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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 454.

My recent appearance on The Rational Egoist. (Spotify; Youtube)

Shownotes:

Michael engages in a lively debate with Stephan Kinsella, a libertarian theorist and anarcho-capitalist, as they explore key issues that divide Objectivists and libertarians. They discuss topics such as intellectual property, the role of the state, and foundational philosophical differences between the two schools of thought.

Grok shownotes: In this episode of the Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (KOL454), recorded on February 12, 2025, libertarian patent attorney Stephan Kinsella engages in a spirited debate with Objectivists Amy Peikoff and James Valliant, moderated by Adam Mossoff, covering intellectual property (IP), anarchism versus minarchism, and the application of Ayn Rand’s Objectivism to law (0:00:00-10:00). Kinsella argues that IP, particularly patents and copyrights, violates property rights by granting state-enforced monopolies over non-scarce ideas, advocating for a stateless society where voluntary institutions replace coercive government, while Peikoff and Valliant defend IP as a natural right rooted in creation and support a minimal state to protect individual rights, aligning with Rand’s philosophy (10:01-40:00). The debate, hosted by the Federalist Society, highlights tensions between libertarian and Objectivist principles, with Kinsella challenging the moral and practical basis of IP and state authority.

The discussion grows contentious as Kinsella critiques the Objectivist justification for IP, citing its economic harms like litigation costs and innovation barriers, while Peikoff and Valliant counter that IP incentivizes creativity and that a minimal state is necessary to prevent chaos, using Rand’s framework to argue for objective law (40:01-1:10:00). In the Q&A, Kinsella addresses audience questions on anarchy’s feasibility and IP’s impact, maintaining that market mechanisms outperform state interventions, while Peikoff and Valliant defend Rand’s vision of limited government, accusing Kinsella of evading practical realities (1:10:01-1:29:56). Kinsella concludes by urging rejection of IP and state coercion, directing listeners to c4sif.org, delivering a robust libertarian critique, though the Objectivists’ insistence on Rand’s principles leaves little common ground. This episode is a compelling clash of ideologies, ideal for exploring libertarian and Objectivist perspectives.

 

Transcript below along with detailed Grok summary.

DETAILED GROK SHOWNOTES

Detailed Summary for Show Notes with Time Blocks
The summary is based on the transcript provided at stephankinsella.com for KOL454, a 1-hour-29-minute debate recorded on February 12, 2025, hosted by the Federalist Society, featuring Stephan Kinsella debating Objectivists Amy Peikoff and James Valliant, moderated by Adam Mossoff. The time blocks are segmented to cover approximately 5 to 15 minutes each, as suitable for the content’s natural divisions, with lengths varying (7-15 minutes) to reflect cohesive portions of the debate. Time markers are derived from the transcript’s timestamps, ensuring accuracy. Each block includes a description, bullet points for key themes, and a summary, capturing the debate’s arguments and dynamics.
  • 0:00:00-7:00 (Introduction and Opening Statements, ~7 minutes)
    Description: Moderator Adam Mossoff introduces the debate, outlining the topics of intellectual property (IP) and anarchism versus minarchism, with Kinsella representing libertarianism and Peikoff and Valliant representing Objectivism (0:00:00-0:01:00). Kinsella opens, arguing that IP, particularly patents and copyrights, violates property rights by creating state-enforced monopolies over non-scarce ideas, and advocates for anarcho-capitalism, where voluntary institutions replace coercive government (0:01:01-0:04:00). Peikoff begins her statement, defending IP as a natural right rooted in the creator’s effort, per Ayn Rand’s philosophy, and supports a minimal state to protect individual rights (0:04:01-0:07:00). The tone is civil but sets up a clear ideological divide. Key Themes:
    • Introduction of debate topics and participants (0:00:00-0:01:00).
    • Kinsella’s anti-IP and anarchist stance, rooted in property rights (0:01:01-0:04:00).
    • Peikoff’s Objectivist defense of IP and minimal state (0:04:01-0:07:00).
      Summary: Kinsella opens with a libertarian critique of IP and the state, while Peikoff defends IP and minarchism from an Objectivist perspective, establishing the debate’s ideological divide.
  • 7:01-22:00 (IP Debate: Property Rights vs. Creator Rights, ~15 minutes)
    Description: Kinsella elaborates on his anti-IP stance, arguing that patents and copyrights restrict the use of non-scarce ideas, violating property rights over tangible resources, using Austrian economics to emphasize scarcity (7:01-12:00). Valliant counters that IP protects the creator’s moral right to their intellectual effort, aligning with Rand’s view that creation is a source of property, and accuses Kinsella of undermining innovation (12:01-17:00). Kinsella responds that IP creates artificial scarcity, citing economic harms like litigation costs, while Peikoff defends IP as essential for incentivizing creativity, claiming it aligns with objective law (17:01-22:00). The exchange is lively, with Kinsella challenging the moral basis of IP. Key Themes:
    • Kinsella’s argument that IP violates property rights by monopolizing ideas (7:01-12:00).
    • Valliant’s Objectivist defense of IP as a creator’s moral right (12:01-17:00).
    • Kinsella’s critique of IP’s economic harms and Peikoff’s incentive argument (17:01-22:00).
      Summary: Kinsella argues IP restricts property rights, while Valliant and Peikoff defend it as a moral and practical necessity, highlighting the libertarian-Objectivist divide on IP’s legitimacy.
  • 22:01-37:00 (Anarchism vs. Minarchism: State Coercion Debate, ~15 minutes)
    Description: Kinsella shifts to anarchism, arguing that the state inherently commits aggression through taxation and monopolistic services, violating the non-aggression principle (NAP), and proposes private institutions for defense and justice (22:01-27:00). Peikoff counters that a minimal state is necessary to protect individual rights, preventing chaos and ensuring objective law, per Rand’s philosophy, accusing Kinsella of ignoring practical risks like gang warfare (27:01-32:00). Kinsella responds that limited government still relies on coercion, incompatible with libertarianism, and cites historical market-based systems, while Valliant defends the state’s role in enforcing contracts (32:01-37:00). The debate grows tense, with both sides entrenched. Key Themes:
    • Kinsella’s anti-state argument, advocating private institutions (22:01-27:00).
    • Peikoff’s defense of a minimal state to protect rights and prevent chaos (27:01-32:00).
    • Kinsella’s critique of state coercion and Valliant’s contract enforcement argument (32:01-37:00).
      Summary: Kinsella defends anarchism against state coercion, while Peikoff and Valliant argue a minimal state is necessary, underscoring the divide between anarchism and minarchism.
  • 37:01-52:00 (Deepening the IP and State Debate, ~15 minutes)
    Description: Kinsella critiques the Objectivist IP justification, arguing that creation-based rights lack a principled basis, as property rights stem from scarcity, not labor, and that IP stifles innovation through monopolies (37:01-42:00). Valliant insists IP is a natural extension of property rights, protecting creators’ efforts, and accuses Kinsella of evading Rand’s moral framework, while Peikoff emphasizes IP’s role in objective law (42:01-47:00). Kinsella counters that market incentives like first-mover advantages suffice, citing open-source software, and challenges the state’s legitimacy, noting its coercive taxation, while Peikoff defends the state’s necessity for legal enforcement (47:01-52:00). The exchange is intense, with philosophical differences clear. Key Themes:
    • Kinsella’s critique of creation-based IP rights and economic harms (37:01-42:00).
    • Valliant and Peikoff’s Objectivist defense of IP and objective law (42:01-47:00).
    • Kinsella’s market incentives argument and state coercion critique (47:01-52:00).
      Summary: Kinsella challenges the Objectivist IP and state justification, advocating market solutions, while Peikoff and Valliant defend Rand’s framework, highlighting deep philosophical divides.
  • 52:01-1:07:00 (Practical Concerns and Objectivist Principles, ~15 minutes)
    Description: Peikoff argues that anarchy would lead to tribalism and loss of free market benefits, justifying a minimal state to enforce contracts and protect rights, accusing Kinsella of ignoring practical chaos (52:01-57:00). Kinsella counters that states cause wars and monopolies, not solutions, and that private systems could outperform, citing historical examples like merchant guilds, while challenging Peikoff’s reliance on Rand’s principles over evidence (57:01-1:02:00). Valliant defends Rand’s view that a state ensures objective law, dismissing anarchy as utopian, while Kinsella insists the NAP’s consistency outweighs hypothetical risks (1:02:01-1:07:00). The debate remains heated, with both sides entrenched. Key Themes:
    • Peikoff’s claim that anarchy leads to chaos, requiring a state (52:01-57:00).
    • Kinsella’s defense of private systems and critique of state failures (57:01-1:02:00).
    • Valliant’s Objectivist defense of state-enforced law vs. Kinsella’s NAP focus (1:02:01-1:07:00).
      Summary: Peikoff and Valliant argue a minimal state prevents anarchy’s chaos, while Kinsella defends private systems and the NAP, rejecting Objectivist reliance on Rand’s principles.
  • 1:07:01-1:22:00 (Q&A: Feasibility of Anarchy and IP Impacts, ~15 minutes)
    Description: The Q&A begins, with an audience member asking about anarchy’s feasibility, prompting Kinsella to argue that market-based dispute resolution and defense are viable, citing decentralized systems, while Peikoff insists a state is needed to prevent power vacuums (1:07:01-1:12:00). Another question focuses on IP’s economic impact, with Kinsella citing studies showing no innovation benefits and high costs, while Valliant defends IP as essential for creators, accusing Kinsella of evading practical realities (1:12:01-1:17:00). Kinsella challenges Peikoff’s hypothetical chaos scenarios as irrelevant to the NAP’s principled stance, while Peikoff reiterates Rand’s objective law necessity (1:17:01-1:22:00). The Q&A highlights the ongoing libertarian-Objectivist divide. Key Themes:
    • Kinsella’s defense of anarchy’s feasibility vs. Peikoff’s power vacuum concerns (1:07:01-1:12:00).
    • Kinsella’s critique of IP’s economic harms vs. Valliant’s creator rights defense (1:12:01-1:17:00).
    • Kinsella’s rejection of hypotheticals and Peikoff’s objective law focus (1:17:01-1:22:00).
      Summary: Kinsella defends anarchy and critiques IP’s harms in the Q&A, while Peikoff and Valliant emphasize state necessity and creator rights, underscoring philosophical differences.
  • 1:22:01-1:29:56 (Conclusion and Final Q&A, ~8 minutes)
    Description: Kinsella concludes, urging rejection of IP and state coercion as incompatible with libertarian property rights, directing listeners to c4sif.org for resources like Against Intellectual Property (1:22:01-1:25:00). Peikoff makes a final defense of limited government, arguing it optimizes liberty by preventing anarchy’s chaos, while Valliant accuses Kinsella of utopianism, reiterating Rand’s principles (1:25:01-1:27:00). A final audience question on IP enforcement prompts Kinsella to emphasize market alternatives, while Peikoff insists on state-backed law, with Mossoff ending the debate due to time (1:27:01-1:29:56). The debate concludes with little common ground, reflecting deep ideological divides. Key Themes:
    • Kinsella’s call to reject IP and state coercion, with resource direction (1:22:01-1:25:00).
    • Peikoff and Valliant’s final Objectivist defense of state and IP (1:25:01-1:27:00).
    • Final Q&A on IP enforcement, highlighting ongoing divide (1:27:01-1:29:56).
      Summary: Kinsella concludes by advocating anarchy and IP abolition, while Peikoff and Valliant defend Objectivism’s state and IP principles, with the final Q&A underscoring irreconcilable differences.

Notes
The summary is based on the transcript at stephankinsella.com for KOL454, a 1-hour-29-minute debate recorded on February 12, 2025. The time blocks are segmented to cover 5-15 minutes, with lengths (7, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, and 8 minutes) reflecting natural content divisions, such as opening statements, key arguments, and Q&A. The final block is shorter due to the debate’s end, but all key content is captured. The debate’s civil yet intense tone, driven by philosophical differences, is reflected, with Kinsella’s libertarian arguments clashing with Peikoff and Valliant’s Objectivist principles. The Economic Policy Journal posts from Wenzel are irrelevant, as they pertain to KOL038, not KOL454, and are not used. If you need further adjustments, additional details, or analysis of another episode, please let me know!

TRANSCRIPT FROM YOUTUBE

welcome to the rational egoist I’m your host Michael libowitz and with us today

is Stephan canella he is a retired patent attorney attorney a prominent

libertarian author and he also writes uh for a substack I believe he’s written

numerous books and we’re here to debate three propositions Stefan welcome to the show

or welcome back to the show and to the live stream for the first time thank you U you should say prominent objectivist

but that depends of on our uh our definition of objectivism well then we’re going to have to debate about that

for an hour and we don’t want we don’t that we’ll save that for another another time but I do find it interesting that

you you would say that I bet you there’s many people that are surprised to to to hear you uh make the claim so the the

first proposition that we’re going to debate is that there is nothing wrong

with Ludwig vanon mis’s is subjective view of values you are going to be

taking the affirmative in that and I will be taking the negative and I will

let you go first why is there nothing wrong with mises’s subjective view of

value okay so I think that there is something wrong with ames’s defense of

Rights um I don’t think he really has one and he doesn’t pretend to um I think

he’s more what we would call consequentialist some people s that call it utilitarian and again the word utilitarian and the

word subjectivist have different meanings in different context so um most

people by consequentialist they think of someone who’s utilitarian and by that they mean someone who believes you should measure um uh the value of

actions by their by its utility net utility for society and and and usually

in Cardinal terms and mises would oppose that because his subjective understanding of economic

um is that value is um subjective to the person and that is not measurable it’s

not quantifiable so he would opposed utilitarianism in that sense but I do

think he’s more of a consequentialist in the sense of he basically says if you

understand economics and the way economics works that if you favor prosperity and um Harmony among men then

a a private property system is the way to achieve that so it’s consequential in the sense of if you want to achieve

prosperity and peace then you should favor private property rights um and I do think that’s actually compatible with

a principled approach of objectivism or or My sort of hoppan uh argumentation

ethics um approach I think that uh as even Rand said um um um the moral is the

Practical I don’t think we can expect there to be any Divergence or any dichotomy between things that make sense

and work and things that are Justified on principle they kind of they converge so it’s not surprising me as his his

basic overall libertarian or liberal political views um would coincide with a

more principled approach even though he doesn’t have a whole theory of it um so that’s number one um on utilitarianism

on subjectivism I think Rand uses the word subjective and by the way I agree with rand’s criticism of what she means by

subjectivism okay so I take that to be a criticism of the of the the

non-objectivity of values and the um and the inability to know nature uh which is

her interpretation of sort of a her interpretation of K and kism I don’t

know that her interpretation of Kant himself is correct um I do think that might be

her her attacking or her criticism of a modern version of Kant uh pop

in America among American philosophers and to the extent that she’s describing that right I agree with her criticism I

do think that they’re wrong to say that we can’t know reality that’s her that’s

skepticism and idealism and I think um she’s right to favor objective ethics in

in the sense that she means okay so when she attacks subjectivism I think she uses that word to attack those things um

I don’t know if that’s the right word to use to be honest because the word sub subjective has another connotation in

economics which is what mises uses so when mises uses the word subjective he doesn’t mean that values are relative he

doesn’t mean we can’t know the Universe um so he’s not being a content in the sense that ran criticizes all he’s

saying is that when we describe what Human Action is and econom therefore

econom uh economics economics is an attempt to systematically describe the

consequences of Human Action which is the attempt by humans to achieve ends

goals in a world of scarcity so we applo we employ means using our reason and our

knowledge uh to to achieve our ends so that’s just a structure of action and that’s not a normative or a prescriptive

or an ethical description of it it doesn’t say that it’s good it just says that’s what it is and so in that

perspective he simp he’s simply saying that uh the value that you’re seeking to achieve is

demonstrated by your actions so it’s subjective to you subjective to the subject that’s all it means and I don’t

really think that’s incompatible with Ran’s focus on with Ran’s understanding of Economics

itself um Rand herself talks about values as something that one acts to gain and or keep and that is very

similar to The misesian View that uh we demonstrate our values or our

preferences in action like you whatever you’re seeking to achieve the end or

goal of Your Action you demonstrate that you value it more than the things you chose not to pursue right um by the fact

that you did it uh so that’s very similar to rand’s view so when Rand attacks mises’s subjectivism she’s just

attacking the the same word but it’s it’s used to denote something different than what Rand is criticizing when she

criticized subjectivism and I think it would be clearer if Rand simply says I’m attacking um the non-objectivity of

Rights and I’m attacking the the inefficacy of reason of this version of

K that she has in mind um instead of saying I I’m attacking subjectivism um

just like if you attack relativism even that word has different meanings there’s relativity in physics there’s moral

relativism uh there’s just the relational idea that things are relative to each other some of those are

innocuous some of those are loaded some of those are bad some of those are neutral some of those are good um so

again it’s not relativism and objectivism she’s criticizing its

non-objectivity of values and um and uh the and the inability to know

the world so she she’s she’s defending a version of realism in her skep in her empir in her epistemology and she’s

defending um rational objective values rooted in the nature of man both of

which I agree with by the way in stated in general terms like that um so that would be my disagreement with her with

her criticism or some of her followers criticisms of mises and by the way she

couldn’t have been too critical of mises because she really had a strong soft spot for Mees as compared to hyek okay

um and I agree with most of her criticisms of Hayek by the way I’m I’m not an admir of H Hayek to be honest at

all um at all unlike my fellow misit the two people for some reason they include

him up there with rothbart and with with with mises and haa um Hayek to me is a

totally different character even mil Freedman to my mind is better than than hyek in many ways better as a

Libertarian anyway okay so that’s that’s what I would say in defense of mises’s

um subjectivism okay thank you Stefan so

first let me just say that I have a soft spot for misus as well misus is my favorite Economist uh I’ve read

virtually everything he’s written I find his Arguments for the most part very

strong and I I would agree with you that that when IR Rand is attacking

subjectivity when it comes to values she’s arguing that no values in fact are

objective I.E values are real that you can discover correct

values um I think there is a problem with Ran’s definition of value I’ve

addressed that in my book and I’ve addressed it in interviews because her definition of value is that which you

seek to gain and or keep is not consistent with her overall theory of value and in other words her definition

of value implies subjectivism because if anything I seek to gain or keep has

value then it’s by in necessity subjective but her overall structure of

how she argues for the objectivity of values I believe to be correct and is inconsistent with a subjective view now

