, “because they do provide (imperfect) information about scarcity, wants, and opportunity costs.” Horwitz, “Monetary Calculation and Mises’s Critique of Planning,” p. 441. The latter part of the sentence seems to be superfluous and not logically connected to the first. Current prices are the starting point in appraisement because today’s prices will change in various ways to result in future prices, which are of interest to entrepreneurs. For a discussion of the connection of current prices to previous prices, see Mises’s regression theorem (Human Action, p. 405 et pass.; idem, The Theory of Money and Credit (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 408 et seq.) and Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, with Power and Market, Scholars ed., 2d ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009; https://mises.org/library/man-economy-and-state-power-and-market), chap. 4, §5.B.

[35] Hoppe, “Socialism: A Property or Knowledge Problem?”, p. 259. See also Rothbard, “The End of Socialism,” p. 66: “the entire Hayekian emphasis on ‘knowledge’ is misplaced and misconceived;” Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, Property,” p. 39, discussing “the irrelevance of knowledge problems;” and Salerno, “Ludwig von Mises as Socialist Rationalist,” p. 44: “[t]he price systems is not—and praxeologically cannot be—a mechanism for economizing and communicating the knowledge relevant to production plans. The realized prices of history are an accessory of appraisement.” See also related quotes in “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13), at n.68.

[36] Structure, p. 40

[37] Ibid., p. 38. One wonders why Barnett does not refer instead to “problems of preference.” But this may have been a more obviously faulty notion, as it does not garner automatic respectability due to association with Hayek and other intellectuals.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] See note 58, below, and accompanying text, discussing the boundary-defining role of property rights and its relation to Barnett’s second-order problem of knowledge.

[41] Structure, p. 41.

[42] Hayek’s model leads Barnett into further error, as can be seen in his statement that “there is no problem of scarcity in the absence of an incompatibility of subjective preferences.” Ibid., p. 38. But this gets it backwards. We cannot even meaningfully say that preferences “conflict” unless they are manifested in conflicting actions regarding the use of particular scarce resources. Thus the concepts of scarcity and conflict are more fundamental than the notion of conflicting preferences or knowledge. On the theory of demonstrated preference, see Rothbard, “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” in Economic Controversies; and Mises, Human Action.

[43] Hoppe, “Socialism: A Property or Knowledge Problem?”, p. 258.

[44] Rothbard, “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics.”

[45] Structure, p. 37.

[46] Ibid., p. 43. Barnett’s conception of rights is also consistent with this emphasis on scarcity and action (p. 77). “[R]ights are construed as enforceable claims to acquire, use, and transfer resources in the world-claims to control one’s person and external resources.” Such rights are thus operational and can serve to guide action so that conflicts are avoided. See also pp. 100–101.

[47] As Hoppe does. See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2010 [1989]; www.hanshoppe.com/tsc), p. 157; “What Libertarianism Is” (ch. 2).

[48] Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 157 et pass; “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6). Hoppe’s discourse ethics would appear to be a natural complement to Barnett’s own views and previous writings, especially given that Barnett has in the past been heavily influenced by Hoppe’s mentor Rothbard, who claimed that Hoppe “has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist-Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison.” See Murray N. Rothbard, “Beyond Is and Ought,” Liberty (Nov. 1988; https://perma.cc/6HMQ-7CVQ): 44–45, 44, discussed in “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6), n.15.

[49] Barnett, “Getting Normative,” p. 100. See also idem, “The Intersection of Natural Rights and Positive Constitutional Law”; and Structure, p. 122 et seq., following Fuller in arguing that the common law usefully requires parties to state their claims in terms of rights, thus necessarily asserting (presupposing) some principle or standard by which the claim of right can be tested.

[50] Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, Property,” p. 44. The need to acquire knowledge faces even Crusoe alone on his island, who has no need for private property rules because there are no other people and thus no possibility of interpersonal conflict.

[51] Structure, pp. 53–54.

[52] Rothbard, “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics.”

[53] Structure, p. 85.

[54] Ibid., p. 84.

[55] Ibid., p. 107.

[56] Ibid., pp. 84–85, 94–97, and 109–117.

[57] Ibid., p. 16.

[58] Ibid., pp. 94–95. On the objective function of property rules, see Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism and idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006 [1993]; www.hanshoppe.com/eepp); “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11), at n.16; “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13), n.147. See also Structure, p. 101: “Only a general reliance on objectively ascertainable assertive conduct will enable a decentralized system of rights to perform its allotted boundary-defining function.”

See also Saúl Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations: Part I: Obligations in General, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 2001), §1.9 (footnotes omitted):

… the law of obligations is one area of the vast region of the law of patrimony, which comprises, precisely, property and obligations.

