Conversation with Block: Binding Promises, Voluntary Slavery

by Stephan Kinsella on November 12, 2025

“The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract”
- A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability
- Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith
KOL442 | Together Strong Debate vs. Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery (Matthew Sands of Nations of Sanity)
KOL004 | Interview with Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery and Inalienability
Thoughts on Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery, Alienability vs. Inalienability, Property and Contract, Rothbard and Evers
Batting about voluntary slavery
Slavery, Inalienability, Economics, and Ethics
Walter E. Block, “Rejoinder to Kinsella on ownership and the voluntary slave contract,” Management Education Science Technology Journal (MESTE) 11, no. 1 (Jan. 2023): 1-8 [pdf]
See also KOL395 | Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection (PFS 2022)

From an email discussion with Walter.

I forwarded this email to Walter, that I had sent to some friends.

Stephan:

Interesting Blockian conundrum. Enough to make left-libertarians heads’ explode. I kinda side with the hunters. Based on below.

see grok summary of case

Appellate Court Case: Iron Bar Holdings, LLC v. Cape et al.The appellate court case discussed in the transcript is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit’s decision in Iron Bar Holdings, LLC v. Cape, No. 23-8048 (10th Cir. 2025). This unanimous ruling, issued on March 18, 2025, affirmed a 2023 district court decision in favor of four Missouri hunters accused of civil trespassing by Fred Eshelman, the owner of Iron Bar Holdings (a 50-square-mile ranch in Carbon County, Wyoming). The case arose from the hunters’ 2019 and 2020 “corner crossing” attempts to access isolated Bureau of Land Management (BLM) parcels checkerboarded within the ranch, using an A-frame ladder to step over a corner intersection without touching private land.Link to the CaseThe full opinion is available on the 10th Circuit’s website: … BAD LINKSummary

Background: Wyoming’s land ownership often follows a 19th-century “checkerboard” pattern from railroad grants, alternating square-mile sections of public (federal/state) and private land. This leaves ~11,000 acres of public land on Elk Mountain “corner-locked” within Eshelman’s ranch, accessible only by crossing private corners. The hunters stepped from one public section to another at a corner where two private parcels met, briefly passing through airspace above private land without physical contact. Eshelman sued for trespass under Wyoming law (Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-307), seeking damages and an injunction. A prior criminal trespass jury acquitted them in 2022.
Key Legal Issues:
- Does corner crossing constitute trespass under state law?
- Does the federal Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA) of 1885 (43 U.S.C. §§ 1061–1066) preempt Wyoming’s trespass statute by prohibiting private actions that effectively “inclose” public lands and deny access?
Court’s Reasoning:
- The panel (Judges Hartz, Phillips, and Rossman) held that Wyoming law would deem the airspace intrusion a civil trespass, but the UIA preempts it. Citing historical precedents like Camfield v. United States (1897) and Bergen v. Lawrence (1944), the court ruled the UIA allows “limited physical intrusion” to access public lands, overriding state laws that block such access.
- No easement was granted; the ruling permits corner crossing only where it doesn’t physically touch private land and where no alternative public route exists. It emphasized public lands are held in trust for all Americans, and private owners cannot use fences, threats, or lawsuits to deny lawful access.
- The decision referenced scholarly work by Justice Neil Gorsuch (pre-appointment) on property rights in the West.
Outcome and Impact: The court dismissed Eshelman’s claims, affirming summary judgment for the hunters. This binds Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming, securing access to ~3.5–8 million acres of corner-locked public land. Eshelman petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari on October 21, 2025, leaving the 10th Circuit’s ruling intact but not nationally binding—creating potential for “circuit splits” in future cases elsewhere (e.g., 9th Circuit states like Montana or Idaho).

This aligns with the transcript’s description: the 10th Circuit victory for hunters, limited to its jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s denial ending the appeal without broader precedent.
***

see also

Walter:

Thanks.

The parents bring a newborn home from the hospital, put him in a crib, and don’t feed him. He dies. This is a frontal attack on libt theory, since according to libt there are no posiitve obligations to feed anyone. I defended libt with my bagal theory (thanks for calling it the Blockian Proviso). But you reject the BP. How, then, do you defend libt theory againt this powerful objection?

Stephan:

There are positive obligations if you choose it by your actions. You should realize this since you believe you can incur positive obligations by making promises.

