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Libertarian Resource and Link Guide – Wiki

I have for some time maintained a web page with libertarian links. But, it’s hard to maintain and is based on only one man’s knowledge.

I have moved the content of this page to a wiki so that other members of the libertarian community can help collaborate to improve this list of resources.

Instructions are provided below:

To help edit and improve the LibertarianGuide Wiki, first, join Wikispaces then join the LibertarianGuide Wiki.

The wiki is designed for libertarians–especially Austro-anarchist-libertarians.

Feel free to encourage any libertarians you know to use or participate in the guide.

Contact me with any questions.

Stephan Kinsella
www.StephanKinsella.com

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Happ Review of Rubins-Kinsella International Law Book

Re my book International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide published last year–I just received the first book review–done by Dr. Richard Happ (other reviews). Excerpt:

a classical treatise. … It is noteworthy and commendable that–unlike so many other contemporary writers–the authors try to give a neutral and unbiased overview over diverging awards and disputed issues. … It is a timely book. In their introduction, the authors state: ‘we hope to provide the non-specialist lawyer, business person, or government official with the tools necessary to understand the international law of investment and its relationship to political risk’. They have managed to do so, and done even more. First, they successfully combined what would be three separate books (on structuring of investment, international law on investment protection and dispute settlement) in their own right. Second, they provide a coherent and–despite the necessary brevity–in-depth discussion of all relevant issues. Even minor points such as pre-dispute settlement negotiations, or the problem of pre-investment expenditures as investments, are dealt with comprehensively…. In doing so, the authors never become lost in academic debate, but always keep the perspective of the practitioner. These features make the book not only an excellent introduction and comprehensive overview about the state of the law of investment protection, but also a valuable reference tool for anyone experienced in the field. It is to be recommended to anyone who wishes to gain an insight into the topics under discussion or only needs a reference guide to current law and practice. The quality of the analysis ensures that the book will not lose its value even if the law continues to develop. For both academics and practitioners active in investment arbitration, it must be considered indispensable. …. These books [IIPR plus a casebook on foreign investment disputes] are like sea chart maps which allow the reader to navigate on the vast sea of information constituted by papers, awards and court cases during the last 100 years. Even the experienced sailor will and should not leave harbour without such sea charts.

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See Richard Epstein on “The Structural Unity of Real and Intellectual Property” (Mises 2006)

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Block on Abortion (Mises, 2006)

From Mises Blog:

[Update: see some of my criticism of Walter’s views in the Appendix to Abortion Correspondence with Doris Gordon, Libertarians For Life (1996); Block, “Does Trespassing Require Human Action? Rejoinder to Kinsella and Armoutidis an Evictionism”]

Block on Abortion

10/02/2006
Fresh online: Walter Block & Roy Whitehead, Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy,” Appalachian Law Review (2005) 4 (2) 1-45.

Comments (48)

  • Curt Howland
  • I was arguing recently with someone that said that “only through government can people with different opinions live together.”How can anyone hold that opinion in the face of the world around them? Every time government steps in, violence erupts.In those situations where government is explicitly denied any perview, such as the United States and the 1st Amendment prohibition on Federal government interference with religion, is there even the _opportunity_ for various opinions to live side by side without hostility. As soon as anything religious is brought into the mix, such as the objections to abortion, violence ensues.

    Every time government steps into a problem, it removes the possibility of peaceful disagreement, because one position or another is being enforced by law, which means by coercive force. Violence.

    When government has a say on a subject, it is self-destructive to say “I don’t care”, because the people who do care are going to carry the “political” discussion their way, and then impose it on me whether I like it or not. No wonder countries erupt in violence as soon as a “government” is going to be formed, like Somalia and the Balkins.

     

     

     

     

  • Published: October 2, 2006 2:14 PM

  • Roger M
  • I think Dr. Block does a nice job of presenting both sides of the debate, and should science rescue us, the eviction position will be nice. I know many pro-lifer’s like me would be very happy with a laws that limited abortions to cases of incest and rape since most abortions are simply a method of birth control.I’m not as pessimistic as Dr. Block on the current situation. Roe v. Wade would never have become law, except in a few states, had the US Supreme Court not forced its will upon the people. (Did the Supreme “rape” American values?) Within a few years I believe a more conservative court will overturn it and let states decide.I still have a problem with the libertarian denial of the right to life. That was a fundamental assumption of natural law and a member of the sacred trinity of rights to life, liberty and property (Jefferson changed it to pursuit of happiness for some reason.) I realize it messes up the neat symmetry of a property-based code of conduct, but evicting it because it smells like positive law is a little disgusting.
  • Published: October 2, 2006 2:44 PM

  • Dennis Sperduto
  • Stephan, thanks for making the article available.However, page 1 of the article, the page that begins with “Background” (not the cover page), prints out blank.
  • Published: October 2, 2006 2:53 PM

  • Sione Vatu
  • Roger MIt is not possible to justify a right to life by coercing someone else to support it by their effort; no right to life at someone else’s expense.Talofa!

    Sione

  • Published: October 2, 2006 4:50 PM

  • Michael Taylor
  • Sione,No convenience at someone else’s expense, either.Remember, a murder is committed with each abortion. And involuntary loss of judicially innocent life is certainly an expense.

    Michael Taylor

  • Published: October 2, 2006 5:35 PM

  • Dennis Sperduto
  • Sorry for my previous posting. I was able to print out the page in question on my home computer; the problem must of been with my computer and/or printer at work.
  • Published: October 2, 2006 5:39 PM

  • pro-lifegirl
  • Something for Pro-lifers to concider……Over 3,500 terminations per day, 1.3 MILLION per year in the United States alone.
    50 or 60 MILLION per year World Wide.I am a pro-lifer who has no religious convictions at all . I didn’t need the fear of god or anything else to come to my decision, just a good sense of what is right and wrong.
    You see we were all once a fetus. Is it beyond the realm of possibilities that when your mother first learned she was carrying you, she may have considered her options? What if she had decided to terminate? Would that have been OK?
    You would not exist, if you have children they would not exist, and your (husband or wife) would be married to someone else. You would have been deprived of all your experiences and memories. In this day and age with terminations being so readily available and so many being carried out, if you make it to full term
    you can consider yourself lucky. Lucky you had a mother that made the choice of life for you. Don’t you think they all deserve the same basic human right, LIFE?
    I’m all for contraception, prevention is certainly better than termination.
    Did you know you can get an implant that is safe, 99.9% effective, and lasts for three years? Just think girls not even a show for three years, wouldn’t that be great? I think too many people rely too heavily on the last option (abortion), I think if abortions weren’t so readily available people would manage their reproductive system far better resulting in a fraction of the number of unwanted pregnancies.
    World wide there are over 50 MILLION aborted pregnancies each year. In America 3,500 terminations carried out every day, that’s over 1.3 million every year, 50% of all cases claimed that birth control had been used, 48% admitted they took no precaution, and 2% had a medical reason. That’s a staggering 98% that may have been prevented had an effective birth control been used. Don’t get me wrong, I suspect the percentages in Australia would be much the same.
    Just a lot of unnecessary killing.

    At the point of conception is when life began for you. This was the start of your existence. Your own personal big bang. Three weeks after conception heart started to beat. First brain waves recorded at six weeks after conception. Seen sucking thumb at seven weeks after conception.

    I am convinced that in the not too distant future, people will look back at many of the practices of today with disbelief and horror.

     

    Want to know how to find humanity-?

    True humanity can only be achieved, by concidering others/ caring about others, as much as, if not more than yourself.

    Until we do we are no more than an uncivilisation, with all the uncivilised things that we do…

  • Published: October 2, 2006 6:39 PM

  • David C
  • I think it needs to be noted that you can’t have government where you don’t have “Human Action”, or free will as I call it. For example, if we were all destined by circumstances, like animals, then written law has no meaning.Well, as awfull and immoral as I think abortion is, the bottom line is that they (the fetus) are clearly not acting on free will, and protecting the liberty of a fetus is outside the scope of government. I would say the law of the jungle applys to abortion. The parents who abort fetuses – their belief systems will have no generational influence. They will suffer the natural loss of not having that child. (most parents know what loss I’m talking about) They will have the disrespect, or feel the need to hide their choices from individuals who understand the value of human life. They will suffer the guilt of knowledge.In fact, the birth of a fetus is probably a very generous cutoff because arguably children have no free will till several years after birth. But since the respect of human dignity is so important, and protection of the childs rights no longer requires coercing a woman to use her body, and the commodity value of the elements in the child not high. In fact, I would argue that the date of birth is natures way of saying when the childs rights to live override the mothers rights to control her body.

    I still think abortion is an awfull sin, but that’s between the mother and God. Hell, I see people make poor moral decisions every day when they turn on the afternoon soaps, but that doesn’t mean we should haul in the government stick a gun to their head and make them watch what we tell them to.

     

     

     

  • Published: October 2, 2006 10:37 PM

  • Sione
  • MichaelYour comment does not make sense. Convenience does not come into it. The fundamental point is that you can’t justify forcing one individual to support another. There is no such right.Sione
  • Published: October 3, 2006 12:30 AM

  • Sione Vatu
  • pro-lifegirlMost of what you have written is irrelevant to the topic.The number of people who make a particular decision and act in a particular way does not make that decision, or action, correct or incorrect. It just means that certain people have decided or acted in a particular manner.

    You wrote:

    The answer is yes. Of course your mother was free to consider her decisions and of course she would have been well within her rights to terminate a pregnancy should she have so decided. There was no “you” at the time. There was a foetus but was that foetus conscious? No. Was it able to think, able to form memories, capable to gain experience and learn? No. Was it self aware? No. The answer is no, not yet. There was no identity of “you”.

    What you need understand is that a potential is not an actual. Your mother’s decision was down to whether the potential to produce a baby in the next few months was out-weighed by other considerations in her life. Her choice and hers alone to make.

    You wrote:

    So what? Consider this. Had your father worn a rubber on the night you were to have been conceived, you would not exist. Same goes for your twenty plus siblings. Or are there no such. So then, what of it?

    Potential and actual should not be confused. They are not the same.

    Had you considered that every egg you allow to escape your body unfertilised is a potential “someone who does not exist”? And their potential children will not exist either? And their potential wives or potential husbands will (if they exist) be married to someone else. And they might have been the potential person who potentially had the cure for all the diseases that plague the World and one of their children’s children might have gone on to become the President of the Potential States of the World and potentially delivered peace and prosperity to all men (potentially) and all women (possibly) as well. It’s all your fault!

    Do you remember the old Monty Python song, “Every Sperm is Sacred”? Well then, that’s your argument right there.

    Remember, a potential is not an actual.

     

    A non-existent has no experiences or memories. They simply do not exist. A non-existent can’t be “deprived” of anything. You are confusing a potential with an actual.

    you can consider yourself lucky. Lucky you had a mother that made the choice of life for you.>

    What choice your mother made was hers to make at the time. “You” as a conscious thinking entity did not exist. Had the pregnancy been terminated “you” would not have known about it anyway.

    What you have to deal with now is the fact that you do exist; not that maybe, possibly, perhaps, could be, you might not have existed.

     

    What is “they”? What precisely are you defining as “human”? What essential attributes are necessary? And what are you trying to define as a “right”?

    BTW don’t all those wasted sperm and eggs deserve the same basic human right, LIFE? What about tumour cells? Be very careful answering that because there is little to distinguish certain tumour cells from those of a foetus. Do cells have a right to LIFE?

     

    Ah, so an individual cell does have a right to LIFE. False! At that point all you can state is that the DNA that would allow a physical being to be formed that had the potential to become “you” was formed. “You” did not come into existence as a conscious, self-aware, volitional person until many months after that. In fact “you” did not exist until your brain was mature enough to operate in a certain manner. That time did not occur until months after the birth.

    And finally the best, last of all:

    No. It was your parents who experienced that at the time. One would hope they enjoyed it.

    Talofa!

    Sione

  • Published: October 3, 2006 1:40 AM

  • Sione Vatu
  • Something went wrong with my forst attempt to post this- 2nd try.pro-lifegirlMost of what you have written is irrelevant to the topic.

    The number of people who make a particular decision and act in a particular way does not make the decision or action correct or incorrect. It just means that certain people have decided or acted in a particular manner.

    You wrote: “You see we were all once a foetus. Is it beyond the realm of possibilities that when your mother first learned she was carrying you, she may have considered her options? What if she had decided to terminate? Would that have been OK?”

    The answer is yes. Of course your mother was free to consider her decisions and of course she would have been well within her rights to terminate a pregnancy should she have so decided. There was no “you” at the time. There was a foetus but was that foetus conscious? No. Was it able to think, able to form memories, able to gain experience and learn? No. Was it self aware? No. The answer is no, not yet. There was no identity of “you”. What you need understand is that a potential is not an actual. Your mother’s decision was down to whether the potential to produce a baby in the next few months was out-weighed by other considerations in her life. Her choice and hers alone to make.

    You wrote: “You would not exist, if you have children they would not exist, and your (husband or wife) would be married to someone else.”

    So what? Consider this. Had your father worn a rubber on the night you were to have been conceived, you would not exist. Same goes for those twenty plus siblings you do not have.

    Had you considered that every egg you allow to escape your body unfertilised is a potential “someone who does not exist”? And their potential children will not exist either? And their potential wives or potential husbands will (if they exist) be married to someone else. And they might have been the potential person who potentially had the cure for all the diseases that plague the World and one of their children’s children might have gone on to become the President of the Potential States of the World and potentially delivered peace and prosperity to all men (potentially) and all women (possibly) as well. It’s all your fault!

    Do you remember the old Monty Python song, “Every Sperm is Sacred”? Well then, that’s your argument right there.

    Remember, a potential is not an actual.

    “You would have been deprived of all your experiences and memories.”

    A non-existent has no experiences or memories. They simply do not exist. A non-existent can’t be “deprived” of anything. You are confusing a potential with an actual.

    “In this day and age with terminations being so readily available and so many being carried out, if you make it to full term
    you can consider yourself lucky. Lucky you had a mother that made the choice of life for you.”

    What choice your mother made was hers to make at the time. “You” as a conscious thinking entity did not exist. Had the pregnancy been terminated “you” would not have known about it anyway. What you have to deal with now is the fact that you do exist; not that maybe, possibly, perhaps, could be, you might not have existed.

    “Don’t you think they all deserve the same basic human right, LIFE?”

    What is “they”? What precisely are you defining as “human”? What essential attributes are necessary? And what are you trying to define as a “right”?

    BTW don’t all those wasted sperm and eggs deserve the same basic human right, LIFE? What about tumour cells? Be very careful answering that because there is little to distinguish certain tumour cells from those of a foetus. Do cells have a right to LIFE?

    “At the point of conception is when life began for you. This was the start of your existence.”

    False. At that point all you can state is that the DNA that would allow a physical being to be formed that had the potential to become “you” was formed. “You” did not come into existence as a conscious, self-aware, volitional person until many months after that. In fact “you” did not exist until your brain was mature enough to operate in a certain manner. That time did not occur until months after the birth.

    And finally the best, last of all: “Your own personal big bang.”

    No. It was your parents who experienced that at the time. One would hope they enjoyed it.

    Talofa!

    Sione

  • Published: October 3, 2006 1:50 AM

  • Ben
  • While I enjoyed much of this paper, I don’t understand how Block and Whitehead can possibly base their pro-choice position on the notion that a developing fetus is a trespasser, or parasite. The fetus does not attach itself to the mother’s body independently of the mother’s actions; clearly, a fetus only implants itself in the mother’s body after the mother has voluntarily chosen to have sex (assuming that she was not raped). Does it not make sense that implicit within the woman’s decision of have sex was a choice to produce a baby? Block and Whitehead, unfortunately, base their entire pro-choice argument on a seemingly absurd premise that their is no relationship between sex and the creation of a baby.
  • Published: October 3, 2006 7:59 AM

  • Roger M
  • Maybe most people can’t articulte it, but we all suspect that human life is different from animal life and property. That’s why the conflation of all moral values to property rights by libertarians can, at times, seem disgusting. I know that libertarians have worked out their logical system to the conclusion that it requires no one to rescue a drowning person. But the average person will find that disgusting, as I do, because a drowning person is not the same thing as a sinking bar of gold.So after Dr. Block’s brilliant and moving defense of an unborn baby as being human, for him to argue that it’s a mere trespasser or “parasite” seems odd at best. To call them parasites dehumanizes them and opens the path to any kind of treatment being morally acceptable.Trespassers are usually adults with options. Why do we consider crimes against children to be worse crimes than crimes against adults? Because children are more vulnerable. As Dr. Block argued, unborn children are the most vunerable and as such, deserving of even greater consideration.
  • Published: October 3, 2006 8:40 AM

  • TokyoTom
  • I support the libertarian principles that underly the speculation in the Block and Whitehead paper, even though I would quibble with various aspects and do not think it is conprehensive. I certainly feel that the loss of all the human life that abortion represents is tragic, but even if all developing fetuses were given the same protection as those who have had the good fortune of being born, our individual rights to not include a duty for anyone else to support us. This is key, and Sione is right on this.Those who are strongly anti-abortion but who are unwilling themeselves to financially bear the costs of raising the children who will be born are in effect trying to use the power of the state to force others (the mothers, any competing children and the father, if there is any around) to bear the costs of the policies they favor.Block and Whitehead are in essence asking pro-lifers to put their money where their mouth is. I hope that tey will rise to the call, but I expect that this will happen only to a limited degree, because who care the most about saving all human life will in effect end up subsidizing the reproduction of others – there will be simple too many fetuses to go around, and one negative effect will be to subsidize the irresponsibility of women who would prefer to have others care for their offspring.

    The argument over whether a fetus is “human” is of course irrelevant from this perspective, as well as being absurd as a scientific matter. Of course the fetus is human – it carries only human genes and, more importantly, it is diploid and carries a full complement of genes from both the father and mother. This allows us to distinguish it from ova and sperm, each of which is technically also a separate human life, but by itself incapable of developing into a full, diploid human (we are not parthenogenic, like certqin other vertebrates)

    As a side note, I think that Block and Whitehead`s argument against RU-236 has its factual premises mistaken. The drug doesn`t kill the embryo, but simply prevents implantation in the uterus. Thus they should see the drug as a permissible eviction drug. As a related matter, science tells us that something like 1/4 to 1/3 of all fertilized ova naturally fail to implant.

    There are other issues I`ll have to address later.

