Related:
Guy Kedem (@guy_carmell) sent me a link to his article Dialogical Libertarianism: Ultimate Foundation of Ethics, which is a Hebrew-language discussion of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics and my estoppel theory of libertarian rights. I post below the archived discussion plus an automatic translation of Kedem’s article.
Update:
For more on argumentation ethics, see:
Update: from our 2011 correspondence:
Kedem:
Hi,
I believe Hoppe, and your subsequent work are the first truly meaningful works in political philosophy.
After arguing these points over many times, and formulating Argumentation Ethics and Estoppel in Hebrew, I have a few reservations about some of the wordings in which the argument is presented, that often give rise to misconceptions about it.
- When explaining universalizability, there seem to be a lot of confusion for many people who mistakenly think there’s a value-judgment involved. the wording “fairness” or “accepted in principle”, should and can be avoided in favor of less confusing wording. In my experience the argument which works best is this:
- Valid argumentative propositions must be justified or be implied in argumentation (this is an a-priori of argumentation).
- Any proposition that can be consistently denied as well as asserted is unjustified.
- Particularistic norms, by definition, apply a deniable criterion of categorical distinction.
- Therefore particularistic norms themselves are deniable.
- Therefore particularistic norms are invalid argumentative propositions.
- When explaining why “global communism” norm is invalid the reason that is given, just for purity, should not be the consiquentialist “all men will die” but “the fact a men acts to propose it contradicts its acceptance”.
- When examining the norm “no man can use external resources”, for purity, it should not be ruled out on the (very reasonable) consiquentialist basis of “all men will die eventually”, but be ruled out on the basis that it implies only a specific goal, and so is argumentatively invalid. Because conflict implies differing goals, and so any norm which simply states “this goal is preferable” is inconsistent with the demonstrated preference of argumentation. (and the norm “no man can use…” by definition regards the current state of external resources as only a goal).
- An explanation of the problem of social order should preferably precede any explanation of arg-ethics as many people constantly miss the context of a conflict… (not a problem when explaining dialogical estoppel).
- An explanation of the rothbardian self ownership rules examination should be a part of a presentation, as simply stating “the use of ones body in discourse implies self-ownership norm” begs many questions.
All of these suggestions rose from debates. Mainly, I think it’s important to avoid any wording which will make it appear to suspicious eyes to be somewhat consequentialist or subjective, instead of completely a-priori. (I also saw this article trying to mix rothabardian natural rights…)
Best Regards,
Guy Kedem.
Kinsella: Title in English?
Kedem: Dialogical Libertarianism: Ultimate Foundation of Ethics
Hoppe: “Excellent points. Tell him that his comments are much appreciated. ”
At Hoppe’s urging, I invited him to the upcoming PFS meeting. (did not come)
***
Grok summary of Kedem’s article:
Overview of Kedem’s Argument
Guy Kedem’s article, as translated in the provided blog post, primarily exposits and defends Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s “argumentation ethics” (also called “ethics of discussion”) as a foundation for justifying absolute property rights in one’s body and external resources. Kedem builds on philosophical concepts like the is-ought dichotomy, the action axiom from praxeology, and the necessity of non-violent conflict resolution in a social context. He argues that morality, while seemingly subjective, can be objectively grounded through the logical implications of engaging in rational discourse. The piece also briefly touches on Stephan Kinsella’s “estoppel” approach in a related context, particularly for justifying responses to aggression, though the main focus is on Hoppe.
Key Sections and Reasoning
Prologue: Subjectivity of Morality and the Action Axiom
- Kedem begins by distinguishing objective properties (e.g., “this page is white” or “a cheetah runs at 55 mph”) from subjective ones (e.g., “beautiful” or “annoying”). He places “worthy” or “proper” in the subjective category, noting it’s not empirical like physical traits.
- He references the is-ought dichotomy (Hume’s idea that facts about what “is” do not imply what “ought” to be) and argues that moral rules are human inventions, not inherent to reality.
- However, Kedem introduces the “action axiom” (from Austrian economics/praxeology): Human actions are purposeful, implying some underlying “norm” or rule (e.g., “it is proper to write this article”).
- Building on Hoppe, he notes that argumentation (discussion) itself is a purposeful action tied to morality, as it aims to resolve real problems non-violently. This sets the stage for deriving objective ethics from the act of debating.
The Problem of Social Order
- Using a thought experiment with Robinson Crusoe on a deserted island, Kedem shows that concepts like “rights” or “property” only arise in social contexts where conflicts over scarce resources occur.
- On a solitary island, no rights are needed. Adding a second person (“Friday,” renamed “Sheshet” in the translation) introduces potential conflicts, even in abundance (e.g., over bodies or standing space).
- In our scarce world, conflicts are inevitable: Two people cannot simultaneously use the same resource (e.g., drive one car to different places or watch different channels on one TV).
- Conflicts stem from scarcity and differing desires. Society’s core problem is resolving them—either violently or through discussion.
- Kedem emphasizes that air isn’t “property” because it’s superabundant; property norms only apply to scarce goods.
Establishing Morality Through Discussion
- If both parties reject violence and agree to discuss, they implicitly accept the norm: “Conflicts should be settled non-violently.”
- Discussion is a cooperative action where arguments (normative claims) are exchanged to resolve issues based on reason, not force.
- Any norm proposed must be justifiable within this framework; contradictory norms are invalid.
- Kedem argues that justice must align with the discussion’s presuppositions—otherwise, the act of discussing becomes pointless.
Words and Deeds: Performative Contradictions
- This is the core of Hoppe’s (and Kedem’s) argument: Discussion is a goal-oriented interaction implying mutual interest in non-violent resolution.
- Proposing a norm that contradicts this (e.g., “Conflicts should be resolved with violence” or “Ignore arguments in discussion”) creates a “performative contradiction”: The act of arguing contradicts the claim’s content.
- Example: Saying “I am dead” is contradictory because asserting it implies you’re alive.
- Applied to ethics: In discussion, participants presuppose:
- Non-violent resolution.
- Universal applicability (norms can’t favor one party arbitrarily, as that would be rejected and revert to violence).
- Particularistic norms (e.g., “I can hit you, but you can’t hit me”) are invalid because they’re not universally acceptable and lead to contradictions. They can’t be perceived as fair by both sides, undermining the discussion’s purpose.
- Kedem contrasts this with universal norms, which can be objectively evaluated without bias.
Implications for Property Rights
- Kedem argues that only libertarian norms (self-ownership of one’s body and homesteading of external resources) can be justified without contradiction.
- Socialist or aggressive norms (e.g., claiming ownership over another’s body or unowned resources without homesteading) contradict the discussant’s own self-ownership (implied by arguing) and lead to performative contradictions.
- No one can argue against self-ownership without using their own body/mind, thus presupposing it.
- This establishes an “absolute justification” for property rights, as any denial performs a contradiction.
Brief Tie to Kinsella’s Estoppel
- While the main body focuses on Hoppe, Kedem (in the translation and implied context) nods to Kinsella’s estoppel theory for enforcement.
- Estoppel: If someone initiates aggression (e.g., theft), they can’t coherently object to retaliation or restitution, as they’ve demonstrated rejection of non-violent norms.
- In a comment on the original post (by “guyk,” likely Kedem), he references Kinsella’s paper on estoppel for handling violations, like reclaiming stolen property.
Critiques and Comparisons in the Article
- Kedem critiques subjective or arbitrary morals by showing they’re untenable in rational discourse.
- He compares Hoppe’s approach to other philosophies (e.g., Kant, Rawls are dismissed as unnecessary in isolation; socialism is implicitly critiqued as contradictory).
- In comments, Kedem addresses objections, like the need for universality: Norms must be universal in discussion because particular ones are inherently biased and can’t resolve conflicts coherently.
- He quotes Hoppe to reinforce that common observations about ethics often miss this performative aspect.
Kedem’s overall thesis: Argumentation ethics provides a non-arbitrary, logic-based foundation for libertarian property rights, as alternative norms self-destruct in debate. This avoids the is-ought problem by deriving “ought” from the inescapable presuppositions of human action and discourse.
ARTICLE:
[Guy Kedem, “Dialogical Libertarianism: Ultimate Foundation of Ethics”]
Ethics of the Hearing
Absolute justification for the right of property in body and property
Guy Kedem
12/5/2011
Prologue
“What cannot be talked about, about which we must be silent.” Ludwig Wittgenstein.
We can look at the world and conclude and claim that “this page is white,” a “Cheetah was running at 55 miles per hour.” By this we refer to the objective properties of objects in reality, color, speed, etc.’ Every person who is connected to reality can examine for himself and enter into them. Unlike such features, it is not possible to objectively claim that “this page is beautiful,” or “This cheetah ran annoyingly.” These “attributes” are not properties of the object to which they are pointing, but rather properties of the perception of the voter. The pointer does not describe the page, but describes his perception of beauty. In other words, these are subjective qualities. Most of all, there is one trait whose very subjectivity has haunted the sleep of many philosophers throughout the ages. “Worthy.” Is something objectively “worthy”?
More than “beauty” or “niceness,” “worthy” is a loaded word. The question of whether or not something is worthy is at the basis of a great philosophical field called ethics. If only “proper” were objective in the sense that “color” or “speed” were objective qualities, we would have a completely objective, scientific, and tested moral theory that every rational person should accept as correct. Any priest, rabbi or philosopher will immediately seek to jump on the bargain. However, as mentioned, this is not the case. Proper is not an empirical quality of objects in reality, it is an invention of human beings. Moral rules are not part of physical reality, reality does not act according to them or take into account our learned opinions on the subject. This is the dichotomy of the no-proper. Since something “is” does not imply that something is “proper” (more on that in the appendix.)1
On the other hand, it’s a bit strange. Have we fabricated the concept of morality from our hearts? Don’t we have an essential, rational need to define certain actions as “murder” or “theft?” It seems so.2 Sometimes, a brief examination of the most basic concepts yields surprising results. In 1811, the economist-philosopher Hans Hermann Hoffe made a brilliant argument on the subject. He based his argument on an axiom known as the action axiom.3 A basic axiom that claims that there is a certain intention behind the actions of human beings. In other words, at the base of people’s movements is some “proper” rule. Behind my actions at the moment, for example, stands the rule that “it is appropriate to write an article.” This is the axiom of action.
Hoffe observed that when we discuss, who murdered or who stole, we do not make random voices in vain. On the other hand, we are trying to work to solve a certain real problem. Therefore, behind every discussion is also a proper rule (a proper rule is called a “norm” or a “normative argument” in philosophy) and he smokes a hookah. The act of discussion is deeply connected, as we shall see below, to the concept of morality. And the act of discussion is not trivial, but is firmly rooted in the reality in which we live. In the next three pages, it seems that there is only one rational definition of morality.
The Problem of Social Order
Let’s say Robinson Crusoe has just washed up the island. As he stands dizzy on the white sand, he realizes that he is alone. We will notice that on this lonely and desolate island, where Robinson is alone, there is no reason for the concept of “right” to come to mind. While he is alone, there is no purpose in this. Robinson needs survival knowledge, technical and physical abilities, but what’s the reason for the lonely island for “property rights?” What will be the significance of a variety of “social rights” for access to health services, education, housing, clothing and food, etc…’ Who will provide them? Robinson’s condition is indeed bad. He needs all his skills and quite a bit of luck, but for the writings of Kant or Rawls… He doesn’t need it right now.
With this simple insight, let’s complicate and assume two more things. First, because the island to which Crusoe was swept is a special island.In the absence of any material desire, it is immediately satisfied by the very thought of it. Want to eat an apple? Just think about it and a slice of apple will immediately appear in your mouth. Want to drive a Ferrari? Think about it and immediately a suitable car will pop up. Second, let’s say that the island has reached six days.
1 Appendix A-E Dichotomy of the Is-Ought The
2 The concept of numbers is also not part of reality, but it does not follow that the definition of numbers is arbitrary. Numbers are used for a specific purpose and hence their definition is derived.
