Libertarian Answer Man: Joint Ownership (Co-ownership) and Future, Conditional Title Transfers

by Stephan Kinsella on September 17, 2025

Esteemed Mr. Kinsella,

I originally intended to pose this question during one of your livestreams with a donation, but I noticed that you unfortunately do not take questions in that format.

I am a libertarian, and I am currently striving to study our theory more deeply. Recently, I had the pleasure of reading your chapter “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability.” I found your title-transfer theory of contract especially compelling.

However, the article focuses primarily on transactions between individuals. My question is: what does libertarian theory say about joint ownership? If joint ownership is possible, under what conditions can it arise, and on what principles is it governed? For example, may a shareholder demand that their portion be separated into private property, and if so, on what grounds?

Could you kindly recommend literature on this topic—whether authored by yourself or by other libertarian scholars—or perhaps consider discussing it in one of your future livestreams?

Should you find the time to address this matter, I would be deeply appreciative.

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Kinsella:

See Libertarian Answer Man: Co-ownership and Ownership and Punishment of Criminals. Also: The Universal Principles of Liberty:

Resource — A scarce, rivalrous, means of action that a Person can control to achieve an end. A Person’s Body is a Resource, as can be things external to any Person’s Body (“External Resources”). Information, ideas, patterns, and knowledge—being non-rivalrous—are not Resources. External Resources may be owned by individuals or jointly by groups of Persons through contract or joint appropriation. Group ownership does not grant any rights greater than those an individual Person may hold.”

See also my more recent “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract.”

A shareholder or other co-owner can demand division if the contract permits it or if the nature of the situation implies it. Imagine two children who inherit the family house. They can decide how to use it or if they cannot agree, either one can demand a sale and the proceeds to be split. Same with husband and wife, since divorce is possible. For corporations I would view a case of divided ownership governed by contract (a combination of the Articles of Incorporation, Shareholder’s Agreement, Bylaws, and so on) where the “owners” are the shareholders and managers, each with defined rights and roles. Someone who owns a share of Exxon or Google or Apple stock is called an owner by the law but we over-rely on state classifications. The Over-reliance on State Classifications: “Employee” and “Shareholder” The shareholder cannot use the corporate jet or the headquarters for a birthday party; the CEO can’t sell it or use it for a private penthouse. A shareholder is denied the right to sell the whole business if he doesn’t want to be a co-owner; he can instead sell his “shares.” And so on.

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Thank you for the detailed response, I’ve gone through the latest version of TTTC from your website.

However, while reading I came up with a new question, which surely must have occurred to other readers as well: while one cannot voluntarily sell himself into slavery, can a person conclude a contract that would transfer title to any property he acquires in the future to the counterparty? If not, why not; and if yes, then what procedure for contract termination is envisioned in libertarian theory?

Of course, that is implied by making a conditional future title transfer, which I have explained repeatedly, unlike a contract to sell yourself into slavery, is and can be made irrevocable. It is too late to “undo” such a transfer later since it has already been done.

The more interesting question is whether there are limits to this. I think this remains to be determined. See

I sincerely apologize for taking up your time, but I tried searching your website for the topics “contract cancellation” and “contract termination,” and did not find any articles on the subject. Perhaps you have resources where your readers could clarify your perspective on this matter so that I would not trouble you directly?

The concept of contract termination as well as the concept of “breach” of contract make no sense in the TTTC. Contracts are not to be seen as binding promises giving rise to enforceable obligations of which the failure to perform is a “breach” that gives rise to an obligation to pay monetary damages. See the TTTC paper, the section “Some Implications of the TTTC,” subsection “Breach of Contract, “Damages,” and Performance Bonds.” In a contract which includes future title transfers, these transfers are always conditional and uncertain because the future is uncertain. But they are operative when the future time arrives assuming the conditions have been met: (a) the implied condition that the thing to be transferred exists and is owned by the transferor; and (b) any other conditions communicated at the time the contract was made. Unless the contract specifies cancellation or a transfer back to the transferor (such as the example with lottery tickets in subsection “Breach of Contract, “Damages,” and Performance Bonds”), the title transfer is going to happen at the appointed transfer date whether the transfer wants it or not; he has already agreed and set in motion the future title transfer.

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Thank you very much for your reply!

I read with great interest the pages you recommended, and I noticed that you yourself raised the question of voluntary slavery through a contract involving the alienation of all future property (in particular, in your discussions with Dr. Williamson Evers and Dr. Walter Block).

However, among all these dialogues I could not find an answer to the following question: On what basis is it possible to transfer title to future property?

After all, in order to transfer a title, one must already possess that title. But at the moment of declaring intent, the property does not yet exist. And without property, there is no title. If there is nothing to transfer, then no transfer actually occurs.

How does TTTC address this issue?

With respect and gratitude,

Kinsella:

Why does it not exist? Suppose I own a car and say I hereby transfer title to you in 24 hours. Why doesn’t it exist?

This statement referred to your discussions about “voluntary slavery.”

“Own a car” means “to own the title to a car.” You own the title, and therefore you can transfer it to whomever you wish.

But in the case of “voluntary slavery,” you declare that you are transferring not only the title to the property you currently own, but also to that which you might hypothetically own in the future. As a result, part of the titles you are trying to transfer do not actually belong to you.

It seems that the possibility of such a transfer can only be introduced axiomatically. And behind it there will still invisibly stand the notion of an “Obligation to give.”

