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Chesterton, Lewis and Tolkien

On an email list I’m on, someone asked:

Tolkien and Chesterton were Catholics. Was Lewis Anglican through his whole life? And who turned whom to what?

Another list member replied:

Lewis went through an atheist/agnostic phase, and Tolkien was one of the contributing forces to moving Lewis back to Christianity. Tolkien later wrote a poem describing, somewhat metaphorically, his conversations with Lewis. (The dedication to “one who said …” refers to Lewis.) But Tolkien always said regretfully that he’d gotten Lewis only “halfway” (i.e. from atheism/agnosticism to Anglicism but not as far as Catholicism.)

My reply:

On 1/6/06, Stephan Kinsella wrote:

Right–Lewis was originally Anglican, went thru an atheist phase when he was very young, then Anglican again, though he was close to Catholic in some ways, according to some things I’ve read. BTW re the recent interest in his Narnia stuff — his “Space Trilogy” (Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, That Hideous Strength) is a more adult set, and better IMO; and his best work of fiction is, I think, his wonderful novel Till We Have Faces, a re-telling of the myth of Cupid and Psyche (reminiscent, to me, of another wonderful book, Mary Renault’s The King Must Die and The Bull From The Sea, a re-telling of the Theseus myth).

Lewis was one of most powerful advocates of Christianity/theism that I have encountered–one of my favorite arguments by him is in this imagery—

“How could an idiotic universe have produced creatures whose mere dreams are so much stronger, better, subtler than itself? … And now, another point about wishes. A wish may lead to false beliefs, granted. But what does the existence of the wish suggest? At one time I was much impressed by Arnold’s line ‘Nor does the being hungry prove that we have bread.’ But surely tho’ it doesn’t prove that one particular man will get food, it does prove that there is such a thing as food! I.e. if we were a species that didn’t normally eat, weren’t designed to eat, would we feel hungry? You say the materialist universe is ‘ugly.’ I wonder how you discovered that! Do fish complain of the sea for being wet? Or if they did, would that fact itself not strongly suggest that they had not always, or would not always be, purely aquatic creatures? If you are really a product of a materialistic universe, how is it you don’t feel at home there?”

C. S. Lewis, An Anthology (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), p22.
(see a version online here and here).

***

Update: See flimsy arguments like this: “Be still, and listen for the father’s voice”:

 

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Kudos on Kinsella International Investment Book

Recent endorsements of my latest book, International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford/Oceana 2005), co-authored with Noah Rubins (available at http://www.oceanalaw.com/main_product_details.asp?ID=391):

“The book is a tour de force. Rubins & Kinsella have written a first-rate study of one of the most vital areas of international law today. Notwithstanding its subtitle (“A Practitioner’s Guide”), scholars as well as practicing attorneys will find this an invaluable guide to understanding the multifaceted adjudicatory regime for cross-border investment disputes.”

William W. Park, R. Gordon Butler Scholar in International Law and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; General Editor, Arbitration International; Counsel to Ropes & Gray; former Vice-President, London Court of International Arbitration; publications include the casebook International Commercial Arbitration; International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd ed.); International Forum Selection; Income Tax Treaty Arbitration; and Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice.

“This book is comprehensive, well-written, and balanced. An admirable mixture of learned commentary and primary documents, it is portable, authoritative, and up-to-date. It is a distinctive and well-organized addition to exisiting reference works and will be of great value to practioners and academics who seek a dependable, balanced treatment of a range of legal and practical questions affecting foreign direct investment and dispute resolution.”

Jack J. Coe, Jr., Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; author, Protecting Against the Expropriation Risk in Investing Aboard (Matthew Bender 1993); International Commercial Arbitration–American Principles and Practice (1997); NAFTA Chapter 11 Reports (with Brower and Dodge); vice-chairman, International Commercial Arbitration Committee, ABA International Law Section.

“This book provides an excellent account of how legal techniques can be used to provide significant protections to foreign investment. Its comprehensive coverage, clarity of expression, and useful appendices will prove invaluable to the busy lawyer. It is one of those rare books that is valuable not only for practice but also for the law classroom.”

Dan Sarooshi, Herbert Smith Associate Professor of International Law, University of Oxford; Barrister, London; author of International Organizations And Their Exercise Of Sovereign Powers and The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers.

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Libertarian Activism–comments [engineers, etc.]

From LRC Blog

Libertarian Activism–comments

Posted by Stephan Kinsella on January 26, 2006 11:57 AM

LRC must be getting ever-more-popular, because I am seeing an increase in the number of replies to my latest LRC piece on libertarian activism.

Most of the replies have been favorable, e.g:

one of many:

As a recovering activist/do-gooder I whole-heartedly thank you for writing this fine article. The brevity and clarity of it will provide me with a far better tool than my normal rambling to explain to others why I now detest all activists, and the harm their unprincipled actions cause.

Thank you for your efforts to share the light of a principled existence.

However, some of the comments I’ve received from activists have been amusing–they illustrate the activist myopia I critique in my article.

Humorously, one lady, with the “VICFA Voice, the monthly publication of the Virginia Independent Consumers and Farmers Association (vicfa.net), an all-volunteer grass-roots group,” wrote me “because of my perception of the lack of willingness of libertarians in general (not the ones in our group) to ACT to change what they oppose.” Ha–did she even read my article? Activists have such myopia they think even anti-activists are activists!One correspondent wrote, “My problem with Anarchocapitalist models is
that they offer no proof that if the proposed enforcement mechanisms actually work,”

My reply:

Again; you activist types can’t help but imposing “what works” as a standard to critique substantive normative assertions. It’s very exasperating that you don’t even seem to be aware there is a difference.

Another wrote me to argue how successful Milsted has been in Libertarian activism. My reply:

Any activist success does not gainsay my points. In fact, to point to them in this context, as you do here, seems to illustrate my point that activist types just can’t separate strategical concerns from questions of truth and right and wrong.

This guy also scolded me for “making blanket judgments” and said that Milsted’s effect has been positive, to which I said:

These are unconnected statements which are set forth as if they are related. First, I don’t know what a “blanket judgment” is or what you mean; or why you oppose them. I am not a California relativist hippie who “doesn’t like labeling, man.” And in any event, whether he is successful strategically, is wholly irrelevant and has nothing to do with your hortation to avoid “blanket judgments.” If you are trying to say some of my comments were too broad or inaccurate, go ahead and explain why.

In response to hims comment that I don’t “like” what I read in Milsted, I replied:

It’s not that I don’t like it; it’s that it is flawed and is arguing for socialistic measures (taxes).

I am a libertarian, not a socialist.

I am also not one of the starry-eyed activist types. that is not my gig. I have seen nothing to show that Milsted offers much on topics that intereset me–rights and legal theory, and the like. That is not to criticize him; we just have different interests. I’m glad he’s had political success; but in the realm of theory, which is what I was criticizing when he ventured, I disagree strongly with his reasoning and method and conclusions. Sorry to label this so plainly.

He told me Milstead is “about trying different things that move us in the right direction to see what works.” I replied:

That empiricist mindset is not surprising; I think it is correlated with the activist types. The principled types tend to have more of an apriori or deductive or normative framework. Anyway, I don’t think of people being “about” things. Not my way of communicating or conceptualizing things.

Then he said “We should move in the direction of privatizing all types of security, but we need to get that concept on the roadmap before we can get closer.” My response:

You activist types speak in terms of what is next; the “roadmap”; etc. Do you not even see how mired your (plural) thinking is in such concepts? There is nothing wrong with activism in general; but be aware of the difference between tactics employed to achieve political goals, and positions on truth and right and rights.