3 This mistake is the application of the parapsychology of Austrian economics to the field of ethics.
Let’s think for a moment, on a magical island where everything is in abundance, would Sheshet and Robinson think of distributing means and objects, apples, for example, to “apples of six” and “apples of Robinson?” There is no logic or purpose in this. On the magical island, when Robinson eats an apple, it does not detract from Sheshet’s ability to eat apples as he pleases. Robinson can also continue to eat apples as much as he wants. We will see this when we ponder for a moment in the air to breathe. Here, too, on Earth, no one sells, steals or buys the air he breathes. There is no need for these because anyone who wants to breathe enough should open his mouth and plenty of air will appear inside him, like an island.
But we will notice that even on the magical island, despite the seemingly idyllic conditions, not everything is plentiful.4 What if Sheshet does not want to eat an apple, but rather to eat Robinson? Alternatively, what if Robinson’s soul wanted to stand in the exact same place where six now stands? In both of these cases, neither Sheshet nor Robinson will be able to get what they want. Also on
The magical island for each person is only one body and a certain plot of land on which he stands. Even on the magical island, one person’s use of his body prevents another person’s use of that body, and one’s standing on a certain piece of land prevents another’s standing. The human body and to a certain extent the land on which man stands, even on the island, are in short supply. In other words, on the island as well, from the moment Sheshet arrives, so-called conflicts may arise, if certain desires arise on Shet or Robinson.
After this little thought experiment, let’s go back to our world. Here it is not enough to merely “think” to satisfy desires, and there are many things that are in short supply and not easy to obtain. In our world, if one eats all the apples, there will be no apples for the other. In our reality, depressingly, conflicts will arise around the use of many other things.
Let’s define a conflict as a situation that arises when two people want to perform a certain action, but only one can. For example, two people can’t watch different channels on the same TV, so if that’s their wish, a conflict arises. Two people can’t drive to different destinations in the same car, so a conflict arises. The car or the television is the resource on which the said conflict revolves. Conflict, by its nature, will always revolve around a scarce resource.5
Then we will understand that conflicts are possible by the very fact that we are human beings living in the company of other human beings, who sometimes have different desires regarding scarce resources. As a side note, enter a separate question on how we resolve conflicts. There are several ways to reconcile them, more violent and less violent. Either way, they will wake up, this is the problem of social order.
Establishing Morality
Suppose some kind of conflict arose between two people. Not both will be able to get what they want. We will notice that it is enough that at least one of the two parties involved does not accept that “conflicts should be settled in a non-violent manner” and the result will be, quite simply, a fight. For example, if one claims “Wait! It’s my car!” And the other person just takes it (or says “so what”? and then takes it) there is not much to expand on the matter, philosophically.The car thief acts as if the other person is background noise or a natural disturbance, i.e., does not acknowledge the formation of a conflict at all.6 There is, of course, another possibility. If both parties accept the (normative) argument that “conflicts should be settled in a non-violent manner,” the result will be a discussion.
The act of discussion7 is at the root of any non-violent solution to the problem of social order. Discussion is nothing more than a civilized, non-violent way in which people can resolve conflicts that arise between them. Through a series of arguments, nothing more than voices and words that are unfounded. A hearing is not decided in favor of the person who can impose his will, but according to the arguments of the litigants. In other words, at the heart of the act of discussion is a certain norm – “the conflict should be resolved in a non-violent manner.”
Super Abundance 4
5 For otherwise the two men can accept their will. 6 See also Appendix C-Self-Defense and Punishment.
Justificatory Discourse 7
In order to decide between the positions, if the litigants have waived the “strong is just” rule for resolving the conflict, some other rule must be determined. A different norm for conflict resolution. This rule, of course, must be consistent with the civilized norm that underlies the act of discussion. A rule that contradicts the very assumption of the discussion is not justifiable in its framework. Thus, justice must be something that can be justified.8
Words and Deeds
Therefore, we will examine the action of Discussion 9, since this is the starting point. Discussing that it is a human action is of course directed towards achieving a certain goal. Also, for a discussion, like tango, you need two participants. Discussion is interaction, a certain form of cooperation. When two people cooperate, they do so for a common goal. It is certainly possible that everyone is interested in achieving the goal of cooperation for different reasons, but the outcome of the cooperation itself is necessarily guided as desired by the participants (otherwise they would not choose to participate in the action.) The denial of this claim by one of the participants directly contradicts what is implied by his very participation.
As noted, the fact that two people chose to litigate implies that they are interested in the underlying goal – resolving the conflict in a non-violent way. If a litigant claims that he denies this claim, there is no point in arguing with him, since he is in fact claiming that the outcome of the hearing is not of interest to him. Making a claim, during a hearing, that contradicts the basic norm underlying the discussion (as the argument – “a conflict must be resolved with blows)”! It is inconsistent, since its content it can be understood that the litigant is not interested in the purpose of the hearing in which he chose to participate. Such a discussant performs what is known in philosophy as a “performative contradiction.”10
A performative contradiction (also known as a “practical contradiction”) occurs when the very assertion of a particular proposition contradicts the content of the proposition being made. As a simple example, the claim “I am dead” is a performative contradiction. Not that the content of the claim (in fact – “Guy is dead)” is not necessarily true, one day it will be true, and not even that the claim contains any self-contradiction. But the very act of charging implies that I, the claimant, am alive. That is, it stems:
- The claimant is alive (by the very act of charging.) 2. The claimant is dead (from the contents of the claim.)
Therefore, this argument is a performative contradiction.
As noted, the act of discussion is not a random collection of isolated, uncontextual, meaningless swans or presentations. Discussion is a practical action. A person participates in the discussion by making arguments within it. In other words, the very act of charging in the hearing implies:
- The conflict should be resolved in a non-violent manner.
Anyone who makes a claim during a hearing that contradicts this basic norm is in fact denying the purpose of the discussion in which he is taking part, and by doing so he is committing a performative contradiction. Let us examine as an example the normative claim: “It is appropriate to ignore the arguments made in the hearing.” This claim, when it has no context in itself, say, written on a note in a bottle floating in the sea, is completely legitimate. But can this argument be made without contradiction in the hearing? It is clear that accepting this argument negates the possibility of achieving the purpose of the hearing in the first place, since a discussion in its essence involves the arguing of arguments in order to resolve the conflict. If each side ignores the other side’s claims, it will not be possible to resolve the conflict in a hearing, without violence. Therefore, a participant in a hearing who makes such a claim is inconsistent with what is implied by his participation and thus performs a performative contradiction. Let us now come to the dog’s bone, and examine which norms, socialist , capitalist, and other, can be charged without contradiction or not.
8 Even those who wish to dispute this argument will be forced to take part in the discussion, if only to say: “False! Not every justified argument must be justified in the hearing!”
9 Paraxiologically
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Performative_contradiction 10
We will see that the only rule that does not contradict the essence of the discussion as a non-violent way of settling disputes is based on the Talmud’s principle of “He who takes out his friend – upon him is the proof.1211 In particular, this means the full ownership of each person’s own body, insofar as the conflict revolves around his own body, and with regard to the ownership of external resources, their owner is the first person to domesticate them (the concept of “domestication” will be explained later) or to voluntarily receive ownership from their previous owners. Any person who argues in favor of rules that do not conform to the principle of “the one who takes out the evidence” or what is often called, the principle of non-aggression is in a performative contradiction.
The human body
Let’s start by examining the conflict over the primary and most essential resource for the human being – the body. A person’s use of his body necessarily precedes any possible use of external resources, since in order to make use of the resources, he must first make use of his body. Since each person has only one material body, the body is also definitely a resource in scarcity.13 It appears negatively that only the ownership of each person over his own body corresponds to the act of the deliberation.
First of all, we will notice that the arguments raised in the hearing should not be arbitrary, but justified. Refutation of this would empty the discussion of any content (and would therefore constitute a performative contradiction.)14 In other words, the essence of the discussion is derived from the norm – “Your position must be justified.” In light of this, we will ask whether the norm of slavery “litigant A. is the owner of the body of litigant B” consistent with the act of the hearing. The proposed norm of ownership is not, what is called in philosophy-universal (but rather particular). In other words, it is not formulated uniformly for all people. Other examples of particular norms are “Guy can hit everyone but no one can hit Guy” or “Blondes are right.” Such norms actually create a categorical-moral divide between women with yellow hair, or the person named “Guy,” from the rest of humanity. Such a separation, as far as human beings with the intellectual capacity to respect each other’s rights and resolve conflicts in the discussion of moral agents is completely arbitrary. Since the partition is arbitrary, the acceptance of a certain norm that contains such a partition is inherently arbitrary. Since an arbitrary claim, by definition, is not justifiable, every particular norm is not justifiable, and therefore its claim in the hearing constitutes a contradiction.15 It follows that any acceptable norm in discussion must first be universal to all human beings.
We will notice that universality is only a prerequisite and not every universal norm, just by virtue of being universal, is justifiable. Norms such as “keep the Sabbath holy” or “It is appropriate to hug every chicken you see” are also universal norms, although they are, at times, ridiculous.
Let’s look at the norm that “no one owns his own body.” Although this norm is formulated universally, since the purpose of
The discussion to settle the ownership and right of use over the body in dispute, its very assertion contradicts the purpose of the discussion, and therefore it is inconsistent with the resolution of the conflict in the hearing and constitutes a contradiction. Hence, given the principle of universality, it is possible that
In fact, there are two possibilities, each person has partial ownership of his body and each person has full ownership of his body.
Indeed, it is possible to formulate a norm of partial ownership of a person’s body in a universal manner. In such a norm, each person actually holds an “equal share” in the body of every other person. We will call this norm “world communism.16” We will notice that this norm indicates that before a person makes any use of his body, he must first ask permission from the other “shareholders” in his body. In fact, to ask and get permission from most of the world’s population. However, the very request for permission, by its very nature, requires a person to make some use of his body. Therefore, according to this norm, people will not be able to move at all and will have to freeze in place (and die).
11 Its equivalent in common law11 is the principle offacie . Prima 12 Wikipedia article
13 Rape and murder are conflicts over a person’s body.
14 If it is possible to argue arguments in a hearing without having to justify them, any nonsense can be argued.
15 See Appendix B on the principle of universality and why when it comes to animals and inanimate objects, the categorical-moral distinction is not arbitrary, but rooted in the nature of things and justifiable.
16 This is what Murray Rothbard called it, in chapter 15 of his book Liberty of Ethics The
Hence, the very act of participating in the discussion, by performing the act of loading, contradicts the acceptance of this norm, and therefore charging it as a norm for resolving the conflict constitutes a performative contradiction.
Since the norms of a person’s lack of ownership or partial ownership of his body contradict the course of the hearing, every litigant must accept that in the framework of a hearing, every person owns his own body as the only acceptable norm for settling conflicts in the hearing, since any attempt to negate this norm leads to a contradiction to the claimant.
External resources
Now we can examine how this affects the rules of ownership concerning other resources. Every person who eats, drinks, breathes, wears clothes, and in short, has a life, accepts the claim that a person is entitled to make some use of external resources. Moreover, conflicts over external resources are of interest to only people who want to make some use of them, i.e., those who accept the claim that people are allowed to make use of the resources. Conflicts with people who reject this norm, in the short period of time they are still alive, revolve around the human body at most.
We will distinguish between two types of norms for settling ownership of a resource. Norms that settle ownership of a resource on the basis of a subjective relationship between the resource and its owner, and norms that settle ownership according to an objective relationship between the resource and its owner (according to Kant, Ascertainable).Intersubjectively subjective norms, which settle ownership of a subjective relationship (e.g., “the one who wants the resource the most is its owner” or “the one who noticed the resource first is its owner)” are not, in essence, more than a claim of ownership based on a verbal statement, there is no way to establish them.17 Because verbal statements contradict the ability to be released into the air at the same time, a subjective norm cannot be the basis for the non-violent resolution of conflicts. Consistency with the act of discussion contradicts the argument in favor of a subjective norm for settling ownership of a resource.
