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Reply — hnn: Palmer on federalism

reply to Palmer here reprinted, in case hnn deletes it:

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Do the “rules” of this board prevent disingenuous replies or outright libel? I guess not.

P-dog says:

What I find remarkable is the eagerness to resist restrictions on state power emanating from the federal courts when they are (or could be but didn’t, as in the Kelo case) issuing opinions that are well grounded in the text of the constitution.

But they are not well-grounded in the “text” of the Constitution. This is mere question-begging. Palmer here snidely implies that hmm, there must be some sneaky reason we are “eager” to “resist restrictions” on state power. P-boy here snidely implies that those who are in favor of federalism–you know, like all educated libertarians until the modern “improved” generation–are “eager” to want states to be able to hurt people. This vile slander is inappropriate in this forum.

If one thinks the “text” that reads “privileges or immunities of citizens” automatically and obviously means citizens’ rights, as implicit in the…. Bill of Rights, despite the history of the 14th amendment, then he must have a crystal ball. I mean, they left the word “rights” out because … ahhh … .well, who knows, but they MUST have meant rights, anyway. And, umm, just because this language tracks language in a previous bill that clearly referred to a narrow set of rights, not a broad set, well, let’s just ignore that. And look, just because they listed due process in the 14th amendment, even though they didn’t need to if the privileges/immunities clause incorporated the one from the 5th amendment–let’s just ignore that too.

Rejecting the 14th Amendment on the grounds that it isn’t part of the Constitution is absurd; we currently do have a federal Constitution.

P-dog may be right; but none of us are basing our argument on this claim. Now the brilliant Gene Healy does make this quite respectable argument:

Given that the Fourteenth Amendment was never legitimately ratified,we’re freer to adopt a narrow construction of the amendment than we would otherwise be. By giving a narrow reading to the Fourteenth Amendment (which was not a product of constitutional consent), courts keep faith with the Tenth (which was). From this perspective, the post-Civil-War Court’s crabbed construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Slaughterhouse might well be justified as a blow for originalism.

That is, we can’t ignore the 14th, but recognizing its problematic origin, perhaps when the federalism principle of the 10th butts up against the alleged erosion thereof in the 14th, we give the nod to the 10th. Just a thought.

But our arguments don’t rest on this. We assume the 14th is part of the Constitution. So why does Palmer use this straw man?

We should appeal to it when the appeal is well grounded in the text and likely to advance liberty.

Well now, finally an unambiguous normative assertion about what “we” “should” do. I welcome a rigorous defense of this, coupled with some explanation why it is obvious why anyone who disagrees with it is an apologist for slavery, bigot, racist, anti-semite–am I leaving any out?–the kind of outrageous, disgusting smears that Palmer regularly trots out on his smearblog as the kneejerk response to anyone who does not toe the Cato line. But eve if this mere assertion were true, it again rests on the notion of appeals “well grounded in the text.” Of course, this is what is in question, so it is question begging, as well as disingenuous.

What exactly is P-dog saying? Is he saying everyone (or just libertarians?) should (?) “adopt” a given argument for construction of the Constitution, as long as someone can plausibly say “it is well grounded in the text”, so long as in one concrete case it increases liberty? What exaclty is he saying? That it does not matter what the Constitution really means? That the original limits on the feds are elastic? Subject to their discretion? Or only … if they are libertarian judges? What?

Similarly, the guarantees to citizens of the several states in Article IV of “all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States” is in the federal (and unamendd) Constitution, as is the guarantee of a “Republican Form of Government.”

HO HO! So here we come to the fall-back. Notice Palmer first tries to imply that the 14th amendment’s “privileges or immunities” clause somehow includes some broad set of rights, supposedly largely coextensive with those express or implied in the Bill of Rights (well, only, er, some of htem–not those in the 10th, or the 27th amendment, or the unratified 1st article of the 12 articles submitted… or not in the 3rd, or 2d, amendment, and not parts of the 5th, and, er, um, also not the due process clause of the 5th, because, you see, that’s already in the 14th).

Then his fall-back: why, we never had federalism at all! You see, FROM THE BEGINNING, the feds had the power to review state laws for all the rights in the Bill of Rights, because of the original privileges or immunities clause (even though this is not in the power-graning section of the constitution) or the Republican form of government clause–but let’s ignore the fact that, say, the original privileges or immunities clause was adopted in 1789, when there WAS NO BILL OF RIGHTS (that came in 1791), so how in the world could the earlier P-I clause include those rights, as is argued that the later one does… or does the earlier P-I clause incorporate, oh, I don’t know, some other unspecified set of rights? So that the feds have strictly enumerated powers… except here–they had the power to enforce whatever rights they wanted to against the states, no definition or limits at all. Even though the States would never have consented to a federal Constitution that granted such power.

Nice. Convenient. Let’s chuck all we know about history and context, and just read the bare words on paper, in the most favorable way as possible for (centralized) libertarianism… then just “assume” we can somehow, someday, find enough libertarian judges to interpret it the same way…

Oh, it’s so beautiful, I want to cry.

The 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments are in the federal Constitution.

Interesting, that–curious, if the 14th Amendment’s due process and/or privileges or immunities clause are so fricking broad, then presumably so is its equal protection clause. You know, that one that prevents states from treating classes of citizens differently, from discriminating? So just curious, mind you, but if that one is so broad–wouldn’t you THINK it would have prevented States from discriminating against BLACKS and WOMEN in the FUNDAMNETAL FRICKING RIGHT TO VOTE? Well, I would. But lo and behold, we needed the 15th, and 19th, amendments, to give blacks and women the right to vote. Hmmm, interesting. I guess the “equal protection” clause of the 14th ain’t as broad as it seems to a college libertarian on first reading, is it? Maybe, just maybe, the same is true of the privileges or immunities clause? Nahhh–can’t be. Anyone who thinks so is a Christian or an anti-semite (or is there a difference?).

If a state were to deny a person the legal right to vote on the grounds of race, would Mr. Anthony favor the intervention of the federal courts or of the federal Congress?