I happen to think that mises’s point where where he gets it right is that it’s the subjective

evaluations of consumers and producers on a Market that leads to market prices

that leads to the market structure yes it it the the objectivity of values is

completely irrelevant there it’s what people want if people want things that’s bad the prices of those things are going

to go up those are going to be the things that are going to be produced but it’s simply not true that misus only

regards economic values as subjective and I’ll was just share a thing a few

quotes with you with regards to them values there cannot be any question of Truth or falsity that’s from Theory and

history what the theorem of subjectivity evaluation means is that there is no standard available which would enable us

to reject any ultimate Val Judgment of value is wrong false or erroneous in the

way we can reject an ex existential proposition is manifestly false

furthermore there is no such thing as a normative science a science of what ought to be normative of course

referring to ethics morality then he says ethical ideas of Duty and conscience demand nothing less than the

blindest faith that is from socialism David Gordon has written at least two

essays for The misus Institute where he addresses uh how misus is not a moral

realist how he does not believe there can be an objective morality uh Murray rothbard mises’s student in an article

for The misus Institute says misus while a praxiological or epistemological

absolutist is unfortunately an ethical relativist so mises’s concept of

subjective value goes far beyond mere economics he ultimately was an a

moralist who didn’t believe there can be a morality even his utilitarianism is phrased in a way that

if these are the ends that you want and given that most people want specific ends then the free market of free

society would be the way to achieve them he never says this is what people ought to want only if they want it if they

want peace if they want Prosperity this is the way to get it so ultimately

mises’s concept of subjective value is totally inconsistent with Ran’s idea of

objective value okay uh first of all I think I would

agree with some of your criticisms of mises there it’s just that I don’t so here’s why mises is revered and useful

to us okay as people like us that are I would say we fellow liberals in the in

the general sense right we believe in human Freedom Liberty property rights uh justice Prosperity that kind of stuff um

number one his his really solid understanding of Economics itself okay

so let’s just talk about economics economics per se and mis’s understanding of it now he happened to be a liberal

too and I think that was because he was a decent person and he did want peace and prosperity and he had a rough

understanding that the way to achieve that is a free market economic system so to that extent I think he’s right I

don’t know if even you would disagree with that so far okay so um the reason

he’s useful is because he he he gives us a good foundation of economic understanding which we can use to

improve our understanding of the of the of the of the um of the argument for Liberty and rights um and to understand

you know how to advocate for that and how to deepen our understanding of it

so so far there’s nothing wrong with that and and when he talks about economics so you mentioned Rand I find

interesting that you okay so I like how you’re willing to disagree with Rand okay although I’m a little surprised

because I thought you were against the okay against the uh open objectivism

thing in the David Kelly group and yet you are willing yourself to say I don’t like her word selfishness I prefer

egoism and you you think there’s something slightly wrong with her um want me to explain real quickly go ahead

go what I mean is when I’m against the open objectivists is if they find something

that they believe to be wrong or if they find something to be new it doesn’t mean that they’re wrong in their finding

they’re wrong and that it would then be objectivism so while I can critique IR Ran’s definition of value I don’t then

substitute my own and say this is part of objectivism and this is what you can you should accept it’s not open in that

sense I just think that she was wrong about that but I don’t think her definition undercuts her broader theory

of values any more than I think that her idea that government gains its Authority

by means of consent which I disagree that government requires consent uh to

have jurisdiction I don’t think that undercuts her theory of Rights you understand so there are areas I disagree

understand but to be to be Technical and precise and maybe pantic so you would maybe call someone like David Kelly a

Neo objectivist right or or Tor MCC I personally would be with that that terminology yes but you but then you are

too you’re also a Neo objectivist you’re both types NE objectivist to be honest with you Stephan there was a time when I

wouldn’t even call myself an objectivist because I disagreed with her on some instances I was convinced to do so by a

friend of mine um he talked me into it who is a prominent objectivist he said that my disagreements with her aren’t so

much as to un fundamentals to disqualify me as being an objectivist and I finally

I finally just uh said okay you know that’s cool I ultimately don’t really care about the title to be perfectly

honest with you I don’t understand but it does allow for somebody to get a basic understanding of My Views if I say

an objetive just like yeah just like I say libertarian even though there’s Anarchist and minarchist Libertarians it’s enough to get the conversation

going and even though some people have rejected the word libertarian because they don’t want to be Associated like Jeff Tucker with those people anymore

I’m too stubborn to give it up yet um I gave it up also because I used to call myself a libertarian

well I don’t think there’s a the only better term I’ve come up with is consensualist or cooperati um

voluntarist is not good um Anarchist is not good it has too many connotations uh

in any case um uh I’m just saying that technically speaking you you agree with

most of Rand but you have some differences David Kelly agrees with most of Rand he has some differences I agree

with most of Rand but I have some differences now you might have a difference of degree or different judgment as to whether one’s close or

different enough to be included in the definition but still we’re all based on Rand but with some differences and then

the one other question might be whether you can still call yourself that like you might say well David Kelly is no you

know they differ too much to you call they shouldn’t call themselves that but but whatever that’s I agree that’s just

terminology and truth and advertising so to speak um my point though is

Ran’s definition of value the way you just explained it if you’re right and I haven’t studied it just now really

closely again um I think I would agree with her and not with you and by her definition it’s even more close to Mees

because she’s just defining what what value is I think she would in other cases say something like a rational Man

by because of his nature and because of his choice to live as a man um ought to

pursue values appropriate to his nature something like that um but it doesn’t mean that if you pursue the wrong values

that they’re not values I mean would you say that someone pursuing a totally evil

irrational end based upon values we would condemn

as evil is they’re not really values how would you here here’s the problem words

many of them have different meanings sometimes words have contrary meanings like for instance the word sanction the

word sanction can be used both to mean approve and punish I agree right so the

word value there there’s multiple senses in which it can be used one of them is a

verb and there’s a noun number one there’s yeah there’s there’s that which I value yeah and then there’s that which

has value now in ethics the two ought to align it doesn’t mean they will

unfortunately with Ran’s definition she defines it in such a way as to as to

make it subjective but that’s not consistent with her idea of measuring it

against a standard with life as the standard and then then coming to conclusion about what you should do the

virtues and so on and so on and Leonard peof actually gives a lecture on this very thing I came to this determination

in prison after studying Rand and misus for years and driving myself virtually

nuts as to who was correct and and how to resolve it but Leonard peof actually

gives a lecture explaining this Harry Binswanger in in an episode where I

interviewed him and he asked me where I disagreed with her and I said here he said well that isn’t actually her

definition he said that’s just a preliminary statement which I thought was a little you know a little odd and

and kind of I don’t want to say cop out but I just didn’t I didn’t agree with it I didn’t find it convincing well that’s

that’s a little bit like a u the way that the the Orthodox randians treat

rand’s kind of comments about a woman president uh you know they don’t really agree with her and they they but they

say well that wasn’t essential to objectivism what she said that was just her personal so they they found a way to

not have to disagree with her well I I got to I disagree with you there and here’s why because she has said that her

philosophy is put forth in her novels and non-fiction books she also endorsed Leonard pof’s lecture as being the only

definitive um statement of her philosophy earlier she endorsed

Nathaniel Brandon’s yes I know lectures on on objectivism she she never withdrew

that did she her her endorsement um not that not that I know of of him as a person yes um so but my point only is

that nowhere in any of that is there anything about a woman President right

they’re philosophical fundamentals that are put for wait a minut you you just said her nonfiction I mean that would her non-fiction books she doesn’t she

wrote an article where she talked about against the woman president but that’s a little pedantic that’s like saying well

because she chose not to put it down in print it doesn’t count I mean well I’m saying that it’s not a part of of her

philosophy I’m not saying it doesn’t count as her belief I’m just saying it’s not Phil philosophy necessarily deals

with fundamentals and She lays out the fundamentals that it deals with in her um she you know the the one foot thing

but at any rate we’re we’re kind of getting far a field but this does show what what the next subject is going

going to be about in my opinion about epistemology because in epistemology a

definition has to be the the fundamental characteristic of the thing which you’re

defining so when it comes to objective value the fundamental thing isn’t that

you have to pursue it the fundamental part of objective value is that it’s

good for you so if you look and I’ve did massive amounts of research on on the

word value and the definition of value is actually in the sense with which ran

uses it any object or quality desirable okay a means or end in itself okay

before we before we get to that are you are you going to topic to now or no no no no I’m I’m going back to you just to

address your question about about the word value so I by by the way I agree

with everything you said about misus in your second goar around I find misus extremely useful I disagree I think that

morality leaves the best argument for capitalism and for freedom however I

think it needs to be buttressed by a consequentialist account which I think mises provides my only disagreement well

I have others mostly with the his idea of the a priority but that’s Nei here nor there for this but his subjective

concept of value is specifically what I’m I’m criticizing because it extends

Beyond economics and into the field of ethics and he specifically has made numerous comments on that and like I

said David Gordon uh Murray rothbart have also commented on it that’s why I say it’s inconsistent with an objective

concept of value I agree with you I just think that that that is his his economics I think his economics and the

way he employees subjective value to describe in a purely descriptive sense the consequences of Human Action is not

inconsistent with objectivism I agree with you on the criticism of his statements that um it’s impossible to

have a science of ethics and all this kind of stuff but no one relies upon that and that’s not part of his

economics it’s not part of his Reliance upon subjective value in economics and

and in fact hop who’s you know hoppan and even rothar to an extent but certainly haa would disagree because haa

thinks you can have a science of Ethics which he’s done using a a form of prology which misus wouldn’t have agreed

with so it’s just that I just think misus didn’t hold himself self out to be a deep expert on that topic he didn’t

talk about it a lot and people don’t rely on it and I and not only that I mean it’s it’s just like uh what did you

say it was a harmless error for someone else a randan or someone to uh I forgot I didn’t but I didn’t but

your your uh your knowledge of law is coming into play with that term I don’t

mean harmless ER Harless error yeah you meant but it was something I forgot who you talking about earlier but um um I

think M’s mistake there doesn’t taint his economic analysis and it doesn’t T I don’t think so either agist case for for

for the free market and and for society um but I think he’s just wrong but like

if but I don’t think but but I think he actually was an atheist he just didn’t want to say it he had a clever argument

against God which he you know he said that you know God could never act because he would never have uneasiness

which means he can exist yes you know but he didn’t go he didn’t pursue that

because that wasn’t his interest and likewise he didn’t try to come up at least he didn’t try to come up with a theory of Ethics um uh neither did

Milton Freedman for you know Milton Freedman thought we can’t know what the right way to live is and therefore

because we’re ignorant of the right way to live therefore we should be tolerant and not force people to live the good

life so his case for Liberty was unfortunately we can’t we can’t be totalitarians and force people because

we don’t know the right way it wasn’t the best defense of Liberty but no again he didn’t focus on that in his writing

um no and by the way contrary to many objectivists and Libertarians I find Great Value in fredman’s economics I do

too I think he has problems but but I do have I I I do find Value in it okay so

resolved M was wrong that there can’t be an objective ethics but his economics still has incredible

value can we agree on that yes but I wanted to one thing you said yeah I agree with all that what you said you

said that value the way you’re defining it and the way you think it’s defining in the dictionary and all this um is U

is something something now you I notice you I think you use the word thing like an object that has value the the the

problem is the the structure of Human Action is that it’s in basically the structure of

Human Action is not to acquire things of value the the whole structure of Human

Action is to attempt to change the future because we we have some awareness

of the past we have an awareness of our present and the world around us and we have an awareness of our values and our

goals and we have an awareness of cause and effect laws of cause and effect and we have some idea of what is coming in

the future future if we do not intervene and take an action and we have an

awareness that we have possibly the chance to change that so every action is an attempt to attempt to divert the

course of Affairs to achieve a future that is different than the one that’s coming if we don’t intervene so in a

sense that’s the general structure of action is an attempt to achieve an end and by end we mean an end state in the

future different than what would otherwise happen that inst state is just what we prefer for whatever reason and

we we therefore value that happening so that’s how I would use the word value there we subjectively value it and if

we’re rational then we we’re basing that rationally on the values that a rational ought to have but what we’re trying to

achieve is not the attainment of a thing it’s the achievement of a different state of affairs now that could just be

I want to see the Northern Lights from from um from Iceland and so I I I do

what I need to do to get there at the right time and see the Northern lights and if I do that I’ve achieved what meus

would call a profit or psychic profit because I’ve had a successful action and I satisfied my the thing that I I

desired that I valued which was having this experience but I didn’t get

ownership of anything I didn’t acquire anything except the satisfaction and the knowledge and the memory of that

experience only a small subset of actions have the goal of attaining

ownership or acquisition or possession of an actual object that’s only I would

say 1% of all actions are you know if you wanted to quantify it Stephen I got to interrupt because you the definition

that I employed was any object or quality desirable as a means or end in

itself so you’re talking about not just objects but you’re talking about experiences and by the way like love for instance love is a tremendous value but

it doesn’t impart ownership but it’s not not it’s not a thing love is not a thing is it no it’s a it’s it’s well it’s an

exist I don’t know what you mean by thing it’s not it’s not some concrete that I can go out and grab no but it

nonetheless is something that I can value and I can and that not only I can value but that has value if the object

that I’m loving that you know the woman that I love is a value to me and not you know some kind of Fatal Attraction that

would that would be not a good thing the way I would word that is because I think we’re in rough agreement but I’m trying

to avoid wording things in a way that gives rise to the mistake of intellectual property okay that’s

ultimately no no no I and that’s I I know but the problem there with with

that is I don’t want to now we’re going to get intellectual property and go sick but ultimately words have reference in

reality words mean right so we we can’t address the words that we use based on

an end argument we’re trying to make no I’m not no I’m not I’ve just I’ve seen the mistake before I’ve seen the

confusion I’ve seen what what what imp Precision in terms gives rise to mistake in conclusions so I’m just trying to be

careful that’s all I’m saying and so the way I would word it is I would say that um uh like love you to be precise if I’m

being correct you said every word has a reference I mean I think speaking every concept has a reference word is a it

denotes a concept and the concept has a reference if it’s a valid concept I mean

some Concepts have no reference yeah I’m speaking of valid concept ghost does there’s nothing in reality that

corresponds to to ghost or uh Santa or God for instance just to offend whatever

people here are watching that are religious and I think it’s a stretch to say that you know if my goal is to make

my niece um Smile by performing a magic trip for her that that what I attain is

some quality that just seems to be a stretch it’s like you attained um an end a state of affairs that you preferred

and you valued it now I wouldn’t say it has value I would say that it’s it’s it’s rational

to have that as something that you value um if if my goal is to kill

Humanity I would say in descriptive terms that’s I’m that’s the value are

pursuing but it’s it’s based upon evil um you know evil values or preferences

that’s because there’s two senses in which the word value at least two can be used in that sense destruction and death

is what you value but but what you value doesn’t actually have value correct so

that’s why I agree that’s why I think that the criticism of Misa is not Misa when he says okay when he says Human

Action is you demonstrate what you value by acting to achieve it that’s just saying what you

value that’s true but he didn’t just say that he went on to say that nothing can

have value and that’s I would agree with you that that I would even then I might agree with him nothing has value but but

nothing I would say nothing some things ought not to have value that’s the way I would put it like there’s a normative

criticism you can say if this guy values the death of the human race that’s his value but it I guess you could say it

doesn’t have objective value which is but misus would not criticize him misus would not say he was unethical and

that’s where misus is wrong well he’s he doesn’t have a theory that he he just

doesn’t I agree he’s wrong but he doesn’t have a he doesn’t try to advance a theory that but then he should say but

then he should say as you and I discussed earlier there’s it’s okay to not know things right you just say I don’t know but misus made definitive

statements about this topic yeah I AG so that in in there he’s he’s wrong now but

there there was something you said when you quoted him I wish I could remember but it was a little a little fledge he

put in there which might save kind of what he said because he says something I think what he was thinking to to try to

defend him what he might have been thinking was in the praxiological methods of

Economics right we can’t use those methods to know

to have an objective ethical science and that’s not part of Economics so he might have been just trying to distance

economics to make sure people understand that it’s value free or ver fry and just an economic descriptive discipline

um but yeah he probably shouldn’t have said it’s impossible to have a whole another moral theory of

values I agree with you okay now the next uh subject we’re going to discuss

is I recently had a debate with Jack Lloyd That was supposed to be objectivism against his libertarian

volunteerism he calls it right and it devolved into a debate on epistemology

now you said and I know that you might want to clean up the language a little bit here but that that epistemology is

irrel an to ethics and politics so you told me that’s not exactly what you mean

so what exactly do you mean and why is it the case right well in that particular discussion so first of all it

it kept you from getting to your actual debate which was which which was really what which

one is the best uh how did you word your debate it was it which one objectivism or or libertarianism which one gives the

best case for free market or something like that yes for capitalism yes yeah and what you meant there believe as you

elaborated was um so you were saying that the objectivist case is stronger

because we have it has an appeal to other deeper values that we have it

appeals to philosophy it appeals to morality and ethics and she gives stories that a you know it’s not just

this bloodless thing about producing more stuff and stuff like that right so

and I agree with you there’s a reason that Rand is the first libertarian and her her novels Garner to following she

appealed is something inside of us we’re more than just um you know producing

efficiency machines we actually have values that’s the reason we do things and the integration of the stories and

and the uh you know her condemnation of of of evil people and horrible things it

all for me it’s part of the case it’s part of the way you persuade people it’s part of the way you get them hooked and the way you get them interested and also

if you do if you are dealing with people that are totally Skeptics and nihilist

then her her realist case for for for metaphysics and epistemology is is the right counter I

believe okay and I think if if you came across a complete altruist who basically is is a um uh is

a misanthrope someone who doesn’t want Humanity some people want Humanity to you know the the people that the vem the

the voluntary human extinction movement who I know one of these people you know they’re pretty malevolent and they’re

pretty nihilistic um either you don’t have a conversation with these people because you treat them

as like someone you don’t want in your house or you know or you have to go down to

deeper levels of philosophy and epistemology and ethics with them I would agree with that and for those

people and even for the average person you’re trying to attract them to the ca the moral case for capitalism not just

the economic case the morals are useful so in a sense I think

that the randan case in a general sense can be stronger uh for making the case for freedom and

for and for liberalism so I don’t disagree with you on that um but I don’t think that’s a criticism of

libertarianism per se uh because you could be a Libertarian

and you can agree with all that like I do or you could be a Libertarian and you could think that’s unnecessary in which case I would disagree with them the

point is you didn’t even get to that point about why object objectivism is stronger because you got admired in this

debate about whether Jack could know things or not and if Jack had been

acting really as a nihilist or as a radical skeptic in his in his claims and

using that as a reason to criticize objectivism or the liberalism

you were supporting I would have agreed that you would have to go there and say listen you either have a confused

understanding of epistemology or you have the wrong epistemology or something like that I just think you were it

was so the reason I say epistemology is not necessary to bring up is because

you start on the highest level of of agreement with your with with the other person because otherwise you have to go

back down to the there’s no stopping point to where you go back you know you could build you could start from

elementary number Theory and logic and then go to you know definitions and

epistemology and metaphysics and and all you could go all the way up and you wouldn’t be able to do that in an hour

anyway right but if you already agree on the on certain things

your common ground you build on the common ground you see where you disagree see where you diverge and I don’t think

that Lloyd disagrees in Practical terms with

your with your and my Baseline understanding of the way of what nature in reality is um he can’t really defend

it using the way he was defending it in the discussion with you but I mean like this why I mentioned on Twitter I mean

do you really think that someone 500 years ago who thought that they knew

that there was a sun and an earth and that grass would die if you you know did

this to it and uh you know if you cut your arm you would bleed I mean I would

think that they had they actually had knowledge and they had a right to believe they they knew these things even though they couldn’t explain they had no

theory of epistemology they couldn’t articulate why I mean you can have knowledge without having the ability to

articulate the theory of epistemology oh I I don’t disagree and the thing is is as you know

when you go to court right you stipulate certain things for the record so then you don’t have to argue about them yes

so I relistened to my discussion with Jack this morning and what happened was I didn’t know it was going to go that

route because the things I were saying I didn’t think were controversial I wanted to get him to stipulate things for the record to avoid arguing about him when

we got to the idea and this is why you can’t and my dogs are going crazy but here’s why you can’t avoid

epistemology often because he said that he didn’t agree

with the objectivity of values he didn’t think you could have objective values and from there it went on to him saying

that you can’t have objective knowledge so now the conversation switches from what we’re talking about to epistemology

and years ago I read a book by Stephen Hicks where Steph Hicks talks about that very thing it was in uh explaining postm