Therefore, we will approach and examine an objective norm. When it comes to objective connection, we should first note that external resources, unlike the human body, are not clearly and objectively related by default to any specific person. In order to create such an objective connection, one must act on the resource. In other words, a certain person must “mix” his work with the resource and change its attributes. From the moment a person comes and through his actions makes a connection between himself and the resource (for example, he fenced off the area, picked up the stick and guarded it, etc.), he has created a clear, objective and visible connection between himself and the resource. Such an action is known as domestication
.)Homesteading(
We will notice that the very demand for an objective connection as a basis for resolving the conflict implies that only the first person who domesticated the resource is the only one who can be justified as its owner. The first person to domesticate the virgin resource is the only one who has attained “vision” without imposing his mind in conflict, that is, without having to “get out of it.” A norm that grants ownership of the resource to a later domesticator actually favors a person who is not in any way objectively related to the resource over a person who has an objective connection to the resource (i.e., constitutes a subjective norm.) Second, we will discern that granting ownership to a “domesticator” who will come in the future will force the first domesticator to first ask for the permission of a future person whose identity is unknown (in order to domesticate the resource for the first time). That way, no one will ever be able to make use of anything. For these reasons, we will differentiate between the first domestication and the later domesticators, and we will acquire ownership of the first domestication only.18
Hence, only a rule based on the initial domestication of a resource is consistent with the action of the hearing, and its denial in the discussion constitutes a contradiction.19 This is effectively the end of it.
17 Both parties can declare, “I want the resource more.”
Prior-Later Distinction 18
Homesteading Principle 19
In conclusion
We have shown that only the right of property in the body and property is justified, since it derives from the essence of the act of the hearing. Anyone who argues in favor of a different norm necessarily contradicts himself. When we swim about capitalism, communism, or socialism, we are in fact swimming in the rules of ownership. Who can take the stage? The government, the manufacturer, the planning committee, etc.” Any communist or socialist ethics at the end of the day boils down to the rule, “I, the tax man, or, I, the politician, or I’m the bureaucrat, can steal / hit you while you can’t steal / hit me.” In other words, this is a particular claim, and its argument in the hearing brings the claimant to the point of a real contradiction. All kinds of communist ideas, even if formulated universally, contradict the very use of man’s body and hence his ownership of it, as required by man’s very action in the framework of the discussion. All those who support these approaches are simply logically wrong. The principle of non-aggression, which derives from its preceding rule – “He who takes the evidence out of his friend” – is the only justifiable principle. A person’s ownership of his body and property is undeniable.
Additional Resources
- Questions and comments can be left in this post (I will answer when I can.)
- Videos:
Short Explanation 7 ( min)
Another excellent lecture by Hofa Stefan Kinsella (lecture)3
Additional Links.
Essayand detailed essay by the Belgian philosopher Frank van Daan.
This article reviews developments based on discussion ethics (highly recommended.) This article expands on the issue of human ownership of one’s body.
This article expands on the essence of domestication.
o o o
o o o o o
On the argument, reviews and answers
Hans Hermann Hoppe came out with The Ethics of Argument (also known as “the argument from argument”) in 1811 (officially) at this symposium . His work is based, first and foremost, on the work of his teacher, the Marxist philosopher Jürgen Habermes, who first developed the idea of appealing to the nature of discussion as the basis for morality. Beyond that, Hoffa is based on a misesian paraxological analysis, on the natural rights approach of his second teacher, Mori Rothbard, and of course on Kant’s teachings.
The economist Murray Rothbard preferred Hoppe’s approach to his own natural rights approach, and so many today
Among them are Walter Block, David Gordon, Jeff Tucker and more. The following are critical responses (both from religious libertarians and utilitarians), including:
Responses to the reviews can be found here:
Appendix A-E Dichotomy of the Is-Ought
Here we are, little ants on a grain of dust, trying to search for meaning and guidance in our marginal existence. But before we deal with this, it is necessary to familiarize ourselves with the dichotomy of the inappropriate (or the dichotomy of the “desirable,),” since it is a necessary point of departure and reference for any rational ethics.The Enlightenment philosopher David Hume20 wrote [Essay on Human Nature,[7193]
In every moral system with which I have met so far, I have always noticed that the author continues for a while with the usual ways of logic, and then establishes the existence of God, or some kind of illumination concerning the affairs of mankind, when suddenly I am surprised to find that under the usual pairing of arguments – this is so, it is not so, I do not encounter a claim that is not connected to”Worthy,” or “Unworthy.” This transition is almost indistinguishable, and at the same time it has the implication below, since it is appropriate, or inappropriate, expresses a new connection, and it is presumed that it will be restored and clarified; and at that moment a reason is given; For this seems inconceivable, how can this new relationship be inferred from the others, which are completely different from it?
Hume argues that it is impossible to deduce from the very practice of the world, from the dry physical facts of reality, what is “proper” and what is not. What is proper already depends on the creator. It can be deduced that a certain anemone is red or that the moon is made of gorgonzola cheese, these are objective properties of objects in reality that are perceived by the senses. The answers to such questions do not depend on the respondent, but on the subject himself. In contrast, “good” and “bad” (as well as “beautiful” or “annoying” or “similar” and other adjectives of this kind) are not qualities that describe the object, but rather qualities that describe the opinion of the subject who expresses them. The weight of an aluminum ingot can be deduced from its volume, but it is not possible to deduce from its weight whether it is “beautiful.” The concept of Yaffe is not really a description of the iron bar, but of the perception of the person who is displaying his mind.
Hume points out that man, in the course of his empathetic attempts to find an “objective” and clear meaning and guidance for his existence, is tempted to “skip” between claims of the first type and proper claims belonging to the second type. In other words, from the description of the objective world to the description of its subjective consciousness. As stated, this is not a valid inference. When the apple fell on Newton’s head, Newton concluded that bodies pull each other, not because it was appropriate to take responsibility for apples you dropped. When Darwin visited the Galapagos Islands, he deduced from this how animals in nature change and evolve over time, not because it is advisable to castrate the weaker individuals in society… This insight of the day is known as the dichotomy of the heno-worthy. Because something is not due to something being worthy.
“He” claims are philosophically referred to as descriptive claims. The claims that “an apple has fallen” or “animals aspire to reproduce” are descriptive claims. “Proper” claims are referred to as normative (or normative) claims.”It is appropriate to pick apples” or “It is worthy of reproduction” are normative claims. In contrast to descriptive claims that describe objective reality, normative claims are not “true” in themselves. Only if we assume one normative claim can we derive another normative claim from it. For example, the following inference is valid and does not violate the dichotomy of the no-proper:
- If it is appropriate to preserve the diversity of species in nature. (Assumption – Normative Argument)
- And picking protected flowers causes their extinction. 3. Because then it is appropriate not to pick protected flowers. (Normative Claim)
But let us emphasize that the first claim is nothing more than an assumption and not an objective truth. The term “moral theory” describes a series of normative claims that stem from one another. Since normative claims are not an integral part of reality, every moral theory is underpinned by at least one normative claim that is simply assumed to be true. This argument is the axiom of the Torah. We will notice that by defining a particular proposition as an axiom, its correctness can be negated with the same degree of consistency as it is possible to accept its correctness. After all, if the negation of the axiomatic proposition were to lead to a logical contradiction, or some erroneous claim, then the argument is not axiomatic but is proven by way of negation. Therefore, it is always possible to consistently assume the negation of any axiom.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume 20
Since there is no rational impediment to rejecting (as well as accepting) the axiom that underlies any moral theory, the acceptance of the entire moral theory is inherently arbitrary. In other words, by the nature of morality, it is not possible to logically prove that every rational creature must accept a specific, single, objective moral doctrine. The arguments in favor of accepting a certain axiom (and, consequently, the entire doctrine on which it is based) can at most be emotional. Hence, the acceptance of a certain moral theory is essentially an emotional matter. There are no rules of conduct that are “written in heaven.” The hino-proper dichotomy bothers many people who seek objective morality. Human beings are looking for meaning and guidance for their meaningless and guided existence. The insight that ‘good and evil’ are ultimately subjective concepts is very difficult for many to internalize. Although this is a psychological issue and not the subject of this article.
Appendix B: The principle of universality – you shall not do to your friend
A plane with a pilot and a navigator crashes in the middle of the Sahara Desert. When they get out of the plane, they discover that their water tank is punctured by bullets and is empty. Thus, after two days of aimless walking in the scorching sun, they notice a tiny, blackish patch of shadow on the distant horizon. They go out towards it and after another 5 and a half hours of walking in the sand dunes without a drop of drinking they arrive and notice an acacia tree, under which is a table with a jug of cool water and two glasses on it.
There are two options:
- They will go with plagues, the winner will drink all the water and the loser will die (from thirst or from the plagues.)
- They will decide to settle the conflict in a discussion.
Since they are brothers in arms and cultural figures, they both decide to settle the conflict in a discussion. After deciding to be brothers, even if they both died, and hugged for a long minute, the navigator opened his mouth to propose a plan of action, and said:
“I suggest that I drink all the water.”
The principle of universality (also known as the Golden Rule) is the principle according to which a valid moral rule is formulated in a way that is valid for all human beings. A norm that differentiates people according to their external qualities and not according to their actions is not universal. For example, the particular norm that “brunettes can murder blondes” is not universal. According to this rule, if a person with a brunette hair wants to murder a person with a blonde hair, one law will be passed (permitted), and if a person with a blonde hair wants to murder a person with a brunette hair, another law will be passed (forbidden). In other words, this rule categorically separates people according to the color of their hair.It is possible to formulate an infinite number of non-universal rules according to every possible external characteristic imaginable (skin color, mother tongue, origin, number of toes on the feet, eye color, etc.). Accepting or rejecting “the color of the hair” as relevant to the question of the murder is inherently arbitrary, i.e., it is not justifiable. Many have noticed that any priori morality must be grounded in objective reality. It seems that this insight derives from the norms embodied in the conduct of the hearing, and therefore cannot be denied in the discussion.
Let’s start with a little thought exercise. Let’s assume for a moment that on the advice of the radical left, it was decided to stop the terrible discrimination between farm animals and humans and to grant them equal rights. In other words, there is no categorical moral separation between animals and humans. A day later, Adam and a horse are brought before a magistrate judge. The person claims that the horse (the heated) spat in his face and therefore demands his punishment. After examining the evidence, the judge concludes that the statements are true. According to the Knesset Law, spitting in a person’s face is liable to two months in prison or a fine. The horse, of course, has no money.
The judge appears to have two options.
To claim that the horse is guilty, he must pay for his actions, and imprison the horse for violating the plaintiff’s rights.
To claim that the horse, being a horse, lacks the cognitive abilities to understand that its actions violate a person’s right and therefore punishing him for violating it is ridiculous. The horse is “blind” to the concept of right, and “you shall not put an obstacle before a blind man.”
Let’s look at both options. Imprisoning the horse for violating a person’s right to keep his face clean involves accepting the claim that the horse is responsible, that is, conscious, for a violation of a human right that he is not able to understand at all. Since this option involves accepting a claim that is objectively wrong, this option is in the form of reduction-ad absurdum.
The second option, acquittal of the “blind” horse, therefore seems, on the face of it, to be the more “logical” option. But what if the situation were the opposite and the person spat on the horse? In this case, it could not be argued that the person is incapable of understanding the language of the law. In other words, because of this consideration, there is no impediment to punishing a person if the circumstances were the opposite. Hence, this consideration contradicts the categorical imperative, since it actually dictates that a horse is allowed to spit on a person, while a person is forbidden to spit on a horse. In other words, according to this consideration, the horse is categorically separated from the human being, in contradiction to the fact, because he and the humans belong to the same moral category.
Hence, the expansion of the categorical imperative for horses requires acceptance of an erroneous claim, or leads to a contradiction. This argument is therefore irrational and objectively erroneous. The story is also similar with regard to the application of the categorical imperative to rocks and clouds, etc. We will ask, does categorical separation between people with different hair color also lead to the acceptance of an objectively erroneous claim? Does the rejection of this claim lead to any logical contradiction?
Hair dye has nothing to do with the ability to respect the rights of others. Since there is no contradiction in the rejection or acceptance of this claim, its arbitrary acceptance is arbitrary and subjective in nature. Being ‘arbitrary’ means that it is not justifiable.”Why”-“?That’s it.” It can be seen that each particular norm is arbitrary by constructing an identical but opposite norm. In other words, for the norm “a goose owns a mulch’s body” it is possible to construct an inverse norm “a goose owns a mulch’s body.” These norms are identical in every respect, except that they favor different desires – one is the desire of mud and the other is the desire of Oz. Will is subjective, not cardinal. In other words, it cannot be said that one desire is size 4 and the second desire is size 7, because as such, the preference of one desire over another is inherently subjective, and so is the particular norm.
