Oliver Janich, The Order of Freedom: The Only Principle That Can Save the World

Summary of Oliver Janich’s The Order of Freedom: The Only Principle That Can Save the World

Oliver Janich’s 2020 book (192 pages) is a popular-level advocacy for anarcho-capitalism, framed as a “private law society” (PLS) or “order of freedom,” which he presents as the singular principle capable of resolving global social, political, and economic problems. Drawing from libertarian influences (implicitly including thinkers like Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, though not deeply cited), Janich argues that the state is the “real root of evil” because it monopolizes conflict resolution, leading to corruption, inefficiency, and moral hazards. He posits that abolishing the state and replacing it with competing private companies for security, law enforcement, insurance, and adjudication would create a more just, efficient, and peaceful society.

The book is structured around a foreword, introductory critiques of statism, and a series of chapters addressing practical “lifeboat scenarios” and objections to libertarianism/anarchy. Key themes include:

• Critique of the State: Janich takes stock of societal issues (e.g., crime, unemployment, war) and traces them to the state’s coercive monopoly, which incentivizes poor decision-making and shields officials from accountability.
• Mechanics of a PLS: In this system, individuals contract with private insurers and security firms. Disputes are resolved by neutral private judges, penalties are market-driven to minimize crime (e.g., calculated for deterrence), and bounties encourage the capture of criminals. Specialization and competition would eliminate corruption, as firms with poor reputations would fail.
• Addressing Objections: Chapters tackle edge cases, such as handling rule-breakers (via exclusion or bounties), child protection (through parental contracts and community norms), abortion (left to private contracts, with market pressures favoring life), animal rights (via voluntary agreements), unemployment (non-existent due to free markets), monopolies (prevented by competition), defense (decentralized and efficient, making invasion impractical), immigration (open borders but with private property owners deciding access, ending “no-go areas”), and organized crime (Mafia would dissolve or legitimize under market pressures).
• Benefits and Practicality: Janich claims a PLS would create jobs for “truthers” (conspiracy investigators), paradise for honest police, and overall prosperity. He uses analogies (e.g., free-market buses vs. state monopolies) to argue it’s not utopian but a natural extension of existing black markets and low-tax jurisdictions. The book ends with a call to action, suggesting the PLS is the only logical solution to humanity’s ills.

The tone is accessible and polemical, aimed at convincing skeptics through real-world examples and thought experiments rather than dense philosophy. Janich positions the PLS as “new in libertarian theory,” emphasizing that property rights and the non-aggression principle (NAP) emerge as consequences of voluntary, market-based conflict resolution. However, the book has ties to Janich’s broader work on conspiracy theories (e.g., “New World Order”), which he weaves in subtly as motivations for statism.

Compatibility with the Libertarian Views of Hans-Hermann Hoppe and Stephan Kinsella

Yes, Janich’s book is broadly compatible with the views of Hoppe and Kinsella, both prominent anarcho-capitalist libertarians influenced by Austrian economics and Rothbardian ethics. All three reject the state as inherently aggressive and advocate for a society based on private property, voluntary contracts, and market-provided law and security. Janich’s PLS mirrors Hoppe’s concept of a “private law society” (as outlined in Hoppe’s articles and books like Democracy: The God That Failed, though not directly in the attached PDFs) and Kinsella’s discussions of decentralized legal systems in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (LFFS), where he references Hoppe’s ideas on private adjudication and property norms.

• Core Alignments:
  • Private Law and Anarcho-Capitalism: Janich’s vision of competing security firms, neutral judges, and market-driven penalties aligns with Hoppe’s argument that a stateless society would rely on private insurance and arbitration to resolve conflicts, preventing monopolies and wars (e.g., Hoppe’s The Economics and Ethics of Private Property justifies absolute private property as the foundation for such a system). Kinsella, in LFFS, elaborates on how private law emerges from self-ownership and homesteading, citing Hoppe’s “idea of a private law society” as a framework where norms are enforced without a central authority.
  • Non-Aggression Principle (NAP) and Property Rights: Janich treats the NAP and property as emergent from voluntary interactions, compatible with Hoppe’s argumentation ethics (which deduces property rights from the inescapability of argumentation) and Kinsella’s rights-based approach (emphasizing self-ownership and the rejection of intellectual property as incompatible with physical property norms).
  • Critiques of Statism: All three see the state as parasitic and immoral. Hoppe’s A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism contrasts socialism/statism with capitalism as superior for prosperity and ethics, while his Getting Libertarianism Right and The Great Fiction critique democracy and open borders under statism. Kinsella echoes this in LFFS, focusing on how state law distorts justice. Janich’s emphasis on the state as the “root of evil” fits seamlessly.
  • Practical Issues: Janich’s handling of defense, immigration (favoring private discrimination), and child protection resonates with Hoppe’s views on covenant communities and cultural conservatism in a free society, and Kinsella’s contractarian legal theory.
• Minor Divergences: While compatible, Janich’s work is more populist and less academically rigorous. He doesn’t deeply engage with Hoppe’s cultural critiques (e.g., anti-egalitarianism) or Kinsella’s specific legal innovations (e.g., estoppel in punishment). Janich’s association with conspiracy ideologies (e.g., QAnon, New World Order, as noted in external sources) introduces elements absent or rejected in Hoppe and Kinsella’s more focused philosophical works—Hoppe critiques “left-libertarians” but avoids conspiracism, while Kinsella sticks to legal and ethical analysis.