Yes, we need to have priorities and do “certain things first”–like have jobs and normal lives, and not believe there is some altruistic duty to delude oneself into thinking one is “making a diffrence” by devoting a large portion of one’s life, time, and resources to a futile attempt to ever-so-slightly increase the chance that we will have a very small and very temporary decrease in the rate of increase of tyranny, for the benefit largely of our socialist-advocating neighbors who don’t deserve it. If that’s your hobby, fine. In a way, it’s mine, but I realize I’m in it for the fight, for the process; not because I delude myself that liberty is just around the corner.

He also criticized my critique of Milsted because it is “widening the divide” instead of “bridging the gap between theorists and activists”; that I should not “excommunicate” Milsted; my response was:

You see, it is the activist mindset that leads you to judge my substantive comments on the grounds of whether it widens the gap, etc. Are you saying my substantive comments and reasoning are wrong? Or that I should not utter them in public?

BTW I did not excommunicate Milsted; I have no power to do so and I would not anyway. And let’s be clear here: if anyone did anything wrong, it was Milsted, for using his perch to call for institutionalized theft. If you want to get indignant, get indignant at him. He is advocating criminality; I am criticizing him for it. Think about what you are doing: you are blaming the victim; instead of criticizing the statist you are criticizing his libertarian critic!

Saying we “need everyone to man the oars” is such an activist mentality. I tend to think in terms of what I and my family “need”. I am not a sacrificial beast whose life is to be spent in a futile attempt to marginally benefit others. Have we libertarians turned into altruists? Do it if you want; but exhortations like this imply we libertarians have a duty to be activists. We do not. Our only libertarian duty is to avoid endorsing or employing aggression.

Re my comments about engineers: some have gotten their back up about it. I have pointed out to them that I am a (former) engineer as well, and know many of them; and while they are preferable to attorneys, and are good in their jobs, and while libertarian engineers are fine by me, I am not talking not about engineers doing engineering. I am talking about their m.o. when they try to develop political views. (and I speak here of non-libertarian engineers; they think you can do-it-yourself and concoct an entire philosophy by brute force; after all, they are smarter than the liberal arts majors, why do they need to waste time reading them?)

Gary Hunt perceptively commented, however:

Good article! I know what you mean about engineers. I am an architect so I work with them on a regular basis. Their thinking is what many architects describe as linear. In other words, “The shortest distance between two points is a straight line”. However, quite frequently the straight line is not the best solution.

I also disagree with Milsted’s contention that sometmes “the economies of scale” justifies the theft for defense, roads ect…. It appears he has not worked in the real world. My experience has been that public works projects cost significantly more than private ones. In fact I know a contractor who bids on many government projects. His method of bidding is to price it as if it were a private job then double the price. He gets a lot of government work.

Thanks again for the good article.

Another perceptive comment about engineers from Max Schwing (Karlsruhe):

Dear Mr. Kinsella,

I understand your point of view and it tends to be coherent with mine
about engineers in general, because we have been indoctrinated into approaching problems from a rational and planning point of view. Therefore we tend to think that we can solve anything by applying mechanical principles to them, especially when it comes to political problems or societies at large. I think it is best said that engineers would like to “engineer society” (Brave New World – style ?!). However, I also know engineers who are looking beyond this view on society and are also interested in the “human or social arts” (as they are called in Germany).

But to persuade an engineer of it, you have to take the economics way of doing it, because we are largely more open to such arguments, than we are to general philosophical ones. I am studying mechanical engineering, so I am closest to the future engineers in Germany and despite that Germany is a social-democratic country, those young bright students are divided between the two big socialist parties (CDU and SPD).

Somehow, engineers still think of the world and society as a mechanical device. So, we are somehow struck in the 19th century, when it comes to society. But still there is hope to get them to the liberal side.

My buddy Robert Capozzi also has a gadfly-ish blogpost about this here; your boy Milsted replies here.

***

Robert Kaercher replies to Milsted in a separate piece here.

***

Milsted’s further reply, Attack of the Hegelian Anarchists; and some blogposts: A Priori Anarchists; and Kevin Rollins’ post Theory and Consequences; and The Seen and the Unseen; and Capozzi’s You Can’t Get There from Here.

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Anarchy, Jurisdiction, Justice, Competition

A friend wrote me something along the following lines, re some of my debates recently (1, 2) with Objectivists over the state and whether it is inherently aggressive, and what it means to be an anarcho-capitalist: “your argument about any government (or acceptance of such) equates to an endorsement of aggression strikes me as wrong. Couldn’t it be a contractual, legal issue? If gov. can do X, I agree to let it do X to protect my life and property. Conversely, if it fails to do X, Y, Z, I can sue or stop it AND keep it from expanding to do A, B, C.”

My reply:

You assume you can sue it if it does ot live up to its agreement–this presupposes a body of contract law (law, rights) outside that little government. Where are you gonna sue it? In its courts? Makes no sense. So you must be assuming other courts or some body of meta-law outside the government itself.

The problem is that suppose 90 people sign up to this “government” but 10 don’t. Okay, fine. the 10 don’t want to pay dues, and they don’t get protection. And if one of them, A, robs a “citizen” C, of the government G, I agree, the government has a right (as agent for the victim-citizen) to punish the robber A, even if he had never signed an agreement with the government.

But A retains a right of self-dfense, does he not? If C robs him, A has a natural right to defend himself, doesn’t he? he even has a right to have C punished. Now I can see C’s agency stepping in and saying, “You may not just punish him on your own, you are too biased and there are not enough procedural protectsion to ensure a fair process, so we will forcibly prevent you from being the judge in your own case.” Fine, I even have no porblem with that. So waht would happen? A might say to C’s government, ‘Fine, then you hold a trial for him, and I’ll pay the costs.” That might work. Alternatively, A might say, “I don’t intend to try him myself. My own private agency is giong to do it–and it has just as fair procedures as you do, so you have no objection.”

I.e., what if those 10 pool their resrouces and hire a small, lean, efficient defense agency D, which is charged with protecting their rights? So wouldn’t Government G and Defense Agency D have an arrangement with each other where so long as certain norms are respected they will cooperate rather than go to war? That is after all what Objectivists say that states have to do today, in a multi-state world.

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Rights and Justification

From a discussion with a friend:

From a discussion with a friend:

Friend: for example, a talk show host is a total free marketer. so he’s basically anarchocapitalist. He’s ambivalent on the idea of rights and is not sure they exist. But yet, he is against aggression (and supports non-aggression) and sees that a voluntary (capitalist) society would be better, etc. Yet I find those comments incomplete without the libertarian (pro-rights) view. How can one know what aggression is without defining rights? (or some other theory of possession?)
Friend: How do I know my actions are justified, even without the state, if there are no rights? What can the non-libertarian free marketer use to “justify”, a priori, laws if they also don’t believe in rights?
NSKinsella: I would say that rights are merely an outcome of what is justified. Not the other way around. I think I differ with most libertarians on this.
Friend: huh
NSKinsella: They ask first what rights there are, to find out what is justified. But I ask what is justified, and use the word “rights” as a shorthand to describe this.
Friend: I think this merits an article. It would fill in the gaps for a lot of people
NSKinsella: Perhaps. It is already implied in my work on rightgs theory but not spelled out specifically. [Causation and Aggression; Punishment and Proportionality: The Estoppel Approach; Defending Argumentation Ethics; Inalienability and Punishment; A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights; New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory; Libertarian Advocates of Aggression (see links in last paragraph–discussions on Chronicles site etc. w/ Scott Richert, Ed Feser, et al. about willingness to admit one favors aggression); The Essence of Libertarianism]
Friend: there are a lot of people like me who are in this limbo. It’s been bothering me for months.
Friend: But if you start with justification, how does one proceed?
NSKinsella: By asking what it means to justify.
Friend: ugh
NSKinsella: What is one looking for when one is trying to justify something?
NSKinsella: Who is it that seeks to justify? Who is it that engages in the activity of justification?
NSKinsella: Hint: it is not criminals. It is those who seek justice–rightness; those who have a predisposition toward peacefulenss, and cooperation.
Friend: well, one could say that the criminal who steals and then wants “justice” even if he’s “wrong” is also predisposed to this (to see if he can get away with it). Anyway, I urge you to write about this, since it would maybe solve this issue.
Friend: so
Friend: I had a long talk with a friend about this and your stuff kinda makes sense 🙂
Friend: also relates to estoppel and justification
Friend: it also seems to fit a Rothbardian view of rights even if it’s better to see it from an estoppel/HHH argumentation view [more on discourse ethics].