Of course, it is in the discussion that arguments must be justified. The one who answers “why”? In “like this”. is inconsistent with the purpose of the discussion to resolve a conflict. Hence, the proposal of a particular norm in their discussion constitutes a performative contradiction.
It should be noted that if the parties agree, a post-priori, 21 on a norm that is not universally formulated, such as a father giving his son a larger piece of cake, then they have expressly agreed to impose this norm without justification. In this case, since the father prefers, to a certain extent, the will of his son, as his opponent to the conflict, there is no real conflict. The parties could also have agreed a post-priori that there is a white elephant in the room, and settle the dispute that way, and that is their right. However, it is not possible to act justifiably in a priori manner, but only according to the principle of non-aggression.
Abortion, circumcision, the right of return and taxes
From the ethics of the hearing, it can be seen that the human right on its merits cannot be denied in the hearing. The ability to settle disputes on the basis of right, in a reality in which our knowledge is limited, necessarily involves the ability to take part in the discussion. A fetus, whether it is made up of two cells or is in the ninth month, cannot understand the concept of the right or take part in the discussion. Therefore, the non-application of universality to him is not subjective, but is rooted in objective reality, and its denial leads to absurdity. The same goes for a 1-day-old baby . While I personally oppose the practice of circumcision and encourage my readers to get rid of this puzzling and age-old tradition, it is absurd to use violence against parents under the pretext of universality applied to the baby. As such, the ethics of the discussion stem from my opinion (this is just my opinion, there are many who would disagree with it) that abortions are justified at any stage of pregnancy, even if they involve the initiated killing of the fetus.)Evicitionism( There is no need to look at the application of universality at one sudden moment. As the child grows and develops, his cognitive ability to act in the society of human beings and to respect more and more rights he is a member of the more and more understandable human category.
21 After the fact.
Appendix C: Punishment and Self-Defense – Dialogical Estoppel
“It’s easier to commit murder than to justify it.” Papinian.22
The principle of legal estoppel.23) Estoppel is a principle in common law countries (and Israel among them) according to which a person is prevented from making a correct claim that contradicts his conduct (if the other party relies on his conduct). For example:
Suppose a painter was commissioned to paint the exterior walls of house number 12a, but he got confused and instead came to house number 12.12 The owner of the house, Yosef, goes out in the morning and sees a painter who begins to paint the walls of his house. Yosef (who is quite a bastard) simply waves to the color for goodbye and continues on his way, leaving the paint to continue with his work and complete the work. After three days of this practice, upon completion of the painting, the painter approaches Yosef and asks for his reward for the work he has done, and Yosef replies that he will not pay, since he has no such agreement with the painter.
In such a case, if brought before an Israeli judge, the judge will declare that Yosef’s claim that there was no agreement between him and the paint “– you shall not hear.” In other words, Yosef acted in a manner that testifies and creates the impression that there is an agreement between him and the color, and therefore he is obliged to argue otherwise. His actions testified and were intended to create the (erroneous) impression that the paint had not been confused and that there was a payment agreement between him and the tortilla.Of course, obviously, hoping to get a free coloring… It was only because of Yosef’s conduct that the paint continued in his work on the wrong house. This conduct, like this, the judge will then interpret, as an agreement to the painting services that the paint offers, and Yosef’s claim that he never agreed to purchase his services “will not be heard.” Yosef will be forced to remain silent and pay the painter his wages. Underlying the principle is the understanding that in a social context, we speak not only through words but also through our actions.24
At the heart of the principle of legal estoppel is a philosophical principle that we will call “dialogical estoppel.” It seems that his acceptance is a prerequisite for the discussion, since his denial leads to a contradiction. We will continue to see that the principle of estoppel prevents an aggressive bully from justifying opposition to the use of violence against him, thus proving the perception of natural rights as negative rights, i.e., that the use of violence is justified but only in response to violence (the principle of non-aggression). Negative rights are therefore embodied in the essence of the act of the hearing.
As we showed above when we discussed the concept of performative contradiction, it is possible to reach a contradiction without stating two explicitly contradictory claims, since the very act of loading can attest to the acceptance of a contradictory claim (and thus the claims “I do not make claims” or “I am dead” lead to a contradiction by the very fact that they are presented). However, we will note that given the occurrence of certain events in the past, even a person who raises a claim that contradicts his actions can thus reach a contradiction. For example, let’s say a person ate ice cream two months ago. If he claims “he who eats ice cream is always wrong,” he will inevitably make a contradiction.
From the data, the claim “I ate ice cream” is true, and therefore it follows that the claimant must accept a contradiction:
- The claimant ate ice cream. (From the data)
- Anyone who eats ice cream is always wrong. (The Claim)
- Hence, those who ate ice cream are not always wrong. (i.e., contradiction)
Therefore, those who are known to have eaten ice cream are “silenced” from claiming that “those who have eaten ice cream are always wrong.” Accepting this argument entails accepting a contradiction. This is a “dialogical silence.” If a performative contradiction relates to an inconsistency with an action in the present (the very act of charging), then a dialogical ejection (hereinafter “estoppel”) relates to an inconsistency with an action in the past.
22 Amylos Papanian was a famous jurist in Rome in the Third Empire. It is said that he was executed for refusing to be a charity member for the murder of the Emperor Caracles, by his brother, his co-king, Getta. He is said to have stated, “It is easier to commit murder than to justify it.”
23 Here I will refer to “estoppel by virtue of representation” and “estoppel of promise,” which are relevant to the subject. There are other variations of the principle of estoppel that relate to the legal proceeding itself.
24 During my military service as a programmer (Mamram), I heard about two programmers whom the IDF forgot to sign on the commitment form for permanent service (R) involved in this service track. The two, upon entering the regular army (after six months of course + three years of compulsory service), petitioned the High Court of Justice claiming that they did not know that this service track was conditional on regular service, and that if they had known this, they would not have chosen this track. Their petition, of course, was rejected. But I’ve seen more desperate attempts. The Judgment –
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/06/370/063/t03/06063370.t03.HTM
Let us now see how this principle dictates that a person who has committed an act of aggression is logically “silenced” from arguing against his punishment. First, we will distinguish between coercive actions (actions that involve force exerted on a person’s body against his will) and actions that are not coercion. There is no moral judgment whatsoever in the very division. Suppose that Adam A, who is hot-headed, attacked and severely injured Adam B. Now let us assume that Adam II demands his punishment. We will notice that A. is silenced from arguing that the coercive act that B seeks to exert on him is unjustified. The significance of such a claim, if A. makes it, is that A. does not have the justification to respond violently to his punishment. But if he makes such a claim, he must also accept that since he himself used violence against B., B.’s violence against him is justified. Hence, the very fact that he wishes to propose a norm that negates the use of force against him, he must accept that it is justified by virtue of his own actions. In other words, this argument brings a contradiction. Therefore, A. is silenced from making this argument and cannot object in a coherent hearing to B.’s punitive action.
In Hoffe’s discussion ethics, which we reviewed above, the argument is presented as to why only the principle of domestication, i.e., the creation of an open and objective relationship between the resource and its owner is consistent with the non-violent settlement of conflict. A person’s right to property in his body as well as his right to property in the property that he lawfully acquired are both from land in the course of the hearing, and therefore, in the same manner described in the previous paragraph, it is also possible to see why theft silences the thief from objecting to his punishment in the hearing. The thief himself in the fact that the thief did not settle the conflict about the theft by means of a hearing, and therefore he is silenced from claiming that only the settlement of the conflict in a just hearing is just.
“If you find in his hand the theft from an ox to a donkey, until he is alive, he shall pay for two years” Exodus 22:3
Embedded in the principle of estoppel is the principle of proportionality. While an arbitrary distinction between “violence of the criminal” and “violence of the victim” is negated by the principle of universality, the distinction between “theft of gum” and “murder in cold blood” is not an arbitrary distinction at all. A person who stole gum is indeed silenced from arguing against his reasonable fine, but it cannot be argued that he is therefore silenced from arguing against his execution. This insight that arises from the principle of estoppel shows that rational legal theory must support proportionate punishment (in addition to restitution of theft). It can also be seen that when it comes to a cold-blooded murderer, the death penalty is justified.
From the principle of estoppel we can deduce other aspects relating to rational and justifiable punishment, although I will not discuss this in this article.25
:Walter Block http://www.reasonpapers.com/pdf/17/rp_17_4.pdf:Original Article 25 http://www.walterblock.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/block_theory-guilt-punishment http://mises.org/journals/jls/12_1/12_1_3.pdf :Kinsella of its expansion crime-statism.pdf
Appendix D Socratic Discourse
Let us imagine a dialogue with a person who bases his position on the dichotomy of the no-worthy, as many socialists and utilitarians do
practice and it seems that it necessarily contradicts itself. First of all, we will notice that when a person makes a claim P in a hearing , he is actually claiming that “Proposition P is true.” Now let’s get to the conversation.
Q: It cannot be shown that the principle of non-aggression should be accepted absolutely, since there are no binding norms that everyone must accept, then it is not possible to deduce what is appropriate from what is found.
K: Wait, why, since the claim “there are no proper rules that are written in heaven” is not true, it follows that a claim based on it should be preferred?
Q: Um… I’m not sure I understand what you’re talking about. If this is a true claim and the negation of the claim is a lie, then the position based on the truth claim should be preferred… It’s clear…
K: From what you say, it’s not clear. Think about it and you’ll see that the content of your claim negates it. If there are no binding norms, why
You claim that since your claim is based on a false claim, it should be preferred to a position that is supposedly based on a false claim?
Q: Because listen, if in the discussion we don’t assume that positions based on truth should be preferred, how can we reach a conclusion? It’s
Turns into a bird… Obviously, we both assume it. We are trying to get to the root of the matter, that is, to the truth, we are not just talking randomly.
K: Yes, but “it is appropriate to prefer truth to falsehood” is a certain norm. You argue that there is no reason to prefer one norm over another (the hino-proper dichotomy) on the basis that a certain norm should be preferred. (Truth about falsehood.) I find here the contradiction.
COMMENTS:
Dialogical Libertarianism: Ultimate Foundation of Ethics:
The Ethics of Discussion (Ultimate Proof of Property Rights)
Another guest post from the inexhaustible Guy.K, and this time, an article!
We already have a thief and a prostitute, and now I am attaching the first Hebrew article describing the ethics of discussion by Hans Hermann Hoffa!
Readers interested in philosophy are invited to read and be impressed (PDF!) and of course, agree, praise and commend. If for some reason a question or objection has arisen, the feedback is at your service.
Tags: Argumentation Ethics , Dialogical Estoppel , Estoppel , Hans Herman Hoppe , Hebrew Libertarian , Hoppe , Ethics of Discussion , Hans Herman Hoppe , Silence , Dialogical Silence , Property Rights , Libertarianism , Mary Rothbard , Philosophy , Libertarian Philosophy , Capitalism and Morality
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אתיקת הדיון (הוכחה אולטימטיבית לזכות הקניין)
פוסט אורח נוסף מאת גיא.ק הבלתי נדלה, והפעם, מאמר!
כבר יש לנו גנב ויש לנו פרוצה, ועכשיו אני מצרף את המאמר העברי הראשון המתאר את אתיקת הדיון של האנס הרמן הופה!
הקוראים המתעניינים בפילוסופיה מוזמנים לקרוא ולהתרשם (PDF!) וכמובן, להסכים, להלל ולשבח. אם בכל זאת משום מה התעוררה שאלה או הסגה כלשהי, התגוביות לשירותכם.
תגים: Argumentation Ethics, Dialogical Estoppel, Estoppel, Hans Herman Hoppe, Hebrew Libertarian, Hoppe, אתיקת הדיון, האנס הרמן הופה, השתק, השתק דיאלוגי, זכות הקניין, ליברטריאניזם, מארי רות’בארד, פילוסופיה, פילוסופיה ליברטריאנית, קפיטליזם ומוסר
הפוסט הזה נכתב בתאריך יום שבת, 5 בנובמבר, 2011 בשעה 19:32 תחת הקטגוריות כללי. אפשר לעקוב אחר התגובות לפוסט הזה באמצעות פיד RSS לתגובות. אפשר לכתוב כאן תגובה, או לכתוב בבלוג שלך פוסט כתגובה ולשלוח טראקבאק.