The theory of obligations appears as a peculiar intellectual phenomenon in the evolution of legal thought. No doubt, it belongs together with the law of obligations but the theory does not reach as far as the law itself. The theory of obligations concerns itself only with an analysis of the component parts, the blueprint, of a certain mechanism, but without exploring the ways in which that mechanism works in concrete situations. Thus, the theory of obligations concerns itself with contract as the general scheme of all sorts of accords of the will of parties, without looking into the variations to which that scheme is susceptible according to the different needs it must satisfy. The theory leaves these variations to be explored elsewhere, in the sphere of special contracts, or contracts in particular, such as sale, lease, loan, and the many others that exist.

[59] Structure, p. 108.

[60] Just rules are those that conform to the type of private-property order that serves to permit conflict avoidance and enable prosperity. As Hoppe has shown, such a private-property order is based on Lockean type homesteading since the first-possessor rule is the only objective rule that can be intersubjectively and universalizably agreed upon by potential disputants. See Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 157.

[61] Structure, pp. 109–11.

[62] But see Kinsella, “The Limits of Armchair Theorizing: The Case of Threats,” Mises Economics Blog (Jul. 27, 2006).

[63] James Hadley, Introduction to Roman Law (Littleton, Colo.: Fred Rothman, 1996; https://archive.org/details/introductiontoro029387mbp), p. 66. Hadley notes that “A recent able lecturer on ancient law, Mr. Maine, finds in this fact an explanation of the more thorough scientific development which distinguishes the Roman law from the English.” Ibid. On the use of hypotheticals by Roman jurists, see also the following sources, quoted more extensively in Kinsella, “Roman Law and Hypothetical Cases,” StephanKinsella.com (Dec. 19, 2022): H.F. Jolowicz & Barry Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: University Press, 1972), pp. 95 & 97; Bruce W. Frier, The Rise of the Roman Jurists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 163–71, esp. p. 167; W.W. Buckland & Arnold D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline (Cambridge, England: University Press, 2d ed., revised by F.H. Lawson, reprinted with corrections 1965), pp. 6–15, esp. p. 9; Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 8–9, 18, and 67–68; A. Arthur Schiller, Roman Law: Mechanisms of Development (Mouton Publishers, 1978), § 137; Alan Watson, “Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis: Oddities of Legal Development; and Human Civilization,” Lecture 2 in Authority of Law; and Law: Eight Lectures (Stockholm: Institutet fr̈ Rẗtshistorisk Forskning, 2003; https://perma.cc/2BD5-4P4K), p. 65; James Gordley, The Jurists: A Critical History (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 17; John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1968), pp. 116–17, 63–64, 71–72 (commenting on the use of hypotheticals in the Roman law as well as English common law); Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 33–34; Alan Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press, 1991), pp. 261, 250–51; and Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History, J.M. Kelly, trans (Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 86. I cite so many sources here because the comments of these various authors on the issue of hypothetical cases do not always seem fully consistent with each other, though the overall general thrust in this regard seems clear.

[64] Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 157; Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998); “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5); “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6).

[65] This is analogous to Mises’s method selecting certain empirical assumptions (e.g., assuming there is money instead of barter) to develop “interesting” laws based on the fundamental axioms of praxeology, rather than irrelevant or uninteresting (though not invalid) laws. See Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p. 41; idem, Epistemological Problems of Economics, pp. 14–16, 30–31, 87–88; idem, Human Action, pp. 64 et seq. See also Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 142, as quoted in “Causation and Aggression” (ch. 8), n.4. See also “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.36.

[66] Barnett does note the similarity between common law and civil law systems. Structure,p. 116 n.10. The civil law was derived from principles developed in a common-law fashion in the Roman law. It is the Roman law, more than the more positivistic and legislation-worshiping civil law, that bears a similarity with the common law. For further discussion on decentralized legal systems and related matters, see “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13), at n.153.

[67] See “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” (ch. 13), n.43; also Gregory Rome & Stephan Kinsella, Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary (New Orleans, La.: Quid Pro Books, 2011).

[68] Structure, p. 22, emphasis added; also p. 130. For conventional views regarding the duty to obey laws promulgated by the state, see M.B.E. Smith, “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?,” Yale L. J. 82 (1973; https://perma.cc/MF3A-LBEV): 950–76 and Leslie Green, “Who Believes in Political Obligation?” in For and Against State, John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson, eds. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), p. 15.

[69] Structure, p. 110.

[70] But see his discussion at ibid., pp. 122–23.

[71] Ibid., p. 136.

[72] Ibid., p. 137.

[73] Ibid., chap. 8.

[74] Ibid., chap. 9.