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Anarchy in Polish

My classic 🙂 article What It Means To Be an Anarcho-Capitalist has just been tranaslated into
Polish; it was previously translated into Dutch and Spanish.

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Minarchists as Statist-Aggressors

Related posts:

I post below my interchange with Gus “DiZerega” from a Hayek list (of Higgs-spanking fame; update: see Hilarious Higgs versus a befuddled author), about the nature of aggression and whether minarchists or other statists are criminal-like (most recent at top):

***

[Laurence Moss wrote: “I do have a challenge. Suppose I could persuade a “private property anarchist,” ( that is my term for what you are calling minianarchist or libertarian anarchist, etc.) that in the absence of the state, a huge Janjaweed-like mafia will emerge on each and every college campus that will terrorize, rape, mutilate and burn every copy of Human Action including your sacred autographed copy. Wouldn’t you then praise the gods that there is “a state” to protect the community? In his early Latin writings, Hobbes saw the state as a logical development out self-help militias that often arise spontaneously in the face of enemy attacks such the onslaught of Janjaweed anti-Misesians. (Hobbes would have had in mind the Mongol invasions or Moslem counter-invasions of earlier centuries).”


Laurence,

Your hypo is problematic in that it implicitly presumes that to be an anarchist is to have some kind of prediction that anarchy will be achieved, or how it “would” work if it were achieved. Let me try again to clarify: as I pointed out in my article What It Means to be an Anarcho-Capitalist, an anarchist simply (a) believes aggression is unjust; and (b) the state necessarily commits aggression–institutionalized aggression, at that. Therefore, the anarchist believes that states–in particular, the aggression they commit–is unjustified.

Your question seems to be of the following type. Imagine a person–call him C, for civilized–opposes aggression–he thinks it is immoral, or unjust. Now he thinks both private aggression (crime), and public aggression (institutionalized aggression perpetrated by the state) are immoral. In a society in which enough people voluntarily oppose aggression, and voluntarily respect their neighbors’ rights, to such a degree and extent that the state is widely seen as illegitimate and therefore does not exist and/or whithers away–then there would still be occasional acts of private aggression. The civilized people would still oppose this and believe it to be immoral.

In such a society, you might pose a hypothetical where C would face an alternative–where some mafia A arises and threatens his copy of Human Action–and ask him if he would be glad if another mafia B intervened and killed mafia A. But note: even if C says he is glad mafia B attacks mafia A, he still believes aggression is unjust as are mafias! In short, if you tell someone that aggression 1 or 2 WILL be committed, and he has a preference for which he opposes most, it does not mean he endorses either.

Note, you said: “just because every single time the state “acts” it involves the initiation of coercion or aggression it does not follow that ONLY the state acts by initiating coercion or aggression.” True: but as I implied above, anarchists oppose all aggression: both institutionalized aggression, and private aggression. I think it might be fair to say that libertarian minarchists oppose all or most private aggression, but do not oppose all institutionalized aggression. Perhaps they believe that “the choice” is between widespread private aggression (chaos-anarchy), and limited, channeled, “legalized” aggression committed by a state who helps minimize private aggression. Now, I think that reason and experience shows that public aggression is obviously more extensive than private aggression; but even if one made the other choice, *it still does not mean one thinks the state is justified*. It just means you think that aggression is unavoidable and you prefer to minimize it by having a state.

In my view, if you believe this, you can technically still be an anarchist, if you maintain the state is unjustified–it is just that you believe the aggression the state permits is not as bad as the private aggression that would be committed in its absence. So you still oppose aggression and believe the state is unjustified. Where you differ with other anarchists is they recognize the state is a far worse aggressor so any idea of having them protect us is ludicrous and dangerous.

However I think what happens is that libertarians who begrudgingly maintain that the state’s aggression is preferable to the private aggression that would rise up in the state’s absence, make the mistake of thinking this means the state is “necessary” or even “justified.” Once you take this leap, you now change your fundamental stance re aggression: now, you maintain that some aggression is actually justified: if a little aggression can be committed to stop greater aggression, for example, it is justified. This is a type of rights-utilitarianism.

My suspicion is that this kind of libertarian feels like a sell-out when confronted by anarchists who refuse to compromise, refuse to sanction aggression, refuse to admit that state violence is better than private violence. So they turn around and attack them as not being “realists” etc.

***

As I see it, “extreme” libertarians–anarcho-capitalists–disagree with each other quite often on concrete applications and questions of whether a given action in a given context *is* aggression. Where we all agree is that we oppose aggression, to the extent something can be identified as such. All libertarians oppose most aggression, and recognize that your average citizen condones a lot more aggression than they do. Whether these libertarians want to be “judgmental” or “label” your mainstreamer advocates of aggression as such; whether you believe it makes the mainstreamer criminal in that respect; is a side issue. The point is that according to even minarchist or classical liberal libertarianism, most mainstream people do condone aggression.

By the same logic, a libertarian who explicitly endorses (a small amount of) aggression, however reluctantly, is similar, from the point of view of the anarcho-libertarian, to the mainstreamer as seen by the minarchist libertarian.

I really don’t see what the minarchists are so offended about. All we anarchists are saying is the state is not justified, since in our view, initiated force against innocent people is not justified. Maybe you reject our view because you think it is too simplistic. Fine. But that is our view. The p
oint is, *we are losers*–we are not getting our way. I do have to pay taxes and give allegiance to the state, despite my abhorrence for it. For those who think a state is necessary, *you have won*–you are getting your way. For example, for libertarians (or others) who think some amount of taxes are justified–hey, you are getting my tax dollars. I am being clubbed out of them, *despite* my opposition. And surely we all know my bitching has no realistic chance of changing this. If anything, I should be offended that the statists are coercing me to go along with their vision of the great society; rather than advocates of the state being offended by complaints. Boy, if I had your deal, I would take it in a second. If I could just have a free society where institutionalized aggression was widely viewed as unjust, thereby preventing the advocates of the state from actually taking my property or drafting or killing me, but I had to let the statists bitch and moan about it, I’d take that deal in a second.

What is it, then, that advocates of the state really want? Is it not enough to ride roughshod over the opposition and non-consent of anarchists? Is it not enough to force us to go along with these insane collectivist mafia schemes? Do we also have to stop complaining about it?

—–Original Message—–
From: Stephan Kinsella

Yes, some of this is semantical: failure to define terms or use them consistently. Aggression is used by most libertarians to refer to the initiation of force–which I think is best described as an unconsented-to use of, or invasion of the borders of, another’s property or body.

Many libertarians, possibly influenced by Rand’s (mis?)use of the term “coercion,” use it as a synonym for aggression. But I would think “coercion” simply means inducing someone to do something by means of a threat of force; i.e., it is a species of, or threat of, force–and can be initiatory, or responsive. That is, coercion might be aggression; or it might be legitimate.

In my opinion, there are many flavors of libertarian. My own flavor happens to be non-utilitarian, principles-based; and non-statist, non-minarchist, anarcho-capitalist position. I have tried to explain what I mean by anarcho-capitalism in my article What It Means to be an Anarcho-Capitalist (available at www.StephanKinsella.com/publications). It does not mean one predicts or believes that we will achieve it; or even, really, that it is possible to achieve it. Rather, to be an anarcho-capitalist is simply to recognize that (a) aggression is unjustified, and that (b) states necessarily commit systematic, institutionalized aggression. As I see it, anyone who is not an anarchist–that is, who favors the existence of any state at all, even a minimal one; who believes that a state is *justified*–has to deny one of these two points.