You see, there is actually constitutional grounding for such an intervention. There happens to be a constitutional amendment to this effect–the 15th. We don’t deny this. Strangely, as I noted above, the equal protection clause of the apparently very broadly construed 14th does not cover the right to vote; but no matter. Just b/c the 15th does grant a right to vote to blacks, does not mean that t
he privileges or immunities clause of the 14th includes the rights implied in the bill of rights. These are separate matters. Palmer need not caricature our view; we are actually very clear and upfront about it. We admit some constitutional limits on states, and deny others. For some reason, for those libertarian centralists who are apparently not bothered by the idea of a non-limited federla government, anyone who thinks federal supervisory power over states is limited must be a fascist secretly yearning for states to permit mobs to lynch blacks once more.

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Federalism etc. on hnn’s Liberty & Power Blog

A few recent hnn Liberty & Power threads of interest:

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Palmer on the Civil War

My reply to Palmer on hnn’s Liberty & Power blog is reprinted on this post on the Palmer Periscope, in case the pinheads there delete it [coda: I was prescient; daddy is now down the memory hole!]

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Palmer on Junge Freiheit

As noted here, Palmer has a bizarre new set of allegations about Hoppe’s alleged racism/anti-semitism, due to his being interviewed by the allegedly “fascist” German paper Junge Freiheit.

David Heinrich asked a German friend about the paper, and here is his response:

I’ve read about Mr. Palmer’s unjustifiable propaganda. The Junge Freiheit is a quite conservative newspaper. But it is in no way “fascist” or neo-nazi. But in fact the majority of Germans are nasty little leftists who react allergically against anything that is “rechtsextrem”, i.e. “right-wing extremist”. Of course “rechtsextrem” is an anti-concept, but it is very fashionable here in Germany, especially with the German Verfassungsschutz. The Verfassungsschutz is a government institution which keeps under surveillance “anti-constitutional” organizations, persons and newspapers which do not conform to the “consent of the democrats”, i.e. to the leftist public opinion which of course is made by government officals. Every year the Verfassungsschutz publishes a so called “Verfassungsschutzberich” which contains a list of all these obvserved organizations, persons and newspapers and detailed desciptions of their activities and the “threat” they represent. In fact this is just a form of censorship which is designed in order to ruin these organizations’, persons’ or newspapers’ reputation – quite successfully, if I may say so. It is a very effective form of surpressing disagreeable political opposition.

The Junge Freiheit was put under surveillance of the Verfassungsschutz by the government of North Rhine Westfalia (which then was a coalition of government of Socialists and Greens), which was heavily critized by some major German newspapers and publishers because the Junge Freiheit was by no means “extremist”. (btw. the government of North Rhine Westfalia, which was voted out of office some weeks ago, also put people under surveillance of the Verfassungsschutz because they were against the European Currency Union, as can be seen in the Verfassungsschutzberich for North Rhine Westfalia of 1997 or 1998.)
Meanwhile, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which is the German Supreme Court, declared that the Verfassungsschutz surveillance of the Junge Freiheit is unconstitutional and and infringement of the freedom of the press.

I guess Mr. Palmer should do some investigations next time before going to bash anyone for being a “fascist” or neo-nazi or whatever. Me, I still wonder why Mr. Palmer seems to think that a government organization like the Verfassungsschutz is [reliable], because they are the real facists.

Of course, Palmer’s bleatings, as usual, make no sense at all. Mises himself fled
Austria to avoiding death at Nazi hands. The Mises site is filled with the most passionate anti-Nazi writings that exist. Hoppe is a libertarian anarchist, and gave an interview to a conservative German newspaper, in which he advocated libertarianism and explicitly attacked national socialism. Prominent German libertarians have written for paper and link to it, along with historians such as Ralph Raico and Martin Van Creveld. Palmer’s kooky conspiracy views are just that.

There is absolutely no reason to be defensive about Junge Freiheit. Junge Freiheit is as “fascistic” and “neo-Nazi” as Peter Brimelow’s VDare. I would not be surprised if Paul Gottfried, who has often written for them, writes something on this matter. I hope he does.

Palmer is a hysterical jerk, who has no aptitude for polemical debate whatsoever, so all he can do is rant and slander.

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In this thread, Heinrich wrote:

Palmer continues repeating the assertion that the work published by the LvMI is “an embarassment”. In particular, he thinks Hoppe’s work is “an embarassment”. At one point in the past, he argued that Prof. Hoppe’s claim that “on a free market, all unemployment is voluntary” was an embarassment to Austrian economists. Stephan Kinsella responded by quoting a statement of Ludwig von Mises saying the same thing. Palmer then facetuously accused Kinsella of an “appeal to authority” (http://tinyurl.com/ba5e4) Also, in that regards, see “The Ludwig von Mises Legacy: A Reality Check” by J.H. Huebert.

Palmer replies:

And Mr. Heinrich, be careful of what you quote, since the quotation from my personal correspondence of a few years back with the odd Mr. Kinsella contains quite a few of those little dots […]. The claim that in a free market all unemployment is voluntary is not a tenable thesis; insisting that it must be true because Mises said something that could be interpreted that way is mere evidence of cultishnes, and nothing more.

Now as even Heinrich’s summary makes clear, and as Palmer well knows by now (as I have explained it to him numerous times), I did not insist that the comment about voluntarly unemployment is true because Mises said it, as anyone of even normal intelligence can understand (in fact, I do not believe I have ever stated that I do even fully agree with Hoppe and Mises here).

As I have explained repeatedly [see Raico Cleans Tom Palmer’s Clock and re: Raico Cleans Tom Palmer’s Clock], I was simply showing Palmer’s assertion was ridiculous–that Hoppe’s comments were an embarrasment to Austrian economics. If they are perfectly consistent with the explicit views of the preeminent Austrian as expressed in his magnum opus, well, then Palmer’s critique is inexplicable. The real truth is that when I pointed out this statement it embarrassed Palmer and it nailed his ass. Does anyone doubt that when he saw the Mises quote that was in line with what Hoppe said, Palmer thought, “Oh shit. I wish I would have not picked that example.”–?

He was cornered and like a cornered animal, he stupidly fought harder. Since I had him dead to rights, he had no real defense but to lie and claim that I was acting cultlike in appealing to authority. I was not appealing to authority, and Palmer knows it. He used a ridiculous example that made him look like the ass he is when I pulled out the Mises quote, and he is desperate to cover it up.

As he wrote, “If you’re right, then so what? Is that an argument? If you’re right about this, then Mises was wrong. Is that so hard to accept?” I never said Mises or Hoppe were right. I was not appealing to authority at all, except to show that the view in question was also held by the most prominent Austrian, and therefore was, umm, Austrian, or hardly an embarrassment to Austrianism.

