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Solar energy is too dilute to ever be the main energy source, even if we got 100% efficient solar cells. See Beckmann, Petr, Why “Soft” Technology Will Not Be America’s Energy Salvation; other material by Beckmann here. [See also my post Access to Energy (archived comments)]

[See also

“A Note on Intellectual Property and Externalities,” by Hardy Bouillon, Mises Daily (Oct. 27, 2009), originally published in Property, Freedom and Society: Essays in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe (2009).

[AM cross-post]

Who Owns You? Corporations Patenting Your Genes

A debate between IP opponent David Koepsell and patent attorney Gene Quinn about gene patents. As noted in IP Debate? (see also Gene Quinn the Patent Watchdog and Is It So Crazy For A Patent Attorney To Think Patents Harm Innovation?), Quinn previously said he wanted to debate an IP opponent, before transparently banning me from his site after I called his bluff; then David Koepsell offered to debate Quinn–it was supposed to be held yesterday at Cardozo law school, but then Quinn backed out, and finally agreed to the online thing you see above. Good thing for him he was not there face to face to present his embarrassingly weak “arguments.”

[AM cross-post]

I’ve discussed the libertarian legitimacy of the corporation before (Defending Corporations: Block and Huebert; Legitimizing the Corporation and Other Posts). I recently re-read Roger Pilon’s Corporations and Rights: On Treating Corporate People Justly, and recalled that it also has some very good material on why limited liability does not give any special privilege to shareholders. The following is an edited version of an email discussion mutualist Kevin Carson and I had about this (reprinted with Kevin’s permission):

KINSELLA: I had forgotten how good Pilon is in his discussion of why limited liability for torts is justified–have you seen this (pp. 1309-16)? He makes the arguments similar to those I have made–that the problem is respondeat superior. There is no reason to hold a shareholder liable in the first place.

CARSON: But as I’ve argued before in response to such arguments, the creation of the corporate form creates an artificially tenuous relationship between property and responsibility, precisely because the “owner” can seek a form of “ownership” in which control is lacking ex ante. IOW, plausible deniability: “Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?” [continue reading…]

[On the official name of the fedgov, see grok]

In other words, U.S. States are simply not libertarian minarchist states. A minarchist state has strictly limited and defined powers, but states are not so limited. U.S. states–indeed, all modern states in the world today, have much broader powers than permitted even by libertarian minarchist theory. The one exception is the US federal government: it actually has less power than a minarchist state would (in some areas): for example a minarchist state could outlaw and prosecute murder; the federal government may not. (Of course there are things the feds are empowered to do that a minarchist state would not be, e.g. tax, draft, build roads, coin money.)

So you can think of modern states as having a wide set of powers, which is a superset of the powers of a minarchist state. The US federal government, by contrast, has a set of powers that only intersects with the minarchist set of powers–it has some powers a libertarian state would not; but it lacks some powers that a libertarian state would have, due to the uniquely federal and limited nature of the federal government’s original charter.

***

What Brayton and his ilk don’t seem to realize is that our federal structure is unique. Our federal state has fewer powers than most normal states; it may not outlaw murder, for example, even though murder is definitely a crime. When a state is created that is defined by and authorized by a Constitution, its self-proclaimed authority is also conditioned on its adherence to the limits placed on it in that Constitution. If that Constitution does not authorize the state to stop another given state from doing something bad, then it simply does not authorize it, even if we might want it to; and if it ignores this limit, then the danger is now that it has established the principle–and we have ratified it–that it is not really bound at all by the limits placed on it. That is, that it is an unlimited state. Brayton and Sandefur may have no problem with an unlimited state–but we libertarians do. (They may protest that they are in favor of constitutional limits on the state–that is, that the state limit itself. Yeah. Good luck. The only real limit would be external to the state: which is exactly what vertical checks and balances (federalism) is all about, which Brayton and Sandefur reject.)

[continue reading…]

According to Cato’s Julian Sanchez:

The Patriot Act should not be “repealed,” which I suppose makes it a good thing that nobody is seriously proposing to do so.