Now non-libertarians really don’t have any problem with this test, because they just don’t really care about being very principled about aggression. They are quite used to the notion that sometimes the indiviual has to be sacrified for the masses–most of them support a draft, or a version of it such as the income tax. Etc. But as far as I can tell, libertarians are a lot more squirrelly when they are confronted with this anarchist test. They have a bit of discomfort with aggression, and probably are used to feeling superior to your average layman who is not nearly so scrupulous as they are about endorsing aggression. They are the ones used to feeling morally superior to their fellow “statists”. So they get miffed when they find a more “pure” libertarian in effect calling them on their own endorsement of aggression. You see this all the time in Objectivists, who feel compelled to label libertarians “nihlists” and anarchists as more dangerous than socialists or criminals. Methink they doth protest too much.

So you have minarchist libertarians or classical liberal types respond to my test in a few ways. One is pure outrage or other forms of evasion. Another is a desperate attempt to change the subject by saying that anarchy won’t work–which is exactly why I wrote that article, to explain that a believe that anarchy will “work” or will be achieved is not what being an anarchist is about. THe anarchist simply refuses to say that states are justified, since he opposes aggression and believes states commit aggression; the anarchist is similar to the libertarian who would condemn all acts of murder even though he thinks we can never achieve a murder-free society.

So when you can get a non-anarchist libertarian to actually answer the question: which do you believe?–that aggression is (sometimes) justified, or that states do not necessarily commit aggression, you get one of two answers. Some will take the latter. Objectivists do this, by blathering on about “context”. They say that “because” an objective law enforcer is needed, “therefore” the actions necessary for that agency to perform cannot be aggression or a rights violation. Etc. Or you will get the California types who say states don’t necessarily commit aggression, since aggression is not “what libertarianism is about” or that it’s not a coherent concept.

And some will say that unfortunately, sometimes aggression is justified. I can respect this answer; I think it is honest, and usually sincere. This position is the position of people who believe that if you don’t allow some aggression to be permitted (at least the aggression necessary for a minimal state to exist), then even worse aggression will be committed in the state’s absence. I think this position is flawed, but it is respectable, and honest, and sincere, and can be debated. And I think it is, at root, the real position of most libertarian statists–sorry, I mean non-anarchist libertarians. But most of them don’t want to admit it this starkly, because then it makes it clear that they do endorse aggression in some cases. Or maybe it makes them look as if they have become compromisers or something. I do not know.

But it does seem to me that this way of classifying and distinguishing types of libertarians is useful and perfectly sensible.

As for those libertarians who try to wriggle out of this classification scheme by denying the coherence of aggression as a concept, let me just say that I think that really, this response simply means these libertarians do not have opposition-to-aggression as their highest political value. That is fine. Nonaggression is the *reason* I am a libertarian. It might not be others’ reason. Why they are reluctant to admit this is a mystery. But I believe the libertarian concept of nonaggression is related to our concept of property rights: to the idea that the way to assign ownership of a given scarce resource is to assign it to the first user, or to his transferee. Basically, all non-anarchists do not believe that first acquisition is the primary or only rule for assigning property rights. They believe in some other rule. For example, if you favor a state, even a minarchy, then you favor some aggression committed by the state–such as its outlawing other agencies, or taxing its subjects. But these actions basically mean the state assumes partial ownership of property that it did not homestead: for example if it outlaws another agency, it is telling that agency what it can do with its own property; or it is telling me what I canno
t do with my money, because it will not let me hire the other agency. Therefore the state is assuming co-ownerhsip of my or others’ property. Libertarians who are in favor of this are saying that title to property is assigned to the state for some reason other than its having first possessed the property or having voluntarily received it. So all non-anarchists favor a property title rule other than first-use. They believe that it is legitimate in some cases for the state to in effect take property by force from the original owner or his transferee. Those of us who are opposed to aggression on principle believe that the owner of property is he who first appropriates it or whoever he gave it to. We think that if the state takes it, it is obviously theft and illegitimate. That is the difference between principled, anti-aggression, anarcho-capitalist libertaraisn, and all others.

Note that this dichotomy does not seek to justify one position over the other; it is just a clear way of identifying our differences.

Stephan

N. Stephan Kinsella

—–Original Message—–
From: Gordon Sollars

MessageStephan Kinsella writes – in response to Gus diZerega:

Yes, but Kopple flat out admitted he is in favor of some forms of
aggression– as you do below. My view is this. Anarcho-capitalists oppose all aggression.

We should be careful here about whether ‘aggression’ or ‘coercion’ are taken to be what some philosophers call “moralized” terms or not. That is, are all instances of the term moral violations of some kind or not? If I understand Stephan, he takes all instances of ‘aggression’ (and perhaps
‘coercion’) as morally wrong. Roger and Gus appear not to take ‘aggression’ (or ‘coercion’ ?) as “moralized”, so that not all instances must be wrong.

One problem that some of my libertarian brethren – who press very hard on ‘aggression’ (or ‘coercion’) – face is that they do not think that it is a moral violation to /respond/ to aggression (or coercion) with actions that, taken by themselves, appear identical to actions that mark aggression (or coercion). Thus, it seems that even libertarians do not oppose /all/ aggression (or coercion).

Even this conclusion must be qualified, since some definitions of ‘aggression’ refer to “unprovoked” attacks, while others refer to “offensive” or “hostile” behavior. The idea of ‘provoking’ helps the libertarian, but perhaps Roger or Gus would not necessarily claim that a wrong-doer has always ‘provoked’. Definitions of ‘coercion’ typically refer simply to “compelling by force”, and, as, such, would seem not to support the idea that ‘coercion’ is a moralized term even for the libertarian (who would compel a wrong doer to, say, make restitution).

Gordon G. Sollars

From: Stephan Kinsella

 

Dear Mr. diZerega:


>NSK>
You yourself oppose most aggression that I also oppose, I am sure, even if you are not an anarchist, but are merely a minarchist, classical liberal, etc.; and this means that you necessarily categorize those committing those acts of aggression as being aggressors–criminals.

> No I do not. <


So — things that you admit are aggression (say, murder), … the people who commit these things are not … criminals? In your view, aggression (of the type that you yourself condemn) is not criminal?

>NSK:> . . . I think there is an obvious and direct correlation between civilization, and the willingness of the general populace to respect each other’s rights (whatver those rights are). Would you really disagree wiht this?

> Yes I would. I would not use rights language, which implies a lot of metaphysical assumptions about the nature of human beings that are not necessary for peaceful and mutually satisfying relationships. If you used the term “respect for others” and leave off rights talk – which can but need not indicate respect, (nor need respect indicate a belief in rights in any strong sense) – I would agree with you. <


I think this is just semantics. I think respect for others is indeed civilized and is the very reason and the root of respect for others’ rights. But this is all irrelevant. My main point is that some of us libertarians are extremely opposed to aggression. In my own case, I view the predisposition to avoid aggression as linked to the desire to be civilized… but this is more of an analysis or personal way of looking at it. I readily admit the concept “civilized” is not rigorous, but more evocative. But I still think the essence of civilization–the reason something of value gets produced by human interaction–is due to the peaceful, cooperative aspects of it. Not the aggressive aspects.


>
I generally avoid the term “civilized” because it has been used to justify so many horrible actions against those deemed uncivilized. <


Well, I tend to try to focus on truth, not self-censoring out of fear for how others might misuse a given idea.


>
If you act in a respectful manner towards someone or something, you act in a civilized manner towards it. <


I quite agree. As between two individuals, if they are really respecful, they don’t go around bashing each other in the head.

>NSK:> Third, of course there are uncertainties about *what is aggression* in a given case. If you said you cannot necessarily join me in denouncing a given institution or practice because you are not quite *sure* it is aggression, that is one thing.

