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On Property Rights in Superabundant Bananas and Property Rights as Normative Support for Possession

by on April 19, 2025

[From my Webnote series]

Related:

From a twitter post. Kinsella on fie-ya.

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This is why I use conflictability (or rivalrousness) instead of scarcity, 2 since the latter term is ambiguous and has different connotations. In common usage it just means lack of abundance. In terms of praxeology and property rights it means the opposite of superabundance. They are different concepts. In the strict sense if you live in a world of a trillion bananas each one is still a “scarce resource,” that is, each one is “scarce” even though bananas are very abundant and practically the banana is not “scarce” in the colloquial sense.

When Hoppe and others use imaginary constructs like the Schlaraffenland 3 (like the Garden of Eden or Land of Cockaigne) they in effect “take the limit,” to use a calculus concept—so that something that is in very-large-supply (in which each unit is still itself “scarce” or conflictable) becomes infinitely available, meaning it’s now a general condition of human action and not a scarce resource at all. So in this unrealistic-world, if you could imagine an infinite supply of bananas, each one would not really be scarce because your taking it from me does not deprive me of it since I can immediately conjure another one (by the same token you would have no reason to ever take it from me since you have your own infinite magical supply).

In other words, things that are such that they are infinite supply–superabundant–are such that they are literally not means of action anymore but are general conditions thereof; and each “unit”, to the extent that concept makes sense anymore in such a dreamworld, is not really an ownable thing and thus not a stealable thing. That is why no property rights apply. And in the real world, this is the case only with information which plays a distinct role in action from that of scarce (rivalrous, conflictable) means. (See ch. 15 of my LFFS, Part IV.E)

This is where my point in  “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract” comes in: where I distinguish between means and possession of means which are economic-descriptive-causal; and property rights which are normative-prescriptive and are normative supports for action and possession in a social context. In my view the importance of these nuances and distinctions cannot be overstated and an understanding of all this is necessary and critical in order to avoid confusion in these matters.

The reason knowledge or ideas cannot be ownable is the same reason that a superabundant banana cannot be owned: ideas guide action but are not scarce (rivalrous) means of action. An actor, say, Crusoe, has possession of and employs scarce means but does not possess (in the same way) ideas/knowledge. He needs both for any action, and the better the means (in terms of causal efficacy) and the better the knowledge (in terms of accuracy) the more successful the action, but scarce means of action, and knowledge that guides the action, play distinct roles. In the social world where norms (laws, property rights) are introduced, the laws play the role of normative support for the possession of scarce means facet of action, but not for the possession of knowledge facet since there is no possibility for conflict over the knowledge part and thus nothing for “property rights in knowledge/ideas” to add.

Similarly with the (hypothetical, imaginary, and frankly impossible—see below) super-banana in a world of infinite or super-abundance of bananas: Since it can never be lost or taken there can be no conflict over it, and thus no real “possession” of it–it’s not a scarce means of action that plays a role in action, like scarce means and knowledge do–it’s more like a general background of human action; and because it’s not possessed it makes no sense to add “normative support” to it in the form of law or property rights. 4

(Regarding the hypothetical of the suber-abundant bananas: Some constructs are not impossible, as is the Schlaraffenland, or the “evenly rotating economy,” but are just unlikely or less rich or applicable, like the Crusoe economy or a barter economy without money. 5 This is another important distinction to keep in mind. See LFFS, ch. 7, text at notes 38-40; and ch. 23, text at notes 16-17.)