  • Published: October 3, 2006 8:49 AM

  • Peter
  • Does it not make sense that implicit within the woman’s decision of have sex was a choice to produce a baby?No, of course not. If she wanted to have a baby, she wouldn’t have an abortion, would she?Most people don’t intend to have a baby most of the time they have sex! [And a good thing, too – the world population would be 60 quintillion by now if they did! :)]
  • Published: October 3, 2006 9:06 AM

  • TGGP
  • I think Block makes a lot of good points on eviction (if such technology existed, my position would be the same as his). However, I still dissagree with him. If you wake up connected to a violinist, neither you nor he has the right to cause the death of the other by removing them from the kidney they are using. If Ernst Blofeld drops James Bond from a helicopter into my raft, which is in water infested by sharks in a blood frenzy, neither of us has the right to kick the other out. Were another raft available, I could kick Bond off of mine and into it. All those examples are analogies to pregnancies resulting from rape, which are a tiny minority of all aborted pregnancies (conception and illegitimacy both rose after Roe, as use of contraceptives declined). A pregnancy not resulting from rape would be like if I placed Bond on my raft while he was unconscious. He cannot consent to this action, so there can be no contract, but I did consent to placing him on it.I also think Block is too dismissive of the possibility of anti-abortionists from achieving their goals without changing strategy. Anti-abolitionists did not need to change their philosophical stance, but it did take them a long time to achieve their goals. In addition, the “Roe effect” means that groups that oppose abortion (and tend to be less keen on contraception) will grow in size and have more political power. It has been said the the recent generation of youths is the first to be more anti-abortion than its predecessors, and this process may well continue.That’s probably the most I’ve written about the legality of abortion without ranting about “substantive due process”, “the right to privacy” or interpretations of the 10th and 14th amendments. Usually that’s what ticks me the most off, even though common sense would seem to dictate that I’d be most enraged by what I believe to be ongoing and legally sanctioned mass murder.
  • Published: October 3, 2006 10:18 AM

  • Roger M
  • TGGP, Good Post!
  • Published: October 3, 2006 10:35 AM

  • Peter
  • You do realise, I suppose, that Roe vs Wade and the 10th and 14th amendments are completely irrelevant to about 95% of the world?
  • Published: October 3, 2006 11:20 AM

  • Ben
  • Peter,My point was that a developing fetus does not attach himself or herself to the mother on his/her own. Rather, he/she is brought into existence due solely to the mother’s own actions. The fetus is the direct result of a previous choice that the mother made.If the premise on which Block’s argument rests is in fact correct, then he would have to show that it is possible for a human fetus to implant himself or herself in the mother without the mother undergoing any course of action to bring the fetus into existence. In other words, Block would have to show that it is possible for a fetus to be created and to implant himself or herself into a mother’s body without the mother having sex. Obviously, that makes no sense.
  • Published: October 3, 2006 11:46 AM

  • Ken Zahringer
  • David C said:
    In fact, the birth of a fetus is probably a very generous cutoff because arguably children have no free will till several years after birth.In other words, you, or the legislature, or a court, or some other person, gets to decide when I am a “real person” and when the rights of life, liberty, and property attach to me. Can you think of a better definition of tyranny?
  • Published: October 3, 2006 11:54 AM

  • Lisa Casanova
  • Ben,
    What is the moral status of a fetus that is the result of rape? It did not come into being as the result of any choice the woman made.
  • Published: October 3, 2006 12:27 PM

  • M E Hoffer
  • Lisa,Not that I’m necessarily disagreeing with you, though, in your Q: “…as the result of any choice the woman made.”– Hypothetically, if the woman chose not to train herself, and, in this exercise, that was a key determinant, in Self-defense, Would you state that that was a “causal choice” that she made, leading to her dilemma?
  • Published: October 3, 2006 12:42 PM

  • Reactionary
  • Lisa,I have heard it argued that a fetus resulting from rape represents the theft of the woman’s genetic lineage and the argument strikes me as sound. However, my cavil with this is that the remedy, abortion, punishes a party who had no hand in the theft. But on the other hand, forcing the rape victim to maintain the fetus punishes an innocent party as well.
  • Published: October 3, 2006 1:24 PM

  • Jesse McDonald
  • I think there are two distinct issues here, which are being confused:1. Should abortion be socially acceptable? 2. What should the punishment be, if any?I think the first question — which has been the subject of most of the above comments — is deeply dependant on the individual circumstances of each case, as with most social questions. Under most of the circumstances in which it is performed at present I would not consider abortion an acceptable choice, just as I would consider it socially reprehensible to fail to rescue someone who was drowning, assuming one had the means to do so. It isn’t a question of positive rights — the so-called “right to life” — but rather an internal need to prove oneself by rising to the occasion.

    I think the second question is more important from a Libertarian, natural-rights point of view. Of those who think abortion should be punished I would ask: by whom? Rothbardian natural rights typically require the victim, or the victim’s representative, to persue action against the perpetrator. However, in the case of (voluntary) abortion the perpetrator and the victim’s representative are the same person, and no one else has standing. The only case where a rights-conflict could possibly exist would be where some other party, perhaps the father, was granted representation rights prior to the abortion. Then the problem would reduce to trespass and self-defense or eviction, the limits of which are far from decided.

  • Published: October 3, 2006 2:39 PM

  • Roger M
  • There’s a danger of becoming like Islam in that every breath a person takes is judged as moral or immoral. Historically, Protestant Christianity has taken the position that some issues are clear clut right/wrong. Others should be left up to the individual. Pregnancy due to rape, I think, is one of those issues that should be left to the discretion of the victim. I could argue either side of the abortion debate regarding rape: The unborn child is human so why punish him/her for the crimes of another? On the other hand, the girl has suffered one crime, why force her to suffer the consequences of that horrendous crime for nine more months?
  • Published: October 3, 2006 2:45 PM

  • greg
  • Roger M> I know that libertarians have worked out their logical system to the conclusion that it requires no one to rescue a drowning person. But the average person will find that disgusting, as I do, because a drowning person is not the same thing as a sinking bar of gold.You must mean “require” only in the legalistic sense. Libertarians who reject such a legal requirement may also feel that they indeed should save a drowning person (under certain local conditions: for example, not dying themselves in the process). These two separate approaches (no legal req and personal assumption of action) to the same occurance are not contradictory. Many people will “require” something of themselves in the personal sense without simultaneously saying that requirement should be a law for all to follow.

     

  • Published: October 3, 2006 3:38 PM

  • Roger M
  • Greg, Thanks! I wasn’t aware of that distinction.
  • Published: October 3, 2006 4:24 PM

  • Sione Vatu
  • TGGPYou wrote: “If you wake up connected to a violinist, neither you nor he has the right to cause the death of the other by removing them from the kidney they are using.”Sure I do. If it’s my kidney he’s using and I don’t consent to him being attached to it, he’s gone.

    And: “If Ernst Blofeld drops James Bond from a helicopter into my raft, which is in water infested by sharks in a blood frenzy, neither of us has the right to kick the other out.”

    Depends on context. Since the raft is too small for both of you to survive you may tip him off. It’s an emergency and it’s your life or his!

    Even were the raft large enough for two; what if you remember the time when James Bond mercilessly killed your innocent brother? Since your government is not going to ever provide justice in the matter, here is your opportunity for justice (and you are preventing a very dangerous state sanctioned killer from ever killing innocent people in the name of the state again).

    The trouble with analogies is that they are not the same as the situation you are actually investigating. Some are closer than others but each comes with a particular context. They may be used to illustrate a point but they do not prove it. Analogy is “similar to” but not “the same as”.

    You wrote: ” A pregnancy not resulting from rape would be like if I placed Bond on my raft while he was unconscious. He cannot consent to this action, so there can be no contract, but I did consent to placing him on it.”

    This is all very well but it is not the same as an abortion. Mr Bond already exists as a volitional active self-aware person. The foetus soes not. Bond may well be unconscious at the time you place him on the raft but he will soon awaken and return to a state of awareness. He exists as a human identity already. In the case of a foetus what you are dealing with is different altogther. Here is a non-conscious, non-volitional, non-active entity which has the potential to become a person but it is not a person yet. Not self-aware. Not volitional. Not conscious. Not active. Never was. Potentially might be. In this example you are confusing a potential with an actual. They are not the same.

    Sione

  • Published: October 3, 2006 4:29 PM

  • Albert Esplugas
  • Ben: I don’t understand how Block and Whitehead can possibly base their pro-choice position on the notion that a developing fetus is a trespasser, or parasite. The fetus does not attach itself to the mother’s body independently of the mother’s actions; clearly, a fetus only implants itself in the mother’s body after the mother has voluntarily chosen to have sex (assuming that she was not raped). Does it not make sense that implicit within the woman’s decision of have sex was a choice to produce a baby? Block and Whitehead, unfortunately, base their entire pro-choice argument on a seemingly absurd premise that their is no relationship between sex and the creation of a baby.a developing fetus does not attach himself or herself to the mother on his/her own. Rather, he/she is brought into existence due solely to the mother’s own actions. The fetus is the direct result of a previous choice that the mother made.I absolutly agree. I think this is a very important point, sadly overlooked by Block and Whitehead and other pro-choice libertarian theorists for years. Positive obligations are generellay recognized in the case of “duty founded on creation of peril”. As Williamson Evers puts it“The third sort of legal duty that is now enforced by the criminal justice process is duty founded on creation of peril. The criminal law punishes persons who put into motion some force that invades individual rights and who then neglect to halt the force which they originally set in What is really being punished is the bringing forth of an emergency, as when the pilot of a passenger airplane bails out on a whim, leaving the passengers to crash. Returning to the idea of causality and its central role in the law, we can see that the creator of the peril has effectively committed an invasive act. If he neglects to halt or mitigate the force or effect of that act, then he can rightly be held responsible. A person is culpable who omits to halt a force which he originally put in motion. If, for example, a person accidentally starts a fire in a building, then escapes the building, but sees others who could be rescued still in the building, it is his duty to try to aid them. While the accidental arsonist created the peril whicl served as an instrument for invading his victim’s rights, the duty of the perpetrator to aid the imperiled in such cases is to be distinguished from a more generalized duty that is sometimes advanced, namely, a duty of everyone to aid the imperiled.”

    Or Posner, quoted here“Thomson is right that we don’t force people to donate kidneys to strangers, or even to family members. But normally the potential donor is not responsible for the condition that he is asked to alleviate, in the way that a woman (unless she has been raped) is responsible, although only in part, for the fact that she is pregnant. The difference in evidentiary difficulty between asking who hit X and asking who failed to save X is a strong practical reason against liability for failing to be a good Samaritan. So although bystanders are not required to rescue persons in distress, someone who creates the danger, even if nontortiously, may be required to attempt rescue, and perhaps that is the proper analogy to the pregnant woman who wants to terminate her pregnancy.”

    Beckwith and Thomas, in the JLS, relate this “duty founded on creation of peril” with pregnancy: For example, according to the prima facie case for negligence, one is liable for negligence if one (1) has a duty, (2) breached a duty, and (3) caused harm as a result of breaching the duty. One could argue against McDonagh in the following way: Since pregnancy is a foreseeable result of unprotected sex, and since for McDonagh a fetus is a human person, therefore, one who engages in sex has a duty to engage in due care so as not to bring into existence persons whose death due to abortion is foreseeable.

    I think Feser gets right too: “it isn’t clear how it would justify any abortion other than in the case of pregnancy resulting from rape, with which the kidnapping by the violinist’s admirers is analogous. Surely a pregnancy resulting from consensual intercourseÑwhich, as everyone knows, has a chance of resulting in pregnancy even when contraception is usedÑis not analogous to Thomson’s example.”

    See also Doris Gordon “Abortion and Thomson’s Violinist: Unplugging a Bad Analogy”.

    Block and Whitehead say that the homeowner has the right to evict a trespasser (in the gentlest manner possible) but, as Ben has explained, the unborn is not a trespasser. The voluntary actions of the parents put him in that position. Imagine a homeowner that put an outsider (who is unconscious) inside his property and then, accusing him of trespassing, evict him causing his death.

    Responding to Lisa, a fetus that is the result of rape may be evicted (in this case doesn’t apply the “duty founded on creation of peril”; the mother has been raped, she has not created the peril), a fetus that is the result of the voluntary actions of his parents can not.

  • Published: October 3, 2006 5:20 PM

  • Albert Esplugas
  • In fact, Block and Whitehead are defending a positive obligation in their article, namely, the obligation to evict the unborn in the gentlest manner possible (or to abandon a child after communicating it to others). What is the foundation of such a positive obligation? Why is it agression not to abide by this positive obligation? They implicitly accept that parents have this obligation (to evict / to communicate the abandonment) because they have put the child in this situation: “In effect, if not explicitly, when you took over the care of the baby [pre or post-birth] you assented to an implicit obligation requiring you to continue to do so or to notify someone else of this fact. To fail to do so thus smacks of rights violation rather than being forced to assume a positive ob1igation. See also footnote 184: “This way of putting the matter would not apply to the rape victim or to Thomson’s forced host to the violinist”. Why not? Because they concede that the voluntary actions ot the parents are relevant. And if the voluntary actions of parents justify a positive obligation to evict the unborn / to communicate the abandonment of the child, why they cannot justify a positive obligation to continue the pregnancy (if eviction will kill the unborn) or to care the child?Block and Whitehead attempt to make a parallel with abandonment of land, but it doesn’t convince me. They say: “the abandoner of land most certainly has the obligation of publicly notifying people of his new non ownership status if he has put up no trespassing signs, fences, etc., on his (ex)holdings. This is because if he refuses to do so, he is actively preventing others from claiming non-owned land. In keeping the baby (land) but not allowing anyone else to homestead (own) it, you are in effect preempting the rights of others to do so.” If I abandon my house or plot of land without communicating it to others I’m not initiating force against others. I don’t see why people have a positive obligation to communicate the abandonment of his property (why it is agression not to communicate that). If I leave without communicating abandonment to others I don’t employ violence against anyone. May be it would be difficult or practically impossible for others to become aware that my property have been abandoned. But, so what? It’s a practical matter, it doesn’t entail agression for my part.Therefore, I think Block and Whitehead defend a positive obligation that can only be justified by considering the voluntary actions of the parents. But this also justify an extended positive obligation to continue the pregnancy / caring the child.

    Anyway, I enjoyed this article.

  • Published: October 3, 2006 8:17 PM

  • Kevin
  • This is one of the most wonderful abortion-debate forums that I have ever encountered – where people on all sides are actually arguing with the same intent – to maximize the rights of everyone. If only more people shared this goal…These conflicts over abortion make me wonder. Is it wrong to be somewhat jealous of the animals whose sole responsibility of child bearing involves dropping some eggs on the ocean floor for another to fertilize?
  • Published: October 3, 2006 8:36 PM

  • Sione Vatu
  • AlbertYour argument fails. Whether or not the mother committed an action that led to the foetus being formed is immaterial. Her decision to have sex with a man does not implicitly include a decision to have a baby. By that reasoning one could claim a woman’s decision to have sex also implies a decision to raise a child until adulthood. Some would hold that it implicitly includes a decision to marry her mate. Not so. These are different decisions entirely. That one decision MAY lead to a situation that necessarily requires another is irrelevant.Here is an actual example. A professional sex worker has paid sex with a client. Did she implicitly decide to have a baby? Of course not. The notion of an implied decision is invalid.

    Another real example, a woman is informed by her specialist that she is sterile, her eggs are toast and she is unable to conceive. Subsequently she has sex and surprise! She falls pregnant. Her specialist was incorrect. Did she implicitly decide to have a baby? Can’t say that she did. She understood she was unable to have one. In her case unprotected sex with her boyfriend was not expected to ever result in pregnancy. Once again, the notion of an implied decision is invalid.

    *

    Aside from the problems in promoting a positive obligation, a debatable idea in itself, you are confusing a potential with an actual. A foetus is not the same as a person. Two differing entities. I’ve pointed this out previously so I’ll avoid repeating it again here.

    *

    I dislike analogies as they so easily confuse rather than clarify. Nevertheless, since the analogy of the trespasser and the homeowner has been raised here let’s examine further. The homeowner may well invite a person onto his property. That’s a deliberate and conscious act. It can’t be said that a woman having sex is necessarily inviting a foetus to come reside within her body. For a start that entity does not exist at the time she has sex. Secondly even if she did have sex, she did not necessarily intend to become pregnant. So, an invitation does not necessarily exist anyway.

    And, of course, the analogy of the invited guest ignores the situation where the guest outstays his or her welcome. Just this weekend I noticed the boys down the street evicted an overstaying dinner guest early Sunday morning. From what I heard the permission to stay was rescinded. Out he went! Fair enough.

    Talofa!

    Sione

  • Published: October 3, 2006 8:51 PM

  • Peter
  • My point was that a developing fetus does not attach himself or herself to the mother on his/her own. Rather, he/she is brought into existence due solely to the mother’s own actions. The fetus is the direct result of a previous choice that the mother made.I know what you meant, but then you could say that “the choice to cross the road implies the choice to get hit by a car” or something, too. It’s nonsense.In other words, Block would have to show that it is possible for a fetus to be created and to implant himself or herself into a mother’s body without the mother having sex. Obviously, that makes no sense.

    I disgree that it’s necessary to show that, and agree that it makes no sense, but the majority of people who claim abortion is morally wrong, it seems to me, are Christians, and that obviously makes sense to them: it’s a fundamental tenet of their religion!

  • Published: October 3, 2006 10:03 PM

  • TokyoTom
  • Here are a few facts to inform the discussion:”The fact is that the best way to reduce the number of abortions is to reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies in the first place.””… 34% of teenage girls become pregnant at least once before their 20th birthday, and the U.S. has the highest teen pregnancy rate of any industrialized country. Children born to teen moms begin life with the odds against them. They are more likely to be of low-birth weight, 50 percent more likely to repeat a grade, and significantly more likely to be victims of abuse and neglect. And girls who give birth as teenagers face a long, uphill battle to economic self-sufficiency and pride.”

    “Each year, nearly half of the six million pregnancies in this country are unintended, and more than half of all unintended pregnancies end in abortion.”

    “… 7% of American women who do not use contraception account for 53% of all unintended pregnancies.”

    “>Dec. 2005 speech by Sen. H. Clinton

    Do those who care about the loss of innocent life really want to support the offspring of the 7% of American women who do not use contraception and as a result account for 53% of all unintended pregnancies?

    An undiscussed aspect of this is the frequent divergence of interests between the sexes over the abortion question. Mothers have to invest at least nine months of their bodies in carrying a child to term, and have physical investments in nursing and child-raising on top of that. Males, on the others, having made their donation of sperm, frequently get off scot free. I think it is rather clear that the bulk of the women who choose to have abortions are doing so because the putative “father” has, despite his success in wooing the mother, demonstrated a lack of commitment or capability of supporting the mother and child. The father may feel cheated – after all, he has done what nature has typically required in successfully bedding the mother – but if we remove the decision about whether to carry the child to term one effect is to encourage irresponsible male behavior.

    We also undermine the ability of expectant mothers to make difficult decisions about how to allocate scarce resources between investments in education, work, existing children and those children as yet unborn. One might regret that advances in technology have enabled what is a difficult and perhaps faustian decision, but one can hardly put the genie back in the bottle.

    Wouldn’t a better policy be to make sure that contraception is available so that pregnancy occurs only intentionally, rather than on a hit-or-miss default basis?

  • Published: October 3, 2006 11:15 PM

  • Albert Esplugas
  • Peter: I know what you meant, but then you could say that “the choice to cross the road implies the choice to get hit by a car” or something, too. It’s nonsense.Of course, the choice to cross the road doesn’t “imply the choice to get hit by a car”. But the choice to cross the road may imply costs you don’t choose (may be to get hit by a car) that you, not others, should bear.Block and Whitehead say: “Further, there is something perverse in interpreting the requirement that people take responsibility for what they do in this manner. If a pregnant woman cannot evict her fetus on such a ground, what of the person who ate too many French fries? Logic would imply the illegitimacy of him obtaining an angioplasty. For if you eat too many fatty foods you are on your way toward having a heart attack, availing yourself of a coronary bypass or other such operation would be to fail to “take responsibility” for your initial actions. This is an obvious bit of nonsense. Yet, precisely this argument applies to the eviction case.”