> And that is the main thing. In at least some cases where you might think something is aggression, I am quite sure it is not. <


Yes, but Kopple flat out admitted he is in favor of some forms of aggression–
as you do below. My view is this. Anarcho-capitalists oppose all aggression. You could say that avoidance of aggression is their highest political value. Minarchists and others down the spectrum–classical liberals, democrats, welfare-statists, conservatives, etc., all oppose many forms of aggression but also endorse some forms of aggression. Most people, for example, favor taxes. I don’t see how you can deny that this is aggression. These people–I don’t deny many of them are sincere–believe that for whatever reason the aggression they favor *is justified*. But all this means is that all non-anarchists–which is to say, all statists–value something more than non-aggression. For example you might prefer egalitarian results, to avoiding all aggression; you are willing to have a bit of aggression to have a more egalitarian society. Or whatever. The point is that if you endorse what you acknowledge or plainly is aggression, in any case at all, then you evidently have something *other* than non-aggression as your highest political value. If I valued X more than non-aggression, I would of course be willing to accept some aggression to achieve X; but I would not be ashamed to admit it; and I would not attack principled opponents of aggression who merely pointed out the difference between me and them. I really find it baffling that some minarchists (or worse) want to have it both ways: they want to favor institutionized aggression (often for sincere reasons, to be sure), but not to be accused of favoring aggression. It is truly bizarre. Why not just take the honest approach and say something like, “Hey, it’s not my fault that the world is such that it’s better to have some aggression in some cases, than to always refrain from its use.” If that’s what you believe, just say so. But I think most libertarians or classical liberal types know intuitively how distasteful aggression is. In fact my theory is that this is the reason most of us become libertarain. But some of us apparently abhor aggression more than others; some of use find it distasteful but also have other things that drove them to libertarianism–some kind of utilitarian-related desire to “increase overall wealth” or whatever. So they have several value they want to achieve, and they see some as in conflict, and some as more important than others when push comes to shove. So for example they are willing to endorse aggression to achieve some other value that is more important to them.


(Incidentally: I have discussed this before, as detailed in the last 2 paragraphs of this post (: In particular, this post has links to
threads which show some conservative types trying to wriggle out of being labeled advocates of aggression despite clearly endorsing it: e.g., my debate with Ed Feser et al. about the nature of criminality and aggression in this thread; the Chronicles thread I participated in with Scott Richert about the non-aggression principle (see his The Limits of Economics; Economics, Catholic Social Teaching, and Dissent); also the recent post on LewRockwell blog lately about this and Thomas Woods versus Thomas Fleming, Storck, et al.; and a Chronicles blog thread I participated in with Fleming et al. )

 

> I am not sure anyone on this list endorses aggression for the same reason no one on this list endorses murder, Both are BY DEFINITION morally loaded terms that imply a wrong is being done. <


But Koppl did say he endorses aggression, as do you. Kopple said, “Yes, yes, that means I would vote to have the state coerce you, Walter, aggress against you, force you to do things you don’t want to do! This is the bedlam into which one is led when one lives without the non-aggression axiom.”
And you say below: “I can also conceive of at least hypothetical instances where I would endorse aggression however personally painful it would be.

Aren’t these outright admissions of favoring aggression? Now you are saying that some people do not actually endorse aggression, despite saying that they do? It seems very clear to me that if you do endorse aggression then you must value something higher than non-aggression. That is fine–hey, you might even
be right. Maybe my obsession with avoiding bashing my neighbors’ over the head with a brick is too extreme. Maybe I should not be so inflexible in my view that you should not use or take someone’s property without their consent.


Moreover, besides the “emergency” or “extreme cases” you allude to: I assume you are not an anarchist (if I am wrong please correct me). But anarchists simply are those who deny the legitimacy of states. So if you are not an anarchist, then that means you think states are legitimate (yes yes, I realize you say you think democracies are not states–I don’t care what label you want to use or avoid, but for me the essence of the “state” is a monopoly on law enforcement and/or the power to tax; do you support either of these for your “non-state”? If not you are an anarchist like me, and I am not sure what you are objecting to. So I have to assume you do favor instittutionalized aggression, despite your reluctance to say you endorse a state and desire to call it by some other name like “democracy” instead. The point here is that you are not only in favor of aggression in emergency or extreme cases — unless you are an anarchist, you are in favor of regular, omnipresent, systematic, institutionalized aggression–of however low a level. 1% taxes is better than 51%, but still institutionalized aggression, in the form of legal robbery.


>
I think people have what we can call intrinsic value, which is rooted in my understanding of Hume’s concept of “sympathy,” and that outcomes matter. <


I am not sure what
“intrinsic value” is–seems a bit metaphorical and imprecise for me, but in any event, my own view is that *empathy* for others is what gives rise to a general reluctance to engage in violent interaction with others… what I might think of as the “civilized” predisposition (apologies)—hence the desire for most people–not criminals or outlaws, but civilized people, yes–to find justifications for force, and to engage in it only when they satisfy themselves that despite their prima facie reluctance, it is justified in this type of case. My view is that the person who is most reluctant, and has the highest standards or thresholds to be satisifed for justifying proposed or desired violence, are just libertarians. And that the most consistent among them recognize that the only good justification to be found is for force that is *in response* to aggression, or initiated force; and the most hyper-consistent among them are the anarchists. In short, the most “true” libertarians are those who oppose all aggression. It is like an ideal to aspire to.

 


>
You take a word that every English speaker agrees refers to unjustified action, at least in the absence of overwhelming necessity, and regrettable even then, and give it a meaning that most people will reject. Thus, you abuse the term in general use unless you can make a persuasive case. And calling those who disagree aggressors and uncivilized won’t convince anybody. <


Two comments. First, as I quoted you and Kopple above, you apparently do endorse “unjustified action,” if by that you mean the aggression. Second, what is the relevance of your comment that it “won’t convince anybody”? Is that supposed to mean that it is wrong? If so, do you mean to imply that an idea’s validity is measured by how persuasive it is likely to be? (Would that imply that a woman who is unable to accuse a rapist not to rape her must be wrong in saying it is a rights violation? that the rapist “disproves” her contention by simply overpowering her and not being moved by her objections?) Or are you trying to give me advice about whether it’s “worth it”
(to me?) to expend effort trying to futilely persuade others of something (that might be true)? I never understand this activist mentality that confuses strategy with truth.

> I would argue, and have incessantly, that democracies are not states, they are spontaneous orders. States are instrumental organizations in Hayek’s sense. I would also argue that any coherent democratic theory relies on the value of consensus, not majority rule. <


Ah, so your “democracies” don’t commit acts of institutionalized aggression?
They don’t tax, they don’t outlaw competitors, they don’t force all people in their grasp to become members? News to me.

 


Best wishes,

Stephan

—–Original Message—–
From: Gus DiZerega

 

Dear Mr. Kinsella-
You wrote

First, I don’t think my clear assertion of my views about aggression and what it entails–and that it correlates with being civilized–is “smug”.

I consider it smug for someone to take for themselves the title civilized, and apply to others the less flattering characterization of uncivilized, ESPECIALLY when the person claiming the title, and those with similar views, comprise a statistically insignificant portion of humanity AND the overwhelming majority of human beings oppose aggression. Where they differ is what constitutes it and the fact that so many disagree suggests there may be room for honest disagreement rather than barbarism.

You yourself oppose most aggression that I also oppose, I am sure, even if you are not an anarchist, but are merely a minarchist, classical liberal, etc.; and this means that you necessarily categorize those committing those acts of aggression as being aggressors–criminals.

No I do not.

. . . I think there is an obvious and direct correlation between civilization, and the willingness of the general populace to respect each other’s rights (whatver t
hose rights are). Would you really disagree wiht this?