כתיבת תגובה
Lecompte is pronounced like “luh count” by the way.
הטיעון דן במה אפשר לוגית להצדיק. למשל, אם הוא יפקיע בחזרה את רכושו של לוקח הבית כפיצוי הלוקח לא יוכל להתנגד לכך באופן קוהארנטי בדיון כיוון שבכך שלקח את ביתו של הראשון ויזם אלימות הראה כי הוא לא מקבל את הנורמה על פיה יש לפתור קונפליקטים בדיון ולכן התנגדותו הפתאומית לנורמה זו כשהיא מופעלת כלפיו לא תהיה עקבית. לא נכנסתי לנושא זה מפאת קוצר היריעה אך תוכל לקרוא על כך כאן: 
Excellent article! I really enjoyed reading it.
My question is: What would a person who chooses such a discussion ethic do when someone takes his house?
Hi Yitzhak, glad you enjoyed it (although it’s pretty rough, when I have time I’ll edit it…).
“What would a person who chooses such a discussion-ethic do when someone takes his house?”
The argument discusses what can be logically justified. For example, if he were to expropriate the property of the house-taker as compensation, the house-taker would not be able to oppose this coherently in the discussion because by taking the former’s house and initiating violence, he showed that he does not accept the norm according to which conflicts should be resolved in the discussion, and therefore his sudden opposition to this norm when it is applied to him would not be consistent. I did not go into this subject due to brevity, but you can read about it here: http://www.reasonpapers.com/pdf/17/rp_17_4.pdf
First, a person does not choose the discussion-ethic, he chooses to take part in the discussion, as you are choosing to discuss with me now, and the discussion-ethic stems from this.
The question of what he would do is not really relevant; most people act according to their own self-interest, and that is it, without any connection to philosophy.
As I said ( http://chickenman.radish.co.il/?p=237 ) I have all sorts of problems with this argument, but my main conceptual problem is related to the Hopfian assumption that morality must be universal. Here is what you wrote on the subject:
“We note that the claim that one litigant owns his body while the other litigant [does not] constitute a particular norm, not a universal one, and therefore not valid. Any rule that resolves the conflict must be one that can be perceived as fair by all litigants. A rule of the type “I can hit you but you cannot hit me” is inconsistent with the goal of the discussion to resolve the conflict in a non-violent manner since in essence it will not be perceived as fair by both litigants. The acceptance or rejection of particular norms that discriminate between litigants is arbitrary and is not based on anything related to the act of the discussion. The other litigant could equally make the opposite claim – “I can hit you but you cannot hit
me.” In other words, an “objective”, universal formulation is a primary condition for the norm to be acceptable for resolving a discussion. “
But the argument here is very weak. To argue in terms of “fairness” is to assume what is wanted, not to prove it. Fairness is circumstantial, not analytical. You have to agree on this because you accept the desired/existing dichotomy. Therefore, the following argument is invalid: ‘A rule of the type “I can hit you but you can’t hit me” is inconsistent with the purpose of the discussion to resolve the conflict in a nonviolent manner since it would not be perceived as fair by either party.’ – On what basis do you say this out of context? For thousands of years there have been feudal and monarchical societies in which this rule was perceived as “fair” in certain situations, but even if there were none, it is not impossible that such societies would exist, and that such situations would occur. Particular norms that discriminate between participants can be very non-arbitrary, and rooted in culture, history, the psychology of the debaters, their appearance, and a thousand other factors, but even if you can’t put your finger on what’s behind these norms, there’s no way to refute their programming. It seems to me that you’re imposing far too much of the currently prevalent egalitarian perception on your (Hoffe’s) argument. The same goes for the formulation: to claim that a universal formulation is actually objective is to assume what you want. I don’t see how, analytically, it’s more objective to claim “no one is allowed to hit anyone else” than “the stronger is allowed to hit the weaker, and the weaker has no right to hit the stronger.”
But you’re missing the point. Norms don’t “have to” be universal per se, but norms promoted through discussion are. If your intention is to resolve the conflict by force, you don’t care who is “right” and there’s no point in discussing it. If you do decide to resolve a conflict through discussion and then, in all seriousness, propose the norm “May Mary always be right,” for example, you are acting in contradiction to your choice to resolve the conflict through discussion, because such a norm cannot be accepted as fair by the other side. We’re not talking about “fair” as a value judgment, but fair because it’s clear that the conflict was created in the first place only because both sides **want** to perform a certain action. And for every particular norm that favors one will over another, there is an identical but opposite norm that favors the second will over the first. Since desire is subjective, the preference for one over the other is subjective, and therefore, by the very nature of the conflict context, each party will necessarily choose the norm that prefers it with the same degree of consistency.
That is, given two completely identical norms, one of which prefers Party A and the other prefers Party B, it is clear that Party A will choose one and Party B will choose the other. This is not a guess, but rather a direct result of the very nature of the conflict context. Only a universal norm has no subjective preference for one of the parties, and there is no identical but opposite norm that the opposing party will necessarily and by the very nature of the conflict prefer. Only if both parties agree that the norms must be formulated universally will they be able to propose norms that in principle will not be automatically (necessarily) rejected by the other party simply because they are particular. Denying the need for universality will not enable the goal of the discussion to be achieved, and therefore denying it is inconsistent with taking part in it.
Allow me to quote Hoffa:
“Quite commonly it has been observed that argumentation implies that a proposition claims universal acceptability, or, should it be a norm proposal, that it is ‘universalizable.’ Applied to norm proposals, this is the idea, as formulated in the Golden Rule of ethics or in the Kantian Categorical Imperative, that only those norms can be justified that can be formulated as general principles which are valid for everyone without exception.” (TSC, p. 131). And Kinsella:
In other words, any proposed norm – that is, an attempted justification for a given action – is not justified if it is not universalizable. This rule is presupposed by the very attempt to argumentatively justify something, because “argumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force.” Because the universalizability principle is an inherent feature of argumentation in general, “the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as grounded in the wider ‘apriori of communication and argumentation.'” (TSC, p. 131) Ie, no one can deny that only universalizable norms can be justified.
While the inconsistency of proposing a particular norm with the sincere desire to resolve a conflict in a discussion seems clear to me, I will point out that the denial of the principle of universality leads neither to utilitarianism nor to consequentialism but to nothing less than _absolute manialism_, in effect a normative “anything goes.” But it is all the more clear that parties taking part in the discussion must formulate the norms universally.
In addition to the explanation, imagine the following situation (not exactly a cake-cutting):
A plane with a pilot and navigator on board crashes in the middle of the Sahara Desert. When they get out of the plane, they discover that their water bottle has a bullet hole in it and is empty. Thus, after two days of helpless walking in the scorching sun, they notice a tiny, dark speck of shadow on the distant horizon. After another 5 and a half hours of walking in the dunes without a drop of water, they arrive and notice an acacia tree, under which is a table, on which is a jug of cool water and two glasses.
There are two options:
1. They will fight, the winner will drink all the water and the loser will die (from thirst or from the beatings).
2. They will decide to resolve the conflict through discussion.
Since they are brothers in arms and men of culture, they both decide to resolve the conflict through discussion.
After deciding to be brothers even if they both die and hugging for a long minute, the navigator opened his mouth to come up with a plan of action, saying:
“I propose that I drink all the water.”
Can a sane person who understands the objective nature of the situation say that the navigator is consistent in his proposal with his choice to resolve the conflict through discussion?
As I have shown, the word “fair” does not represent a value judgment here, but rather the objective inability of a particular-subjective norm to bring about a peaceful settlement of the discussion due to the very nature of the conflict. Briefly regarding the sentence you wrote:
“On what basis do you say this out of context? For thousands of years there were feudal and monarchical societies […]”
See the beginning of the article. The things are said in context (since I accept the dichotomy of the right and the wrong). The context is the act of discussion in which we take part, which is not a random collection of floating sentences devoid of context, but claims guided by certain norms that are therefore guided by the discussion. As I wrote at the beginning of the article, there is no contradiction with the fact that the world as it is is customary: rapists will rape, pickpockets will pickpocket, murderers will murder, etc., etc. People will also be irrational, only they will not be able to justify it.
I don’t think I’m missing the point. In fact, agreeing to prefer discussion over violence does not necessarily mean agreeing on global principles. There is no reason why you and I should hold to the particular norm “May Mary always be right” and that we both prefer to argue rather than fight based on this norm. On the other hand, you, for that matter, can accept the norm as fair if (for example) you are educated from the age of 0 that it is fair. It is (absolutely) untrue that “for every particular norm that prefers one will over another will, there is an identical but opposite norm that prefers the other will.” A norm is not a claim floating in some metaphysical void, nor is it any proposition that can be imagined. A norm is a “property” of a particular society, and there is no reason why a particular norm cannot exist in a particular society and at the same time that an identical but opposite particular norm cannot exist in it. For example, a society in which the norm “in a debate between Richard the monarch and a peasant, the monarch is always right” exists and at the same time the norm “in a debate between a peasant and Richard the monarch, the peasant is always right” does not exist. The conflict between desires that you find here does not really exist, because both the peasant and the monarch want the same thing – that in a debate between Richard and the peasant, the monarch will be right. But just because they want the same thing does not mean that there is no need for discussion. Often, in order to clarify a certain situation (prima facie conflict of interests) so that the parties can prove that they are not in conflict, a discussion is necessary (example below). Discussion can also be used as a propaganda tool to strengthen or weaken norms, for example by endlessly repeating a certain claim. Values are achieved, among other things, through discussions of a propaganda nature.
I don’t see how simply agreeing to a discussion means that only universal norms will be accepted by both sides. You don’t prove it, you assume it. “Given two completely identical norms, one of which favors party A and the other favors party B, it is clear that party A will choose one and party B will choose the other.” Prove that it is necessary that the two norms not be identical. In fact, it is easy to see that it is impossible to prove this because everything that is perceived as discrimination necessarily depends on a prejudice, and therefore there is always the possibility that B holds a different prejudice than the one who thinks that the particular norm “screws” him.
Kinsella claims what you claim, and he doesn’t prove it either. “Argumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force.” Not entirely true. Argumentation (and discussion in general) is not always and not necessarily convincing through its argumentative force, sometimes it is convincing through its emotional impact on the listener. But let’s assume for the sake of argument that Kinsella is right in this claim, still, as stated, there is nothing preventing someone from being convinced by an argument that supposedly blows them away from Kinsella’s point of view, or mine, or yours, or that of most people who look at a situation from a particular culture that is fundamentally different from that of the “struck down.” Particularism does not necessarily mean a conflict with the will of one of the parties.
Regarding your claim that moral particularism leads to nihilism, I of course strongly disagree with you and think that morality anchored in universal rules is a fundamentally flawed idea. What is certain is that it is not that “anything goes”, there is no society that has all the norms imaginable, it is not a realistic society. In any case, this is off-topic here.
Regarding the scene you described. Yes, it doesn’t seem very plausible, but you can change it a bit and see how it supports my thesis. For example, instead of a pilot and a navigator, there are two crusaders who get lost on their way to the Holy Land and get stuck in the desert, until they come across the same jug that can only last one of them. Since they are civilized, they decide to argue rather than fight, but during the discussion it is revealed that one of the crusaders is the legendary Lord Thrangulus, whose name goes before him as a holy Christian hero who exterminates Muslim warriors with the efficiency of an IKEA branch. The lord manages to prove his identity to the other crusader, and therefore they agree that Thrangulus will drink the water and that the other will die, because they both hold the norm “The life of Saint Thrangulus is worth more than the life of an ordinary soldier.” And here is a particular norm that brings the discussion to its peaceful conclusion.
Okay, we’re drinking beer today, so just briefly:
If both crusaders want Crusader A to live *then there is no conflict*, the problem only arises when both crusaders prefer that they drink the water. Note, the context.
The same goes for the norm “Samri is always right,” etc., etc. If a conflict arises between people, they will not agree to this norm by definition.
