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Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?

Note: An updated and revised version of this transcript is included as chap. 25 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023).

Note: on the origins of modern libertarianism, see also Murray N. Rothbard, “Towards a Strategy for Libertarian Social Change” (April, 1977):

“The contemporary libertarian movement in the United States may be precisely dated as beginning just after World War II. … Into this wasteland there stepped Leonard E. Read, late of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the National Industrial Conference Board, who, in 1946, founded the Foundation for Economic Education. The creation of FEE marked the beginning of the modern libertarian movement in America.”

See also Rothbard, “Listen, YAFLibertarian Forum (Aug. 15, 1969).

And Rothbard, quoted in Rothbard on Leonard Read and the Origins of “Libertarianism”: “More than any other single person, Leonard was the founder of the modern libertarian movement. … ” 1

See also many, many references to “modern libertarianism” or “the modern libertarian movement” in The Complete Libertarian Forum (1969–1984). See also Roderick Long’s Foreword to the Laissez Faire Books edition of Jerome Tuccille’s classic It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand (2012): “It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand is a jazz improvisation on the early history of the modern libertarian movement …”

See also Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi, The Individualists: Radicals, Reactionaries, and the Struggle for the Soul of Libertarianism (2023), p. 7:

After introducing libertarianism in chapter 1, we turn to introducing the three major periods or waves of libertarian thought. The first, “primordial” era covers the latter half of the nineteenth century, with special focus on Britain, France, and the United States. The second “Cold War” era runs from the 1930s through the 1980s and mainly centers in the United States. Finally, and more tentatively, we discuss the emerging “Third Wave” of libertarianism.

I agree that there are precursors to modern libertarian thought in the nineteenth century and before, but would not count the “primordial era” as modern libertarianism proper; in my estimation, and that of Rothbard, as noted above, modern libertarianism finds its beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s, with FEE and Ayn Rand’s works, especially Atlas Shrugged (1957), Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1962), and many other works by Bastiat, Mises, and so on.

See also Timeline of libertarianism in the United States.

As for my comment in the chapter that “the modern libertarian movement is only about five or six decades old,” this of course means there is still work to be done. As Ayn Rand herself wrote of Objectivism in 1978, just 4 years before she died (as quoted by Barbara Branden in the Foreword to Nathaniel Branden’s The Vision of Ayn Rand:

Much work remains to be done, as Rand was quick to acknowledge. In an interview with Garth Ancier of Focus on Youth in 1978, Rand was asked: “Miss Rand, is there anything more to say about your philosophy that you haven’t said already?” I’m glad you are not that acquainted with my philosophy, because if you were, you would know that I haven’t nearly said everything yet. I do have a complete philosophical system, but the elaboration of a system is a job that no philosopher can finish in his lifetime. There is an awful lot of work yet to be done. 2

We have made progress since the early days of Rand and Rothbard and their earlier progenitors and contemporary colleagues. Libertarianism has become more radical and more integrated with insights from Misesian-Austrian economics. Its numbers have grown, as have the numbers of scholars and books written.

As we do not have a fully libertarian world in which detailed libertarian law can organically develop, we have no body of concrete libertarian law developing. This will eventually be essential to have in a free society, since there are limits to what theory alone can do. Deduction, reasoning, and armchair theorizing can only get you so far. 3 The legal system of a free society will need to have concrete rules or legal precepts that are operational and that develop organically in decentralized legal systems, but based on more general and abstract libertarian principles of justice. 4 Such a libertarian legal order cannot develop until it starts being used.

In the meantime the activists can try to bring about more freedom more quickly and the theorists can keep trying to advance our understanding of liberty and libertarian principles. Again, there is much work left to be done in libertarian theory. Theorists since the days of Rand and Rothbard have continued to contribute to the edifice of libertarian thought, and there is much more that calls out for attention. 5

It is not for everyone. Some are not libertarian at all. Others are more or less libertarian in their lives but otherwise not interested in thinking about it or doing anything about it. That is fine. It’s enough to just be a productive, peaceful person. Still others are passionate about understanding the ideas, both to enrich their own lives and understanding and to help understand what can be done to make things better. Some are activists, both political and intellectual; others more cerebral and focused on understanding, teaching, correcting, writing (even if the activists, in their impatience and often with an anti-intellectual kind of snobbery, often disdain or even scorn or mock theory and the theorists).

