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Machan on Kelo

From July 4, 2005 LRC blog:

Machan on Kelo

Posted by Stephan Kinsella on July 4, 2005 10:50 AM

My friend Tibor Machan has a column, Some Libertarian Confusion about Kelo v. New London City, CT, criticizing my article on Kelo. Unfortunately, Machan’s critique itself is confused. [Note: Machan’s short column linked above was apparently subsequently deleted and replaced by this newer version.]

First, Machan states that I justified Kelo’s ruling based “on the view that government has no authority to take private property in any case, including for public use (which the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution sanctions, provided compensation is provided), and if it does engage in taking, it is better to do it for a genuine private than a nonexistent public use.”

But I did not justify Kelo’s ruling; I simply argued that the constitutional result would have been for the Court to have refused to strike down the state law for lack of constitutional authority to do so. The Court in Kelo upheld the law by applying the Fifth Amendment to the states and then giving it a bizarre interpretation–which I criticized: as I noted, “the Court’s reasoning was flawed.”

Moreover, my argument did not rely upon the anarchist notion that there are no valid “public uses”, nor did I unequivocally state that it is better to have a taking for a private than for a public use. My main argument was that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the states. I only added an afterthought stating that it is odd for “libertarians to be more offended at takings that are for a private purpose than for those that are for a public purpose.” This is so especially because the taking of property itself is the harm; what is done with it afterwards is of secondary consequence. I stated my personal preference that my own property, if taken, be used for peaceful, private uses rather than by the state; but this preference is not an attempt to justify the ruling in Kelo at all.

As I said, my primaray argument was that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the states. Machan’s reply:

this is not proper legal theory by now, not if one considers how the Constitution has been applied in, for example, cases baring on the right of freedom of speech and religion, as well as the right to freedom to bear arms and be free of coerced confessions (also part of the Fifth Amendment) of all American citizens.

I confess I am not quite sure what Machan is saying here, in his main substantive critique of my main substantive argument. He is confused to say that the rights to freedom of speech and religion, to bear arms, and to be free of coerced confessions, are part of the Fifth Amendment. These rights are included in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments. I suspect he was trying to say that these rights are now part of the Fourteenth Amendment (not the Fifth). (Although I do not recall the right to bear arms having been incorporated yet by the Court, but I could be mistaken.) But he seems to be saying that my interpretation of the Constitution is wrong, because of Supreme Court precedent. I am not quite sure what his argument is here, unless he is either saying that Supreme Court decisions take precedence over the Constitution’s language and original meaning, or that he agrees with (which?) prior Court reasoning (but even libertarian legal experts who support incorporation reject the Court’s reasoning to date, which uses the Due Process clause instead of the Privileges or Immunities clause).

In any event, Machan has simply not even made an attept here to explain what is flawed in my argument that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the States. If it is an argument that the Court has ruled otherwise, I find that argument flawed as either an appeal to authority or as based on the notion that the Constitution is “living” and does not have an original meaning.

Machan also writes:

The main motivation behind the states rights stance of some libertarians seems to be that they consider empowering small governmental units to be less hazardous than empowering the federal government (even if both should not be so empowered). It seems to be especially objectionable to such libertarians that a branch of the federal government would be empowered to rule on what constitutes securing our rights, so when they fail to do this securing, or actually do the opposite, these libertarians play the “bite the bullet” gambit instead of construing what the branch does wrongheaded. For instance, in Kelo v. New London City, CT., these libertarians just hold that whatever the Court says about anything other than the powers of the feds must be wrongheaded.

I believe Machan, like many libertarians, is confused for some reasaon by the very idea of federalism, of vertical separation of powers. They just cannot seem to accept the view that the states predated the Union and are not empowered or created by the Constitution. My and other federalists’ view of “states rights” is not that “states” have “rights,” but that the federal government has only limited powers–those enumerated in the Constitution. And my view is not so much that the federal courts “should not” be empowered to review state legislation for compliance with rights in the Bill of Rights–but that they are NOT so empowered by the Constitution. Machan’s pointing to how Supreme Court decisions as somehow refuting my argument fails, because it is those decisions I am inherently critiquing. It would be question begging to say my critique of constitutional case law is flawed because the case law disagrees with me.

