From the Mises blog. Archived comments below.
Update: for extended quotes from Rothbard and Hoppe about the problem of universal equal or communist ownership, see KOL468 | Is Group Ownership and Co-ownership Communism?
In Jan Narveson’s thought-provoking and elegantly-written The Libertarian Idea (1990), he discusses an admission by a Marxist, G.A. Cohen, of a serious problem with communal ownership of property. As Narveson notes (p. 68): “The problem for socialists, as Cohen observes, is how to have both the right of self-ownership … and yet a right of equality, getting us the socialism they are so morally enamored of. That there is a problem here is suggested by” the following comment by Cohen (found on p. 93-94 of his book Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (originally from G.A. Cohen, “Self-Ownership, World-Ownership and Equality,” in F. Lucash, ed., Justice and Equality, Here and Now (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 113-114):
people can do (virtually) nothing without using parts of the external world. If, then, they require the leave of the community to use it, then, effectively …, they do not own themselves, since they can do nothing without communal authorization.”
Narveson comments: “It is testimony to the strength of our position that even someone so ideologically opposed gives it clear recognition as an argument that must be confronted.”
Does Cohen’s reasoning sound familiar? It should, to Rothbardians and Hoppeans. See below —
In Rothbard’s The Ethics of Liberty he argues in favor of self-ownership because the only logical alternatives are “(1) the ‘communist’ one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or (2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another–a system of rule by one class over another.” However, “in practice, if there are more than a very few people in the society,” the first
alternative must break down and reduce to Alternative (2), partial rule by some over others. For it is physically impossible for everyone to keep continual tabs on everyone else, and thereby to exercise his equal share of partial ownership over every other man. In practice, then, this concept of universal and equal other-ownership is Utopian and impossible, and supervision and therefore ownership of others necessarily becomes a specialized activity of a ruling class. Hence, no society which does not have full self-ownership for everyone can enjoy a universal ethic. For this reason alone, 100 percent self-ownership for every man is the only viable political ethic for mankind.
Rothbard goes on,
But suppose for the sake of argument that this Utopia could be sustained. What then? In the first place, it is surely absurd to hold that no man is entitled to own himself, and yet to hold that each of these very men is entitled to own a part of all other men! But more than that, would our Utopia be desirable? Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish. [emphasis added]
(See also Rothbard’s comments in Man, Economy, and State, where he refutes the idea that the free market robs future generations by wasting natural resources, since “[s]uch reasoning would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that none of the resource be consumed at all.”)
Hans-Hermann Hoppe makes some related points as well. In Hoppe’s The Ethics and Economics of Private Property, Hoppe argues that the libertarian principle of original appropriation–“Everyone is the proper owner of his own physical body as well as of all places and nature-given goods that he occupies and puts to use by means of his body, provided that no one else has already occupied or used the same places and goods before him” is not only intuitive and obvious to most people (even “children and primitives”), it is also provable. Hoppe argues that there are only two alternatives to this rule: “Either another person, B, must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or both persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.” However, the first rule reduces A to the rank of B’s slave, and is therefore not universalizable. As for the “second case of universal and equal co-ownership,”
this alternative would suffer from an even more severe deficiency, because if it were applied, all of mankind would instantly perish. (Since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative must also be rejected.) Every action of a person requires the use of some scarce means (at least of the person’s body and its standing room), but if all goods were co-owned by everyone, then no one, at no time and no place, would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured every other co-owner’s consent to do so.
Thus, “universal communism,” as Rothbard referred to it, is a “praxeological impossibility.”
For similar comments, see A Theory of Socialism of Capitalism (1989), pp. 142-143.
Hoppe also criticizes the notion that aggression can be viewed as “an invasion of the value or psychic integrity of” others’ property, as opposed to the libertarian view under which aggression is “defined as an invasion of the physical integrity of another person’s property.” Hoppe critiques this alternative conception of aggression because
While a person has control over whether or not his actions will change the physical properties of another’s property, he has no control over whether or not his actions affect the value (or price) of another’s property. This is determined by other individuals and their evaluations. Consequently, it would be impossible to know in advance whether or not one’s planned actions were legitimate. The entire population would have to be interrogated to assure that one’s actions would not damage the value of someone else’s property, and one could not begin to act until a universal consensus had been reached. Mankind would die out long before this assumption could ever be fulfilled.
See similar arguments by Hoppe in his 1988 Austrian Economic Newsletter article, The Justice of Economic Efficiency (p. 3). Interestingly, in the ensuing exchange between the late David Osterfeld and Hoppe, they use language eerily similar to Cohen’s: Osterfeld (p. 9): “Hoppe argues that socialism is ‘argumentatively indefensible’ because if private property is not recognized, then one would have to come to an agreement with the ‘entire world population’ prior to committing oneself to a course of action, a requirement that would paralyze all human action, and thus all life. It is not clear that the only alternative to individual ownership is ownership by the ‘world community’.” (I cannot find the exact phrases “entire world population” or “world community” in the Hoppe piece Osterfeld is critquing, however.) In Hoppe’s response (p. 239), he notes: “Osterfeld claims that I construct an altemative between either individual ownership or but that such an altemative is not exhaustive. This is a misrepresentation. Nowhere do I say anything like this.” (emphasis added)
Archived comments:
Since when do Marxists/Communists/Socialists ever address inconsistancies in their beliefs. Marx himself did not address several facts at his disposal. Among them are:
1. Urban England, London in particular, had INCREASING incomes, wages and standards of living not decreasing.
2. Urban England had poor folks who were much wealthier than those in rural England.
3. Factory workers moved to cities to get better lives given the alternative of starving in the rural areas.
4. The middle class was much larger than was commonly accepted. AND GROWING RAPIDLY!!!
Posted by: Bill at March 9, 2007 7:48 AM
Hoppe argues that there are only two alternatives to this rule: “Either another person, B, must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or both persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.”
Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?
For this reason I have a hard time swallowing argumentive ethics, since it only shows that once you accept the normative concept of ownership, you can derive private property as the only defensibly just principle.
Posted by: iceberg at March 9, 2007 9:05 AM
Iceberg Slim wrote:
Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?
For this reason I have a hard time swallowing argumentive ethics, since it only shows that once you accept the normative concept of ownership, you can derive private property as the only defensibly just principle.
Rothbard wrote about that alternative in The Ethics of Liberty. Though it was only a footnote.
In Part II of the book, Section 8 Rothbard writes a chapter titled “Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression.” A quote from Rothbard:
Let us set aside for a moment the corollary but more complex case of tangible property, and concentrate on the question of a man’s ownership rights to his own body. Here there are two alternatives: either we may lay down a rule that each man should be permitted (i.e., have the right to) the full ownership of his own body, or we may rule that he may not have such complete ownership. If he does, then we have the libertarian natural law for a free society as treated above. But if he does not, if each man is not entitled to full and 100 percent self-ownership, then what does this imply? It implies either one of two conditions: (1) the “communist” one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or (2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another—a system of rule by one class over another. These are the only logical alternatives to a state of 100 percent self-ownership for all.[1]
Footnote [1] says this:
Professor George Mavrodes, of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.
I wouldn’t call that an in depth “refutation”, but at least it is spoken of.
Posted by: Black Bloke at March 9, 2007 9:46 AM
Why does the preview show one thing and the post another?
Posted by: Black Bloke at March 9, 2007 9:47 AM
iceberg: “Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?”
I believe it was, but perhaps the refutation has not adequitely explained. Ownership is defined in terms of rightful control over some specific resource. The right to control when and how a resource is transformed and/or consumed — and thus the acts of transforming and consuming themselves — imply ownership. By definition, then, in order for any resource to be utilized it must first be owned by some person or collection of persons. To say that no one owns anything is equivalent to say that no one has any right to transform or consume anything. This would naturally lead to the mass extinction of the human species.