Why work on understanding the ideas of liberty, on repeating them, preserving them, teaching them, correcting and developing and extending them, in an unfree world which largely sees this as unserious, pointless, a parlor game? In a sense, it is for the remnant, biding its time until it can be called into action. 6 We want to advance libertarian theory so that it can be used by jurists when a freer world emerges. 7

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Below is an edited transcript of my speech “Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?” delivered at the NYC LibertyFest (Brooklyn, NY, October 11, 2014; available at Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 152). The original title was “Libertarianism After Fifty Years: A Reassessment and Reappraisal” but I was allotted only about 15-20 minutes so condensed the scope and could only touch briefly on many of the matters discussed.

Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?

Stephan Kinsella
NYC LibertyFest, Brooklyn, NY
October 11, 2014

Introduction

Hello. I’m glad to be here. Thank you to Ian and Mike for the invitation. I do have my eleven year old son with me. It’s the second or third time he’s seen me speak. He’s been to Auburn with me. I went to NYC Comic Con with him on Thursday. So turnabout’s fair play although it was fun. Comic Con was great.

I have fifteen minutes. My topic is “Libertarianism After Fifty Years – What Have We Learned”? If I get cut off I will continue this in a private podcast, if I run out of time. You can find more information, if I run out of time, because this is a big topic for fifteen minutes.

This is my own view of libertarianism. It might not be shared by everyone here. But what I would like to talk about is—what is the libertarian movement? How old is it? Where did we come from?

In my view, the libertarian movement is about fifty years old—the modern libertarian movement. I think we can date it, you know, the glimmers of the movement started with Ayn Rand and Isabel Patterson and Rose Wilder Lane with their books in 1943. Of course, there are precursors to the libertarianism in the Enlightenment and classical liberal thought. There are other writers, Leonard Read, Milton Friedman. But I think we can really date the dawn of the modern libertarian movement to 1957 with the publication of Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand. And then the works of Rothbard, more importantly, with Man, Economy and State in 1962. 8

So the movement is about 55, 45 years old. It’s a relatively young movement as far as ideologies go and political philosophies go. We still have our disagreements over certain controversies like abortion and other issues. But a lot of progress has been made in the last fifty years. We’ve had a lot of development, partly because of incessant libertarian internal debate, criticism by outsiders, criticism by minarchists, criticism by insiders. But at the fifty year stage, I do think it is a good time to step back and reflect and think what have we learned over the last fifty years. How we could use this going forward to further refine and develop our ideas. [continue reading…]

  1. See Rothbard’s obituary of Leonard Read in his journal Libertarian Forum, Vol. 17.5-6, May-June 1983; the PDF and HTML versions of the journal are apparently down now, but .mobi and epub versions are available here. []
  2.  Barbara Branden, “Foreword: The Dawn of Objectivism,” in Nathaniel Branden, The Vision of Ayn Rand: The Basic Principles of Objectivism (2011), quoting Objectively Speaking: Ayn Rand Interviewed, edited by Marlene Podriske and Peter Schwartz, p. 239. []
  3. The Limits of Armchair Theorizing: The case of Threats; also Libertarian Answer Man: Corporations, Trusts, HOAs, and Private Law Codes in a Private Law SocietyKOL359 | State Constitutions vs. the Libertarian Private Law Code (PFS 2021)KOL345 | Kinsella’s Libertarian “Constitution” or: State Constitutions vs. the Libertarian Private Law Code (PorcFest 2021). []
  4. On the distinction between abstract legal rights and more concrete rules that serve as guides to action, see “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society” and Kinsella, “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law,” in LFFS, the subsection “Abstract Rights and Legal Precepts” and the section “The Third-Order Problem of Knowledge and the Common Law,” text at n. 24 et seq. []
  5. Areas That Need Development from Libertarian Thinkers. []
  6.  Activism, Achieving a Free Society, and Writing for the Remnant. []
  7. See Stephan Kinsella, “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society [LFFS] (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), Part V.B; also Roman Law and Hypothetical Cases. For an example of a concise statement of the basic principles of libertarian justice, see Aggression and Property Rights Plank in the Libertarian Party Platform. []
  8. The following is an excerpt I wrote to a Foreword for a forthcoming libertarian book:

