From the Mises blog. Archived comments below.
Update: for extended quotes from Rothbard and Hoppe about the problem of universal equal or communist ownership, see KOL468 | Is Group Ownership and Co-ownership Communism?
In Jan Narveson’s thought-provoking and elegantly-written The Libertarian Idea (1990), he discusses an admission by a Marxist, G.A. Cohen, of a serious problem with communal ownership of property. As Narveson notes (p. 68): “The problem for socialists, as Cohen observes, is how to have both the right of self-ownership … and yet a right of equality, getting us the socialism they are so morally enamored of. That there is a problem here is suggested by” the following comment by Cohen (found on p. 93-94 of his book Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (originally from G.A. Cohen, “Self-Ownership, World-Ownership and Equality,” in F. Lucash, ed., Justice and Equality, Here and Now (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 113-114):
people can do (virtually) nothing without using parts of the external world. If, then, they require the leave of the community to use it, then, effectively …, they do not own themselves, since they can do nothing without communal authorization.”
Narveson comments: “It is testimony to the strength of our position that even someone so ideologically opposed gives it clear recognition as an argument that must be confronted.”
Does Cohen’s reasoning sound familiar? It should, to Rothbardians and Hoppeans. See below —
In Rothbard’s The Ethics of Liberty he argues in favor of self-ownership because the only logical alternatives are “(1) the ‘communist’ one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or (2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another–a system of rule by one class over another.” However, “in practice, if there are more than a very few people in the society,” the first
alternative must break down and reduce to Alternative (2), partial rule by some over others. For it is physically impossible for everyone to keep continual tabs on everyone else, and thereby to exercise his equal share of partial ownership over every other man. In practice, then, this concept of universal and equal other-ownership is Utopian and impossible, and supervision and therefore ownership of others necessarily becomes a specialized activity of a ruling class. Hence, no society which does not have full self-ownership for everyone can enjoy a universal ethic. For this reason alone, 100 percent self-ownership for every man is the only viable political ethic for mankind.
Rothbard goes on,
But suppose for the sake of argument that this Utopia could be sustained. What then? In the first place, it is surely absurd to hold that no man is entitled to own himself, and yet to hold that each of these very men is entitled to own a part of all other men! But more than that, would our Utopia be desirable? Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish. [emphasis added]
(See also Rothbard’s comments in Man, Economy, and State, where he refutes the idea that the free market robs future generations by wasting natural resources, since “[s]uch reasoning would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that none of the resource be consumed at all.”)
Hans-Hermann Hoppe makes some related points as well. In Hoppe’s The Ethics and Economics of Private Property, Hoppe argues that the libertarian principle of original appropriation–“Everyone is the proper owner of his own physical body as well as of all places and nature-given goods that he occupies and puts to use by means of his body, provided that no one else has already occupied or used the same places and goods before him” is not only intuitive and obvious to most people (even “children and primitives”), it is also provable. Hoppe argues that there are only two alternatives to this rule: “Either another person, B, must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or both persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.” However, the first rule reduces A to the rank of B’s slave, and is therefore not universalizable. As for the “second case of universal and equal co-ownership,”
this alternative would suffer from an even more severe deficiency, because if it were applied, all of mankind would instantly perish. (Since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative must also be rejected.) Every action of a person requires the use of some scarce means (at least of the person’s body and its standing room), but if all goods were co-owned by everyone, then no one, at no time and no place, would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured every other co-owner’s consent to do so.
Thus, “universal communism,” as Rothbard referred to it, is a “praxeological impossibility.”
For similar comments, see A Theory of Socialism of Capitalism (1989), pp. 142-143.
Hoppe also criticizes the notion that aggression can be viewed as “an invasion of the value or psychic integrity of” others’ property, as opposed to the libertarian view under which aggression is “defined as an invasion of the physical integrity of another person’s property.” Hoppe critiques this alternative conception of aggression because
While a person has control over whether or not his actions will change the physical properties of another’s property, he has no control over whether or not his actions affect the value (or price) of another’s property. This is determined by other individuals and their evaluations. Consequently, it would be impossible to know in advance whether or not one’s planned actions were legitimate. The entire population would have to be interrogated to assure that one’s actions would not damage the value of someone else’s property, and one could not begin to act until a universal consensus had been reached. Mankind would die out long before this assumption could ever be fulfilled.