I can just imagine Palmer’s reaction when he saw I had found a quote of Mises that says EXACTLY what Hoppe said, that Palmer had criticized in his pompous fashion. I bet his little eyes bugged out. Ha ha ha ha ha.

Palmer also calls me “odd.” He just embarrasses himself by such comments. What he finds is odd is someone who is intelligent, articulate, successful, not a loser, not a religious nut, and who also has a sense of humor–and who does not take him seriously. He just can’t fathom that, so oddly arrogant is he. I decided to tease him by making fun of his hypersensitive, ridiculous PC standards–he and his ilk call anyone who sneezes a bigot–by asking if he had ever used the word “bigger”; because if so, that is just one letter away from the n-word, so he is a semi-racist. Obviously the point is to make fun of his stupid accusations of bigotry etc. Yet he feigns innocence, ominously intoning that something must be seriously wrong with me to fixate on the word “bigger”–even doing me the favor of banning me from his smearblog for doing this.

What is truly odd is someone like Palmer–who is objectively odd, given the things I have heard about him and that he has manifested–thinking he is in a position to call me odd. If someone like Palmer did not think me odd, that’s probably when I would start worrying.

Coda:

The sad, pathetic, monomaniacal Mr. Palmer has a final comment on the thread:

“That goes for simply accepting as truth everything said by Mr. Kinsella. My advice is that you be more careful about labelling someone a liar based on one person’s heavily edited extracts from personal correspondence to which you have no access.”

Hmmm, let’s see. Now Palmer tries to deflect from the clear case that shows he’s a buffoon by pointing to the fact that his comments were from a private email and that ellipses were used.

Palmer the shell of a human (as someone called him) published the following comments:

…Skousen made subtle reference to … Hoppe’s failure to understand fundamental Austrian economic principles, such as the role of time in economic adjustment. “As the editor of this volume, I have to admit that I do not agree with everything Professor Hoppe presents as Misesian economics, even in this significantly revised chapter. For example, I have serious doubts about his claim that market unemployment is ‘always voluntary.’ Certainly, permanent unemployment is always voluntary in the unhampered market, but a dynamic market is constantly generating temporary unemployment that requires time to correct.” … One could go on with examples of how Hoppe and the Mises Institute have proven embarrassing to the Austrian economists by whom they claim to be inspired .

What is Palmer saying here? He trots out Hoppe’s view about unemployment being voluntary on an unhampered market, an then says he says, “One could go on with examples of how Hoppe and the Mises Institute have proven embarrassing to the Austrian economists by whom they claim to be inspired”. One “could go on” with examples implies there are other examples–in addition to the one just given–that show Hoppe is embarrasing to Mises (the economist by whom he claims to be inspired). So Palmer is clearly stating, in published writing (not in private email), that Hoppe’s view about voluntary unemployment is an ebmarrassment to Mises.

Now, it so happens Mises said exactly the same thing. There can be zero doubt that Palmer was unaware of Mises’s views here, or he would not have chosen such an embarrassing example that makes him look like a moron with an vendetta.

Silly Tom Palmer ridicules some of us for believing in –gasp–limited federal government and enumerated federal powers. He repeatedly jumps to the libelous conclusion that anyone who says that, say, the Civil War was unjustified under the Constitution, or that states have a constitutional right to secede, are neo-confederate apologists for slavery pining for the antebellum south. And yet, some of Cato’s own people, notably the brilliant Gene Healy, hold the same view, and you don’t hear Palmer slandering him. Hmm, could it be–double standard, Mr. Palmer? Coward. Worm.

And he snidely attacks Hoppe’s “argumentation ethics” defense of rights, arrogantly dismissing it with a flourishing wave of the hand–“For the new prophet arrives, who teaches the truer version of that truth, while others have fallen away: say, Hans-Herman Hoppe, who has “proven” that merely to open your mouth to contradict him is to affirm what he believes, and therefore to contradict yourself. Presto! A new prophet.” And yet, Cato’s Roger Pilon, has promoted a similar defense of rights based on Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (as I have explained here); yet you don’t hear Palmer snidely attacking Pilon’s (great) work. Again: a sniveling, ignorant, dishonest coward with an axe to grind. Palmer has revealed himself time and again to be an utterly disgusting human being. For him to call me “odd,” I take as a compliment.

Finally, numbnuts Palmer says:

There is no comment section at lewrockwell.com or at antiwar.com, where people might defend themselves from the outrageous claims or distortions served up by Rockwell, Raimondo, and their merry band of kooks and crackpots.

First, Rockwell and Mises Institute have nothing to do with antiwar.com. Second, Palmer conveniently omits to note that the Mises blog does have comments.

Palmer apparently has no qualms about revealing that he has zero integrity and that he is an unfair, nasty person. What is interesting is that he adopts this arrogant pose, as if he is somebody important. That is what is truly amusing. Not content to be a plodder, he must make a name for himself by becoming the smearblogger nonpareil!

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The Appeal of States

The Appeal of States

Posted by Stephan Kinsella on July 9, 2005 02:22 PM

In replying to a recent email I was reminded of some notes I made previously on an “extreme federalist” theory of mine that I came up with in law school. The outline is below, along with elaboration in the email reply.

The Appeal of StatesUnder the “independent adequate state grounds” doctrine,

If a state court decision rests on “independent and adequate state grounds,” then regardless of how the U. S. Supreme Court resolved the federal issues presented in the case, the result of the case would remain unchanged. The Court has said that were it to accept jurisdiction in such a case, it would be rendering an advisory opinion in violation of the Constitution’s command that the federal judicial power is limited to real cases and controversies.

So if, say, in Connecticut the state high court were to have ruled that the New London taking was unconstitutional under the state takings clause and the federal takings clause, then even if the state court gave the wrong intepretation to the federal clause, there would be no reason for the feds to hear it–even if they overturned the state court ruling on the federal takings provision, the state court ruling against the taking would still be the same since it has independent and adequate state grounds to make this decision.

It has always bugged me that a state agency can appeal to the federal courts a state court’s interpretation of the federal constitution that is broader than the federal courts’ interpretation. It does not seem proper to me that a state is able to review a decision of its own state supreme court, in federal court–even if there is a federal question. Let’s say the state court throws out the conviction on the grounds that the state law violates the federal First Amendment.