Finally, Machan notes:

The state’s rights issue is but a diversion here, not one of basic principle.

I never brought up states’ rights; Machan did. What we have is a case where the Supreme Court assumed the right to review a state law, even though the Constitution does not empower them to do so. Libertarians upset with the Court’s decision seem to endorse the notion that the Court does have the right under the Constitution to review state laws. I have tried to point out to those libertarians who do care what the Constitution says that this view is incorrect. What I cannot figure out is if Machan thinks the Constitution does apply the Bill of Rights to the states (and therefore my legal-constitutional arguments are wrong), or if he does not give a damn about what the Constitution says (in which case his appeal to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it makes no sense) and just wants the Court to do “the right thing” regardless of its authorized power to do so.

So I have no idea what Machan thinks is a diversion. Perhaps the libertarians who want the Court to strike down every unlibertarian state law and who therefore just assume this must be the constitutional result, are the diversion. It seems to me that being concerned with keeping the large, central state limited by the Constitution that created it is not a diversion, and indeed related to the basic principle of trying to limit the state in order to protect individual rights.

***

Coda: In a private exchange with Machan, I noted:

My point was primarily addressed to the question of whether is legal, and a good idea, for the federal central state to be in charge of supervising state laws. [Concerns] about property rights and
the New London condemnation are valid and do not undercut at all my
view.

He replied to me, alleging that I would simply let people be victims of a socialist system rather than work with the system we have or favor incremental, ad hoc improvement, because it is not “pure enough.”

My reply:

You are wrong in characterizing my views. Where have I opposed working with or within the system, or incremental improvements in freedom?How is any of this implied by my views: (a) that it would be unconstitutional (not because I WANT it to be, but because it IS) for the feds to intervene here with the states; or (b) that it is preferable to honestly *identify* what the Constitution specifies, even if it is contrary to our preferences or beliefs; or or (c) that it is in general a good idea to insist the federal government refrain from acting in ways prohibited by the Constitution; or (d) that it is in general a good idea to have both horizontal and vertical separation of powers in a large, federal union such as ours?

I am not in favor or letting people suffer or be victimized by the state, just because doing anything to help would be sanctioning the system. It is a unwarranted and I believe unfair for you to distort my views this way. Where did I scott at incremental, ad hoc improvement? I am all in favor of this. Why do you imply otherwise? Are you sure you are giving me a charitable reading?

However, it is another thing to disagree with a given move or policy on the grounds that it is a move in the wrong direction. For example, I used to support the idea of educational vouchers, but now I oppose them. Not because they don’t go far enough or are only incremetnal or ad hoc improvements, but because the costs of the improvements are too high, in my view–even if education is improved and educational efficiency increased by vouchers, the drawback is that it increases the amount of tax dollars spent on public education and gives the state more control over private education.

Now you can disagree with me on this, but my objection is based on libertarian principles and on the grounds that the measure is a bad one, not that it is “merely incremental.” Likewise with decisions like Kelo. I assume you would have the court overturn the state law. I do not disagree that overturning the state law would be a good thing for liberty–for the Kelos at least, and perhaps for other potential victims of states. But I also recognize it is a bad thing for liberty too, in some ways–it further centralizes power in the feds, which increases the likelihood of federal violations of rights in the future; and it erodes the limits in the Constitution that are important.

You yourself obviously believe the Bill of Rights set forth important limits on “governemnt” in general, and that must include limits on federal power. So you yourself want the Constitutional limits on federal power to have some force and effect. As do I. That is exactly why I am concerned when the feds ignore these limits in order to seize the power needed to review state law. You seem to want to turn a blind eye to the feds’ eviscerating the principle of enumerated powers in the Constitution. As long as it achieves a good result in some cases, it seems to be okay with you. Don’t you see you are endorsing the principle that the feds are not really bound by the limits in the Constitution, which includes the Bill of Rights? I think it is dangerous to advocate this cherry picking approach. It is better as a PRACTICAL measure to insist the feds abide by the limits placed on them in the Constitution–all of them, both the idea of enumerated powers, and the specific limits placed on them in the Bill of Rights.