Yes I would. I would not use rights language, which implies a lot of metaphysical assumptions about the nature of human beings that are not necessary for peaceful and mutually satisfying relationships. If you used the term “respect for others” and leave off rights talk – which can but need not indicate respect, (nor need respect indicate a belief in rights in any strong sense) – I would agree with you.

In other words, it is inevitable that if we have different concepts of justice and rights, then we will have necessarily different views about what constitutes “civilized” behavior.

I generally avoid the term “civilized” because it has been used to justify so many horrible actions against those deemed uncivilized. If you act in a respectful manner towards someone or something, you act in a civilized manner towards it. That is how I usually use the term, if I have to.

Another legitimate use of the term is to refer to literate cultures, and that says nothing at all about the moral behavior of its residents. Rome had a civilization. It also acted horribly in all too many cases. So has every such civilization. So this very legitimate use of the term does not require us to agree about justice and rights to agree that a particular society is a civilization.

Third, of course there are uncertainties about *what is aggression* in a given case. If you said you cannot necessarily join me in denouncing a given institution or practice because you are not quite *sure* it is aggression, that is one thing.

And that is the main thing. In at least some cases where you might think something is aggression, I am quite sure it is not.

I am not sure anyone on this list endorses aggression for the same reason no one on this list endorses murder, Both are BY DEFINITION morally loaded terms that imply a wrong is being done. One MIGHT endorse actions that will injure peaceful people if there seems no alternative and the costs of not doing so are deemed prohibitively high. However undesired and unfortunate, this is a logical possibility for anyone who would not be willing to run the risk of injuring an innocent person if the cost of not doing so were the destruction of the world, or even the universe. The example is absurd – but I use it because I am inclined to regard most kinds of moral absolutism as absurd. Like Roger I am powerfully influenced by Hume, though maybe not in the way he is.

I think people have what we can call intrinsic value, which is rooted in my understanding of Hume’s concept of “sympathy,” and that outcomes matter.

. . . The plain fact is that I and probably Block would view any minarchist as *mistaken* to the extent he advocates aggression–and in fact, as advocating criminality. Just as the minarchist views the conservative as advocating criminality in many of the policies the conservative endorses. I see no reason to hide or to evade or to pretend otherwise.

But that is just the point. You take a word that every English speaker agrees refers to unjustified action, at least in the absence of overwhelming necessity, and regrettable even then, and give it a meaning that most people will reject. Thus, you abuse the term in general use unless you can make a persuasive case. And calling those who disagree aggressors and uncivilized won’t convince anybody.

You can make a persuasive case to me by rebutting the various points I listed in my original post in this thread. And I will then become an anarcho-capitalist – as I once was long ago.

. . . libertarians who say they are not anarchists, and support the existence of some minimal state, must either: (a) maintain that the state does NOT necessarly employ aggression;

I would argue, and have incessantly, that democracies are not states, they are spontaneous orders. States are instrumental organizations in Hayek’s sense. I would also argue that any coherent democratic theory relies on the value of consensus, not majority rule.

. . . What I do not understand is why people who frankly acknowledge that they sometimes endorse aggression, are reluctant to admit this, and react hysterically when called on it.

Because they think you use the term incorrectly. I agree with them. As you see, I can also conceive of at least hypothetical instances where I would endorse aggression however personally painful it would be. Indeed, I can logically conceive of cases where the aggression I endorsed might cause greater pain to me than to the person aggressed upon – and I would still endorse it.

best,

Gus diZerega
Dept. of Government
St. Lawrence University
Canton, NY 13617

—–Original Message—–
From: Stephan Kinsella

 

Dear Mr. diZerega:


First, I don’t think my clear assertion of my views about aggression and what it entails–and that it correlates with being civilized–is “smug”.


Second, smugness is irrelevant to the substantive correctness of my assertions. In any event, I prefer to focus on substance, not meta-issues like smugness, presentation style, tactic, rhetoric, strategy, and activist concerns. It has always seemed to me that truth is more important. Call me crazy. It has also always seemed to me that there should be no reason one cannot state his views plainly and bluntly; that people being thin-skinned and ever ready to resort to meta-argument, which amounts to a change of subject and evasion, is just a time-wasting distraction.


You yourself oppose most aggression that I also oppose, I am sure, even if you are not an anarchist, but are merely a minarchist, classical liberal, etc.; and this means that you necessarily categorize those committing those acts of aggression as being aggressors–criminals. Just like I do. Even if they are committing or endorsing those acts out of ignorance, or even good faith. The question of whether being mistaken in a given case is excusable is a separate issue. So it would appear that you and I would
both label a large number of people as “aggressors”, and as engaged in what we both consider to be wicked or unjust. Is this “smug”? Or is your main objection that I correlate my own aggression-related norms to being civilized? Is this seriously your objection? What is civilization? It is organized human interaction, which of course at its base depends on peaceful interaction. I think there is an obvious and direct correlation between civilization, and the willingness of the general populace to respect each other’s rights (whatver those rights are). Would you really disagree wiht this? In other words, it is inevitable that if we have different concepts of justice and rights, then we will have necessarily different views about what constitutes “civilized” behavior.


Third, of course there are uncertainties about *what is aggression* in a given case. If you said you cannot necessarily join me in denouncing a given institution or practice because you are not quite *sure* it is aggression, that is one thing. But Koppl, if I recall, off-handedly and casually admitted he believes in aggression in some cases. Not that he disagrees with Block about whether a given policy or law or institution is aggression–reasonable libertarians can disagree about this. But that he actually endorses aggression. Now this is fine; he is entitled to endorse aggression; are others of us not free to condemn aggression? And given these simple observations about differences among types of libertarians, are we supposed to avoid acknowledging implications of this, out of some rule of politeness? No. The plain fact is that I and probably Block would view any minarchist as *mistaken* to the extent he advocates aggression–and in fact, as advocating criminality. Just as the minarchist views the conservative as advocating criminality in many of the policies the conservative endorses. I see no reason to hide or to evade or to pretend otherwise.


I have tried to detail some of this in my article What It Means To Be an Anarcho-Capitalist (http://www.lewrockwell.com/kinsella/kinsella15.html). As I explain there, those libertarians who say they are not anarchists, and support the existence of some minimal state, must either: (a) maintain that the state does NOT necessarly employ aggression; or (b) maintain that some aggression is justifiable.
I see no logical way out of this. I think the answer, to be honest, is (b) in most cases. What I do not understand is why people who frankly acknowledge that they sometimes endorse aggression, are reluctant to admit this, and react hysterically when called on it. IT is akin to liberals nowadays not wanting to be called liberals (by contrast, conservatives don’t mind being called conservatives; and libertarian anarchists like me do not mind frankly admitting that we oppose aggression period). If you think aggression *is* justified, why not just admit it? Why turn it into a meta-discussion about the propriety of having the discussion?


Stephan

N. Stephan Kinsella

 


—–Original Message—–
From: Gus DiZerega

Stephan Kinsella wrote:

My point here is not to justify our end of the spectrum; some people prefer
to be civilized and deal with others in peaceful ways wherever possible;
others do not.

I had intended to stay out of this, but the smugness of the above broke my resolve.

Some libertarians find aggression easy to define because they define it in a way that most reasonable people find unsatisfying, even if it leads to a simple world.

Of course armed robbers are aggressors, and I know of next to none who think otherwise. Does someone who wants a national park fall in the same category? The surrealists in part of the libertarian movement would say yes. 99 % of humanity would likely say no.

Libertarians with such views seem to rest their argument on several assumptions not supported by fact or logic.

1. The market is a perfectly neutral means for facilitating peaceful human cooperation.

It is not. That it is not is a major reason Hayek favored certain kinds of government action. For example, it breaks down customary ties that served to assist people who are caught in misfortunes not of their own making. I am very well aware of the argument that free people can find alternatives sources of support. I am also well aware that large numbers of people fearing such things happening to them have been far from convinced. Democracies can be ways of rationally reducing organizing costs for large numbers of relatively isolated people if modest means, at the risk of having some of the benefits siphoned off by those who game the system.