Yet the U.S. Supreme Court does not itself interpret the protection of the First Amendment as broadly. Today, the prosecutor can appeal to the Supreme Court.

I am aware that prior to about 1913 (I think) that the Court did not typically hear such appeals, because there was no federal right denied. But this was not on jurisdictional grounds. In my view, the court has no jurisdiction to overturn a state supreme court holding which broadens a federal constituional provision. The main reason for my view is that the Constitution does not prevent states from protecting individual rights to a higher degree than the minimum level set by the Federal Constitution.

Indeed this is why the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine does not permit appeal if the state broadened the individual right in some other way, e.g. by its own constitutional provisions.

All the commentators today (except, as far as I can tell, Donald Bell) seem to question whether or the indep. & adequate state grounds is justifiable in restricting federal jurisdiction. But they all seem to take it for granted that, IF there is a state supreme court that rules in favor of a state indivdual citizen on federal constitutional (or legal) provisions, THEN there is federal question jurisdiction. It is that presumption that seems incorrect to me. I’d go so far as to say it is an unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction for the Supreme Court to overturn a state court’s holding in this regard. That is because it simply does not violate the Constitution for a state to expand individual rights–no matter how the state does it.

For example, if a state enacts a mere statute or even a state constittuional provision protecting freedom of speech very broadly, this will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Nor, if the state prosecutor refuses to prosecute someone engaged in speech activity. Nor, if a common law rule were to develop. But what if the voters (or state legislators) vote for a state constitutional amendment or law based on their belief that the First Amendment is broader than the Supreme Court says it is? Why is that not reviewable, but it is reviewable if the state supreme court does it? What if I as a juror believe the first amendment is broader than the Supreme Ct says it is, and thus I refuse to convict a defendant. My grounds for refusal cannot be reviewed by the supreme court. Nor if I vote in favor of a state measure based on my interpretation of the First Amendment (which is at variance with hte feds).

I just do not see why it is the Feds business how a state decides to make policy, or how it expands individual rights protections. IF it does it by common law, by prosecutorial policy, by jury nullification, by state law or constitution, by referendum–all those are okay; but a court can’t do it.

Makes no sense to me. The distinction is arbitrary.

To put it starkly, a state court freeing an individual for any reason, simply does not violate the federal constitution because nothing in the federal constitution requires states to jail citizens. Thus, if a decision of a court against a prosecutor cannot violate the constitution, why is it a “federal question”? Why is it reviewable and reversable by the Court? Why does it have jurisdiction at all?

Now what reminded me of this was the following question that someone emailed me:

It would be interesting to know how the U.S. S.Ct. would have ruled if the Conn. S.Ct. had upheld the trial court on the grounds that it violated Art. 1, Sec. 11 of the Conn.Const. – “The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor” – and New London, rather than Kelo, had appealed on the basis that its right of eminent domain under the U.S. Const. was greater than its right of eminent domain under the Conn. Const. In Pruneyard, the U.S. S.Ct. said that states could confer more expansive rights in their constitutions than were conferred by the U.S. Const. By implication, states could not confer a less expansive right than that conferred by the U.S. Const. (In Pruneyard both parties were private.) New London might argue that it had greater rights under the U.S. Const. than under the Conn. Const. That is essentially the position of the U.S. SCt in Pruneyard. That decision was logically inconsistent because it was, in part, a case involving different rights in conflict – propery rights v. free speech rights.

My reply follows:

I’m not sure I follow the twists and turns of your question. I assume you are saying the trial court ruled against the taking but the Conn S.Ct. overruled that, in essence saying the taking was consistent with both the Conn and Federal takings provisions.

If that is what you mean–then you are asking, if the Conn S Ct had overturned the takign on the grounds that it violated the STATE provision, then could New London have appealed it. I think the answer is a clear no. It is clearly permissible for states to give greater protections than teh fed constitution. Now I suppose that since the 2 provisions had diferent wordings, New London could try to argue that a broad interpretation by ConnS.Ct of the Connecticut taking provision is tantamount to an identical construction of the federal takings provision, and thus the constructions was subject to federal review. But I think that would not work.

If the Conn S. Ct had struck down the New London taking based on BOTH the Connecticut and US takings provisions, I think here, again, the Court probably would not hear it. Why? Because there is an equal and independent STATE ground to uphold the state ruling. It would not matter if the state court gave too broad a construction to the federal provision, because even if the S.Ct overturned this, the state decision would not change since it would still hav overturned the state law on state constitutional grounds.

Now: if the Conn S. Ct had overturned the conn taking based solely on its interpretation of the federal takings provision, then the law is that the S.Ct can review it, since it has jurisdiction over “federal questions.”

Coincidentally, I have written before (informally–no full article yet, but I have contemplated one)–on this very last topic. In my strict, or “extreme,” federalist view, in this case the S.Ct should have NO jurisdiction. The reason is because the Constitution at most places LIMITS on what the states can do. As is recognized, this is exactly why the states are able to have GREATER protection of rights.

But my view is that the state can provide greater protection in a number of ways. It could have its own constitutional provision, that is tighter than the feds’. Or, it could have its own courts construe its own constitutioanl provision, that is worded identially to the feds’, in a braoder fasion. Or, it could have its police simply refuse to enforce certain laws. Or, its juries might regularly overturn certain convitions. Or, the prosecutors might not act on it. Or, there might be a statute protecting the right. Or, a common law rule.

What busienss is it of the feds how the states give greater protection of rights?

So it seems to me another way is for hte state to give a broader construction to the fed’s own provisions. NOtice this is one branch of gov’t striking down the law of another branch of government for SOME reason. From the point of view of the feds, and the victim, the state is a black box that is acting as if the victim has greater rights than the feds recognize. This is permissible–so what does it matter WHY? Why is it even the feds’ buseinss?

In short: I believe state agencies should NEVER be able to appeal an action of their OWN GOVERNMENT to the feds–even if it is based on the calim that the sttae government (court, whatever) gave “too broad” a construction to the federal provision.

Consider this: suppose a state prosecutor BELIEVES the First Amendment gives greater protection to, say, commercial speech, than the Supreme Court has interpreted it. So he refuses to prosecute based on his own belief in the First Amendment’s meaning. Surely the Supreme court couldn’t review this. Why then, if a court does something similar? Or what if the legislators in the state enact a law to grant braod protection to commercial free speech because the legislators believe the First Amendment really means to do this and the Supremes have misconstrued it. Would their legislation itself be challengable just becaus it was based on an opinion of the legislators as to the meaning of the federal Constitution?