    This analogy is not correct. Nobody says that a person who eat too many French fries cannot try to minimize the cost of his actions. What I’m saying is that he cannot externalize the cost of eating too many fatty foods to others. He, not others, must bear the cost of his voluntary actions. In the case of abortion/eviction (if that implies the death of the unborn), however, parents externalize the cost of their voluntary actions (voluntary sex). The child bears the cost of the parents’ actions. Parents don’t try to minimize their cost, they try to externalize it passing it to the child.

  • Published: October 4, 2006 5:54 AM

  • Laura Miller
  • It may be relevant that between 10 and 50% of fertilized eggs spontaneously abort. So the statement that “the fertilized egg will most certainly become a human being (if kept in the womb 9 months)” is erroneous – a percentage of those eggs will in fact die. Most spontaneous abortions occur in the first trimester and I believe this had some bearing on the argument about viability.I also have to agree with the 7%/53% argument – if these women don’t have the option of abortion, does that not imply (to some extent) that I will be coerced into supporting their children via the welfare state?
  • Published: October 4, 2006 10:19 AM

  • JIMB
  • In my view there are a few thoughts which bear saying that haven’t been visited yet1 – Self ownership is a physical reality but is not a moral code (i.e. ownership hardly implies what the proper use of the thing should be)2 – The logic in the paper, if extended, would similarly make the abandonment of unwanted children legitimate

    3 – The arguments that a person is “compelled to carry a child” I find nonsensical – the child develops, in the vast majority of cases, from an act with known risks (or perhaps even from intent) and without “compulsion”. It takes a positive act of killing (there is the compulsion) to stop it. But even the child required a positive act of support, the consequences demand that the child be given support by those most directly responsible for it’s existence.

    4 – If I take an action which, by it’s nature, reasonably results in my having to care for a handicapped non-violent person for nine months, then decide later that I wish to evict that person but can do so only by tearing their flesh and bone to pieces and vacuuming their dismembered parts from my home, I’d say that was a moral crime to be fought against in every way, and any such “property right” later asserted to my home which contradict the natural consequences and natural moral law cannot reasonably exist in superiority.

    5 – The general result of “libertarianism” seems to indicate non-physical evil would gain greatly in power: and evil doesn’t stay non-violent. The effect – especially in this environment – is to change the rules of the battleground in the state and yield it far more to evil and increase violence.

    6 – It appears the traditional family is an essential atomic element of good society and perhaps cannot be usurped without a destruction of society – hence the institution of marriage is deserving of state sanction and alternative lifestyles, while they may be permitted, are not given equal time or weight.

    7 – Natural moral law is a common ground for ethics and should be promoted along side (or even instead of) Rothbard’s (and other strict self-ownership) views. Natural moral law can be defended by appeal to acts and consequences, and just as economics is corrected by an axiomatic approach, morality is corrected by a practical cause-effect approach visible, and while disagreements can exist, agreeable enough to be settled on

  • Published: October 4, 2006 12:13 PM

  • Sione Vatu
  • JIMBSurprise, surprise. More baseless assertion from you.”Natural moral law” is really another set of wild assertions you made up. They are arbitrary. Be honest (just for once) and admit what it is you are promoting. Your claims rely on the idea that a creature within super-natural realm tells you what to do; what is moral and what is immoral. The super-natural is revealed to you (voices in your head- whatever). What utter hokum!

    YOu need to do better than that.

    Sione

  • Published: October 5, 2006 7:39 PM

  • JIMB
  • Sione – Natural moral law is apparently so visible that whether a statement should be supported or denied is made constantly by authoritative reference to the harm or support it causes other people (hence the self-ownership principle, limited government, harm to children, etc. etc.). That is hardly arbitrary. I think – perhaps falsely – that the position is very much reversed.
  • Published: October 6, 2006 5:43 AM

  • Sione
  • JIMBThis statement : “Natural moral law is apparently so visible that whether a statement should be supported or denied is made constantly by authoritative reference to the harm or support it causes other people” is arbitrary.You need to define what your concept “natural moral law” is, how it is derived and what its nature is. Further you need to explain what is you consider “authoritive reference” to actually be.

    From this and your previous statements it is clear you are promoting a collectivism based on a primitive type of mystical faith. Unreasonable and illogical. You need to do better.

    Sione

     

  • Published: October 6, 2006 3:39 PM

  • ausblog
  • World estimations of the number of terminations carried out each year is somewhere between 20 and 88 million.3,500 per day / 1.3 million per year in America alone.50% of that 1.3 million claimed failed birth control was to blame.

    A further 48% had failed to use any birth control at all.

    And 2% had medical reasons.

    That means a stagering 98% may have been avoided had an effective birth control been used.

  • Published: October 6, 2006 9:02 PM

  • JIMB
  • Sione – But why should I “need to do better” unless you are using a standard? You see – you cannot avoid the “natural” appeal to an observable standard of fairness and reason, of which natural moral law is clearly derived.I did not “make it up”. It is visible from the natural order.For a comprehensive defense of natural moral law, I refer you to the history of common law and to our framing fathers.
  • Published: October 7, 2006 9:22 AM

  • ausblog
  • If you think the point of conception is NOT when life begins, and all you have is a clump of cells and not a living human being.
    Then at least concider this -Soon after you were conceived you were no more than a clump of cells.
    This clump of cells was you at your earliest stage, you had plenty of growing to do but this clump of cells was you none the less. Think about it.
    Aren’t you glad you were left unhindered to develope further.
    Safe inside your mother’s womb until you were born.
  • Published: November 22, 2006 10:22 PM

  • Vince Daliessio
  • ausblog says;”If you think the point of conception is NOT when life begins, and all you have is a clump of cells and not a living human being.
    Then at least concider this…”Technically, since the egg is alive, and the sperm are alive, then life does not “begin”, rather it is continuous.

    I happen to be horrified by the prevalence of abortion in our society, but equally horrified at the way the issue is demagogued for political purposes by politicians of every stripe, it being a red rag that can be used to motivate voters on both sides of the issue.

    But since the issue was placed into the federal purview via Roe v. Wade, has anything really been done about it one way or the other? I submit, it has not, for the reasons above – a fair and reasonable dialogue on the issue will take away a powerful election tool.

    What we are left with are rights, which we austrians usually trace back to the concept of self-ownership. To me, absent any alternative way to evict the unwanted tenant intact, there seems to be no way to prevent abortions consistent with the fundamental SO premise.

    The best I can offer is a utilitarian argument that if abortion, adoption, and medicine were all unregulated, fewer unintended pregnancies might occur, and more of those would end with some kind of adoptive arrangement, lowering the incidence of abortion dramatically. What I know for sure however is that the current political non-solution is NOT working.

  • Published: November 23, 2006 12:57 AM

  • Abortion Debate
  • A debate on libertarianism and abortion has started here:http://2008presidentialcampaign.us/message_board/YaBB.pl?num=1186219695/0#0
  • Published: August 4, 2007 5:34 AM

  • Kiwi Polemicist
  • Block’s assertion that an unwanted baby is a trespasser is fatally flawed.http://christianclassicalliberalist.wordpress.com/2008/11/14/abortion-is-an-unwanted-baby-a-trespasser/
  • Published: November 13, 2008 6:16 PM

  • cavalier973
  • Sione’s argument seems to be that the right to life can only be legally protected by the state (or prosecuted by the state if violated) if the person in question is a “volitional active self-aware person.”Since it could be argued that a newborn is not a volitional active self-aware person, is the newborn then to be deprived of the right to life? What about those who are older but severely mentally retarded?Rothbard, incidentally, argued that the parents of a newborn do not have the right to actively kill the newborn, but that they did have the right to abandon him (i.e. allow the newborn to starve to death).

    I agree rather with those whose argument rests on the idea that the fetus’ parents are responsible to care for him, or arrange care by others, since they voluntarily engaged in activity that brought the fetus into existence.

    At the very least, if they are so irresponsible as to procrastinate on the abortion until the child reaches the point where he could survive outside the womb (which is now, what, six months?), then they should be prohibited from killing the child.

  • Published: December 30, 2008 11:40 PM

  • cavalier973
  • Also, the analogy of being hooked up to the violinist needs to be expanded. Imagine that there is an event called the “Greatest Concert Ever”, that is guaranteed to uplift and inspire everyone who attends.
    There is a catch, however: according to the rules of the house, if you attend this concert, there is a 50% chance that you will wake up afterward with a violinist hooked to you and using your kidney for nine months. There is, however, a special badge that you can purchase and display on your outer clothing that only makes it a 5% chance of being hooked to a violinist.Now, assume that candidate A, understanding the rules of the house and the potential consequences of attending the concert without a badge, proceeds to attend the concert but without purchasing the badge. Proceed with the analogy….
  • Published: December 31, 2008 4:31 PM

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On Conspiracy Theories

I’ve often ranted myself about libertarian cranks and nuts, conspiracy theories and the like. One of my favorite analyses is that by Brian Doherty in Reason (see The Worst of the Supreme Court, which links to Doherty’s It’s So Simple, It’s Ridiculous”; also and Five Reasons You Don’t Owe Income Tax, Dammit!) — he gives a nice analysis of the income tax protestor nuts:

The tax honesty movement’s vision of the world is fantastical in another way. It is not merely obsessed with continuity; it is magical in a traditional sense. It’s devoted to the belief that the secret forces of the universe can be bound by verbal formulas if delivered with the proper ritual.

In a debate with other libertarians, we discussed the issue of conspiracy theories. Some conspiracy theories are sensible, e.g. those having to do with the rise of the Fed and the influence of certain interested parties. I suppose what we are really criticizing are crackpot theories. Which conspiracy theories are crackpot, and which are not? It’s hard to say ahead of time, but usually you know it when you see it.

Anyway, two recent pieces critical of conspiracy theorizing, one by Objectivist Robert Bidinotto, A rant against conspiracy theories [original gone; some excerpts here]; one by Catholic Ed Feser: We the Sheeple? Why Conspiracy Theories Persist (Justin Taylor, We the Sheeple?).

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Kim Davies on the Transcendental Foundations of Ethics

From the Mises Blog, Sept. 15, 2006

Downloads: PDF; Researchgate; Academia

Related:

Kim Davies on the Transcendental Foundations of Ethics

(Archived comments below)

09/15/2006  

I have previously posted on Frank Van Dun’s stimulating and promising draft comments on Hoppe’s argumentation ethics defense of libertarianism. I’ve long been fascinated by Hoppe’s argument and any related ones, which led me to publish New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory in 1996. In 1997 I received an email notice about a talk to be given by Kim Davies on “The Transcendental Foundation of Ethics”. I had not been successful locating Davies or any of his work, but recently I located him (the wonders of the Internet and Google); he’s Deputy Principal at Gateshead College. He sent me an outline/summary of The Transcendental Foundation of Ethics. [continue reading…]

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Re: We’re Not Worthy

From LRC blog

Update: Tweet:

interesting example of how US states are uniquely quasi-sovereign under international law: they can engage in what are basically treaties with other countries, more or less, with approval of the US Gov. see https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/trump-threatens-to-block-opening-of-bridge-between-us-and-canada/ar-AA1W390V
 
Ch. XXX of Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th ed.), pp. 59-60:
“The position of members of federal unions is interesting. In the constitutions of Switzerland and the German Federal Republic component states are permitted to exercise certain of the capacities of independent states, including the power to make treaties. In the normal case, such capacities are probably exercised as agents for the union, even if the acts concerned are done in the name of the component state. However, where the union originated as a union of independent states, the internal relations retain an international element, and the union may act as agent for the states. The United States constitution enables the states of the Union to enter into agreements with other states of the Union or with foreign states with the consent of Congress.”
 
In this case the Gordie Howe International Bridge Crossing Agreement (signed in 2012 between Michigan and Canada) instead of Congress, it received key federal approvals through executive branch mechanisms, including: A Presidential Permit issued by the U.S. Department of State on April 12, 2013, authorizing the “construction, connection, operation, and maintenance” of the bridge, which is the primary federal approval for international border crossings over navigable waters; also a U.S. Coast Guard Bridge Permit (issued May 30, 2014) for the portion over U.S. jurisdictional waters. There was also additional federal involvement, such as environmental reviews under NEPA, coordination with agencies like CBP, GSA, and others (including a 2015 non-binding arrangement outlining federal roles). See
 
Because federal approval is needed perhaps this is why La Trump thinks he can scuttle the bridge by withdrawing federal approval, though not sure if that’s legal or not.
See also Grok on this.

Re: We’re Not Worthy

Posted by Stephan Kinsella on September 9, 2006 02:22 PM

Tom D and Tom W, right on, my neo-confederate brothers. (Joke, joke, I KID the Timster.) For anyone with a passing familiarity with contract law or international law (not that I know much about either topic :) , it’s natural to view the Constitution as a compact–treaty–between sovereign states. The original States party to this treaty created, by means of this instrument, a new international legal entity the powers of which were defined by the Constitution.

International law recognizes the creation of new states or even non-states with legal personality under international law, such as the United Nations, European Community, European Union, OAS, etc.–see, e.g., Ch. XXX of Ian Brownlie’s seminal Principles of Public International Law (6th ed.). Interesting, as Brownlie notes on pp. 59-60, regarding the status of “states” as legal persons under international law:

The position of members of federal unions is interesting. In the constitutions of Switzerland and the German Federal Republic component states are permitted to exercise certain of the capacities of independent states, including the power to make treaties. In the normal case, such capacities are probably exercised as agents for the union, even if the acts concerned are done in the name of the component state. However, where the union originated as a union of independent states, the internal relations retain an international element, and the union may act as agent for the states. The United States constitution enables the states of the Union to enter into agreements with other states of the Union or with foreign states with the consent of Congress. [emphasis added]

Note the almost casual observation implicit here, that the international legal personality known as the USA under international law originated as a union of independent states–states that even to this day are able, under international law, to enter into treaties with foreign states (that Congress’s consent is needed does not change the fact that they are sovereign “states” in the international law sense). In fact, this distinction makes a difference–as Brownlie observes, in other unions with “constituent” states, such as Canada, or Germany–that is, a union or state that did not arise as a union of independent states already having legal personality on the international law plane–if such a constituent state enters into a treaty, it is really acting merely as agent for the union, which is the “real” international legal personality.

By contrast, where the union is a creation of independent states under international law (as in the US case), these states may still be parties to treaties in their own right, under international law.

This commonplace observation under mainstream, standard international law principles of course supports the “compact” theory of the US union, as do standard principles of contract law.

(The issue of delegation of powers by states to international legal organizations is also treated in detail in chapter 5 of International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, by my good friend Dr. Dan Sarooshi (I met Dan when obtaining my master’s in international law at King’s College London and the London School of Economics; in fact, not only did we share the same student dorm (King’s College Hall, in Camberwell), Dan and I both studied under Lady Rosalyn Higgins, now Chief Justice of the International Court of Justice, who was then a law professor at LSE. What a pleasure. The woman is amazing. But again, let me reiterate, I know absolutely nothing about international law).)

[Update: The latest edition of the book, 8th edition, by James Crawford, has similar language, at pp. 116-17:

In some federations (notably those created by a union of states at the international level), the constituent members retain certain residual capacities. In the constitutions of Switzerland and Germany, component states are permitted to exercise certain state functions, including treaty-making. Normally, the states, even when acting in their own name, do so as agents of the union. The US Constitution enables the states of the Union to enter into agreements with other states of the Union or with foreign states with the consent of Congress. But this happens rarely if at all, and in most federations, old and new, the federal government’s power to make treaties with foreign states is exclusive. The position of the International Court, set out in LaGrand and Avena, is that international obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) must be fully observed irrespective of constitutional limitations, and, though the means of implementation remain for it to choose, the federal state incurs  responsibility for the wrongful acts of its subdivisions.

***

Note: Tom D, Timmy now has an addendum to his post admitting that he was wrong in saying that your writings were “almost the exclusive foundation for the book under review.” He says he should have said “for the relevant chapter in the book under review.” But then he says this “mistake” was “a completely irrelevant one, since this is the chapter relating to the subject at hand.” What is funny about this is that it was DiLorenzo who told me about that chapter’s reliance on his work, and knew I was going to blog it. He was not hiding it!

Moreover, note this his reply is devoid of substance. It amounts to name-calling and ad hominem, and whining that no one is taking his little blog posts seriously enough. He calls me a “silly little man,” which is, even if true, utterly irrelevant; he lies and says I don’t “believe in considering the ideas of those who don’t describe themselves as libertarians” (merely because I am skeptical of the essentially political views of a mainstream, modern law professor. Maybe Sandefur, the faux libertarian, eager to appear moderate and mainstream in his zeal to make a difference and work with the system, trusts the constitutional policy analyses of “neutral”, mainstream, modern law professors more than those of, oh, I don’t know, Thomas Jefferson or James Madison, or more contemporary, less modernist scholars closer in time to the Founding. But I don’t. And his attack on me for–get this–”praising” a book review written by someone (Tom DiLorenzo) … whose work was cited by the subject of the review. Got that? I must be wrong because I praised someone who did a book review of Napolitano…. because Napolitano cites the reviewer’s own work. Hunh? Wow, I see why Timmy likes modern law professor-think: he absorbed a lot of the slippery way of reasoning in law school.

Timmy also retreats to the charge of “willful ignorance” and intellectual dishonesty”–why? Why, beause I “ignore” Timmy’s repeated “demonstrations” of the opposite. In other words, because I have a substantive disagreement with him, I am ignorant and dishonest. As far as I can tell, he attaches great significance to the difference between saying there is a right to revolultion, and a right to secede. Reminds me of those legal theorists who say that although rights may not be “alienated,” they may be “forfeited.” Um, yeah. (I have already utterly demolished Sandefur’s reliance on his “revolution” theory which he tries to use to show that the Union’s attack on the CSA was justified.)

He also inserts the irrelevant and silly hypothesis that I must be choosing to rely on the “bad” works because the others are not “the work of officially approved Lew Rockwell affiliates”. Well, that proves it–I must be wrong–little Timmy has already done the work of psychologizing about why I’m wrong.

Now, this lying twit resents being called a lying twit. Boy, these activist sell-outs are touchy, aren’t they?

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Empathy and the Source of Rights

From the Mises Blog. Archived comments below.

Empathy and the Source of Rights

09/06/2006

I often tire of people asking (usually in a self-contradictory, petulant tone, more demanding than asking), “Okay, so what is the source of rights?! Where do they ‘come from’?!” My reply is usually that the questioner either respects my rights, or he does not. If he does not, he can go to h*ll—I’m not wasting time talking to an uncivilized thug, any more than I would treat with a rampaging elephant, bandit, lion, or hurricane. And if he does respect rights—then my stance is: how dare you demand of me that I justify your own views? Look inside—and figure out for yourself why you believe in such and such.