Kinsella:

This statement referred to your discussions about “voluntary slavery.”

“Own a car” means “to own the title to a car.” You own the title, and therefore you can transfer it to whomever you wish.

Right. And the moment you add any condition, it must be an uncertain and future-based title transfer.

But in the case of “voluntary slavery,” you declare that you are transferring not only the title to the property you currently own, but also to that which you might hypothetically own in the future.

I think we need to disentangle matters. one is transferring to others in the future title to things you own in the future. The other one is transferring to others title to your own body. My argument is that the latter is not an effective title transfer. I give reasons for it in A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability and The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract.

So voluntary slavery pertains to the sale of one’s body. It has nothing to do with transfers of title to external resources that you own.

As a result, part of the titles you are trying to transfer do not actually belong to you.

It seems that the possibility of such a transfer can only be introduced axiomatically. And behind it there will still invisibly stand the notion of an “Obligation to give.”

I tried as hard as I could in both the pieces mentioned above to clarify that contract and contractual title transfer has nothing to do with binding obligations or binding promises; in my view the entire current positive law legal theory of contract as consisting of legal obligations to perform, the failure to perform which counts as “breach” and gives rise to “damages,” is flawed. If I transfer title to you, either now or in the future, it is not the fulfilling of an obligation. There is no obligation. There is only the disposition of owned resources by consent of the owner.

as an example suppose A agrees to massage B in exchange for an ounce of silver. Under current law this means A is obligated to perform an action and failure to do it is breach and gives rise to another obligation, the obligation to pay money damages to B. In my view there is is a promise but it is not binding; there is no obligation and there is no transfer of title to the “massage” or massage service. Rather, the contract simply sets up a single one-way, future, conditional title transfer: “IF A massages B, THEN 1oz of B’s silver transfers to A.” (There could be ancillary, auxiliary, or related title transfers, such as “and IF A fails to massage B, THEN x oz of A’s silver transfers to B” (so called “liquidated damages”).

Now take another case. A gives 1oz of silver to B as a gift. “Here, I give this to you.” That is a present, unconditional title transfer. It has nothing to do with obligations. When A does this he in effect “abandons” the ownership of the silver, “in favor of” B who, now that he possess it, re-homesteads it, so to speak. See the Title-transfer paper, Part V and VI.B. https://stephankinsella.com/2024/09/tttc-wp-1/#_ftnref2

Now suppose A gives 1oz of silver to B tomorrow, with no additional conditions. This is still conditional since it is in the future and thus uncertain, so there is at least the implied condition that tomorrow A and B and the world still exist and that tomorrow A is in possession and ownership of the 1oz of silver. THEN at the specified time, the transfer happens automatically because A already set it in motion, he already indicated his intent to abandon at the future time. When this happens, B now owns the silver. Not because A was “obligated” to do it, but because he already did it.

Now you can ask why A can abandon now for a future time and why it’s too late to for him to change his mind between the time he initiated the future, conditional title-transfer and the time of the transfer, but we first need to be very clear that it has nothing to do with legal obligations. Make sense?

Thank you for the detailed explanation. Of course, I was referring not to the body but exclusively to external property.

> Now you can ask why A can abandon now for a future time and why it’s too late to for him to change his mind between the time he initiated the future, conditional title-transfer and the time of the transfer

This is exactly my question. In addition, I am also curious about the following point: why is A’s declaration of abandonment of property at a future time valid, even if at the moment of the declaration A does not hold the title to the property he is abandoning? How can one abandon something one does not yet have?

Kinsella:

This is exactly my question. In addition, I am also curious about the following point: why is A’s declaration of abandonment of property at a future time valid, even if at the moment of the declaration A does not hold the title to the property he is abandoning? How can one abandon something one does not yet have?

let’s take a simple example first. I have an apple. I possess and own it. My ownership is based on my intent to own. If I relinquish the intent to own I am now just a possessor. Right? This is why you can give or sell things–because you abandon it. The decision to abandon must be communicated and happen at a moment in time.

Now let’s say I let you hold the apple. You posses it, I own it. I abandon it. Now you are the possessor. If you indicate also an intent to own, you have homesteaded it and own it.

If you hand it back to me now I am the possessor but you are still owner.

Now let’s say I abandon the apple but still hold it, and sell it to you. You are now the owner though not the possessor. Agree?

Now le’ts add a time element: I possess and own the apple, but I abandon it in 5 minutes. that means I own and possess it now but in 5 minutes I only possess it since I have relinquished intent to own.

In this case the apple exists now and also exists in 5 minutes.

with me so far?

At the current moment everything is clear. But the question still remains — why is it that if you say “I changed my mind, I don’t want to abandon the apple”, the original intent is stronger than this one? (if this new statement is made before the 5 minutes have passed and the apple has not yet been abandoned)

Kinsella:

I think this question is more difficult to answer easily. [see: Areas That Need Development from Libertarian Thinkers] In any case compared to normal contract theory which also assumes this, but assumes it in the form of an obligation, the TTTC is more elegant and accomplishes this more directly. I will have to think of a way to explain this in a coherent way, or wait ofr others to do it.

But you have identified an issue that has not gotten enough treatment, and though I have realized this issue is out there and needs to be addressed, I was waiting for someone else to notice. You may be the first. Congrats.

If you have any ideas or a better solution for future contracts, I’m all ears.