I am not even opposed to your Hobbesian point that we ought to take short-term, concrete improvements in liberty where we can find it. I don’t oppose that notion. I would not mind terribly a libertarian Justice on the court who flat out ruled for the Kelos because he can, and didn’t dishonestly try to justify his decision based on the text of the Constitution.

If by “working with the system we live in” means you think we ought to take it as “established” at this point that the Supreme Court is going to have final say-so on the constitutionality of acts of states, and then urge the Court to make the most constitutional or libertarian decisions, I don’t even oppose this very much. It means giving up on the idea of federalism as one of the constraints on federal abuse of power, but I can understand your being willing to make this tradeoff. I am bothered by it; but I can understand your view here. But this does NOT imply that the Constitution itself supports this. So if I point out the constitutional aspects of this–and many libertarains ARE interested in what the Constitution actually says–why am I attacked by those who don’t really care about the Constitution? An honest reply to me would be: you may be right about the Constitution, but I think the Court should do whatever it can to vindicate rights, regardless of the constitutionality of this. But instead, I get people telling me I am wrong about the Constitution…. because they think my interpretation is not… libertarian. Wishing does not make it so, as you know.

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Long on Anarchy, Short on Government

From August 2004 LRC blog:

Long on Anarchy, Short on Government

Posted by Stephan Kinsella on August 13, 2004 10:07 AM

Roderick Long’s Mises U talk on anarchy is on his blog. I’ve heard that one anarchist expert said it’s the best speech he’s ever heard on the subject.

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Long on Anarchy

From LRC blog, Feb. 2004

Long on Anarchy

Posted by Stephan Kinsella on February 16, 2004 09:12 AM

Re a recent debate about anarchy, a new entry from Roderick Long:

“For those who’ve been following my online debate on anarchism with Robert Bidinotto, my latest contribution is available here.”

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Followup to this post: Latest pretentious terms from today’s Slate Political Gabfest and Culture Gabfest #40 (feel free to email me suggestions or leave them in the comments to the main page):

  • annus horribilis [CG#40]
  • anodyne [PG7-17-09, Emily]
  • chanteuse [CG#40]
  • gonzo [CG#40-all 3 hosts]
  • milquetoast [PG7-17-09,guest host Chris Beam]
  • patrimony [CG#40]
  • spanner (for wrench) [PG7-17-09, Dickerson]
  • sussed out [CG#40]
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Libertarian Papers, Vol. 1 (2009), Art. No. 31: “The Ethics of US Monetary Policy in Response to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009,” by George Bragues

Abstract: Since the financial crisis first erupted in the summer of 2007, the US Federal Reserve has sought to contain negative spillovers into the real economy by dramatically loosening monetary policy. Initially, this was done by lowering its key lending rates, but as the crisis has worsened, and rates have approached closer to zero, it has resorted to expanding its balance sheet in a historically unprecedented fashion. The Fed’s total assets have more than doubled to nearly $2 trillion since the summer of 2007.

Much of the debate surrounding the wisdom of this extraordinary increase in the production of money has revolved around its expediency–in other words, will it actually work to rescue the economy? Very little has been said, at least explicitly, about whether it is the morally right thing to do.

This paper seeks to fill this gap by providing a moral analysis of the Fed’s response to the financial crisis. For this purpose, we apply Aristotelian virtue theory, Lockean natural rights philosophy, Kantian deontology, and Benthamite utilitarianism. The idea is that if a consensus, or a strong majority, can be reached from differing philosophic assumptions and starting points, then the resulting judgment ought to be compelling for all neutral observers. On the basis that the Fed’s efforts are likely to result in a marked rise in inflation, we argue that every one of these four moral theories ultimately renders a negative judgment. As such, we conclude that the Fed is pursuing an immoral course.