Second, I point out that to ask for a “source” of rights is scientistic and positivistic. It presupposes someone or some “thing” “legislates” or “decrees” rights. Even the natural law advocate who says legislatures don’t “decree rights” seem to move it back a level—to God, or to Nature. But rights don’t really “come from” anything. When it is demonstrated that 2+2=4, this is a truth, a fact. Does it make sense to ask what is the “source” of this “truth”? Where does 2+2=4 “come from”? This is just nonsense. And it is similar with normative propositions—with moral truths.Values and norms is that they are not causal laws. They are not self-enforcing; they are prescriptive. This is a crucial insight: it shows that even the best proof of rights—even the Ultimate Natural Law Proof handed down by God Himself can be disregarded (is not this the lesson of the Ten Commandments?). Or, as Hoppe argues here,

no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively … [T]hat Rawls or other socialists may still advocate such ethics is completely beside the point. That one plus one equals two does not rule out the possibility that someone says it is three, or that one ought not attempt to make one plus one equal three the arithmetic law of the land. But all this does not affect the fact that one plus one still is two. In strict analogy to this, I “only” claim to prove that whatever Rawls or other socialists say is false, and can be understood as such by all intellectually competent and honest men. It does not change the fact that incompetence or dishonesty and evil still may exist and may even prevail over truth and justice. [last emphasis added]

Or, as Hoppe explains here,

To say that this principle [underlying capitalism] is just also does not preclude the possibility of people proposing or even enforcing rules that are incompatible with it. As a matter of fact, with respect to norms the situation is very similar to that in other disciplines of scientific inquiry. The fact, for instance, that certain empirical statements are justified or justifiable and others are not does not imply that everyone only defends objective, valid statements. Rather, people can be wrong, even intentionally. But the distinction between objective and subjective, between true and false, does not lose any of its significance because of this. Rather, people who are wrong would have to be classified as either uninformed or intentionally lying. The case is similar with respect to norms. Of course there are many people who do not propagate or enforce norms which can be classified as valid according to the meaning of justification which I have given above. But the distinction between justifiable and nonjustifiable norms does not dissolve because of this, just as that between objective and subjective statements does not crumble because of the existence of uninformed or lying people. Rather, and accordingly, those people who would propagate and enforce such different, invalid norms would again have to be classified as uninformed or dishonest, insofar as one had explained to them and indeed made it clear that their alternative norm proposals or enforcements could not and never would be justifiable in argumentation. [emphasis added]

What this means is that any norms that are abided by in society are necessarily norms that are self-undertaken by a community of people who share that value.

In the case of civilization, you can envision two types of individuals: civilized people who want to live in peace and harmony and prosperity; and criminals or outlaws, who do not care about this. This latter type are animal-like; even the “best” argument or proof of rights can and will be disregarded by them (see Hoppe’s comments quoted above). What do the former people have in common? I suspect that it is the trait of empathy. Only by placing some value on others’ well-being—for some reason—can one value respecting their rights; and it seems to me that it is empathy that is at the root of this other-valuing, almost by definition. In my view, evolution is probably what led to this trait, as a psychological matter, but that is not that significant to me. So, in a sense, if we must find a “source” of rights, I would say—it is empathy.

Update: Discussion extended in The Division of Labor as the Source of Rights; see also Mike Masnick, Rethinking Bullying: Kids Don’t See It As Bullying (discussing empathy).

Archived comments:

{ 48 comments… read them below or add one }

Stephan Kinsella September 6, 2006 at 10:42 am

Gil Guillory sent this comment to me:

Of relevance to your line of thought is Mises’s contention in Human Action that the Ricardian Law of Association gives rise to cooperation and that empathy grows out of cooperation, not the other way around. So, if we are insisting on a source of rights, and we follow Mises in this regard, then it is the self-interested motivation to cooperate that is the source of rights. If you want to cooperate with me, then I will do so on particular terms, among which are that you respect my equal rights to person and property.There are many ways to approach the rules of justice.

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Gil Guillory September 6, 2006 at 12:12 pm

Actually, the passage I was thinking of is the second-to-last paragraph here:

http://mises.org/humanaction/chap8sec1.asp

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Roger M September 6, 2006 at 12:23 pm

Another way to put it is to say that rights are based on logic and reality. Essentially, that’s what Aristotle did and all natural law philosphers who followed him.

However, every system uses reality and logic, even Marxism (although that may be hard for some to swallow). The conclusions drawn from reality and logic differ because of differing assumptions, differing starting points. Assumptions, or presuppositions, are difficult to prove, so we assume them to be true. For example, we assume that we exist and are not characters in some else’s dream. Early natural law theorists assumed that survival was an essential character of human beings and built their logic on that assumption. They saw sociability, which is a similar concept to empathy, as necessary to survival.

Hoppe believes that being logically consistent is most important and begins with the implications of argumentation. Where I disagree with Hoppe is that he limits the implications of argumentation to just property, when the same implications apply to survival, sociability and other things. If you substitute survival for property in Hoppe’s logic, you can arrive at different rights than if you arbitrarily limit it to just property.

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Philanthropic Patriot September 6, 2006 at 12:27 pm

My simple argument justifying property rights in particular goes like this.

Once you are born you have an absolute right to your own life. No one has a right to take your life, for them to have that right amounts to slavery. If I claim the right to come into your house and, looking at your books, determine you are not giving enough of your wealth to the poor or disadvantaged, then I am claiming the right to your life as well. For all I need to do is to say that you must give 100% of your wealth to the poor and starve you to death. If we don’t have absolute property rights, we are slaves.

No one has given me a strong argument against this.

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Phil R September 6, 2006 at 1:25 pm

I like your final answer to the question much more than your initial, flip answer. I’d have become a libertarian a lot sooner if I’d seen more of the latter and less of the former.

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Jacob Shreffler September 6, 2006 at 1:52 pm

It should be noted that mathematicians with too much free time have proven that 2+2=4 using more elementary statements from Set Theory.
See http://us.metamath.org/mpegif/2p2e4.html

However, in math as with any field there are always statements so basic they cannot be proven. (It’s not turtles all the way down.)

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Stephan Kinsella September 6, 2006 at 2:39 pm

Phil: “I like your final answer to the question much more than your initial, flip answer. I’d have become a libertarian a lot sooner if I’d seen more of the latter and less of the former.”

Phil, I find this interesting. The latter answer is not really a justification of rights, but more of an attempt at explaining why we have them–more precisely, why most people do adopt/have values that underpin rights. The former is not meant to be flip: it is meant sincerely and seriously to emphasize that rights are sort of a bootstrapping thing: they are presupposed by any participant in civilized discourse (a la Hoppe).

But thanks for your comments.

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Phil R September 6, 2006 at 8:26 pm

Stephan:

Consider, if you believe such a creature exists, a well-meaning minarchist. Clearly he doesn’t respect ALL of your rights; he’s willing to use the power of the state to take your wealth to pay for national defense and courts and whatnot.

He’s not going to punch you in the mouth because he doesn’t like your hat. He’s not a thug in the sense that he’s personally, literally going to break into your house in the middle of the night and take your possessions at gunpoint, even though his viewpoints entail that someone, somewhere do that to you if you don’t pay your tribute to the state.

You’re certainly entitled to say he’s a thug and refuse to try to reason with him; you don’t need argumentation ethics to do that.

If you decide not to do that, though, and to try to convince him, what are you doing if not arguing? I’m assuming the set of people who didn’t start out in life accepting libertarian rights but were later convinced of the truth is nonzero. What can you call the process of convincing such people if not arguing?

Please assume good faith on my part. I’m trying to crack what’s a pretty tough nut for me, and I’m bound to get it wrong the first dozen or so times.

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Stephan Kinsella September 6, 2006 at 9:34 pm

Phil:

Sure, I think there are well-meaning minarchists.

My “thug” comment is meant to isolate and illustrate stark opposites, and to highlight the fundamental choice individuals make: to be civilized or not–to try to avoid conflict and find just and fair ways to get along. Etc. It is not meant to imply that I will not talk to someone who I have a decent reason to talk to. It is meant to show that the presuppositions of discourse are in fact civilized norms, and to show that the only real hope at convincing people is to show them that some high-level norm they claim to favor is really incompatible with more fundamental norms that lie at the base of their presumed civilized posture or stance they would claim to be following.

Of course I am arguing with someone like this if I am arguing with them about rights. To the extent they are really engaging in genuine argumentation with me, they *are* accepting civilized norms as valid; the task then is really just to point this out to them. It is almost ostensive, as in when you have point to the barn right in front of someone to show them what you mean by “this barn here.”

“I’m assuming the set of people who didn’t start out in life accepting libertarian rights but were later convinced of the truth is nonzero. What can you call the process of convincing such people if not arguing?”

Of course, it is. Did I imply otherwise?

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averros September 6, 2006 at 9:40 pm

Actually, empathy itself has a well-understood origin: it is, basically, a way to reuse modules in the brain which perform emotional analysis of the situation and choose the course of action for the complicated task of decoding intentions of others. Needless to say, guessing intentions of other people gives an individuum a serious advantage – he can use this information to form alliances or evade hostile acts by others.

There is a special set of neurons in the brain – which are called “mirror neurons” because they fire in the same patterns when someone’s observed doing something or experiencing something similar to the corresponding actions or experiences of the individuum itself. People have a significant number of these, animals fewer.

So, this means that the concept of rights based on empathy is hardwired in our brains. However, one needs to understand that empathy is not infallible, by far. For it to work there has to be a significant similarity in mental structure between people – after all, empathy does not tell what other person feels, but rather what the observer would feel in other’s place.

The empathy is also limited to emotional processing, and does not tell anything about other’s higher-level cognitive functioning.

In other words, it means that the conscious understanding of rights cannot be completely and satisfactory explained by empathy.

My hypothesis is that it has memetic origin, rather than genetic – societies having some form of this concept in their culture were more successful ecomonically (and, therefore, military) and mostly displaced societies which didn’t.

It must be noted that the competing, collectivist, memeset is also based on empathy – in fact, it consists of immediate action based on emotional demands of empathy to the poor and downthrodden, unmediated by any conscious rational processing needed to consider longer-term consequences of one’s actions.

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Stephan Kinsella September 6, 2006 at 9:45 pm

Averros, this may be right, but in my view, it is only of incidental interest, since the empathy point is merely explanatory of *why* people (for some reason) to value others’ well-being and are willing to respect their rights. It is not a justification for the values one has, any more than a physiological/evolutionary explanation for why humans find the taste of chocolate better than that of rotted meat is a *justification* of this taste, or actions based on this taste preference. IT is just an explanation of why we might have this taste preference. But the fundamental given is the taste preference itself; our eating choices follow from, or are based on this. Likewise, those people who happen to be empathetic in this sense are going to desire acting-civilized and trying-to-justify their interpersonal behavior. Etc.

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Phil R September 7, 2006 at 1:12 am

Phil: What can you call the process of convincing such people if not arguing?

Stephen: Of course, it is. Did I imply otherwise?

Not intentionally, I infer from your response, and perhaps only in my flawed understanding of what Hoppe (and you, since most of what I know of Hoppe is actually from your defense on anti-state), but I thought the crux of Hoppe was that argumentation necessarily presupposed argreement about fundamental norms, and these norms included full (anarchist) libertarian rights.

If that’s true, then whatever the process of convincing minarchists happens to be, it can’t be termed argumentation, since the minarchist is manifestly not in agreement with some libertarian norms, such as “It’s wrong to take property from you against your will even if it’s to pay for national defense.”

If that’s not true, then I have even less of an idea of what Hoppe was trying to get at than I thought I did. I’m fine with assuming “We’re not going to punch each other” and “We’re going to communicate in good faith” as required norms; I thought Hoppe was trying to go much further than that.

Clearly I’m missing something; my goal here is to figure out what. I suppose since I’ve spent this much time thinking about it I ought to just get off my ass and read the primary source material, but I appreciate your indulgence.

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Stephan Kinsella September 7, 2006 at 1:59 am

Phil:

I thought the crux of Hoppe was that argumentation necessarily presupposed argreement about fundamental norms, and these norms included full (anarchist) libertarian rights. 

the idea is that if there is genuine argumentation that means that each party *is* respecting the others’ right to control their body, and not threatening them into accepting their arguments, and also supporting any norms society-wide tht would make argument possible. The idea is that argumentation by its nature requires certain implicit presuppositions. Therefore, if your opponent advocates someting that contradicts it, you point out that he is in dialectical contradiction.

If that’s true, then whatever the process of convincing minarchists happens to be, it can’t be termed argumentation, since the minarchist is manifestly not in agreement with some libertarian norms, such as “It’s wrong to take property from you against your will even if it’s to pay for national defense.”

I see your issue; the point is that if they are really arguing they *are* agreeing w/ libertarian norms; if they simultaneously assert a non-libertarian norm they are in contradiction with themselves, and thus they cannot be correct.

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Paul Edwards September 7, 2006 at 4:17 am

“Hoppe believes that being logically consistent is most important and begins with the implications of argumentation. Where I disagree with Hoppe is that he limits the implications of argumentation to just property, when the same implications apply to survival, sociability and other things. If you substitute survival for property in Hoppe’s logic, you can arrive at different rights than if you arbitrarily limit it to just property.”

Roger,

Where you miss the mark is to think that there is anything outside of the libertarian non-aggression ethic, which calls for respect for private property rights, which can provide for human survival, and peaceful, cooperative sociable human interaction. Only this libertarian ethic can accomplish this, and all other ethics violate rules which then necessarily puts such goals in jeopardy.

If you substitute any other ethic for the libertarian ethic, you will find that it cannot be justified and this is because such an ethic will either be non-universalizable, will allow and encourage aggression, or else if followed strictly, would lead to the demise of the human race.

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Phil R September 7, 2006 at 9:57 am

I see your issue; the point is that if they are really arguing they *are* agreeing w/ libertarian norms; if they simultaneously assert a non-libertarian norm they are in contradiction with themselves, and thus they cannot be correct.

It seems very odd to me to describe someone as being in agreement with a norm when they believe they are not.

(As an aside: I’m also not sure I understand what the phrase “really arguing” is intended to connote. I’m a little wary of a “no TRUE Scotsman” argument trying to be snuck in here.)

How important is the act of argumentation itself, specifically? Would it be a fair translation to say that it could have been called, somewhat flippantly, “Being a logically consistent non-thug” Ethics? Is the point of bringing argumentation into the picture so you can say “But we’ve implicitly agreed not to be thugs, and to be logically consistent.” If so, then the well-meaning minarchist thinks he’s doing both of those things. He’s just wrong about one of them. If the domain of the argument is what is entailed by those things, it seems like putting the cart before the horse to claim that your (albeit correct) version of what those things entail gets priviledged status, assuming your goal is to convince someone of what those correctly entailed claims are.

Part of what’s troubled me about the argument is that it’s always seemed like it’s intended to be used as part of a cheap rhetorical trick. “Well then, I guess we aren’t really arguing after all.” (I don’t think it was intended that way, only that I don’t have a good feel for what it’s supposed to be able to /do/ other than that.)

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TGGP September 7, 2006 at 10:14 am

Even though by the standards of this board I’m a minarchist/criminalist sheep everywhere else my comments tend to elicit the response “Libertarianism is applied autism”. I would suspect that I exhibit less empathy than the average person (I would also surmise this is the case for libertarians as a whole), but I don’t see how whether or not I “feel your pain” has anything to do with an analysis as to its cause and possible alleviation.

My take is that all ethical/normative statements are inherently subjective. Your desire to murder everyone on the planet cannot be proved to be wrong. I would certainly consider it so, but to paraphrase someone else, that would just be me saying “Ugh, murder, boo!”.

I don’t know if people can be divided so easily into civilized and animals. As pointed out in “Ordinary Men”, ordinarily peaceful people carried out massacres and experiments like the Stanford Prison one and that (fake) administration of shocks reveal that most of us can cross over the line. That doesn’t make me any more lenient toward criminals though. I don’t really care if there’s no free will and you aren’t responsible for your actions because everything was pre-determined (with some quantum dice/coins rolled/flipped), punishing you (depending on the nature of the punishment) prevents further criminal acts on your part, warns others and makes people feel good. The last one isn’t really sufficient, but why not list bonuses?

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Vince Daliessio September 7, 2006 at 11:33 am

Enough, look past Kinsella’s occasional impatience and at the substance of the arguments – he’s working on some fundamentals here that are important. Questioning fundamentals is often dangerous work, irritating friend and foe alike – people simply do not enjoy being told their basic worldview is wrong. It makes them cranky, and Stephan is responding to that constantly, and, in the case of Person, repeatedly. If you are looking for gentle reassurance, you probably need to try Daily Kos or Thomas Friedman, maybe.

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Stephan Kinsella September 7, 2006 at 11:33 am

Mr. cowardly-anonymous Enough–Thank you for your vapid post. (And my post was not an article, O Perceptive One.)

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Person September 7, 2006 at 11:46 am

Vince: when has Stephan Kinsella responded to me?

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Paul Edwards September 7, 2006 at 5:07 pm

Phil,

Kinsella: “I see your issue; the point is that if they are really arguing they *are* agreeing w/ libertarian norms; if they simultaneously assert a non-libertarian norm they are in contradiction with themselves, and thus they cannot be correct.”

Phil:”It seems very odd to me to describe someone as being in agreement with a norm when they believe they are not.”

It does indeed. It is the same kind of oddness that can be apparent when someone says something like this: “such and such a topic is unworthy of comment, but here is my comment on the topic…”. They claim to believe, and in a strange way, they do believe the topic does not warrant comment, and yet their actions betray a more fundamental truth: that they actually do believe the topic to be worthy of comment, since they are in fact commenting on it. Their actions dispute and refute their statements. And it is this dialectical contradiction which reveals their true belief. And this is true even if they fail to recognize the inconsistency between what they say, and their act of saying it.

“(As an aside: I’m also not sure I understand what the phrase “really arguing” is intended to connote. I’m a little wary of a “no TRUE Scotsman” argument trying to be snuck in here.)”

Well it is very important for you thoroughly analyze what it means to argue. And keep in mind that Hoppe is not inventing the wheel on this question. When you think about what it means to argue, you will conclude that it is action which implies conflict free application of scarce resources such as each person’s body towards discourse in the pursuit of truth. When applied to property norms, it implies also a drive towards universalizable truths which any arguer can in principle agree with, and all can agree to disagree without threat of violence.

“How important is the act of argumentation itself, specifically?”

Argumentation is the only way we have of justifying anything including ethics or property norms. Any ethic that violates the ethical presuppositions of argumentation simply cannot ever be justified in argumentation because any attempt to do so would constitute a dialectic contradiction. And if an ethic cannot be justified in argumentation, it cannot be justified; ever.

“Would it be a fair translation to say that it could have been called, somewhat flippantly, “Being a logically consistent non-thug” Ethics? Is the point of bringing argumentation into the picture so you can say “But we’ve implicitly agreed not to be thugs, and to be logically consistent.” If so, then the well-meaning minarchist thinks he’s doing both of those things. He’s just wrong about one of them. If the domain of the argument is what is entailed by those things, it seems like putting the cart before the horse to claim that your (albeit correct) version of what those things entail gets priviledged status, assuming your goal is to convince someone of what those correctly entailed claims are.”

Argumentation ethics is simply a more rigorous and precise formulation of what it is I think you are saying. The key of argumentation ethics is that it is in the argument and ONLY in the argument, that anything can be justified. And so it makes sense to show what it is about the peaceful ethical presuppositions of argumentation that validates the libertarian ethic and also shows all other ethics to be unjustifiable.

“Part of what’s troubled me about the argument is that it’s always seemed like it’s intended to be used as part of a cheap rhetorical trick. “Well then, I guess we aren’t really arguing after all.” (I don’t think it was intended that way, only that I don’t have a good feel for what it’s supposed to be able to /do/ other than that.)”

It’s just rigorous, and the form of reasoning is kind of unusual to us, and yet at that same time, it is simple once you hammer away at it for some time. So when something as simple as this also demonstrates the a priori validity of the libertarian ethic, people freak out. But it is no trick and when you see this, all arguments against it will probably tend to strike you as quite surreal.