And also somewhat analogously, as I pointed out before, 6 bitcoin cannot be owned since it does not “exist” as an independent material thing—but which is instead just the conceptually understood unit of an abstract concept of a spreadsheet or ledger, essentially a data or information structure that is also was just stored on or impatterned in some existing material substrate or carrier, which itself has independent existence and as a scarce thing, an owner according to standard property allocation principles (original appropriation and contractual transfer)—and because it does not exist in this sense it cannot be possessed and also cannot be owned; but then it does not need to be owned, as it does not need the normative support of property rights for the same reason information does not: information or knowledge is not conflictable, there can be no conflict over it, so property rights make no sense as it is not “possessed” and thus cannot be and does not need to be “owned”; it needs no normative support. Same with bitcoin: “it” can be “possessed” only in a figurative but practical sense of being controlled by its holder by virtue of the secure encryption scheme of Bitcoin; it is simply impossible for someone to “take” it given the design of the system. Thus property rights and ownership of bitcoin not only makes no sense but would be superfluous. Bitcoiners’ instincts are right when they refer to “ownership” of bitcoin as absolute or perfect ownership, but what they really mean is control or possession that is of a type that cannot be taken—there is no danger of conflict and thus there is no conflict, and so property rights, which only add normative support on top of control or possession, but which are not perfect (since property rights are normative and prescriptive and unlike physical, causal laws, can be violated), make no sense and could never be as good as the security of possession/control the bitcoin holder already has by virtue of the design of the BTC system itself.

It would be like having a house with a lock that could not be broken, or an invulnerable suit of armor that no one could pierce; or invulnerability like Superman or The Hulk, or even like God–which is getting to the fantastical just like the Schlaraffenland or evenly-rotating-economy constructs [see above] … all this shows that property rights for such things simply make no sense: not for bitcoin, not for knowledge, not for God, not for super-abundant bananas. But unlike superabundant bananas, knowledge really does guide action and is useful, and Bitcoin is useful too as a medium of exchange and maybe, someday, money…

Update: on all (human) rights being property rights, and the problem with the Objectivist idea of a “right to life”. See tweets here, including:

On norms, rights, and similar concepts applying to God and so on:

From the Tweet:

It’s kind of interesting how a principled libertarian Christian should view God. Just as Christians (confusingly, IMO) reject Mises’s views about praxeology–the idea that humans act, which is always driven by felt uneasiness, meaning they are imperfect, not omniscient, not omnipotent–which imply there can be no acting God 7 by this weird handwave “praxeology only applies to humans”–they could also say that libertarian ethics only applies to humans. But there I think they would be correct. If we assume God is benevolent, then he is libertarian 8 in the sense that He wants humans to live happy, flourishing lives, and since he is omniscient He understand that this means property rights rooted in original appropriation and contract, i.e.. he opposes violent conflict prefers harmony and prosperity and thus favors law based on property rights.

As for God himself you could look at it two ways: either rights and the NAP “don’t apply” to God–in a little shuffle similar to their praxeology dodge, but here it actually make sense. Or you say that even if the NAP applies to God he is in compliance with it since he created the universe and all men and thus He does have a unique connection to it so that he has the best claim. He is the owner of all reality. As I have pointed out, creation is not a source of rights for men, since we do not create things we only find them and rearrange them. 9 Occupation is the source of property rights for men. That’s for external resources. For your body, you have the best connection since you directly control it. 10

God’s connection to things is unique and sui generis since he did create all things and also by his magical powers he can directly control all men–if He wanted to he could move your body around like a puppet. So God has two claims to “own” every person’s body superior to each person’s own claim: He created your body and he also can directly control it at will. So God treating us as his owned slaves is not contrary to libertarian ethics. He is the “ur-owner” 11 since he is the Creator of our bodies and he is the direct controller; God is an exception to observation that creation is normally not a source of ownership or property rights. 12 Furthermore because He is omniscient and benevolent he would never “misuse” or “mistreat” his slaves, and anyway we cannot do anything about it anyway. 13

And finally the reason it does make sense to say libertarian ethics does not apply to God (while it is dishonest and confused to say that praxeology does not apply to Him because it’s “only for humans”) is that for humans there is free will and choice and norms but norms are not causal laws, they are not “binding” causally and can be disobeyed or violated (unlike causal laws); property rights provide normative support for possession. But just as bitcoin cannot be owned but need not be since possession of a bitcoin is more secure than property rights anyway, God does not need norms or property rights.