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Without Borders is an interesting fee-based monthly newsletter subtitled “Dispatches for Intellectual Adventurers, Investors and Speculators” published by one Fitzroy McLean, its “Chief Bon Vivant and Speculator.” The newsletter “is one part finance and investment, one part geopolitics and one part globalist libertarian philosophy.”  McLean tells me the newsletter is an “account of how I spend my time and allocate my capital with a healthy dose of capitalist and libertarian rhetoric.”

McLean is an interesting character–a West Point graduate and former Army Ranger and Special Operations Officer who served throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, before being recruited into the CIA’s Clandestine Service where he earned his living running covert and paramilitary operations. But now he’s an anti-government “Libertarian with Anarchist and Hedonist tendencies.” Check it out.

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I am skeptical of the technological singularity ever happening–or happening soon, as people like Kurzweil predict–but it’s possible. And, something less is possible too–a substantial increase in the effect of technolgy on productivity–perhaps enough to counteract the bust. See the figure below: this is a sketch of how I have long pictured the business cycle.

kinsella-singularity-business-cycle-graphIn this chart, imagine a free market emerging at the left axis. GDP increases, with ups and downs, before a central bank is formed. When the central bank with fractional reserve banking is introduced, it inflates the supply of money and credit which sets in motion the first boom, and the recurring boom-bust cycle described by Mises and Hayek. The Austrian insight is that not only does this hurt some and harm some (by redistribution or uncertainty effects), but that it also destroys wealth (because of malinvestment). This means that even if there is an underlying average growing GDP (the lower dashed line)—that is, the GDP increases over time despite the cycle—it is less than it would have been if the cycle had never been imposed (that’s the upper dashed line). The cycle in effect exerts a drag on growth; or it reduces the slope of the rate of increase in GDP over time, in addition to making it more volatile and causing redistribution due to inflationary effects.

This point is somewhat addressed in this discussion Every Investment Projection You’ve Seen Is Wrong: The Truth About Compounding, which explains why compounding produces lower returns than would be calculated if you assume a given rate of grown, because the growth is never smooth: any volatility around the average rate of growth reduces the effect of compounding that we would see for the same average but constant rate of growth. I believe something similar happens with the business cycle. Because it causes malinvestment, it results in a lower average annual rate of growth because the malinvestments reduce productivity. But in addition, the increased volatility of the (already lower) average annual productivity growth means the net results—the “compounding” effect—of productivity increases are reduced for this reason as well.

Now see the right elbow of the curve–if some super-advances in technology, or even a technological singularity, occurs, so that it boosts the average rate of growth of productivity and GDP enough, it is conceivable that the “down” or bust part of the cycle would be relative only. We are still worse off than we would have been, but in this case a “recession” would be a period of, say, 4% annual GDP growth instead of, say, 20%.

I am not predicting this. I am only saying it’s an effect. Even on the middle part of the curve, which is what we appear to have had from about the 1910s to the 1970s or so, the average upward growth of GDP ameliorates the bust because it is relative to that general upward trend (which is partly due to increasing technological advances). As a crude example, if we experience a bust, while at the same time the price of computers and electronic devices keeps falling and their qualities are rapidly improving due to technological progress, then consumers experience less of a bust than they would otherwise. It’s just an empirical question of the comparative downward slope of the bust, and the upward average slope of GDP grown. They could cancel out, or one could dominate the other. Up till now the bust of course always dominates, and I don’t expect it to reverse, but it could, or could be signfiicantly ameliorated.

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Heroic! Here it is, from March 7, 2003:

***

An Open Letter to the Peace Movement

[by Roderick Long]

Dear Peace Activists:

All honour to you. In your opposition to the United States’ impending war on Iraq, you represent a welcome voice for sanity and civilisation, lifted up against the incessant baying of the dogs of war.

But I want to urge you to follow the logic of your position just a bit further.

Much has been said, and eloquently so, about the need, in dealings between nation and nation, to choose persuasion over violence whenever possible. Hear, hear!

But why this qualification: between nation and nation?

If persuasion is preferable to violence between nations, must it not also be preferable to violence within nations?