    Modern libertarian theory is only about five decades old. The ideas that have influenced our greatest thinkers can be traced back centuries, of course,[1] to luminaries such as Hugo Grotius, John Locke, Thomas Paine, Herbert Spencer, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill, and to more recent and largely even more radical thinkers such as Gustave de Molinari, Benjamin Tucker, Lysander Spooner, Bertrand de Jouvenal, Franz Oppenheimer, and Albert Jay Nock.[2]

    The beginnings of the modern movement can be detected in the works of the “three furies of libertarianism,” as Brian Doherty calls them: Rose Wilder Lane, Ayn Rand, and Isabel Patterson, whose respective books The Discovery of Freedom, The Fountainhead, and The God of the Machine were all published, rather remarkably, in the same year: 1943.[3] But in its more modern form, libertarianism originated in the 1960s and 1970s from thinkers based primarily in the United States, notably Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard. Other significant influences on the nascent libertarian movement include Ludwig von Mises, author of Liberalism (1927) and Human Action (1949, with a predecessor version published in German in 1940); Nobel laureate F.A. von Hayek, author of The Road to Serfdom (1944); Leonard Read, head of the Foundation for Economic Education (founded 1946); and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, author of the influential Capitalism and Freedom (1962).

    The most prominent and influential of modern libertarian figures, however, were the aforementioned novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand, the founder of “Objectivism” and a “radical for capitalism,” and Murray Rothbard, the Mises-influenced libertarian anarcho-capitalist economist and political theorist. Rothbard’s seminal role is widely recognized, even by non-Rothbardians. Objectivist John McCaskey, for example, has observed, that out of the debates in the mid-1900s about what rights citizens ought to have,

    “grew the main sort of libertarianism of the last fifty years. It was based on a principle articulated by Murray Rothbard in the 1970s this way: No one may initiate the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. The idea had roots in John Locke, America’s founders, and more immediately Ayn Rand, but it was Rothbard’s formulation that became standard. It became known as the non-aggression principle or—since Rothbard took it as the starting point of political theory and not the conclusion of philosophical justification—the non-aggression axiom. In the late twentieth century, anyone who accepted this principle could call himself, or could find himself called, a libertarian, even if he disagreed with Rothbard’s own insistence that rights are best protected when there is no government at all.”[4]

    We can date the dawn of today’s libertarianism to the works of Rand and Rothbard: to Rand’s Atlas Shrugged (1957); and, especially, to Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State (1962), Power and Market (1970), and For A New Liberty (1973), plus his journal The Libertarian Forum (1969–1984). For A New Liberty stands today as a brilliant, and early, bold statement of the radical libertarian vision. By the mid-60s, the modern libertarian movement was coalescing, primarily behind the non-initiation of force principle and the “radical capitalism” of Ayn Rand, and Rothbard’s systematic libertarian corpus based upon the non-aggression principle or axiom. It is no surprise that the Libertarian Party was founded in 1971, as these ideas, and the liberty movement, were gaining steam.

    In the ensuing decades many other influential works appeared expounding on the libertarian idea, such as Linda and Morris Tannehill, The Market for Liberty (1970), John Hospers, Libertarianism: A Political Philosophy for Tomorrow (1971), David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom (1973), Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Henri Lepage, Tomorrow, Capitalism (1978), Samuel Edward Konkin III, New Libertarian Manifesto (1980), Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (1988), Anthony De Jasay, Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism (1991), Richard Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (1995), Charles Murray, What It Means to Be a Libertarian: A Personal Interpretation (1996), David Boaz, Libertarianism: A Primer (1998), Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty (1998), and, more recently, Jeffrey A. Miron’s Libertarianism, From A to Z (2010), Jacob Huebert’s Libertarianism Today (2010), Gary Chartier’s The Conscience of an Anarchist (2011), and Gerard Casey’s Libertarian Anarchism (2012).