Posted by: Jesse at March 9, 2007 9:47 AM
Cohen’s point, though, is that self-ownership is rendered insubstantial and merely formal under such a socialist situation. It is not violated, any more than a person’s property rights in a corkscrew are violated by a worldwide absence of corked bottles. It simply means that you cannot use yourself. Cohen responds, however, that the situation could be precisely the same in a libertarian society if one guy (somehow) buys up all the land (or otherwise justly appropriates it) and so leaves everybody else in a position of not being able to use themselves to do anything (except maybe think about what they are missing out upon) without the permission of the owner of that land.
However, there are obvious answers to Cohen. One bad one is that since self-ownership is not strictly violated in either situation, who cares? This is bad because self-ownership is attractive precisely because of features the substantive concept has that this strictly formal concept under the world-ownership arrangement lacks.
A better response would be to say, sure, libertarian regards substantive ownership as what is important. However, in the real world, land is not owned by a single owner, it is highly unrealistic to think that it could be, so the closer we get to the real world, and the fuurther from Cohen’s socialist situation, the better, in terms of substantive self-ownership. Moreover, if we include libertarian arguments about the relative non-problem of monopoly absent state intervention, the more libertarian the society, the more substantive self-ownership becomes. We could say, “fine, there would be a problem in a world where one guy bought up all the land,” without really having to abandon much of libertarianism and what makes it attractive at all.
Posted by: Richard Garner at March 9, 2007 11:28 AM
“Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?”
When no one owns anything, no one controls anything. The word, ownership has been bastardized throughout the centuries. When we speak of natural control over resources, we are relley speaking of property ownership.
For their to be peaceful relations between people, their must be agreement on who controls resources, so we are not constantly fighting over resources. agreement over control over resources is contract.
blah blah 🙂
Posted by: jason at March 9, 2007 12:09 PM
Now that it’s been brought up, the fourth alternative (the claim that no-one owns anything) would make a quite intriguing initial situation/plot background for an an-cap Anthem…
Posted by: Daniel M. Ryan at March 9, 2007 2:32 PM
Richard,
“We could say, “fine, there would be a problem in a world where one guy bought up all the land,” without really having to abandon much of libertarianism and what makes it attractive at all.”
Why would there be a problem? If people sell their property, they must surely take responsibility. If original appropriation is rather what is meant, then Cohen and also self-described “left-libertarians” (Hillel Steiner, Peter Vallentyne, Michael Otsuka) have seemingly misunderstood the libertarian theory of acquisition. I think on this point Stephan’s good friend Tom G. Palmer has shown Cohen to wrongly identify Nozick’s proviso as being *the* theory of acquisition, instead of some unnecessary and mistaken addition.
Posted by: ste at March 10, 2007 8:26 AM
Iceberg:
“Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?”
There are many ways to say it, but basically this “no one owns anything” ethic is not an alternative ethic. The problem is it does not help us answer the question “what am i justified in doing right now and with what?” It in no way helps us avoid conflicts over scarce resources that acting man will necessarily have conflicting ends for.
“For this reason I have a hard time swallowing argumentive ethics, since it only shows that once you accept the normative concept of ownership, you can derive private property as the only defensibly just principle.”
But the act of arguing and justifying anything demonstrates that one accepts these things. Therefore, their validity cannot be disputed. It applies to all who in principle, would argue to justify themselves and ask a justification of another; I.e. humans. And to those beings who in principle would not, or could not in principle present or respect a justification, a property ethic does not and can not apply. But this is exactly why animals have no rights. They can in principle, neither claim any for themselves, nor acknowledge them to others.
Posted by: Paul Edwards at March 10, 2007 3:20 PM
so what then is correct response to the common objection that persons being born into a world where they own no property creates a conflict of rights? e.g. what if nobody wishes to have them on their land, giving them literally nowhere to go. or, are there numerous responses, all with some value? i am certainly not suggesting that such an objection against libertarianism carries any weight, but rather that if we disagree on why the objection isn’t strong, then does that in itself pose a problem?
any thoughts?
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 8:30 AM
ste, try this analogy: What if no store wanted to sell their goods to one particular person? It’s well within a store’s moral rights to refuse to serve someone, but obviously, they only make money by selling their goods, so there would need to be a very strong reason why they wouldn’t want to sell to someone, like if they were a klepto trying to steal their goods.
Same thing with land. Unless a landowner is using their land specifically for their own residence, they want to use land for productive purposes, and would need a strong reason not to allow any particular person on their land.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 11:20 AM
Michael,
but the reply could be that while there is no conflict of rights if every shop refuses to sell food to some person, there is a *necessary* conflict of rights if someone is not permitted to reside anywhere in the world. this difference is one that the self-described “left-libertarians” (Steiner, Otsuka, Vallentyne) pick up on. Steiner, for example, holds that all rights must be simultaneously realisable, or they or not rights. libertarians seemingly want to make this claim too, but your comment does not escape the objection i have outlined.
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 12:22 PM
Well, let’s clarify the issue-what particular right is violated by the situation, and why is it different from the store example?
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 1:06 PM
Michael,
if i have to stand somewhere, and no one wants me to stand on their property, then am i not necessarily trespassing? the store example contains no rights violation that i can see. as i asked earlier, is the best libertarian response that, in practice, this will be highly unlikely to occur? this approach doesn’t seem to rule out unavoidable rights-violations entirely, and hence, seems to be open to attack (as Cohen and others recognise).
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 1:24 PM
Store example is identical, because food is also a necessity of life.
But I want to return to a STE’s statement:
“…there is a *necessary* conflict of rights if someone is not permitted to reside anywhere in the world.”
There is no conflict of “rights” here. You don’t have a right to reside anywhere in the world (thank goodness), simply because I don’t want you in my bedroom. You ask, what if nobody wants me and all land is privatized? Well, even nomadic Gypsies are able to survive while traveling, by entertaining or doing something useful for private owners. Some of them find abandoned parcels and establish adverse possession (their own property) – but we can even assume there is no such land anywhere. If you have nothing to offer to anyone and nobody even wants to give you a shelter – the problem is in you, not in the system of private ownership. The same goes for shops that sell you food: you must offer something in return for their property and if you have nothing to offer you can’t say that your rights are violated by their refusal to serve you.
PS
Also, the example in which one landowner purchases all the land in the world is absurd. People residing on that land cannot go to Mars and they will establish their own adverse possession on that same land if they keep living and working there (also, people would not give-up their land for free and they would not sell their land without some mean of survival and somewhere to go).
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 1:33 PM
Sasha,
rather than a conflict, is it not still true that a rights violation necessarily occurs? and would this not in itself be problematic? as you say, my not having anywhere to go would be a (non-rights-violating) problem for me, but is it not necessarily a rights-violating problem for the unfortunate property owner?
the store example differs in that i could produce, on my own, enough food to survive.
a single person purchasing the entire world is, of course, highly unlikely. but it is not logically impossible (though this is not relevant to the above objection).
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 2:35 PM
Ste,
Quite the contrary:
Rather than a violation of rights, a conflicts may occur in a completely privatized world (any hobo may attack me, in order to get my property without any work for me)… But such violations of private property would be sanctioned. Anyway, a person may have a limited privilege in case of necessity, but he will still own a compensation to the rightful owner (the trespasser will work it out)
I didn’t understand how could you claim that you can produce enough food to survive. What if you own only bare walls and unfertile land as many people do in this world? Are your rights violated if shops don’t want to give you food for free?
