[From my Webnote series]
Related:
- Classificationism, Legislation, Copyright
- Dualism, Monism, Scientism, Causality, Teleology: Hoppe, Mises, Rothbard
- The Great Fractional Reserve/Freebanking Debate
- Fractional-Reserve Banking, Contracts of Deposit, and the Title-Transfer Theory of Contract
- On Coinbase, Bitcoin, Fractional-Reserve Banking, and Irregular Deposits
- UK Proposal for Banking Reform: Fractional-Reserve Banking versus Deposits and Loans
- Musings on Fractional-Reserve Banking in a Bitcoin Age; Physicalist Shock Absorber Metaphors
- Michael S. Milano, “Privacy and Fungibility: The Forgotten Virtues of Sound Money,” Mises Wire (07/05/2025)
Update:
Your patience is incredible. The woman kept insisting money is debt, which is an astonishing and just confused claim. Money is not a legal phenomenon, any more than action, production, or trade are. Debts are legal, not economic, concepts.
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The analysis of human action is teleological, yes, but it is still a descriptive, not prescriptive, endeavor. Action is the employment—possession—of means in the pursuit of some end. Not the ownership of means, which requires society and a legal system, but the possession and use of means and resources in action. Economic analysis applies to the actions of Crusoe, for whom there are no laws at all, and to the actions of many people interacting (society), whether or not this society has (a) just law, (b) unjust law (a hampered market, as Mises analyzes in Human Action, Part Six, and Rothbard in Man, Economy, and State, ch. 12, and Power and Market), or (c) no law at all.
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This applies to all interactions between people: violence (hence Mises’s and Rothbard’s analysis of the hampered market economy) as well as cooperation, exchange, and trade. None of this presupposes property rights or law—or things like contracts, debts, IOUs, and so on.
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Exchange is a type of interaction that does not require ownership or property rights; at base, it has to do with possession of means. In a primitive barter society, the double-coincidence-of-wants problem, plus the inability to engage in economic calculation when embarking on future-oriented projects because heterogeneous factors are incommensurable, leads to the emergence of a medium of exchange—some good that others are traded against, and in whose prices such factors can be arithmetically compared.
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That good is not a debt; it is a possessed, used, exchanged resource. It need not even be owned, though usually it is, where there is a functioning legal system. In general, it has to be a type of thing that can be possessed and employed in action—something valued and controlled by an actor. The key point is that it is some tradeable, valued thing. Its role as money has nothing to do with ownership or legal rights, much less IOUs or debts.
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Further reading:
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Law is normative; economics is descriptive:
– Disentangling Legal and Economic Concepts (economic concepts like exchange and possession describe action; legal concepts like contract and ownership are norms; conflating them breeds error) https://t.co/Rd3mI16M1j
– On Property Rights in Superabundant Bananas and Property Rights as Normative Support for Possession (possession is a fact of action; property rights are norms that support it) https://t.co/xsp1dwSStB
– Libertarian Answer Man: Self-ownership for slaves and Crusoe… Mises distinguishing between juristic and economic categories of “ownership” (Crusoe possesses and uses means but doesn’t “own” them, since ownership requires society; Mises’s economic vs. juristic ownership) https://t.co/tePx7KcSUp
– Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection (“sell” and “own” mean one thing in economics, another in law) https://t.co/J5ePvDzRXT
– Hoppe: A Précis (economics describes possession; property rights are the normative layer; Mises and Rothbard on the hampered market) https://t.co/wEBrz7Jdba
– Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe: An Indispensable Framework (Mises kept economics descriptive and value-free, distinguishing catallactic from juristic ownership) https://t.co/KrgRrDfnxC
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The hampered market:
– Mises, Human Action, Part Six: The Hampered Market Economy (economic analysis of government interference with the market) https://t.co/AfZj1IdwBY
– Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, with Power and Market (ch. 12 and Power and Market analyze violent intervention in the market) https://t.co/m1mFUNEwT1
– Rothbard, Power and Market https://t.co/PHxu567OEb
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Money, barter, and calculation:
– KOL337 | You Don’t Own Bitcoin—Property Rights, Praxeology and the Foundations of Private Law (the purpose of money is to overcome the problem of barter and to enable economic calculation) https://t.co/qNAVqTO8tA
– KOL401 | Sazmining Twitter Space: Bitcoin & Property Rights (money solves “the barter problem and the calculation problem”) https://t.co/H7Xf5DUipv
– Jeffrey M. Herbener, “Calculation and the Question of Arithmetic” (calculation requires a common monetary unit so heterogeneous factors can be compared arithmetically) https://t.co/83eOwwj3fZ— Stephan Kinsella (@NSKinsella) November 14, 2026
It’s time someone do this. I was hoping someone else had or would, but I’ve given up finding anyone comprehensive and solid on this. I guess I’ll have to do it, if I find time. Maybe I can coax Bob Murphy into doing it with he: I am decent on economic methodology; he is deeper and better. We are both solid on austro-libertarianism: he is a libertarian, and I am the libertarian. And he is probably decent on law, and I am deeper and better. I may approach El Bobborino about this at some point. Or maybe Hülsmann or Hoppe. Or Konrad Graf. 1
What I am thinking of something that has increasingly dawned on me over the years, and I’ve had to keep returning to it to help clarify some matter that confuse lots of people. I’ve had to do this with many issues over the years, for example in IP and contract reasoning, to explain why selling does not require owning (and owning does not imply the right to sell either); to understand this, you have to distinguish between descriptive economic concepts, like sale, exchange, possession (what Mises calls catallactic or sociological ownership), and normative/legal ones like (legal) sale/exchange/contract, and (juristic) ownership. This is necessary to develop a more coherent understanding of property rights and applications like intellectual property, contract theory, and so on.