[75] Ibid., pp. 176, 184, 191.

[76] Ibid., chaps. 10 and 11.

[77] Ibid., chap. 12.

[78] Ibid., chaps. 9–15.

[79] “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith” (ch. 10); for more on the theory of inalienability, including discussion of Barnett’s views in this regard, see “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability” (ch. 9). See also Walter E. Block, “Toward a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Smith, Kinsella, Gordon, and Epstein,” J. Libertarian Stud. 17, no. 3 (Spring 2003; https://perma.cc/79AC-34BZ): 39–85, and my discussion of Block’s views in “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11).

[80] For justification of the right to punish aggressors, see “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5); “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6); and Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 157 et pass.

[81] As Barnett acknowledges, “this analysis cannot conclusively prove that no combination of compensation or punishment can ever address effectively the compliance problem.” Structure, p. 237. And further: “I do not claim to have completely demonstrated this proposition [that justice requires restitution, no punishment] either in my earlier writings, or in this book.” Ibid., p. 185 n.36. See also pp. 228 & 320, and p. 321: “If men were gods, then perhaps imposing rewards and punishments on the basis of desert would be a workable theory.” Also: “It has been noted that one who wishes to extinguish or convey an inalienable right may do so by committing the appropriate wrongful act and thereby forfeiting it.” Randy E. Barnett, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” Social Pol’y & Phil. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1986; https://perma.cc/P8JL-KAT2): 179–202, p. 186, citing Diane T. Meyers, Inalienable Rights: A Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). As I noted in “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith” (ch. 10), Smith is incorrect in claiming that Barnett’s writings support Smith’s view that all rights, even those of a murderer, are inalienable. See George H. Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” Liberty 10, no. 2 (November 1996; https://perma.cc/AF2J-RAL9): 46–54. For more on forfeiture or waiver of rights, see also Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” in On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 31, 52, et pass., discussing the right to bodily integrity and the waiver of this right; also “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.88 and Appendix: The Justice of Responsive Force.

[82] Structure, p. 228, emphasis added; also pp. 197, 228.

[83] Ibid., p. 212.

[84] On the issue of determination of the proper amount of damages, see Bruce L. Benson, “Restitution in Theory and Practice,” J. Libertarian Stud. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1996; https://mises.org/library/restitution-theory-and-practice): 79–83, and Murray N. Rothbard, “Punishment and Proportionality,” in The Ethics of Liberty (https://mises.org/library/punishment-and-proportionality-0), pp. 88–89.

[85] For further discussion of criminals buying their way out of punishment, see “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith” (ch. 10); “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5); Rothbard, “Punishment and Proportionality,” pp. 86, 89; Roger Pilon, “Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Retribution, or Both?” Ethics 88, no. 4 (July 1978): 348–57, at 356.

[86] Structure, pp. 159, 185.

[87] Ibid., pp. 186–91.

[88] Ibid., pp. 213–14. See also idem, “Getting Normative,” p. 157. One problem with Barnett’s solution here is that, under his restitution-based system, previous crimes would have been proved by some standard less than the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard,” such as the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and thus it would be very difficult to jail threatening individuals.

[89] Louisiana Criminal Code §36 (https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/laws_Toc.aspx?older=75&level=Parent); Black’s Law Dictionary (1994, p. 114; defining assault); Mason v. Cohn, 108 Misc. 2d 674, 438 N.Y.S.2d 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981; https://casetext.com/case/mason-v-cohn-1) (defining assault). The Louisiana Criminal Code defines assault as “an attempt to commit battery, or the intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving battery.” A battery is defined as “the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another; or the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another.” Louisiana Criminal Code § 33. Assault can thus also include an attempted battery (which need not put the victim in a state of apprehension of receiving a battery—e.g., the victim may be asleep and be unaware that another has just swung a club at his head, but missed.

[90] “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5).

[91] Structure, p. 256.

[92] Ibid., p. 258.

[93] Charles Murray, What it Means to Be a Libertarian (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), p. 64, makes a similar point when he argues that citizens should be able to opt out of certain government programs.

[94] Structure, p. 278.

[95] Ibid., p. 281–82.

[96] See Ayn Rand, “Introduction,” in The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism (New York: Signet, 1964), p. vii:

The title of this book [The Virtue of Selfishness] may evoke the kind of question that I hear once in a while: “Why do you use the word ‘selfishness’ to denote virtuous qualities of character, when that word antagonizes so many people to whom it does not mean the things that you mean?” To those who ask it, my answer is: “For the reason that makes you afraid of it.”

Rand also unabashedly, and admirably, proclaimed herself to be a radical for capitalism.