As for the other stuff, I don’t believe that there is a libertarian principle that libertarianism abhors unowned property. Whatever that means. This is metaphorical and non-rigorous nonsense.

That said, maybe it’s a form of trespass to deny previously homesteaded rights of way or easements. As indicated in my comments in the linked posts.

Walter:

I don’t believe you can incur positive obligations by making promises. Are you referring to voluntary slavery and specific performance contracts? The heart surgeon quits in the middle of the operation and the patient dies. You think that’s not a crime on the doc’s part?

You don’t answer my question of how you deal with the parents who starve their kid

Stephan:

I don’t believe you can incur positive obligations by making promises.

Well you say that I can sell my body into slavery which means that the “owner” is now entitled to use force against my body to compel me to do what he wants me to do.

This is precisely what enforceable promises means except yours is even worse and more extreme. The title transfer theory of Rothbard denies that contracts are enforceable, binding promises, which is the prevailing theory. In the prevailing theory, promises that meet certain formalities (including “consideration” in the common law) are binding, meaning they give rise to enforceable obligations. Failure to perform is a breach of contract. The remedy the court will order is almost never specific performance: the judge does not make you perform. Rather he orders the payment of “damages” for the “breach.”

In the TTTC of Rothbard, which you claim to agree with, but I think you realy do not, instead allows people to transfer owned resources to others. There really is no such thing as “breach of a contract there are only conditional transfers of title. So instead of viewing damages as payable for breach, it would be an agreed monetary payment upon failure to perform. It’s the same result as the law but without adopting the unnecessary assumption that there is a binding promise and breach. There is simply an agreed payment.

You however would do even more than the law, which claims there are enforceable obligations but then only really awards a transfer of money as “damages,” thus it really devolves into a Rothbardian TTTC theory without being aware of this. You would say that the owner can actually use force against his slave, i.e. the promise is not only binding but breach of it doesn’t give rise just to money damages but the owner can still use force — this is specific performance on steroids. You do believe in enforceable promises. You reject the Rothbardian TTTC, IMO, though you do not seem to realize this.

See “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract”, e.g. Part IV.A, Breach of Contract, “Damages,” and Performance Bonds.

Are you referring to voluntary slavery and specific performance contracts? The heart surgeon quits in the middle of the operation and the patient dies. You think that’s not a crime on the doc’s part?

Let’s stay on topic. But for comments on some related issues, see Legal Foundations of a Free Society, ch. 10, n.46 and KOL426 | Discussing Immigration and Homesteading Donuts with Matthew Sands of Nations of Sanity (transcript at 33:28).

You don’t answer my question of how you deal with the parents who starve their kid

parents have obligations to care for the child, not because they are slaves but by their actions they have created a rights-bearing being with rights that is naturally dependent on the parents’ care. It has nothing to do with contract or title transfer.

Kinsella:

Why this mention, now? Is it apropos of anything recent?

just getting around to it, it was in my email inbox

By the way, have you published anything on my evictionist theory?

Block, “Does Trespassing Require Human Action? Rejoinder to Kinsella and Armoutidis an Evictionism”

On vol slavery?

yes. see links above

You oppose specific performance contracts. I pay for open heart surgery. In the midst of the operation, the cardiologist goes off the job and leaves me to die. He’s not a criminal in your view?

We both have sons we love. I’d be willing to put down my freedom, my very life, for him. If I could save his life, only, by agreeding to be a slave, I would do it. You wouldn’t?

agreeing is fine, the question is whether it’s aggression if the “owner” hits me

***

You say this:

agreeing is fine, the quesiton is whether it’s aggression if the “owner” hits me

if it is agression, then no such agreement can ever be made in the first place

Agreements, per Rothbard TTTC, are transfers of title to owned, alienable resources. This does not include your body, per Rothbard. You do not seem to understand that TTTC does not permit specific performance because bodies are inalienable and contracts are not binding obligations. You say you agree w/ Rothbard but you do not because you want the law to enforcing promises not only with money damages but with specific performance, which makes no sense in Rothbard’s TTTC b/c (a) the body cannot be alienated by contract, and (b) there is no such thing as breach of contract. It is fine for you to reject it and come up with your own theory of contract but you should not say you agree w/ Rothbard. IMO.

my son dies. The heart surgeon who leaves me in mid operation to die is not a criminal.

You’re happy with that?

I think he would be the cause of the harm but not because he’s a slave. This has nothing to do with me refusing to pick your cotton and you shooting me to coerce me.