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curious September 7, 2006 at 11:34 pm

I’m curious about what you think of Roderick Long’s critique of what he calls the Hoppriori argument. I assume you will disagree with him. Perhaps you could write an article or blog post in an attmept to refute it?

http://praxeology.net/unblog05-04.htm#10

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Paul Edwards September 8, 2006 at 4:15 am

Curious,

I hope I am not being presumptuous to guess you might be directing that question to me. If so, the answer is yes, or at least I have written a blog posting in response to Roderick’s comments here: http://blog.mises.org/archives/005071.asp if you search there for “I enjoyed your discussion of “The Hoppriori Argument” very much.”, you’ll find my swing at his position there.

There are other entries in that thread that follow where i debate a person or two.

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TGGP September 8, 2006 at 8:10 am

Philosophy (huh!), what is it good for?

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Sione Vatu September 8, 2006 at 7:02 pm

TGGP

Are you serious? Answer this then.

What is the use of ideas? What good are they?

Sione

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TGGP September 9, 2006 at 1:37 pm

I was aiming for a laugh. There’s a well known song that goes “War (huh!) what is it good for!? Absolutely nothing!”.

But seriously, how often is anyone in a situation where they have a pressing need to hire a philosopher? If you’re a philosopher I guess you can teach philosophy to students so they can become teachers of philosophy. That’s about it.

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Michael September 9, 2006 at 5:38 pm

Rights are a silly fiction perpetrated on society by philosophers and other con men promoting nefarious agendas. There is nothing in nature to suggest that a human being has any special claim on life or liberty. Indeed, nature, whatever that is, seems to hold mankind in apathetic disregard, if at all.

Assert your right to life until the day you die. A lot of good it will have done you.

– This post brought to you by the Postmodern Objective Truth Society of Bored Devil’s Advocates.

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Stephan Kinsella September 9, 2006 at 7:30 pm

Michael, your last comment about asserting a right not doing any good, is positivistic. It implies that teh “test” of normative claims is some kind of empirical success.

What you are missing here is that *rights are for civilized people*–not criminals. As always, criminals can only be dealt with by force or some other method; they are treated as mere technical problems. Rights are *for* civilized people. It is civilized people who seek to justify their action–and to whom? to criminals? No–to other civilized people.

When you call rights a fiction, you in essence validate rights. Because anyone who seriously maintains this position is unable to criticize the legitimacy of civilized people enforcing their conception of rights–which is all that the civilized person seeks anyway. So–thanks for the assist.

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Sione September 11, 2006 at 1:26 am

TGGP

So why do you regularly post your arguments on the VMI blog? After all, you are engaged in debating aspects of philosophy.

Sione

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TGGP September 11, 2006 at 8:06 am

I’m not sure if many of my posts could be considered philosophical. In this thread I stated that the propositions usually debated in philosophy are subjective, which I suppose might count as a philosophical statement insofar as it deals with aspects of philosophy. In that sense the statement “Screw philosophy!” might count as well.

By the way, I’ll count your comparing the field of philosophy to my posts on the VMI blog to be a small victory within my one-man-war on philosophy. Take that, Hegel & Kant!

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TGGP September 11, 2006 at 8:22 am

On second thought, the second part of my last post doesn’t make much sense and is likely the result of misreading and posting too early in the morning while not fully awake. Oh well. Rationality is just another form of bourgeouis oppression and to be truly free one must throw the shackles of such restricted thinking and its constraints on the use of language off oneself. Stop making sense and make sure you do everything for the lulz.

REPLY

Kevin April 16, 2009 at 12:47 am

Stephan, asking for an argument for rights doesn’t require that rights have ‘foundations’, whatever you might mean by that. You’re in non-sequitor territory.

What you’re really doing is arguing that the fact that there are rights is a brute or basic fact that cannot be reduced to any other set of facts. That may be (although I think that’s false, myself). But certainly the fact that there are rights has a truth-maker. And if so, what is it? You could argue, a la Roderick Long, that some a priori facts don’t have any truth-makers, that they’re Wittgensteinian hinge propositions. And then you could argue that the fact that there are rights is one of the facts. But even Roderick denies this latter claim, as you can see from his lecture series.

Some thoughtful people wonder if there are rights. Many people have tried to answer them, including many of the greatest philosophers. Merely asserting that rights are brute facts is rarely pursued. It’s really just fist-pounding unless you can show that (a) denying the fact that rights exist is somehow incoherent and (b) no positive argument can be given on behalf of rights and (c) rights cannot be justified by appeal to any more foundational moral truths.

I have no idea what good arguments that accomplished these goals would involve. Your estoppel line, if it works at all, only holds against those who claim rights for themselves. An impartial observer could always ask why rights claims applied to him. You could refuse to talk to him, but that’s not very illuminating. It’s just avoiding the inquiry.

You aside, basically everyone in the history of moral philosophy interested in a justification for rights wants a justification that goes deeper than that. And I don’t see any reason from your post to think that searching for such a justification is in vain.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 16, 2009 at 1:35 am

“Kevin”–

Kevin, what *Does* “require” that rights have foundations?

“asking for an argument for rights doesn’t require that rights have ‘foundations’, whatever you might mean by that.” Nothing “requires” that they do.

“What you’re really doing is arguing that the fact that there are rights is a brute or basic fact that cannot be reduced to any other set of facts.” It’s noting the quite obvious truth that That you cannot derive an ought from an is. See Hume.

“It’s really just fist-pounding”

WHAT’s just ‘fist-pounding”?

“unless you can show that (a) denying the fact that rights exist is somehow incoherent”… Read More

It is incoherent, if any denier by virtue of being a denier (arguer) necessarily presupposes certain grundnorms, which are compatible only with libertarian rights and with no others.

“Your estoppel line, if it works at all, only holds against those who claim rights for themselves.”

So does any argument. The best argument you can imagine can be disregarded by criminals; then your arguments are directed to the civilzied community to justify your desire to punish or convict them.

” An impartial observer could always ask why rights claims applied to him. You could refuse to talk to him, but that’s not very illuminating. It’s just avoiding the inquiry.”

I don’t care, as long as he respects my rights. if he does, no problem. If he doesn’t, I can use force against him, and justify this to my civilized peers by appealing to their common grundnorms.

“You aside, basically everyone in the history of moral philosophy interested in a justification for rights wants a justification that goes deeper than that.” Well, as my dad says, people in hell want ice water, too. The is-ought gap is real. Sorry, it’s not my fault…. Read More

” And I don’t see any reason from your post to think that searching for such a justification is in vain.”

See Hume. See tons of writing. e.g. http://www.jstor.org/pss/2380101; see also
p. 1432 of my 1994 review essay https://stephankinsella.com/publications/kinsella_hoppe_econ-ethics-review.pdf on one of Hoppe’s books (discussing how Hoppe’s argumentation ethics overcomes the Humean is-ought dichotomy; and p. 136 (text at n. 13) of Hoppe’s 1989 book Theory of Socialism and Capitalism … Read Morehttp://www.hanshoppe.com/publications.php#soc-cap,: “In fact, one can readily subscribe to the almost generally accepted view that the gulf between “ought” and “is” is logically unbridgeable. …. On the problem of the deriveability of “ought” from “is” statements cf. W. D. Hudson (ed.), The Is-Ought Question, London, 1969; for the view that the fact-value dichotomy is an ill-conceived idea cf. the natural rights literature cited in note 4 above.”) Even Rand’s ethics is hypothetical, for god’s sake http://blog.mises.org/archives/003101.asp

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 10, 2010 at 4:37 pm

This is part 1 of a comment that appears to be too long to post here in one piece. It is posted in its entirety at a Google group: http://groups.google.com/group/libertarian-critique/t/462e6ed9cf0c8829 where the format is more amenable to lengthy discussion. The second part will follow.

Stephan Kinsella wrote:

I often tire of people asking (usually in a self-contradictory, petulant tone, more demanding than asking), “Okay, so what is the source of rights?! Where do they ‘come from’?!”

These are totally reasonable questions which often are not asked in any
manner which can be construed as a “self-contradictory, petulant tone,
more demanding than asking” (by me for one). So right off Kinsella is
guilty of using exaggeration and emotional tactics, rather than logical,
reasoned argumentation. Every concept valid for reality must have a
source in reality. This is even true for emergent properties – those
which appear to be novel characteristics and for which it is useful
(aids thought processes) to consider them as such, even though they are
actually a synergistic summation of other attributes with their apparent
novelty being the result of the complexity and inherent unpredictability
of the system of which they are characteristics.

My reply is usually that the questioner either respects my rights, or he does not. If he does not, he can go to h*ll-I’m not wasting time talking to an uncivilized thug,

This statement is totally illogical. Unless and until the fundamental
concept of “rights” is defined and the details of the relationships of
such a concept to reality are fully described, how can it be reasonable
to ask any reasonable person to “respect” such a thing, much less accuse
hir of being “an uncivilized thug” if s/he does not.

any more than I would treat with a rampaging elephant, bandit, lion, or hurricane.

This is again illogical, because the very existence of such a question
about “the source of rights” shows that the asker is a thoughtful,
concerned human and will almost certainly *not* act equivalently to “a
rampaging elephant, bandit, lion, or hurricane”. The mere asking of the
question, does not imply any desire, willingness or ability to cause
Kinsella harm either intentionally or unintentionally. The question
could have come from an invalid in a wheelchair, whom Kinsella is now
potentially treating as an “uncivilized thug”. This makes it clear that the
biggest logical problem with Kinsella’s response here is that he places
the burden of any violation that might be done to him on the person who
does not accept Kinsella’s “rights”, rather than on some enforcer who
might actually cause such a violation.

And if he does respect rights-then my stance is: how dare you demand of /me/ that I justify /your own views/? Look inside-and figure out for yourself why you believe in such and such.

The above also is illogical as well as insulting with the “how dare you”
– this to a totally reasonable question and a request for a helpful and
sincere answer. The questioner may well “believe in” respecting what
s/he thinks are well defined and valid rights, but may still be very
foggy about where in reality these come from and why they are as they
are. Hir question is clearly a request for help in understanding
“rights”, particularly including Kinsella’s own definitions of them and
his description/justification for their existence and application to
human interaction.

Kinsella has been so illogical and discourteous up to this point that I
think it highly likely that most readers (at least anyone with such a
serious question looking for a serious answer) would simply have quit
reading by this point or earlier.

Second, I point out that to ask for a “source” of rights is scientistic and positivistic.

Yes, but what is wrong with trying to be scientific (rational, I would
call it) about every aspect of reality?

It presupposes someone or some “thing” “legislates” or “decrees” rights.

No, it does not! No sensible person supposes that reality is a “thing”
which “legislates” or “decrees” the fundamental laws of physics.

Even the natural law advocate who says legislatures don’t “decree rights” seem to move it back a level-to God, or to Nature.

Yes to the latter (nature), but everything that is real (valid for
reality) must necessarily “exist in”, “derive from”, “be based on” or
“be connected to” some part of reality.

But rights don’t really “come from” anything.

If so then they would be fundamentally different than any other existent
(which is one of my arguments against their validity).

When it is demonstrated that 2+2=4, this is a truth, a fact. Does it make sense to ask what is the “source” of this “truth”? Where does 2+2=4 “come from”? This is just nonsense.

Here Kinsella shows that he has little understanding of metaphysics and
none at all of mathematics. “2+2=4″ is not a part of reality, rather it
is a statement about numerical attributes abstracted from reality, which
statement is true essentially as a tautology logically derivable from
the definitions given to all the terms within that equation. It makes
total sense to ask “what is the source of this ‘truth’”, since that
truth comes directly from the definitions of the terms and the use of
logic, without which definitions the equation would be not only invalid,
but meaningless. However this kind of constructed, definitional truth
(concerning Existents of Meta-Realities – for more detail see
http://selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html) is not equivalent to the
scientific statements (“truths”) concerning the Existents of Reality
itself, which are always only known with less than a 100% degree of
confidence.

And it is similar with normative propositions-with moral truths.Values and norms is that they are /not/ causal laws. They are not self-enforcing; they are /prescriptive/. This is a crucial insight: it shows that even the best proof of rights-even the Ultimate Natural Law Proof handed down by God Himself can be disregarded (is not this the lesson of the Ten Commandments?).

The above is very confused and confusing. It is first necessary to give
a consistent meaning for “moral truth” (which is not at all obvious or
necessarily even possible) *before* one can hope to describe what it is
and is not. Furthermore if one uses the general, but still ambiguous,
phrase “principles of right action” for “moral truths”, then it is clear
that they *are* causal. Following them or not most certainly does have
many and different sets of effects. But yes, since humans are generally
free to take or not take any action, they are certainly free to
disregard any such principles (moral truths), even though because of
causality they are not free to disregard the consequences of such actions.

End of part 1 of comment.

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 10, 2010 at 5:02 pm

For some reason the second part of my comment is not being accepted, even though it is shorter than the first part.

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 10, 2010 at 5:45 pm

This is part 2 of my comment.

I have removed my comment about Kinsella’s use of quotes from Hoppe because inclusion of that seemed to be causing me to not be able to post this part 2.

What this means is that any norms that are abided by in society are necessarily norms that are self-undertaken by a community of people who share that value.

In spite of Kinsella’s previous errors, here he is very close to a
correct description of the voluntary arrangements and agreements with
respect to fundamental philosophy which are necessary within a truly
free (and necessarily cooperative) society.

In the case of civilization, you can envision two types of individuals: civilized people who want to live in peace and harmony and prosperity; and criminals or outlaws, who do not care about this.

My major criticism here is the use of the word “civilized” since it
derives from “civil” and “civic” which both relate to a member of a body
politic – a State of some kind. However at this time I don’t know of any
better descriptive word for a human who fully understands and agrees
that living in cooperative harmony with others, voluntarily trading
values to mutual advantage and being fully responsible for the
Responsible Harm done by all one’s Violations is the optimal way for
hirself and all others to behave. Perhaps a better word for
“uncivilized” would be “savage”, often used in this manner by Ayn Rand.
Within the society founded by the _Theory of Social Meta-Needs_ –
http://selfsip.org/fundamentals/socialmetaneeds.html I have simply
called such people, Freemen. Note that the capitalized words are defined
in the Natural Social Contract at URL: selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html

However Kinsella errs in maintaining that humans who act as criminals do
not want to live in prosperity, since that is the major motive of most
of them. The true destroyers of all value around them are very rare.

Finally I take major exception to Kinsella’s use of the word “outlaw”
for such “uncivilized” humans. In my view since an outlaw by definition
rejects and acts contrary to current Statist laws, such a person may be
one of the very finest of humans. After all, Ayn Rand’s hero Ragnar
Danneskjold was certainly an outlaw.

This latter type are animal-like; even the “best” argument or proof of rights can and will be disregarded by them (see Hoppe’s comments quoted above).

While it may be true that “uncivilized” humans reject all concepts of
and arguments for “rights”, the converse is not true – I and my wife,
Kitty, (at least) are exceptions to such a converse statement. We both
reject all concepts of and arguments for “rights” but we are most
certainly “civilized” as Kinsella uses that word (“people who want to
live in peace and harmony and prosperity”). The important point is that
certain people are “uncivilized”, not because they reject the concept
and arguments for “rights”, but because they reject that the optimal way
for themselves is to live in cooperative harmony with others,
voluntarily trading values to mutual advantage and being fully
responsible for the Responsible Harm done by all their Violations.

What do the former people have in common? I suspect that it is the trait of empathy. Only by placing some value on others’ well-being-for some reason-can one value respecting their rights; and it seems to me that it is empathy that is at the root of this other-valuing, almost by definition. In my view, evolution is probably what led to this trait, as a psychological matter, but that is not that significant to me. So, in a sense, if we must find a “source” of rights, I would say-it is empathy.

I want to start my comments on the above paragraph by commending
Kinsella for at least attempting to find a source in reality for the
notion of “rights” which notion he steadfastly maintains must exist, be
valid and be the foundation of all “civilized” behavior. Note that this
is contrary to his opening remarks strongly rebuking anyone who even
asks for such a source! But there are several problems with thinking
that empathy is the source of “rights”.
1) The amount of empathy that a given human has for another human has
great variation both among individual humans and with respect to
particular situations. I know of no evidence that such empathy is
strongly correlated with the acceptance of “rights” as the best way to
achieve “peace and harmony and prosperity”.
2) In my experience libertarians are *not* highly empathetic humans
(both libertarianism and Objectivism seem to attract many “hard-nosed”
and even “greedy” businessmen) and socialist utilitarians are generally
much more empathetic, even though their actions are far less likely to
effect the benefit of others that they profess wanting to occur.
3) Empathy (particularly with respect to particular aspects of others)
is very much connected with cultural conditioning during youth and
development, which again suggests no logical relationship to any notion
and acceptance of “rights”.
4) Empathy is a highly subjective emotion which for most people is
totally unrelated to rational thought. Surely one should seek to ground
such an important notion, as Kinsella and other libertarians regard
“rights”, in some more absolute aspect of human reality. Or else how can
any argument for such “rights” ever be expected to be acceptable and to
be accepted?

Actually the “natural law” approach, which approach Kinsella
peremptorily rejects as merely “mov[ing] it back a level”, is far more
reasonable than his idea of empathy as a “source” for “rights”. However
I reject that approach also, but for quite different reasons than
Kinsella – see my critique of Randy Barnett’s “The Imperative of Natural
Rights in Today’s World” at:
http://selfsip.org/dialogues/rbarnett/nri.html Moreover even though in
my treatise on Social Meta-Needs referenced above I strongly reject the
entire notion of “rights” as invalid, that treatise *does* provide a
fully rational basis for humans to be convinced that living in
cooperative harmony with each other, voluntarily trading values to
mutual advantage and being fully responsible for the Responsible Harm
done by all their Violations (which means Restituting those whom one has
Harmed) is clearly the best way for each to behave. Moreover that
treatise even derives a clear meaning of and standard for just exactly
what is this “best way”.

End of part 2 and last part of my comment.

REPLY

Beefcake the Mighty April 10, 2010 at 8:31 pm

Ironic how Paul Wakfer basically confirms Kinsella’s initial observations about the character of people who inquire about the “source” of rights and such.

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 13, 2010 at 2:36 pm

@Beefcake the Cowardly

How typical that an anonymous poster’s comment contains nothing of substance, meaning or truth.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 11, 2010 at 12:11 am

Beefcake: Right. Wakfer has a lot of scientistic confusions, including conflating scientific with scientism. I’m not sure he understands what scientism is. A google search will turn up a lot on this.

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 13, 2010 at 2:50 pm

@ Stephan Kinsella

It is notable that Kinsella avoids the substance of my critique by first agreeing with an anonymous poster effectively stating ad hominems and then appyling the evasion/diversion tactic of avoiding the substance of my critique by nit-piking one non-essential that he thinks is in error.

The facts of the situation relevant to “scientistic” are as follows:
1. When I first read Kinsella’s piece I mistakenly read “scientistic” as “scientific” (mea culpa, but understandable given the dearth of usage of the former word) and that is why “scientific” appears on the Libertarian Critique version of my long critique.

2. By the time that I (successfully, at last) posted the Mises.org version, I had noticed this mistake of mine. However I chose to retain the word “scientific” because I wanted to have as few differences as possible between the versions, and for clarity with readers because there is no essential difference between the meanings of the two words if one agrees with the “thesis that the methods of the natural sciences should be used in all areas of investigation including philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences : a belief that only such methods can fruitfully be used in the pursuit of knowledge” (“scientism.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged. Merriam-Webster, 2002. http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (13 Apr. 2010)), which I do, AND if one is not “devoted or pretending to the methods of scientists” (“scientistic.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged. Merriam-Webster, 2002. http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (13 Apr. 2010)), which I am not (neither *devoted* nor *pretending*).