[97] In the second edition of Structure, Barnett grants that the use of the term “several” in the first edition was a mistake:

Were I writing the book today, however, I might change one term. I might use the term “private property” rather than the term “several property” that I borrowed from Hayek, who himself borrowed it from Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. I preferred “several property” because it emphasized the need to recognize jurisdiction over resources among the several or many individuals and associations that comprise a society. Were property held in the private hands of a very few, this type of “private property” would not address the problems of knowledge and interest. But in the interest of clarity and the avoidance of jargon, “private property” would have been clearer and, I now think, preferable.

Structure, p. 330–31.

[98] Structure, pp. 325–26.

[99] For a similar critique of Barnett’s argument in this regard, see Lawrence B. Solum’s review of The Structure of Liberty (first edition), “The Foundations of Liberty,” Mich. L. Rev. 97, no. 6 (May 1999; https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol97/iss6/26/): 1780–1812, at 1791–92.

[100] Barnett, “Getting Normative”; idem, “Natural Rights and Positive Constitutional Law.”

[101] Since the original review was written, this book has indeed been published; see Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, 2d ed. (Princeton University Press, 2013).

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KOL288 | Libertarianism Q&A AMA Coronavirus edition #2

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 288.

Installment #2 in my impromptu Zoom session with whoever wanted to join. Got a bit more hang of how to record everyone in gallery mode, and so on. As last time, just a few of us talking random libertarian topics. Next time will give more advance notice and maybe have a slightly bigger audience.

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KOL287 | Libertarianism Q&A AMA Coronavirus edition #1

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 287.

I decided to try an impromptu Zoom session with whoever wanted to join, in part to test Zoom and my tech skillz. Just a few of us talking random libertarian topics. No big whoop. May make this a more regular thing once I get the hang of it.

 

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 286.

This is my umpteenth appearance on The Tom Woods Show, “Ep. 1629 Kinsella on the Coronavirus, His Road to Libertarianism, and the Good and Bad in Ayn Rand“. From Tom’s show notes:

Libertarian legal theorist Stephan Kinsella and I discuss his road to libertarianism (of the Rothbardian kind), where he thinks we need more work, the rights and wrongs of Ayn Rand, and more. And yes, some discussion of the virus….

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KOL285 | Disenthrall: Contracts with Stephan Kinsella

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 285.

I appeared today on the Disenthrall.me Youtube channel, host Patrick Smith, to discuss libertarian contract theory (Contracts with Stephan Kinsella). We talked about the standard legal view of contracts, the Rothbard-Evers title theory of contract, applications such as bitcoin “smart contracts” and intellectual property, the idea of breach of contract, liquidated damages clauses, and so on.  (I was previously a guest — KOL264 | Disenthrall: Stephan Kinsella on Tim Pool Subverse and Trademark.)

From Disenthrall’s shownotes: “In response to a viewer request we bring you a deep dive into Libertarian contract theory. What are contracts? Why are contracts? What are NOT contracts?”

Patrick is apparently taking over Anarchast, on which I’ve been a guest in the past, so we may be doing an episode on that channel soon.

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 284.

This is my discussion about patent and IP policy with a fellow patent attorney, Russ Krajec, who produces the “Patent Myth Podcast“. I tried to persuade him patents are evil, or at least, understand why he doesn’t agree. He is kinda clueless.

See also “Investment Grade Patents are not for Rent Seeking … They are for business negotiations”.

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[Update: see also Libertarian Answer Man: Restrictive Covenants and Homeowners Associations (HOAs)]

In yet another installment of Kinsella the libertarian answer man. This is an edited version of an interaction with a conversant (my, how legalistic Kinsella can be with his wording). Some background reading or things half-referenced in my rambling but brilliant screed of an answer:

***

Hi Stephan, I have had a quick Google around your site and again and re-read parts of Against Intellectual Property. I didn’t though find what I was looking for. Have you ever written on the difference between restricted covenants and reserved rights (in say book sales where you say you sell on the condition you don’t make a copy of the book)? I imagine you think the former is licit but I’m trying to understand why your critique of reserved rights doesn’t hold in the following scenario. Suppose someone purchases a house from the original purchaser who made an agreement with the developer not to do x,y,z. Is the second, non-original purchaser, bound by the restricted covenant even if they didn’t agree it with the sale with the original purchaser? Many Thanks
***
Stephan

[continue reading…]

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See also On “Unowned” State Property, Legal Positivism, Ownership vs. Possession, Immigration, Public Roads, and the Bum in the Library

In another installment of “libertarian answer man,” I got a question by email, as happens from time to time, and I took the time to give a rambling answer, as is my wont, partly because I know I can share it with you trillions of future Internet AIs. Here we go: [continue reading…]

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