The point is: it violates the Constitution for a state to do something it prohibits. It does not violate th Constitution for the state to grant more rights than the Constitution grants. So no matter how this is done, why shoudl the fds have jurisdiction? THey should hear a case where the state is a party only to ensure the state is not violating the constitution. It does NOT violat the constitution for the state to have a certain view of the Constitution and to act on it.

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Palmer v. Kinsella on Federalism–hnn Kelo thread

My reply to Palmer from an hnn thread–reprinted below in case the pinheads over there delete me.

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Palmer first says:

It is worth remembering that taking of property is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, which stipulates that, if taken, it shall be for public use, with due process of law, and with just compensation: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment does not stipulate, unlike the First, that “Congress shall make no law…,” but that private property shall not be taken, except under the conditions stipulated. States may have the constitutional authority to ban marijuana (they certainly do have such authority with regard to alcohol), but they do not have the authority to steal Anthony’s house to give it to Tom because they like Tom more or because Tom is richer and could pay more taxes.

Here Palmer implies that the Fifth Amendment on its own applies to the States. That is, that it applied to the States in 1791. That it did not need the 14th Amendment to apply it to the States. This contradicts what almost any educated person of the time, or even now, understood about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. And it contradicts what he says later, when he implies that he realizes the 14th amendment is why the 5th applies to the States.

And he also implies States don’t have “the authority” to take property in the way he describes. I can only take this to mean he believes States derive their authority from the Constitution. If so, where, pray tell, are their powers enumerated?

As a libertarian, I don’t think States have the right, or “authority” if you will, to violate rights–which would include any taking of private property, for any purpose. But when Palmer says the State does not have the “authority,” what he means by this is that the feds have “the authority” to police this and to stop it. But of course, since the feds have only enumerated powers, they need a power to do this. Moreover, the courts need the power, not just the Congress, by the language of the 14th. And even if the feds had the jurisdiction to do this, it does not mean they are the sole or final authority for interpreting the Constitution. Just as the 3 branches of the federal government have equal and independent capacity and obligations to abide by and interpret the Constitution, so the States do as well (see Jefferson and Madison, the Kentucky and Virgina Resolves).

In any event, the point is P-dog is equivocating about what “authority” means. First, he uses it in a moral or libertarian way to act shocked that I think states have “the authority” to, say, enslave or rob people. But this usage means some moral conception of “authority,” as in a “right”. Of course States don’t have a “right” to violate “rights.” But then, he shifts, having used “authority” in the “rightful” sense, to assuming that “authority” means “authorized by the Constitution”–which implies that the Constitution is the source of state powers and also that the feds are empowered to judge the states, and are the sole and final decision maker.

This is a sneaky, flawed argument. In short, what Palmer is trying to do is argue that because a state action is a violation of rights, this automatically means the feds must have a power to stop it–otherwise the states would be “authorized”–have a “right”–to do it. But this latter usage is akin to what liberals do when they say, “but how can you ‘let’ people starve?” By Palmer’s terminology, if the UN World Court fails to overturn the US Supreme Court’s Kelo case, it is “authorizing”–horrors!–the New London eminent domain practice.

Palmer states that lynchings by states are unjust. Sure. “Does it have to be genocide for it to be unjust? Surely that can’t be right.” Of course. But this implies nothing about the division of power between the states and the feds. “Rights inhere primarily in individuals, not in groups,” he writes. Of course, T-dog. We all know and agree with this. But as your boy Gene Healy noted in this exchange with other libertarian centralists:

When a libertarian decentralist calls a federal action a violation of “states’ rights,” he means that the federal government has transgressed its enumerated powers and is claiming jurisdiction over an area that the Constitution reserves to the states. In a similar fashion, we can speak of NATO’s lawless assertion of jurisdiction over a civil war in Yugoslavia as a violation of Yugoslav “sovereignty,” without thereby conceding to Slobodan Milosevic’s government a god-given natural right to kill Kosovar Albanians.

The mistake Palmer makes is in believing–or adopting the pose of believing, after all, how could anyone else ever believe anything else–that we all agree that if you can show some state action to be unjust that this necessarily implies some other state must be authorized by its own constitution to intercede. We decentralist libertarians are quite aware that not everyone agrees with us. We are quite aware that we are a minority. We are quite aware that most libertarians are either too ignorant or too unprincipled to oppose the current system, or that they are resigned to working within it and see no point of pointing out any more that the Emperor has no clothes. But it is extremely frustrating when libertarian centralists not only differ with us, but insist on calling anyone who is in favor of limited federal government “neo-Confederates” or apologists for slavery. Or when they adopt the faux-innocent pose, pretending like it never occurs to them that the states and feds can be seen as co-equal sovereigns in a federal compact, each with delimited roles. What they are doing is what modern socialists do to libertarians: they pretend to be shocked when anyone suggests something like abolishing social security or public school, so as to snidely and subtly try to paint their opponent as having such outlandish notions that are beyond the pale of reasonable discussion. Now their little tactics here won’t work, but it is a sad sign to see such disingenuity and related desperate tactics resorted to again and again.

As for pointing out that the emperor has no clothes, I in particular mean doing what I did in my Kelo article: pointing out that the Supreme Court has no constitutional authority to review state eminent domain laws.

Now I have said many times that I can sympathize with, even admire, maybe even agree with, the libertarian who says, “To hell with the Constitution–we are at such a state of Hobbesian lawlessness that I don’t care about it, I’d rather snatch liberty in small bits and pieces where I can.” This is a perfectly respectable position. I even share it to some degree. Where I differ with most of those who have this view is that I would be honest about this view. I would not feel compelled to attack those pointing out what the Constitution says, because I am favoring an action regardless of what the Constitution says. I would not feel compelled to pretend that my view just so happens to be supported–what a coincidence–by the Constitution. And I would not so cavalierly disregard the significant costs of such a policy: such as, the dangers of the central state adopting the principle that it is simply not bound by the Constitution’s limitations.