PS
Logical impossibility of owning entire livable space in the universe is contained in the adverse possession argument and the fact that people will establish property rights over the land on which they work and live (since they are not slaves and they will use some space on which they will store their compensation for the land they sold). I only mentioned this in the post scriptum as the response to one previous posting.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 2:57 PM
To correct myself (- rather than legalized violation of rights, a number of conflits may occur in a completely privatized world -):
The violation of rights (aggression) can occur in any type of society… The difference is that common law in capitalism would sanction the aggressor, while socialism would legalize the aggressor’s actions.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 3:02 PM
Sasha,
my point is not that violations may occur in a completely privatised world (of course this is true anywhere, as you say) but that we can conceive of a situation which has no solution, whereby a necessary rights violation exists.
in what sense would common law sanction a violation? and, in what sense is this different from it being legalised? if property rights are absolute, why do i have to suffer from having persons on my land? this is the problem that Steiner and others discuss, and i am as keen as you to work out the best libertarian response to it. Richard (above) seems to think that denying the probability of such a situation is the correct response, though you seem to be committed to a different view. are they both valid? or is one more valid than the other? if they are both valid, is only one required to refute the objection?
it is logically possible that we each produce enough food for our survival, so the difficulty of my main point is avoided. as i said, a shop’s refusal to give me food for any price does not infringe my rights. but my being situated on another’s property does, which is precisely the problem. if you could say a little more about the role of common law, i would be grateful.
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 3:53 PM
The point is that one doesn’t have an inherent right to land. Thus, even if no landowner will allow you on their land, no rights are being violated. Trespassing would be a crime, but if there was literally no place for the trespasser to go, I would imagine a just legal system would carve out a solution to the problem, not to mention a humane society. But it wouldn’t be an issue of rights conflict.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 4:03 PM
Michael,
but surely the solution your just legal system will carve out is only necessary to resolve a rights violation. as Sasha pointed out, the objection is not one of conflict. rather, it is that i must be somewhere rather than nowhere.
the objection entirely accepts that we do not have an inherent right to land, i.e. that my rights are not violated by everyone denying me access. the very problem is the one that you point out — for absolute property rights do not seem to be consistent with an inability to remove a trespasser.
however, it is not clear what the court’s decision would be, nor could be. is this a better way of framing the objection?
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 4:14 PM
It’s hard to know what the court’s decision would be a priori without more circumstances. It’s difficult for me to believe that an entirely blameless and unobjectionable person would be refused entrance onto somebody’s land somewhere. Or are we talking about some kind of crisis situation, like extreme overpopulation or the like?
And if the person is, in fact, a criminal of some sort, then the court’s decision and the legal system, should include some way for him to serve his time/work out restitution/redeem himself so that others will eventually allow him onto their lands.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 5:45 PM
Michael,
but if self-ownership does not give us an a priori answer, isn’t this a weakness of the theory? moreover, what circumstances would/could count towards a decision?
the point remains, does it not? whether it is hard for you to believe or not cannot be relevant to the difficulty that the objection poses. absolute property rights dictate that the property owner, and no one else, makes decisions about who can occupy his property, doesn’t it? why should he abide by the decision of any court?
this shows why any talk of a crisis situation is irrelevant (Rothbard correctly refutes Nozick’s use of such a justification) since it admits to the strength the objection i posed.
the person without access to any land need not (otherwise) be a criminal.
one solution, of course, is that the trespasser be executed,but i am not sure this represents a good escape.
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 6:06 PM
Ste says:
“if property rights are absolute, why do i have to suffer from having persons on my land?”
That’s the problem with your entire argument. You falsely presuppose “suffering” that will not be sanctioned in anarcho-capitalism. But it will. In cases of easement or limited privilege in case of necessity, the owner is compensated… trespasser is held responsible.
Also, Ste commits another logical error:
That’s nonsensical. It is logically possible that we each parcel land in ways in which everyone will have a shelter – so the difficulty of my main point is avoided in the same way.
But your point was different, because you asked whether someone rights will be violated “if someone does not have any land,” without actually asking yourself: “what if someone does not own means for food production?”
Just like owner of shops does not violate the right of those who can’t produce food by refusing to give it for free – the landowner does not violate rights of those who hypothetically have nowhere to go and nothing to offer in exchange for shelter.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 6:32 PM
This was cut out with an incorrect HTML code:
It is logically possible that we each produce enough food for our survival, so the difficulty of my main point is avoided.”
That’s nonsensical. It is logically possible that we each parcel land in ways in which everyone will have a shelter – so the difficulty of my main point is avoided in the same way…
But your point was different, because you asked whether someone rights will be violated “if someone does not have any land,” without actually asking yourself: “what if someone does not own means for food production?”
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 6:34 PM
So we have to keep analogies straight.
When Ste wants to prove “inconsistency” in anarcho-capitalism, he tries to play with false analogies.
That’s rather misfortunate, since I’m eager to hear some valid anarcho-communist objections to anarcho-capitalism, when it comes to self-ownership and derived rights.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 6:41 PM
Sasha,
i am merely playing devil’s advocate, in the hope that the objection i’ve stated can be dismissed with more than the claim that it is unlikely to happen.
still, the difference between the two cases will not disappear. without wishing to repeat myself, i think the inconsistency remains. my question is why should anyone be, of logical necessity, forced to house a trespasser? it is all very well that a court sides with the property owner in principle, but the fact is that the person must continue to reside somewhere, thereby violating the rights of a property owner. another way of stating the point is to say that it odd that a series of just decisions could lead to a necessarily unjust situation. i fail to see how self-ownership alone can resolve this logical problem.
which false analogies am i playing with?
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 7:12 PM
Nobody should be forced to house a trespasser. So what?
Your “objection” is pure meaningless sophistry.
It’s like asking “what if two plus two was five”? Well, who cares what if – it isn’t!
Posted by: Peter at March 12, 2007 7:50 PM
Ste,
While it is true that many communists are dishonest – I would rather see you not emulating their incorrect analogies (I pointed out which false analogy I refer to, read more carefully), but instead raising some valid objections.
There is no difference between two cases (shop-keepers who refuse the free access to food and landowners who restrict free access to shelter):
In order to survive, a person must reside somewhere — but that person also must eat. Anarcho-capitalists do not believe that a person has an inherent right to survive at someone else’s expense, whether we talk about housing or food needs.
YOU SAID: “but the fact is that the person must continue to reside somewhere, thereby violating the rights of a property owner.”
Forgive me, but that is such a nonsensical assumption that I must question your honesty. Who says that by residing on someone else’s property you necessarily must violate someone else’s property???? I don’t have my own housing and I live on someone else’s property – but I pay for it and I am not a violator. The same goes for food: I don’t own any means for food production, but that does not imply that I will steal to get it. Even if I had no alternative for food and shelter in some unrealistic world, these facts would not change! I own my body and I will offer labor for good like money, with which I would obtain food and shelter…
Anarcho-capitalism would equally sanction any trespasser and there is no inconsistency between markets for food or shelter.
Regards.
….
PS
You say: we can imagine a world in which “each [person] produces enough food for our survival” (the means for production of food are perfectly divided in your imaginary world), so we would not have any conflicts over food in those utopian circumstances…
– but we can also imagine a world in which people have perfectly parceled the land between each person – so there is no conflicts over shelter in those utopian circumstances.
That’s why I pointed inconsistency in your analogy. Anarcho-capitalism is not inconsistent even in such absurd scenarios.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 7:53 PM
but if self-ownership does not give us an a priori answer, isn’t this a weakness of the theory? moreover, what circumstances would/could count towards a decision?
Um, self-ownership is separate from the legal system. Arbitration and mediation will always require knowledge of the circumstances involved. Expecting a system of rights to solve non-rights situations is a little silly, isn’t it? And yes, crisis situations are usually outside of normal legal systems, as well. I was merely trying to find out if you wanted to raise that objection.
