Esteemed Mr. Kinsella,
I originally intended to pose this question during one of your livestreams with a donation, but I noticed that you unfortunately do not take questions in that format.
I am a libertarian, and I am currently striving to study our theory more deeply. Recently, I had the pleasure of reading your chapter “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability.” I found your title-transfer theory of contract especially compelling.
However, the article focuses primarily on transactions between individuals. My question is: what does libertarian theory say about joint ownership? If joint ownership is possible, under what conditions can it arise, and on what principles is it governed? For example, may a shareholder demand that their portion be separated into private property, and if so, on what grounds?
Could you kindly recommend literature on this topic—whether authored by yourself or by other libertarian scholars—or perhaps consider discussing it in one of your future livestreams?
Should you find the time to address this matter, I would be deeply appreciative.
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Kinsella:
See Libertarian Answer Man: Co-ownership and Ownership and Punishment of Criminals. Also: The Universal Principles of Liberty:
Resource — A scarce, rivalrous, means of action that a Person can control to achieve an end. A Person’s Body is a Resource, as can be things external to any Person’s Body (“External Resources”). Information, ideas, patterns, and knowledge—being non-rivalrous—are not Resources. External Resources may be owned by individuals or jointly by groups of Persons through contract or joint appropriation. Group ownership does not grant any rights greater than those an individual Person may hold.”
See also my more recent “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract.”
A shareholder or other co-owner can demand division if the contract permits it or if the nature of the situation implies it. Imagine two children who inherit the family house. They can decide how to use it or if they cannot agree, either one can demand a sale and the proceeds to be split. Same with husband and wife, since divorce is possible. For corporations I would view a case of divided ownership governed by contract (a combination of the Articles of Incorporation, Shareholder’s Agreement, Bylaws, and so on) where the “owners” are the shareholders and managers, each with defined rights and roles. Someone who owns a share of Exxon or Google or Apple stock is called an owner by the law but we over-rely on state classifications. The Over-reliance on State Classifications: “Employee” and “Shareholder” The shareholder cannot use the corporate jet or the headquarters for a birthday party; the CEO can’t sell it or use it for a private penthouse. A shareholder is denied the right to sell the whole business if he doesn’t want to be a co-owner; he can instead sell his “shares.” And so on.
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Thank you for the detailed response, I’ve gone through the latest version of TTTC from your website.
However, while reading I came up with a new question, which surely must have occurred to other readers as well: while one cannot voluntarily sell himself into slavery, can a person conclude a contract that would transfer title to any property he acquires in the future to the counterparty? If not, why not; and if yes, then what procedure for contract termination is envisioned in libertarian theory?
Of course, that is implied by making a conditional future title transfer, which I have explained repeatedly, unlike a contract to sell yourself into slavery, is and can be made irrevocable. It is too late to “undo” such a transfer later since it has already been done.
The more interesting question is whether there are limits to this. I think this remains to be determined. See
I sincerely apologize for taking up your time, but I tried searching your website for the topics “contract cancellation” and “contract termination,” and did not find any articles on the subject. Perhaps you have resources where your readers could clarify your perspective on this matter so that I would not trouble you directly?
The concept of contract termination as well as the concept of “breach” of contract make no sense in the TTTC. Contracts are not to be seen as binding promises giving rise to enforceable obligations of which the failure to perform is a “breach” that gives rise to an obligation to pay monetary damages. See the TTTC paper, the section “Some Implications of the TTTC,” subsection “Breach of Contract, “Damages,” and Performance Bonds.” In a contract which includes future title transfers, these transfers are always conditional and uncertain because the future is uncertain. But they are operative when the future time arrives assuming the conditions have been met: (a) the implied condition that the thing to be transferred exists and is owned by the transferor; and (b) any other conditions communicated at the time the contract was made. Unless the contract specifies cancellation or a transfer back to the transferor (such as the example with lottery tickets in subsection “Breach of Contract, “Damages,” and Performance Bonds”), the title transfer is going to happen at the appointed transfer date whether the transfer wants it or not; he has already agreed and set in motion the future title transfer.
Your articles always leave me thinking.