See also Van Dun on Argumentation Ethics and and Federal Judges Aren’t Real Judges, On “Unowned” State Property, Legal Positivism, Ownership vs. Possession,
From Mises blog, July 19 2008. archived comments below.
In Frank Van Dun‘s paper on argumentation ethics, [see “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide”] “Argumentation Ethics and the Philosophy of Freedom,” [see Van Dun on Argumentation Ethics; now “Argumentation Ethics and The Philosophy of Freedom”] there is a fascinating discussion about what law and courts and lawyers have become: not justice-seekers, but technical interpreters of artificial rules. Van Dun argues that equality before the law
was a great idea, but of course the powerful, the rulers and their clients, often enough intervened in court proceedings and made a mockery of the independence of the courts of law, replacing them with boards of officials whose main function was (and is) to see to it that their master’s voice is heeded by all. The judges were replaced with “magistrates.” The jurists, whose main concern is the knowledge and application of the principles of justice, were replaced with legists, whose main occupation is to know and apply their masters’ wishes as these are revealed in legal edicts and codes.[27]
Nevertheless, even in this day of rampant legal positivism, the ideals of justice still fashion the way in which those boards and magistrates present themselves to the public at large and to their masters. Unlike bureaucrats and diplomats, the magistrates posing as judges do not claim authority on account of their loyal subservience to their masters, but on account of their “independence” from them. Paying lip service to the ethics of dialogue and argumentation is vitally important for maintaining not only their position in society but also their status as possessors of a science of necessary things. While positivism rules the curriculum in the law schools, telling their students that only “the law” matters and that “the law” is nothing but the set of legal rules, edicts and decisions promulgated by the authorities that other rules in the same set designate as “legal,” the schools never tire of instilling in their students the sense that the implications of positivism do not apply to the magistrates and the advocates they are being trained to become. Like scientists, they should be aware that they are supposed to answer to a calling that transcends loyalty to any social or political regime. Like scientists, they should feel entitled to claim immunity from arbitrary interference, admittedly not as a general human right but as a professional privilege. And like scientists in the Age of Big Politicized Science, they should not have any qualms about serving and assisting the powers that be as long as the latter keep up the pretence of their “independence.”
Albeit in an increasingly emaciated and perverted form, the ethics of argumentation still has a hold on the imagination as the bulwark of civilized co-existence, no matter how obscure the distinction between a scientist and a government expert, or between a judge and a magistrate, has become in public discourse. However, its force is sapped when the point of argumentation in a court no longer is to reveal which actions are justifiable and which are not but merely to determine which party complied with some set of arbitrary politically imposed rules. Then argumentation gives way to a contest in which one “legal mind” tries to outwit his opponent in a game that turns primarily on one’s skills in combining officially recognized legal classifications of facts, legal rules, other legal data such as precedents, and currently fashionable notions into “a strong case.” Similarly, the ethics of argumentation and dialogue loses its grip on the intercourse of scientists if convincing the authorities of the social or political relevance of one’s research becomes a priority.
The argument from argumentation is not a mere academic artifact without any practical significance. It underlies the Western tradition of the philosophy of law and its impressive harvest of principles of substantive and procedural justice, which command respect even after more than a century of systematic “debunking” at the hands of scientistic positivists and others for whom man’s reason counts for nothing and his voice (“vote”) for everything.[28]
[27] For an etymological explication of the distinction between jurists (“ius”) and legists (“lex”), see “The Lawful and The Legal” referred to in note 18 [From note 18: For the argument that “freedom among likes” defines the condition of order (i.e. the law) of the human world, see FRB, and my “The Lawful and the Legal,” Journal des économistes et des études humaines, 1995, VI, 4, p.555–77].
[28] On the distinction between speech (logos, Latin ratio) and voice (phonè), see Aristotle, Politics, I, 2, 1253a9–15.
Comments (6)
Published: July 20, 2008 6:01 PM
Published: July 20, 2008 7:49 PM
Published: July 21, 2008 6:45 AM
Published: July 21, 2008 10:20 AM
scientifically defend the following position: “the real source of justice is God and His laws.” It falls within the scientific application of subjectivism.
You are welcome to critique any of my books. The one that conclusively proves the above statement is “ETHICS of the Divine Economy” published in 2007.
Published: July 21, 2008 2:23 PM
i, for one, hope that mises.org gets around to reviewing your book. (not that i’ve read it, though).
Published: July 22, 2008 10:31 AM