Soem people want all human social and ethical conditions to be subsumed under the legal system. Politicizing all aspects of human behavior is not only undesireable, it also has terrible consequences on social, cultural and ethical norms and aspects of society. In short, I don’t think it’s a flaw in a rights system to not have an a priori answer to a non-rights issue. It’s an improvement. To say that someone is not legally required to be charitable is not at all the same thing as saying that people should not be (as in social pressure) or will not be (as in basic human kindness and nature) charitable.
Libertarian rights are a basis for a legal system, not a comprehensive philosophy for all human conduct.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 7:57 PM
Peter,
the objection is not meaningless, and is certainly not akin to saying 2 + 2 = 5, because it is possible that the situation i described can exist, without any assumption of aggression on anyone’s part. i raise it only to suggest a possible difficulty in absolute property rights. if we are to take them seriously, as i certainly do, then doesn’t it help to determine exactly what the best response to doubters is, and to stick to it? there have been different replies to my point, and this is the precisely the issue i wanted to raise. are all valid, or not? if not, it might be worth arguing against those who reject my point but for different reasons. on a practical note, objections like the one i raised are (unsurprisingly) largely accepted in politics departments throughout academia today, and this is even more reason to be clear on exactly why my objection does not count.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 12:18 PM
Sasha,
but i disagree that the analogy holds. i could just as well ask you to read me more carefully.
the difference between the cases is that no shop owner has to provide food (this is plainly obvious), and in doing so the rights of every shop owner are upheld. however, if every land owner refuses the person permission to reside on his land, then necessarily the person will be aggressing against one of them. which part of the distinction are you missing?
if you are saying that the difficulty will quickly disappear because people do not live very long without food, then isnt this just limiting the problem to the number of days that the person survives for? this does not elmiinate the objection posed.
“Forgive me, but that is such a nonsensical assumption that I must question your honesty.”
as i said, i am simply trying to work out the best response. it seems to me that you disagree that saying the situation is very unlikely to happen is the best response, so on that score at least we have made some progress. whether your response it valid is what i’m attempting to determine.
“Who says that by residing on someone else’s property you necessarily must violate someone else’s property???? I don’t have my own housing and I live on someone else’s property – but I pay for it and I am not a violator.”
yes, i understand this. it is, after all, unlikely. the point is that if every property owner justly refused you access, you would have nowhere to go. all of these decisions are just, yet an unjust situation can logically result. this is the basis of the objection.
“The same goes for food: I don’t own any means for food production, but that does not imply that I will steal to get it.”
but the food example requires intentional criminality on your part, whereas the land example does not. ideal theory seems to have a problem here, and assuming that the problem raised will not happen does not seem to be a valid escape, as you seem to suggest.
cheers.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 12:45 PM
Michael,
“Arbitration and mediation will always require knowledge of the circumstances involved. Expecting a system of rights to solve non-rights situations is a little silly, isn’t it?”
but we know all the relevant circumstances, do we not? every property owner is refusing to allow a person to reside on their land. what more could we find out empirically?
are you claiming that trespass isn’t a rights violation? if not, are you inadvertantly claiming a crisis situation?
“Soem people want all human social and ethical conditions to be subsumed under the legal system. Politicizing all aspects of human behavior is not only undesireable, it also has terrible consequences on social, cultural and ethical norms and aspects of society.”
Some people might well do, but the objection does not imply this.
“In short, I don’t think it’s a flaw in a rights system to not have an a priori answer to a non-rights issue.”
why isn’t it a rights issue?
“It’s an improvement.”
Is this saying absolute property rights are imperfect? If so, does it matter? Sasha, do you agree with this Michael here?
“Libertarian rights are a basis for a legal system, not a comprehensive philosophy for all human conduct.”
This is undoubtedly true, but again, my objection is not making this claim.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 12:58 PM
Yes, trespass is a rights violation, but as we’ve already made clear, this is not an issue of rights conflict. As for the circumstances of the situation, there must be some kind of reason why ALL the landowners would refuse to allow someone on their property, or else we are talking about a supremely irrational situation or a crisis situation of some sort. It may be a “possible” situation, but absurd under normal circumstances.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 13, 2007 1:40 PM
Ste,
I read you carefully and that’s why I question your honesty.
You asked: “however, if every land owner refuses the person permission to reside on his land, then necessarily the person will be aggressing against one of them. which part of the distinction are you missing?”
I am not missing anything.
If every land owner refuses the person to reside on his land – that is perfectly analogous to a twisted world in which every shop-owner refuses to give food to a person who does not have means of producing it.
So what’s the problem here? Rights will always get violated when person wants to live at someone else’s expense. Anarcho-capitalism does not eliminate violations of rights – but it is the only system that would sanction these violations. Socialism would try to legalize such parasitism.
STE SAID: “but the food example requires intentional criminality on your part, whereas the land example does not.”
If you use someone’s land and refuse to pay for it – that is also intentional act. When you are starving, you unintentionally (out of necessity) must use someone’s food – but you have to pay for it.
You are insisting on a lie in order to find a flaw in anarcho-capitalism.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 1:49 PM
Michael,
“It may be a “possible” situation, but absurd under normal circumstances.”
Forgive me if i misinterpret, but that sounds like an admission of the strength of my objection, and simply falls back on “it is unlikely.” if this is the best response, then fine, but i hoped we would find a better one.
i don’t see why the (irrational?) reasons for all landowners to refuse access are relevant. if, as you suggest, it might be a crisis situation, then what counts as a crisis? Hoppe says that we should not compromise on the level of theory. what if this peculiar compromise is unavoidable?
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 2:15 PM
Ste is forgetting that anarcho-capitalism recognizes necessity as a legal concept (some people cannot avoid being present on someone’s land and to use someone’s food – like a shipwrecked person on a private island – but they will have to owe some kind of compensation to this owner.
So there is no “violations” in cases of necessity, unless person refuses to pay some kind of compensation for their use of land and food. The only to avoid the hypothetical possibility of having these violations – is by legalizing theft. That’s the socialist “solution” for a non-existent problem.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 2:17 PM
Ste said: “Forgive me if i misinterpret, but that sounds like an admission of the strength of my objection”
Leave Michael alone for a second…
I just politely showed how absurd your pseudo-arguments are. There is no strength in them… and no readiness for critical thinking either, either.
Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 2:20 PM
All I’m wanting is a clarification of the issue being presented, before we start appealing to Lewis Carroll. The circumstances DO matter, and the appropriate response may well differ depending upon those circumstances.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 13, 2007 2:51 PM
Sasha,
“Ste is forgetting that anarcho-capitalism recognizes necessity as a legal concept (some people cannot avoid being present on someone’s land and to use someone’s food – like a shipwrecked person on a private island – but they will have to owe some kind of compensation to this owner.”
perhaps this is, in part, the answer i was looking for. it certainly sounds more promising than your previous attempts, and is very different from the “unlikely” argument. but also perhaps not. for instance, i do not equate the land example with the food example, and i do not think you necessarily need to in order to argue against my objection. the word “necessity” is being used in two different ways, which could be more important than you allow.
i don’t tthink those who originally made my objection would be convinced by your detailed and thoughtful points, but then maybe i will never convince you of (any of) the merits of my point.
(I am sure Michael can look after himself.)
cheers.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 2:55 PM
Ste,
I consistently raise the same types of objections, so there is nothing “more” or “less” promising in my last posting.
The problem in your argument is that you try not to equate food with land examples – by trying to establish a false analogy between a world in which everyone has enough food to survive (world without scarcity of basic food) – with a world in which we have people without any land to live on. And then you say: look at these different outcomes, hence food and land cannot be compared.
All I said was: let’s imagine the world in which I don’t have any means to produce food (even if I owned unfertile land)! Would my rights be violated if ship-owners refused to give me their food for free? Of course not. Will shop-owners rights be violated if I take their food in order to sustain my life? NOT NECESSARILY. Only if I refuse to pay them at the later time – that would constitute a violation! And trust me: anarcho-capitalism would sanction these violations.