2. Property rights are justly owned, or a perfectly just system of property rights can at least in theory be imagined, such that there would be no need in the name of justice to intervene in property ownership.

There is no generally agreed upon theory of property rights that can meet the latter criteria – in no small part because libertarian theories of property rights assume a Newtonian kind of world, where boundaries can be firmly delineated and in principle inexpensively defended. That model breaks down as people become ever more intricately involved with one another, in no small part because of the market’s success. And existing systems of property rights hardly reflect perfectly just allotments by any criterion. Please, tell me how I can objectively determine whether sound waves or photons or odors violate my property rights? Who draws the line if a line must be drawn? Why should I accept the judgment of the line drawer? If I do not accept the judgment, by the radical libertarian standard of aggression isn’t it an act of aggression against me?

To ask victims of unjust actions to refrain from seeking government help because governments are or can be aggressors is simply asking those who are weak in the absence of government to submit to those who are strong in its absence. Of course, all real examples of this happening in the world we live in are belittled as occurring in a non libertarian world, and so are not really indicative of libertarianism’s practicality. But the market exists in a non libertarian world, and libertarians have no trouble saying it is evidence that their principles are solid. Yet key elements of the market are defended by government – su
ch as contracts and property rights. It is skimming the cream to take those less than perfect examples of today as evidence for your position and rejecting the less than perfect examples that challenge it.

3. As has been discussed earlier on this list, public values are not always reflected in consumer choices, as Mark Sagoff memorably and convincingly showed in his book, The Economy of the Earth. Check his discussion of Mineral King and Disney locatable in the index. I have used similar cases in my teaching every year for over ten years, ALWAYS with the same results. I also know it is true for me personally regarding things like the Trail Ridge Road in Colorado – I drive it frequently, would pay tolls to drive it if necessary, in fact, in a sense I do when I pay a park entrance fee and plan only on driving through it. And I wish it did not exist.

4. If theorists from Aristotle to Madison to lesser contemporary figures like myself are correct, what we today call democratic theory can only be coherently developed with its ideal being consensus, not majority rule. Rules that can be supported unanimously do not need to require unanimity, in fact they probably would not, because that leaves the community open to blackmail by a single party. In practice super majorities are more reasonable for the most important decisions except when speed is of the essence – and are relied upon in efforts to create governments based on consent, such as our own. That such rules can be subverted is perhaps evidence the task is impossible, but it may also be evidence the task needs to be done better.

I send this post only because of the irritating smugness of the author taking upon himself the label of civilized, and denying it to those of us who see the world as more complex.

On an unrelated matter, I also suggest we go back to what was once a rule for posting- that we identify who we are. I have noticed some posts were virtually anonymous. Who in the name of the Gods is “Bill” or whoever that was?

i think that is more civilized.

Gus diZerega
Visiting Assistant Prof.
Dept. of Government
St. Lawrence University
canton, NY 13617

—–Original Message—–
From: Stephan Kinsella

Roger,

At least you admit that you are in favor of aggression. But you seem to think you can dismiss those who oppose aggression on principle, like Walter and real libertrians, with a wave of the hand and some vague comment implying that if you are concerned about “actual details of how things really get done in a given market or region” then, why, of course, you would support aggression. Such considerations may suffice for you to favor aggression in a given case, but of course, it does not, for true libertarians–that is, for those of us who sincerely and on principlied grounds oppose aggression, and think violent force should be applied to our innocent neighbors *only* if it is truly justified and called for–that is, only in response to their acts of aggression.

True libertarians simply are those people who have a very high threshold to be satisfied when seeking justification for violent conflict with our neighbors. At the other end of the spectrum are the utterly criminal minded, and the might-makes-right types, who simply do not give a damn whether their violent actions are justified–they want what they want, and that’s that. They are hardly humans, hardly civilized; they are near-animals. Between the uncivilized, animalistic, criminal-mentality, thuggish end of the spectrum, and the civilized, anti-aggression, libertarian end, there are people who oppose some aggression, and who are to that extent civilized, and who also favor some aggression, to that extent rejecting civilized human life.

My point here is not to justify our end of the spectrum; some people prefer to be civilized and deal with others in peaceful ways wherever possible; others do not. But my point is that the existence of mean criminals at the bad end of the spectrum does not serve to prove to us libertarians that our preference for peace is wrong; it just means there are unfortunately people out there who are willing to live as savages and harm the rest of us. Likewise, the fact that there are people in between, like you apparently, also does not serve as any kind of disproof of our principled opposition to aggression. A bandit has, I suppose, if you press him, some weak set of reasons for his willingness to aggress against others; it is irrelevant, since he simply has a very, very low threshold for being willing to commit or condone aggression. Likewise, the fact that your concern about “actual details of how things really get done in a given market or region” seems to satisfy for you the appropriateness of using initiated, physical violence against innocent people is also irrelevant–it only shows that you have a lower threshold for approving violence than a real libertarian does. So my point is, what is the relevance of your announcing that you happen to have a lower threshold than does, say, Walter? How in the world does the fact that you have a lower threshold even suggest that his threshold is too high?

Stephan

N. Stephan Kinsella

—–Original Message—–
From: Roger Koppl

Walter, I didn’t mean to sign onto just everything Hayek might have said. On the other hand, I agree with Hayek on the particular shocker you indicate: “limited support for rent control.” His “support,” as you know, consisted merely in favoring a gradual, not instantaneous, elimination of such controls. I haven’t examined how to exit rent controls, so I don’t have a strongly held position to defend. But the general suggestion that you don’t just pull the plug seems right to me. I think de-regulation is a very difficult matter and should be approached carefully. Yes, yes, that means I would vote to have the state coerce you, Walter, aggress against you, force you to do things you don’t want to do! This is the bedlam into which one is led when one lives without the non-aggression axiom. You end up having to sort out, you know, actual details of how things really get done in a given market or region. When bereft of the non-aggression axiom, you have to study the world to form an opinion about many of the phenomena within it. It’s very messy business and may drive one to support various forms of coercion. You see, Walter, I really am not a libertarian. I really do leak at least as much as Hayek. I love it that Pete calls me “left.” Who else would give me such a label?

Cheers,
Roger

—– Original Message —–
From: “Walter Block” >

> Dear Roger:
>
> I agree with you entirely in your criticism of Pete. Certainly, this
> material is not “out of bounds.”
>
> But I’m puzzled by your remarks about the non
> aggression axiom. You favor the initiation of
> aggression against non aggressors? Surely not?
>
> We need not go there, however, to look askance at
> Hayeks support for all sorts of leftist welfare
> schemes. Don’t tell me you go along with those,
> included limited support for rent control?
>
> Best regards,
>
> Walter
>
> — Roger Koppl wrote:
>
> > Sure Pete, of course. If you want to put forward
> > any research agenda in any field, then the point of
> > about predecessors is their frameworks and tool
> > sets, not a checklist of beliefs with which one
> > agrees or disagrees. No kidding. Indeed, my recent presidential
> > address before the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics
> > is given in this general spirit. It lays out how Austrian economics
> > has become “mainstream” again:
> > http://alpha.fdu.edu/~koppl/sdae.doc. (What a
> > shameless plug!) The context of my recent comments
> > on this board, however, was Juliet Williams’ post,
> > which raised the question of w
hether Hayek the man
> > was or was not a “staunch libertarian.” That’s less
> > interesting, but not a out-of-bounds, Pete.
> >
> > I happen also to believe, by the way, that the
> > Hayekian framework does not lead to
> > anarcho-capitalism. Some of the issues have come up
> > on this board before. Humean status quo bias is a
> > big issue in this regard. I’m very much the Humean
> > on that point. This is a conservative element in
> > the though of both Hayek and Hume. I think the
> > criticism of hubris and constructivism cuts against “staunch
> > libertarianism” as well, if only because it tells us to dispense
> > with any supposed fundamental axioms on which we might hope to
> > build.
> >
> > This brings me to Walter Block who is surprised
> > that I like Hayek’s leaking. Well, Walter, it is
> > for a reason that Pete calls me “left”! This is the
> > sort of thing that happens when you let go of the non-aggression
> > axiom. Tsk, tsk, tsk. 🙂
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Roger

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Kinsella Vandalized!