“”Given two completely identical norms, one of which favors Party A and the other favors Party B, it is clear that Party A will choose one and Party B will choose the other.” Prove that it is necessary that the two norms not be identical.”
You didn’t understand what I meant here, we’ll wait for the beer…
Here it is.
http://www.greatplay.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/calvin_ethics.jpeg
We drank beer, in more detail:
The sentence:
“I don’t think I’m missing the point. In essence, agreeing to prefer discussion over violence does not necessarily mean agreeing on global principles.”
is clearly not true, since the act of discussion is not random. As an example: Don’t we assume that the other side’s arguments should be addressed? (If you think not, I see no reason to continue the discussion…)
Since it is clear that there are certain norms, as well as dialectical truths that are implied in the discussion (try to deny that your opponent exists or that language has objective meaning, etc.), it is clear that denying them in the content of the claims made in the discussion constitutes a contradiction, and the same applies to denying the claims that stem from them.
As for the examples: Your examples are unrelated. If both crusaders prefer that the jug be drunk by the Lord, there is no conflict. In the above, it is given that there is a conflict and that is the whole context of the argument. You did not provide a counterexample to this, nor did you show why you believe that the navigator contradicted himself by proposing a particular norm for resolving the conflict.
Much of your message is based on redefining the concept of norm as a “property of society” (I defined the concept in the standard and explicit manner at the beginning of the article, see link). So to negate my words by redefining the concepts simply indicates a lack of relevance. Furthermore, it is a categorical error to say that norms “exist” (“where the norm exists”). I link to the Wikipedia entry for the concept norm in the hope that it will address the content of the claims and not what happens when you redefine the words.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norm_(philosophy)
“I don’t think I’m missing the point. The agreement to prefer discussion over violence does not necessarily mean agreement on global principles.”
This is clearly an error, since the act of discussion is not random. As an example: Don’t we assume that the other side’s arguments should be considered?’
1. Not necessarily. Some people debate just to get their points across and tend not to listen too much to what the other side has to say, let alone respond in a substantive manner to what the other side has to say. In fact, most of the debates you hear out there do not involve sophisticated dialectics and substantive exchanges, but rather the repetition of one-sided slogans and similar propaganda devices. In many cases, the debate is intended to persuade through the speaker’s declaration and a host of rhetorical elements that have little to do with logic. This does not make the act of debate random, unless you define a random debate in a very artificial way as “any debate that is not based on dialectics.” But if you strive for that, then the Hophian argument loses all its sharpness, because then it does not begin to operate in relation to all law and things, but only in relation to law and things of a certain type (which needs to be isolated by interpretation, but then there is nothing new in the Hophian argument because it is clear that an analysis of law and things may in certain cases lead to the conclusion that the litigants hold a preconceived position of property rights).
2. “Do we not assume that the other side’s arguments must be addressed?” – Perhaps we assume that the other side’s arguments must be addressed, unless it turns out that they conflict with the scale of values of Saint Thrangulus? To do this, we had to hear what the other side had to say, that is, to enter into a discussion with it, but we did so out of a particular principle. To the best of my understanding, there is no universal principle that is required by the very choice of discussion over violence. But even if you find one, it does not detract from the fact that there are also particular arguments that are capable of producing a similar effect (i.e., causing discussion to be preferred over violence), and therefore examples are unable to decide this issue. Perhaps, instead of an example, you will provide an argument that explains why you think this is required – so far you have not done so. Instead, you used words like “fair” and “obvious” to skip over a point of paramount importance to the argument.
“If both crusaders prefer that the jug be drunk by the Lord, there is no conflict. But given that there is a conflict, and that is the whole context of the argument.”
3. What is given is a situation. To say that there is a conflict is to interpret the situation, not to describe it. If I don’t see a conflict there, then it is not enough for me for Sagi Kedem to tell me “given that there is a conflict” in the same way that it is not enough for a socialist to tell me about a certain situation “given that there is exploitation.” I don’t have to accept your interpretation. You can’t “put” a conflict into the situation in the same way that you can put a camel, dates, or a similar objective element there, I have to identify the conflict in order for it to be there for me.
So here is the semantic gap between us and my perception: You perceive conflict more or less like this: any case of a conflict of interests, ignoring the circumstances. I perceive conflict this way: cases of a well-founded conflict of interest, that is, not a conflict of interest arising from critical ignorance, temporary misunderstanding, etc. Therefore, for example, if Grisha tells Misha, “Today I’m taking Dad’s car,” and Misha tells him, “Okay,” but Grisha mistakenly hears, “No,” then by your definition there is a conflict between them, and by my definition there is no conflict between them because they are in substantial agreement (and a quick clarification between them will indeed confirm that there is agreement). I think your definition is too liberal, but so that a discussion of semantic interpretation does not arise here, let’s define conflict as you define it, and I will define “my” conflict as a “substantial conflict.”
So back to the Crusaders. There is a conflict between them, they enter into a discussion and then come to the conclusion that there is no substantive conflict between them based on a particular norm that they both hold. This example refutes the claim that it is not possible to resolve a conflict through a particular norm. What exactly is the problem and why is it “irrelevant”?
Regarding “norm”. Like other complex philosophical concepts, there is no absolute agreement on what a norm is. There are interpretations, and just because you decided to align yourself with Wikipedia’s interpretation doesn’t mean I have to align myself with it (by the way, if you do align yourself, then here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms/ ). “A feature of society” is a metaphor, not a neologism. It’s clear to you that I don’t think a norm really ‘exists’, it’s a way of expressing myself, I don’t understand what this minimization is for. In any case, you’re not making any substantive argument here, “A large part of your message is simply based on a redefinition of the concept of norm” is too general. Feel free to point out a specific problem with my arguments.
Shamri, you are not dealing fairly with the argument, and I see no point in continuing at this time. Readers will be able to evaluate your response and judge whether it deals with the argument itself.
Guy, if anyone is being unfair here, it’s you. If you don’t want to argue, then state that in advance. If I knew that instead of responding substantively, you’d throw out “I see no point in continuing,” maybe I wouldn’t see any point in continuing either and wouldn’t waste my time writing a response that you barely bother to read.
I read the response in its entirety. In the body of the article you will find precise definitions of both the concept of conflict and the concept of norm. Addressing an argument according to different definitions that you decide to associate is not a logical or reasonable way of arguing, and therefore the one wasting time here or “coming off unfairly” is you.
Well, what was the purpose of the discussion?
I wouldn’t want to put my head between two mountains (especially since I can’t read half of the words you wrote – certainly not understand them), but I would like to raise another point:
a person can enter a discussion with the goal of achieving what they want (for example, the other party’s house) and then both of you agree that there is a conflict here. What happens when the discussion comes to an end and the parties have come to the conclusion that the house should remain in the possession of its owner? The claimant of the house will go to violent practical levels, since his goal has not yet been achieved.
I assume that such a person in advance will not enter a discussion in which he cannot achieve his goal, right? If so, what is the point of having a discussion at all? What is the goal for which people enter a discussion? If I understand the answer, it is because they prefer to resolve conflicts nonviolently. But why does this preference exist? Who said that it is better to resolve conflicts nonviolently? And if you tell me that there is no reason to prefer this form of solution over the other, then why do I need rights? Anyone who chooses to live in a society devoid of rights is in fact indicating to himself that he is a person who chooses violence.
Now, when I come to examine which society I prefer to live in, is there an advantage to a free society over a violent society?
Yitzhak, I would like to point out that I agree with what was said before your question. To your question:
“But why does this preference exist? Who said it’s better to resolve conflicts nonviolently? And if you tell me there’s no reason to prefer this form of solution over the other, then why do I need rights? Anyone who chooses to live in a society devoid of rights is actually showing himself to be a person who chooses violence.
Now, when I come to examine which society I prefer to live in, is there an advantage to a free society over a violent one?”
These are good and even important points. Any valid ethics must be “hypothetical,” that is, of the form “if X then Y,” such is the nature of ethics. Hoffa places in X what is praxeologically required by the act of discussion, since like any human action, discussion is guided by certain norms. Thus, Y is obtained that cannot be consistently denied during a discussion, and in this case, Y is “the one who derives the evidence from his author” (and from which the right of ownership of the body and property is derived).
But it is of course possible not to enter into a discussion in the first place (and therefore there is no violation of the dichotomy of right and wrong). Although someone who chooses not to resolve conflicts through discussion, that is, chooses to take and attack without pretending to justify his actions, voluntarily chooses to deny the need for it, is no different from Matan or a tiger that escaped from the zoo. In doing so, he removed himself from the rest of the human race, who live in society and are capable of reason and therefore deserve to be treated in accordance with his choice – as a human being. On the other hand, those who choose to behave as members of a culture, that is, to recognize the humanity of the other, to live as equals, will be able to make and honor agreements, cooperate, divide labor, and prosper. Anyone who chooses this option must logically accept the principle of non-aggression as a derivative of it. The choice is simple – are you a human or are you a savage. Both are completely rational choices, the second will lead to your death.
It’s not clear to me at all.
“He who chooses not to resolve conflicts through discussion, that is, he chooses to take and attack without pretending to justify his actions, he chooses voluntarily to deny the need for it, is no different from Matan or a tiger that escaped from the zoo. In doing so, he has removed himself from the rest of the human race, who live in society and are capable of reason, and therefore deserve to be treated according to his choice – as a
living being.” Okay, but is it any less good than living in a society like this, which is animalistic and savage, than living in the society you describe: “Those who choose to behave as civilized people, that is, to recognize the humanity of others, to live as equals among equals”?
Can you know for sure if there is a more worthy society, or do you arbitrarily decide which society you see fit?
“The choice is simple – are you human or are you savage? Both are completely rational choices, the second will lead to your death.”
Why did you decide that a human society is precisely the one that chooses to litigate, while a savage society is the one that chooses violence? Maybe the other way around? Maybe a human society is a society in which you are allowed to take the property of others, and a savage society is a society in which taking the property of others is forbidden to you?
“Can you know for sure if there is a more worthy company, or do you arbitrarily decide which company you think is better?”
Indeed, my choice to live as a civilized person is subjective, in the sense that its negation does not lead to any logical contradiction. All the natural rights approaches of Rothbard, Rand, Marx, Locke, etc. are weak and arbitrary in nature because they try to bridge the gap between what is and what is not… In any case, you and I are not talking at random now, but are conducting a discussion, and therefore we are not operating in a normative vacuum. Because in this way, within the framework of our discussion, we can talk about certain norms that necessarily underlie it. By the way, not only did I choose to conduct a discussion, but you too, why? I chose because it is me, and it also interests me. This is not a praxeological question and there is no rationalist answer for it. Do not try to dress the ethics of the discussion in the square of natural rights, as you know from objectivism, they do not exactly coincide.
“Why did you decide that a human society is the one that chooses to litigate, while a savage society is the one that chooses violence? Maybe the other way around? Maybe a human society is a society in which you are allowed to take the property of others, and a savage society is a society in which you are prevented from taking the property of others?”
Maybe. These were emotional, not logical descriptions, as you may have noticed. Society does not debate, people debate. I examine the act of debate (i.e., Hans Hermann Hoffa…). Only because ethics is hypothetical like this, *if* you debate *then* these and those norms are implied by it. Without this form these ethics would not be valid, just like the hollow, subjective value judgment-based approaches of Rothbard, Rand, etc. During a debate the principle of non-aggression cannot be denied without contradiction, that’s all I can say.
But maybe you are looking for a code of conduct that will guide your actions… Unfortunately, in that case, I am not the right person for such answers. I can tell you what I think, but it will be my opinion, I do not know what is right for you. This is no longer serious analytical philosophy but psychology in disguise. All I have to say philosophically is that there is and cannot be an objective answer here. Anyone who claims that is so is engaging in mysticism. But, if you are still looking for an answer that suits you, your personality and your worldview, you can find such answers in various rabbis, “self-improvement” books or more pretentious (but less right) philosophers. In my opinion, you can also think for yourself and come to answers that are no less good than what any overly smart, egoist or altruist, will dictate to you in a decisive tone. It is precisely for this purpose that I am flying to the East now for a short period, in order to reflect on such issues in peace and quiet. You are welcome to join.