Overall, Janich’s views could be seen as a practical application of Hoppe and Kinsella’s theories, with no fundamental contradictions.

Does It Provide a Coherent and Systematic Defense of Libertarianism?

Yes, it offers a coherent defense, but it’s more systematic in addressing practical objections than in building a foundational philosophical case. The book is logically structured: It starts with diagnostics (state as evil), introduces the PLS as the solution, and systematically debunks counterarguments through dedicated chapters (e.g., on monopolies, defense). This makes it accessible and persuasive for lay readers, using data, facts, and analogies to show how markets outperform state monopolies. However, it’s not as rigorous as academic works—it’s a “defense” in the sense of advocacy, not axiomatic derivation. It assumes basic libertarian premises (e.g., NAP) without proving them, relying on intuition and examples rather than deductive reasoning.

What Is It Missing?

• Philosophical Depth: Lacks a ground-up justification of rights, such as Hoppe’s argumentation ethics or Kinsella’s detailed self-ownership arguments. It assumes property and NAP as given, without exploring why they are ethically binding.
• Economic Rigor: While it touches on Austrian ideas (e.g., no involuntary unemployment), it misses in-depth praxeology or critiques of interventionism, like Hoppe’s analyses in A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism.
• Legal Nuances: Doesn’t delve into contract theory, punishment (e.g., Kinsella’s estoppel or proportionality), or specifics like intellectual property (which Kinsella opposes vehemently).
• Cultural and Strategic Elements: Ignores Hoppe’s emphasis on cultural homogeneity for stable free societies or strategies for achieving liberty (e.g., secession, covenant communities).
• Critique of Alternatives: Skims over minarchism or other libertarian variants, dismissing them briefly without Hoppe-like dissections.
• Empirical Breadth: Relies on anecdotes; could use more historical examples of private law (e.g., medieval Iceland, as in Hoppe’s works).

What Is It Confused or Wrong About?

The book is mostly sound within its populist scope, but potential issues include:

• Over-Optimism on Practicality: Janich claims a PLS would eliminate issues like the Mafia or no-go areas through market forces alone, but this underestimates coordination problems or cultural factors—Hoppe notes that free societies require high-trust populations, and low-IQ/heterogeneous groups may struggle.
• Conspiracy Overlap: Janich’s integration of “truther” jobs and New World Order motifs (from his prior books) risks conflating libertarianism with unsubstantiated conspiracism, which could alienate rigorous thinkers like Hoppe (who critiques globalism factually) or Kinsella (who avoids it). This isn’t “wrong” per se but confuses the core message.
• Immigration and Borders: His “open borders but private control” is compatible, but he optimistically predicts a “more German” society without addressing Hoppe’s warnings about mass immigration eroding liberty under welfare states (though Janich assumes no welfare in a PLS).
• Abortion and Children: Treating these as purely contractual may overlook natural rights arguments; Kinsella and Hoppe ground rights in homesteading/self-ownership, potentially leading to stricter views on fetal rights.

No major errors in libertarian theory, but the book sometimes prioritizes rhetoric over precision.

What Could It Benefit From in the Work of Hoppe and Kinsella?

Janich’s accessible style could be strengthened by incorporating:

• From Hoppe:
  • Argumentation Ethics: A non-consequentialist justification for property and NAP (The Economics and Ethics of Private Property), bolstering Janich’s ethical claims beyond utility.
  • Critique of Democracy and Socialism: Deeper analysis from A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism and The Great Fiction to explain why states inevitably expand, enhancing Janich’s “root of evil” section.
  • Cultural Realism: Insights from Getting Libertarianism Right on why free societies need discrimination, hierarchy, and cultural norms to thrive, adding nuance to Janich’s immigration and defense chapters.
• From Kinsella:
  • Legal Theory: LFFS’s discussions of causation, responsibility, and private adjudication could refine Janich’s penalty and judge systems, e.g., using estoppel for punishment or contract models for child protection.
  • Anti-IP and Contract Focus: Kinsella’s rejection of intellectual property as incompatible with scarcity-based rights could expand Janich’s monopoly critique.
  • Rights Derivation: Kinsella’s emphasis on self-ownership and homesteading provides a clearer foundation for why a PLS respects individual sovereignty, addressing Janich’s “single assumption” on human cooperation.

Overall, Hoppe and Kinsella would add academic rigor and depth, making Janich’s defense more robust without losing its practical appeal.