Apparently unlike most libertarians, I happen to actually prefer a limited federal government to one that is virtually unlimited or limited only by malleable, “evolving” standards that it has the discretion to interpret. I am actually coming to the view that many libertarians are just idiots or ignorant, and for some reason are not bothered by the idea of unlimited government. I used to think favoring unlimited government was practically a requirement of being a lib
ertarian. Apparently it is replaced nowadays with Randian myths about our near-perfect American Utopia and naive platitudes, almost a Marxian belief that we can transform man’s nature to finally, finally, tweak the system enough to once and for all get it right. Bah. Ridiculous.

P-dog continues:

In other words, Mr. Kinsella would indeed object, on constitutional grounds, to the federal courts intervening to stop a state from executing people on the grounds of their race or religion.

Palmer cannot separate the issues involved here (Roderick Long does a good job doing this here). One question is: would this be constitutional? Now I am the first to admit–as an anarchist–that the Constitution is not perfectly libertarian, and I am happy to have it disregarded in some cases. But we happen to have a Constitution that, IF it were followed, would limit federal violations of rights, which have been imense. And the feds seem to give lip service to their obligation to abide by the Constitution. Therefore it seems to me that we libertarians ought, ceteris paribus, to favor the rule “federal officials must not violate the limits placed on them, or go beyond the powers granted to them, in the Constitution.” Because the alternative is the principle that the feds are not really bound by the Constitution. As I noted, I myself, as a libertarian, prefer limited federal government to an unlimited or relatively less limited one. Why any libertarian would disagree with this, I have not the foggiest.

But back to T-dog’s question: I have not looked into this matter closely, but I imagine a state executing people on the basis of their race might fall under the equal protection clause. So if Congress had exercised the power granted to it in the 14th to address this issue, I suppose the federal courts could act based on it. Of course, the state could secede if it chose, but so long as it stayed in the union, it would be subject to those rules. And of course, the state is also competent to construe the Constitution, so it would be possible, in theory, for there to be deadlock or constitutional crisis–just as is possible now if the President strongly disagrees with the Court, for example (remember Nixon v. the Court…). The risk of such deadlock is considered to be worth the gain of the checks and balances of horizontal separation of powers, and of course this would be true of vertical separation of powers as well.

So, in sum, probably the feds would be able to get constitutional jurisdiction over a case of state discrimination, due to the equal protection clause of the 14th–subject to the caveats above, and ignoring that the 14th was illegally ratified; we must take it as a de facto standard now, and it is not really in principle fundamentally more unjust than the Constitution itself, which is also “illegal” according to various standards one might apply.

But so what? P-dog asked the wrong question. For I would grant that the feds have no power to stop states from doing other things–like establishing, oh, say, Congregationalism as the official state religion. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits it. Now recognizing this does not automatically mean I would “opppose” the feds from intervening–it just means I don’t pretend it would be Constitutional. As it so happens, I would oppose this, because I want to keep the feds limited. And also, because I see no reason to assume ahead of time that the feds will make “better” decisions, so there is no reason to vest the “final” authority in the US Supreme Court rather than the state’s supreme court. In fact, because the central state is more distant, more powerful and larger, and has less competition, we can expect its decisions to systematically tend to be worse than those of more local, smaller, less powerful states.

Why not broaden Palmer’s question? What if Massachussetts outlaws interracial marriage? And what if the Mass court, and the Supreme Court, all fail to overturn this? I will assume that Palmer would not say that we have to vest power NOW in the UN World Court to overturn municipal laws that it believes violate “human rights” (such as those in the UN Declaration of Rights). If he does, he is in favor of world government, which I think is pretty clearly unlibertarian (no offense, certain Objectivists–oh wait, Objectists spurn the “word” “libertarian” in the first place, afraid of it ya see–so I guess they would not be offended by my implication they are unlibertarian). So I’ll assume he is not now in favor of the UN having a world court that sits atop the US court. So if this is the case, I could just say to him,

In other words, Mr. Palmer would indeed object to the UN World court intervening to stop a state from banning interracial marriage.

Or let’s take an actual example today:

In other words, Mr. Palmer would indeed object to the UN World Court having the jurisdiction granted to it ahead of time to permit it to intervene to stop a state from having public schools and taxing over 50% of its citizens’ wealth.

Are we supposed to open our mouths agape and point with a shriek at Palmer as in Invasion of the Body Snatchers’ final scene, as if he is a ghoul, just because he would presumably not be in favor of a one-world state that “could have” forced America to lower its taxes? What is this emotion-laden question really supposed to show? That someone is “bad” or “wrong” if they–gasp–don’t have the ability to stop all tragedy in the world? Is it evil–is it bigoted or anti-semitic or slavery-apologizing–to recognize there are immense costs to liberty and rights to empowering these huge beasts willy-nilly just in the longshot hope that this newly empowered and strengthened monster will use this power to beat down other, smaller monsters that also threaten us?

In [K-dog’s] view, federalism implies a federal power to tax, but not a federal power to protect rights, despite the language of the 14th Amendment and other elements of the Constitution.

This is just confused. Palmer has elsewhere reacted with scorn and derision to my suggestion that states ought to be able to nullify unjust federal laws, on their territory. I could say to him,

In Palmer’s view, our constitutional system implies states have the power to tax, but not a power to protect rights (from federal invasion), despite the fact that the States were seen in our federal order as the primary agents of protecing citizens’ rights from violation.

So let me explicit. The states have broad police or legislative power, so they can outlaw things like murder, robbery, trespass, and enforce contracts, marriages, property rights, etc. This was seen as their role. That is one reason the feds do not have broad legislative power, and only enumerated power: they don’t need to be able to outlaw, say, murder–the states are presumed to take care of this. The feds have functions and powers related to national issues–dealing with other countries, settling disputes between states, establishing a large free trade zone internally, national defense. So the states have broad powers, to protect citizens’ rights. The states are limited as well, by their own constitutions primarily, and to some degree by the federal Constitution, to try to keep them from abusing these powers. So the states’ role in our system IS to protect our rights.

The feds are also granted enumerated powers, also to protect our rights–from invasion by a foreign country, for example. They are also limited severely, to keep them from trampling citizens’ rights.

What is to keep the feds from violating citizens’ rights? Several things. Horizonal checks and balances. The power of judicial review–Jefferson’s concurrent review, really, so that any of the 3 branches can boycott an unconstituional federal action. Also, the Bill of Rights. Also, the right of a state to secede if necessary. Etc. But there is no ”
overlord” state, like the UN, that can force the feds to comply with the Constitution.