Of course I’m looking for a code of conduct to guide my life!
I don’t understand why you think you’re not the addressee. If you think that the ethics of discussion can be learned from the premise of discussion, why don’t you think that the ethics of life can be learned from the premise of life?
As I said, there is no objectively binding code of conduct. You are welcome to search for the code that is right for you.
“If you think that the ethics of discussion can be learned from the premise of discussion, why don’t you think that you can learn about the ethics of life from the premise of life?”
Only action posits a norm. Discussion is action. Norms do not exist objectively in themselves. The approach is a praxeological approach. The above is merely a semantic analogy, on the face of it. What is the “life posit”?
If the “debate” premise is the premise regarding the essence and nature of the debate, as well as the goal of the debater, then the “life” premise is the premise regarding the essence and nature of life, as well as the goal of the living.
After all, one cannot justify violence in a debate because of the opposite nature of the act of debate. “A moral claim that is inherently unjustifiable in a debate is meaningless and fundamentally stupid.”
Is it not possible to deduce from the same form of learning that a person who wants to live will have to investigate the nature of life? Can we assume that there are things that are beneficial to life (for example, food) and there are things that prevent it? (Let’s say, poison…) If we find that this is indeed the case, can we not conclude from this that the assumption of life dictates certain actions?
First, by “the premise of the discussion” I assume you mean the norms implied by the act of discussion.
It can be deduced that “a person who wants to live” needs to eat, drink, and perhaps also explore his environment, etc.
It can also be deduced that “a person who wishes to conquer and destroy the world” needs to eat, drink, and perhaps also explore his surroundings, in order to achieve his goal.
What is the context we are examining?
“From the fact that the assumption of life determines certain actions?”
Absolutely, from the moment a norm is assumed, certain actions can be determined. There is no dispute about that.
So, I can say that a society in which conflicts are resolved through discussion and not violence is a society that is more suitable for human life. That’s what I asked.
I think such a society would be rich and prosperous. I assume that’s what you mean.
“We will notice that the lack of ownership or partial ownership of a person over his body is such a norm. For example, from a rule according to which a person holds only a “percentage” of partial ownership over his body, it follows that before he makes use of his body, he must first ask permission from the other “shareholders” in his body. However, in order to ask for such permission, he must first make use of his body in order to ask.
Why does he necessarily “have to first ask permission from the other shareholders in person”? If in a given situation the shareholders are known to the person in question and their approval for certain actions has been given in advance, then he has no need to ask for permission. The argument regarding external objects, of course, is the same.
“Why does he necessarily “first have to ask permission from the other shareholders in person”? If in a given situation it is the case that the shareholders are known to the person in question and their approval for certain actions is given in advance”
Because of universality.
The other shareholders, in practice all other people in the world in equal parts (so that the norm can be formulated universally) must act while making use of their bodies in order to give the approval, but in order to approve they must also seek approval from all other people. Therefore, such a norm requires them to freeze in place.
The claim is not necessarily “Man is partly owned by other men.” It could be, for example, “Every man who is not X is partly owned by man X.” If X does not participate in the discussion, then the claim is universal. For example, here is a claim from a discussion between two white slave owners: “Every black man is owned by some white man.” If that white man has a way to prove his claim objectively, the mere fact of making it does not contradict it, even if a black man participates in the discussion.
Furthermore, why is it necessary to ask for permission? Isn’t it possible for the white man to give permission to the black man to breathe, eat, etc. when buying him?
“Any person other than X is partially owned by person X. If X does not participate in the discussion, then the claim is universal.”
Well, the assertion of person X, being subjective, favors one of the disputants. For example, if I get into a conflict with another person over his body, I might propose the norm that “all human beings are owned by my older brother,” a norm that favors me. Clearly, proposing this norm is inconsistent with my desire to successfully resolve the conflict on the basis of discussion. The other party could equally well propose that “X” should actually be his mother, and then the norm would favor him. By the subjective nature of the will of the disputants, the preference for the norm in which X is my older brother over the norm in which X is my partner in discussion is entirely subjective. One will prefer one and the other the other. Therefore, only universally formulated norms are a priori objective and can therefore be used to resolve the conflict in a manner consistent with the desire to resolve it in discussion.
“Here is an argument from a discussion between two white slave owners: ‘Every black person is owned by some white person.'”
Note that the whites here are telling each other how they intend to resolve a conflict with blacks… They claim that they will do so according to the norm “I own your body.” This norm is inconsistent with the desire to resolve the conflict with the black in discussion. Hence, in effect, they claim that they do not intend to resolve these conflicts in discussion. If they act in this manner, they will not be able to resist without contradiction the application of a norm towards them and the forcible harm to their bodies (since the sudden acceptance of the norm that conflicts must be resolved in discussion will force them to condemn their behavior in advance and agree to their punishment). See here: http://www.reasonpapers.com/pdf/17/rp_17_4.pdf
“Furthermore, why is it necessarily necessary to ask for permission? Isn’t it possible for a white person to give permission to a black person to breathe, eat, etc. when buying it?”
First, I will explain my previous statement. The norm “every person owns his own body” is not the only universal norm. There is another norm, let’s call it “world communism” which is also formulated universally according to which “every person has an equal share in the body of every other person”. Every other norm is particular-subjective. The second norm requires every person to ask the permission of all other people before making any movement. Since the very act of asking requires the body to be moved, every person must freeze in place and die. Therefore, asserting it in a discussion by making use of the body constitutes a performative contradiction. Therefore, the only universal norm that can be promoted in a discussion without contradiction is “every person owns his own body”.
Your question concerns a conflict between a subject and a slave, in which the subject contradicts his proposal of the norm in question, the particular one, with a desire to resolve the conflict with the slave in discussion. Slavery, therefore, cannot be justified in discussion, since its justification leads to a performative contradiction.
But you assume that the determination of X is subjective. If X can be determined in some objective way and the claim can be proven objectively, then it will not contradict its very claim. For example: Let us denote X – the smartest person who satisfies the condition: X is objective with respect to the disputants. Claim: Every person is owned by X.
Is it not possible that I will be able to convince a person that I own his body? If we say that I am a black African who sees white people receiving medicine and thus living for 200 years instead of the 25 years that I have lived, can’t I sell them my body in exchange for preserving it with their medicine? And if such a contract can exist, can’t there be a clause that says that even though my body is owned by the white person, I am entitled to perform all the actions necessary for the purpose of a discussion? If such a situation exists, can that white person, during a discussion with me, prove to me (a black person for that matter) objectively that my body belongs to him, at least in part. Why would the mere fact that I have a discussion with him contradict his claim?
In other words – there is a universal claim here (about the laws of ownership) from which a particular norm is derived regarding some (and only some) of the disputants. Is this norm subjective?
“But you assume that the determination of X is subjective. If X can be determined in some objective way and the claim can be proven objectively, then it will not contradict its very claim. For example: Let us denote X – the smartest person who satisfies the condition: X is objective with respect to the disputants. Claim: Every person is owned by X.”
Wait, that’s not what the word “objective” means. What is meant by objective is that there is no preference for one will over another. Will is inherently subjective, and therefore preference for one will over another is subjective. A priori, it cannot be argued that a particular norm is objective.
“Suppose I am a black African who sees white people receiving medicine and thus living 200 years instead of the 25 years I have lived, can’t I sell them my body in exchange for preserving it with their medicine?”
As for the slavery contract – no. You cannot detach yourself from your body as you can with external resources (Alienation). And therefore your claim to your body is always objectively better than anyone else’s claim. For example, if a girl promised to kiss you tomorrow and the next day she changed her mind – you cannot force her to kiss you because of what she said in the past. The consent in the moment to the use of the body is what matters because unlike external resources you cannot detach yourself from your body and thus allow it to be related to another person. The body is related to you differently than property, because, at least in a certain sense, you are your body. While ownership of external resources depends on the first one who used them, we all assume in our actions that ownership of the body is different, necessarily, since otherwise we would be the property of our parents (and our parents would be the property of their parents, and so on ad infinitum). For more reasoning, read here – http://mises.org/daily/2291
But you can formulate your argument not about the human body but about an external resource. That is, one person bought an apple and then sold it contractually to another person. In the act of sale, the person effectively “abandoned” the apple and thus its ownership passes to the customer. The contract is evidence that the seller abandoned the apple to the buyer. While an apple can be abandoned, the body cannot be “abandoned.” The body, at least to some extent, is the person himself and therefore the person’s ownership of himself is fundamentally different, which cannot be externalized like the apple. We distinguish between the human body and external resources, the ownership of both of which is derived from the concept of an objective connection, but in their nature they are fundamentally different.
A side note about wording – the question is not what can be “convinced”, because people can be convinced of many mistakes, for example. The question is what can be logically justified without contradiction.
“Wait, that’s not what the word “objective” means. What is meant by objective is that there is no preference for one will over another.” – Where is there a preference for a particular will in choosing X? I did not give any meaning to the word “objective” at all, but used it as is, assuming that “objective” is a transitive property. I choose some X that has no tendency toward the will of any of the participants in the discussion, and make claims about it. In the same way, I could choose X as the “smallest prime number” and make claims about it.
“You can’t detach yourself from your body the way you can with external resources” – so what does “ownership” mean if the use I can make of my property is limited (and it is limited even without the existence of other people)?
“Your claim to your body is always objectively better than anyone else’s claim. For example, if a girl promised to kiss you tomorrow and the next day she changed her mind – you can’t force her to kiss you because of what she said in the past.” – That is, in effect, you can’t enforce contracts.
Regarding your wording comment – the whole point of the discussion is to resolve conflict in a non-violent manner. If I can justify a claim logically without contradiction, but the other side does not accept my premises, violence will ensue. On the other hand, if I convince them that my claim is true even if it is not true – the conflict is resolved non-violently.
“Where in the choice of X is there a preference for a particular desire? I did not give any meaning to the word “objective”, but used it as it is, assuming that “objective” is a transitive property. I choose some X that has no tendency to the desire of any of the participants in the discussion, and make claims about it. In the same way, I could choose X as the “smallest prime number” and make claims about it.”
The point is that you cannot justify such a norm. If it is a given that it is acceptable to both parties, you will not have to justify it of course, like any claim, however false it may be, but that is not a given. There is no reason why the other party to the conflict would agree to accept X or not offer another X. Both the acceptance and rejection of such a norm are consistent with the act of discussion, and therefore there is no objective reason for this type of norm, and therefore the acceptance of a particular norm is not *justifiable*. Only a norm formulated universally without categorical separation between people can be known in advance that the parties will not be able to claim that it is “discriminatory.” When it comes to justifying norms, only universal norms can be perceived a priori as objective, and therefore this is a primary and necessary condition. All that is known is that the parties chose to take part in the discussion; universality is of course only a primary and not a sufficient condition.
“So, what is the meaning of “ownership” if the use I can make of my property is limited (and it is limited even without the existence of other people)?”
The meaning of ownership is that any conflict over the object of ownership is settled in favor of its owner.
“”Your claim to your body is always objectively better than anyone else’s claim. For example, if a girl promised to kiss you tomorrow and the next day she changed her mind – you can’t force her to kiss you because of what she said in the past.” – That is, in effect, you can’t enforce contracts.”
There is an uncommitted assumption here that ownership, that is, the right to prevent or allow others access to something, necessarily entails the possibility of transferring this ownership to another person. But this is already related to what grants ownership, under the principle “whoever takes away the sight from his friend”, that is, consistently with the act of discussion, note that in the body and in external resources it is not the same “sight”. Imagine that Harry Potter flew over your house and, with a wave of a wand, breathed life into one of the hypothetical figurines in your yard, and now he is a lovable dwarf named Dave. Are you still allowed to break Dave? That is, is Dave still your property or does the fact that Dave is now a moral being with consciousness invalidate your ownership of him?
Assuming that you agree that Dave is now the owner of himself, you will see that ownership of your body stems from the very relationship of a person’s control over his body. You can also see this in the ethics of discussion. Two people who are debating necessarily accept the norm that their very control over their bodies gives them ownership of it, otherwise they are owned by their parents or the obstetrician or something like that. Hence, ownership of the body is not transferable consistently with the act of debating. Alternatively, it is certainly possible to domesticate dead bodies that do not belong to anyone.