  1. On Conflictability and Conflictable Resources [↩]
  2. On Conflictability and Conflictable Resources [↩]
  3. Search for this word in my book, it’s mentioned in a few places; Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) (LFFS). [↩]
  4. Update: Penner on Intellectual Property, Monopolies, and Property: p. 15: “there are a number of rights to things or states which do not involve any action at all on the part of the right-holder, and therefore there are no actions which they can guide in a straightforward way. Consider the rights to life and bodily security. These rights name states in which a person finds himself, i.e. alive and secure. Even so, one’s actions are guided by whether one has these rights. One will act differently in a society in which one has these rights, especially if they are legal rights, from the way in which one will act in a society where there are no such rights. Presumably, one is simply less likely to come under attack if one has those rights. Without them, one would modify one’s behaviour accordingly-carry a gun, perhaps, or stick with one’s clan or tribe.” [↩]
  5. Konrad Graf, “Action-Based Jurisprudence: Praxeological Legal Theory in Relation to Economic Theory, Ethics, and Legal Practice,” Libertarian Papers 3, 19 (2011), p. 4, writes: “… “Crusoe economics” is a fictional device to explain the most fundamental concepts of praxeology itself”. To be clear, Crusoe economics is not impossible and is realistic, and not necessarily fictional, unlike constructs such as the Schlaraffenland or the “evenly rotating economy,” which are completely impossible and unrealistic. [↩]
  6. KOL274 | Nobody Owns Bitcoin (PFS 2019) [↩]
  7.  Mises on God. [↩]
  8. Omega-Chloride-Redford on my “Plagiarism”; Jesus is an Anarchist (2). [↩]
  9. Libertarian and Lockean Creationism: Creation As a Source of Wealth, not Property Rights; Hayek’s “Fund of Experience”; the Distinction Between Scarce Means and Knowledge as Guides to Action. [↩]
  10.  How We Come to Own Ourselves; Libertarian Answer Man: Mind-Body Dualism, Self-Ownership, and Property Rights. [↩]
  11. See Stephen R. Donaldson’s term “ur-viles” in The Chronicles of Thomas Covenant. [↩]
  12. Locke on IP; Mises, Rothbard, and Rand on Creation, Production, and ‘Rearranging’; Rand on IP, Owning “Values”, and ‘Rearrangement Rights’. [↩]
  13. I have elsewhere mused that God, if He exists, is an existential threat to humanity and we should be working with AI and technology to develop defensive superweapons against Him. E.g.: “x.com/NSKinsella/sta “God can kiss my ass. If He exists, He’s an existential threat to humanity, and we can only hope we achieve AI or whatever quick enough to kill or imprison his ass.”; x.com/NSKinsella/sta “there is no God but if there was one it would be humanity’s mission to build weapons to hunt him down and destroy him since he’s an evil fucker and an existential threat to all that’s good in life. Please ban me, dirt-worshipper.”; x.com/NSKinsella/sta “I don’t think there was a Flood nor was there or is there a God. Just saying, if he exists, he is an existential threat. And I can question his will because I don’t need to trust his opinions–maybe he’s wrong, or evil, or has different values than I do. I don’t answer to others.” x.com/NSKinsella/sta “States don’t have authority and neither does your God. But unlike God, states actually exist. if God also existed, our duty would be to find a way to conquer and defeat him, for he is evil and an existential threat to mankind (remember the Flood?).””. [↩]
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Kinsella profile-head - 1Stephan Kinsella is a libertarian writer and retired patent attorney in Houston, Texas. He has published widely on various areas of libertarian legal theory and on legal topics such as intellectual property law and international law. His publications include Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Papinian Press, 2023), Against Intellectual Property (Mises Institute, 2008), International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford, 2020), and The Universal Principles of Liberty (2025).

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