ISM or postmodernism explained I can’t really remember what the title is but he talks about this and I’ve always been

keenly aware of when this happens he says note when you’re in a discussion with somebody and you have them on the ropes they will turn and say well nobody

can really know anything it’s a matter of opinion he said now notice what happens here is the subject gets

switched from whatever you’re talking about yes to epistemology and that’s what happened with Jack and once you get

to the point where somebody says in a conversation no there’s no objective ethics and there’s no objective

knowledge well now he’s opening he’s closing a door on discussion because anything I say he can say is wrong but

he also had a very interesting trick in that he was claiming objective knowledge

and claiming an objective ethics while at the same time denying them when they were coming from me and so now if you

look at let’s just take three schools for instance of of epistemology right T

say subjectivism intrinsic ISM and objectivism if somebody has an what what

intrinsic ISM subjectivism and OB an objectivism right intrinsic ISM means that things exist that Concepts adhere

in objects they exist independent of us they also say that it morality right and

wrong is intrinsic it exists independent of our judgment independent of our goals so if somebody has an

intrinsic idea of epistemology they then go to an intrinsic idea of eth eics

their ethics is conditioned and determined by the epistemology they hold similarly if somebody is a subjectivist

in epistemology and they say you can’t know anything well if I can’t know anything then I can’t know moral right

and wrong so they end up with a subjective ethics now with the objectivist epistemology there’s two

factors right there’s the human mind and there’s the external and and internal realities that that we have and concept

formation is a relationship between the mind and that reality similarly ethics

is a relationship between the human being and the reality that confronts him it’s his life or her life that operates

as the standard but his mind his mind has to judge these things through

rationality as you said to be of value to him and that’s what makes him objective so the three different

epistemological approaches lead to very different approaches on ethics and given

that politics is derived from ethics you’re the political system that you Advocate and why you Advocate It

ultimately stems from your epistemology and that’s why it’s relevant and so I would rather avoid it I don’t like

getting into big epistemological discussions when discussing ethics and politics but it it’s just if somebody is

an intrin assist or if somebody is a subjectivist it’s it’s just unavoidable and for the record had I known that he

was an epistemological subjectivist I wouldn’t even had the discussion I just didn’t know that yeah those are all fair

points let me let me put it this way um so if you’re going to have a discussion about epistemology with someone then

that’s fine but invite them on there knowing that and they should be prepared and they should sure claim to have some

informed opinions about it um and number two um

so me mises himself as we just discussed mises apparently had these comments that

you cannot know an objective ethics and all that now I don’t think he rested that view upon a radical skepticism he

he didn’t rest that view upon the the comment that the he didn’t he didn’t say that because we can’t know anything we

can’t have IR rational ethics he just thought it was outside the scope of science or something like that so sure

likewise even if you disagree with Lloyd on on a rational ethics or or or or or

whether values are subjective or or relative or or whatever the right term is you that doesn’t necessarily have to

rest upon a deeper epistemological argument that oh and that’s because I’m a skeptic and we can’t know anything I

mean so you might have just said well what’s your basis for rights if you

don’t think we can know what man’s what man ought to be valuing according to his nature something like that but um I’m

just simply saying he and but on the other hand he did claim at least in the Twitter afterwards that he’s an expert

on this um uh I just I I just think it was I want to say it was unfair

sandbagging because I don’t think you meant to do it it just kept you from getting to your point and I do think you

maybe there was a way in that debate where you could have said can we can we agree like the stipulation can we agree

on the following things but as you say maybe you couldn’t get him to stipulate

and maybe that was the problem he wouldn’t and not only that the problem was is he claimed he had a way to validate ethics while saying at the same

time there could be no objective ethics he claimed knowledge while then claiming you can’t have knowledge for instance he

said we can he said you can’t know anything but then he said we have to all we can do is go by evidence but how

would we know that there’s evidence me it was just you know I like I said to him on Twitter it was like trying to

nail Jello to a tree right like there was just and I’ve had those

discussions but in believe me in prison that’s part for the course yeah of course right well I I think on Twitter I

I quoted a Misa quote which is you know mis’s and haa both have a very I think

to me it’s a it’s a is is a really good criticism of of of empiricism which is

the The Logical positivism of popper which is the view that the only thing that’s uh the only source of knowledge

is evidence and the only thing that’s scientific is is basically um a a a

falsifiable hypothesis like that’s it uh like everything else is just um Def

definitional and doesn’t give you information it’s toal logical um you know or it’s just uh empty empty

assertions but the pro the problem with that as me is pointed out is what’s the status of that proposition itself if you

say that the only thing we can know is something that is eviden from our senses

that can be tested well then what about the status of that assertion there that’s like in a sense an AR prior thing

that’s at the base of all so in a sense philosophy or or the the things we assume are true or the base of physics

and the empirical Sciences they’re in a sense subsidiary and less important than philosophy itself and those things can’t

be test now I know Rand would have a different view she she would she would have the view where you have a Unity of

reason and empirical knowledge and I don’t strongly disagree with that but even Ran’s arguments are her her

theories are based upon there are certain things we know she called them axiomatic some things we know for

certain right we don’t know the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity and and the idea that there’s

such a thing as Consciousness and a distinction between the Observer and the outside world we don’t know that by um

doing doing a falsifiable experiment any falsifiable experiment you could do has

to presuppose those things are true already so you could never do an experiment that would disprove the law

of identity right yeah well she says that those that the the oxums are self-evident from observation but that

not that they’re here and this kind of goes to your point about misus earlier where you said well misus wasn’t a

subjectivist well in some ways he was he was a conent he writes about the categories he believes that categories

are conditioning uh the human thought he believed that the category of action conditions you know all all our thinking

is one of the categories that conditions are thinking he actually says well if these categories make us think the way

that we do then how can they explain how we can act correctly and he says well

per he says perhaps Evolution has produced them so in essence he says like

K that our brains and our minds are cut off from external reality and are conditioned

by these categories so in that sense he is a subjectivist although he does have some aristan ideas rothbart on the other

hand is pure Arista tilian correct but if and I so if you I would just people listening if they’re interested in this

I would say read hoa’s economic science and the Austrian method where haa basically says so he takes an also

realist contan approach like mises kind of arguably did but it’s even more

explicit and stronger and haa says look this our theory is completely realist and the reason is because action itself

is the ground between the human categories in the mind and reality so you might not agree with that argument

but he definitely is a realist he think there is a tie between Human Action haa

haa I I haven’t read hoa’s epistemology you recommended it to me and I’m I I

want to I’ve just got a lot of other stuff to read but I definitely am interested I’ve only read ho haa on

ethics his argumentation ethics I want to say here real quick somebody in the comments who says Ran’s axioms are

derived from inductions I’m sorry Chris that’s false um Leonard peof makes the case explicitly that axioms are the base

of induction and cannot you cannot induce them because they’re necessary in order to induce to begin with there’s

self-evident is what he says he even corrected himself earlier he said that the law of causality was arrived that by

induction but later on peof corrected that and said no causality is actually necessary I totally agree for induction

he says or say they’re a priority yeah well the well the difference is is that he holds objectivism that there

self-evident from experience whereas misus holds that they’re a logical

structure of the human mind that are conditioning our thinking there are two different things but there in one we can

know reality for what it is in the other we can’t well whatever Merit your criticism of misus has if you read haa

it’s a whole different he makes an attempt to root it in actual ual realist connection between our our senses and

and and and and the concepts and the percepts and the concepts we have in our mind um so I believe H I’m I’m totally

realist and I’m I I agree with Ran’s basically ran Ran’s basic approach here and also that of David Kelly um and I

think I I see no incompatibility with between that and between hoa’s interpretation of mises’s interpretation

of the European version of Kant okay that so I’m I’ve got to I’m going to have to

check out what uh what what haa says but by the way um my disagreements with

David Kelly notwithstanding I I his book evidence of the senses I think is phenomenal I agree as a work on

epistemology nothing to criticize there no pun intended oh because I said

phenomenal nice I I got to tell you Stephan you’re not exactly known for

your sense of humor and that’s one thing that coming to know you from from engaging and doing these interviews is

you do have a great sense of humor you’re known for being prickly but not for having a sense of humor but I don’t mind the prickliness it’s okay as Han

say even I don’t know why people think I’m a nice guy I’m a cuddly little fuzzy bear fuzzy fuzzy little cdy cuddly

cuddly teddy bear um okay well so I do agree with the importance of

epistemology I just think if you talk to your average person okay or your average intelligent person who basically is a

liberal in the sense of of they like Western Society they like Civilization they’re not hostile to their fellow man

they might have rational self-interest in the sense of they prefer their own well-being to that of others they still

want everyone to have good lives if they can they want to live in PE peace and prosperity among each other they have

some rough knowledge of supply and of the laws of Economics I think those people they’re

not going to say well the reason we need to have a a welfare state is because uh

we can’t know anything no listen I think most people are realists when it comes

to epistemology right they don’t need to be explained to them that my microphone is actually here they don’t think the

microphone I’m experienced a phenomenal as opposed to the new middle World none of that but nonetheless when you’re

having discussions and and debates then it becomes relevant the average person

had I said to him will you stipulate for the record that these are uh you know the that that ethics is such and such

that we can know it they would just say yeah you wouldn’t end up with a a big he he quibbled but I think he in the end in

his kind of fumbling way did because he kept saying he he was inarticulate in

explaining like he tried to Fumble around and say well it’s kind of the assumption that we both make and and you

kept saying well then but he said well I know you exist because I’m assuming you exist because you just said this you said how do you how do you know I just

said it yeah because you have to have knowledge but I think

basically he he he thought he had to have a sophisticated defense of just saying look it seems obvious to me that

we both know that we have bodies we live on Earth in the year 2025 the Earth is spherical we we’re Mortals with a finite

lifespan and we live in you know I I think if you would have just conceded that stipulated it if you will then he

would have taken the the gas out of your like you wouldn’t have been you you couldn’t have then said well but you

really don’t have a good def a good criticism of of a good defense of of realism do you it’s like yeah but that

wasn’t what the debate was supposed to be no if he would have just said yes I I think we can have knowledge I would have

said okay and he if he said but I don’t really know how to defend that would have been fine that would have been fine

with me now I would have used that fact as an attack on his Downstream theories

fine that’s that I would have done but we would have gotten to those theories you know what I mean then you could have

pointed out uh a contradiction you said well you’ve already conceed that we know this but now you’re resting this

argument upon we don’t know anything exactly then you could have you said you have to choose are you really not

nihilist are you are you really a skeptic or are you essentially a realist

even if you can’t yeah you have to choose um yeah I I would agree with you on that and I would also agree with you

that the reason object objectivists that they’re kind of right

in viewing philosophy as a unit as as a as a comprehensive whole although why

they only pick four branches and they leave as Aesthetics out in the cold I’m not sure how they why they have Aesthetics Aesthetics is the fifth

Branch yeah but again it’s the fifth it’s not essential what well then well

that we could say the fourth isn’t essential well I’m saying objectiv is don’t regard it as essential I don’t know I don’t know who they are I maybe

me to be honest I’ve never I’ve never I haven’t heard many objectivists say that you you can’t have a a I’ve never heard

them criticize Libertarians they criticize Libertarians because we we only have one of the four

branches is we have politics and we we’ve left out the other three I’ve

never heard them say and you also left out our view of Aesthetics I mean I don’t you know well Aesthetics don’t

condition politics my problem let let me let me just speak let me just speak let me just speak for myself in that a big

problem I have with Libertarians isn’t so much that they lack an ethical Theory

it’s that they introduce ethical Concepts floating in Midstream without

validating those ethical concept take some things for granted but on the other hand sometimes they’re doing that because they know that everyone they’re

talking to already agrees with them um even even some some so I don’t think you need to defend the the virtue of

honesty uh if you agree with it and if you’re David fredman attacked me on it the other day when we had a

debate well so and not just honesty but he has what he calls The Prudent Predator now when I I’m going to debate

Dr fredman on Monday and I’m sure he’s going to raise that as an objection so he would say on a selfin ethic that

honesty is not I think yeah he’s more like me or he’s more like his dad you know his dad his dad’s argument for

Liberty is that because we we have we lack knowledge of the right way to live so we

we don’t have the right to force people to live the right way like it’s such a horrible argument I mean I’ll take it but it’s not the best argument for

Liberty right uh as long as you’re willing to not commit Force against

people I kind of happy with that but if your basis is because we don’t know anything thing you know it’s kind of a

weak way to argue because someone’s going to come along and say well I do know so now I can use the state uh to

force people to live that’s problematic and I think David frean is so wrapped up in logical positivism of his dad and um

and and the Chicago way of looking at what again what true science is science is only testable empirical things I mean

David Freeman and I argued in person at at Liberty libertopia about 12 years ago

uh and he was he said you know my case against he’s not like he’s against intellectual property kind of but not

completely because he doesn’t have any principles about it he says well it depends and he goes because it depends on how the utility works out and I said

well you can’t measure utility it’s a subjective thing in terms of quantities right and it’s interpersonally

incomparable and it’s not a quantity he goes oh no uh Von noyman proved he

showed that you can I mean this to me sounds like the the the Socialists in the 30s who argued against mises’s U uh

uh the CC cul proof that that socialism can’t calculate and they then they came they

said well if we have the right kind of computers we could Tre we been saying well we you and I don’t know exactly

what everyone’s subjective utility u tools are but if you have the right computers and and there because one

noyman showed you can have these equations I mean he sounds a little autistic when he talks like that it’s just not it’s not right uh but it’s

because he’s mired in positivism he thinks that’s the only thing that’s me measurable things anyway that’s that’s

off track but my point is when you talk to him he’s got another paper which you would probably hate um I think there’s a

way to steal man it a little bit but it’s it’s it’s this idea of the optimal amount of not the not only the optimal amount

of punishment but the optimal amount of crime prevention so he basically argues

that um the optimal amount so you and I would say the optimum amount of crime is

zero right the optimal amount of crime in society would be have zero rights violations and he’s got this paper using

these stupid equations where he says and you might want to look this up so you can challenge him on this he says that

no the optim you got to put these equations in and the optimal amount is somewhere between zero and 100 because

and basically the argument is that it would cost too much to stop every crime

so but he’s sort of going back and forth between ethical domains and and economic

descriptive domains that’s funny you said that because in Reading reading Machinery of Freedom over again so you

know some of the sections because I read it years ago and you know when you read something years ago you don’t remember anything but the he it it’s got terms

like rights self- ownership that sort of thing and it drives me crazy when if

you’re going to speak in utility terms stick to it and that that this is so now you know if you have that discussion

with them you end up bouncing back and forth this is what you said I agree but

here’s the interesting question we’re not going to have time to get to the other uh point we wanted to debate we could do it another time but I wanted to

ask you about this there was quite the debate on um X the other day about

whether what the first one was whether David fredman is actually an anarchist

right which to me is he’s an anarchist yeah the next one was his idea that law

could arise on a market that was challenged and he said well how would he know it it it arise on the

market and now you’re you’re a lawyer so you’re familiar with these distinctions

so the claim was made that natural law theorists say there’s

no such thing as man-made law if it’s contrary to natural law that it’s not

law now my understanding of natural law has always been that the idea is you

want your man-made laws in order to be valid to represent the natural law yeah

it’s like the malamin say malam prohibitum distinction what are your thoughts on this first on fredman being

an anarchist seems like so by the way I like David Freeman

I admire and respect him um and David So Milton Freeman is one of

the first books I read which helped make me a Libertarian so even though I disagree with his methodology now and

some of his libertarianism um it was kind of helped me make me a capitalism freedom and free to choose especially

capitalism and freedom were are awesome or were at the time I probably would find more fault with them now but they open my eyes to lots of basic economic

stuff like so so did Henry haslett’s economics one listen and then when I was first an anarchist well first an

objectivist then more like a Libertarian and then um and then an anarchist because of the work of the Tanana Hills

and rothbard and Bruce Benson and also David freedman’s Machinery Freedom now is David free if I read them now I am

much more um uh I mean they open my eyes to lots of things about the possibilities of a free society and

self-organizing groups and things like that but is he an an I mean look I thought nosic was an anarchist at first

because I read his book in law school and I the title is anarchy state in Utopia and he’s supposed to be a Libertarian I thought he was arguing for

Anarchy until I got I don’t know halfway through the book and I realized holy this guy’s arguing for um basically

an Ultram minimal or even worse State um and rothbard of course is eviscerated

that book um but I’m not sure if Freeman’s an anarchist I don’t want to

say that he’s wrong if he self- claims to be but he doesn’t really have a theory of rights at all that I can tell

or he doesn’t even admit that rights exist like you say he uses the term rights so in the law there’s a

descriptive sense of Rights um or like what the law is that’s the positive law

yes um but I would and so I would distinguish and I’ll get to your question about um about natural law uh

and because it’s something I think no one has written yet a case that I think is satisfactory

I have my own views on it but I haven’t articulated them in detail anywhere I’ll tell you what I think about all this um

I think both sides are confused just like both sides are confused about the Free Will debate um um and just like

both sides are confused about the God debate except the randians have the best correct case um and George Smith did too

but even they have some problems but um um Love George Smith by the way I love I

loved him too um or part of his writing he as a as a person he he was well I didn’t know him personally I just mean

that book the case against God I’m talking some other things I’m I’m I I had encountered with with respect to

that but um uh I forgot where I was going with this but um where was I going

with this um natural law uh

um I think I I mess going but anyway on the natural law thing so uh oh no where

David Freeman use these terms so I would distinguish between what we

might call natural law although you can use a better term for this and by that I just mean law that’s

Justified legal law legal principles and and law that’s Justified according to uh

objective and and justifiable ethics okay something you and I would agree with like yeah a law basically law that

that that enforces the property rights that we all agree come from a rational ethics based upon man’s nature okay how

I think of it too so that’s what law is and then and you’re thinking of it the precise way that I try to think of it

and so I think that’s really good like you’re basically being right you’re saying there’s there’s existing positive law positive law is whatever the state’s

enforcing and that is law whether I agree with it or not that’s D so you and I disagree with the natural law guys

because they don’t want to concede that because they put too much emphasis on the power of labels and words they’re

afraid that if you grant some some existing statute let’s call it a statute

is law that you’re conceding that’s legitimate and that’s because they don’t have an objective ethics outside they

basically still either wrap their their theory of authority either in the

state or in God what and God’s a better one to wrap it in but even that is

pushing it back a l you’re still looking for some outside authority to tell you to decree what the basis of all this is

right so um I would distinguish between possess possession and between ownership okay

possession is a factual descriptive term it’s What man does when he acts he possesses and uses means even cruso on

his Island possesses things that has no normative connotations and I wouldn’t

say has no moral connotations to be honest because I I don’t agree with people that ethics is only about

inpersonal relations even cruso on his Island because I’m an objectivist in a sense I would say that things cruso

could do on his Island would be immoral because they don’t further his his his life as a man right uh he wouldn’t be

hurting anyone except himself but it would still be immoral okay but still when he possesses something that’s

purely descriptive action it’s possession when we come in society there’s a possibility of other people

interfering with our possession so we have property rights or legal system that’s supposed to protect our

possession that’s called ownership or property rights Okay so one is a

descriptive term that’s economic and one is a normative or juristic or legal term

and the problem is and then within that you have positive law that’s actually

enforced and then you have the natural law the natural law by definition is just the positive law is unjust to the

extent it doesn’t comport with the I’m sorry the positive law is is inconsist is is unjust if it if it deviates from

what the natural law ideal or standard is that’s how I look at it okay so that’s how I view these things the

problem is the legal positivist like um like HLA Hart he’s a famous One his book

is called the concept of law which is the kind of classic Treatise on This brilliant brilliant work and then his