3. Readers should note that the word “scientistic” is effectively an ad hominem, used to disparage all those who think that a scientific approach is valid for all pursuit of knowledge. Sure, the experimental method is inapplicable to many aspects of praxeology, but then it is also totally applicable to astronomy and mostly inapplicable to geology, both of which use all other scientific methods and are correctly considered to be among the “hard” sciences.

I continue to wait for a substantive response to the essential points of my critique.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 13, 2010 at 3:19 pm

Mr Wakfer, I doubt many people will conclude that it is dishonest or evasive simply not to reply exhaustively to your rambling screeds.

You say, re “scientism” and “scientistic”:

I chose to retain the word “scientific” because I wanted to have as few differences as possible between the versions, and for clarity with readers because there is no essential difference between the meanings of the two words if one agrees with the “thesis that the methods of the natural sciences should be used in all areas of investigation including philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences : a belief that only such methods can fruitfully be used in the pursuit of knowledge” … which I do 

.

Exactly. You are scientistic because you believe in applying the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences. This is a stunted, monistic view that is incompatible with the methodological dualism of Misesian economics. For more on this see Rothbard’s The Mantle of Science, Hoppe’s Economic Science and the Austrian Method and Mises’s The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science.

“Readers should note that the word “scientistic” is effectively an ad hominem”–no, it’s a pejorative, since we Misesian dualists believe the monism and positivism it implies is flawed.

“… used to disparage all those who think that a scientific approach is valid for all pursuit of knowledge.”

Your wording here either betrays your total immersion in scientism or is disingenuous. We Austrians think the social sciences are scientific. We should have “a scientific approach” but that does not mean that the positivist-empiricist methods of the natural sciences is THE scientific approach; and to imply that it is, as you do here, is the very scientism I accuse you of. Galambos also suffered from this, as do many engineers.

“Sure, the experimental method is inapplicable to many aspects of praxeology, but then it is also totally applicable to astronomy and mostly inapplicable to geology, both of which use all other scientific methods and are correctly considered to be among the “hard” sciences.”

The hard natural sciences are not like the social sciences. Praxeology is in a sense a “harder” science than the natural sciences ever can be because we can determine non-contingent, apodictic laws; whereas the causal laws that are the domain of the natural sciences are forever contingent.

“I continue to wait for a substantive response to the essential points of my critique.”

I am not aware of any obligation for anyone to give a point by point reply to you.

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 21, 2010 at 3:09 am

Mr Wakfer,

Stephan, if we are going to directly address one another, then I prefer simply “Paul”. However, if you wish to be more formal and use titles, (which I generally abhor) then you should more correctly be using the one with which all my mail from the University of Toronto is addressed: Professor Wakfer (my rank when I was a faculty member there – 1964-1970).

I doubt many people will conclude that it is dishonest or evasive simply not to reply exhaustively to your rambling screeds.

Unless one is a believer in democracy, the opinions of “many people” do not determine either truth/falsity or ethics. Both of these are determined by reality. When someone has given a serious, considered and logically sound critique of a person’s writing, then it definitely is evasive for the critiqued writer to not respond to each and every point of the critique (and evasiveness is most certainly a sub-genre of intellectual dishonesty). Finally once again, your ending with a totally subjective opinion, “your rambling screeds”, seems designed (intentionally or not) to deviously influence the reader to accept your prior statement. This, again, is not the method of discussion that an open honest person uses in search for understanding and truth, and I request that you cease these tactics.

You say, re “scientism” and “scientistic”:

I chose to retain the word “scientific” because I wanted to have as few differences as possible between the versions, and for clarity with readers because there is no essential difference between the meanings of the two words if one agrees with the “thesis that the methods of the natural sciences should be used in all areas of investigation including philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences : a belief that only such methods can fruitfully be used in the pursuit of knowledge” … which I do.

Exactly. You are scientistic because you believe in applying the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences. This is a stunted, monistic view that is incompatible with the methodological dualism of Misesian economics. For more on this see Rothbard’s The Mantle of Science, Hoppe’s Economic Science and the Austrian Method and Mises’s The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science.

Stephan, The pejoratives you are using here (“stunted”, “monistic”) followed by your appeals to authority are not an adequate replacement for presentation of your own logical arguments to support your case (or even making a direct quote from someone else which I could then also critique). My comment that had to be removed from my 2-part critique of your blog entry was related to just such an appeal to Hoppe’s authority.

My response to such pejoratives and appeals to authorities are:
1) I have already stated that I agree that not all aspects of the scientific method apply or apply equally to all areas of investigation of reality.
2) Yes, I am convinced that major parts of the methods used for the sciences of physics, chemistry and biology can be applied to any investigation of reality, and further that only such methods will discover the truths of reality. In this regard I reject any attempted logical distinction such as the “natural sciences” and the “social sciences”.
3) And yes, this means that I do also reject the views and writings of Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe and many others, in this regard. Further, I would maintain that, again in this regard, it is their thinking that is “stunted” (to use your word), or better still, that none of them had/have the logical, mathematical and scientific background (mathematics, physics, computer and biological sciences) that I have and which has enabled me to become convinced that they are all wrong in this regard, even though they are correct and their ideas/writings have been highly beneficial in other regards.
4) As I stated in the portion of my text that you omitted (the rest of a sentence, in fact, thereby effectively quoting out of context):

“AND if one is not “devoted or pretending to the methods of scientists”…, which I am not (neither *devoted* nor *pretending*).”

“Readers should note that the word “scientistic” is effectively an ad hominem”–no, it’s a pejorative,

I suggest that interested readers critically read the definitions of the words: “disparage”, “pejorative”, “belittle” and “ad hominem” (using a major dictionary) to verify that you are here merely nit-picking, which is again avoidance of substance. I hasten to add that an appeal to a dictionary is one of the few correct appeals to authority since without using similar meanings for words, no communication is possible. However I also need to add that I am no lover of dictionaries because of the numerous highly different and sometimes even logically opposite meanings that they all insist on giving for so many important words.

since we Misesian dualists believe the monism and positivism it implies is flawed.

Without description of to what they apply, the terms dualist and monist have no substance to them (they are essentially characteristics of some undefined set of ideas) except as applied in their most commonly held meaning which is to metaphysics and epistemology. In that respect I am definitely convinced of the truth of metaphysical monism: “the metaphysical view that there is only one kind of substance or ultimate reality”, but I am also convinced of the falsity of epistemological monism: “an epistemological theory that proclaims the identity of the object and datum of knowledge”. (Note that I haven’t “believed” anything since I became an atheist soon after childhood.) Rather objects are existents of reality, whereas data are existents of meta-reality. (For details see my initial metaphysical definitions at the start of the Natural Social Contract (NSC). To complete my comparison, I am equally convinced of the falsity of metaphysical dualism: “a theory that divides the world or a given realm of phenomena or concepts into two mutually irreducible elements or classes of elements: as a : an ontological theory that divides reality into (1) subsistent forms and spatiotemporal objects or into (2) mind and matter – ‘Cartesian dualism’ ” and equally convinced of the truth of epistemological dualism: “an epistemological theory that objective reality is known by means of subjective ideas, representations, images, or sense data”. (All definition text above and below taken from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged. Merriam-Webster, 2002. http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (20 Apr. 2010) – MW)

When it comes to “pluralism”, it is interesting that while MW defines metaphysical pluralism (which I reject), it does not define epistemological pluralism which I am convinced is the solution to so many logical and philosophical apparent paradoxes – see details of my scheme in the NSC.

Finally, I agree that positivism, as it is often defined and described, is flawed, but that is because it usually goes much further than merely being monist in the sense defined above, into logical positivism and legal positivism. OTOH, during my review of these definitions, I discovered that I may well be a therapeutic positivist: “positivism that undertakes to remedy the ambiguities, paradoxes, and perplexities of traditional philosophical and especially metaphysical problems by employing logical analysis to disclose the linguistic confusions that give rise to them”. I shall have to look into that more deeply.

“… used to disparage all those who think that a scientific approach is valid for all pursuit of knowledge.”

Your wording here either betrays your total immersion in scientism or is disingenuous.

Neither – I reject the duality of that choice.

We Austrians think the social sciences are scientific. We should have “a scientific approach” but that does not mean that the positivist-empiricist methods of the natural sciences is THE scientific approach; and to imply that it is, as you do here, is the very scientism I accuse you of. Galambos also suffered from this, as do many engineers.

It is difficult to respond to this, when I am convinced that the phrase “social sciences” is an invalid and therefore epistemologically harmful categorization. All that I can say is that I too take a “scientific approach” to all of reality, which does not mean that I take the same approach as positivists and empiricists (at least as they are generally described – but I hate such categorizations since every human is uniquely distinct). Some aspects of the approach of many scientists is just as invalid for the so-called natural sciences as they are for the so-called social sciences – in a word such aspects are patently unscientific.

While I know a fair amount about Galambos, because of his strange ideas regarding so-called intellectual property, I don’t know enough to comment, so I won’t.

“Sure, the experimental method is inapplicable to many aspects of praxeology, but then it is also totally applicable to astronomy and mostly inapplicable to geology, both of which use all other scientific methods and are correctly considered to be among the “hard” sciences.”

The hard natural sciences are not like the social sciences.

The differences between various sciences are much deeper than this simple differentiation. In fact there are major differences in applicable and useful methods between all the subject areas of discovery of the operations of reality. Furthermore it must always be remembered that any categorization is a purely artificial human construction that is necessarily of limited value.

Praxeology is in a sense a “harder” science than the natural sciences ever can be

Do you really not know that the word “hard” used in this manner refers to the sciences concerned with physics, chemistry and biology? But perhaps you are merely making a kind of pun, since I do agree that praxeology is a fundamentally “harder” science in certain ways than are physics, chemistry and biology. Correctly viewed, praxeology is closer in type and method to mathematics than to any other science. I have always thought it a shame that Mises did not have sufficient knowledge of mathematical axiomatic theoretics to found praxeology in that manner. I still hope to get sufficient time in my life to accomplish that.

because we can determine non-contingent, apodictic laws; whereas the causal laws that are the domain of the natural sciences are forever contingent.

The part of the above which is true is why I maintain that praxeology is closest to mathematical science and should be similarly founded. OTOH, the reason why mathematics is apodictic is that it is based on pure abstractions from reality which are all in meta-reality where truth can be absolute (true by logic alone or essentially non-contingent – effectively elaborate and complex tautologies). In the extreme, mathematics need not be true of reality, although there are cogent arguments that its results, when correctly based, always will find applications in (be models for) reality. Similarly, to the extent that praxeology maintains that it models reality, it must be held accountable to reality in the same manner as any mathematical model of reality.

Finally, a major error in your statements above is the use of the term “laws” which suggest some statements that are true of reality. Instead, praxeological truths are not directly about reality, and the theories of the so-called natural sciences are never truths of reality at all.

“I continue to wait for a substantive response to the essential points of my critique.”

I am not aware of any obligation for anyone to give a point by point reply to you.

While it is certainly true that you have no “obligation” for that (I and you have not executed any contract obligating you in that manner), the personal characteristics of openness, sincerity, consideration and desire for the truth should impel any writer to respond as I have described.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 21, 2010 at 12:15 pm

Paul Wakfer:

Stephan, if we are going to directly address one another, then I prefer simply “Paul”. However, if you wish to be more formal and use titles, (which I generally abhor) 

But of course you do. I would have expected nothing else. Stephan is fine.

When someone has given a serious, considered and logically sound critique of a person’s writing, then it definitely is evasive for the critiqued writer to not respond to each and every point of the critique 

We will have to agree to disagree on this point. I insist.

Stephan, The pejoratives you are using here (“stunted”, “monistic”) followed by your appeals to authority are not an adequate replacement for presentation of your own logical arguments to support your case 

I’m not appealing to authority–I’m referring those interested to a more detailed explanation of the dualist case–one I agree with. I don’t intend to reproduce their arguments.

And yes, this means that I do also reject the views and writings of Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe and many others, in this regard. 

Of course you do.

Further, I would maintain that, again in this regard, it is their thinking that is “stunted” (to use your word), or better still, that none of them had/have the logical, mathematical and scientific background (mathematics, physics, computer and biological sciences) that I have and which has enabled me to become convinced that they are all wrong in this regard, even though they are correct and their ideas/writings have been highly beneficial in other regards. 

This is typical of the way engineers think.

I also need to add that I am no lover of dictionaries 

Of course you’re not.

“Your wording here either betrays your total immersion in scientism or is disingenuous.”Neither – I reject the duality of that choice. 

Of course you do.

“Praxeology is in a sense a “harder” science than the natural sciences ever can be”Do you really not know that the word “hard” used in this manner refers to the sciences concerned with physics, chemistry and biology? But perhaps you are merely making a kind of pun, 

No, it’s not a pun. I am serious. You positivist-monists often classify the “harder” sciences (physics, etc.) to distinguish them from “softer” ones–those that are less rigorous or less amenable to empirical testing and falsification. By “harder” you mean it is more rigorous, and you can get more certain results out of it. But economic science, due to its apodictic nature, is in a sense much “harder” than even physics since it results in apodictically true knowledge, much more rigorous, while in physics the knowledge is always contingent and subject to revision.

since I do agree that praxeology is a fundamentally “harder” science in certain ways than are physics, chemistry and biology. Correctly viewed, praxeology is closer in type and method to mathematics than to any other science. I have always thought it a shame that Mises did not have sufficient knowledge of mathematical axiomatic theoretics to found praxeology in that manner. 

This view is typical of the engineering mindset mired in empiricism.

The part of the above which is true is why I maintain that praxeology is closest to mathematical science and should be similarly founded. 

Well there can be arbitrary maths based on arbitrary axioms, while praxeology is based on undeniable, apodictically true foundations.

OTOH, the reason why mathematics is apodictic is that it is based on pure abstractions from reality which are all in meta-reality where truth can be absolute 

here we go with the crank-sounding talk that makes people’s eyes glaze over.

“I continue to wait for a substantive response to the essential points of my critique.”” I am not aware of any obligation for anyone to give a point by point reply to you.”While it is certainly true that you have no “obligation” for that (I and you have not executed any contract obligating you in that manner) 

Even if I had, that would not give me an obligation. Contracts are title transfers. Not binding promises. (See Rothbard, and Evers.)

, the personal characteristics of openness, sincerity, consideration and desire for the truth should impel any writer to respond as I have described. 

Yet another thing on which we’ll have to agree to disagree. I insist.

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 23, 2010 at 7:56 pm

Again Stephan Kinsella addresses nothing of substance in my original critique and little of substance in my last response. I will therefore only respond to the few points of tactics and of substance that he did address and ignore his pointless response to the rest.

More generally it has now become clear that Stephan Kinsella does not have the fundamental understanding of the foundations of philosophy, mathematics and science necessary for any fruitful dialog between him and me. (A major point of this dialog was to determine just that, as opposed to whether he just had a penchant for being difficult, avoiding and abrasive with commenters.) This also implies that his many posts on areas which involve such knowledge and foundational thinking are both a fraud and a waste of time for others to be reading. For this reason, although I will continue to respond to his posts because it is necessary for someone to show others that there is nothing of substance behind his posturings, my responses will be just once to the main substance of the post without any continuation (unless perchance he or someone else should address the substance of my response remarks).

We will have to agree to disagree on this point. I insist.

[The above stated several times]

Agreeing to disagree is a tactic of a coward, a quitter or an arrogant person who thinks that the other is incapable of true understanding – most certainly it is not the approach of someone who treats others as peers and who sincerely wants to achieve a mutual understanding of reality.
I often temporarily stop my attempts to get others to understand when I see that I am getting nowhere (as now), until such time as I see evidence of a fundamental change in such person, but I never “agree to disagree”, since such “sweeping under the rug” is always a recipe for eventual disaster in any relationship. And I most certainly never accept anyone’s insistence – not unless it is clear that physical force will be used against me if I don’t.

I’m not appealing to authority–I’m referring those interested to a more detailed explanation of the dualist case–one I agree with. I don’t intend to reproduce their arguments.

If you, Stephan Kinsella, cannot produce your own arguments in your own words (or at least a synopsis) then you don’t understand what you are talking about and are merely a follower, rather than an independent thinker. And BTW, your classification of yourself as a “Misesian” is little different that the classification of followers of Christ as Christians and the followers of Ayn Rand as Randians (or “students of Objectivism”) – all of these being “true believers” in contrast to independent critical thinkers about the ideas espoused by those individuals.

Further, I would maintain that, again in this regard, it is their thinking that is “stunted” (to use your word), or better still, that none of them had/have the logical, mathematical and scientific background (mathematics, physics, computer and biological sciences) that I have and which has enabled me to become convinced that they are all wrong in this regard, even though they are correct and their ideas/writings have been highly beneficial in other regards. 

This is typical of the way engineers think.

[And later]

since I do agree that praxeology is a fundamentally “harder” science in certain ways than are physics, chemistry and biology. Correctly viewed, praxeology is closer in type and method to mathematics than to any other science. I have always thought it a shame that Mises did not have sufficient knowledge of mathematical axiomatic theoretics to found praxeology in that manner. 

This view is typical of the engineering mindset mired in empiricism.

Here Kinsella seems to forget that it is engineers who made the modern technological world, by standing on the shoulders of scientists, who in turn stood on the shoulders of mathematicians. Without engineers, whose fundamental thinking he so disparages, we would not be having this discussion in this format. I also note that Kinsella continues to use categorizations rather than individual ideas, attributes and characterizations, which, of course, is the antithesis of methodological individualism.

“Praxeology is in a sense a “harder” science than the natural sciences ever can be”Do you really not know that the word “hard” used in this manner refers to the sciences concerned with physics, chemistry and biology? But perhaps you are merely making a kind of pun, 

No, it’s not a pun. I am serious. You positivist-monists often classify the “harder” sciences (physics, etc.) to distinguish them from “softer” ones–those that are less rigorous or less amenable to empirical testing and falsification. By “harder” you mean it is more rigorous, and you can get more certain results out of it. But economic science, due to its apodictic nature, is in a sense much “harder” than even physics since it results in apodictically true knowledge, much more rigorous, while in physics the knowledge is always contingent and subject to revision.

Here Kinsella really shows his ignorance. The term “hard sciences” has no relationship to “rigor” (Kinsella appears to not know the meaning of that word). Rather the term “hard sciences” had its origin in the fact that certain sciences dealt more directly with the matter/energy of reality and, in particular, can make better and easier use of measurement (although it is now the case that much of psychology does make good use of measurement), than is the case for the other sciences (sometime called the “soft sciences”, but not by me since that term is often used disparagingly). I, as with many others, simply use “hard sciences” as a short form instead of listing them all as physics, chemistry and biology. Note that l do not include mathematics as one of the hard sciences although it appears most people do. Also note that until recent times biology was also not included among the hard sciences – mainly because it did not use the scientific method but rather was mostly an observational and classificational science.

Well there can be arbitrary maths based on arbitrary axioms, while praxeology is based on undeniable, apodictically true foundations.

Spoken like a true believer and a devout follower of a prophet!
Again Kinsella shows that he has no fundamental understanding of his subject matter nor even of the words that he so glibly spouts. In which case, of course, he should, in all fairness and honesty to his readers, refrain from writing on such subjects.

