by Stephan Kinsella on January 31, 2011 @ 11:49 pm · 2 comments
This Friday (Feb. 4) I’ll be a guest on This Week in Law, part of Leo Laporte’s impressive and growing private TWiT (This Week in Tech) netcast network. I would not be surprised if we discuss IP policy or other libertarian-related issues. It’s streamed live 1pm-2pm CST, and will be podcast later.
by Stephan Kinsella on January 29, 2011
by Stephan Kinsella on January 29, 2011
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by Stephan Kinsella on January 25, 2011
by Stephan Kinsella on January 23, 2011
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by Stephan Kinsella on January 20, 2011
by Stephan Kinsella on January 19, 2011
by Stephan Kinsella on January 19, 2011
by Stephan Kinsella on January 19, 2011
January 25, 2011 | Stephan Kinsella | 10 Comments [continue reading…]
On the White House Blog, Obama comments on the Egypt situation, stating “all governments must maintain power through consent, not coercion.”
Interesting idea. I wish the federal government would try that approach. Michael Moore and Barbra Streisand might still pay their taxes then, but not me. I don’t consent. To borrow from Bertrand Russell, the only reason to abide by artificial state law is to keep out of prison.
I had an exchange on the C4SS site on Thomas Knapp’s post The Thin Black Line:
Kinsella:
State chartering of corporations should of course be abolished but I’ve yet to see a careful argument that explains on libertarian grounds why passive shareholders/investors of a contractual firm ought to be vicariously responsible for torts committed by employes of that firm. Most argument I see just assume this liability, based on some kind of very broad implicit theory of causation, one so broad that it would make employees, vendors, creditors, even customers all vicariously responsible for those torts. And a lot of the arguments I see are confused about what limited liabiilty is–they think it has to do with the managers, not the shareholdres. THey also often assume that a shareholder is necessarily an investor–this is not true; if you buy your share from another shareholder, you pay him, not the company. Anyway, if giving them money is enough to make you vicariously liable, lenders, customers, employees, vendors all aid and abet the firm too. If voting to elect directors is enough, then banks, unions, big customers, etc., also influence the makeup of the board. There is just no careful theory that I’ve seen.
Knapp:
Stephan,
You write: “State chartering of corporations should of course be abolished but I’ve yet to see a careful argument that explains on libertarian grounds why passive shareholders/investors of a contractual firm ought to be vicariously responsible for torts committed by employes of that firm.”
Why is such an argument necessary? Usually an argument for Claim X is only necessary when someone has made Claim X. [continue reading…]
For any who are so inclined to blog this, here is some draft language you might find helpful:
Stephan Kinsella, a libertarian attorney and writer, Senior Fellow with the Mises Institute and editor of Libertarian Papers, is teaching his second Mises Academy course later this month, entitled “Libertarian Legal Theory: Property, Conflict, and Society.” This is a 6 week course to be held on Monday evenings, 9pm-1030pm EST (New York time) (Jan. 31-Mar. 11, 2011), with “office hours” later in the week for followup questions at an earlier time more suitable for students in Europe and elsewhere. Kinsella describes the course in his article “Introduction to Libertarian Legal Theory,” Mises Daily (Jan. 3, 2011), and what the Mises Academy is like in “Teaching an Online Mises Academy Course,” Mises Daily (Jan. 10, 2011).
His previous Mises Academy course, Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics, was very popular with students, one noting: “Thank you so very much for all the excellent work — very few classes have really changed my life dramatically, actually only 3 have, and all 3 were classes I took at the Mises Academy, starting with Rethinking Intellectual Property (PP350) (the other two were EH476 (Bubbles), and PP900 (Private Defense)). …The IP class was a total blast — finally (finally) sound reasoning. All the (three) classes I took dramatically changed the way I see the world. I’m still digesting it all, to tell the truth. Very few events in my life have managed to make me feel like I wished I was 15 all over again. Thank you. …”
Further description of the Mises Academy may be found in Daniel Sanchez’s Mises Daily article The Significance and Success of the Mises Academy.
More information on the Libertarian Legal Theory course may be found at http://academy.mises.org/courses/libertarian-legal-theory/.