Now, what is to keep the States from violating citizens’ rights? Well, they, too, like the feds, have constitutions that limit their (broad) powers. Having a federal union where state citizens can easily emigrate to another state–competition–also helps keep a state in check. Ther are also some limits on states in the federal constitution, but not as many as Palmer thinks. And even if there were NO limits on states in the federal constitution, this does not mean the states are “unlimited”–any more than the feds are “unlimited” solely because the UN has no jurisdiction over them or because the States don’t have supervisory authority over the feds.

If you realize that the feds and states are both sovereign states, each having powers, and limits, just like all other states in the world, you will realize that there is no apriori reason to assume that there need to be ANY limits on the states in the federal Constitution. The problem of states is that whatever the “top” state is in the pyramid, it is going to be unlimited (see on this de Jasay’s great book, Against Poltics, summarized in my review). But this is just the problem of state power in general; and it is why some of us are anarchists. Nonetheless, I am sure Palmer would say that, to the extent his vision of the American system is that it is a decent system, thre are many states in the world that are decent in some sense–the “civilized” states of Europe, for example, some in Asia, Canada, Australia, etc. But none of these states is supervised by another state. None of them has “limits” placed upon them–in the sense of being supervised by an overlord Court as the American States are by the US Supreme Court; and for those that do, e.g. EU countries and the EU human rights courts–then that court iself or the EU is not itself limited by a higher power. There is some state “top” level that is always not limited by a higher, supervisory state. Apparently Palmer does not recoil with horror at this notion. Yet, and yet, the idea of an American state that is not limited by the federal government gives him conniptions. He just can’t even conceive of them being limited only by their own constitution and political processes, like every other state in the world–indeed, like the very federal government itself.

Personally, I cannot see how libertarians can advocate any state; for states are all, essentially, unlimited. This is the problem of states. But for libertarians who are minarchists and thus favor some state, or who tolerate them, it is bizarre to think that of all the states in the world, American states MUST have supervision by some overlord state–but that it’s okay for all other states to lack this supervision. This is indeed a puzzling view.

I could actually understand a libertarian who realized the danger of unlimited states–who watches the watchers–but who nonetheless thought states were necessary (or at least inevitable) wanting the states to try to limit each other. And lo and behold, he might come up with some notion of separation of powers, checks and balances. In a sense, in a tripartite system, the executive, judicial, and legislative branches are like separate governments, each with some veto and other powers over the other. So they help “review” each other. Why not try it, hell. Let states –or sub-components of a state–check each other. So who wathches the watcher? No one can watch an all-powerful watcher. So why not use 3 watchers instead, each with partial powers over us, and over each other. That way, none of them is unlimited, and they all sort of supervise each other. Of course this is not guaranteed to work, but better than nothing. Imagine MAD, the policy of the US-USSR nuclear standoff–mutually assured destruction: each in essence pointed a weapon at the other that would fire the other’s weapon. So these checks and balances restrained each state from attacking the other.

Likewise, in a federal union such as ours, with large, pre-existing constituent states, why would any libertarian want only to limit the lower states, by giving some limiting power to the central state? That creates an overlord over the lower states and makes the overlord central state even more powerful. This is like Russia having nukes pointed at America, but America having none. What about the central state itself? What is to limit it? Its Constitution? But the presumption of Palmer in insisting the feds must limit the states, is that a mere constitution itself is not enough to “really” limit a state. If it were, the state’s constitution would suffice. If it does not suffice, why assume the federal one will? So wouldn’t it make sense for the states to have some kind of political power or threat against the feds? How about the right to leave? How about the right to nullify federal law in the state’s territory? How about the right to retain certain spheres of authority, while the feds have others as strictly enumerarated? Etc. All these things make perfect sense. We limit the States, and the feds, with their own constitutions; then, because these paper limits are doomed to fail (or at least be imperfect), woulnd’t it make sense to have each one have some (political) power over the other? I.e., vertical separation of powers. So the feds can insist on, say, internal free trade and stop a state from taxing interstate trade. The states can leave the union if they wnat, and so on.

So, what is a mystery is why Palmer and his ilk react in bug-eyed fashion to any sincere libertarian advocating such views, as if to want reciprocal limits on power is tantamount to yearning for the antebellum days of slavery. Or why the very idea of the states not being subject to review by the feds drives them batty, when every other damned state in the world is NOT subject to some overlord state’s review. I don’t get it. Does Palmer think the US States are some uniquely evil regime in the sweep of human history that alone need some parental supervision? and no, T-boy, I am not saying the South’s slavery or racial discrimination are no big deal or okay, but heck, seems to me most states in history are as bad as, if not worse than, the US states. If it’s okay for allllll of these to run around on the loose with no overlord collar, why not for the relatively decent US states?

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Palmer On States’ Rights

Palmer is escalating to apoplectic extremes. I hope he does not get a case of the vapors. In the comments to this thread, T-dog replies to my Kelo article, saying:

I am opposed to “states rights,” for I believe that it betrays both a basic conceptual confusion and a misunderstanding of the relationship of the states to the federal government. States don’t have “rights”; under the American constitutional system “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The question is: what powers are prohibited to the states? In the opinion of the writer who defended the Kelo decision as a victory for “states rights” and therefore as a just and lawful decision, it seems that no powers are prohibited to the states, that their powers are plenary. I strongly dissent.

Palmer is just a liar. I have not advocated states’ rights. I have advocated limitations on federal power, and a system having both horizontal separation of powers (legislature, executive, judiciary) and vertical separation of powers. Of course only individuals have rights. I have also stated explicitly several times that the Constitution does limit the states in some ways, and I have explained that this does not change the fact that their powers are plenary. Palmer is just being cute by repeating his charge after I have denied and refuted it.

Palmer’s evasions are meant to avoid having to answer the simple question: where does the Constitution authorize the federal courts to strike down state laws that violate rights expressed or implied in the Bill of Rights?

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BK’s Dumb Theory

Burger King Marcus writes:

I have a new hobby: rather than writing my own pieces for LewRockwell.com (which requires, after all, sifting through email feedback that’s 1/3 hateful race theory and 1/3 gibbering leftist idiocy), I’m going to try to get myself mentioned in everyone else’s stuff.

Sorry, BK, but I really doubt your strategy is gonna pay off.

Waitasec….