Getting back to substance, however, just as mathematics can be based on different (and even opposed) self-consistent sets of axioms, both of which resulting theories can still model different aspects of reality (eg Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean geometries), so too can praxeology (the study of human action and conduct – Mises did not invent the word) be based on different (and even opposing) sets of axioms/assumptions only some of which will model some part of human reality as verified by observation, prediction and, if possible, experimentation, while others of which may model other aspects of human reality (or perhaps the “action and conduct” of some other species). The only apodictic truth is that which interrelates concepts and other constructs of meta-reality and which is based entirely on the logic of manipulating such constructs.

OTOH, the reason why mathematics is apodictic is that it is based on pure abstractions from reality which are all in meta-reality where truth can be absolute 

here we go with the crank-sounding talk that makes people’s eyes glaze over.

Interesting how the word “crank” is so often used by people who are regarded that way by the vast majority of the world and/or have no understanding whatever of the subject area of their correspondent’s writing. As for “eyes glaze over”, that is what happens when one’s intellect is so low and/or one’s knowledge so shallow that one has no inkling of what the other person means.

“I continue to wait for a substantive response to the essential points of my critique.”” I am not aware of any obligation for anyone to give a point by point reply to you.”While it is certainly true that you have no “obligation” for that (I and you have not executed any contract obligating you in that manner) 

Even if I had, that would not give me an obligation. Contracts are title transfers. Not binding promises. (See Rothbard, and Evers.)

This is coming from a lawyer?!? Contracts can deal with service obligations just as they deal with transfers of ownership of material objects. In that manner, they can deal with binding promises. The major flaw in most conceptions of a valid contract is that any valid contract must have penalty and escape clauses – which prevent any promise (or contract clause of any type) from being totally binding. Again see the definitions and clauses of the Natural Social Contract for all such definitions and connections between the definitions.

As stated at the beginning, this will be my last response on this blog entry unless there are substantive responses to my original critique.

Julien Couvreur April 11, 2010 at 10:32 pm

I wonder about the notion of “natural rights” and Lockean property too. Aren’t those rules arbitrary in some sense too?

I’m not sure that empathy is the best explanation. What about self-preservation instead?

You can see society as a prisoner’s dilema. Each player has options: respect others and the non-aggression principle (which are fairly neutral and defendable from a negotiation point of view) or not.
Honoring the simple rule is probably the most rational choice.
A few people choosing to betray are taking a risk of retaliation, and a large number of people choosing to betray create a self-destructive environment.

REPLY

Paul Wakfer April 13, 2010 at 3:36 pm

@Julien Couvreur

It was nice to see your thoughtful comment.

I maintain that the notion of “natural rights” is inconsistent and therefore essentially vacuous. See see my critique of Randy Barnett’s The Imperative of Natural Rights in Today’s World

Concerning “Lockean property”, for which I use the phrase “Real Estate” to distinguish a volume of space from “Property” that consists of “Material Objects” (matter/energy), I agree that any definition for it is somewhat arbitrary. Still I think that some definitions and methods of social operation concerning Real Estate are more useful than others for the establishment and maintenance of an optimally self-ordered truly free society. You may be interested to read my own such definitions and methods of operation which are detailed in the Natural Social Contract.

Yes, “self-preservation” is more in tune with Ayn Rand and certainly closer to the evidence behind this matter than is any notion of empathy. To get at the correct source one needs to first discover the answer to the question “what it the purpose of any human’s life”.For an answer derived from the evidence of human reality I direct you to my treatise Social Meta-Needs: A New Basis for Optimal Interaction.

REPLY

Julien Couvreur April 14, 2010 at 1:02 am

@Paul Wakfer
Thanks for the pointers. I’ll check them out.
This thread prompted me to think and learn some more on this topic. Craig Biddle has a series of lectures on The Source and Nature of Rights. It also focuses on Ayn Rand’s philosophy, but it starts with a broader analysis of three other explanations of the source of rights: god, nature and society.
I’m still processing through (this is pretty heavy stuff), but it is interesting to notice how a central concept emerges, that of human action. Just like praxeology.

REPLY

Julien Couvreur April 25, 2010 at 9:29 pm
Paul Wakfer April 27, 2010 at 2:52 am

Thanks Julien, but video presentations are of no value to me unless a full written transcript is available on the Internet attached to commenting capability. If that is not the case, then I have no interest, because without that my ability to critically analyze the details and respond to them is far too limited. Furthermore I would contend that this limitation is true for everyone else. Those who think that merely listening to such presentations can gain them truly deep understanding are just fooling themselves.

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How We Come To Own Ourselves

My latest article: How We Come To Own Ourselves, Mises.org, Sep. 7, 2006 (concerning homesteading and property rights in bodies). Mises.org blog discussion.

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Van Dun on Argumentation Ethics

see also Van Dun on Lawyers and the Law, Federal Judges Aren’t Real Judges, On “Unowned” State Property, Legal Positivism, Ownership vs. Possession,

From mises blog, Aug. 22, 2006

The brilliant and erudite Belgian libertarian legal theorist Frank Van Dun has a powerful, rich and provocative draft article: Comment on R.P.Murphy’s & Gene Callahan’s Critique of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics [Note: updated version, in PDF, here: Argumentation Ethics and the Philosophy of Freedom]. It’s a response to recent criticism of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics.

Van Dun is well-suited to join the fray, having himself written on this topic before, as he explains in his draft comment. For more on Van Dun, see:

Comments (11)

  • Person
  • Came across this little gem in the Van Dun reply to M/C:”…that argumentation is between one person and another, between an ‘I’ and a ‘You’, and also that the success or force of the argumentation does not depend on who is the ‘I’ and who is the ‘You’.”It just made me think about how Stephan Kinsella always tries to respond to my arguments by finding something about me, or how he claimed Murphy and Callahan “were not libertarians” and “were ethical skeptics” in his reply to them on this topic.
  • Published: August 22, 2006 11:48 AM

  • Richard Garner
  • Suppose that a slave is instructed to go to Hoppe and argue that he, the slave, does not own himself. Where is the performative contradiction in this?
  • Published: August 22, 2006 12:18 PM

  • Stephan Kinsella
  • Well, clarify your query. First, is it, or is it not, *genuine* argument? This matters.Second, clarify what exactly the slave is saying. Is he saying he does not actually own himself; or legally; or that he consents to the relationship with some master; or that he agrees that he “should” be dominated by the master? What exactly is the slave saying?
  • Published: August 22, 2006 12:40 PM

  • Richard Garner
  • Well, clarify your query. First, is it, or is it not, *genuine* argument? This matters.

    Does it even need to be an argument? A slave, one day, comes up to Mr Hoppe, and says, “Mr. Hoppe, my Master has instructed me to tell you that he owns me.”

    Second, clarify what exactly the slave is saying. Is he saying he does not actually own himself;

    Sure, he is saying that somebody else owns him.

    or legally;

    Well, I had in mind, when thinking of the scenario, some period in ancient Roman history, so perhaps, yeah, we could say legally. I’m not sure of the relevance.

    or that he consents to the relationship with some master;

    Consents is a tricky question, since this might depend on whether you are using a moralised notion of consent or not. However, suppose that this wasn’t the result of some voluntary slave contract a la Nozick, but instead was imposed against the slave’s will. What difference does that make?

    or that he agrees that he “should” be dominated by the master?

    Whether he agrees or not may well be irrelevent to the question of whether or not he is a slave.

    What exactly is the slave saying?

    He is saying that he does not own himself. If he is a slave, a person owned by another person, this statement is true.

  • Published: August 22, 2006 6:06 PM

  • Paul Edwards
  • Richard,“Does it even need to be an argument? A slave, one day, comes up to Mr Hoppe, and says, “Mr. Hoppe, my Master has instructed me to tell you that he owns me.”�?Yes. It needs to be an argument. The question is can anything other than self-ownership be justified, and a justification must take place during argumentation.

    “Sure, he is saying that somebody else owns him.�?

    What do you think this would prove? Hoppe is not claiming the slave is not considered to be a slave by his owner, by others or by the slave himself. So the slave’s confirming this fact verbally is not in question nor is it relevant. The question is: is slavery of non-aggressors justifiable? This slave’s statement of his condition of slavery does nothing to answer this question.

    “…suppose that this wasn’t the result of some voluntary slave contract a la Nozick, but instead was imposed against the slave’s will. What difference does that make?�?

    Slavery imposed against the non-aggressing slave’s will is unjustified, whereas slavery imposed against a criminal is or may be justified.

    “Whether he agrees or not may well be irrelevent to the question of whether or not he is a slave.�?

    And whether or not he is a slave is definitely irrelevant to the question of whether slavery can be justified.

    “He is saying that he does not own himself. If he is a slave, a person owned by another person, this statement is true.�?

    The statement may be true in the sense that he is treated as a slave and viewed as a slave by others and even himself. This is however, irrelevant to whether his being a slave is justified.

    I’d elaborate on why a slave saying he is a slave is irrelevant to a justification of slavery, but van Dun does this pretty well in his article. Do a search on “slave” in the text and read the surrounding paragraphs.

  • Published: August 22, 2006 7:40 PM

  • Stephan Kinsella
  • R. Garner:First, I endorse and hereby incorporate by reference Paul Edwards’s comments to you (how’s that for some lawyer-talk!).NSK: Well, clarify your query. First, is it, or is it not, *genuine* argument? This matters.

    RG: Does it even need to be an argument? A slave, one day, comes up to Mr Hoppe, and says, “Mr. Hoppe, my Master has instructed me to tell you that he owns me.”

    Hoppe’s argument is that argumentation presupposes the libertarian ethic, and that therefore if you engage in argument and propose something non-libertarian then you are contradicting yourself.

    So the contradiction plays out only when there is (a) genuine argumentation (of the type that presupposes libertarian principles); and (b) someone who proposes a non-libertarian ethics.

    In your case, it is not clear whether this is argumentation. Apparently the Master ordered the slave to say those words, and if he is being ordered, presumably he is not free to really change his mind and accept Hoppe’s counterarguments. HOw is it an argument?

    If we somehow assume the Master gave the slave permission to be totally free to argue and to accept whatever conclusion he believes right, solely on the force of the aguments made, then I suppose it might be an argument. So. Suppose this is so, and the slave, call him “num-nuts,” says, “Master owns me.” Is this proposing a non-libertarian ethic?

    Why would it be? It might be a (legal) fact that in this community Master owns num-nuts. Num-nuts is then just stating the truth. How is this proposing a non-libertarian ethic?

    Now, let me go ahead and answer teh rest of the hypothetical you should have posed, if you had really understood argumentation ethics.

    Suppose Num-nuts says, “I am owned by Master, and this is right and good; and it’s okay for some people to own others, even if they didn’t do anything wrong to the owner.” (See why I called him Num-nuts? I think ahead.)

    In this case, it is obvious that Num-nuts’ status as a slave is irrelevant to whether there is a contradiction or not. If it is a genuine argumment, it merely means his master gave him permission to argue. And if he is a slave and says slavery is okay, he is actually consenting to his enslavement, so it’s not really enslavement! Now, you might say, well, he is not really consenting, he is forced to agree to this proposition–hey, if that’s the case, it’s not really argumentation and we are back to square one. For your hypo to work you have to assume the slave is free to say what he really believes and is not coerced. Which means, if he defends slavery, he’s not a slave. Which means, Num-nuts pro-slavery comments in the argument are no different than if the Master or some other free person utters them.

    So all we have is a person S engaging in argument, saying “Slavery is justifiable.” His status as slave is irrelevant to whether there is a contradiction or not (in fact, as noted above, he really can’t say he is okay with slavery and be a slave; he is just a willing masochist). Moreover, even if he were somehow still a slave, it still does not affect whether his statement is a contradiction or not. The only question is whether the libertarian ethic is presupposed by the activity or argumentation or not. That is the only question really. And to answer this, it is utterly irrelevant whether the parties to a genuine argument are “really” slaves, or not. What matters is whether argumentation presupposes the libertarian ethic as justified.

    NSK: Second, clarify what exactly the slave is saying. Is he saying he does not actually own himself;

    RG: Sure, he is saying that somebody else owns him.

    Since you apparently do not understand the nuances here, or are unwilling to engage them, I”ll assume here you mean the slave is merely stating a legal fact: that under the legal system, his Master has a legal right to administer force to the slave to induce him to do what the Master wants. IN this case, there is no contradiction at all because the slave is not saying he supports slavery.

    RG: Well, I had in mind, when thinking of the scenario, some period in ancient Roman history, so perhaps, yeah, we could say legally. I’m not sure of the relevance.

    Right, that’s become clear.

    RG: Consents is a tricky question, since this might depend on whether you are using a moralised notion of consent or not. However, suppose that this wasn’t the result of some voluntary slave contract a la Nozick, but instead was imposed against the slave’s will. What difference does that make?

    It makes no difference at all. What I was getting at was the nature of Num-nuts’ statement: was he merely recognizing a legal fact (he is owned), or was he endorsing it? HE apparently is only doing the former, which means he is not engaging in contradiction.

    NSK: or that he agrees that he “should” be dominated by the master?

    RG: Whether he agrees or not may well be irrelevent to the question of whether or not he is a slave.

    Well, if he agrees, he is arguably consenting so it not a slave, is he? But even if you are right: it does not matter whther it is relevant to the question of whether he is a slave, because as I explained above, it does not matter whether he is a slave or not, for purposes of determining whether his statements are a dialogical contrdiction or not. If he engages in genuine argument, somehow (whether he is a slave or not), then if he asserts a non-libertarian ethic, he is engaged in a contradiction. Why? Because the argument preuspposes the libertarian ethic as justifiable.

    If you disagree then you only disagree with the latter statement, and that is what you should focus on.

    RG: He is saying that he does not own himself. If he is a slave, a person owned by another person, this statement is true.

    Yes. And irrelevant.

  • Published: August 22, 2006 8:41 PM

  • Geoffrey Allan Plauche
  • It seems to me that Hoppe’s argument only works, if at all, for people who think that the purpose of argumentation is only to discover truth and/or only for those engaging in “genuine” argumentation. For anyone not engaged in “genuine” argumentation – that is, for anyone seemingly arguing but really just trying to persuade others over to his or her own point of view – there would be no performative contradiction in espousing a non-libertarian point of view. Also, hypothetically, what about people who do not believe that the purpose of argumentation is only to discover truth but rather and primarily to persuade (i.e., as a more effective (in the long run) and less costly and less risky means than violence)? They already know the truth afterall (via intuition, revelation, feelings, their superior intellect, or what have you).I still don’t see why a master and his slave can’t have a “genuine” argument. Let’s say we have a particularly intellectual slave-owner and he likes to keep philosophers as slaves, to gain from their wisdom and have debates with them. It seems to me that he very well can have an argument with his philosopher slave. They could have arguments about topics that the slave-owner allows to be discussed. And even if the slave-owner allows the topic of slavery to be debated, they could argue about that. Maybe the slave-owner would win such an argument, maybe he wouldn’t; and let’s say for the sake of argument that he would lose against the superior arguments of his philosopher-slave, recognize this, and then proceeds to free all of his slaves. I’d say an argument took place. But even if he won the argument – let’s say because his philosopher-slave, for whatever reason, didn’t come up with very good arguments against slavery – I would say that an argument took place. It seems to me that as long as the slave-owner allows the slave control over his own person for the purpose of debating and it is clear to both parties that there will be no repercussions to the slave for whatever arguments he may make in the course of the debate, that genuine argumentation (and no performative contradiction) will have taken place even though during the course of the debate the slave-owner sincerely believed that he justifiably owned the slave. In short, it seems that control, not ownership, of one’s person during the course of the debate and an absence of punishment for anything that may be said during the course of the debate, are all that is needed for “genuine” argumentation.
  • Published: August 24, 2006 9:41 AM

  • Stephan Kinsella
  • Plauche:

    It seems to me that Hoppe’s argument only works, if at all, for people who think that the purpose of argumentation is only to discover truth and/or only for those engaging in “genuine” argumentation. For anyone not engaged in “genuine” argumentation – that is, for anyone seemingly arguing but really just trying to persuade others over to his or her own point of view – there would be no performative contradiction in espousing a non-libertarian point of view.

     

    So what? The fact that there are uncivilized criminals is no disproof of a normative claim. Hoppe’s claim is only that one cannot actually ever justify a non-libertarian norm; and that only a libertarian norm is justified. Of course only those who care about justification–those who engage in genuine argumentation–even care about this. But so what? This comment of yours actually further bolster’s Hoppe’s case. You are basically saying that the only way to avoid the contradiction is to not genuinely argue. That in effect means that if and to the extent you are really engaged in argument, you are demonstrating your acceptance of the underlying libertarian norms and cannot contradict yourself by arguing against them.

    Also, hypothetically, what about people who do not believe that the purpose of argumentation is only to discover truth but rather and primarily to persuade (i.e., as a more effective (in the long run) and less costly and less risky means than violence)? They already know the truth afterall (via intuition, revelation, feelings, their superior intellect, or what have you).

    If and to the extent they are engaged in genuine argumentation they have to be open to hearing the other side’s reasons and potentially changing their mind based on the force of the others’ ideas alone. In any event, these people cannot atually engage in genuine argument and deny the libertarian ethic, since a genuine argument is required to justify anything, and also presupposes the libertarian ethic.

    I still don’t see why a master and his slave can’t have a “genuine” argument. Let’s say we have a particularly intellectual slave-owner and he likes to keep philosophers as slaves, to gain from their wisdom and have debates with them. It seems to me that he very well can have an argument with his philosopher slave. They could have arguments about topics that the slave-owner allows to be discussed.

    Let’s suppose a master M and slave S can have a genuine argument. If so this is only if and to the extent the Master in effect frees the slave so as to be free from the threat of coercion if he refuses to accept the Master’s propositions. The Master himself would have to recognize at least his own right to control his body, and to be able to homestead resources in order to have an argument, and to be able to survive in order to have one; and he would have to recognize the value of a conflict-free mode of interacting; and he would have to recognize the value of justifying propositions and being able to engage in the activity of justifying; and he would have to value the assignment of property rules that permit conflicts to be avoided. Given all this, Rothbardian and Austrian reasoning shows that his only choice is to accept the libertarian “first use” rule of property assignment. This is the only one that fulfills all the requirements above.

    And even if the slave-owner allows the topic of slavery to be debated, they could argue about that.

    Sure; the master would, in asserting his right to own the slave, be contradicting his other necessarily held view that the libertarian ethic is justified. So he is contradicting himself.

    Maybe the slave-owner would win such an argument, maybe he wouldn’t

    Of cousre he wouldn’t, since slavery is unjustified and unjustifiable, and becuase (and *just* because) it contradicts the ethic presupposed in argumentation as such.

    ; and let’s say for the sake of argument that he would lose against the superior arguments of his philosopher-slave, recognize this, and then proceeds to free all of his slaves. I’d say an argument took place.

    Sure. O, Happy day.

    … I would say that an argument took place. It seems to me that as long as the slave-owner allows the slave control over his own person for the purpose of debating and it is clear to both parties that there will be no repercussions to the slave for whatever arguments he may make in the course of the debate, that genuine argumentation (and no performative contradiction) will have taken place even though during the course of the debate the slave-owner sincerely believed that he justifiably owned the slave.

    The question is not whether a slave can argue. The question is this: if and when there is a genuine argument, do the participants presuppose the libertarian ethic? This is really the only question. If they do, then anyone who proposes a non-libertarian ethic contradicts himself–whether he is the slave, master, or dog-catcher.