    [1] For more on this, see Brian Doherty, Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern American Libertarian Movement (2008), and David Boaz, The Libertarian Reader: Classic and Contemporary Writings from Lao Tzu to Milton Friedman (1998).

    [2] See Boaz, The Libertarian Reader, id.

    [3] See Doherty, Radicals for Capitalism, id.

    [4] John P. McCaskey, “New Libertarians: New Promoters of a Welfare State” (April 14, 2014), See also Wendy McElroy, “Murray N. Rothbard: Mr. Libertarian,” LewRockwell.com (July 6, 2000). []

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Answers to Questions About Libertarian Punishment and Estoppel

An interchange with someone with questions about one of my articles, which sets out my “estoppel” theory of libertarian rights. For more background on these issues, see the links interspersed below, and those in the following endnote: 1

From Mr. S:

I just read your article “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights”, which was very interesting, thank you.  It raised a number of questions in my mind which I wanted to raise with you in case you’ve dealt with them elsewhere and can point me to these sources.

(Note that I am ignoring for now that both aggressor and victim may have protection insurance policies and so the punishment scale might already have been agreed to; I’m more focused on what a libertarian judge should decide in the absence of preset penalties.)

  1. I raised with [a certain libertarian philosopher] the problem of failed attempts.  You deal with this a little in the area of assault (p.640), but not sufficiently to answer my question.  If A shoots at B but misses, what is the punishment B can levy on A?   Is it just that B can shoot at A and miss, which seems pointless?   But if that wouldn’t instill in A the same amount of fear that B suffered, per your assault example, is B justified in actually hitting A with the bullet and potentially killing him, with A being estopped from complaining about this?  Should failed attempts be punishable at all?  According to Rothbard, neither deterrence nor rehabilitation are valid bases for punishment; rather, only restitution and retribution are appropriate.  But in my example, there is nothing to be restituted and retribution would imply shooting and missing.  Then, to make things more interesting, what if A shot at B and missed, and B didn’t even know A had shot at him, so never suffered any fear (but witnesses saw it and reported A)?   Again, what is the basis on which failed attempts should be punishable?  In a failed attempt there has been no physical invasion of body or property, and mental distress cannot be the basis for action since one cannot have property in one’s feelings (that would raise a host of conflict-creating problems).
  2. It seems to me that the estoppel principle should be more narrowly stated.  In your examples, you say that if A murders B then  A is estopped from complaining about being murdered as punishment.  Yet shouldn’t this be restated to say that A is estopped from complaining about being murdered as punishment by B or his representative?  In other words, I don’t think you mean to imply that A is estopped against the whole world from complaining about being murdered; D (a complete stranger) cannot murder A and then claim that by A’s action in murdering B, A is estopped against anyone from complaining.  Yet that would be one reading of the estoppel principle as stated, since A has by his actions apparently indicated that he sees nothing wrong in murder, so it could be open season on A.
  3. If, as stated on p.635, the goal of punishment is to equalize damage suffered, not just the actions that caused the damage, then that could work against the victim.  If nice person A beats up gang member B, since B is used to getting beaten in his daily life the damage suffered is probably not that great.  Thus he would have to reduce the punishment beating he exacts on A.  Perhaps the theory should be that the victim can exact the greater of (x) equalizing action and (y) equalizing damage.  However, saying “should” is somewhat normative, and I wonder what the positive theory behind such a “greater of” concept would be.
  4. That raises a broader point: what is actually being estopped and therefore what forms the basis for outlining the bounds of punishment: (A) the actions of the aggressor [e.g., punching the victim], (B) the result caused [e.g., burst spleen] or (C) the damage suffered by the victim [e.g., inability to continue working as a laborer]?  Can an aggressor be estopped from any one of these that was not obvious at to him at the time?  If so, then does estoppel not really rest on what the aggressor has actually acknowledged by his actions, but rather what a “reasonable aggressor” should have realized what he was doing?
  5. Moreover, why can the victim choose to exact a dollar remedy for a physical aggression (leaving aside the situation where the aggressor bargains for this with the victim to avoid physical retaliation)?  Under estoppel the aggressor has only acknowledged he does not believe hitting is wrong, but it doesn’t mean he has acknowledged that taking someone’s money is wrong.  It seems that the broader the range of remedies the victim is entitled to exact, the looser the connection to the aggressor’s actions which give rise to the estoppel.  We could end up effectively concluding that the aggressor indicated by his actions that he does not believe in the sanctity of private property at all, and thus any punishment is warranted.  Surely that’s not where we should end up?
  6. What is the theory underlying why heirs can take action on behalf of a murder victim (assuming there is nothing in the victim’s will saying so, and there is no protection policy for which the heirs are the beneficiaries)?  If each person’s body is his own property, how can an heir claim to have been damaged when only the victim’s body was invaded?