Haven’t Ron Paul, Andrew Napolitano, and others “seriously” proposed to do so? I understand Sanchez has written a good deal critical of the Patriot Act’s surveillance powers and in opposition to the growth of the surveillance state, but why it should not be repealed is beyond me.

[LRC cross-post]

In Thin Liberalism and the Folly of Burning Bridges, Timothy Lee makes (at least implicitly) several interrelated claims. First, that libertarians tend to oppose net neutrality. Second, that “free software intellectuals like Richard Stallman and Eben Moglen” are anti-IP. Third, that this is compatible with libertarianism. Fourth, that Moglen and Stallman, despite some unfortunate rhetorical excesses, hold views that are not really inimical to the free market. Fifth, that some libertarians, who (properly?) oppose net neutrality, wrongly accuse the anti-IP/free software types as being unlibertarian. Finally, that the reason these libertarians get it wrong is that they have succumbed to thinness.

It seems to me that most of these claims are at least partly incorrect, or confused. Let’s take them one at a time.

1. Libertarians tend to oppose net neutrality. (I’m inferring this position from Lee’s post.) Libertarians seem to me to be confused about this area, but the principled ones I am familiar with of course oppose net neutrality. I oppose it. ¹ On the other hand, the various forms of state support received by the telecom and other Internet infrastructure corporations should of course be abolished, which might alleviate most of the concerns of (left?) libertarians sympathetic to the aims of the net neutrality crowd. But libertarian position is clearly to oppose any state interference with the market to impose “net neutrality.” Service providers should be able to charge whatever they want, in whatever manner or tiers they wish, if the market supports it; at the same time, any state favors, monopolies, protectionist regulations, etc., should of course also be abolished.
2. Free software intellectuals like Richard Stallman and Eben Moglen are anti-IP. (I’m inferring this position from Lee’s post.) Not really. The problem, from the libertarian perspective is not that Moglen and Stallman are anti-IP; it’s that they are not anti-IP enough. If I am not mistaken, Moglen, for example, is not completely opposed to copyright and patent. (See my Eben Moglen and Leftist Opposition to Intellectual Property.)
3. The ideas of open source/free software/anti-IP are compatible with libertarianism. Yes, this is true, as I have argued extensively. But this is a strange argument coming from Lee, who himself is not opposed to IP in any principled way (and neither are the leftist free software types, as noted above). For example, as I noted in $30 Billion Taxfunded Innovation Contracts: The “Progressive-Libertarian” Solution, Lee has written: “I can’t agree with Baker that all copyright and patent monopolies are illegitimate. Copyright and patent protections have existed since the beginning of the republic, and if properly calibrated they can (as the founders put it) promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Like any government intervention in the economy, they need to be carefully constrained. But if they are so limited, they can be a positive force in the American economy.” Unlike the views espoused by confused, quasi-economically illiterate leftists and utilitarian, minarchist libertarians, the proper, principled, libertarian position is that patent and copyright are completely and utterly unlibertarian and unjustified.
4. Moglen and Stallman, despite some unfortunate rhetorical excesses, hold views that are not really inimical to the free market. I tend to agree with Lee that various comments about “a bottom-up, participatory structure to society and culture, rather than a top-down, closed, proprietary structure” and “the democratizing power of digital technology and the Internet,” etc., are not anti-libertarian. However, as noted in Eben Moglen and Leftist Opposition to Intellectual Property, Moglen holds clearly unlibertarian views, such as his view that free bandwidth is everyone’s “birthright” (as socialist Finland believes, too-it recently enacted legislation making broadband access a legal right); and his opposition to regulating the EM spectrum as a property right (and his confused view that it already is, despite the state’s nationalization of the EM spectrum).
5. Some libertarians, who (properly?) oppose net neutrality, wrongly accuse the anti-IP/free software types as being unlibertarian. This appears to be correct. Some libertarians are pro-IP and thus, mistakenly believing the free software socialists to be opposed to IP, confusingly criticize them on these grounds. In this respect, the confusion on both sides is similar to confusion about IP held by leftists and traditional libertarians: both the left and traditional pro-IP libertarians accept the false assumption that intellectual property is a legitimate type of property right. Libertarians who accept this premise thus favor IP, because they are pro-property; and leftists oppose IP because they are hostile to private property rights and mistakenly believe IP is a type of private property right.
6. The reason these libertarians get it wrong is that they have succumbed to thinness. So here we have Lee, who is pro-IP, criticizing libertarians for being pro-IP. Leaving this bizarre critique aside, is Lee right that “thinness” is what makes some libertarians too pro-IP? Lee maintains that “A libertarian whose conception of liberty is confined to limited government is going to be left rudderless when confronted with a pro-liberty movement whose concerns are orthogonal to the size of government.” I think this is just confused. Thickness is actually problematic since it just muddies the waters, conflating issues pertaining to the permissibility of interpersonal violence with other interpersonal norms and institutions. The thickness theorizers add nothing of substance to our understanding of libertarian principle; instead, they pointlessly link the libertarian opposition to aggression to non-rigorous, malleable leftist gremlins like “hierarchy” and “bossism” and “pushing people around.” I am, in some sense, a “thin” libertarian yet oppose IP root and branch, on principled, pro-property, pro-rights, pro-individualist, non-leftist grounds. Thinness is not the cause of confusion about IP. Rather, it is the lack of principle. It is the lack of principle and the adoption of flawed, bankrupt utilitarian ideas which leads libertarians to try to be “moderate”, to support some IP, but not too much; and to be minarchist–that is, statist–rather than anarchist.