Nemesis his foil was law Fuller a natural law guy the problem is in my view as a Libertarian and as an

objectivist they’re all in a sense positivist because they all believe there’s a higher authority we have to

resort to uh outside like it’s not like an imminent an IM imminent like there’s

not like a a natural law that you and I would resort to to show here’s why this is wrong here this is right because n

nature says this um the natural law guys so they would say that a a bad law is

not a law at all in fact you can find quotes historical quotes like that law an unjust law is no law at all but to me

that’s just denying but that was just but that was just Augustine right like

when I was I did a lot of research on natural law natural rights and I I they

would say it’s an invalid law meaning it it doesn’t comport with

the natural law but I’m not but they they also say it’s no law at all but when they say it’s no law at all that’s their way of saying it’s an invalid law

but to deny that it’s a law is just silly I mean it it is a it is against

the law in America right now to to sell cocaine or to evade income taxes it

simply is the law yeah although we both disagree with it right well I well I I

don’t disagree that it’s the law I no I mean it’s not just it’s not just it shouldn’t be so that’s how I distinguish

it and a lot of these natural law types they don’t want to admit it’s just like the inal property thing a lot of people say hey Stefan I agree with you that

intellectual property is not property and I like I said my argument is not that it’s not property it’s not about

the word property my argument is that that law is an unjust law because it invades property rights you know it

seems like a a nitpicking distinction but you have to be clear about these things um so in the legal positivism

debate I would say I agree with the legal positivist and like Oliver wend Holmes he’s got this famous legal

positivist it’s called the prediction theory of law or the bad man theory of law it’s like if you want to know what

the law is in society and by law he means what the enforced law by the authorities is doesn’t necessarily mean

it’s just it’s just what the law happen if you want to know what that law is is you have to think like a Badman would

would act would think and he the bad man’s thinking what are the consequences to me if I violate this law so if the

government said it’s illegal not to pay your taxes but there’s zero penalty for doing it I would say it’s not really a

law it’s just a Hort it’s just a recommendation that you’re free to ignore because there’s no penalty it’s

really there’s a word for that isn’t there a legal term for that when that happens when a law doesn’t uh is never

enforced I can’t remember what dude maybe well there’s duuude if you talk the word there’s a word duuude but that

simply means a law that’s like um uh there’s another word for it but it’s a word that’s it’s a law that’s been so

long out of force that we don’t consider it to be because no one enforces it anymore and it’s it’s so old that we

wouldn’t even view it as legitimate law anymore but it’s not because they don’t enforce it it so if we if you had a law

that had no penalty explicitly I would just say that’s not a law you’re just misdescribed it’s not a law but the

point is the legal positives are right in in in in saying that we can identify

something as a law based upon whether the the legal system in a given Society

treats it like it’s illegal right and that could be whether it’s a common law rule or a statute a legislated statutory

rule either one the if the courts will enforce it then it’s effectively a law

right um and I I disagree with the natural law guys who says that that is giving that’s

giving a sort of a power to the law by admitting that it’s and because I don’t think it admits that it’s legitimate

because I have distinct a distinct standard that’s outside of that it’s outside of the state it’s by my human

reason and my human my objective human values that’s how I judge what the law is I again I come up with a set of

principles which are compatible with human nature in the world we live in and that’s basically self-interest and the

non-aggression principle and the right to pursue our values by using things in the world rearranging them appropriating

them and so on which leads to the core values that or principles that you build

a legal system on or that you should build it on now I do think that in the world there is a lot of leeway in in the

details of Any Given legal system I think you could have a hundred different C countries or communities in the world

with different customs and traditions and language and legal systems that that

that evolve in a different way but they’re all are basically implementing the core principles we all agree with

don’t murder people they have a property right to their stuff like but there’s details on how you implement it and I I don’t think I

would call that system illegitimate if system a does it does it differently than system B which by the way a lot of

these OCD Libertarians don’t like because they and a lot of rans don’t like it which is why I think a lot of

randians want there to be objective law by which they mean a final solution that

is uniform across like they some objectivists would almost prefer a a final answer in one supreme

court that rules the whole world even though they’re even if they’re wrong rather than a 100 jurisdictions that

have different results it’s like this obsession with with uh with with a final

single authority to decide things which to my mind is not it’s not it’s not U

you don’t need to believe that to believe in objective rights okay now we didn’t get to get to

uh our value cre debate and I promise you if you’re willing to come back on and discuss it we definitely will

Stephan thank you so much uh it’s always a pleasure to debate discuss and just

talk with you it’s always excellent I I really appreciate it where can uh people that are watching where can they find

you uh Stefan conell.com and it’s NS consella on

Twitter all right thank you so much and for now this is the rational eal with signing out I’m Michael elowitz till

next time [Music] all right I thought that was nice

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The Freedom Scale

The Freedom Scale, Christopher CookThere is apparently yet another new libertarianism-related book in the works: The Freedom Scale: An Accurate Measure of Left and Right, by one Christopher Cook, whom I have never heard of before (h/t Adam Haman). See:

My initial impressions from a quick glance: [continue reading…]

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I have argued against voluntary slavery contracts previously (see “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability,” Legal Foundations of a Free Society [LFFS], Part III.C.1; KOL285 | Disenthrall: Contracts with Stephan Kinsella; see also my query to Grok, appended below).

As I wrote in LFFS:

But in the case of an attempted voluntary slavery contract, the promisor, by saying, “I promise to be your slave,” or “I give my body to you” does not commit an act of aggression. It does not create any victim who has a right to retaliate against him. So if the would-be slave decides to renege on his promise and run off, the would-be master has no right to use force to stop him. It is always current consent that matters. If a girl promises a kiss at the end of the date and the boyfriend an hour later kisses her, she cannot claim it was nonconsensual. In effect, she communicated her consent, she set up a standing presumption that is reasonable to rely on—until and unless she changes her mind. If at the end of the date she announces she no longer wants a kiss, it is that consent that matters. It is always the most recent consent that matters since this is the best evidence for what was consented to. There is nothing in libertarianism that says people cannot change their minds. To simply state that you can make an irrevocable, binding promise is just question-begging since it is just another way of sneaking in the assumption that our bodies are alienable, even though our rights to our body do not stem from homesteading or acquisition but rather from our direct control of them.

[continue reading…]

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 453.

I was approached recently by my old friend, legal scholar and philosopher David Koepsell (a fellow opponent of IP who appeared on the John Stossel show with me a few years back), 1 as one of his students at Texas A&M, Eliot Kalinov, was interested in my and Hoppe’s work on argumentation ethics and related issues. I offered to have a discussion with Eliot about these issues for his research and publication plans, which we did yesterday (Feb. 18, 2025). We recorded it for his own purposes, and I post it here, with his permission, for those who might find the topics discussed of interest. He is very bright and asked very intelligent questions. We discuss mainly the topics noted in the title of this episode.

Grok shownotes: [0:03–28:37] In this episode of the Kinsella on Liberty podcast (KOL453), Stephan Kinsella engages in a discussion with a Texas A&M Classics major and Philosophy Club president about Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics and related libertarian concepts. The student, introduced to libertarianism through figures like Liquid Zulu and Kinsella’s work on intellectual property (IP), seeks to explore argumentation ethics for an undergraduate philosophy journal paper. Kinsella explains that argumentation ethics, which posits that certain normative presuppositions (like self-ownership and property rights) are inherent in rational discourse, is a compelling framework for grounding libertarian principles. He clarifies its transcendental nature, avoiding the is-ought gap by deriving norms from the act of argumentation itself, and addresses its persuasive power despite not always convincing non-libertarians like socialists.

[28:38–1:33:11] The conversation delves into critiques of argumentation ethics, particularly from Bob Murphy and Gene Callahan, focusing on issues like the necessity of property rights due to scarcity and the applicability of norms to edge cases (e.g., children, mentally impaired individuals). Kinsella defends the theory by emphasizing the prior-later distinction and the inevitability of conflict over scarce resources, which necessitates property norms. He also tackles inalienability, distinguishing body ownership from external object ownership, and critiques Walter Block’s voluntary slavery stance, arguing that contracts do not create obligations but transfer titles. The discussion broadens to libertarian property rights, the role of aggression in justifying responsive force, and the cultural rise of libertarianism, with Kinsella offering to review the student’s paper and suggesting publication avenues like the Journal of Libertarian Studies.

Transcript and detailed Grok shownotes below.

Update: He recently (May 2025) notified me that his updated paper has been published as Eliot Kalinov, “The Universalizability of Argumentation Ethics,” Aletheia: Texas A&M Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy (Spring 2025): 58–79 (local copy).

He also told me “in our discussion, I mentioned an Encrypted Will analogy and falsely attributed it to Walter Block.” The paper is Ian Hersum, “A Rational Theory of the Rights of Children,” Studia Humana 9:2 (2020): 45–52.

Detailed Grok Shownotes

Detailed Summary for Show Notes with Time Segments
Segment 1: Introduction and Background (0:03–7:26)
  • Description: The episode begins with the student introducing their background as a Classics major at Texas A&M, their role as Philosophy Club president, and their exposure to libertarianism via David Koepsell, Liquid Zulu, and Kinsella’s anti-IP work. They express interest in argumentation ethics, inspired by Kinsella’s discussion with Bob Murphy, aiming to write a paper for an undergraduate philosophy journal. Kinsella shares his connection with David Koepsell, a utilitarian with unique legal theories, and outlines the persuasive appeal of argumentation ethics, noting its transcendental approach to grounding libertarian norms.
  • Summary:
    • Student discusses joining the Philosophy Club and learning about IP from Koepsell, connecting Kinsella’s anti-IP stance to their research (0:03–1:23).
    • Mentions discovering Kinsella through Liquid Zulu and realizing his Houston connection (1:05–1:37).
    • Kinsella recalls collaborating with Capsel and publishing a translation of Adolf Reinach’s work in Libertarian Papers (2:09–3:09).
    • Student introduces their paper on argumentation ethics, inspired by Kinsella’s Murphy discussion, aiming to steelman the theory (3:28–4:45).
    • Kinsella explains argumentation ethics as a transcendental argument, avoiding the is-ought gap by deriving norms from discourse (4:52–6:27).
Segment 2: Contract Theory and Inalienability (7:27–28:37)
  • Description: The student raises a contract example to explore the is-ought gap, prompting Kinsella to discuss his Rothbardian title-transfer theory of contract, which views contracts as title transfers, not obligations. He critiques conventional contract theory, arguing that ownership, not promises, drives legal norms. The discussion shifts to inalienability, with Kinsella distinguishing body ownership (inalienable due to direct connection) from external object ownership (alienable via intent and possession). He contrasts this with Walter Block’s voluntary slavery argument, asserting that body ownership cannot be contractually alienated due to the primacy of current consent.
  • Summary:
    • Student references Capsel’s a priori contract theory, linking it to the is-ought gap (6:44–7:14).
    • Kinsella outlines his title-transfer theory, arguing contracts transfer ownership, not obligations, per Rothbard (7:21–8:46).
    • Discusses economic vs. legal exchanges, clarifying that economic exchanges describe actions, while legal exchanges involve ownership (9:18–14:53).
    • Explains inalienability, arguing body ownership is distinct from object ownership, as bodies are not acquired like external goods (15:48–21:13).
    • Critiques Block’s slavery stance, emphasizing that current consent overrides past promises, using a rape analogy (21:58–24:14).
Segment 3: Argumentation Ethics and Scarcity (28:38–44:03)
  • Description: The student asks why scarcity necessitates property rights norms, addressing critiques from rational and ethical skeptics. Kinsella clarifies that scarcity, or rivalrousness, implies conflict over resources, requiring norms to minimize disputes. He explains that argumentation presupposes peace, self-ownership, and the right to homestead unowned resources, aligning with Hoppe’s prior-later distinction. These norms are unavoidable in rational discourse, making libertarian principles the only justifiable framework. The discussion touches on handling socialist objections, emphasizing that argumentation’s context inherently supports libertarian norms.
  • Summary:
    • Student questions why scarcity requires property norms, targeting skeptical audiences (28:58–29:36).
    • Kinsella defines scarcity as rivalrousness, necessitating norms to resolve conflicts over resources (29:49–31:28).
    • Explains argumentation’s presuppositions: peace, self-ownership, and homesteading rights, per Hoppe (31:52–34:02).
    • Argues that socialists cannot deny conflict’s role in norm-setting, as discourse assumes peaceful resolution (34:08–35:42).
    • Introduces the prior-later distinction, grounding property rights in first use and consensual transfer (35:54–39:54).
Segment 4: Aggression, Children, and Edge Cases (44:04–1:03:25)
  • Description: The student probes distinctions justifying differential treatment (e.g., imprisoning criminals), asking if only prior aggression validates such actions. Kinsella confirms that aggression (e.g., crime) creates a relevant distinction, allowing responsive force, unlike arbitrary traits like race. He addresses children’s rights, using Walter Block’s “decrypted will” analogy to argue that parents have guardianship due to their special connection and children’s limited rationality. For mentally impaired individuals, Kinsella suggests society may extend rights via “piggybacking” out of benevolence, acknowledging these as edge cases requiring moral, not strict legal, reasoning.
  • Summary:
    • Student asks if only prior aggression justifies differential treatment, citing Murphy’s critique (42:11–43:07).
    • Kinsella argues aggression creates a relevant distinction, unlike race or height, allowing responsive force (43:44–50:30).
    • Discusses children’s rights, endorsing Block’s “decrypted will” analogy for gradual consent development (53:08–56:57).
    • Addresses mentally impaired individuals, suggesting “piggybacking” rights out of respect for human affinity (57:23–1:01:26).
    • Notes that libertarianism doesn’t solve all edge cases (e.g., lifeboat scenarios), but neither do other systems (1:03:32–1:04:47).
Segment 5: Post-Scarcity and Critiques of Argumentation Ethics (1:03:26–1:33:11)
  • Description: The student explores a post-scarcity world’s impact on property rights, with Kinsella arguing that even superabundance wouldn’t eliminate conflict over bodies or specific goods, necessitating norms. They address critiques claiming argumentation ethics presupposes norms like wakefulness, which Kinsella dismisses as misdirected, as all normative systems face similar challenges. He critiques Objectivist hostility to Hoppe’s Kantian-inspired approach, linking it to misinterpretations of Kant and Mises. The episode concludes with Kinsella identifying critics’ main misunderstanding: failing to grasp the normative presuppositions of discourse, like the right to disagree, and offering to review the student’s paper.
  • Summary:
    • Discusses post-scarcity, arguing that conflict over bodies persists, requiring property norms (1:05:00–1:07:24).
    • Addresses critiques about presupposed norms (e.g., wakefulness), noting they apply to all normative systems (1:08:59–1:13:19).
    • Critiques Objectivist hostility to Hoppe’s Kantian approach, linking it to misreadings of Kant and Mises (1:26:36–1:29:36).
    • Identifies critics’ main error: overlooking argumentation’s normative presuppositions, like peace and self-ownership (1:23:41–1:26:05).
    • Offers to review the student’s paper and suggests publication in Journal of Libertarian Studies (1:32:33–1:33:11).
References:
  • Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism and related lectures on argumentation ethics.
  • Stephan Kinsella’s The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract (Papinian Press, 2024).
  • Kinsella’s Against Intellectual Property (Mises Institute).
  • Bob Murphy and Gene Callahan’s critique of argumentation ethics.
  • Walter Block’s works on voluntary slavery and children’s rights.
  • Liquid Zulu’s contract theory discussions.
  • Libertarian Papers and Journal of Libertarian Studies for publication options.

Transcript

okay um so are you you’re a student at uh A&M yeah I’m a Classics major at A&M

and then I joined the philosophy Club about two years ago and then now I

became the president but ksil is the advisor so through him and his uh

occasionally he gives meetings and presentations about his own legal

theories okay and he gave one about intellectual property maybe three

semesters ago and he mentioned a friend of his who was a patent attorney who was

with him in being against it as a concept and then through pure

coincidence I was reading um I got into it I will admit I started with liquid

Zulu yeah of all people and then through him he mentioned you in stopple and ALS

so intellectual property video that he created and then I looked you up saw

that you were a patent attorney and then they clicked like I woke up at like 2 am and I was like wait a

minute small world and then I found out that not only were you guys friends but

you were Houston base I’m also Houston base so it’s very funny oh really yeah and David and I we actually went to New

York uh together to do the stasel show on on IP about five years ago seven years ago oh wow

so that’s funny funny yeah he’s great guy very smart very smart dude oh yeah

some of his IP one I can keep up with kind of yeah his Adolf rack theory of

Rights was challenging but then when he started talking about legal ontology I just I don’t think anybody could follow

yeah I uh I’m not a philosopher so um but I I’m not aware of his rho theory of

Rights I’ve written a good deal on rho and his some of his stuff um so I’ll be

curious to look to look into that um yeah Roch I actually published uh

well I’m familiar with his AR prior theory of the civil law which uh was in published in Altha in the 80s I recall I

mean originally published in the early 1900s I think he was killed in World War I um but then he wrote one on on the

criminal law but it was never published in English and so I found a transcript I mean a translation of it by Barry Smith

and one of his students um um uh a woman who I forgot her name um but um she’s a

European and anyway um she gave me her translation and I published it in my

journal at the time libertarian papers which I don’t publish anymore but um Brett brogard I want to say um anyway

Barry Smith’s another another smart philosopher libertarian philosopher um I

don’t think capsil is quite a Libertarian but he’s pretty solid on IP stuff anyway so yeah I’ve talked to him

about that he is I think more of like a utilitarian in terms of his ethic and

then he grounds it with right an which is it’s interesting

it’s definitely unique yeah have to look into it all right what did you want to chat about what what you got yes I

wanted to talk about mentation ethics because I know um I watched the YouTube

video where you were talking to Murphy about each other’s responses to papers

concerning that topic and you expressed how argumentation ethics is usually used

to convince people who already were Libertarians and to ground that into a

more like uh I guess grounding for me it actually was got me what got me into it

as an ethic um because of I guess the philosophical interest so that’s what

got me excited about it and I wanted to write about critiques and responses to those

critiques almost as if I’m steel Manning the position the best I could I’m doing so for

um the undergraduate Journal at A&M for philosophy where partnering with them

this semester and I’m want to submit my own publication for that and uh okay talked to ksil and then

he’s mentioned you and I was like Wella that’s this would be a great opportunity to get from The

Source yeah and I I think I sent you the main stuff I would look into on this I think You’ seen it seen it by now H has

given a recent talk about five years ago seven years ago on this that’s the last time he really talked about it in

detail um and he actually did def respond to some of his critics but in the meantime I responded to some of the

critics and a few others have too like he I Brasa and Frank vun yeah um yeah

and I when I said it’s it’s mainly meant to explain why we believe things um yeah