In a way this endeavor is akin to Mises’s dualism which distinguishes between action (teleological, purpose-oriented) and behavior (causal), and which also recognizes different methods of analysis and study appropriate to each demesne of phenomenon—apriori analysis and deductivism vs. aposteriori analysis, inductivism, and empiricism—which also recognizes the epistemological priority of the former over the latter (physicists and causal scientists have to presuppose apriori truths to engage in causal enquiry—such as the assumption of time-invariant causation itself, as well as the scientific method itself, both of which are not subject to falsification or testing), 2 as well as significant differences therebetween—apriori truths are undeniably true and apodictic (the universe exists; there is consciousness and a difference between observer and external reality; humans act; humans employ causally efficacious means to achieve ends; other categories of action like opportunity cost, profit and loss, value/demonstrated preference, time preference, and so on) but although they are synthetic and real and not empty, they tend to be very bare or sparse or if-then/ceteris paribus, requiring contingent empirical assumptions to make them useful and interesting an applicable to the real world, while aposteriori and empirical knowledge about facts and causal laws is always less certain (apodictic) and subject to falsification.
Bohm-Bawerk seems to gotten closer than anyone to realizing this is a real issue that needs to be sorted out, but the task is not complete.
You people better hope I live a nice long life so I am able to find time and motivation to turn my gaze to this and fix yet another problem area in austro-libertarian theory. 3
Anyway some things that need to be tackled are mentioned in Areas That Need Development from Libertarian Thinkers, such as negotiability, the enforcement of contracts and what “IOUs” mean (for that we need a reformed theory of contract, hinto schminto “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract”), and an improved understanding of the distinct but equally important roles of both scarce (conflictable) 4, causally efficacious means of action, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the other; 5 economists, including Austrians, have given short shrift to the latter (now I know how the Holy Spirit feels), and they even have downplayed the crucial significance of the economic concept of scarcity; it seems to me that only Mises, and then Hoppe, fully integrated it into his economic and legal-normative-libertarian-political thinking, which is why he was able to see the problem with the idea of IP right way whereas Rothbard mangled it.
More elaboration to come. But for now, see: Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, “Whether Legal Rights and Relationships Are Economic Goods,” George D. Huncke, trans., in Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Shorter Classics of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1962 [1881]), p. 57 et pass.; see also Gael J. Campan, “Does Justice Qualify as an Economic Good?: A Böhm-Bawerkian Perspective,” Q. J. Austrian Econ. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 21–33, p. 24.
Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society [LFFS] (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection,” pp. 279–81, “On Libertarian Legal Theory, Self-Ownership and Drug Laws,” p. 640; and distinguishing juristic from economic phenomenon, see idem, “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract” (“contract law may be considered to be the legal analogue or normative support for the economic institution of exchange”).
This plays into issues like not only the nature of contracts are title transfers and not as binding promises or obligations, and then the related issue of how contractual “rights” should treated both legally and economically; and related issues like ownership of bitcoin, 6 as well as ownership of ideas/knowledge (IP). And issues like the difference between economic exchange and legal exchange, mirroring the distinction between possession and ownership (as normative support for possession), 7 and so on.
- Konrad Graf, “Action-Based Jurisprudence: Praxeological Legal Theory in Relation to Economic Theory, Ethics, and Legal Practice,” Libertarian Papers 3, art. no. 19 (2011); idem, Bitcoins, the regression theorem, and that curious but unthreatening empirical world February 27, 2013; Are Bitcoins Ownable?: Property Rights, IP Wrongs, and Legal-Theory Implications [PDF]. [↩]
- “The essence of logical positivism is to deny the cognitive value of a priori knowledge by pointing out that all a priori propositions are merely analytic. They do not provide new information, but are merely verbal or tautological, asserting what has already been implied in the definitions and premises. Only experience can lead to synthetic propositions. There is an obvious objection against this doctrine, viz., that this proposition that there are no synthetic a priori propositions is in itself—as the present writer thinks, false—a synthetic a priori proposition, for it can manifestly not be established by experience.” Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p. 5. [↩]
- See Areas That Need Development from Libertarian Thinkers. [↩]
- On Conflictability and Conflictable Resources. [↩]
- Libertarian and Lockean Creationism: Creation As a Source of Wealth, not Property Rights; Hayek’s “Fund of Experience”; . [↩]
- Nobody Owns Bitcoin; KOL274 | Nobody Owns Bitcoin (PFS 2019); Konrad Graf, “Action-Based Jurisprudence: Praxeological Legal Theory in Relation to Economic Theory, Ethics, and Legal Practice,” Libertarian Papers 3, art. no. 19 (2011); idem, Bitcoins, the regression theorem, and that curious but unthreatening empirical world February 27, 2013; Are Bitcoins Ownable?: Property Rights, IP Wrongs, and Legal-Theory Implications [PDF]. [↩]
- On Property Rights in Superabundant Bananas and Property Rights as Normative Support for Possession. [↩]