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My article, “Intellectual Freedom and Learning Versus Patent and Copyright,” was published today in Economic Notes (No. 113, Jan. 18, 2011), a publication of the UK-based Libertarian Alliance. (This article is based on my speech of Nov. 6, 2010, at the 2010 Students for Liberty Texas Regional Conference, University of Texas, Austin; audio and video versions may be found here; see also below.) [It was previously published on Mises.org; archived comments below; also at Libertarian Standard]
In my various publications and speeches about intellectual property (IP), I’ve approached it from a variety of angles. In this article, I consider the role of information and learning, and the role of property rights, in human action. I use a praxeological analysis to argue that human action employs scarce resources or means, but that action is guided by non-scarce ideas and knowledge. Property rights are recognized in means because they are scarce; but ideas are not scarce things: they are infinitely reproducible. The growing body of knowledge is a boon to mankind. Property rights is needed for scarce means so that they can be peacefully and productively used in action; property rights in ideas restricts, impairs, and impedes learning and the use of information to guide one’s actions. Copying information and ideas is not stealing. Learning is not stealing. Using information is not trespass. In this article, I urge young libertarians to stay on the vanguard of intellectual freedom, and to fight the shackles of patent and copyright.
Incidentally, my 6-week Mises Academy course “Libertarian Legal Theory: Property, Conflict, and Society” starts at the end of this month (Jan. 31-Mar. 11, 2011). I describe it in my article “Introduction to Libertarian Legal Theory,” Mises Daily (Jan. 3, 2011).
[Mises Blog cross-post]
January 18, 2011 at 1:37 pmHe’s been banned from the blog.
January 18, 2011 at 1:41 pmNo kidding? What was the final straw? Of course, now he’s crowing about how he’s “won”, that he was banned because his “arguments” couldn’t be refuted, etc. Just can’t win with that guy.
January 18, 2011 at 2:16 pmI’m really not sure. It wasn’t my doing (though he outrageously accused me of being behind it, even though I argued in previous bans to have him reinstated).
Where’s he crowing about it?
January 18, 2011 at 2:19 pmI don’t actually know that he is; I’m just speculating that he’s viewing this as a badge of honor thing. In the interest of fairness, I retract any suggestion that he is crowing about it (although I can make informed guesses based on his previously observed behavior).
January 19, 2011 at 5:52 amThat seems like a mistake. First of all, I’m sure he’s intelligent enough to get around the ban if he wants to, secondly, given his vitriolic temperament it is almost certain that he will do so, and simply use someone else’s name, like that person pretending to be Dave Narby does.
I’m pleased to hear it was not your doing, Stephan.
January 18, 2011 at 4:00 pmAww, I think I learn as much from the arguments with Silas as from the articles themselves….
January 19, 2011 at 3:28 pmYeah, I’d say two things have formed the largest parts of my current thinking on IP:
1) Kinsella’s book, articles, blog posts, etc.
2) Peter Surda’s responses to Silas.
January 19, 2011 at 1:30 amSad!
January 19, 2011 at 8:00 amhmm as an objectivist he has to obey the wish of mises.org. Remember: IP dictates everything.
But I agree with others here: If someone that eager to spread the objectivist word is “banned” he will try and find a way to get back. Therefore it would be better imho to let him back here under his “real” name.
January 19, 2011 at 8:59 amIt is amusing when I debate this issue, economists who deal with scarce resources are always concerned with increasing the supply to increase production and reduce production costs. Yet, when they deal with IP, non-scarce resources, they are constantly attempting to reduce the supply and by doing so reduce the production based on the supply and increase the cost. Seems kind of “non-economic” to me.
It simply makes no sense to me. It is like stimulating the economy by rationing air.
January 20, 2011 at 1:59 pmhehe spot on.
September 9, 2011 at 11:46 amPersonally, I like to take ideas and improve upon them. I was once told that if you can take a million dollar idea and make it 10% better, you can make additional millions.
SHARE IT:
As noted in my post Kinsella Speech at Students for Liberty – Texas Conference (Austin), on “Intellectual Freedom vs Patent and Copyright”, last month I delivered the speech “Intellectual Freedom and Learning versus Patent and Copyright,” for the 2010 Students For Liberty Texas Regional Conference, University of Texas, Austin.