Food and living space are both necessities of life – what goes for one, goes for the other. You can even expand these necessities to clothing, healthcare, education, employment… once you legalize land theft, there’s no end to slippery slope of socialism.
I am sure that communists who made false objections to anarcho-capitalism will not be convinced by my arguments, since most of them are not interested in hearing other people’s ideas.
On the other hand, I carefully considered your arguments, and I am not convinced simply because your objections to anarcho-capitalism are false. Anarcho-capitalism would not cause property right violations – even if all land was privatized and you had nowhere to go. Your necessity use of someone’s food or land – does not imply that you will refuse to pay them. And anarcho-capitalism is not inconsistent in either scenario.
Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 3:55 PM
I think something is being forgotten here.
Nobody can, in a privatized world, simply be “born” into a world where they don’t own any property and thus their presence is a perpetual trespass.
Somebody had to have given birth to the person and that somebody either lives legally, would have either committed a prior trespass, or was a descendant thereof.
One interesting side point that I haven’t read about (perhaps there is an article covering this somewhere–it’d be interesting if anyone knows of such): Say the world is privatized. You own land, your neighbors own theirs. You find someone trespassing on your property.
Now nobody would dispute that you have a right to expel this person, but the question becomes “where to?” Now it may not be any of your business, but what if your expelling of this trespasser simply creates a trespass against your neighbor? Now perhaps there is a private road that permits someone (perhaps your defense agency) to take this trespasser back to their own territory, which is all and good. But, if we assume this is not an option, what options does the landowner or trespasser have other than to further trespass? My initial reaction is to say that the trespasser should, in this example where there are no publicly available options such as roads, return in the reverse order he arrived. Sorry if this is off-topic.
Posted by: Jordan at March 13, 2007 6:00 PM
Jordan,
Someone like me have parents with property (where I lived until I turned 18), but what if they kicked me out of there? Now imagine a hypothetical world in which everything is privatized and I don’t have anyone’s invitation to live on their property (Ste’s scenario). What then?
My response to Ste was: In the anarcho-capitalist world, I would have a limited privilege of necessity to obtain food and shelter, but I would have to compensate the owners… My aggression against owners (refusal to pay) is not presupposed.
The answer to your last question is: a proletarian person would continuously (and unintentionally/out-of-necessity) trespass until he finds a willing host who will accept his labor in exchange for hosting. I won’t get into the debate about common law easements and private roads for public use, because that would take us even farther away from this topic.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 6:19 PM
I remember reading an article where someone argued that commons could and would still arise in AC society. Don’t remember the specifics, though–I’ll have to see if I can find it again. Also, the purpose of a road, even a private road, is to allow people to travel to different locations. Again, it would be quite strange if our trespasser wouldn’t be allowed to travel on a road or path, perhaps to a commons area.
The only thing I can figure is that our opponents expect guarantees and perfection from our theories. If they fall short, even just a little bit, that becomes a justification for them to reject them completely, and to hold on to their own preferred theories.
I can only argue to the best of my ability and knowledge, not being a Rothbard, or Mises, or even a Friedman.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 13, 2007 6:53 PM
Sasha,
perhaps if i change the emphasis of my point.. the objection is not at all concerned with the survival of the person without property — after all, what happens to them is not a problem.
it is instead concerned with the property owner (not?) having to allow the person a place to stand. hence food is not the issue, because the person without property could (logically) decide not to steal any food, but (as a matter of logic) he could not decide to not stand anywhere.
either i do or do not have to allow a person to stand on my property. the compensation idea seems to want to have it both ways, i.e., by maintaining that property rights are absolute, but also admitting there are certain instances where these rights are necessarily violated (albeit with restitution). you say that, providing the person compensates, then no rights are violated. but if no rights are violated, why is compensation necessary? would instead this be described as a “contract”? if not, what is it?
therefore, the specific details of “limited privilege” are interesting, and worth exploring, i think.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 7:21 PM
Michael,
“The only thing I can figure is that our opponents expect guarantees and perfection from our theories. If they fall short, even just a little bit, that becomes a justification for them to reject them completely, and to hold on to their own preferred theories.”
you seem to accept my objection may have at the least *some* weight, while Sasha does not. my original purpose was to see what differences exists between anarcho-capitalists’ rejections of such objections, and the extent to which this is important. perhaps you agree with Sasha, perhaps not.
i am, of course, not suggesting that we abandon the theory. i am merely pointing to a potential point in need of clarification. some contemporary political theorists attempt to get around what they see as a problem (the one i stated), claiming for example that full self-ownership be combined with some egalitarian world-ownership. i do not think this is possible, of course. nevertheless, their failure does mean that my original objection does not stand.
it’s an interesting issue though, right?
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 7:37 PM
Sasha/ste,
To reply to both of your critiques–does not the right to expel someone from your justly owned property presuppose that there is a location to which that person could be justly expelled?
Also, in reference to Sasha’s example of the parents kicking their child out of the house at 18–a la Rothbard, Hoppe, Kinsella, et al, a child becomes a fully realized self-owner when they express their objective link to their own body by moving/running away. If the parents have been the childs’ caretakers/trustees for 18-years, and they all of a sudden decide they want to rid themselves of this person, they can abrogate their status as caretaker/trustees to which end the child can then choose to express their objective link and move out or, failing that, the title of caretaker/trustee can be taken over by whomever has the next best link (family, etc). At any rate, the child is not a trespasser by mere parental decree.
Posted by: Jordan at March 13, 2007 7:55 PM
Jordan,
well, does it? what are the implications of there not being such a location?
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 8:13 PM
Jordan,
we cannot talk about any “child” after the person reaches certain age and it is not anyone’s responsibility to continue to support him and feed him. If, however, that child had a certain autonomy on his parents land, where he worked, made improvements, and lived in separate “quarters” – you may argue that he established an adverse possession and that he can’t be kicked out of there.
—-
Ste,
You are mistaken. My emphasis did not neglect the property owner in your scenario – I quite clearly addressed his rights.
In case that someone uses your property out of necessity (not by intentional trespass) – you will have a claim on compensation from this user. Your rights will only be violated if he refuses to pay – but that theft can happen in any system and it is completely irrelevant to our discussion on anarcho-capitalism.
But I am concerned about your another statement. You said:
“you say that, providing the person compensates, then no rights are violated. but if no rights are violated, why is compensation necessary?”
Why is compensation necessary when you finish your dinner at a restaurant? You used someone good and service and you owe for it. Only if you refuse to pay you committed a theft. In case of necessity, we don’t talk about an “implied contract” but about the exercise of substantive self-ownership, which is absolute and precedes property rights – but do not conflict with other person’s rights (as long as the owner of used property gets compensated).
Due to your unfair objections, I don’t give much weight to your argument. Specific details of “necessity” are worth of exploring to you, because we talk about principles present even in Roman law, yet you completely disregarded them in your initial assumptions.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 8:53 PM
the objection is not meaningless, and is certainly not akin to saying 2 + 2 = 5, because it is possible that the situation i described can exist, without any assumption of aggression on anyone’s part.
What do you mean by “possible”? You mean you can imagine a world in which that situation obtains, in the same way you can imagine a world in which the speed of light is 17mph? Or do you mean it’s actually a possibility in this real world? Because if you mean the latter, you’re wrong. And if you mean the former, it is indeed meaningless.
Posted by: Peter at March 13, 2007 8:59 PM
Sasha: “Someone like me have parents with property (where I lived until I turned 18), but what if they kicked me out of there? Now imagine a hypothetical world in which everything is privatized and I don’t have anyone’s invitation to live on their property (Ste’s scenario). What then?