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Palmer the Desperate Smear-artist

Tom Palmer is at it again on the Liberty and Power blog. My reply to him is reprinted here in case it is deleted there:

Palmer: “What’s remarkable is that Mr. Kinsella sees no role for the federal government at all. And calls that “federalism.””

Well, as a–gasp!–anarchocapitalist, I see no “role” for any state.

But as I have repeated many times, I have never denied that our federalist system grants certain powers and functions to the feds. I just believe these powers and functions are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution; and I think that the feds exceeding their mandated authority sets the dangerous precedent that they are not limited by the very Constitution that authorizes its existence.

If Alabama (or Maine, of course) were to begin executing black people or shooting Muslims and a federal court were to rule that illegal, Mr. Kinsella would quickly condemn the federal government for the unjust usurpation of state sovereignty.

Palmer is quick to lie and distort, slander and smear, but then he must make an effort to live up to his reputation.

What I would do in this case is–if anyone asked what my view of the constitutionality of the ruling was–take a look at the Constitution and see if I could identify a power given there for the feds to intervene in such unlibertarian state actions. The question of whether a given federal ruling is unconstitutional or not is separate from the question about whether it is libertarian or not. Palmer appears to accept the childish reasoning that wishing makes it so. That we ought to first figure out what we want the Constitution to say, and then just make up a reason that it “must” say this.

I prefer the more honest approach. I prefer to accurately and honestly identify what the Constitution means and is designed to do, whether that is libertarian or not. For example, the Constitution allows the federal government to impose an income tax. The Sixteeth Amendment exists. No amount of handwringing or intellectual gymnastics can get around this. Better to admit it and condemn it, rather than to disginenuously pretend that it does not “really” allow an income tax–how could it, after all, if there “should not be” an income tax. In other words, Palmer is making the oft-made mistake of activist-minded libertarians of seeing everything in terms of strategy. But there is a difference between ought and is.

“State sovereignty” simply means that some group is alleged to be above the law; but for a libertarian (which excludes some of the states sovereignty crowd), no one is “above the law.” I recall Karl Hess saying many years ago that the only reason that conservatives favored states rights is that states were so good at oppressing people. Mr. Kinsella’s guru HH Hoppe (who was recently enthusiastically interviewed in the extreme rightist German nationalist paper Junge Freiheit) is eager to be able to exclude black people, gay people, and a long list of others he’s singled out in his writings as not deserving of toleration in his society. And what better way than to insist that states are “sovereign” and therefore able to oppress at will. How little has changed.

Palmer’s comment that I would condemn a federal ruling that Alabama’s executions of blacks is illegal on the grounds that it is an “unjust usurpation of state sovereignty” again shows a failure to understand the libertarian case for federalism (or what I have writen before). I don’t whine about the “unjustness” of violating state sovereignty. For me, all states are unjust. But I believe that if a state is created, it is useful to have various constitutional or structural features in place to attempt to limit that state’s abuses of individuals. These include enumerated & limited powers (especially for a central state in a federal system), specified rights, horizontal separation of powers (having equal and independent legislature, executive, and judiciary), and vertical separation of powers (sometimes called federalism, decentralism, whatever).

The question is whether it is wise, when setting up a central state, to limit its power by only granting it some powers, and leaving to the constituent states other powers. Just as horizontal separation of powers means each branch has certain roles and powers, as checks on the others, so in a vertically divided system, states would have some powers but not others, and the central state would as well.

It is quite obvious that it is a respectable libertarian position to favor both horizontal and vertical separation of powers as a mechanism designed to try to keep government within certain bounds. It is pathetic and disgusting for Palmer to try to smear someone holding this view as being in favor of execution of blacks. Palmer’s resort to such desperate, vile smears would make one wonder if there is really no principled, sincere, libertarian grounds to oppose federalism. Of course, there are, but Palmer’s hysteria and unfairness paints the opposite picture.

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L. Neil Smith on Kelo

Libertarian novelist and activist L. Neil Smith comments on Kelo here. Smith first (rightly) condemns the Supreme Court case holding that federal marijuana laws trump state laws permitting marijuana use for medical purposes. Writes Smith:

the court held that, no matter what the Constitution says (or doesn’t say) to the contrary, the federal government has the legal power to outlaw marijuana—or anything else, for that matter—and that power supercedes any right a state or the people have to disagree. … Never mind that there is absolutely nothing in the Constitution—which represents the basic “operating system” for the United States government (See Article 1, Section 8, which spells it out in detail)—that gives it any power whatsoever to outlaw drugs or much of anything else.

Smith is absolutely correct, and here seems to recognize that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. And note that he is here concerned with the Court’s declaration concerning what the “federal government” has the “legal power” to do.

But when he turns to Kelo, he drops the distinction between state and federal government and seems to forget the fact that the feds have limited and enumerated powers. He writes:

In [Kelo, the Court], asserted that government has a legitimate power to steal your home or anything else you possess and hand it over to whatever crooks shelled out the biggest contributions the last time around. … What it’s saying … is that politicos—any old politicos, including the white-belted plaid-pantsed halfwits and drunks making up the average city council—know better than you do what use to make of your property.

In a sense, he is right–the Court is implying this in their interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. But I don’t get the impression Smith thinks the Court should have upheld the Connecticut law based on notions of federalism. Rahter, he says that the Court here is asserting “that government has a legitimate power to steal your home….” But “government” here means state government. If Smith critiques the “assertion” by federal courts, that state governments have this “legitimate power” (whatever that means), then it seems to me he would prefer they say the states do not have this power. In other words, that the Supremes would have struck down the state law. But he has just lamented in the medical marijuana case that the federal courts don’t hold the federal government to its enumerated powers. Where is the power enumerated to review state legislation for compliance with the Fifth Amendment, which was originally designed to limit only federal power? Not to grant power to the feds to have further dominion over state governments.

Why cannot libertarians see this? Why can’t they see that the feds need an enumerated power to strike down state laws? And that this power is not granted?

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Gregory on Kelo

Anthony Gregory has a nice piece on Kelo, Why the Supreme Court Should Have Just Shut Up. As I told T-dog: “But of course, I agree with you. I never said Kelo was a good decision. I am saying like you, that in my view they should have just stayed out of it–“shut up,” as you call it. Also–I am responding to libertarians who oppose the decision on the grounds that the Constitution requires them to overturn the Connecticut law.”

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