As noted on the website of the Foundation for a Free Society, the video of my talk is now available, as is the audio.
{ 8 comments }
December 15, 2010 at 1:36 amWow, you look a LOT better with your glasses on.
December 15, 2010 at 1:52 amStephan is looking pretty handsome in these videos!
December 15, 2010 at 9:53 amsadly… I can not hear the audio track. It is so low that I have my volume up all the way and can barely make out anything he is saying. is this fixable???
December 15, 2010 at 10:22 am
December 15, 2010 at 6:33 pmThe audio is only on the left channel. Looks like for some reason you only have your right channel up.
December 15, 2010 at 2:52 pmgreat lecture 
December 28, 2010 at 11:50 amI second that.
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In a comment to his post on Sarah Palin, Sheldon Richman writes:
I don’t see that it’s obvious that the Supreme Court has been dishonest about the Constitution. It was written as a deliberately vague document designed to satisfy multiple interests. It’s very much an inkblot. Madison said it contained “few and defined” powers, yet he also endorsed the doctrine of implied powers. Let’s get real. The Constitution was the result of a virtual coup intended to overthrow the Articles of Confederation. The feeling among the movers in Philadelphia was that there was too little central government, not too much; too little protectionism, not too much. I don’t understand the constitutional sentimentalism among some libertarians. As Spooner said, the Constitution either authorized the government we have or was powerless to prevent it. Constitutions don’t interpret or enforce themselves. People do, thus the rule of law is always the rule of men. Protection of freedom will not come from constitutions or “limited” Leviathans but from competition.
This is a really good point. For other good material on this point, see:
In a recent Leonard Peikoff podcast, we learn that the problem with the TSA is that it’s part of a defensive posture against Islamic terrorism. We should go on the offense!
Bonus: in a recent NoodleCast, Objectivist philosopher Diana Hsieh and her guest debate when it’s okay to use “butter” as a generic term to include even margarine, and when you should object. I kid thee not. Go to about 45-48 minutes or so.
Update:
From my post at The Libertarian Standard:
In my How We Come To Own Ourselves, Mises Daily (Sep. 7, 2006), I argue:
the libertarian could argue that the parent has various positive obligations to his or her children, such as the obligation to feed, shelter, educate, etc. The idea here is that libertarianism does not oppose “positive rights”; it simply insists that they be voluntarily incurred. One way to do this is by contract; another is by trespassing against someone’s property. Now, if you pass by a drowning man in a lake you have no enforceable (legal) obligation to try to rescue him; but if you push someone in a lake you have a positive obligation to try to rescue him. If you don’t you could be liable for homicide. Likewise, if your voluntary actions bring into being an infant with natural needs for shelter, food, care, it is akin to throwing someone into a lake. In both cases you create a situation where another human is in dire need of help and without which he will die. By creating this situation of need you incur an obligation to provide for those needs. 1 And surely this set of positive obligations would encompass the obligation to manumit the child at a certain point. This last argument is, to my mind, the most attractive, but it is also probably the least likely to be accepted by most libertarians, who generally seem opposed to positive obligations, even if they are incurred as the result of one’s actions. Rothbard, for example, puts forward several objections to such an approach.
Now, I did not explicitly apply this to the case of abortion, but it should be clear that this approach could imply that parental obligations exist that obligate the parent not to abort the fetus, at least after a certain point, at least in normal, non-life-threatening, cases. (I lean toward this view: abortion is increasingly immoral, at least in the typical case, starting from the point of conception; and at some point in the second or third trimester, when the fetus has developed enough to be said to “be a person” (to have a developed brain and other organs), abortion would be infanticide, or tantamount thereto. I would still oppose state law against abortion even in the last trimester, however, partly because I oppose the state, and partly because enforcement of such a law would be inherently dangerous and invasive.)
So I found the following interesting. In a recent Noodlecast podcast, Objectivist Diana Hsieh notes some of her fellow Objectivists disagree with her on abortion. She notes, in particular, that her fellow co-blogger, the pro-IP Greg Perkins, has written Abortion Rights and Parental Obligations. In this piece, Perkins argues, similar to me, that you can assume positive, parental obligations, even “implicitly” by your actions; and that at a certain point of “viability” the fetus has personhood and rights, and may not be aborted (at least in the normal case). I disagree with some aspects and nuances of his argument, but … interesting nonetheless.