My response to Ste was: In the anarcho-capitalist world, I would have a limited privilege of necessity to obtain food and shelter, but I would have to compensate the owners… My aggression against owners (refusal to pay) is not presupposed.”
Yeah–someone so unliked, so despicable, such a loser, that their own parent kick them out, they have no friends they can stay with, no charitable groups they can avail themselves of, no job with their own income–such a person is likely to be able to pay compensation for trespass, right? Uh, yeah.
Posted by: Stephan Kinsella at March 13, 2007 9:07 PM
Dr. Kinsella,
Inability to pay does not excuse anyone from legal liability. Such person still owes his body and ability to do at least some kind of labor (any form of useful labor, as demonstrated by the ability to get on someone’s property and feed himself). It is up to the owner to decide whether to forgive a poor person – not up to the legals system.
Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 9:14 PM
Will shop-owners rights be violated if I take their food in order to sustain my life? NOT NECESSARILY. Only if I refuse to pay them at the later time – that would constitute a violation! And trust me: anarcho-capitalism would sanction these violations.
Of course the violation occurs at the time you take the food. Paying for it after the fact is restitutive punishment. (Regarding your earlier post, about a shipwrecked man washing up on a private island, I can’t for the life of me see how he owes the owner anything for that)
[Also note that you’re using the word “sanction” in an unusual way. The normal meaning is “allow” or “approve of”; confusingly, it is sometimes used to mean “punish” recently, which is apparently what you mean, but it’d make a lot more sense if you said “anarcho-capitalism would NOT sanction these violations” (not that it actually makes any sense either way: anarcho-capitalism is a concept, concepts don’t give approval to actions)]
Posted by: Peter at March 13, 2007 9:21 PM
Peter,
OK. You violate rights of restaurant owner when you eat your dinner there – and your payment for it is “restitutive” punishment.
Of course I’m joking, but you demonstrated your ignorance of basic legal concept. If “necessity” was in fact violation, a person would not only owe for something he used, but he would also pay PUNITIVE damages. No such thing exists… sorry.
Also note that a legal definition of “sanction” is “embargo” or “punishment” – hence the term “legal sanction.” I agree that if somebody fell from Mars, he would find my use of term “sanction” unusual. I did not talk about Latin or Indo-European root of this word.
When I say that anarcho-capitalism would not sanction something, I refer to people under such order – which is also clear to everyone.
Thanks for your contribution. Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 9:33 PM
OK. You violate rights of restaurant owner when you eat your dinner there – and your payment for it is “restitutive” punishment.
If the owner doesn’t want to serve you, that would be true. Otherwise, you’re eating there on the understanding that you’ll be paying for it (or someone will), not just taking the food.
If “necessity” was in fact violation, a person would not only owe for something he used, but he would also pay PUNITIVE damages.
It’s certainly a possibility.
Also note that a legal definition of “sanction” is “embargo” or “punishment” – hence the term “legal sanction.”
The term “legal sanction” means exactly the opposite of what you say: legal approval to do something, not punishment. E.g., the first hit on Google, an article entitled “Bush administration seeks legal sanction for torture” – means Bush wants approval to use torture, not that Bush wants to be punished.
Posted by: Peter at March 14, 2007 2:03 AM
Life and self-ownership
Mark Humphrey “I don’t want to precipitate trench warfare with devoted Rothbardians, but I strongly suspect that Rothbard owed his insight about “life as the standard of moral value” to Ayn Rand. I can’t prove this, of course. Sadly, in “The Ethics of Liberty”, (published in the early Eighties) Rothbard chose to, in a sense, blacklist Rand by claiming that NO ONE, other than himself, in the libertarian movement was working to develope a system of rationally defensible ethics. (Maybe Rothbard meant “at the moment I am writing this statement”.)”
Björn That life is an axiomatic value and functions “as the standard of moral value” in an ethical system, Rothbard could, alternatively for example, have gotten this insight from Mises himself through analyzing his statement in his book, “Human Action”, page 11:
“We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will.”
http://www.mises.org/humanaction/chap1sec1.asp
I am not saying that Rothbard did get his insight from Mises; I am only saying that it was possible. Surely, many other possibilities exist which we do not know anything about.
Mark Humphrey “It has been awhile since I’ve read Hoppe, and Rothbard; but I suspect Hoppe’s reasoning goes: either we all own ourselves, or everyone owns everyone else. Since the first proposition is clearly more defensible than the latter absurd proposition, one can affirm self ownership as valid. But if this is the argument, it fails. For that argument assumes that which it sets out to prove, namely that an ethical concept, “ownership”, exists. But on this basis, ownership remains unproven, so that one could just as well assert: “no one owns anything, and anything goes.””
Björn Self-ownership is a natural fact, since a man in his very nature controls his own mind and body (natural disposition), that is, he is a natural self-owner of his own will and person (having a free will) and if this was not true, neither could he effectively control any property and, therefore, not own it. In other words; “nothing could control and own something”.
Naturally, praxeology the science of human action, by itself logically confirms the natural fact of self-ownership, since praxeology is based upon “the acting man consciously intending to improve his own satisfaction” and I quote from answers.com:
“From praxeology Mises derived the idea that every conscious action is intended to improve a person’s satisfaction. He was careful to stress that praxeology is not concerned with the individual’s definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction. The way in which a person will increase his satisfaction is by removing a source of dissatisfaction. As the future is uncertain so every action is speculative.
An acting man is defined as one capable of logical thought — to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes capable of removing, otherwise he cannot act.
Another conclusion that Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being only capable of one decision at a time — even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction.
As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, for every further goal reached, his satisfaction, or utility, is lessened from the preceding goal. This is the rule of diminishing marginal utility.
In human society many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague’s possession than he does for his own. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics, and is the more commonly accepted realm of economics.”
http://www.answers.com/Praxeology?gwp=11&ver;=2.0.1.458&method;=3
Further:
The Ethics of Liberty, page 45:
Footnote:
“[1]Professor George Mavrodes, of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.”
http://www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/eight.asp
Or in my own words from the essay “Normative principles”:
“Why must anybody own anything?
In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:
“Everybody owns themselves and their Justly owned property rights”.
Nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).
This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).
Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.”
http://normativeprinciples.blogspot.com/2006/12/normative-principles-pure-free-market_10.html
An Animated Introduction to the Philosophy of Liberty:
http://www.isil.org/resources/introduction.html
The animation in full-sized window:
http://www.isil.org/resources/introduction.swf
Björn Lundahl
Göteborg, Sweden
Posted by: Björn Lundahl at March 14, 2007 3:28 AM
Peter,
You say: “Otherwise, you’re eating there on the understanding that you’ll be paying for it (or someone will), not just taking the food.
But that is also true of “necessity.” You are eating in order to survive, exercising substantive self-ownership, understanding that you will pay for it.
Coming from the legal definition of “violation” – you cannot say that you must commit it in case of pure necessity, when you acknowledge that you will pay for it. Anarcho-capitalism might hypothetically and unlikely lead to a situation in which a particular person will not have any means for producing his own food – but that does not mean that this person’s act out of necessity can ever be viewed as unlawful and forceful (violation) as long this party does not refuse the responsibility to compensate the owner. There can be no punitive damages when it comes to necessity.
I accept your concerns, but for the most part they were unnecessary.
PS
[As far as term “sanction” goes, it has different meanings and people will understand me from my context, rather than “google”. English has a few other words that can refer to opposites, such as the verbs dust (meaning both “to remove dust from” and “to put dust on”) and trim (meaning both “to cut something away” and “to add something as an ornament”).]