I I I find the argument persuasive it it it it it really uh blew my mind when I

read it in law school and look I’ve known people who have come to libertarianism through reading my stuff

on intellectual property so you never know how people get to a certain idea um yeah um I do think it’s persuasive

argument um I think one thing I meant was a lot of people say um you’re not going to use that to

persuade like a socialist as if that’s as if that’s a reputation of the soundness of the argument it’s like well

just because it doesn’t persuade someone doesn’t mean it’s not a sound argument um so persuasiveness is not the is not

the lipus test of whether an argument is sound um um but because it’s sort of a

transcendental type argument where what you’re really doing is avoiding the isot Gap

by by you’re going from a to a so it’s a logical argument and you’re pointing out

that there are certain basic oughts which I call Gren Norms kind of following Kelson and I don’t know if

that terminology is idiosyncratic on my part or not but it seemed like a useful term to me um it’s it’s a um you’re

going from a to a because you’re pointing out there are certain basic Norms which are unavoidably presupposed

in argumentation um so you’re going from odd to odd um that’s what I found

interesting about it at first because I I would admit that when he

talked about RAC capsule he gave a meeting about that he was talking about his aiori um of contracts yeah and

that’s when I was around the same time learning about the isad G from Hume and I was thinking about it how

the the is of a contract is created through the A and then it has certain

obligations within it so if you take it upon yourself to enter into a contract then there are legitimate objective

obligations such as to fulfill it well that would get us into a whole different topic um which I’ve just written on I

just wrote um a long paper on contract theory um I’ll send it I’ll send you the

link after but um oh great thank you the example is fine I think it’s in reality

that example it’s probably a sloppy way to sloppy well you’re taking you’re using you’re using the the existing sort

of termin you’re using the existing um um theory of contract that most lawyers

and legal theorists use which I think is um somewhat wrong like I actually think

contracts do do do not give rise to obligations at all um but that’s that’s

the rothbardian Tittle transfer Theory which um and and my my sort of U massaging of that um

um it it gives rise to it gives rise to um transfers of ownership now that could

give rise to an obligation if you if you already accept um that ownership rights are

enforcable and that they have um that they have um that rights always have a

uh corresponding uh obligation like if I have a right then that imposes on you a

duty not to invade the right or to to respect the right so rights and Duties are are reciprocal and those are both

normative Concepts um so but again the contract doesn’t give rise to an

obligation what it it gives rise to is a CH a change of ownership but ownership is a normative term too because that’s a

that’s a legal normative term um so again saying you have an obligation to respect property rights presupposes

um your obligation to respect rights and and law in the first place so you’re already in the realm of

of of of shoulds or or Norms when you’re talking about obligations

um see one thing most people don’t point out and I haven’t written too much on this except in passing um I think it’s

something someone needs to do and maybe I will someday the do you know much about Austrian

economics um I have been getting into that as extension like Human Action just came in the mailed 5 days ago yeah or or

even just regular economics just the concept of um the concept of exchange for example yeah um so the concept of

exchange I think the the maybe it’s just English but the way we use words in English there’s there’s a potential

ambiguity because economics in principle is is has nothing

to do with art with arts or Norms or shoulds or even with law it it only has to do with a description of the

consequences of action which is a totally value-free category um so in

principle economics could describe the way it could describe the actions of of someone alone on its Island cruso cruso

economics that’s called um it would be a very simple economics but it would still be U it would still be economics proper

so you could say you know uh you’re choosing among ends to when you do

something you you’re choosing means to achieve those ends the the choice of ends and implies

value and preference it it implies opportunity cost um the action implies

profit and loss subjective profit and loss or psychic profit and loss um all

those things are implied in the category of action per se um and Concepts like investment and

savings those all apply and when you have multiple people you make the the you make the assumptions a little bit

more Rich to get an interesting analysis but not without not with money let’s just say a barter Society even that can

be described in purely descriptive terms like you can explain why people engage in a certain action they do it to get

the end they they chose why they engage in interaction with each other they do it for the division of labor

specialization of Labor and to trade with each other but that trade when you

describe it simplicit like that it only means economic trade so why do I hand

you this apple and why do you hand me your your orange

in a trade well the economic explanation is you handed me your Apple to get the orange and vice versa doesn’t

necessarily mean that there’s anything legal about it like there’s there might not be ownership recognized it’s just why you do

something um and then usually we have laws on top of that in society where there’s ownership of the Apple not just

possession so like the the first action could be described as transfer of possession why do you do that I give you

the Apple because I my belief is my hope is that that will induce you to hand me your orange

doesn’t mean you own it or that I own it it’s just it’s it’s the reason why I do something so it’s a description of why I

do things but when we when we assume that there’s not only interaction and trade

between people but there’s also laws and ownership you go down from you go from

possession to which is factual and descriptive you go from that to ownership which is prescriptive and

normative and legal um and the problem is that when you describe an exchange

it’s you could be talk you could be talking about an economic exchange or you could be talking about a legal

exchange and they’re different but the words used are the same so people get confused by that because for example in

intellectual property you’ll often have someone say well and I have a chapter in

my book on this um on why selling doesn’t imply ownership and vice versa

because people because the terms can be applied different Realms one could be the descriptive Realm Of Human Action in

a sense but one can be the the prescriptive Realm Of Human Action um in

a context where there are are norms and oughts and shoulds and laws and ownership um so someone might say well

canell you claim that intellectual property is not valid which means that you don’t own your

ideas but yet you think you can sell your ideas because it’s okay to have a contract where you sell I sell my

knowledge to you and you pay me money for it so you must be buying something and if you’re buying something I must be

selling it for me to sell it I must own it so you see but they’re using these terms back and forth from the normative

and the descriptive realm and it leads to confusion um so like Tech so that’s why the contract thing matters if you

view a contract is only the transfer of ownership then technically speaking if

if I say I’m going to pay you a dollar well let’s say I pay you $100 for you to

uh for you to paint my house in economic terms we would

describe that as an exchange or a trade because we’re trying to exra explain the reasons why each person performs that

action so one person gives the money to induce you to

do to perform an action that’s why I do it the means I use is giving you the

money the end I have in mind is to get you to paint the house and the reason you paint the house is to get me to

induce me to give you the money so symmetrical that’s an exchange it’s a symmetrical Exchange in economic

terms but in legal terms there’s only one title transfer the title transfer is when I transfer the ownership of the

money to you but you didn’t transfer any money to me all you did was perform an action yeah so the mistake there is in

making the analogy in because the language is the same like I say I buy

that from you if that has a legal meaning it means that you you gave me ownership of your money and I gave you ownership of the

thing you bought if it’s a thing that has ownership like if you buy a car from me I have ownership of the car and you

have ownership of your money that’s a bilateral or a mutual transfer of

ownership but if you buy a service from me there’s only one title transfer but

economically they’re both exchanges because in both cases you can explain each person person’s action by what they

hope to achieve in economic terms anyway but go ahead I’ll let you I derailed you

but go ahead I’ll let you oh no not at all that’s interesting it reminds me the

example you gave of oh but you can sell your ideas so you can own ideas that sounds like a similar but the opposite

argument is the one about if you could if you own your body then you could sell your body that’s yeah that’s another one

um I talk talk of that one in another chapter in the book it’s about inalienability and again

the so there’s a slight difference though so in the case of sale of of Labor I’m pointing out that there are

two senses of the word sale yeah and and and the word possession is a descriptive

word and the word ownership is a juristic or a legal word so you have to be clear what you’re talking about so if

you untangle that you can see that in the in the purchase of a service you’re only there’s only one

title transfer okay but in the case of the body the slight difference so so the

the thing is when I when I when I perform a service for you like I paint your fence you can say I sold you my

labor but it’s just a metaphorical description of what I’m doing if you look at it closely no one really can

seriously maintain that I own my labor because it’s not like after I performed the service you have I had the labor in

some bucket and now you have it it it’s just a metaphorical description however in the case of human bodies it there is

a meaningful sense in which you do own your body okay so if I own a car I can

sell it to you because I own it that’s true so you would think

that the ability to sell is is implied by the by the uh capacity or by the um

uh by the nature of ownership because that is possible when you own a car and then you would think that okay then

likewise if you own your body which is implied by the idea of non-aggression if non-aggression means that no one has the

right to use my body body without my permission which is another way of saying I own my body so clearly we we

have ownership of our bodies and if you if you assume that well ownership means that you can sell

it then a contract to sell your body would be enforceable as well which is what Walter block argues U and my view

is my argument is that the mistake there is that in assuming that um the ability

to or or the right to own something the right to control it the right to exclude

people from it necessarily implies the right to get rid of that right it

doesn’t necessarily and the argument is that my argument is that because there are different modes or ways that we come

to own or Justify our ownership of our bodies and other things in the world

there are different ways that you can get rid of that right so the reason you can sell an object that you own is not

because you own it but it’s because of the way you came to own it and the way you came to own it was you found it in

the world when it was unowned and you came to you acquired it and if you can

acquire something that was unowned then you can unacquired by just getting rid of the intent to own it for example

again if you take seriously the distinction between cons uh between um ownership and

possession then owning something is different than possessing it like cruso possesses a STI a stick but he doesn’t

own the stick because there’s no one else that he has a right against um but in the world where there’s laws and

Norms you can possess a stick or you can own it and they’re not the same thing for example if I own a stick and I

possess it those are two different things but I if I loan it to you I still maintain ownership of the stick but you

so possession and ownership are different are different uh statuses um so by the same token if I come to

possess an unknown stick in the woods I don’t necessarily own it if I don’t have the intent to own it I might just intend

to use it briefly and then throw it away so I never owned it um so by the same

token if I own something that I do possess I can separate ownership and

possession like I can hand the stick to you and let you use it so you possess it but I own it and then I can abandon it

so now I no longer own it and now you own it because you’re in possession of it and if you intend to own it now you

be homesteaded so to speak so that’s sort of the contractual mechanism that’s the reason why ownership as applied to

acquired things implies that one thing you can do with it is to give it to

someone else we go in the case of your body you never acquire your body because

acquiring an own unkown thing presupposes that you already have a body because to acquire an unknown thing

requires an action and that requires a human being with a body um so it would

be nonsensical to talk about acquiring your body unless you use some mystical religious argument like you know there’s

a soul and God sends it down and but that’s just not a rational argument so

the reason we own our bodies is simply because U uh not because you’re the first user of an unknown thing but

because you have an intimate direct connection to your body which I argue in in my book um and that’s the reason but

that that’s an ownership which means that no one can use your body without your permission but it doesn’t mean that they gain that right to use

it later on when you object just because previously you uttered the words you can

use my body in the future if I uh without my permission or or with you

have my permission now to use my body in the future it doesn’t mean you can’t change your mind so to me that’s the

distinction between types of ownership and that’s why the ability to sell something or to

transfer it is not a part of ownership it’s a part of um it’s it’s like saying

you know if I own a house it includes within it the right to to

dance naked well it doesn’t really include within it the right to dance naked it it’s just that the right to a

house gives you the right to exclude others and practically speaking that gives me the ability to be naked inside

that house right if I own my body it gives me the it gives me the right to

tell you no to use my body without my permission but and that gives the

ability to prevent you from using my body without my permission but obviously the relevant permission for something

that you own is the most recently stated or communicated permission not the previous one so for example if a woman

tells you um in an hour I’ll let you have sex with me and then you do it in

an hour we we presume that it was consensual because that was the last thing she said but if she says no when

the time comes and you you go ahead anyway that’s called rap because and and the defense

wouldn’t be his defense couldn’t be well she said yes an hour ago I mean it’s the most recent communication that matters

because that’s what ownership is it’s the right to say to communicate your your choice whether to give permission

or to deny it um in any case go ahead yeah it sounds similar to like will it’s

always the most recent version that matters and then um that important

distinction between direct and indirect control I know haa makes clear in the

the lecture that you sent me from five years ago and I think that kind

of helps me understand that how you can’t sell your body it’s inalienable

you can’t forgo that ownership claim as opposed to a stick which you can because

you acquire it right now just to be clear this this is my argument and I

don’t know if it’s widely accepted it’s sort of a legalistic and very careful argument I’m sure HOA would agree with

me on this um lots of other Libertarians seem to be confused on a lot of this

however I will say that almost all Libertarians I’m aware of well I don’t know what the percentage is but if I had

to guess the percentage of Libertarians that agree that you can sell your body in the slavery is very small it’s Walter

block um um Robert knows it kind of implies it

I doubt he would he’s dead now but I yeah I can find that past is in Anarchy state in Utopia it’s because he had a

simplistic understanding of a contract again if you just think contract is something that you can by mouthing words

obligate yourself to do then why why what’s the difference between your body and other things yeah but again if you

don’t think of contracts as obligations that helps to solve the problem and if you see the distinction between

different types of ownership that helps but while nosing didn’t see that he was more simplistic uh and then I think also

Gerard Casey who is a guy a recent guy in his book he has a com he doesn’t really go to

detail but he has something so I think Casey nosik and uh block almost everyone

else basically seems to Intuit it that there’s inalienable rights they don’t

really have a good argument for it the the best argument is is mine really and then it’s implied in

rothbard’s arguments against in in his arguments against voluntary slavery um

he gets it a little bit confused because on the one hand he wants to view contracts according even to his new

Theory uh he wants to say that if you don’t pay off a debt later it’s implicit theft which is not true he he he says

that because he has a revolutionary brilliant contract theory but even he doesn’t understand what it implies like

so he’s thinking that if you don’t pay off a debt in the future you’re you’re a you’re a thief and so in theory debtor’s

prison would be justified but debtor’s prison means you could bind Yourself by your promise because it could be backed

up by force which goes against the idea of inalienability so he’s a little bit confused on that I’ve tried to sort it

out on that article I’ll send you on on contract theory and I would imagine to be a thief in that situation you would

have to be owning or possessing something which you don’t own but then there’s no correct there’s no thing the

money is not there yeah so that’s the first thing so if you ask Walter block or

rothbard okay what thing did you steal then the first answer is well you’re

stealing the money that you you owe someone I’m like well if you don’t own anything there’s nothing to steal and so

then Walter would say which I’ve had a debate with him he’ll say okay it what so let’s say a loan for $1,000 on day

one to be repaid 1,00 to be repaid in a year if if the BET dtor doesn’t own the

1100 when he’s by the way if he does have the 1100 then ownership does transfer to the to the Creditor and if

you refuse to turn it over then it would be it would be theft but but if he doesn’t have any money then there’s no

future title to of anything to steal so then Walter would say okay well then it was the original $1,000 I said well

so on day one year from now you’re making the ACT a year ago retroactively

theft even though it was consented it just doesn’t make any sense you can’t retroactively steal something um and not

only that the 11 the $1,100 was given so that the buy borrower could spend it he

has to be able to he has to own it completely this this the thing Walter

block would say well the transfer of the $1,000 is conditional on you being paid

back later but as HOA points out you know you property rights have to be able to answer the question right now who

owns what you can’t have to wait for something in the future um and and and

and U so and and this is clear if you don’t make it money with interest because it seems like you’re repaying

the loan if you just make it two different things like I give you a hammer now and in one year you TR and

you you transfer to me um um I don’t know um a

shovel so they’re just two different things so obviously the ownership of the of the hammer is transferred outright

and the ownership and that’s a future trans it’s a present title transfer it’s done it’s gone now and it’s done and and

this recip IAL and it’s related to a second separate title transfer which is a future title transfer of the future

shovel but that’s a future thing which doesn’t exist yet that’s why all future

transfers are always conditional they have they’re conditioned upon the thing

existing at the future time and being owned by the person who’s supposed to transfer it those things those two

things have to have to take place for there to be sort of an obligation to

transfer I think liquid Zulu goes over that in his contract

chapter I think he does touch on it I think you’re right yeah

um did you want to get to the actual did you want to get the actual uh uh criticisms of uh argumentation ethics or

the responses to it yeah so I went through Murphy and Callahan’s uh

critique and then I went through your response to that critique there were a couple questions that I had in in

general about argumentation ethics and then I had a couple that stemmed from

Reading both of those okay my first one

was from um haa himself I

guess because you know my club I would admit where there are a lot of and I

myself came from this background a lot of rational and relative Skeptics and ethical Skeptics and so that’s who I

would be that’s the sort of crowd I would be dealing with for the most part when defending the paper and so my first

question was why does scarcity mean we require property right

Norms why does scarcity mean require proper well uh yeah and you might notice

in my in my writings I scarcity is fine it’s just that’s another word you have to uh disambiguate because it has

different connotation so I tend to use like rivalrous or even conflict to refer

to the conflict nature of things things that there could be conflict over um which which are scarce means of action

it’s just that the word scarcity for some people in a technical economic sense as

we use it it implies um ravness really it means um yeah yeah but but in in

common common language it means lack of abundance so yeah that’s I I will go

into that because many times people talk about how oh you know there’s no more

there’s no longer a scarcity of things in the world yeah but so I would say if you know if there’s a thousand bananas

and and you and I are sitting there and I have one of them in my hand then if there’s a dispute over who

owns that particular banana like you take it from me then that particular banana we would call it a scarce good

it’s got nothing to do with how abundant it is although in the limit in a world that’s an unrealistic world the world of

the world of U The Garden of Ed an example yeah and that kind of thing um

um there would be no property rights because there would be no conflict because and there would be no there

would be no theft because if someone took my banana I I would just conjure up another

one I wouldn’t lose anything and on the other hand they would never take my banana because they can conjure one up

too so the whole concept disappears um so I think HOA goes into this so so

there’s two aspects to it I guess one is the nature of Human Action which is always the employment of these scarce

means to achieve an end and the nature of these means is that they’re not super abundant um that means there can be

conflict over them which means basically in Practical terms only one person can use them at a time so that’s really

what’s going on here um and then the second issue is whenever this question comes up it’s

always in the context of a of an argumentation between two people who are

discussing Norms they are discussing they are discussing this possible conflict over this use of this

resource that’s what the context always is um in other words whenever you

whenever you say um who owns this or what should the law be you you have to you have to decide

that in the course of an argument or a discussion and in such a in such a context both parties are necessarily

presupposing certain things normative there’s ative presuppositions of an argument um there’s practical and

normative presuppositions the Practical ones are that you know you had to be alive to get here you had to use scarce resources to get here you can’t outright

condemn the very ability of people to use resources or to use them in the first place because if no one could use

something in the first place we would all still be dead because no one would have been able to use something in the first place yeah so if you’re looking

for Norms which is what you’re always doing in these discussions you’re already presupposing

you’re already taking taking for granted there’s conflict is possible in other words that’s the nature of the world that things are scarce so every

discussion about what Norms should be in place is always a discussion uh that

takes into account the possibility of conflict I don’t see how anyone can deny that even a socialist can’t deny that

the things that we’re discussing and saying who should own them are things that by their nature can only have one

user at a time and if we are to avoid conflict which again is the purpose of Norm coming up with a rule that people

can follow to avoid conflict if people don’t want to avoid conflict they wouldn’t engage in discussion they would

just use the mo Whoever has the most most might would just take it so so then the only question becomes

well then what’s the norm that would that would reduce the conflict in the use of these

resources and number one that can only be the norm that uh is comp that’s

compatible with any other Norms that you’re presupposing as part of discourse and one of those is peace and the other

one is recognition of each person’s self- ownership of their body the reason the reason that self ownership is

presupposed is because when you’re having a genuine rational

discussion about what Norms we should agree or to adopt mutually among each

other um you’re necessarily going by the force of

argument alone in other words there’s no coercion there in other words I’m not trying to persuade you to adopt my

claims or my argument uh based upon the threat that I will I will physically harm you if you

don’t because if you do that’s just coercion and that’s not a genuine argument so there has to be an implicit

recognition that willing as HOA talks a willingness to walk away a willingness to agree to

disagree if there’s not that then it’s not a real argument and every no no

proposition about who owns what what’s right wrong as haa argues could ever be uh solved except an argument and

that’s undeniably true because no one can no one can deny that’s true because AR they have to be in an argument to

