Armoutidis, Who Owns Public Property? Libertarian Property Theory and the Problem of Immigration

by Stephan Kinsella on October 1, 2025

Christos Armoutidis, “Who Owns Public Property? Libertarian Property Theory and the Problem of Immigration,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 29 (2): 56–71

No time to read just yet, but here is Grok:

Prompt:

Compare this article by Armoutidis to the immigration views of Hoppe and Kinsella, as found in I’m Pro-Immigration and Pro-Open Borders [well, not exactly…], Hoppe and Kinsella on Immigration, On “Unowned” State Property, Legal Positivism, Ownership vs. Possession, Immigration, Public Roads, and the Bum in the Library, A Simple Libertarian Argument Against Unrestricted Immigration and Open Borders, Boudreaux on Hoppe on Immigration, On Free Immigration and Forced Integration, In the Free Market, May a Businessman Hire Any Immigrant He Chooses?,

Natural Order, the State, and the Immigration Problem.

Overview of Armoutidis’s Position

In his 2025 article “Who Owns Public Property? Libertarian Property Theory and the Problem of Immigration,” Christos Armoutidis argues that public property (e.g., roads, ports) is rightfully owned by taxpayers as partial restitution for state aggression via taxation. This ownership implies the right to exclude, making unrestricted open borders inconsistent with libertarian principles in a state-dominated world, where immigration often relies on public resources. Instead, he views targeted immigration restrictions as a “second-best” solution: they minimize rights violations and maximize restitution by aligning with the majority of taxpayers’ preferences (who empirically favor controls). Armoutidis grants exceptions for truly unowned lands (e.g., un-homesteaded national parks) and critiques opposing views, like Simon Guenzl’s claim that public property is unowned, by defending taxpayer restitution through homesteading analogies and contractual validity. He explicitly positions his argument as an extension of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s and Stephan Kinsella’s work, portraying open borders as favoring a minority of owners at the expense of the majority.

Hoppe’s Views on Immigration

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a key figure in anarcho-capitalist thought, consistently argues that libertarian immigration policy must prioritize property rights and voluntary association over egalitarian open borders, especially in the presence of state welfare and public property. In an ideal private-law society, all land is privately owned, so “immigration” becomes irrelevant—access requires explicit invitation from owners, enabling exclusion based on covenants, zoning, or cultural compatibility to preserve property values and community homogeneity. Hoppe rejects both unconditional open borders (which invite “invasion” and welfare exploitation) and conditional ones (tied to welfare abolition, but still risking cultural displacement). He advocates restricted, contractual immigration: immigrants need sponsorship from a domestic property owner, exclusion from welfare, liability for the sponsor, and revocable invitations, with borders serving as checkpoints for validity.

Public property exacerbates the problem by enabling “forced integration”—uninvited immigrants can use state-controlled roads or parks, imposing costs on taxpayers without consent, unlike private arrangements (e.g., Swiss cantons or factory towns where employers cover all costs). Democracies, as “publicly owned governments,” prioritize short-term votes over long-term value, leading to non-discriminatory policies that flood high-wage areas with low-skilled migrants, eroding cultures and atomizing societies for state control. Solutions include privatization (distributing public property shares by tax paid), secession for local controls, and strict state-level filters (e.g., skills tests, cultural assimilation requirements). Hoppe sees free trade as compatible with restrictions, as trade doesn’t require physical relocation onto others’ property.

Kinsella’s Views on Immigration

Stephan Kinsella, a libertarian legal theorist, shares Hoppe’s skepticism of open borders but frames his critique around restitution and the moral ownership of public property. He distinguishes legal (state-controlled) from rightful (taxpayer) ownership: public resources are stolen from taxpayers via taxation, so they hold moral title as rectification, entitling them to influence usage rules (e.g., excluding non-residents from pools or roads). Unrestricted immigration via public property (e.g., ports) violates these rights more than controlled access, as it favors a minority of “owners” (open-borders advocates) over the majority, reducing net restitution.

Kinsella prefers privatization but, in the interim, supports state management reflecting taxpayer majorities—empirically, most favor restrictions to avoid “forced integration” costs (e.g., welfare, overcrowding). He critiques open-borders libertarians for ignoring this, arguing that no rules on public property (pure openness) further victimizes taxpayers, while restrictions (like citizenship-based access) provide partial justice. Like Hoppe, Kinsella ties this to broader state critiques but emphasizes utilitarian restitution over cultural arguments.

Comparison

Armoutidis’s article is a direct intellectual descendant of Hoppe and Kinsella, synthesizing and defending their positions against critics like Guenzl (who claims public property is unowned, rendering borders irrelevant). All three prioritize property theory: public resources aren’t “common” but stolen, entitling taxpayers/owners to exclusion rights. They agree open borders are untenable under states, advocating restrictions as harm-reduction. Differences are minor and tonal:

Aspect	Armoutidis (2025)	Hoppe (1998–2004)	Kinsella (2005)
Core Argument	Taxpayer restitution via public property justifies restrictions as “second-best.”	Invited/contractual immigration only; state forces unwanted integration.	Moral taxpayer ownership demands rules reflecting majority preferences for restitution.
Public Property	Rightfully private (taxpayers’); unowned exceptions rare (e.g., virgin lands).	Enables forced access; privatize to limit movement.	Legally state’s, morally taxpayers’; manage for utility/restitution.
Open Borders	Untenables minority preference; increases violations.	Disastrous (welfare collapse, cultural invasion); incompatible with property.	Ignores victim rights; less restitution than controls.
State Context	Restrictions minimize aggression vs. alternatives short of abolition.	Democracies over-admit; favor monarchies/Swiss models for selectivity.	Second-best: align with taxpayer majorities (e.g., via polls).
Solutions	Privatize; homestead unowned lands preferentially to taxpayers.	Secession, privatization, strict filters (skills/culture).	Privatize; interim rules like non-resident fees/exclusions.
Tone/Emphasis	Defensive (vs. Guenzl); focuses on logical consistency.	Cultural/economic warnings; anti-democratic.	Restitution-focused; pragmatic/utilitarian.

Similarities: All reject open borders as libertarian in welfare-state realities, centering public property as the crux (contra “unowned” views). They envision private societies resolving issues via invitations/exclusions and see restrictions as protective, not contradictory to free markets.

Differences: Armoutidis is more explicitly restorative (restitution as ownership title) and less cultural than Hoppe, who warns of “foreign invasion” eroding civilizations. Kinsella is closest, emphasizing majority preferences and analogies (e.g., pools), which Armoutidis echoes but expands with fiat-money/contract critiques. Armoutidis “grants false assumptions” to bolster their shared thesis, making his work a rigorous update rather than innovation. Overall, it reinforces Hoppe/Kinsella without substantive divergence, substantiating claims that open borders overlook aggression against property owners.