[continue reading…]

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Related:

Modern libertarianism began in the 1960s, about 50 years ago, with the writing of Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard, primarily, and others like Leonard Read, Milton Friedman, Hayek, Mises, etc. Over the years, certain canards or confusions keep appearing, some from insiders, some from our statist critics. There’s a continual need to debunk and counter some of these. As the theory of liberty continues to mature and advance, the mistakes that need to be addressed become more obvious, at the same time that we are more able to address them.

I’d like to discuss here a couple of paired confusions relating to property rights. One relates to the “Lockean” argument for homesteading, or original appropriation of property; the other concerns rectification for past injustices. Both are interrelated. You’ve probably heard both of these in various forms. For example, the opponent of libertarianism just assumes that our theory is based on the Lockean idea of original appropriation—then makes the “original sin” argument that all property rights are tainted by various acts of theft or statism, and therefore, since you can never trace your property title back to the original pristine owner, no current property title is really valid.

My instant reaction to such comments is always: they are (if they are statists) trying to justify taking my property. If they are libertarians, they are trying to justify not being anarchist. Basically, when I hear people talk like this, I brace myself for the inevitable theft that they are about to endorse or condone or advocate. Two favorite quotes of mine come to mind here:

“Run for your life from any man who tells you that money is evil. That sentence is the leper’s bell of an approaching looter.” —Ayn Rand, Francisco’s Money Speech

“Is there a need to reform taxes? Most certainly. Always and everywhere. You can always make a strong case against all forms of taxation and all tax codes and all mechanisms by which a privileged elite attempts to extract wealth from the population. And this is always the first step in any tax reform: get the public seething about the tax code, and do it by way of preparation for step two, which is the proposed replacement system.

“Of course, this is the stage at which you need to hold onto your wallet.” —Lew Rockwell

When I hear people saying the libertarian theory of property is flawed because it relies on theft, etc., I know this is just a precursor to some kind of advocated aggression. I hold onto my wallet. I keep an eye on these people.

These issues are related but somewhat different. Let me take them one at a time. [continue reading…]

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My second interview with The Daily Bell just came out. It’s fairly informal but lengthy and complements the earlier one, and has a bit fewer links and adopts a more colloquial tone. It seems to be getting very positive feedback on Facebook etc. FYI. The recent and older one are linked below. The interview shows how heavily influenced I am and how permeated my thought has been by what I consider to be by far the greatest libertarian/liberal thinkers, Mises, Rothard, and Hoppe.

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On Libertarian Legal Theory, Self-Ownership and Drug Laws

Note: An updated and revised version of this article is included as chap. 23 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023).

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Stephan Kinsella on Libertarian Legal Theory, Self-Ownership and Drug Laws,” interview with Anthony Wile, The Daily Bell (July 20, 2014). Revised version in published as “On Libertarian Legal Theory, Self-Ownership and Drug Laws,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (forthcoming 2023).

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From The Libertarian Standard, May 9, 2014:

Second Thoughts on Leoni, Hayek, Legislation, and Economic Calculation

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My articles have been translated so far into 14 languages. Most of it so far is my shorter pieces, as well as my Against Intellectual Property. But the topic that has always interested me most is rights theory. What I regard as one of my most important papers, and in any case one of my personal favorites, Punishment and Proportionality: The Estoppel Approach, Journal of Libertarian Studies 12:1 (Spring 1996), though, which sets out my view of libertarian rights in some detail, has never been translated. Nor has much of my other writing on rights theory, except for a Dutch translation of New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory, which contains a summary of my rights theory and related ones such as Hoppe’s argumentation ethics

Until now, that is: the Punishment and Proportionality paper has just been translated into Portuguese by Miguel Serra. The translation is: Pena e proporcionalidade: A abordagem do Estoppel (also now published on the Ludwig von Mises Institute Brazil). I’m extremely grateful to and honored by Mr. Serra, as well as those who have done the other translations. The spreading, global libertarian community is truly a wonder to behold. It gives me hope for humanity.