even deny it so I think that’s all true and so it’s very all that’s left for the

Socialist by socialist I mean anyone who doesn’t agree with libertarian political Norms um anyone who arguing against

libertarian political Norms um someone who’s in favor of slavery someone who’s in favor of tion

egalitarianism uh rule by a king you know what whatever they want to argue

they’re arguing for some political norms and they have to take into account they have to take for granted that the right

to agree to disagree and that everyone has to have the right in the beginning to Homestead unowned resources to be

able to survive and then this is where ca’s prior later distinction comes into it so

he points out that the prior later distinction is an inherent necessary part of what property rights are and the

reason is because the reason is because

uh you can’t base the property right principle on mere verbal decree or

arbitrary assertions otherwise again it’s not a genuine argument to argue means to give reasons grounded in the

nature of things which means that I can’t simply say well the reason I own that football

is because I’m me and you’re you that’s again not giving a reason it’s just resorting back to violence and force

okay so you have to give a reason and I can’t say I’m I’m your owner and you’re my slave and that’s Justified because

you’re black and I’m white that is a distinction but you have to show that it’s a relevant distinction or I’m a man

and you’re a woman or or I’m I’m 6′ 3 and you’re 6’1 you know those are

distinctions but they have to be relevant distinctions and unless you give a reason why that’s a relevant distinction it’s just arbitrary and to

be it’s not it doesn’t count as a as a reason has to be grounded in the nature of things so all we really know is that

when we both come into this argument we’re both assuming each other how’s body rights because we’re willing to respect each other’s body for the

purpose of the argument and we both assume that that everyone at least Prim

aasi has the right to use unknown resources in the world that were previously unowned otherwise we we

wouldn’t be here okay so once you accept that and then you accept the norm also that the current owner of something is

now the owner and they can’t be dislodged from that ownership unless they transfer it

consensually by contract if you don’t believe that then again we’re not talking about ownership we’re talking

about possession yeah right because otherwise it’s like well then I don’t care who owns it I’m just going to take it and

now I take it again you’re back to just bare physical Force argument okay so

that means that means the current ownership has to matter but what that implies is that the current owner has a

better claim than someone who comes after by virtue of what ownership is but

if you go back in time sort of like the regression theorem for money of mises that implies that the very first owner

of an un unknown thing had ownership of it until someone else until they sold it

voluntarily to someone else right so that’s why the current

recognition of mutual bodies ownership in an argument implies the implies

number one the prior later distinction which means that it implies that we’re searching for ownership rules for the

current things in dispute and that search for ownership rules implies uh that the current owner has a

better claim than a late Comer okay because that’s what it means to recognize once we come up with the answer to our argument like who owns the

football is it me or is it you you’re the owner that means you own it until you give it to someone else but that

necessarily implies the prior letter distinction and also because you cannot

deny the the um you can’t deny the

justice of someone being able to acquire an unknown thing in the first place because otherwise you wouldn’t be alive

and furthermore if you take an unknown thing in the wilderness there’s no one that can complain that you took it from

them right because they would be owner already and that that’s against the Assumption okay so

again those three or four assumptions which are virtually undeniable goes back to mean that the first owner has to be

the owner so that’s why the only Norms that can be justified

for ownership of of external resources or property rights that’s what they are that’s what you’re looking for when you

have a debate about who should be able to control this thing and that’s why the only ones that can satisfy that are

those that are rooted in the ability to acquire something first which we call original appropriation and the maintainance the

maintaining of that ownership unless you consensually transfer it which is why contract enters into the picture so the

the the Three core rights of libertarianism are very they all come up

they come from the from the context of an argumentation which is the only way you

could ever justify these things and those are self- ownership original appropriation and transfer by contract and then there’s a

third one which I I view as a sub is a subtype of of of

um of contract which is if you transfer it because you have to pay someone restitution or compensat for

compensation if you harm them but again you could look at that is um as a type

of contractual title transfer like if I punch you by that action of aggressing against your body I’ve consented at that

moment to you taking some of my resources to pay you back for the damage I’ve done um but so those three or four

principles are the are basically the core of all political philosophy and all libertarianism and there the and the way

that we look at thosee those three things is what distinguishes libertarianism from every other

political philosophy um most of the political philosophies adopt these views those principles to one extent or the

other it’s just that they make a lot of exceptions so most political

philosophies would say that they agree to body ownership they oppose

slavery in most cases but they don’t do it completely like yeah you own yourself unless you don’t pay taxes or unless you

refuse to fight in our Wars yeah or unless you smoke marijuana and then we can put you in jail and treat you like

our slave um but unless there’s an exception but the point is they’re exceptional the general rule is everyone

owns themselves and the general rule is that you own your body until you part with it consensually unless the

government takes it from you a forced for taxes know so they make exceptions so the libertarianism rule is simply the

one that that has no exceptions that it’s more consistent than the

others I had a question about when you were talking about how you can’t make a

distinction between 6 foot1 versus 6 fo3 and things like that and or black versus

white it has to have a um a distinction that matters you

mentioned with the Murphy YouTube video how a distinction that would matter is

if somebody was committing a crime then you could legitimately um imprison them are there

would would those distinctions that matter revolve solely around them already having committed a

crime are there other situations where that could

happen um

I’m G look at my notes and see if I could find no I think it is I’m um um and I think this is this is implicit in

HOA he he he doesn’t always go into those distinctions and I’ve talked to him I’m pretty sure he would agree when

I tried to defend him in that argument and others I tried to so one of M M

Murphy and and and kellahan things is well you could argue with your slave that kind of thing as that’s that’s as

if that’s a counterargument um and I understand why they might have made well I think it’s I think it’s a

mistaken argument but I understand why they might have made that argument because haa doesn’t explicitly make the distinct he doesn’t

make the exception about if you own a slave that’s committed a crime against you I think that’s implicit in his

theory so the way I would look at so yeah I think the answer is yes and the reason is because um for the same reason

that your body rights are inalienable um and by inalienable I don’t mean they’re they’re

I I don’t mean they’re really inalienable what I mean is that um they’re not alienable by contract by by

they’re not alien alienable which is another way of saying the only way someone can have a right to

your body um is number one if you grant them

permission by communicating it okay uh but if the only way they have a right to use your body even when you say no

um uh is is if they committed an act of aggression

but not if they merely said you can use my body because you have the right to change your mind and the reason is

because telling someone I will I sell you my body is not an act of aggression

so saying words to someone doesn’t invade the borders of their property and doesn’t give them any any right to

commit aggression against you um now Walter block and others would say well but then why can you sell your your car

to someone so they again they’re they’re thinking that it’s magical words that that had this um this effect of changing

your ontological status but they’re they’re they’re

they’re they’re forgetting the reason for all this and the reason that the reason that saying you own my car

now transfers ownership is because the way you came to own it was the was the

combination of your intent and your possession it was a combination of those things it was a previously unknown thing

which had the status of being unowned owned and now has the status of being owned by you because of the Union of

your intent and your possession but if you get rid of one of those two thing if you get rid of the the of the intent

part you’re just possessing it you don’t own it anymore and because you came to

own it or acquire it by an act of intent you can get rid of that by intending to

abandon it and you can do that by your communication to tell people what what the status is just like if I own

something if I pick up a stick I can tell people I don’t own this I’m just using it temporarily so your

communication of your intent can tell them whether you’re an owner or just a possessor by the same token if I own

something that I already own I own it until I change that status and one way to one way to do it would be to die if I

die I don’t own it anymore right another way to do it would be to uh to abandon it forever in the woods and I just no

one and then let’s say there’s no Trace left anym of my ownership to it someone else could treat that as unowned and re

Homestead it and another way would be to like physically hand it to them and say you you possess this car and now I

abandoned my claim to it so now they become the owner it’s not magical it’s just it’s just I’ve relinquished my

intent to own it so I don’t own it anymore so that’s why your your your

your verbal or your written communication that you you own this

works it works because I’ve gotten rid of my intent to own but your body is not

owned because of your intent to own it’s owned because you have a better connection to it so merely saying I

don’t own my body anymore doesn’t change that fact you still have the will that’s what Rockbar talks about in his argument

like you still have the will over your body now here’s where people get they say well then if that’s true why why can you

argue with your slave and why wouldn’t that mean you could never justify imprisoning someone who’s

actually an aggressor and the answer is because in that case so if I’m if I’m a

Roman Guy arguing with my slave HOA would say you actually cannot argumentatively just ify keeping him as

your slave you’re engaged in a performative contradiction because you’re treating him as if he’s a self- owner and yet after the argument’s over

you go ahead treat you you use Force against him even though you’ve already conceded you shouldn’t do that so you’re you’re you’re caught in a contradiction

which is why no ethic other than libertarianism can can be justified but if I kept if a guy’s in my on my farm

and he just murdered one of my children and he’s he’s a rampaging threat and a menace and he’s done damage to me and I

I subdue him using self-defense and I put him in a cage waiting for I don’t know waiting for the local private

Defense Agency to come to card him off to I know eject him to Siberia or to kill him or whatever they’re going to do

with him I’m treating him for that finite duration of time as as my slave

because I am treating him as a means to my ends I’m I’m disregarding his verbal

assertion that of no when he when he denies me the ability to control him so

if we have a discussion about it I could justify treating him

differently I he could say oh you don’t have the right to treat me like like your slave because we’re both

equal as far as we know we’re both equal because we both have the capacity to reason we both need things to survive um

and and and and you’re and you’re recognizing my right to use my vocal cords right now and I the response could

be yeah but I I’m your owner because not because I’m me and you’re you but because you committed an act of

aggression against me so and that’s not that’s not arbitrary or irrelevant if I

said I’m white and you’re black that’s a there’s I can’t give I can’t give a reason for why that distinction is

relevant because for whatever reason I have for rights it’s not because of my skin color it’s my rationality it’s my

my will it’s something that we share it’s a capacity we both share but it’s

not my skin color now I could say that well God told me I’m special I’m the chosen people or

something like that and you’re just an inferior person so that’s why but now

I’m resorting to something mystical and something Supernatural and something irrational which we can say is also not

permitted in a rational discourse between people uh that’s not in the nature of things that’s some mystical

text so I would say that doesn’t count either and also it wouldn’t count for me to say well it’s because you’re you’re

black and I hate black people it’s like okay but you haven’t related it to the reason why we’re assuming we both have

rights which is something to do with our mental capacity right but now our rights do have to do with mutually respecting

each other’s rights and living in the world together and if someone’s committed an act of aggression they have

they have put themselves outside of that they’ve distinguished themselves yeah now they’re an aggressor and they can be

treated differently because they did not respect my rights and because they didn’t respect my this is where my stopple Theory comes into it because

they didn’t respect my rights I don’t have to respect their rights sort of like a symmetry is there um so that’s

why I think that it is not um it’s not a debunking of of ha’s argument to show

that there are cases where you could have an argument with a slave where you

could justify enslaving him now another one they give is I think Murphy’s

religious and I don’t remember he goes into this thing well if God owns us to me this this sort of like mises’s kind

of off-handed arguments about about he says well Human Action is an undeniable practic logical truth because you can’t

deny that humans act and when they act they act to in a world of uncertainty to achieve some end because they’re

dissatisfied right now with the current way that things are heading and they want to change that so if we imagine a

God God is perceived God has conceived as being um perfect and all good and all

omniscient omniscient and all powerful omnipotent um and therefore it’s

inconceivable God would ever act because to act means he’s dissatisfied with

something but that would imply he’s not perfect so I mean I actually think that’s an argument by means as why God

can’t exist because he an impossible thing it just but basically he’s Trea he’s like okay well God exists then

we’re going to have to separate him from this category of action it only applies to humans on the earth what he really means is it’s a nonsensical concept so

if Murphy wants to say well there’s a God up there and he’s really our slave owner okay but even if there’s a God who

created the universe and because he created it and because he’s omnipotent and he’s all good and he has some kind of super moral

right sup some super right to to just treat us like his ends let’s say that’s

true that still doesn’t mean that we have that right with respect to each other because on on this Earth and in this moral plane even in God’s eyes he

put us down here as equals because he gave us all equal ability to use the resources on the earth that he gave us

so it still wouldn’t justify socialism it might justify God being a

dictator but that’s not really our problem here and if it was our problem we would have bigger problems because if

God wants to be our dictator there’s nothing we can do to change his mind or stop him because he’s omnipotent so it’s

just a silly uh it’s a distraction from the argument I think

the distinction that you were talking about the black and white one it’s similar to the same paper he mentioned

the Aristotle and The Barbarians one yeah now you could use it for for children’s a more interesting case

because that’s my next question well you could say that so you could you could say then why does a a a

father of let’s say a three-year-old have the right to do things to him that he wouldn’t do to a neighbor

um and again the answer is because you could point to a difference you could say well the child is obviously he has

rights or he’s growing into a point where he has rights but is because of the way humans develop this is again

grounded in the nature of things because of the way humans develop in our social nature and because of my special

connection to him I’m the father of him I have a better connection to him than a stranger because of all these things uh

and because of his incapacity he just doesn’t have the maturity or the rational faculty to make decisions yet

it’s obvious that you could argue that there’s a Continuum when he’s born and

even before he’s born to when he develops a certain level of maturity and then has full ownership but between that

point he has less than full ownership which means that someone else has the right to make decisions on his behalf

and in his interest which is presumably the parents they can use that right by abusing it and then maybe some other

adult would have the rights the supervisor supervisory rights the guardianship rights that’s why I really

liked Walter Block’s decrypted will analogy I thought that was a great way

the decrypted will analogy decrypted will from Walter block where you the

rights of a child much like a decrypted will as they age you slowly decrypt what

um rights they’re able to express of themselves I never heard that uh but that makes that makes a sort of sense to

me in other words it’s a that was part of uh the contract and the rights of children chapter of liquid to lose

course encrypted decrypted will yeah like or encrypted will where um you’re

slowly decrypting it and then as the child age it’s much like that where okay yeah certain parts of it become

available as to how they’re able to express and consent yeah and I would yeah so I would the way I would word

that is um there there’s a when the when the when a when a when the when the

natural parent of a child who has not abused the child and who is fulfilling their sort of natural obligations to

take care of the child uh when that’s the case then we we presume that the child would consent to

whatever the parent consents on their behalf um and that presumption can be

broken in obvious cases of abuse or when the parent is not acting in the child’s behalf but is acting on their behalf

like if you sell a child into into into slavery or something like that uh in most cases I would say um um yes so I

would and I would say that’s a gradual thing although I would you know I would say technically speaking the age of consent would be a

lot lower than the current legal systems laws regulate or at least it would be flexible enough to let a very young

child if it came if push came to shove if things got so bad for that child that he wanted to and that’s what Roth BR

says when the child is old enough to run away now yeah that’s a little bit that’s

a little bit too glib I mean two years old they can run away but a toddler

doesn’t really have any but I think a five or seven or 10-year-old can

basically commit enough of a they can express their desire to be manumitted sufficient to you know at a

certain age even in today’s system you can go to a court and you can ask the judge to free you of your parents you

can manit yourself before you’re 18 um and I think something like that makes

sense but sure I would agree with that that decrypting the encrypt cted will

metaphor that leads me to my next question um because children are growing

into their ability to um engage in consent for certain

things over and um appropriate resources and trade with

them what would the argument for the rights of I know Murphy and Callahan

mentioned this like um people with mental retardation yeah and I don’t think I think that’s an argument more that’s more of a um that’s

not really necessarily an argumentation ethics argument anymore that’s more of a that’s more of a borderline or or an

edge case issue or a Continuum issue as Walter block calls it

um I mean the essence of

Rights according to hoa’s rights theory is bound up with

reason the the the capacity to reason okay we can say that for sure so there’s

a clear case the clear case is a functioning adult human

um does it apply to a a one- day old fertilized zygote inside the mother’s

womb you know opinions vary um my view is is because it’s bound up

with rationality not with not with personhood which is just just a tautological term uh and

not with being a human which is which by the is Walter’s argument which I think is Walter argument for abortion or is

that or for choice or whatever he calls it evictionism is that all humans have

rights from conception because they’re humans but they’re parasites on the mother so they can be

aborted um they’re I’m sorry the’re trespassers I mean I think both steps of the

argument are wrong you don’t have rights from conception because you don’t have a rational faculty yet and and you’re not

a you’re not a trespasser because you’re invited so like both s both sides of his argument are wrong um in my view um I

think the best view is that because rights are bound up with the rational faculty it’s clear that there’s a

there’s a there’s a time period between let’s say late term of ab of

pregnancy and somewhere in early childhood when when after that point

children clearly have rights between in that gray area you could have arguments about it and I think what happens is in

a rich and generous and benevolent Society people tend to a on the side of

Rights for the child so because there’s no clear answer and we can’t just say what what a God say then out of respect

for human life we would say well um you know a seven-year-old has rights we’re

going to treat the baby like he has rights to and even late term abortion we’re going to we’re going to frown on

doesn’t mean you would treat late term abortion as murder for other reasons

which I which I gave in my argument my talk on abortion last year at PS um I

think you could argue that it’s it’s murder to to kill a healthy late term

fetus but that the the jurisdiction over that should be still with the mother so

it’s up to her to decide to treat it like murder whereas we on the outside might treat it like murder I think the

outside legal system of the community should not get involved until the baby’s born but after the baby’s born it would

be reasonable for a society to extend the right Lauren lamasi has a section in his

book on person’s rights in the moral Community he’s a philosopher and libertarian he’s got a section in there

on what he calls piggybacking how like the rights of what he calls defective humans which I guess he means like

people and people in people in comas people like that whether we

attribute rights to them the very infirm the elders you know and I guess

fetuses he kind of treats them as edge cases not really exactly having rights but we we we attribute the rights of

healthy adult people to them out of respect for their kind of affinity to us

and again piggybacking so like I’m walking and if like a little child is with me yeah I put them on my back to

help them get across the Stream So they kind of get the attributes of my and I think that’s it’s it’s not a very

rigorous argument it’s kind of metaphorical but I think that’s the best we can do to help sort this out so I

think the short answer is in the in their sense in the arguments of like Ein Rand I think she would say that you know

in a sense someone who’s severely or in a coma um they’re essentially dependent

upon the healthy people in the world helping them out they’re they’re

utterly dependent just like just like a newborn baby is dependent upon its parents otherwise that it will die yeah

because of this dependency they in a sense they have to depend upon the voluntary help of of of the people so

the most important thing is to make sure you have a working capital of society where everyone that’s a functioning

adult has their rights respected so that they have the ability to care for the people that need the help um and then we

we as a practical matter you always have to count on these people’s generosity

and benevolence to help out the people that need it whether you can say that you know a severely person has

full rights I think it’s a hard argument to make I think it’s more of a moral argument at that point um just for the

same reason we wouldn’t say that you know a horse has rights they just don’t

have the rational faculty to have it but we can still oppose needless cruelty of

animals based upon moral considerations but we keep them

distinct not not not to not to equate humans with animals um but

there is a sense in which they they all have a certain impairment of their

faculty compared to the faculty of a functional adult human

um so I would say that um at most you can argue by analogy and

from moral principles to and and hope for the benevolence of everyone to treat um those edge cases um you know to

extend as much of as much of our status to them as we can as as much as we can afford

to and by the way when you have these kind of difficult cases people always expect the the libertarian to have an

answer for everything um yeah and it’s not always possible and a lot of randians and a lot of anarchists and a

lot of non- Libertarians they’re bothered by that um but I always view

these things comparatively like um for example you could point out a these

are sometimes called Lifeboat scenarios you know you could have a situation where you have three people on a Lifeboat and there’s only enough food