Update:

Discussing Stallman admits GPL flawed, proprietary licensing needed to pay for MySQL development, I mentioned to some friends this post and others criticizing lefists who have an unprincipled, nonlibertarian, non-abolitionist, economically illiterate approach to IP. I noted that GPL requires copyright to work, and mentioned these posts: Copyright is very sticky!, Eben Moglen and Leftist Opposition to Intellectual Property, and Leftist Attacks on the Google Book Settlement.

A friend, David Christy, said the following about Stallman (edited; posted with permission):

I met RMS once about 10 years ago. People were dogging him about the GPL and profit, and his responses were like what one would expect to see on Mises.org today about IP. It was pure enlightenment until I suggested that without copyright the market would probably favor people who share source openly to promote their code and create a similar effect to the GPL. The idea that people would share their source without the GPL forcing them to seemed to shock him. He’s almost like a principled libertarian about IP in every other way, but on every non IP issue is a hard core socialist. He is a genius in a lot of ways, but when it comes to freedom and liberty outside of IP, [he has flawed ideas]. He literally gave me these gazing stares, even an hour later like “how could you hurt me so bad,” and run away like a little boy or like I was a secret agent traitor. …

I remember at the time I didn’t know much about his other views. I looked at him like a hero because the GPL broke the copyright cartel and freed software from statist intervention bringing forth the bounties of free market cooperation. I saw the free software movement as a pure freedom and free market movement. When I realized that he saw me like a greedy capitalist traitor, I gotta say, it rather hurt and I took it personally hard.

[Mises blog cross-post (archived comments, including some responses by Lee); Against Monopoly cross-post]

1. [See Net Neutrality Developments and A Libertarian Take on Net Neutrality] [↩]

Smugmug just partnered up with Animoto–a very cool service that makes videos based on your own music, videos, and pictures. Here’s a quick one based on some pictures from the Hoppe festschrift ceremony. The Animoto-hosted version is below; a YouTube version is here and below.

See Nokia: Apple iPhone Violates Our Patents: A few choice excerpts:

In a statement, “Nokia said Apple has refused to pay for use of intellectual property developed by Nokia that lets handsets connect to third-generation, or 3G, wireless networks, as well as to wireless local area networks. “Apple is attempting to get a free ride on the back of Nokia’s innovation,” Ilkka Rahnasto, Nokia vice-president for legal and intellectual property, said in the statement.