Update: There is an HTML version available, Agressão, pena e proporcionalidade – como estabelecer os limites?. And I also now see Punição e Proporcionalidade: A Abordagem do Estoppel

Update: PDF versions of the above are now available, sent to me by Thiago Machado, a Brazilian libertarian student: one file formatted for A4 paper (good for PC/tablet) and the other one formatted in A6 (good for smartphones).

 

 

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The Limits of Libertarianism?: A Dissenting View

Update:

Moyer’s piece is now memory-holed so I will append below the entire piece from Archive.org.

One Will Moyer recently penned The Limits of Libertarianism, which has gotten some attention among libertarians, and critics thereof, on Facebook and various blogs. In the article, Moyer, who implies that he is an ex-libertarian, makes various characterizations of, statements about, and criticisms of libertarianism, many of which I believe to be incorrect. Below I discuss a few of my disagreements with Moyer’s piece. As a preliminary matter, it will be helpful to set down a brief explanation of some of the basic aspects of libertarianism.

“Libertarianism” is the name given to a particular political philosophy. As I discuss in some detail in What Libertarianism Is, what characterizes libertarianism is not “property rights,” since every political philosophy has some treatment of property rights. Every system has an answer to the question: who gets to control that resource?

What distinguishes libertarianism from other political philosophies is its particular answer as to how property rights should be allocated in scarce (i.e., rivalrous, contestable) resources. And that answer is: property rights ought to be allocated in accordance with Lockean principles of initial appropriation, sometimes called homesteading; contractual transfer; and other transfers as a result of torts or crimes. As Roderick Long puts it, citing Robert Nozick,

Libertarian property rights are, famously, governed by principles of justice in initial appropriation (mixing one’s labour with previously unowned resources), justice in transfer (mutual consent), and justice in rectification (say, restitution plus damages). 1

Another formulation that describes the libertarian idea is the opposition to “aggression.” The link between the so-called “non-aggression principle” and our property rights view is that we oppose aggression defined in terms of property rights so allocated. We believe aggression is unjust and unjustifiable. Thus, our shorthand use of phrases like “non-aggression principle” or “non-initiation of force,” as well general terms like “liberty” and “freedom,” and opposition to “coercion,” 2 and so on—all of which are either shorthand or conceptually dependent terms on the more fundamental and primary notion of property rights. As an example: if I hit you, it is aggression because you own your body. If I take an apple from you, it is aggression only if you own the apple; if it is my apple and I am retrieving it from a thief, the act of force used to take it back is not aggression. We cannot determine whether a given apparent “border crossing” is invasion, or theft, or trespass, or aggression, unless we first identify who the owner of the contested resource is.

In fact, the reason property rights are more fundamental than, and a concept upon which “aggression” depends, is that the only reason there is a need for property rights is the possibility of conflict, and this arises only because we live in a world of scarce (rivalrous) resources. As Mises explains, humans act, which means to employ certain scarce means to achieve certain chosen ends. The scarce means are physical resources in the world that our scientific knowledge informs us are causally efficacious in interfering with the world, in changing the course of events to achieve some forecasted state in the future that is desired more than what is otherwise predicted by the actor to come about. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe explains in Of Private, Common, and Public Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization,

Conflict only results if our different interests and beliefs are attached to and invested in one and the same good. In the Schlaraffenland, with a superabundance of goods, no conflict can arise (except for conflicts regarding the use of our physical bodies that embody our very own interests and ideas). There is enough around of everything to satisfy everyone’s desires. In order for different interests and ideas to result in conflict, goods must be scarce. Only scarcity makes it possible that different interests and ideas can be attached to and invested in one and the same stock of goods. Conflicts, then, are physical clashes regarding the control of one and the same given stock of goods. People clash because they want to use the same goods in different, incompatible ways.