for two of them how’s libertarianism going to solve that problem it’s like well how is socialism going to solve

that problem how is nothing sometimes there’s tragedy and sometimes there are

situations where there’s no good solution and that’s not because we have libertarianism that’s because the world

is not always perfect and Justice and peace and and Harmony is not always

possible but in in a case where we have that we hope to make it better by by

adopting property rules that allow us to minimize violence and conflict um so

again I always point out well how you know how’s your how’s your property right system going to going to solve is

it going to magically make enough food appear for all three people on the boat to to live it just it’s not going to

happen some would say that will eventually stop being a concern I’ve heard that well and I’m I’m

not I’m not too again this is like the it’s like this this is why this like the

scarcity versus abundance concept yeah uh I could conceive of us reaching what

we might call now a post post scarcity future what is it called post scarcity is that what it’s

called I think so yeah um but even that wouldn’t really be a world of post scarcity it might be a world of such

superabundance that rights don’t matter as much anymore um and if that’s the

case but again it’s like the bananas thing it’s like if there’s a billion bananas around I could still want that

one I I might want it but if they’re all the same if they’re all the same they’re homogeneous units of of of a good then

there would be no theft there would be no need for theft and there would be no concept of theft because no one would care and no one would want to do it in

the first place so you know in a post scarcity World everyone’s physical needs are met I just think that that is a

little bit science fiction because even in such even in a POS in in a post scarcity world the best we’re going to

have is a world where there is no poverty left like there’s machines and plentiful energy and food where no one

starves no one no one is missing out any material Goods that they want you’re

still going to have people have an attachment to their physical bodies and things they like and they’re still going

to be the possibility of murder and rape because people will still have free will

and so there would still be the need for laws and property rights to prohibit

those things so I don’t think that this post scarcity World means that property rights go away it could mean that money

goes away because we have so much that we don’t need money to coordinate our actions anymore because the whole

purpose of money is to is to allocate scarcity in the sense in the in the in

the in the in the in the non-abundant sense um if you don’t care if everything’s provided for then you

wouldn’t care about e economic efficiency so much anymore so I I could

see a world where prices go away although it’s hard to imagine now you need prices as Mis has pointed out you

need prices as long as you need to compare heter heterogeneous factors of production you

can’t compare alternative ends if you’re trying to make a monetary profit without money prices but if you don’t care about

monetary profit anymore then I guess you wouldn’t need money prices and so money might disappear like in the Star Trek

world but even in the Star Trek world there’s still there’s still crime and still property rights in people’s bodies

yeah because even in um hoa’s example the guardian of Eden he still explains how you’re standing room in your own

body standing right so you if you take the if you take the the hypothetical construct of the land of Eden or the

garden of the Garden of Eden or the land of cocaine he calls it um if you take

that to an extreme then it’s just a it’s just a fictional thing that it’s just it’s a of ghosts basically yeah they

like there’s no standing room there’s no bodies there’s no Corp corporeal anything and then that that construct is

totally useless to us we can’t use it to we can’t use it for any conclusions like even the even the Robinson cruso example

cruso economics is a real realistic example it could happen it’s just it’s rare and the Garden of Eden thing really

couldn’t happen um or like the evenly rotating economy example of mises and

rothbart that could never really happen you just assume that to be the case to isolate some features of the world that

you’re trying to explore for understanding time preference or interest or something like that but even

that could never really happen because the future is uncertain as mises elsewhere demonstrates is unavoid it’s

it’s inherently uncertain because it hasn’t happened yet and our knowledge is not we’re not we’re not

omniscient I had another question um I guess one of my biggest problems

when trying to understand the argumentation ethics was how it the

conclusions that you can derive from it for example if it’s the case that you cannot logically argue

that um for conflict and you must it’s a necessarily peaceful

action one of the common critiques I see is oh well there are other Norms that you presuppose in argumentation so

therefore you can’t argue against those one of those being that you have to be awake so therefore it’s unjustifiable to

argue for sleeping or same for yeah something like I’ve I’ve heard that one

before and I didn’t necessarily it was during a debate and I didn’t necessarily get a see a good response to that I want

to know I I think those are all variants of the you can’t argue their slave in a in a sense and and they I think they

also missed the okay they missed the point that there’s another argument people they’ll say like well all you’ve done is proved

that during an argumentation we have to respect property rights just during the course but once the argument’s over then

we’re back to to I don’t know world of of of no Norms like yeah but the whole

purpose of the argument is it’s a it’s the argument is not about the argument itself it’s about how we handle

situations in the world in the world when we not argue it’s about like it’s about who’s going to own you know the

land that they use who’s who’s going to own it if the question is who’s going to own it then you’re you’re just answering

this kind of hypothetical question about it’s a general question you’re so the

point is if in the real world outside the argumentation if you want to respect

if you want your actions to be justified they can only be justified in accordance with the Norms that you could justify in

an argumentation so if you don’t care about your AR actions being justified then you can just do it so it is true

that the nor but that’s almost like saying okay I’m arguing with someone who

has a very short attention span and I might persuade them right now that they shouldn’t take my my chocolate but

they’re going to forget this and in 10 minutes they’re going to take my chocolate anyway so why would I bother argue like why would someone bother

engaging in an argument with someone if if they’re treating it like a game and they’re GNA just start misusing they’re

going to treat me like they’re slave as soon as the argument’s over I guess I’ll I guess I’ll Never End the argument then I’ll I’ll arguing with them forever so

they’ll they’ll at least treat me with respect during the AR I’ve heard that one before too that if you know you

presuppose that you should be arguing therefore argumentation ethics say that you should never stop arguing yeah and

the other the other thing to keep in mind is most people that are making these criticisms argumentation ethics

it’s because well some of them agree with libertarian ethics they just don’t like hoa’s argument yeah and I I want to

say to them it’s like well then so haa simply argues that you can’t argue until

justify socialism if you’re a Libertarian you must believe that too you must think for some reason you can’t

there’s no good argument there’s no good justification for socialism and that’s all hop is saying is there’s no good argument for

socialism he’s just pointing out why it’s because when you argue you’re adopting Norms that are inconsistent

with it but because you’re a Libertarian you already you already agree with those Norms too so it’s it’s not it’s it’s not

really clear why PE why Libertarians don’t agree with it but when you’re arguing with someone else if they’re criticizing argumentation ethics or if

they’re criticizing libertarian ethics um and if one of their arguments is well your argument for rights is flawed

because uh it doesn’t apply to people that are sleeping or something like that

yeah it’s like they usually have their own alternative arguments so their alternative argument is like um well in

my view the better argument is that we should all live in an egalitarian society and we should have the right to welfare and all this stuff then you

could just tell them you could you could come back to them and you could say well well doesn’t your argument only apply to

people that are not sleeping or like you made that argument when you’re awake does that mean that someone sleeping

can’t make that argument so therefore socialism is not a good system

because no one can make the argument all the time I mean again it’s just like the

it’s like the Lifeboat thing it’s like libertarianism doesn’t solve that problem but socialism doesn’t either and

if you point out that argumentation can only happen between rational conscious

people who are not sleeping okay well I can aim that back at any kind of rational discussion about

any Norms I don’t see why it’s it’s especially picking on argumentation ethics to make that

point the same kind of retort that I’ve seen in response to

critics of your aole ethic actually people talking about how oh well when

they try to particularize it like oh I’m me and therefore I can do what um just did like let’s say it’s kick you and

then you can’t do it back to me because you’re you and then U how they could

just turn that back and be like oh well I’m me and so I can or even if it was like oh well I used to think this now I

don’t I regret it and they’re like okay well I’m gonna hit you as punishment and then I’ll later regret it and then it’ll

be fine according to your own ethic yeah my my stole thing is not gotten quite as

much attention as hopas and so it has it also hasn’t gotten quite as much criticism but on occasion I’ll get

something like that um and my my response was already buried in a few

sentences in the original article I wrote about it and it’s simply that

um if you’re if if if you committed aggression

against me and then I try to retaliate and your response is you can’t do that

to me because um I own my body uh and it’s wrong to use my body without

my permission then once you grant that you’re granting

that you have to you have to acknowledge that you shouldn’t have done what you did to me previously and you do because

usually in the hypothetical they they they say oh I I admit I shouldn’t have done that I apologize um I shouldn’t

have done that but now you shouldn’t do it to me because we both agree that it’s wrong to do that to people it’s like

yeah but you not only agree that it’s wrong to do that to people you agree that you did it and that you shouldn’t have done it and if you agree that you

shouldn’t have done it and that you did it and you agree that there should be a law against it or some kind of

enforceable rule against it then you have to agree that some response is

Justified because if no response is Justified and the and the response has to come after so that’s the thing the

response has to come after the fact because nothing is simultaneous so

the response to an act of aggression has to come after the act of aggression so if response is going to be

justified it has to come after which means that the fact that someone now agrees with you doesn’t change that fact

or that it’s irrelevant um and if you say

well the fact that a response has to come after means that you can never have a response then that means that we don’t

have any rights at all that means that we’re back to Mere shoulds or we’re back

to a might R role either one one or the other so again once you concede that

there should be rights and there enforceable rights and you con see that the response has to come after the fact

then once you admit that you committed the ACT then you’re you basically I would say you’re stopped from denying

your from withholding your consent that’s why in a sense when you use Force

against someone who says the word no in a sense they they’ve already consented and again this is why I would

distinguish the voluntary slavery thing or the kissing or the having sex with a girl who said yes

before she can change her mind and in her case her later consent is the one that matters and the reason is because

she hasn’t committed an act of aggression if she had committed an act of aggression first that would have

stopped her from withholding her consent later okay that’s why a criminal is

stopped from complaining about Force being used against them after because in a sense they’ve already granted their

consent and their act of aggression and that and it’s to too late for them to change your

mind but if I merely make words to You and I say I will kiss you at the end of the day or I will be your slave I

haven’t committed aggression so I can change my mind that’s the distinction which is really apparently Hard for some

people to see to my mind it’s very simple you got to keep it clear in your mind the distinctions but it’s it’s it’s

easy to see why there’s a distinction an act of aggression is a fact that happened and it cannot be

undone word saying something to you didn’t harm you so it can be undone I

can take it back I can change my mind that’s the difference and that’s what Walter block doesn’t see because he just

keeps thinking but I I promise to be your slave I I can’t undo it anymore that I can undo the sale of the car it’s

like yeah but they’re not because of promises they not because of obligations they’re because of the way you come to own these things so I think when you

untangle all these things have a clear view then all these conundrums you can

see the you can see why people get confused about but you can see why they’re they’re just

wrong one of my um I don’t want to get too deep into stole but that’s something

I’ve always found a little confusing myself I understand how you can’t later

retract that oh you shouldn’t aggress on somebody because I I guess I I wouldn’t I doubt you would call it aggression to

use Force against somebody who aggressed not just

yeah so there’s there’s two ways I would you could word it so if if I’m the I’m the recipient of aggression when I use

Force against them um you could you can you can distinguish it you can say it’s it’s it’s respon I call it responsive

Force it’s Force that’s not in response so when they initiated Force against me their force was not in response to any

Act of force I committed so it’s it’s it’s it’s initiated or aggression when I respond it’s responsive so that’s one

distinction and then the other way you could look at you could charact you could say well well it’s not

even by being responsive it’s another way of saying that it’s consented to

it’s consented to by by the aggressor when I aggress against his body because

even though he’s mouthing the words no he’s a stop from saying that because of

his previous act so you can look at it either way you can say you can say that I can use Force against him because it’s

it’s responsive force and it’s Justified or it’s because he’s consenting to it

now because he can’t withdraw his previous consent either way is a kind of an

equivalent way of looking at it I used um the estaple method in a paper I wrote

in my Greek in Roman drama class um we were going over the oran Trilogy with cl nestra and

Agamemnon and uh clam nestra killed both Agamemnon

and agam’s concubine I was the question was whether she was justified in her actions and I gave a defense for her

actions of killing Agamemnon because Agamemnon killed her daughter okay but not Cassandra the concubine because she

was just a bystander in the situation I think it was perceived

pretty well but um I just you know as a way to see if I understand something I

try to use it myself that’s Le me yeah I don’t know the I don’t know the classics

as well as you do um by the way did you ever you ever heard of the St John school the one in uh Maryland I have not yeah it’s got It’s

got a deep Classics program there um okay and uh it’s quite interesting um

that’s I think I I would have wanted to go there if I was studying classic something like that um but there’s an

there’s an example in Roman law use there’s a there’s a um the most fam of the Roman the most famous of the RO the

five famous Roman jurists was called penan and I think it was around the year 200

ad it was when caracella you know the TW you see the movie uh Gladiator the new one no but um that’s

during the rain his rain yeah well and then well in the new one it’s in the Reign it’s a few years later maybe a

generation later and it’s in the reign of of the that twins with the The Sibling Brothers uh um carosella and

um I forgot the other one’s name any carisella carala and the other one uh um

Gada G yeah g and I think carala had get murdered and uh in the

movie in the movie uh Cara’s killed like a week a day lat five days later uh but

in reality uh Cara lived another eight years until another guy became emperor but

anyway after he had his his brother killed he went to Pini who was who was

the jur chief jurist at the time and he he asked him to compose a justification for what he had done because it kind of

didn’t look bad that one Emperor killed his co-emperor his brother so he wanted him to propose a justification say no no

he had a right to kill him for the following reasons and penan says he said this this quote which I love is it is

easier to commit it’s easier to commit murder than to justify it so he refused

to compose the justification and what he meant was you know there’s a difference between fact and Norms there’s

difference between thoughts shoulds and facts and the fact is you murdered them that’s might but the right was it was it

was it was a crime and there’s no justification for it and so um caraa had

had pinan uh tortured and and executed because he refused to compose a

justification but he was right he was right to refuse to because uh there is

none good it’s good it goes perfectly in hand and I need to go in a few minutes so if you got any final and

we can talk if you need to but U but but I I greatly appreciate I my last question actually I think would be a

good way to wrap it up it was what is the main thing that critics misunderstand about argumentation

ethics if you had a so probably restricting to try to pinpoint into one

thing but if you had to think well I think a lot of them don’t I mean haa is a very dense writer and he also writes

in this dramatic Style style and his original books were all trans he wrote them but then his his wife and others

had to help him clean up the English so I think um he says a few things in

passing that you can just glance over and not really get the import of like he you know he says like there’s three or

four things he says that are extremely important to his argument one is that all argumentation is necessarily

argumentative justification okay you can’t justify anything especially anything normative except in a

justification so if you can’t do it in justification you can’t do it at all I mean if you can’t do it in argument you

can’t do it at all and if argument has certain normative presuppositions then those are ones you can never argue

against okay so then the question is what are those argu what are those and then when he says that and the right to

agree it right to agree to disagree is also extremely important he just sneaks that in but it’s an extremely important

thing because it shows the distinction between a real argument where you’re trying to persuade someone by force of

reason alone the force of your words alone which he says um and coercive

threat which is not a real argument you’re just trying to get someone to say to agree with you to say words so they don’t get hit

um and then this thing about articles argument is a practical affair because in the real world you have to have

standing room and the right to control your body but you also have to have the ability to control scarce resources

right now and also to have gotten there in the first place which means this right to you have to presuppose the

right to first start using something right um and then the prior later

distinction that try ties back in this regression so all four or five of those things kind of combined together so I

guess the probably the biggest misconception or argumentation ethics is well I guess there’s a couple one is

failure to understand all these things um in in an explicit way and if you just reread it and listen to it enough you

you get that part uh then the other is sort of this um hostility towards what

they think of AR priori or transcendental reasoning or or what they

call knockdown arguments they sort of want to be stuck in this uh noii and model of always having just kind of

making it a game and never settling on anything or even the idea I think David Freeman and some others they’ve said you

know or or noser or someone like it’s almost oppressive to have a knockdown argument to say that there are some

things you just can’t argue without running into a contradiction they think that’s oppressive to like they think it’s

almost cororve it’s like I don’t think it’s coercive um uh and then I guess the slave the slave and the like someone

arguing with their slave they think that’s a counter but a lot of people haven’t read it deeply enough to know

that um or maybe some of them just don’t a lot of them are randians too a lot of randians have a hostility towards Kant

that could be part of it they have a hostility towards Kant because of Ran’s hostility

towards uh what she call what she call subjectivism which she really means I

think moral relativism or or skepticism um I’m not a deep philosopher but I’ve

been persuaded by haa and others that Kant was a murky writer in a way so

people that have a certain interpretation of him could be forgiven for for it because he was murky but my

understanding is there’s like there’s one tradition of interpretation of kant’s views like on E iics um and

epistemology and stuff like that in in in America the American tradition and one in Europe the Continental tradition

and the the Continental tradition is far more realistic and that’s that’s what mises and and and haa come from so

they’re not real they’re not they’re realists they’re not idealists and they’re not Skeptics at all especially not haa um and then the American

realists they I mean Sor the American conents sort of have this more idealistic skeptical interpretation of K

and the argument is that ran when she she didn’t really read Kant in the original sources she read secondary

sources and she was reading some Americans who were arguing for kind of a skepticism so when she’s attacking Kant

she’s attacking she’s attacking this kind of skeptical yeah uh a moral relativist

version of Kant uh in any case I think there I think the hostility of a lot of Libertarians who are randian influenced

to Kant might be one reason they just um um are averse to hoa’s seemingly contian

ariori all that stuff inspired argumentation ethics and their hostility towards mises who they think no no hoa’s

argumentation that is not really misesian I would say is grounded in in I

say hoa’s argumentation I think is grounded in mises’s basic prac logical content way of looking at things it’s

also grounded in the political realism of rothbard and radicalism of rothbard and it’s also grounded in some of the

inside of his Professor Jurgen hos and Carl otter Opel which were both kind of

democrat socialist types but kind of the argumentation ethics insights so all

that kind of combination of stuff is where haa got it from but even mises was sort of a conent and he was a

utilitarian in ethics not really principal more consequentialist or pragmatic and I

think so the randians have this hostility towards um mises’s what they

would call subje ISM which is not subjectivism um in the randian sense but anyway I so I think it could be because

of their their kind of Nar hostility towards what they perceive as kinism um

because the way he goes about the Norms of argumentation did remind me of K’s

categories when reading it yeah and the randians also if you read Chris’s book

um I think it’s called total freedom where he goes into his philosophy he’s

trying to defend ran but show that her method is heavily dialectric right she’s trying and she always does try to if you

read her stuff she always tries to um she tries to to explode dichotomies I

might not be using the right term but but like uh like the Mind B the analytic synthetic dichotomy the mindbody

dichotomy dualisms things like that um and she did that a little bit even with knowledge like she doesn’t like this

ariori versus aposteriori way of looking at things um even though her own way of

looking at knowledge is very similar to um the subjectivism of of the economics of Mees

in terms of um we we demonstrate that we subjectively value things by our actions

he didn’t mean that all ethics were were sub were were morally relative it’s it’s

a different use of subjective um um uh and uh

um and and so like so so so she would so when she says there’s

axioms for example she goes she meant axiomatic knowledge so we know some things to be absolutely true because

they self-evident and the attempt to deny it leads to self-contradiction like you can’t deny that there’s Consciousness because and therefore you

can’t deny that there’s existence because you gota and you can’t deny there’s a difference distinction between you and the outside world because to be

conscious is to be conscious of something it’s a relational property right you can’t deny the law of non-contradiction because it’s at the

base of what it means to have a contradiction at all or falsity and Truth like all these kind of Elementary

things that she builds her philosophy on she calls him axiomatic which is I think

not the standard way philosophy uses the term axiomatic what she meant was self-evidently true so that contradict

uh denying it leaves self-contradiction so it’s something you could never show is wrong and that’s the same way that

that mises argues with about the Human Action Axiom and aspects of praxiology

and it’s the same way haa argues about um about his Norms so it’s all the same

way of arguing about what’s true and what’s not true what’s obviously false and all that stuff so

um I think she had she just didn’t want to use the word AR priori because this too sounds too conting to her right um

anyway awesome I’m thank you very much for giving me this opportunity this has

been very helpful and I still have to go through and organize clean up all my

notes and then finish this paper in March but this has yeah if you write the paper if you want any feedback I’ll be

happy to do it and if you you end up publishing it that’d be great send me if it’s published and if you don’t if you want to publish it like in the journal

libertarian studies or something like that uh you could think about that if if it’s not suitable for yours so we can talk about that later oh wow okay thank

you thank you all right well good luck thing and and I’ll I’ll send you the recording when this okay great thank you

have a good night take care all right take care C

 

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  1.  KOL308 | Stossel: It’s My Idea (2015). []
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Owning Ideas, Owning Bitcoin, Owning Fiat Dollars

In discussing an article by Ron Johnson, The Government Says Money Isn’t Property—So It Can Take Yours, I mentioned that in previous writing 1 I had argued that just as bitcoin is not ownable, in today’s world of fiat money even dollars are not exactly ownable 2 —but that I would not want to get the state to accept this argument at present time.