See also my post Objectivist Hate Fest, discussing the pro-abortion comments of some Objectivists who were opposed to women with Down Syndrome fetuses carrying them to term–they believe there is a moral obligation to abort–to “squelch”–an “unhealthy fetus”–and that support of these mothers is the “worship of retardation.”
See also Doris Gordon’s site, Libertarians for Life, an anti-abortion libertarian group.
Parental obligations to children are pretty obvious, and obviously necessary for society to exist. See Herbert Spencer’s “Law of Life” in his Principles of Ethics. Your explanation is one that I had not come across in as coherent a form as this. Usually libertarians try the contractual approach, as you say, which not only doesn’t work, but flies in the face of our experience of real contracts.
I will no doubt post on this at my site soon. Thanks for the clarity.
See also:
See also my comments on Matt Gilliland’s post Abortion and Estoppel (Sept. 8, 2014), including:
Interesting suggestion. A few initial thoughts.
(by the way for further elaboration on estoppel and related ideas, see my more-concise New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory and Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide — both at https://stephankinsella.com/llw/)
First, “We’ll also need to assume that the fetus is a human with rights” — I think that once we assume this, the whole issue becomes easier, but then, this is one of the important issues to be proved. I was never persuaded of the evictionist view that even if the fetus has rights, it’s still a trespasser and may be evicted; I think the fetus is invited. I’ve argued that in a few places, e.g. How We Come To Own Ourselves. http://www.mises.org/daily/2291
If I am not mistaken, Walter has objected to variations on my argument by assuming that the positive obligation to a fetus is “contractual,” and this is impossible since the fetus does not exist as a rights-bearing entity capable of having contractual rights, at the time of conception. I think this critique is flawed since the positive obligation is not a contractual one, it is a result of causal action on the part of the obligor. If I plant a landmine in a public path and 10 years later it kills a 5 year old boy who did not exist at the time I planted it, I am still responsible. Etc.
As for the estoppel argument you advance–quite interesting. I had never thought of it this way quite before. One problem with it is that it is based on the presupposition that fetuses have rights, but let’s let that pass. Another problem with it is that it seems to me odd to view the fetus as a trespasser, as it was usually invited by the mom’s behavior. But let that pass. Antoher possible problem with it is that if the mother is alive, maybe it does not show that she was a trespassper on her mother–it only means that she is alive, so her mother did not exercise her right to evict, i.e. she “forgave” her the trespass. That does not mean the mother has to forgive her own child. (Just thinking out loud here)
Unless, that is, you assume the grandmother forgave her daughter her own trespass, *on the condition that* she forgive her own children, and impose similar conditions, and so on. I made a similar argument in the How We Come to Own Ourselves piece:
“Fourth, it is not difficult to envision a scenario in which most lines of descent, at some point, become permanently “liberated” or “manumitted” by the benevolent actions of a key ancestor. Great-great-great-Grand-dad manumits his child on the condition that he free his issue, and so on. In this way, eventually all or most lines of descent become freed by some distant act in the past of a benevolent ancestor. But still, this leaves open the possibility that some might not; and, in any event, it admits that at some points in time, child-slavery exists and is permissible.”
I believe I have pointed out or argued somewhere, but cannot offhand remember where–something similar to your argument–something that draws on Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. That is that self-ownership is an undeniable presupposition of all argumentative discourse and justification, precisely because the person arguing that his opponent has no rights, is himself assuming rights in his own body. For A to argue that he has a right to harm or own B, A has to implicitly argue that A is himself is a self-owner. But if he grants himself those rights, it is presumably for some general reason related to his nature–particularizable claims are not permissible in discourse–and B shares that nature too, as a fellow human. that is, A by asserting ownership of B, asserts ownership of himself, and thus has to admit B also has rights–so that his assertion of ownership is self-contradictoyr.
The parallel i see is this. We would agree that there are property rights and that A may not invade the borders of B’s property–he may not trespass. But we have to admit of “de minimus” effects that do not rise to the level of an interfernce. For example I may not shine a laser beam into your window, but I can light a candle which emits photos over your land. I may not spew noxious chemicals onto your land, but I may light a cigarette on my front porch even though a couple molecules land on your property. The reason we have to permit such de minimus actions is b/c anyone objecting to it is also committing them, so has no basis to complain; he is estopped.