Note that ownership of something, including the body, provides the justification to impose the owner’s position regarding the nonviolent use of the thing. From a libertarian perspective, violence is justified only in response to violence. Saying something to someone, including the words “I sell myself” or “Today I’m tired, tomorrow” is not an act of violence! Therefore, future violence is not justified. And unlike external resources that are not organically connected to the speaker, it also does not constitute evidence of the abandonment of the body. Therefore, indentured servitude, in the sense that you can forcefully impose on the slave’s body, abuse and harm it in order to make it do as you wish, is an act of violence. The goal is not to “enforce contracts” but to resolve conflicts without violence. Note that a very heavy financial obligation in exchange for “slavery services” is actually possible, as is a future obligation to sell your body.
The whole issue of involuntary servitude is relevant and interesting, even if not exactly at the root of the matter. Indeed, using violence for a non-violent action – that is, any statement – is not justifiable in the discussion.
Tzip, a quick question, how did you get into blogging?
“There is no reason why the other side of the conflict would agree to accept X or not offer another X. Both the acceptance and rejection of such a norm are consistent with the act of discussion, and therefore there is no objective reason for this type of norm” – I think I understood you, but I don’t understand the reason for this: Given that people are not identical or equal to each other, one can point to person X and say that he is different from the rest in attribute A, and one can make claims about attribute A and from that infer X. One can also construct A so that it contains only one person at any given moment.
“From a libertarian perspective, violence is justified only in response to violence.” – That is, violence is not justified in response to a breach of contract. How, then, can contracts be enforced? If you are a libertarian and you sign a contract with a non-libertarian, and he breaks the contract – he has not used violence against you. He has actually stolen money from you, for example, in a non-violent manner. He owns your property, but he is not interested in violence. You are not interested in violence either, but you are interested in your property. Is this a conflict?
There is a Google group called Israeli Libertarians, someone posted a link there.
Hello, regarding the first paragraph, great, but I don’t understand what is meant by “You can point to person X and say that he is different from the rest in attribute A, and you can make claims about attribute A and from that infer X. You can also construct A so that it contains only one person at any given moment.”
If I guess correctly, then a categorical separation (in terms of a moral category) between humans based on characteristic A is particularistic and arbitrary.
“That is, violence is not justified in response to a breach of contract. How, then, can contracts be enforced? If you are a libertarian and you sign a contract with a non-libertarian, and he breaks the contract – he has not used violence against you. He has actually stolen money from you, for example, in a non-violent manner. He owns your property, but he is not interested in violence. You are not interested in violence either, but you are interested in your property. Is this a conflict?”
You are entitled to receive your property, because if he declared it contractually, it is your property and not his. The problem arises only when there is no obligation to return property. Is it permissible to use force against his body? Regarding this –
if our intention is to avoid violence, we must know at all times who owns what. Therefore, it is less correct to look at a contract as a “promise”, i.e. ownership dependent on a future condition, but (for example, in a loan) as a transfer of current ownership in exchange for future ownership (when the future inherently embodies an element of uncertainty by virtue of being in the future). In other words, if you invest in my business in exchange for a certain interest and my business goes bankrupt, this is part of the risk that the investor took in the contract. The investor is entitled to receive everything that can be given to him, and on into the future until his debt is paid, but he is not entitled to harm or enslave the business owner. (This approach to looking at contracts makes more sense than the approach of the contract as a promise (with ownership subject to conditions that will be clarified in the future) for several additional considerations, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Title-transfer_theory_of_contract ).
That is, every contract that refers to the future contains a certain uncertainty, it is possible that the contract did not hold through no fault of the person who violated it, but rather due to natural causes or very urgent needs, etc. Failure to comply with a contract is not violence (and only justifies full material compensation as much as possible, down to the last cent). The whole issue of throwing people with debts into prison is clearly not rational (libertarian) in my opinion.
“If I guess correctly, then a categorical separation (in terms of a moral category) between people based on characteristic A is particular and arbitrary.” – I’m not sure what you guessed.
I’ll try to clarify with an example: Argumentator A makes the claim “The richest person (X) in the world (= the person with characteristic A) should pay the highest percentage of taxes.” He proves his claim using various economic models that show that it would be economically beneficial for most people, including X. Now, characteristic X contains only one person at any given moment. Why is such a claim particular/arbitrary?
“The whole thing about throwing people with debts in jail is clearly not rational (libertarian) in my opinion.” – Okay, that’s what I wanted to know. In other words, contracts are indeed unenforceable, and in libertarian morality contracts are not something to be enforced. The link you provided says that fraud of the kind I described in the previous post violates the non-agression principle – why, then, is it not rational to throw people with debts in jail?
Okay, that’s what I wanted to know. In other words, contracts are indeed unenforceable, and in libertarian morality contracts are not something to be enforced. The link you provided says that fraud of the kind I described in the previous post violates the non-agression principle – why, then, is it irrational to throw people with debts in prison?
There’s not much to comment on because your “other words” are not simply related to your words. I was just explaining that a contract is a transfer of ownership, so you don’t bypass a contract, you bypass ownership. So it’s clear that a contract can be bypassed in this sense.
Fraud is theft and therefore must be enforced. Ownership did not change hands in this case as the specified condition for this was never met.
“The richest person (X) in the world (= with trait A) should pay the highest percentage of tax”
Tzip, in this case the conflict is between some person and the rich person. The norm promoted here actually claims that X’s property belongs to all people who are not X as long as X meets a certain condition. This is a particular norm since accepting the moral distinction based on some condition (wealth) is arbitrary and its acceptance is not binding. This is no different from saying “Tzip5 should pay a high tax” even the name “Tzip5” is a criterion. Therefore such a norm is not justifiable, and the whole issue of supposed utility is irrelevant at all.
For several posts, every time I try to clarify my point, you claim that the example claim I bring is arbitrary, and time after time I try to explain that it is not arbitrary, because it can be supported by objective proof and in the latter case it may even convince the richest person in the world (take, for example, Warren Buffett’s position on taxes…).
Let’s take, for example, a universal claim “Every man is his own owner,” and from it we deduce the particular claim “I am my own owner.” Someone can come and claim that I am wrong, and he is my owner, but my claim, unlike his claim, is justifiable – the universal claim from which it stems.
Now there are two options:
A. Every universal justification must be performative, that is, it must be inferred as true solely from the fact that the discussion took place.
B. The claim can have any universal justification that the disputants accept.
If there are additional options, I would be happy to hear them. I invite you to prove that option A is the correct one. In the absence of such proof and given the purpose of a debate – resolving a conflict between the disputants in a non-violent manner – I will assume that option B is the correct one.
Well, in order for all the disputants to accept a certain universal justification, it must at least satisfy the following conditions:
1. Be objective in relation to the disputants. At this point I want to clarify the issue of objectivity: the claim “a field without previous owners belongs to the first person to cultivate it” prefers the will of people who cultivate fields over the will of people who do not cultivate fields. Nevertheless, it is objective if it can be objectively deduced from another objective claim or from a claim that all the disputants accept.
2. Be a justification, that is, justify the claim, again, objectively.
And again, if there are additional conditions that I have missed, I would be happy to hear. So far, these are the conditions that I can think of.
In the example of the richest man in the world, if the economic model that proves the claim is based on assumptions that all the disputants accept, and is constructed objectively, and proves the claim objectively, then it is not arbitrary and there is no reason why the disputants (including the arguer himself and the richest man in the world) should not accept it. Under what conditions is the model arbitrary in this case? If universal justification must be performative, then the assumptions from which the model is derived are also not performative.
Having said that, it seems that I am missing something here, some subtlety, so I would appreciate it if you would explain to me slowly and in more detail regarding the claim (reasoned, so to speak) that requires the richer man to pay more:
1. Why does it constitute a particular norm – is the claim “I own myself” particular? If so, why is the fact that the norm is particular relevant to anything? And if not, what distinguishes it from the claim about the rich man?
2. Why is the moral distinction arbitrary? What makes a moral distinction non-arbitrary and not based on a claim?
3. Why is its acceptance not mandatory? Is it because it speaks of a specific person (back to the claim “I own myself”)? Is it because it has no justification (and if so, why is the economic model not a justification)? Something else?
yes,
“‘A field without previous owners belongs to the first to cultivate it’ favors the will of people who cultivate fields over the will of people who do not cultivate fields.”
No, the first person to cultivate an unused plot of land does not enter into conflict with anyone, no one objects, and therefore a norm that grants him ownership of the field does not favor anyone’s will. A norm that grants the first person to domesticate a field and not the second or third person to domesticate the domesticated field is the only one that establishes an objective connection between the resource and the owner, and therefore, given a conflict of wills, is the only one that is consistent with the act of discussion. That is, it allows ownership to be clear to both parties seeking to act and for the ownership settlement to be well-founded, so that people can act on it and avoid conflicts.
Now, regarding the issue of assumptions. If you and I accept that there is an elephant in the room, we can resolve a conflict based on the fact that there is an elephant in the room, even if there is not. In a discussion, we accept that claims must be justified, and this is the starting assumption. If claims cannot be justified, there is no point in arguing. Each side will simply state its final position, and thus it will not be possible to resolve a conflict. Therefore, to claim in a discussion that claims cannot be justified is a performative contradiction. Therefore, justification is required for everything. Therefore, the question concerns what is justified by the nature of the discussion, the existence of which is an objective fact that cannot be denied. If Guy and Tsif accept the norm “Guy is always right,” it is possible that a conflict between them will be resolved according to this norm, but if Tsif denies the norm and asks “Why Guy and not, for example, Tsif?” It would not be possible to justify why Guy’s rights are greater than Tzip’s rights, and therefore, although this claim is clearly formulated (i.e., it is clear who Guy is, it is clear who Tzip is, and it is clear what the relationship between them is), it is not objective, in the sense that it creates a categorical separation based on an external characteristic (ibid.). Therefore, if I were to propose this norm, I would not be consistent with my sincere desire to resolve the conflict with you in a discussion.
As for the rich man’s claim. The norm in question actually means that a rich person has different rights than a non-rich person. A rich person, for example, has no property rights as long as he is rich, for example. The “rich” are underdogs according to this norm. Is the claim “a person who owns X amount of money has fewer rights” justified? Let’s examine a conflict between a person who has identified a “rich person” and wants to take something from him. Both are very civilized and before a person takes something – it is important for him to settle it in a discussion. Therefore, he enters into a discussion with the rich person.
If he proposes the norm “those who are ‘rich’ have no property rights,” will he be able to justify it? Is there an objective reason to accept a moral categorical separation between “the rich” and “the non-rich”? If the rich deny the norm, claiming that it is unjustifiable, it is clear that the rich are no less consistent in denying the discriminatory norm (or in claiming an opposite norm “those without the rich have fewer rights”) than the other person is consistent in proposing it. After all, denying this norm does not lead to any logical contradiction or acceptance of a false claim. Therefore, if the disputants want to successfully resolve the conflict using objective, justifiable norms, they must accept that they must be formulated objectively for all people. From the moment there is a categorical separation based on “hair color” or on an external characteristic, origin, native language, etc., this norm is essentially arbitrary, its rejection is consistent and does not lead to a contradiction, and hence it is not justifiable.
To your questions:
1. Is the claim “I own myself” particular? – It’s not exactly a norm, the norm “Only Ziph owns himself” is particular. The norm “Every person owns himself” is universal.
2. “What makes a moral distinction non-arbitrary and not sustained by reasoning?” For example, the claim that rocks have no rights arises from the fact that rocks cannot respect the rights of others. Acceptance of such a norm entails error or contradiction.
3. “Why is its acceptance not binding?” Because acceptance of its proposed touchstone is not binding. “Is it because it has no justification (and if so, why does the economic model not constitute a justification)?” Because moral separation based on the prediction of a particular economic model as a criterion is also arbitrary and deniable.
http://seekingalpha.com/article/287783-why-warren-buffett-is-a-hypocrite-on-taxes
See the story about comparing the rights of horses and humans (update: added as an attachment):
http://chickenman.radish.co.il/wp-admin/media.php?action=edit&attachment_id=668
(initial draft)
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