Even under conditions of scarcity, when conflicts are possible, however, they are not necessary or unavoidable. All conflicts regarding the use of any good can be avoided if only every good is privately owned, i.e., exclusively controlled by some specified individual(s) and it is always clear which thing is owned, and by whom, and which is not.

It is important, then, to emphasize that every dispute is always really about scarce resources. And every proposed or disputed law is ultimately about the use of force against some identifiable scarce resource: a human body, or other scarce resources in the world that humans can employ as means of action. For example, it is sometimes said that people “fight over religion.” This is not true. People fight only over scarce resources. Disagreement over religion may be the reason for the fight but the fight is always conducted with physical force, mediated by causal means (e.g. weapons), to physically control others’ bodies or owned resources. For example A may tell B to change to A’s religion or face death; the fight here is over who get’s to control B’s body. 3  When the state threatens to jail people for disobeying drug laws, the state is asserting an ownership claim over its citizens’ bodies. When the state taxes people, it is taking their money.

So: we say aggression (invasion of property rights) 4 is unjustifiable. This matters, in our view, or should matter, to those who care about justice and justifying their claims (as anyone engaging in argumentation or discourse about such matters undeniably demonstrates). 5  As I noted in my 1996 JLS paper Punishment and Proportionality: The Estoppel Approach, [continue reading…]

  1. Long, Why Libertarians Believe There is Only One Right. []
  2. But see my post The Problem with “Coercion”. []
  3. On the danger of imprecise language and metaphors, see my post On the Danger of Metaphors in Scientific Discourse. []
  4. See text at n. 11 of What Libertarianism Is for various terminological formulations used to describe aggression[]
  5. See Hoppe’s “argumentation ethics” defense of libertarian ethics; links in my Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide. []
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From a (fairly informal) Facebook post of mine:

First significant thinker to get libertarianism totally right: Hans-Hermann Hoppe. Let me splain.

I view the modern libertarian movement as starting around the 50s or so, with people like Leonard Read, Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman, and a bit later, Rothbard, and the like. Yes there were important forbears—Bastiat, classical liberals, and others. (http://archive.mises.org/18385/the-origin-of-libertarianism/; see also Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?)

But the earlier libertarians always got something major wrong or were missing some major essential points. Most of them were pro-state—not anarchist. Minarchists, classical liberals. That’s a serious problem.

And the ones who were anarchist always seemed to get some major issue wrong. For example, Spooner, who was great on just about everything, was bad on IP (http://c4sif.org/2012/06/tucker-on-spooners-one-flaw/). This flows from a confused concept of the nature of rights and acceptance of the confused idea of the labor theory of property, stemming from Locke’s formulations and overly metaphorical thinking.

Probably the best overall libertarian in pre-modern times was Benjamin Tucker but even he, like lots of the earlier anarchists, was confused on some basic economic issues, the “land” question, etc.—this latter issue even corrupted his heroic opposition to IP: his argument against IP is that it is based on the idea that you own the products of labor (“he who first takes possession of any material production of nature”), but that this would imply you can own land. And we know we can’t have ownership of land, therefore the principle behind IP must be flawed too. [See Land Monopoly and Literary Monopoly]

So Tucker was great, esp. for his time, but not complete.

Further, he was too early to benefit from modern Austrian economics, especially the praxeological-Misesian approach. Which I regard as essential to being a basically modern, complete, systematic, coherent, principled libertarian. You need to be anti-state/anarchist, Austrian (Misesian), and also consistent and very propertarian. Without this it is more proto-libertarian or flawed libertarianism.

Rand was bad on IP (a major issue) and bad on the state. So fail.

Milton Friedman—ditto (at least on the state).

Read was great, and good on IP, and Austrian-ish economics, but he was not an anarchist AFAIK.

Hazlitt was getting closer, but as far as I know he was not an anarchist. In any case, he was not a comprehensive political philosopher.

One of the people I’m learning a bit more about is Sam Konkin III. From everything I know about him he was pretty solid on everything—the state, IP, everything. He was in fact one of the pioneers of the modern anti-IP movement. However, he was more of a minor figure and did not have a fully fleshed out political theory that I am aware of. He is known for “agorism” and his fairly brief (but profound and correct and perspicacious) comments on IP, but ….