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 8:36 AM
So the last line of defense of anarcho-communism has been reduced to a false assumption that anarcho-capitalism could hypothetically lead to world which is so subdivided that there is no land on which a proletariats (people who own nothing but themselves) can establish an adverse possession or homesteading. But even if this happens – it does not mean that these proletarians will automatically commit any violation if they act out of pure necessity. Dr. Kinsella’s objection that proletarians have no wealth to pay any compensation does not hold – as long as proletarians own themselves (and their body as a valued mean of production).
Communists logically failed and their alternative plan to argue universal co-ownership of the world’s resources was effectively debunked by Rothbard and Hoppe.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 10:41 AM
Sasha,
“But even if this happens – it does not mean that these proletarians will automatically commit any violation if they act out of pure necessity.”
i still think you are ignoring my point. how can non-violation rest on the person agreeing to compensate? as Stephan Kinsella pointed out, it is very possible that the person cannot or will not compensate. but this i think comes after the point at which the objection strikes. i assume that Stephan does not agree with my objection, but this does not necessarily follow from his comment. also, you seem to have some disagreements with Peter now, despite you both disagreeing with me. this is yet more evidence for me of the importance of how anarcho-capitalists successfully refute objections such as the one i raise.
as i already asked, how are you to deny the logical necessity of trespass that pertains when all property owners justly refuse access? in this sense rights are not compossible (all realisable without violation), and herein lies the objection. do you agree that *this* sense of ‘necessity’ is very different to the one used if the person CHOOSES to eat the food of someone else in order to survive?
Posted by: ste at March 14, 2007 11:47 AM
Ste,
My initial impression is that yes, it does pre-suppose that there is either a location to which that person owns or has contracted to reside, or a location to which entry is assumed to be allowed (a “public” place, in the non-governmental sense). I imagine that this scenario only comes up in very primitive, limited cases (if ever) and that in the real world, there would always be a place for the non-landowner to legally stand.
That’s just my initial impression, however. I haven’t given it a lot of thought–In a moment of haste, I’ve thought 53 and 28 made 71 as well…
Posted by: Jordan at March 14, 2007 12:49 PM
I’ve got to agree with Peter, Sasha. It’s quite different for a restaurant to allow you to order and eat with the expectation that you’ll pay at the end of the dinner than it is to have somebody trespass out of necessity, and then pay compensation.
And I still have to go with “unlikely” on the trespass problem, simply because I’m not going to be absolutist and say it’s impossible when it’s possible but absurd. Still, I think the analogy to a restaurant is fair. Under what circumstances would a restaurant, from a high-class French joint to your local McDonald’s, deny a person to dine on their premises? Their whole raison d’etre is to sell their food/service to customers. There would be no good, rational reason to denying a thorougly unobjectionable person with the means to pay from dining. They would only reject him if they knew that he couldn’t pay, or he was a health risk (Typhoid Mary?), or he was a danger, or he was a known restaurant thief, or SOMETHING like that.
Land, of course, has various and sundry uses, and use as rental property is only one of them. But the same considerations apply, at least to landlords. They must have some good reason for denying someone on their property, not because I say so, but because they, like the restaurants, want to make money.
Thus, like I said, the circumstances of the situation matter. It might be entirely understandable, even to the most ardent anti-AC’er, why some particular person would not be legally allowed on people’s property. Without knowing the circumstances, it’s hard to make blanket, generalized statements that will be true.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 14, 2007 1:23 PM
Michael,
You didn’t surprise me with siding with Peter. You don’t understand that principle of necessity does not imply “violation” as long as you pay for your use. I only used the restaurant example, because in many cases people who don’t have money to pay in a restaurant – get a deal with the manager to wash the dishes and compensate him in that way. But in case of necessity, self-ownership (which cannot be exercised if you starve to death) will be protected – but the owner will be compensated (there will be no injured side).
—–
Ste,
I did not ignore any of your objections. Self-ownership is absolute, and property ownership is the only ethical way to exercise it.
You mentioned Dr. Kinsella’s objection that a person who act out of necessity perhaps will not be able to pay for his use. Hold on one second… There is nothing criminal about not being able to pay. How can you classify it as a “violation” then? “Violation” by its legal meaning is something criminal (check the definition) – and “necessity” can never be classified as such.
You also mention the possibility that the proletarian will refuse to pay for his use of someone else’s property. HOLD ON ONE SECOND! Such criminal act would be punishable in anarcho-capitalism, and such violations would occur in any system (except that socialism would legalize such unlawful acts). The fact that you point out such irrelevant nonsense only illustrates you lack of ideas.
Despite of disagreements from some people here, they did not raise any valid objections to anarcho-capitalism. The only possible way to prove that self-ownership could theoretically create a conflict with property rights in anarcho-capitalism – is by claiming that use in case of necessity is a crime (implying that it would yield some punitive damages). Unfortunately for anarcho-communists, such assumption would be nothing but a lie.
You asked: “how are you to deny the logical necessity of trespass that pertains when all property owners justly refuse access?”
Who said I would do something so silly. Trespasses are always possible – and that’s how people obtain adverse possessions and easements. Anarcho-capitalists do not claim that they would eliminate trespass. We only claim that self-ownership would not be conflicted with property rights, because even necessity will be countered by liability compensation.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 6:04 PM
I merely agreed with Peter that there’s a difference between a common expectation and an unexpected use, such as an emergency or crisis situation.
I think that the idea of necessity has validity under certain, limited circumstances, but
I’m not sure if the land example would be such an application, given the lack of circumstancial evidence.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 14, 2007 6:36 PM
There was actually no need to create such absurd scenario in which there is no space for adverse possession of a proletarian…
Ste could have created a more realistic example in which one parcel of unfertile land is completely surrounded by its neighbors’ land. According to an ignorant view of anarcho-capitalism, this person will starve to death, unless he commits a “violation” against his neighbors. However, there is such a thing called “easement” or “right-of-way,” which will allow to this person to leave his property – but he will in turn have to compensate his neighbor(s). So we cannot talk about “violations,” when we talk about non-criminal exercise of self-ownership rights – and compensation for such use of someone else’s property. Accidents (unintentional trespasses) cannot be called “violations” in legal terms (anarcho-capitalism would not eliminate accidents against property of others, either), but this fact does not mean that a victim of an accident would not be entitled to a compensation.
Anarcho-communist simply doesn’t have a valid objection and they can’t find a contradiction in our views – as long as we insist on compensation for any property use, even if such use is absolutely necessary. Roman law, from the Twelve Tables to the Theodosian Code and the Justinian Corpus, recognized the right of private property as near absolute. Property stemmed from unchallenged possession…
– BUT prior usage always established easements and necessity yielded limited privileges. In either case, owners would not be uncompensated. Is the objection to anarcho-capitalism reduced to the statement that in perfectly privatized world we would not be able to eradicate the principles of privileged necessity and easements? Well, thank dear God that we would not get rid of these wonderful principles – even if only 1% of the world was privatized.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 7:22 PM
But that is also true of “necessity.” You are eating in order to survive, exercising substantive self-ownership, understanding that you will pay for it.
In the case of the ordinary diner at the restaurant, you could consider it a (very short term) credit situation; but for the guy claiming “necessity”, the restaurateur hasn’t agreed to extend credit. You say “understanding that you will pay for it” – but how much is he expected to pay? The restaurateur doesn’t want to serve him. Or maybe he could say “fine, you can eat here, but all the menu prices will be in units of $1000 instead of $1” – if he decides to walk away and then take the food anyway and claim “necessity”, would you have him pay the replacement cost for the food, the menu price, the menu price multiplied by 1000, or what? No; there’s no question he’s stealing in this situation, regardless of any willingness/intent to pay – the restaurant owner could demand “punitive damages” (“two eyes for an eye”), but if the theft was “necessary” I’d expect the owner who did so to come under fire (figuratively, not literally) from the majority of his customer base.
