I, for one, am sick of the Robin Hood myth and movies. Or I thought I was. On the latest episode of Mark Kermode’s BBC film review podcast, there’s a fascinating discussion with Russell Crowe and “Billy Bragg” about the upcoming Ridley Scott film Robin Hood, starring (and co-produced by) Crowe. The new movie is a departure from other versions, with Robin Hood involved in the Magna Carta and also the Forest Charter which, “In contrast to Magna Carta, it provided some real rights, privileges and protections for the common man against the abuses of the encroaching aristocracy.” One line I like from the Forest Charter: “Any archbishop, bishop, earl, or baron who crosses our forest may take one or two beasts by view of the forester, if he is present; if not, let a horn be blown so that this [hunting] may not appear to be carried on furtively.”
The discussion about this with Crowe and Bragg (9:00 to about 32:10 of the podcast) goes into how the Norman aristocracy unjustly invaded the land rights of the common people, which was redressed to some degree by the Forest Charter. Sounds interesting.
Update: see Rand on the Injuns and Property Rights:
See Hoppe, “Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization,” as ch. 5 of The Great Fiction, Part II, discussing the right of groups to homestead partial easements of land by use. I have written a bit on some similar matters, about how the English “enclosure” did violate some pre-existing easement rights, so in some sense “property” is “theft” as Proudhon said (meaning property rights decreed legislatively by the state that trampled on pre-existing easement rights).
Creative Common Law Project, R.I.P. and Waystation Libertarians:
From Jamin Hübner, before he became a socialist:
Another myth is more fundamental: that of “free and voluntary exchange” that underlies all market interactions. This individualistic, utilitarian, and neoliberal dogma, repeated ad nauseum by anarcho-capitalist and neoconservative apologists, was perceptively challenged by William Thompson nearly two centuries ago when he observed that people without capital (e.g., tools and materials to produce)—like former serfs who were evicted from the manor during the enclosure movement—have no choice but to sell themselves. “The selling of their labor power was not a free exchange, but was coerced. The threat of starvation was as coercive as a threat by violent means” (E. K. Hunt and Mark Lautzenheiser, A History of Economic Thought, 158).
Gene Epstein and I were discussing this the other day and I observed that it could be argued that this violates the easement rights of the ranchers/hunters, like the enclosure laws that left-libertarians have opposed (“property is theft”). I pointed out that even in Hoppe’s theory you can have group easement rights that are violated by enclosure/fencing. Here is the email I sent him:
Re our brief discussion—Hoppe on group easements: “Of Private, Common, and Public Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization” — see in particular Part II.
Re the Forest charter, enclosures, and so on — Robin Hood, Magna Carta, and the Forest Charter. And how the enclosure movement could be seen as a type of theft of preexisting easements–a la Hoppe’s comments too.
[TLS]
Update: Grok Prompt:
from a libertarian perspective, how could it be argued that the land enclosure movement was a taking of property rights (such as pre-existing hunting and access easement?) and not pro-property rights after all, so that proudhon’s “property is theft” is not really an attack on private property but on the state’s interference in the natural property system? Consult https://mises.org/mises-daily/rationale-total-privatization https://stephankinsella.com/2024/10/polygamist-sect-fence-off-1000-acres/ https://stephankinsella.com/2010/05/robin-hood-magna-carta-and-the-forest-charter/ and “See Hoppe, “Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization,” as ch. 5 of The Great Fiction, Part II, discussing the right of groups to homestead partial easements of land by use. I have written a bit on some similar matters, about how the English “enclosure” did violate some pre-existing easement rights, so in some sense “property” is “theft” as Proudhon said (meaning property rights decreed legislatively by the state that trampled on pre-existing easement rights).”
Summary:
From a libertarian perspective, grounded in the principles of homesteading and natural rights, property ownership emerges through original appropriation of unowned resources via first use, occupation, or transformation, creating an objective, intersubjectively ascertainable link between the individual and the resource. This view, as articulated by thinkers like Hans-Hermann Hoppe and Murray Rothbard, extends beyond full ownership to include partial rights, such as easements, which can be homesteaded by individuals or groups through repeated use without claiming the entire parcel. For instance, communities might establish rights-of-way for access, hunting, or grazing on common lands, preserving these as non-exclusive but protected interests that do not infringe on others’ potential full appropriation so long as the appropriator respects them.
The English land enclosure movement, spanning roughly the 16th to 19th centuries, involved parliamentary acts that consolidated and privatized vast swathes of common lands—previously open fields, forests, and wastes—into exclusive holdings for landowners, often aristocrats or wealthy farmers. On the surface, this might appear pro-property rights, as it shifted resources from communal use to individual control, ostensibly incentivizing efficient agriculture and economic growth. However, libertarians can argue it was fundamentally a state-orchestrated taking, violating pre-existing homesteaded rights. Commoners had long homesteaded partial easements through customary use: rights to hunt, gather wood, graze livestock, or traverse paths across these lands, as evidenced in historical documents like the Forest Charter of 1217, which explicitly protected such communal privileges against royal or aristocratic overreach, including allowances for limited hunting by certain classes under defined conditions. These easements were not mere privileges granted by the state but naturally arising from prior occupation and use, akin to how groups can co-own or claim restricted access to streets or paths without full privatization infringing on established rights-of-way.
In this framework, the enclosure acts represented aggression: the state legislatively extinguished these homesteaded easements, evicting serfs and commoners, fencing off lands, and redistributing them to favored elites, often without compensation or consent. This mirrors modern analogies, such as unauthorized fencing of public forest land, which libertarians view as trespass against implied group easements established by ranchers, hikers, or recreational users through ongoing access and use. Hoppe emphasizes that genuine privatization of common goods, like streets or lands, must preserve pre-established easements to avoid conflict, stating that appropriation “can be done provided only that the appropriation of the street does not infringe on the previously established rights — the easements — of private-property owners to use such streets ‘for free.'” By contrast, enclosures did precisely that, using state power to override natural property norms, leading to widespread displacement and poverty, as symbolized in folklore like Robin Hood’s resistance to Norman encroachments on forest rights. Thus, rather than advancing property rights, enclosures distorted them, institutionalizing theft under the guise of law.
This interpretation reframes Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s famous declaration that “property is theft.” Libertarians can argue it does not attack private property per se—the voluntary, homestead-based system that resolves scarcity conflicts peacefully—but critiques state-interfered “property,” where legislative decrees trample on pre-existing, naturally homesteaded rights like easements. In the enclosure context, the “property” created was indeed theft, as it stole from the commoners’ prior claims, much as state ownership of public lands today perpetuates conflicts by denying restitution to original users or funders. Proudhon’s phrase, then, aligns with a libertarian call for “total privatization” that rectifies such injustices by restoring resources to those with legitimate homestead claims, eliminating state distortions, and allowing easements to persist or be negotiated voluntarily. This underscores the distinction between artificial, state-granted titles and the organic property system emerging from human action.
I’ve always seen the Robin Hood legend as something of a misinterpretation. Or perhaps just misinterpreted given the prevailing social views of a particular era. Consider that when he “robbed from the rich to give to the poor”, who they are talking about. The “rich” of that time were the aristocracy (the government). Wealthy private individuals didn’t really exist – even mercantilism wasn’t around yet. In my mind he’s the forerunner to Rand’s Ragnar Danneskjold.
I would prefer a Robin Hood that robs intellectual property from evildoers