Suppose my neighbour runs a business out of his home, and I’d rather he didn’t. If I call the zoning board and ask them to shut his business down by force, am I acting like a peace activist? Or am I acting like George Bush?

Suppose I go to the polls and vote to maintain or increase income taxation, or gun control, or mandatory licensing, or compulsory education. Am I not calling upon the state to invade people’s lives and properties? To impose my will, by legalised force, on those who have done me no harm? To choose violence over persuasion? Am I acting like a peace activist, or am I acting like George Bush?

As Ludwig von Mises writes:

It is important to remember that government interference always means either violent action or the threat of such action. The funds that a government spends for whatever purposes are levied by taxation. And taxes are paid because the taxpayers are afraid of offering resistance to the tax gatherers. They know that any disobedience or resistance is hopeless. As long as this is the state of affairs, the government is able to collect the money that it wants to spend. Government is in the last resort the employment of armed men, of policemen, gendarmes, soldiers, prison guards, and hangmen. The essential feature of government is the enforcement of its decrees by beating, killing, and imprisoning. Those who are asking for more government interference are asking ultimately for more compulsion and less freedom.

To the extent that government initiates force against its people – and every government qua government must do so, since a government that maintained neither coercive taxation nor a coercive territorial monopoly of authority would no longer be a government, but something a good deal more wholesome – every government is waging a war of aggression against its own people. A consistent peace activist must be an anarchist.

It may be objected that in democratic countries, the government represents the will of the citizens; since the citizens are understood to consent to the government’s actions, those actions cannot count as “aggression” against the citizenry. Volenti non fit injuria.

The notion that voting counts in any meaningful sense as “consent” was subjected to devastating criticisms in the 19th century by the English classical liberal Herbert Spencer, in his essay The Right to Ignore the State, as well as by the American abolitionist Lysander Spooner, in his pamphlet No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority. Both works are available online; those tempted to regard majority rule as a form of self-government are invited to consult them.

As peace activists, we understand that aggressive warfare between nations is neither moral nor practical. If violence is to be employed, it must be defensive in nature, and it must be the last resort, not the first. Why would this principle hold good at the international level, but fail at the intranational?

Fellow peace activists: I invite you to join me in the work of the Molinari Institute. The state is the cause and sustainer of war, because the state by its nature is warfare incarnate. Its imperialist aggression beyond its borders is simply an extension of its inherent modus operandi within its borders. There is a peaceful, consensual alternative: Market Anarchism. The object of the Molinari Institute is to see that alternative implemented.

If you love peace, work for anarchy.

Yours in liberty,

Roderick T. Long, President
Molinari Institute

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Just published: Libertarian Papers, Vol. 1 (2009), Art. No. 30: “Mercantilism, Corporations, and Liberty: The Fallacies of ‘Lochnerian’ Antitrust,” by James Rolph Edwards

Abstract: Progressive legal theorist Daniel Crane has argued that libertarians who believe that monopoly results from government intervention should accept antitrust law because the monopoly problem is a result of state government passage of General Incorporation Acts after the Civil War. The resulting corporate consolidation and control of industry necessitated federal antitrust law as a corrective. Crane has all of this wrong. State permission for incorporation was an ancient tool of mercantile grants of monopoly still in practice by state legislatures in the early 19th century, and the General Incorporation Acts were a major expression of a successful Jacksonian antimonopoly policy.

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New Favorite Quotes: Rand, Smith

To be added to my favorite quotes collection:

If there is any society among robbers and murderers, they must at least, according to the trite observation, abstain from robbing and murdering one another.” —Adam Smith

It’s so wonderful to see a great, new, crucial achievement which is not mine!” —Ayn Rand

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McElroy and Peron on Gay Marriage

Update: See also

In Marriage’s shifting status…and gay marriage today, Wendy McElroy posts an original essay on gay marriage by Jim Peron which “We may wish to return marriage to its original, private status, but until that happens, basic principles of justice require that gay couples have equal access to the flawed state system.” Wendy’s view is:

I am among those who argue for privatization rather than the inclusion of more people within the current statist framework of marriage but I see the logic and good intentions of those who wish to have gay marriage legally recognized. This is an honest disagreement between people who wish to protect human rights and dignity… In the process of exploring this disagreement, Jim raises excellent points in a fascinating essay.