Posted by: Peter at March 14, 2007 7:25 PM
Peter,
You can say that eating somewhere out of necessity is a credit situation. While the restaurant owner can demand “punitive damages” against someone who eats and refuses to pay for the heck of it – someone who is in dire need cannot be liable for any punitive damage (no intent of wrongdoing), but he will be liable for the property he used.
You ask: how much a person owes to the owner? If the owner cannot reach an agreement with the user, it’s up to the courts to decide what would be expected compensation of regular customer (to determine how much would person in need pay if he had money in wallet).
Trying to compare “necessity” with theft is nonsensical. It can only be compared to unintentional trespass, since the person in need does not have a choice in his decision to use someone else’s property. In other words, anarcho-communists cannot prove that proletarians would be forced to become thieves by the virtue of self-ownership – even if the entire world was privatized and unwelcoming. As I said, the principle of limited privilege in case of necessity is like an easement for self-ownership right, which precedes all property.
It seems to me that libertarian-communists think that anarcho-capitalists are senseless bastards who would create an order in which some people could starve to death in the middle of unused paradise of wealth. They forget that our property theory includes concepts like adverse possession, necessity, and easement.
Like I said – even if only 1% of world was privatized, these principles would still hold for anarcho-capitalists. There is no need to imagine absurd scenarios like Ste’s (or Cohen’s).
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 9:30 PM
When it comes to those libertarian-communists who try to invent the arguments against anarcho-capitalism by playing devil’s advocate and pretend that they are concerned about property owners who could be theoretically placed in a “horrible” situation in which a proletarian is forced to cross over their property, while looking for a shelter – all I can say is this:
————————————————–
Dear advocates of the extinction of the mankind,
There is no need for you to invent absurd scenarios in which there is not even a single spot on which someone can find a land to establish his own adverse possession. Even a capitalist world with plenty of unused land that “waits” for homesteading will unavoidably have issues which you try to dishonestly exploit:
– Even if we had an entire new planet ready for settlement, here on Earth we will have private properties that get completely surrounded by other private properties — and they will need path to communicate with the outside world.
– Even in such world in which there is unused abundance of food, there will be shipwrecks, plane-crashes, or any case of dire poverty, which will force some people to use other people’s property in order to survive.
– There will always be possibility of car-crashes, accidents with weapons, people who loose direction, and other unintentional trespasses (accidents) against people’s property — as long as property exists.
Yes, private property rights necessarily leads to these situations, even if only a small portion of Earth was inhabited – but even in Roman times, law based on absolute protection of private property provided solutions for these situations. People who use their privilege of necessity in order to survive on someone else’s property, as well as people who use easement right to cross someone else’s property, will legally be liable to compensate the owner whose land they used. Law in anarcho-capitalism will not tolerate any injury to this owner.
However, this does not mean that law can guarantee that the person who owes compensation will have means to pay his debt. Debt default situation is possible in any system in which property exists – but the fact remains: the rightful owner will still have a legal claim and ownership of goods for which he awaits delivery. As long as indebted side owns his body and capability to work, there are ways in which this debt can be repaid.
So what’s the problem with this? If you seek to avoid theoretical possibility of accidental injuries to your body (for which you would be compensated) – simply kill yourself! If you want to be spared from someone crossing your property and paying you for that – abolish your right to any property (to control anything but your body) and simply starve to death! If you can’t cope with the fact that someone in dire need may use your property to survive – you can simply decide that we all co-own everything in this world, and don’t take another breath before you get permission from everyone — and simply starve to death. You see, anarcho-capitalism allows you to practice what you preach.
What anarcho-capitalism does not allow — is to use your property right to deny substantive property rights of someone else, but no one can cause any injury to your property without owing the adequate remedy for that action. Prior usage always establishes easement for which the other side will be compensated — and the oldest “prior usage” is self-ownership. No contradiction exists there.
Regards,
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 11:51 PM
I want to emphasise this regarding my above comment with the headline “Life and self-ownership”:
In a world without any property rights there wouldn’t be any property rights at all which, naturally, excludes any state or public property rights too.
That would mean that no one would have a right to anything not even to themselves.
Without any property rights the human race would quickly vanish.
This is a logical conclusion which can not, therefore, be refuted by empiricism.
Björn Lundahl
Posted by: Björn Lundahl at March 15, 2007 2:27 AM
This might instead be clearer:
Why must anybody own anything?
In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:
“The existence of property rights”:
In a world without any property rights nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).
This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).
Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.
Please read some of Hans-Hermann Hoppe´s excellent writing from the book “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property”:
http://www.mises.org/etexts/hoppe5.pdf
And to:
ON THE ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION OF THE ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY:
http://www.hanshoppe.com/publications/econ-ethics-10.pdf
Björn Lundahl
Posted by: Björn Lundahl at March 15, 2007 3:04 AM
Sasha,
You know, I’m still not convinced.
“If you want to be spared from someone crossing your property and paying you for that – abolish your right to any property (to control anything but your body) and simply starve to death! If you can’t cope with the fact that someone in dire need may use your property to survive – you can simply decide that we all co-own everything in this world, and don’t take another breath before you get permission from everyone — and simply starve to death. You see, anarcho-capitalism allows you to practice what you preach.”
Does absolute private property require that I allow someone to cross my property? Why can’t I shoot them dead? In any case, that was not my objection, which instead centred on certain necessary trespasses (see above posts). In Hillel Steiner’s words, the first come, first served ethic is incompossible. That is, that the mutual consistency of all the rights in the proposed set of rights is at least a necessary condition of that set being a possible one.
“What anarcho-capitalism does not allow — is to use your property right to deny substantive property rights of someone else, but no one can cause any injury to your property without owing the adequate remedy for that action. Prior usage always establishes easement for which the other side will be compensated — and the oldest “prior usage” is self-ownership. No contradiction exists there.”
Again, if adequate remedy is required, that would suggest a rights violation occurred. None of what I said implies the correctness of any other set of rights. Anyone else?
ste.
Posted by: ste at June 3, 2007 4:22 PM
STE said:
“Does absolute private property require that I allow someone to cross my property? Why can’t I shoot them dead? In any case, that was not my objection, which instead centred on certain necessary trespasses (see above posts). In Hillel Steiner’s words, the first come, first served ethic is incompossible. That is, that the mutual consistency of all the rights in the proposed set of rights is at least a necessary condition of that set being a possible one.”
You are confusing the issues here. Private property only stems from self-ownership rights, and you cannot violate this right of others even if they cross your private property. You cannot shoot someone dead just because he uses his easement rights in order to leave his own property and/or sustain his life. You also cannot “evict” a passenger from your airplane at 41000 feet, even if you don’t want him there at the moment. Hillel Steiner forgets that we have absolute self-ownership rights, while all other property serves as a mean of sustaining these rights. As H.H. Hoppe brilliantly showed, only Lockean principle of property acquisition is ethical and all other alternatives (when completely applied) would lead to the extinction of mankind.
Again, if adequate remedy is required, that would suggest a rights violation occurred. None of what I said implies the correctness of any other set of rights.”
Not true sir. Compensation for use of someone else’s property does not presuppose any “violation”. We can talk about violations only if a user refuses to compensate the owner for his use. Use of someone property is not a violation in itself.
Anyway, anarcho-capitalism includes the concepts of necessity and easement, simply because property rights are means of sustaining self-ownership — and these rights can never serve as a mean of violating someone else’s self-ownership.
Anyhow, the existence of easement and necessity rights do not prove any inconsistency or logical problem in anarcho-capitalism. Likewise, the fact that there will always be plane crashes or accidental entries on someone else’s property does not “prove” that there is any problem with the Lockean view of private property rights. Anyone else?
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at June 8, 2007 5:29 AM
http://phreadom.blogspot.com/2008/05/intellectual-property-is-fiction.html
The very nature of reality indicates that the idea opens a path towards harm.