This implies apple copied their patented inventions. but copying need not be shown for infringement, and you can bet they will not rely on this in pressing their case. They are trying to have it both ways: to darkly hint Apple copied them, while being happy to persecute Apple for non-copying acts that still infringe their patents.

The Finnish handset giant said Oct. 22 it has filed suit against Apple … in U.S. District Court in Delaware, accusing its California-based rival of infringing patents for core technology that allows the iPhone to make calls and connect to the mobile Internet. Although Nokia … has sued rivals such as Qualcomm … over patents in the past, the latest lawsuit came as a surprise—and represents an escalation of increasingly contentious competition with Apple.

So … the filing of the lawsuit is how they are engaging in “increasingly contentious competition.” How much more clear could it be that these patents are nothing but anti-competitive devices used for protectionism?! It’s obvious to everyone.

The loss of smartphone share is doubly frustrating to Nokia because it sold phones with computer-like features years before Apple. During the last two years Nokia has launched a series of handsets with iPhone-like touchscreen interfaces, but none has generated quite the same buzz as Apple’s devices….

So they are losing out in competition, so using legal weapons instead.

Apple, like all mobile-phone makers, relies on such standards to make its devices compatible with carrier networks. Nokia says it has contributed its intellectual property to global standards bodies, but demands to be compensated for the use of its patents in commercial products. “Apple is expected to follow this principle,” Nokia’s Rahnasto said in the company’s statement.

So, Nokia contributed to a standard with the very goal of making a standard that everyone would start using. Apple starts using it–bam, they sue them. Nokia is leveraging the monopoly the state granted them. Horrible.

[Mises blog cross-post; Against Monopoly cross-post]

Two new Libertarian Papers articles published this week:

41. “Why There are No Dilemmas in Widerquist’s ‘A Dilemma for Libertarians’”, by Lamont Rodgers

Abstract: Karl Widerquist has recently argued that libertarians face two dilemmas. The first dilemma arises because, contrary to what Widerquist takes libertarians to suggest, there is no conceptual link between robust property rights and the libertarian state. Private property rights can legitimately yield non-libertarian states. Libertarians must thus remain committed either to robust property rights or the libertarian state. I call this the “Conceptual Dilemma.”

The second dilemma is empirical in nature. Libertarians can try to undermine state property rights by showing that the means by which all present states came to have their property was unjust. However, doing so would presumably undermine almost all the property claims of private individuals. So the dilemma is that libertarians can undermine state property rights only by undermining individual property rights, on the one hand. On the other, libertarians can vindicate private property rights of individuals only by vindicating state property rights. I call this the “Empirical Dilemma.”

I attempt to diffuse both of these dilemmas here. I argue that the Conceptual Dilemma relies on a misunderstanding of the libertarian’s commitments. In particular, I show that libertarians need not think robust property rights can yield states more extensive than Nozick’s minimal state. I then argue that Widerquist ignores libertarian scholarship aimed at meeting the Empirical Dilemma. Many libertarians have attempted to demonstrate that there are legitimate private property rights which are illegitimately disregarded by current states. The upshot of this discussion is that there are no genuine dilemmas posed by Widerquist’s “A Dilemma for Libertarians.”

42. “Single Trial Probability Applications: Can Subjectivity Evade Frequency Limitations?”, by David Howden

Abstract: Frequency probability theorists define an event’s probability distribution as the limit of a repeated set of trials belonging to a homogeneous collective. The subsets of this collective are events which we have deficient knowledge about on an individual level, although for the larger collective we have knowledge its aggregate behavior. Hence, probabilities can only be achieved through repeated trials of these subsets arriving at the established frequencies that define the probabilities. Crovelli (2009) argues that this is a mistaken approach, and that a subjective assessment of individual trials should be used instead. Bifurcating between the two concepts of risk and uncertainty, Crovelli first asserts that probability is the tool used to manage uncertain situations, and then attempts to rebuild a definition of probability theory with this in mind. We show that such an attempt has little to gain, and results in an indeterminate application of entrepreneurial forecasting to uncertain decisions—a process far-removed from any application of probability theory.

[Mises cross-post]