My own view is here: The Libertarian Case for Gay Marriage.

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The Most Libertarian Patent Work

Update: See Are anti-IP patent attorneys hypocrites?, collecting various posts about this topic.

***

Following up on An Anti-Patent Patent Attorney? Oh my Gawd!, I was chatting with a friend about the following. I’ve argued that merely filing for patents is not inherently unlibertarian since patents, like guns, have both legitimate and illegitimate uses. The former being defensive use to ward off patent infringement suits or to countersue someone who sues you first. Still, there’s an … icky … feeling involved in getting a patent. The following may be a bit inside baseball for patent lawyers but I thought revealing some of the innards of how the process works may be of interest to some readers.

Laymen may not be aware of this but patent “prosecution” work (as filing the patent and interacting with the patent office to get it allowed, is called) is fairly fungible, low-dollar work, compared to other types of IP. To prepare and file a patent application, the patent attorney might charge anywhere from $7k to $15k or more. But patent litigation is much more lucrative (or can be), since the lawyers can get a cut of, or be paid based on the hopes of, multil-million or billion dollar judgments.

Patent lawyers also are often called on to prepare patent opinions. The good thing about these is they are more lucrative than patent prosecution—the attorney can often charge a good $25k or more to prepare one—and they can be completely libertarian. The typical usage is this. Company A is minding its own business and then becomes aware of a patent owned by company B that they are accused of, or otherwise concerned that they might be, infringing by selling a certain product that appears to be described by the claims in the patent. Quite often the issue is not clear cut—the patent language is ambiguous and there are a variety of possible legal defenses one might have, that might or might not succeed at trial. If the risk seems high and the product is not important, the company may (a) design around the patent—that is, modify the product’s design so that it doesn’t infringe the patent; (b) stop making the product; (c) approach the patentee for a possible license. If the risk is low or the product is essential, sometimes there is option (d): keep making the product and pray that you are not sued (and one reason you might not be sued is if you hold your own patents that the other company might be infringing). Option (a), designing around, sometimes employs an opinion of an attorney that the new design doesn’t infringe, or relies on input from patent attorneys as to how to increase the chance that the new design doesn’t infringe.

But when option (d) is invoked, then here is the dilemma companies face. If you go to trial, and lose, you may have to pay damages for past infringement—some kind of “reasonable royalty”; and the patentee may be able to get an injunction to force you to stop making the product going forward (which may result in a license with a royalty provision). However, the patent statute also provides for enhanced damages—”the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed”, in certain cases—which the courts have found to be cases of “willful infringement”.

Now, the courts hold that if you get an unbiased opinion from a professional that says you do not infringe the patent, and you rely on this, then even if you lose at trial (and the attorney turns out to have been wrong), then you have a good argument that, although (it turns out) you were infringing, it was not willful since you “sincerely” believed (hoped) that you were not infringing, because you were “relying” on an attorney’s opinion.

Thus, when patent litigation is threatened or a possibility, the potential infringer will often pay patent attorneys tens of thousands of dollars to exhaustively research the problem patent(s), and to prepare an opinion that “concludes that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed.” (One of the most recent cases on this is the Seagate case (discussed here), which reduces but does not eliminate the need for such opinions.)

In other words, potential patent victims are so desperate to keep selling their product, that they in effect pay tens of thousands of dollars to get a patent opinion that buys them “insurance”—it basically reduces the risk of treble damages being awarded in the event they lose at trial.

Anyway—I can’t see any possible libertarian argument that preparing such a purely defensive opinion is unlibertarian. Indeed, it’s heroic, much like income tax defense or criminal defense work.

[Against Monopoly cross-post]

Update: Related posts: Advice for Prospective Libertarian Law Students; Are anti-IP patent attorneys hypocrites?; An Anti-Patent Patent Attorney? Oh my Gawd!The Morality of Acquiring and Enforcing PatentsA collection of recent blogs about patent hypocrisy and “success” stories.

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