Dear Mr. Kinsella,
I hope this message finds you well. I have a question regarding the use of performative contradiction in argumentation ethics. I’d really appreciate it if you could share your thoughts.
My question is, without using performative contradiction, self-ownership is naturally true in argumentation since argumentation presupposes self-ownership. It is like Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem that Gödel found a way of allowing mathematics to talk about itself. It is self-referential. In the case of argumentation, if A owns B, there is no need for an argumentation between A and B over the ownership of C, A would just own C by default. In this case, in order to have an argumentation, A and B must be self-owned.
The performative contradiction in argumentation ethics— “you cannot argue that you cannot argue”—serves more as a cautionary reminder. It suggests that the term “argue” implies meaningful argumentation that follows the rules of argumentation. To draw an analogy to programming, “argue” here means a function rather than strings of symbols that can be strung together in arbitrary ways. But I don’t see how it proves self-ownership.
Thank you very much for taking the time to read my question! I look forward to your thoughts on this matter.
KINSELLA REPLY:
I do not have time to go into this in detail at present, and at this point Hoppe and I together have fielded about as many questions as we can about this topic. I would suggest you comb through all this. I’ll provide some links below.
But a few quick comments.
I am not sure what is the relevance of Gödel to all this, except perhaps as some kind of vague metaphor. I have always doubted the rigor and usefulness of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem. David Kelley discusses this in the Foundations of Knowledge lecture series, I think it is in the lecture on Skepticism, perhaps. As I recall he points out that Godel’s argument doesn’t show limits to the ability to reason but only to limits of a formal self-contained logical system. See also Hoppe’s discussion of this — ch. 22 of my book Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), at note 56.
As for further resources — see “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide,” Mises Daily (May 27, 2011), especially the “Supplemental Resources and Updates”. I also direct you to numerous podcast discussions I’ve had with others about this.
A few other quick comments—
My question is, without using performative contradiction, self-ownership is naturally true in argumentation since argumentation presupposes self-ownership. It is like Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem that Gödel found a way of allowing mathematics to talk about itself. It is self-referential. In the case of argumentation, if A owns B, there is no need for an argumentation between A and B over the ownership of C, A would just own C by default. In this case, in order to have an argumentation, A and B must be self-owned.
I do not follow why B owns C. Or how A owns B, unless B committed some crime and forfeited his rights—thus making it permissible for A to treat him differently because B’s actions give rise to a difference grounded in the nature of things. For more on this, see LFFS, ch. 7, e.g. n.18; text at n.34; and the section “Arguing With Your Slave”.
The performative contradiction in argumentation ethics— “you cannot argue that you cannot argue”—serves more as a cautionary reminder. It suggests that the term “argue” implies meaningful argumentation that follows the rules of argumentation. To draw an analogy to programming, “argue” here means a function rather than strings of symbols that can be strung together in arbitrary ways. But I don’t see how it proves self-ownership.
Again, you can read my and Hoppe’s comments on all this. The point is that any norm to be justified can only be justified in the course of and context of an argument which by its nature has certain normative presuppositions (since argument is different than coercion; and requires a pre-agreement to agree to disagree. See on this my Foreword to the LFB edition of Hoppe’s A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: “In genuine discourse, the parties try to persuade each other by the force of their argument, not by actual force. Each party is free to disagree without being bonked over the head if he does so.”
And see Hoppe’s ch. 7 in the same book, e.g.,
- “Only if there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual’s property right in his own body can argumentation take place.9 Only as long as this right is recognized is it possible for someone to agree to what has been said in an argument and hence can what has been said be validated, or is it possible to say “no” and to agree only on the fact that there is disagreement.”
- “To argue and possibly agree with someone (if only on the fact that there is disagreement) means to recognize each other’s prior right of exclusive control over his own body.”
- “it can be stated that whenever a person claims that some statement can be justified, he at least implicitly assumes the following norm to be justified: ‘Nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body of any other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone’s control over his own body.’ This rule is implied in the concept of justification as argumentative justification. Justifying means justifying without having to rely on coercion.”
- See also my related discussion in ch. 7 of LFFS, e.g. text at n.22, and at n.24.
I don’t see how it proves self-ownership.
You must be careful to distinguish between normative and factual propositions. Ownership or property rights is a norm that can only be justified argumentatively. Possession or control are distinct and non-normative. See LFFS, ch. 2, at notes 28-29 etc. Since, as Hoppe shows, argument has normative presuppositions (such as peace, and justifying without threats and by the force of reason alone, without coercion, which respects the bodily autonomy of the other) no norm could be successfully justified if it contradicts these normative presuppositions since that would lead to a performative contradiction. Thus it is simply the case that it is impossible to argumentatively justify non-libertarian or “socialistic” norms since they would advocate things incompatible with the very norms of peaceful argumentative discourse. The argumentation ethics argument is simply a way to demonstrate, or to explain, that and why only libertarian norms survive the “filter” of all the constraints imposed on justification, by the nature of the justificaticatory context itself–the universalization principled, honesty and truth and sincerity and the related laws of logic (law of non-contradiction), recognition of the right to disagree and walk away without coercion. (See LFFS, ch. 7, the “Universalizability” section, e.g. at n.20, et pass.)
This “proves” self-ownership, in the sense of proving that no norm calling for other-ownership can be argumentatively justified. This is why Hoppe calls it the “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic” in Liberty 2, no. 1, September 1988), p. 20, republished as “On the Ultimate Justification of the Ethics of Private Property,” chap. 13 in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006 [1993]).
Best, Stephan
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Dear Mr. Kinsella,
Chapter 22 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society really answers all my questions. Thank you very much for sharing relevant readings!