So the obvious candidate is Rothbard. Anarchist, radical, propertarian, profound, comprehensive and systematic, steeped in Misesian economics. You might award him this crown. But he misstepped on IP. It is not just a misstep that is the issue here; it is why he did it. He failed to apply his own property rules and contract theory consistently here. And the former was, I think, because he did not emphasize the role of scarcity and conflict at the root of property enough. Being an expert on Misesian praxeology, with its emphasis on the role of scarce means in human action, it’s a bit surprising, but hey, you can’t do everything. Every great thinker stands on the shoulders of giants, as Rothbard himself did (including being influenced Rand’s sort of systematic tying together of various strands of thought into a libertarian-ish whole), even as he was a giant in his own right.

Hoppe, thoroughly steeped in both Mises and Rothbard, finally got it right, IMO. He did not write much about IP but in his brief comments he indicated the right path. And he also focused intensely on property rights, and—crucially, the issue of scarcity and its core relationship to property rights. He built on Rothbard and Mises, with insights from people like Hume (scarcity) and others like Habermas (rights theory, argumentation ethics, which Rothbard enthusiastically endorsed and saw the revolutionary promise of). If you combine Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe, you get the culmination of advanced, consistent libertarian philosophy. (See Hoppe, A Realistic Libertarianism)

Not saying this is perfect or the political philosophy is closed or complete, nor that there is not more work to do. But in my view, the main edifice of modern, radical, principled libertarianism is Rothbardian-propertian-Austro-anarcho-Hoppeanism.

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Related:

Starting around 1:30:00, another deeply flawed attempt to argue for intellectual property. It’s made all the worse in that it comes from an anarchist libertarian, J.C. Lester, author of Escape from Leviathan: Liberty, Welfare and Anarchy Reconciled (conspicuously not online yet. Why some people take time to write books but don’t want to make their ideas accessible is a perennial mystery—but in tune with the IP idea, I suppose). His entire Popperian “conjecturalist” approach is in my view flawed, as his is view that libertarianism is about reducing “impositions,” instead of aggression. See my discussion of some of this in “Aggression” versus “Harm” in Libertarianism. See transcript below. [continue reading…]

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Letter to Mr. Owens about the Six Cities Problem

In 1978 or so, in seventh grade at St. George, a Catholic elementary school in Baton Rouge, one of my favorite teachers was Mr. Owens. In 1989, when I was in grad school, I sent him the following letter (somewhat edited here). He was by then the principal of St. George and a friend who visited years later said he saw a copy of my letter pinned on the bulletin board being Mr. Owens’s desk. I took that to mean he was happy to have gotten the letter. He passed away a few years ago.

***

Sunday, July 30, 1989

Mr. Jim Owens, Principal
St. George Elementary School
7880 Siegen Lane
Baton Rouge, LA 70809

Dear Mr. Owens,

I don’t know if you remember me or not.  I used to be a student of yours at St. George, when I was in the 7th grade.  I think that was in 1978 or so.  You taught me religion.

You might not remember this either, but I haven’t forgotten.  You always gave us puzzles and riddles to work out.  For example, if you have 99 marbles of one color and 1 of the other color in a bag, what is the most you would have to pull out to be sure what the dominant color is.  Or, in the famous Alpha (truth tellers) and Beta (liars) puzzle, what do you ask the native at the bridge to see if the bridge is safe.  Etc. [The solution is: you ask the native: if you were a member of the other tribe, and I asked you if the bridge were safe to cross, what would you answer? And then the answer is the opposite of the answer.]

Well, one puzzle you gave us was:  if you have three cities at the top, and three at the bottom, can you draw a road from each city at the top to each at the bottom without crossing roads?  We tried and tried, all of us students, to get that one; no one could find a solution.  We always had to cross some lines.  When we told you we thought it was impossible, you said, “Ahh, but can you prove it’s impossible?”  Which none of us could.

I am writing to present you with the proof. [continue reading…]

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Legislação e direito em uma sociedade livre, Portugese translation of “Legislation and Law in a Free Society,” Mises Daily (Feb. 25, 2010). Translations of my other writing is here.

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