    In short, it seems that control, not ownership, of one’s person during the course of the debate and an absence of punishment for anything that may be said during the course of the debate,

    But the participants demonstrate their *preference* for argumentation *as an activity* and they demonstrate their *preference* for this *conflict-free mode of interacting*. They demonstrate their recognition of the undeniable fact that propositions can only be justified argumentatively, and that they *should be* justified argumentatively. They recognize the value of argumentation; and the factual (conflict-free, control-recognizing) aspects of argumentation); and thus recognize the value of people having control over their properties. They recognize, moreover, the value of rules that assign ownerhsip of title to scarce resources at least sufficient to permit them to have survived long enough to argue and to control enough resources to engage in the argument. This means that they cannot advocate a property rule that “no one is permitted to use property”, because if this were followed argumentation would not be possible. Yet if they cannot consistently advocate this, they also cannot advocate any collective ownership rule, because it woudl be the same thing. They also cannot advocate that there be NO rule; and they cannot advocate a PARTICULARISTIC rule since by arguing they accept univeralizability.

    So what is left? Here we have it that no participant in genuine argument can without contradiction (a) deny the value of conflict-free interaction; (b) deny the value of rules that permit some use of scarce resources sufficient to avoid conflict sufficient to permit the participants to engage in argument and to survive long enough to have done this; (c) deny that it is good that some individuals are property owners so that the argument can proceed (even if both arguers are slaves, there has to be some independent, sovereign owner who permits the slaves to argue; if the slaves are prisoners being punished for a crime, then there is an argumentive distinction between master and slave; if not, then whatever basis underlies the presupposed ownership of the ultimate “master” consenting to the argument, must apply also to the slave(s)); (d) argue that there be no property rules; (e) argue that there be a collectivist property rule where everyone owns everyone else; (f) argue for a late-comer rule; (g) argue for particularistic rules.

    Given all this, it is obvious that the ONLY rule that is compatible with these argumenative restrictions is the unvarnished, unlimited libertarain first-use appropriation rule. For only this one is compatible with the body-ownership rule presuspposed by the arguers. Only this one solves conflicts. Only this one is not particularistic, and universalizable. Only this one avoids the nihilism of advocating NO property rule.

  • Published: August 24, 2006 10:22 AM

  • Geoffrey Allan Plauche
  • Stephan, I think you have misinterpreted, misunderstood, or overlooked some important points in my argument.Notice that you quote the following line of mine: “Maybe the slave-owner would win such an argument, maybe he wouldn’t.”But not this one immediately following it: “But even if he won the argument – let’s say because his philosopher-slave, for whatever reason, didn’t come up with very good arguments against slavery – I would say that an argument took place.”

    I do think that slavery is unjustifiable, but that is a separate issue from the quality of the arguments put forth by the slave-owner and his philosopher-slave. The slave-owner could win an argument over the justness of slavery if his philosopher-slave provides weaker arguments than he does. You’re conflating the truth of the conclusions with the strength of the arguments and assuming, contrary to the stipulations given in my example, that the parties in the argument provide the best possible arguments for their positions.

    You say: “The question is not whether a slave can argue.”

    But this precisely is the question. If a slave can argue, genuinely argue, then genuine argumentation takes place. This question and the question you insist on are in fact related.

    You say: “slavery is unjustified and unjustifiable, and becuase (and *just* because) it contradicts the ethic presupposed in argumentation as such.”

    But I don’t see that you, or Hoppe, or Van Dun, have established this.

    You say: “Let’s suppose a master M and slave S can have a genuine argument. If so this is only if and to the extent the Master in effect frees the slave so as to be free from the threat of coercion if he refuses to accept the Master’s propositions.”

    In effect? It seems like you are talking about control here, not self-ownership. This is, I think, where you, Hoppe, and Van Dun go wrong. You conflate self-ownership with control. The slave may “in effect” be free (for the purpose of debating only) when his owner grants him the control necessary to engage in argumentation and promises that he will not be punished for speaking freely. But this does not establish that the slave must not be a slave, i.e., that he must have self-ownership, in order to engage in argumentation; it does not by itself establish that the slave must be set free in the sense of being released from his bondage in order for genuine argumentation to occur. In other words, this does not get you from the ethics of argumentation to libertarian self-ownership. Something else beyond the ethics of argumentation is needed to generalize the conditions necessary for genuine argumentation beyond argumentation to human activity in general. And something more is needed beyond that to establish that not merely control is needed but that self-ownership is true and people should therefore and on that basis be left in control of themselves.

    Van Dun is correct on page 6 of his essay that I would performatively contradict myself if I claim that an argumentatively justified conclusion is justified only within the context of argumentation itself, but this is not what I am claiming. If you or I successfully argue that libertarian self-ownership is justified, its justification is not limited to the context of our argument. I am merely arguing that the argument that the ethics of argumentation by itself establishes the justification of libertarian self-ownership fails.

    I’ll grant you that if in the course of argumentation the slave-owner finds himself unable to defeat the anti-slavery arguments of his philosopher-slave, then should he refuse to free his slave he would be engaging in a performative contradiction: namely, professing to engage in argumentation, which presupposes certain normative commitments, and then refusing to respect said commitments when he loses the argument. This performative contradiction stems not from the claim that argumentation presupposes libertarian self-ownership and that therefore he cannot simultaneously claim to own slaves and engage in argumentation without contradiction; rather, it stems from the fact, stipulated in my example here, that he has lost the argument – having failed to refute his slave’s anti-slavery argument – and then refuses to respect the commitment he made in engaging in argumentation to accept conclusions of the winning argument.

    If one wants to restrict the meaning of “genuine” argumentation to something that requires self-ownership, one has to make implicit or explicit (historically mostly implicit as far as I can tell) assumptions that are not justified by argumentation ethics itself but rather form the justificational foundations of argumentation ethics and which themselves still need to be justified. Argumentation ethics cannot stand alone. To be effective, it must be situated within a broader and deeper philosophical and ethical theory.

  • Published: August 24, 2006 11:44 AM

  • Geoffrey Allan Plauche
  • I would like to add, by way of clarification, that I do not think that merely winning an argument is enough to bind the loser to the conclusions of the winning argument. Again, it is possible to have a true conclusion but bad arguments for it, and one could lose an argument on such grounds. It would be perverse if the ethics of argumentation entailed that those who are less intelligent, logical, educated, or are for whatever reason not good arguers, would have to accept slavery as justified if they could not refute it. There are many bad arguments for libertarianism, but their proponents are not thereby obligated to accept statism. This is yet another reason why the ethics of argumentation cannot stand alone.
  • Published: August 24, 2006 12:05 PM

  • Stephan Kinsella
  • Plauche:

    Stephan, I think you have misinterpreted, misunderstood, or overlooked some important points in my argument.

    And one just “doesn’t do” this, in an argument, right? It’s not … permitted? by the … rules of argumentation? 🙂

    I do think that slavery is unjustifiable, but that is a separate issue from the quality of the arguments put forth by the slave-owner and his philosopher-slave.

    YOu can never justify that which is not justifiable.

    The slave-owner could win an argument over the justness of slavery if his philosopher-slave provides weaker arguments than he does. You’re conflating the truth of the conclusions with the strength of the arguments and assuming,

    Silly me, I would think an argument’s strength comes from its being correct.

    Could someone also “win” the side of an argument contending that A is not A; or that 1 + 1 = 3?

    You say: “The question is not whether a slave can argue.”But this precisely is the question. If a slave can argue, genuinely argue, then genuine argumentation takes place.

    Er, okay. How does that show the argument does not presuppose the libertarian ethic?

    You say: “slavery is unjustified and unjustifiable, and becuase (and *just* because) it contradicts the ethic presupposed in argumentation as such.”But I don’t see that you, or Hoppe, or Van Dun, have established this.

    In any case, it is unrelated to whether a slave is part of a genuine argumet. The identity or legal status of the participants has nothing to do with anything. Whatever is presupposed is presupposed, by virtus of its being argumentation, not because of who the participants are.

    You say: “Let’s suppose a master M and slave S can have a genuine argument. If so this is only if and to the extent the Master in effect frees the slave so as to be free from the threat of coercion if he refuses to accept the Master’s propositions.”In effect? It seems like you are talking about control here, not self-ownership.

    Ownership is just the right to control.

    This is, I think, where you, Hoppe, and Van Dun go wrong. You conflate self-ownership with control.

    Self-ownership is the right to control one’s body. If we are speaking of legal rights, then we are speaking of legal ownership. If we are speaking of libertarian (“natural”) rights, we are speaking of natural ownership. It’s just terminology.

    If the legal system permits A to own B, even though B is innocent of any crime, then the legal owner of B is A. We libertarians woudl say this is unjust, *because* A is the “real” owner of his body–by “real” we mean, he is the one who has the (moral) right to control his body, even thoguh this right is not legally recognized.

    The slave may “in effect” be free (for the purpose of debating only) when his owner grants him the control necessary to engage in argumentation and promises that he will not be punished for speaking freely.

    Okay…

    But this does not establish that the slave must not be a slave, i.e., that he must have self-ownership,

    He must have the right to control his body to participate in the debate. THe master’s granting him freedom to debate means giving him the right to control his body.

    in order to engage in argumentation; it does not by itself establish that the slave must be set free in the sense of being released from his bondage in order for genuine argumentation to occur.

    THe point is that the master has to presuppose a variety of normative principles which *imply* that he cannot justify the proposition “I should own the slave”.

    I’ll grant you that if in the course of argumentation the slave-owner finds himself unable to defeat the anti-slavery arguments of his philosopher-slave, then should he refuse to free his slave he would be engaging in a performative contradiction: namely, professing to engage in argumentation, which presupposes certain normative commitments, and then refusing to respect said commitments when he loses the argument.

    NOtice here, though, how strange and … bloodless an alienated your argument is (I think it suffers from what Van Dun criticizes as the mere “academic” way of viewing argumentation): you yourself as a libertairan have admitted you think slavery is wrong. For wahtever reason–you must have some basis for this view. and you necessarily think that it is better than any counterclaims. So the slave could just put forward your argument, whatever it is; and he would then win.

    … So… are we done, then? Have you conceded, or not? I think you are confused because you accept something yet you don’t want to accept it at the same time.

    This performative contradiction stems not from the claim that argumentation presupposes libertarian self-ownership and that therefore he cannot simultaneously claim to own slaves and engage in argumentation without contradiction; rather, it stems from the fact, stipulated in my example here, that he has lost the argument – having failed to refute his slave’s anti-slavery argument

    HE faield to refute it because he is wrong. I don’t see this as some stupid game theory exercise, wehre everything is infinitely and forever debatable and uncertain. I don’t harbor the illusion that you can “win” an argument if you are wrong. What standard are you using? Some litigator-lawyer standard?

    If one wants to restrict the meaning of “genuine” argumentation to something that requires self-ownership,

    Genuine argumentation is conflict free, by its nature. It requires each participant have control of his body–and, vis-a-vis each other, the right to control. Surely you can see this. It also requires them to be alive, and to control something more than just their bodies–some external resources. This means the participants endorse also the rule that people should be permitted at least sometimes to use scarce resources and in a conflict-free way. This implies, as I argued in last post, that only the full-fledged libertarian homesteading norm is compatible with argumentation.

    To be effective, it must be situated within a broader and deeper philosophical and ethical theory.

    Interesting–you say this statement *in the context of an argumentation*. It’s like trying to deny the significance of the limb you are standing on.

  • Published: August 24, 2006 12:16 PM

Apparently Van Dun has a wealth of libertarian writing in Dutch; it’s high time we have some English translations.

***

Update: See the entry Kim Davies on the Transcendental Foundations of Ethics.

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The Nature of Economic Analysis

I’ve been Hoppe-ing my brains out lately. Take this cool, pithy statement about the nature of economic analysis:

Essentially, economic analysis consists of: (1) an understanding of the categories of action and an understanding of the meaning of a change in values, costs, technological knowledge, etc.; (2) a description of a situation in which these categories assume concrete meaning, where definite people are identified as actors with definite objects specified as their means of action, with definite goals identified as values and definite things specified as costs; and (3) a deduction of the consequences that result from the performance of some specified action in this situation, or of the consequences that result for an actor if this situation is changed in a specified way. And this deduction must yield a priori-valid conclusions, provided there is no flaw in the very process of deduction and the situation and the change introduced into it being given, and a priori—valid conclusions about reality if the situation and situation-change, as described, can themselves be identified as real, because then their validity would ultimately go back to the indisputable validity of the categories of action.

A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 118-19.

[Mises blog cross-post]

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My article, The Greatest Libertarian Books, was published on LewRockwell.com today. I reprint it below. (wayback version) For some additional suggestions, see:

Libertarian

Other/General/Cultural

The Greatest Libertarian Books

August 7, 2006
by N. Stephan Kinsella

Austrian libertarians, more than most, should be acutely aware of the impossibility of coming up with a truly objective “top ten” list. Smith’s most valued book may be far down on Jones’s subjective rankings. Nonetheless, we forge ahead because such lists can be provocative, illuminating, and interesting. So in response to “The Ten Best Libertarian Books” from the September 2006 issue of Liberty, which provoked some discussion on the Mises blog, I’ll offer my own admittedly idiosyncratic and personal choices — books or authors I consider great or notable, or that have had some significant influence in my own intellectual development.

Great Libertarian Books and Authors

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism. Topping my list is A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, as well as a host of other works, by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, our greatest living intellectual. Hoppe’s other influential works include Democracy: The God That Failed, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, and Economic Science and the Austrian Method (update: and The Great Fiction). Sure, Hoppe stands on the shoulders of giants — primarily Mises and Rothbard — but to my mind his edifice of thought is the pinnacle of Austro-libertarian thinking. Somewhat sobering is the realization that Hoppe was only forty when he wrote Capitalism. Gulp.

Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. And his other works too, including another of my favorites, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science. Arguably the greatest genius of the twentieth century, if not all of human history. Need anything else be said?

Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty. And Man, Economy and State, Power and Market, For A New Liberty, and countless other works. The Mises-Rothbard-Hoppe troika are the standard-bearers for modern Austro-libertarianism. I’m tempted to call them the Austro-libertarian trinity, but to avoid offense, I’ll refrain.

Henry Hazlitt, Time Will Run Back. Okay, okay, I know it’s not a great novel, but it’s a favorite of mine. An illuminating tale of a dictator slowly appreciating the limits of centralized socialist planning. And Hazlitt’s Economics in One Lesson is one I often recommend as a starting point for a novice interested in learning more about the freedom philosophy. As is my next choice —

Llewellyn H. Rockwell, ed., The Free Market Reader: Essays in the Economics of Liberty. This underappreciated selection of classic short pieces — mainly by Rockwell and Rothbard — from The Free Market is a fantastic introduction to sound economic thinking. See also the followup, The Economics of Liberty.

Frederic Bastiat, The Law. Another great introductory book. They don’t make ’em like they used to.

Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. I might now find things I don’t agree with in this magnificent book — perhaps whiffs of positivism, insufficient radicalism — but, for me, reading it was eye-opening and helped deepen my budding appreciation for libertarianism and free market economics.

Linda & Morris Tannehill, The Market for Liberty. For minarchists and mainstreamers, a mindblowing introduction to the possibilities of non-state order and liberty. David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism complements the Tannehills’ book well, as does “Imagining a Polycentric Constitutional Order: A Short Fable,” chapter 14 of Randy Barnett‘s The Structure of Liberty. Something about Friedman’s Machinery always bugged me — maybe it was the way he noted that Hazlitt’s Economics in One Lesson is “reputed” to be a good introductory book on economics, but “I have not read it” — as if he does not need to. From someone with degrees only in physics and chemistry, I suppose I would have expected a bit more humility; and his over-reliance on “law and economics” has always made Friedman seem just a tad too much the dilettante and Austro-cynic for my taste. Nonetheless, Machinery has to be mentioned here.

Lysander Spooner, No Treason No. VI: The Constitution of No Authority. An eye-opening expose to the lies spread by contractarians and constitutionalists.

James J. Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia. The works noted above are all by libertarians or proto-libertarians (e.g., Spooner and Bastiat). Kilpatrick was no libertarian but this work is probably one of the best non-fiction books I’ve ever read, and reading it would be immensely valuable to all libertarians today, especially those who too readily condone state centralism. See, for example, this brief excerpt on the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves, and the federal judiciary. And consider this passage, describing the Supreme Court’s illegitimate expansion of power under the guise of the Constitution’s interstate commerce clause:

It was an insidious process, conducted with the care of the cat that stalks her prey — now creeping forward, now pausing to sniff the air; now advancing, now lying still as the bird takes alarm; then edging forward again, and so, step by inexorable step, moving to the ultimate seizure. [p. 235]

Sounds a lot like the tactics used by the left over the last several decades, doesn’t it? Kilpatrick may not have been a libertarian, perhaps, but this book is great libertarian ammunition. Would that this were required reading in all law schools, if not all high schools.

Honorable Mention

There are of course many others that could be listed, but they can’t all be on the “greatest” list. Some are too recent/modern, or too narrow (e.g., too American-centric), but are still high on my list. These include Jan Narveson’s The Libertarian Idea and Loren Lomasky’s Persons, Rights and the Moral Community. There’s much to disagree with in both books, but each has a load of provocative insights.

Those who find Kilpatrick’s work of interest might also profit from Felix Morley’s Freedom and Federalism and Raoul Berger’s Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights and Federalism: The Founder’s Design. Bruce Benson’s The Enterprise of Law also seems destined to be a classic, and would be appreciated by those who like the Tannehills. I also suspect George Reisman’s massive tome Capitalism deserves to be in any “greatest” list, but I haven’t absorbed it completely enough to make this judgment yet.”

And if I were not growing increasingly distant from Rand’s thought and annoyed by many of her modern-day followers, I’d probably include on the list above Atlas Shrugged, Philosophy: Who Needs It, and Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal.

Fiction

Speaking of fiction, other than Hazlitt’s Time Will Run Back, I just can’t bring myself to include any among the company of the “greats” listed above, but there is some I’ve found very enjoyable as well as illuminating portraits of possible libertarian societies: these include Heinlein’s The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, of course Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, J. Neil Schulman’s Alongside Night, L. Neil Smith’s The Probability Broach and The Gallatin Divergence, and my newest favorite novelist, John C. Wright, author of the sci-fi trilogy The Golden Age.

Didn’t Make the Cut

As for others that just don’t come close to making my cut: some rave about Herbert Spencer’s The Man vs. the State. Hey, I just can’t get past the annoying use of “the” in the title. Reminds me of the affectation of referring to “the calculus.” Other purportedly “great” books or authors that I just can’t seem to motivate myself to read or finish include Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Isabel Paterson’s The God of the Machine, Rose Wilder Lane’s The Discovery of Freedom, Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (and other works), John Stuart Mill, anything by anyone who ever even flirted with Georgism or Galambosianism, “mutualism,” or “conjecturalism/anti-justificationism.”


The interested reader can find many other very interesting recommendations in the LRC bibliographies — see especially Hans-Hermann Hoppe on Anarcho-Capitalism, David Gordon on Liberty, and Lew Rockwell on Reading for Liberty.

  1. See Foreword to A Spontaneous Order[]
  2. Zwolinski seems to be unsure whether he is a libertarian or just a classical liberal, despite having published articles or books on libertarianism. See, e.g., Aaron Powell and Trevor Burris, “Bleeding Heart Libertarianism: A Retrospective (with Matt Zwolinski),” Free Thoughts Podcast, Libertarianism.org (June 26, 2020; Youtube), at 30:20. []
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