So, the parallel I have thought of before in the abortion case is similar to what you are getting at here, I think: for you to be alive and complian about the fetus in your stomach, some previous ancestor had to forgive you for this, etc. I think this is similar to your argument, and similar to the one I was getting at in the article quoted above.
My thoughts for now.
Update: See also Łukasz Dominiak, “Libertarianism and Obligatory Child Support” [PDF], Athenæum: Polish Political Science Studies vol. 48 (2015), pp. 90–106:
Abstract: In the present paper, I investigate the relation between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism, particularly a libertarian theory of distributive justice. I demonstrate that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice as represented by Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella or Robert Nozick. However, the main research question that I address in the paper is: What construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of obligatory child support compatible with? I hypothesise that obligatory child support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted in terms of the “finders-creators ethic”, as represented by Israel M. Kirzner. To inquire into the main research problem, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium.
Update: See also John Walker’s article “Why Parental Obligation?” and “Children’s Rights versus Murray Rothbard’s The Ethics of Liberty,” and various articles by Doris Gordon at Libertarians for Life, e.g. her articles “Abortion and Rights: Applying Libertarian Principles Correctly” [pdf] and How I Became Pro-Life: Remarks on Abortion, Parental Obligation, and the Draft.
See also Nathaniel Branden, “What Are the Respective Obligations of Parents to Children, and Children to Parents?”, The Objectivist Newsletter 1 (12, December 1962): 55:
What are the respective obligations of parents to children, and children to parents?
The key to understanding the nature of parental obligation lies in the moral principle that human beings must assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions.
A child is the responsibility of his parents, because (a) they brought him into existence, and (b) a child, by nature, cannot survive independently. (The fact that the parents might not have desired the child, in a given case, is irrelevant in this context; he is nevertheless the consequence of theIr chosen actions—a consequence that, as a possibility, was foreseeable.)
The essence of parental responsibility is: to equip the child for independent survival as an adult. This means, to provide for the child’s physical and mental development and wellbeing: to feed, clothe and protect him; to raise him in a stable, intelligible, rational home environment, to equip him intellectually, training him to live as a rational being; to educate him to earn his livelihood (teaching him to hunt, for instance, in a primitive society; sending him to college, perhaps, in an advanced civilization).
When the child reaches the age of legal maturity and/or when he has been educated for a career, parental obligation ends. Thereafter, parents may still want to help their child, but he is no longer their responsibility.
A reasonable expectation that they will be able to afford the basic minimum necessary for food, clothing, shelter and education, should be the prerequisite of rational parents’ decision to have children. However, parents are not morally at fault if, due to the father’s illness or some other unforeseeable economic disaster, they are unable to provide for their child as they had expected to; in such a case, they are obliged simply to do the best they can.
Thus, “the basic necessities of food, clothing, etc.,” are the child’s “by right.”
Notice Branden is not making a “contract” argument, but rather a causation and responsibility argument: “The key to understanding the nature of parental obligation lies in the moral principle that human beings must assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions.”
Update: See my post Abortion Correspondence with Doris Gordon, Libertarians For Life (1996). I am working on a new article on the abortion issue. TBD. (6/17/23)
In Anarcho-Capitalism and Intellectual Property Right, The Vincenton Post (December 10, 2009), some Objectivist nym attacks my anti-IP views (citing Greg Perkins). He writes: “Now let me reproduce here the argument made by Greg Perkins against some Libertarian scholars against intellectual property. Perkins wrote the following:” …
Consistency FAIL!
Stephan Kinsella is a libertarian writer and patent attorney in Houston, Texas. He has published widely on various areas of libertarian legal theory and on legal topics such as intellectual property law and international law. His publications include Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Papinian Press, 2023), Against Intellectual Property (Mises Institute, 2008), and International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford, 2020).
My Failed Libertarian Speaking Hiatus; Memories of Mises Institute and Other Events, 1988–20192025
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I wonder how long it will take Silas to make his usual assinine statements. We know he won’t bother actually reading this paper.