Oakeshott, On Human Conduct

Re Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (1991) ¹

ChatGPT query:

summarize and analyze the attached book by Oakeshott. Provide a concise overview followed by a chapter by chapter summary. Consult the work of Hans-Hermann hoppe, Stephan Kinsella, and Murray Rothbard, on the internet and in the attached documents. Is Oakeshott compatible with the libertarian views of Kinsella and Hoppe and Rothbard? If not, explain where they would differ or disagree with Oakeshott’s approach and parts Hoppe might agree with. What part would libertarians influenced by Hoppe, Rothbard, and Kinsella most agree with or profit from?

ChatGPT response:

Here’s a tight guide to Michael Oakeshott’s #On Human Conduct# and how it resonates (and clashes) with Hoppe–Kinsella–Rothbard–style libertarianism.

Overview (1–2 paragraphs)

Oakeshott’s book is three linked philosophical essays: (I) a general account of how to theorize human conduct; (II) an ideal of political order he calls the civil condition (or civil association)—a community bound by non-instrumental, general rules; and (III) a genealogy and diagnosis of the modern European state, whose character he says is ambiguous, oscillating between a law-bound association and a purpose-driven enterprise. He frames the whole work as an essayistic “intellectual adventure,” not a set of instructions or a system that “cross[es] all the t’s,” and he underscores that its conclusions are conditional, not final.

Chapter-by-chapter summary

I. On the Theoretical Understanding of Human Conduct

Oakeshott starts with theorizing as an open-ended effort to make what we already partly understand more intelligible. We always inhabit a world of intelligibles; theory is a resolve to “abate mystery,” not to deliver definitive proofs. He analyzes the “going-on” that we pick out for attention, the reflective inquirer (the theorist), and what inquiry yields (a theorem).

He then treats human conduct as transactions among “free” agents, involving deliberation and persuasion, and distinguishes practical relations from transactional ones; a practice is a kind of language with non-instrumental “moral” conditions. The payoff is methodological: to theorize any concrete performance is to treat it as an eventum—a contingent outcome of beliefs, recognitions, acknowledgments, etc.—so its proper understanding is historical (not natural-scientific reduction). (Outline signals and terms.)

II. On the Civil Condition

He identifies two basic modes of association:
(1) enterprise association—a relationship ordered to a common substantive purpose; and
(2) civil association—a relationship ordered to conditions (rules) to be subscribed to in choosing and acting, not to shared ends. The civil condition is of the second type and is specified as moral (non-instrumental) conditions: civil law, adjudication, authority & obligation, legislation, politics—all understood as rule-articulating and rule-applying rather than goal-pursuing.

He warns that whenever politics is recast as the pursuit of an “orthodoxy” (general happiness, growth, righteousness, etc.), it converts civil association into enterprise association—turning citizens into joint enterprisers and the res publica into a managerial schedule of purpose-maximizing rulings, which denies the civil condition. Properly understood, politics is deliberation about what rules should obtain (the bonum civile), not direction of collective ends; and crucially, those conclusions are not deducible from natural-condition theorems such as scarcity or survival.

III. On the Character of a Modern European State

Part III sketches how the modern European state emerged from medieval circumstances. As an artifact and as a mode of association, it is ambiguous: it can be viewed under two analogies—societas (law-bound association of rule-followers) and universitas (a collective enterprise with common purposes). He recounts the fortunes of the state under each analogy and assesses their merits and defects.

Points of contact and friction with Hoppe–Kinsella–Rothbard

Where they converge

• Nomocracy over teleocracy. Libertarians influenced by Hoppe, Rothbard, and Kinsella will applaud Oakeshott’s attack on turning the polity into a purpose-maximizing enterprise and his insistence that politics should concern general rules binding on all, not the imposition of substantive ends. His account of politics as deliberation about the conditions of interaction (not aggregate goals) closely tracks the libertarian preference for general rules and a private-law orientation.
• Skepticism toward “orthodoxies.” Oakeshott’s critique of governing in the name of “growth,” “righteousness,” or other comprehensive goods mirrors libertarian worries that the state smuggles in contested ends under color of public reason—undermining equal rules for unequals.

Where they diverge (and why)

• Foundations: anti-deductivism vs. natural law/praxeology. Oakeshott says you cannot deduce particular civil rules from natural facts like scarcity; political conclusions are persuasive and circumstantial, not apodictic. Rothbard, by contrast, does deduce a structure of rights from natural law and reason (self-ownership, first-use property, nonaggression), and builds out rules of contract, punishment, etc., on that basis. Hoppe adds a praxeological and “argumentation-ethics” layer to similar effect. Oakeshott would see this as overreaching theoretical ambition; Rothbard/Hoppe see it as necessary grounding.
• The state’s status. Oakeshott treats the modern state as a historical artifact that can be understood as societas (law-bound) even if it tends to drift toward universitas (enterprise). Rothbard calls the state inherently predatory (“the nature of the state”) and argues for its replacement by purely voluntary institutions; Hoppe extensively critiques democracy as institutionalizing privileges under “public law” versus private law, and advocates a pure private-law society. Oakeshott’s best case (civil association within a state) thus falls short of the anarcho-capitalist ideal.
• Public vs. private law. Oakeshott’s civil association keeps the focus on general, non-instrumental civil rules; libertarians press further, objecting that modern states preserve a privileged public-law sphere that exempts officials from ordinary duties—precisely what Hoppe targets in his critique of democracy.

What parts libertarians can profit from

1. The enterprise/civil association distinction. It’s a powerful diagnostic tool for spotting when politics has slipped into teleocracy (managing toward collective ends). That maps neatly onto libertarian critiques of managerial progressivism and “policy” government.
2. Politics as rule-deliberation, not end-selection. This bolsters the nomocratic ideal behind private-law reasoning and equality before the same rules—useful even within minarchist or transitional settings.
3. Ambiguity of the modern state. Oakeshott’s societas/universitas lens helps explain why “limited government” tends to become managerial government—an insight that harmonizes with Hoppe’s historical–institutional arguments about monopoly law and the growth of privilege under democracy.

Bottom line on compatibility

• Compatible elements: Oakeshott’s civil association, his suspicion of purpose-driven governance, and his rule-centric (non-instrumental) view of law will feel congenial to libertarians in the Hoppe–Kinsella–Rothbard orbit.
• Incompatibilities: He does not ground politics in natural law/praxeology and does not conclude to a stateless order; he treats the civil condition as a posture the state may adopt, whereas Rothbard/Hoppe/Kinsella regard the state itself as the problem and argue for a purely private-law society.

Sources you asked me to consult (in the uploads)

• Oakeshott’s structure, civil/enterprise association, and the societas/universitas framing.
• Rothbard’s natural-law architecture and his critique of the state (see especially Part III: The State vs. Liberty).
• Hoppe’s critique of public vs. private law under democracy and his case for a private-law order.

If you’d like, I can turn this into a printable brief (two-page summary + a one-page “compatibility map”).

1. Frequently cited by waystation libertarian Gene Callahan. [↩]