)) A friend asked me: “what would follow if the courts accepted your premise? How could that affect intellectual property law?” [continue reading…]

  1.  Nobody Owns Bitcoin and Libertarian Answer Man: Eminent Domain and Ownership of State Monetary Payments. []
  2. Update: Armoutidis agrees with me. See Armoutidis, Who Owns Public Property? Libertarian Property Theory and the Problem of Immigration. []
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Libertarian Answer Man: Argumentation Ethics Questions

Related:

From an email:

Hello Mr. Kinsella,

I have been interested in Libertarianism for some time now and Hoppes AE has especially fascinated me. However, I have some questions which were left open. Hoppes central claim seems to be, that you cannot argue without accepting NAP and self-ownership.

Not exactly. It is that all truth claims must be established in argumentation, including claims about what norms or conduct is justifiable. Also, that the activity argumentative justification necessarily presupposes certain norms or values, such as peace, universalizability, non-contradiction, truth, the ability to homestead unowned resources, the ability to control one’s own body, the value of avoiding conflict, and so on; and that these norms–which we may think of as “grundnorms”–cannot be denied without contradiction since they are inevitably presupposed by every participant in argumentative justification; and finally, that any political norm other than libertarianism (that is, all forms of socialism) are incompatible with these grundnorms and thus cannot be argumentatively justified. It is essentially a proof by contradiction: that any non-libertarian political norm contradicts more basic norms that are necessarily presupposed by all participants in argumentation. Socialism is aggression and violence and contradicts the norms presupposed by the participants by virtue of participating in the peaceful activity of argumentation.

I go into some of this in Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) (LFFS), e.g. ch. 2, n. 22, ch. 14 Part II.C, et pass.

But I could be a utilitarian or a moral nihilist, who just uses argumentation to maximise utility or for selfish reasons. It doesn’t require me to accept that me or you own our bodies, just that we control them. Hoppe seems to use ownership and control interchangeably.

I actually address this issue in LFFS, e.g. ch. 22, Part II.G. I think he does use them interchangeably sometimes (English was not his native language) but it does not seriously affect his argument. Hoppe correctly observes that for argument to take place actors must have the ability to control their body, to use standing room, and to have previously acquired and used natural resources; and he also is correct that participants in argumentation cannot object to the right of the parties to have done this. So it does not matter if a nihilist is just pretending to be sincere; it is still the case that it is impossible to argumentatively justify institutionalized aggression, since if and to the extent he is engaging in argumentation then he does recognize the value of peace and the value of he and the other participant being alive and being able to use resources and thus being able to acquire them in a conflict free way, which thus implies grundnorms that are compatible only with libertarianism and not with any form of socialism.

Also saying that one cannot speak is a performative contradiction, but saying that one should not speak seems more like hypocrisy. I would be thrilled, if you could clarify.

I am not sure what you are referring to. AE does not rest on the notion that it is a contradiction to say “one should not speak”.

You should review the more recent literature on this—by Hoppe, me, and others, before coming back with more questions. Many of your questions may be already answered there. See for instance the sources linked below, which I take from an answer to an email I received just a few days ago:

Meanwhile you might check out these in case you are not aware of them: namely, the material listed here, “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide,” including:

these updated chapters in my book Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023):

As well as more recent pieces by Hoppe and others listed in the Supplemental Resources and Updates section of that post, e.g.

***

Followup:

Thank you for clarification. One last criticism I have of Hoppe, is that he seems to follow the neo-Kantian mystic tradition of Mises rather than Rothbards Aristotelian approach. However, this is a separate issue.

I think Rothbard’s approach is actually somewhat confused, as the natural rights/natural law idea has flaws, in that it attempts to go from is to ought: e.g., the way something is (its nature) determines what it ought to do. But there is a problem with this approach as Hoppe rightly points out: “[O]ne can readily subscribe to the almost generally accepted view that the gulf between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ is logically unbridgeable.” See Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society, ch. 6, text at n.12 (p. 119). In fact Rothbard himself recognized this:

In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he [Hoppe] has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist, Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison. (Ibid., p. 121)

As for Kant’s “mysticism,” I am not quite sure what you mean but I suppose this is the bound up with the Randian criticism of “mysticism” and Kant and his idealism. In my view, there is nothing mystical about Hoppe’s argument nor about Mises’s own epistemology and methodology which is based on some Kantian concepts and insights (Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, 3d ed., George Reisman, trans. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2003)).

I assume by mysticism you mean the idealistic interpretation of Kant made by Rand. A few things here. First, I tend to agree with Rand that the Kantian idealism (skepticism, subjectivism) they describe is flawed and their criticisms of it are largely accurate. However, it is far from clear that this is actually what Kant’s views claim. Kant’s writing is complex and sometimes murky, and it appears there are two interpretations of him: the American one which reads him as promoting idealism; and the European interpretation of Kant which is essentially realistic. This latter one is the Kantian approach adopted and employed by Mises and Hoppe, who are realists, and it is perhaps why this realist-Kantian perspective is similar in some respects to the more Aristotelian approach of Rothbard (in ethics, say) and why Rothbard had essentially no problems with the Misesian approach to economics, praxeology, “apriori” truths, and so on, even if he would use different terminology. For more on this see Kinsella, “Mises and Rand (and Rothbard)” and Kinsella, LFFS, ch. 22, n.53; also Rothbard, “The Mantle of Science,” “In Defense of ‘Extreme Apriorism,’” and other chapters in Section One: Method, of Economic Controversies (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2011). On Mises’s realism, see Ludwig von Mises, “Epistemological Studies,” in Memoirs, Arlene Oost-Zinner, trans (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009) (formerly Notes and Recollections); Mises’s dismissive remarks on Popper in The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), chap. 4, §8 and chap. 7, §4; idem, Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2007 [1957]), chap. 1, §3. See also Edward W. Younkins, “Menger, Mises, Rand, and Beyond,” J. Ayn Rand Stud. 6, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 337–74, p. 342 et pass. (also in Edward W. Younkins, ed., Philosophers of Capitalism: Menger, Mises, Rand, and Beyond (Lexington Books, 2005)), and Heidi C. Morris, “Reason and Reality: The Logical Compatibility of Austrian Economics and Objectivism,” Rebirth of Reason (May 10, 2005).)

I do not really trust Rand’s interpretation of Kant; as noted, her critiques of the idealism she is describing are mostly well taken, but it may be aimed at a straw man. As Hoppe wrote:

Among some followers of Austrianism, the Kant interpretation of Ayn Rand (see, for instance, her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology [1979]; or For the New Intellectual [1961]) enjoys great popularity. Her interpretation, replete with sweeping denunciatory pronouncements, however, is characterized by a complete absence of any interpretive documentation whatsoever. On Rand’s arrogant ignorance regarding Kant, see B. Goldberg, “Ayn Rand’s ‘For the New Intellectual,’” New Individualist Rev., vol. 1, no. 3 (1961).

Kinsella, LFFS, ch. 22, text at n.53.

[Update: Re Rand and Kant: Objectivist Round-up, April 2025: “2. Ayn Rand Institute (ARI) philosopher Greg Salmieri is asked how much of Kant Rand read. He says he doesn’t know because we don’t have any books by Kant that she “marked up.” Salmieri says that Rand likely learned a lot about Kant from Peikoff and she may have studied the various arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason with him. Brook asks Salmieri about Rand’s take on Kant and he says it’s correct albeit on a high level.”]

***

My interpretation of Kant came largely from Liquidzulu. I think he is an objektivist. His recent video goes into detail on this topic. You should check out his content sometime. … here are the two sources for my critiques of AE and Kant: https://youtu.be/QoU3KsZaj-M?feature=shared and https://youtu.be/W-NQWJn-AHw?feature=shared

I know of Zulu and like a lot of his stuff. See my post LiquidZulu’s Free Course: “The Fundamentals of Libertarian Ethics”. However I am not sure about all of it and only have limited time at present to look into this.

In any case, this is another reason it’s important not to rely only on secondary (or tertiary) sources, or at least to be wary of it. I think if you are serious about this, about forming views about Kant and how it relates to Hoppe’s work, you need to actually read scholarly works about Kant, at the very least, if not Kant himself, and not just rely on Youtube video especially those by amateur scholars instead of professional philosophers. Unfortunately many younger libertarians seem not to actually read anymore but learn mainly from informal sources like youtube videos. To really understand libertarian theory one must read the world of past thinkers. Like … books.

Ok, I have one question left. Do you consider the Action axiom a law of thought or of reality?

I would not call it an axiom. That is an idiosyncratic usage by Rand to describe truths we know that are self-evident or whose denial leads to contradiction. Instead I would refer to what Mises calls apodictic knowledge or truths–what he would call apriori true knowledge.

Such knowledge includes Descartes’ cogito: I think therefore I am. I.e., I know that I exist, because I (know that) I am thinking. It cannot be denied by any thinking person that he exists. This is apodictic knowledge. Likewise other knowledge like consciousness, the law of non-contradiction, and so on. E.g. see Rand’s comments about consciousness.

To assert that “man acts” reads at first like an assertion fact, like “monkeys eat bananas.” We can imagine a world with no acting men, but to the extent there is anyone wondering about whether man acts, there must be a man in existence to ask the question, and if he exists, he does act: he employs means to achieve ends. This seems apodictic to me, though it is not simple and it is somewhat complicated. For example I accept Mises’s dualist approach where he sees the methods of the natural sciences are appropriate to the study of causal phenomenon and other methods appropriate to the study of teleological phenomenon.

Thus we can view humans in the causal realm as behavers and in the teleological realm as actors, and the latter us usually more useful. Introspectively we are aware that we experience life as a series of actions: choices to pursue a given end in an attempt to overcome felt uneasiness by employing efficacious scarce means to achieve those ends. We reasonably assume that other humans with a similar biological makeup have a similar internal experience and thus we characterize their motions not as mere behavior but as action: we impute meaning to what they do, we impute purposes to their motions. This is neither right or wrong; it is a useful framing. To say that humans act is to say that one way to understand what we observe is to think of it in terms of the means-ends framework.

But it is conceivable to view humans purely causally in which case they do not “act” any more than a lawnmower acts. God could view us this way, for example. Or as Hoppe writes, in Economic Science and the Austrian Method,

“One might hold this conception of freedom to be an illusion. And one might well be correct from the point of view of a scientist with cognitive powers substantially superior to any human intelligence, or from the point of view of God. But we are not God, and even if our freedom is illusory from His standpoint and our actions follow a predictable path, for us this is a necessary and unavoidable illusion”.

But for us, it seems unavoidable to understand what we ourselves do as actions, that is, from the teleological framework, and thus to apply this to understanding what others do as well. It is undeniably useful and probably unavoidable and indispensable. Does this mean humans “really” “act” “instead of” being “caused”? I am not sure. I am not sure it matters to be able to answer this question, and I do not think I am enough of a philosopher to answer this—but I am beginning to suspect no one is. I am a dualist, in the Misesian sense (see Human Action and The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science).

Causality is apriori true since it is presupposed in any action and any inquiry into either the causal or teleological realms of phenomena. As Mises explains, “we may speak of causality as a category or an a priori of thinking and acting. … All we can say about causality is that it is a priori not only of human thought but also of human action.” The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, ch.1, §4.

So it is an undeniable “fact” “that” “humans act”? I would say that it is true enough so as to not matter.

It is a truth; I am not sure how to easily answer the question as to whether it is a law of thought or of reality. I am not sure it is a “law” at all. It is an assertion about one aspect of reality, in the end, but it stems from the way we understand reality conceptually and according to various categories and framings. As Mises writes, “Eminent philosophers have tried to elaborate a complete list of the a priori categories, the necessary conditions of experience and thought. One does not belittle these attempts at analysis and systematization if one realizes that any proposed solution leaves a broad margin for the individual thinker’s discretion.” I.e., it is useful to think of humans as acting; within that framework, yes, humans “do” “act.”

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In my book Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), ch. 5, p. 73, n.23, I provide a quote, “What you do speaks so loud I can’t hear what you are saying.” which I took from an article by Clarence Carson. Carson calls it an “old saw” but provides no attribution.

I have realized this is a version of a quote widely attributed to Ralph Waldo Emerson. According many sources on the Internet, the original quote is “What you do speaks so loudly that I cannot hear what you say.” Emmet Fox, in The Sermon on the Mount: The Key to Success in Life (HarperOne, Reissue ed., 2009), provides a subtly different version, also attributed to Emerson: “What you are shouts so loudly that I cannot hear what you say.”

I found it curious that none of the sources attributing this to Emerson provide a citation. I was unable to find this exact quote anywhere in Emerson’s work. With the help of people on Twitter, I finally came across this: “What you are stands over you the while, and thunders so that I cannot hear what you say to the contrary,” from this paragraph:

Let nature bear the expense. The attitude, the tone, is all. Let our eyes not look away, but meet. Let us not look east and west for materials of conversation, but rest in presence and unity. A just feeling will fast enough supply fuel for discourse, if speaking be more grateful than silence. When people come to see us, we foolishly prattle, lest we be inhospitable. But things said for conversation are chalk eggs. Don’t say things. What you are stands over you the while, and thunders so that I cannot hear what you say to the contrary. A lady of my acquaintance said, “I don’t care so much for what they say as I do for what makes them say it.

[continue reading…]

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Slenzok: Libertarians Against the American World

Interesting recent paper, Norbert Slenzok, “Libertarians Against the American World. A Critical Analysis,” Athenæum: Polish Political Science Studies 84, no. 4 (2024): pp. 7–27 (pdf).

Abstract:

The paper deals with the view of contemporary world politics presented by American libertarians. Specifically, it examines the claims of Murray N. Rothbard and his successors with regard to the role of the United States of America in the international arena. The article argues that since the Cold War, the libertarian account of international relations has been staunchly critical of the US, while exhibiting a soft spot for competing powers, particularly the USSR and the Russian Federation. As the article submits, this asymmetry is supported by two flawed theoretical contentions: the liberal imperialism thesis (LIT) and the American hegemony thesis (AHT). Moreover, the article shows how anti-Americanism impinges on libertarian analyses of contemporary Central- Eastern European politics, in particular the war in Ukraine.

[continue reading…]

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[UPDATE: See final version here]

Here is a first draft of a translation of Stephan Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) into Chinese, translated by Li San (李三). The following is not yet proofread, according to the translator.

[continue reading…]

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Randy Barnett, “What’s Next for Libertarianism?”

I’ve learned and profited a great deal from libertarian legal scholar Randy Barnett’s work—on contract theory, punishment, constitutional and ninth amendment issues, originalism, and more. 1

In his really unique and excellent new book, A Life for Liberty: The Making of an American Originalist (2024), which I read cover to cover, he has an intriguing section near the end on “What’s Next for Libertarianism” where he hints a possible future book extending his previous thought on liberty and libertarianism. He suggests several extensions to or possibly modifications to libertarianism that might try to address. For example: “If we are to be libertarians and not propertarians, … libertarians need also to be concerned about threats to individual liberty now posed by privately owned companies. … A good theoretical start would be to separate the “public-private” binary from the “government-nongovernment” binary.” I have concerns about conservatives and libertarians who try to blur the distinction between between private and state actors—for example in attempts to subject big tech platforms to defamation liability out of spite or because they just don’t like them 2, or in arguments that private actors (banks, big tech, New York Times) are really “part of the state” and thus it’s fine to subject them to otherwise unjust and unlibertarian laws, such as libel law, or even to justify having the state regulate these corporations, since they are after all effectively state organs 3—but it would be interesting to see Barnett grapple with these matters. [continue reading…]

  1. See my review of his book, The Structure of Liberty, “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), and many other references to Barnett’s work in this book. []
  2. No, Libertarians, We Should NOT Abolish the CDA §230 and DMCA Safe Harbors! []
  3. KOL354 | CDA §230, Being “Part of the State,” Co-ownership, Causation, Defamation, with Nick Sinard; Van Dun, Barnett on Freedom vs. Property; Is Macy’s Part of the State? A Critique of Left Deviationists; on Block’s defamation suit against the New York Times, see Walter Block Defends His Libel Suit Against The New York Times; A Libertarian Analysis of Suing for Libel (“How … can I justify suing the New York Times for libel? It is simple. The libertarian case against suing for libel applies only to innocent people, and this newspaper does not at all qualify. Rather, this organization is a member in good standing of the ruling class, and all bets are off for criminals of that ilk.”), and others here. For my criticism of Walter’s libel suit and defense of libel, see Block on Defamation; also “A Tour Through Walter Block’s Oeuvre”, n.40. []
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KOL452 | Ethics, Politics, and IP for Engineering Students

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 452.

I was asked recently to guest lecture for a course taught to some mechanical engineering students at Colorado University Boulder (EMEN 4100: Engineering Economics) by the lecturer, David Assad. Assad covers some ethics related matters in the latter part of the course and asked me to talk generally about ethics and related matters. I discussed ethics, morality, politics, and science. I discussed ethics and its relationship to science and politics, and discussed about what science is, the types of sciences, ethics and ethical theories and the relationship to specialized ethics and morality in general, and its relationship to political ethics and political philosophy. I then discussed libertarianism in general, the nature and function of property rights, and then explained how the intellectual property issue can be addressed based on the libertarian and private law perspective. The references and notes I gave the class are embedded in the slides and reproduced below.

[continue reading…]

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Dear Mr. Kinsella:

If you have the time I wanted to ask for some clarification regarding your views on positive obligations and their relationship with aggression and bringing children into the world.

In your article “How we come to own ourselves” you argue libertarianism is not inherently against positive obligations just unchosen obligations. You say one can incur positive obligations by commiting aggression. You use the analogy of pushing a person into a lake (aggressing against them) that creates a positive obligation to rescue them. You then say bringing an infant into the world with certain needs is akin to pushing a person into a lake.

My question is, does this mean bringing an infant into the world is aggression which then creates a chosen obligation to feed the infant (rescue them from the situation you’ve put them in)? Is this an accurate reading of your argument? [continue reading…]

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