I was just informed that someone had covertly uploaded a modified picture of me on my Wikipedia entry and overwrote the previous image–made my forehead look bigger etc.

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Kinsella v. Volokh on IP?

I have previously posted (Intellectual Property & Scarcity) on some of Eugene Volokh’s utilitarian arguments in favor of IP; see the post Dirty Little Secrets and Intellectual Property Solutions, by Stephen Gordon of Hammer of Truth, discussing my views and those of Volokh.

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Great Podcast

TWiT: This Week in Technology.

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Liberty and Power Ban–reversed!

As you may recall, I was banned some time back from the Liberty & Power blog. Well, I’m ba-a-a-ack. Thanks to the kind intervention of several L&P; peeps including Aeon Skoble, David Beito, Wendy McElroy, Roderick Long, Anthony “Tee-Boy” Gregory, and William Marina, they let me back in.

And on this topic–see my recent comments on the topic of the ninth and tenth amendments in reply to one of Aeon Skoble’s posts. My comments are pasted below, sans context:

I have pointed out before that the entire notion of “privacy” in terms of rights, seems confused. For example, even the term “private property” seems a bit misleading–the essence of property is that it is a scarce resource that has been acquired, homesteaded and brought into the homesteader’s ownership; property requires publicly ascertainable borders, and acquiring unowned resources means embordering it (as Hoppe perceptively argues–on the nature of ownership, see Hoppe’s A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, chs. 1, 2, esp. pp. 5–6, 8–18, discussing notions of scarcity, aggression,
property, norms, and justification, and ch. 9, esp. pp. 130–145;
also links in this post).

So property is in a sense necessarily “public”–the very function of property rights is to establish intersubjectively ascertainable borders that others can see and avoid, in order to avoid conflict.

But this is sort of a semantic point.

***

Mark–good comments.

Aeon:

“So if there is no explicit power to violate privacy given to the government, which there isn’t, then we retain our natural right to privacy.”

Aeon, I respect what you are trying to do, but in my opinion, you do here what too many libertarians do, when discussing the federal Constitution–you use “the government” in a generic way, that would include the states too.

But this is contrary to your reasoning, which is sound, more or less, I think–your point is that if a power is not enumerated, then because the fed gov’t is one of strictly enumerated powers, then it does not have the power to do it. yet of course this does not apply to the states, which are governments of general or plenary legislative power, not enumerated powers.

Also you use the 9th amendment to buttress your point that the fed gov’t is one of limited and enumerated powers–you don’t really use it to argue for unenumerated rights, as you seem to start to do. You basically are arguing that if there is not a power enumerated to infringe on a right, then it must be part of the 9th’s unenumerated rights.

I think this is a bit confused. Hear me out.

You would be better to point to the 10th Amendment if you are going to make the argument that lack of an enumerated power to violate the right to privacy means they don’t have the power. This argument (IMO) has little to do with the 9th.

I view the proper structural reading of the Constitution as follows. First, as the 10th and its history and structure shows, the feds have only enumerated powers; if a power is not granted, the feds have no power. You don’t even need to point to a right. The rights listed are just safeguards, sort of a secondary system. They are trumps, or side-constraints. So for example, Congress has no power to censor speech in the first place; but if they try to do it, the 1st amendment would be violated too. It is a backup. You only need to constrain a power that is assumed to exist.

But what if Congress tries to violate an unenumerated right, like right to “privacy”? Or the right to marry who you want? Etc.? Well again, the first argument is: Congress has no enumerated power to legislate in this field. If that fails, what is the backstop argument–the 9th amendment? I suppose, but this is loosey-goosey. How do you konw what is an enumerated right?

Consider this case: Congress passes a law banning murder. This is clearly unconstitutional because there is no power enumerated for this. But suppose the Court finds a power somewhere–in the interstate commerce clause, say. Notice that you cannot find a right now as a backup; the only way to do it would be to say, well the 9th amendment must protect an unenumerated right to commit murder. But obviously no one would argue this. Why not? It’s logically the same as using it to argue there is a right to privacy. In both cases, (a) Congress has no power delegated to it to regulate “privacy” (or abortion etc.) and it also has no power granted to it ot regulate murder; and (b) none of the enumerated rights cover the right to privacy, or a right to commit murder. What is the difference between these cases? How could you, by merely relying on the enumerated-powers scheme of the Constitution, and the rule of constrution laid down in the 9th Amendment, to distinguish between them?

In my view, the 9th amendment is largely worthless except as (a) reinforcing, in tandem with the 10th amendment, the idea that the feds have only limited powers: only those enumerated and delegated to them (I discuss some of these issues re the 9th and 10th here); and (b) perhaps providing some kind of presumption of liberty to force the feds to bear the burden of justifying any given law that infringes on some kind of common law liberty interest, as Randy Barnett argues, if I recall. I am, however, skeptical of (b) since, although I like the idea as a libertarian, it just seems too much of a later invention by modern, libertarian, wishful thinking; a substitution of what the Constitution really says for what one would like it to say; it’s hard to believe this is a natural implication of the original understanding of the Constitution’s text and structure.

(I must say, btw, the notion of a right to privacy seems ridiculous to me. It’s vague and undefined. Why is this part of libertarianism, or even consistent with libertarianism. We support individual rights which are in essence property rights; and we oppose aggression, or the invasion of those rights. What has this to do with a “right to privacy”? But this is neither here nor there.)

In any event, I would not oppose the 9th setting up a presumption of unconstitutionality whenever any liberty is infringed (as I believe Barnett proposes), but notice that this presumption would be reached only if we pass the first test, which is asking if there is a Congressional power enumerated.

It seems to me that if there is no power enumerated, then the Court would either recognize this, and strike the law down (in which case it does not need to look at the “rights” in the Bill of Rights); or it ignores this and implicitly assumes that there is a power enumerated. In this latter case, if you do presume Congress has power to legislate, it’s hard to say there is an unemerated right standing in the way of this power. In other words, if the Court recognizes that Congress indeed has limited powers, then the Bill of Rights, including the 9th amendment, is unnecessary; and if it does not recognize this, then the 9th amendment, at least, is going to be useless (as it has proven to be).

***

“we by nature have _all_ (negative) rights, and governments only have those powers given to them to secure those rights.”

Aeon, as I noted in the longer post here–this use of “governments” is treating states like the feds. But it is simply not true that state governments have “only those powers” given to them to secur
e those rights. States in fact have general (sometimes called plenary) legislative power. This does not mean, as some unfairly and dishonestly suggest, that states have unlimited power; but it does mean that they have a wide range of power to regulate various actions, not just those that secure our natural rights.

In other words, U.S. States are simply not libertarian minarchist states. A minarchist state has strictly limited and defined powers, but states are not so limited. U.S. states–indeed, all modern states in the world today, have much broader powers than permitted even by libertarian minarchist theory. The one exception is the US federal government: it actually has less power than a minarchist state would (in some areas): for example a minarchist state could outlaw and prosecute murder; the federal government may not. (Of course there are things the feds are empowered to do that a minarchist state would not be, e.g. tax, draft, build roads, coin money.)

So you can think of modern states as having a wide set of powers, which is a superset of the powers of a minarchist state. The US federal government, by contrast, has a set of powers that only intersects with the minarchist set of powers–it has some powers a libertarian state would not; but it lacks some powers that a libertarian state would have, due to the uniquely federal and limited nature of the federal government’s original charter.

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Palmer on Friends of Freedom

Blogged here.

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