See similar arguments by Hoppe in his 1988 Austrian Economic Newsletter article, The Justice of Economic Efficiency (p. 3). Interestingly, in the ensuing exchange between the late David Osterfeld and Hoppe, they use language eerily similar to Cohen’s: Osterfeld (p. 9): “Hoppe argues that socialism is ‘argumentatively indefensible’ because if private property is not recognized, then one would have to come to an agreement with the ‘entire world population’ prior to committing oneself to a course of action, a requirement that would paralyze all human action, and thus all life. It is not clear that the only alternative to individual ownership is ownership by the ‘world community’.” (I cannot find the exact phrases “entire world population” or “world community” in the Hoppe piece Osterfeld is critquing, however.) In Hoppe’s response (p. 239), he notes: “Osterfeld claims that I construct an altemative between either individual ownership or but that such an altemative is not exhaustive. This is a misrepresentation. Nowhere do I say anything like this.” (emphasis added)
Archived comments:
Since when do Marxists/Communists/Socialists ever address inconsistancies in their beliefs. Marx himself did not address several facts at his disposal. Among them are:
1. Urban England, London in particular, had INCREASING incomes, wages and standards of living not decreasing.
2. Urban England had poor folks who were much wealthier than those in rural England.
3. Factory workers moved to cities to get better lives given the alternative of starving in the rural areas.
4. The middle class was much larger than was commonly accepted. AND GROWING RAPIDLY!!!
Posted by: Bill at March 9, 2007 7:48 AM
Hoppe argues that there are only two alternatives to this rule: “Either another person, B, must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or both persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.”
Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?
For this reason I have a hard time swallowing argumentive ethics, since it only shows that once you accept the normative concept of ownership, you can derive private property as the only defensibly just principle.
Posted by: iceberg at March 9, 2007 9:05 AM
Iceberg Slim wrote:
Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?
For this reason I have a hard time swallowing argumentive ethics, since it only shows that once you accept the normative concept of ownership, you can derive private property as the only defensibly just principle.
Rothbard wrote about that alternative in The Ethics of Liberty. Though it was only a footnote.
In Part II of the book, Section 8 Rothbard writes a chapter titled “Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression.” A quote from Rothbard:
Let us set aside for a moment the corollary but more complex case of tangible property, and concentrate on the question of a man’s ownership rights to his own body. Here there are two alternatives: either we may lay down a rule that each man should be permitted (i.e., have the right to) the full ownership of his own body, or we may rule that he may not have such complete ownership. If he does, then we have the libertarian natural law for a free society as treated above. But if he does not, if each man is not entitled to full and 100 percent self-ownership, then what does this imply? It implies either one of two conditions: (1) the “communist” one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or (2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another—a system of rule by one class over another. These are the only logical alternatives to a state of 100 percent self-ownership for all.[1]
Footnote [1] says this:
Professor George Mavrodes, of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.
I wouldn’t call that an in depth “refutation”, but at least it is spoken of.
Posted by: Black Bloke at March 9, 2007 9:46 AM
Why does the preview show one thing and the post another?
Posted by: Black Bloke at March 9, 2007 9:47 AM
iceberg: “Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?”
I believe it was, but perhaps the refutation has not adequitely explained. Ownership is defined in terms of rightful control over some specific resource. The right to control when and how a resource is transformed and/or consumed — and thus the acts of transforming and consuming themselves — imply ownership. By definition, then, in order for any resource to be utilized it must first be owned by some person or collection of persons. To say that no one owns anything is equivalent to say that no one has any right to transform or consume anything. This would naturally lead to the mass extinction of the human species.
Posted by: Jesse at March 9, 2007 9:47 AM
Cohen’s point, though, is that self-ownership is rendered insubstantial and merely formal under such a socialist situation. It is not violated, any more than a person’s property rights in a corkscrew are violated by a worldwide absence of corked bottles. It simply means that you cannot use yourself. Cohen responds, however, that the situation could be precisely the same in a libertarian society if one guy (somehow) buys up all the land (or otherwise justly appropriates it) and so leaves everybody else in a position of not being able to use themselves to do anything (except maybe think about what they are missing out upon) without the permission of the owner of that land.
However, there are obvious answers to Cohen. One bad one is that since self-ownership is not strictly violated in either situation, who cares? This is bad because self-ownership is attractive precisely because of features the substantive concept has that this strictly formal concept under the world-ownership arrangement lacks.
A better response would be to say, sure, libertarian regards substantive ownership as what is important. However, in the real world, land is not owned by a single owner, it is highly unrealistic to think that it could be, so the closer we get to the real world, and the fuurther from Cohen’s socialist situation, the better, in terms of substantive self-ownership. Moreover, if we include libertarian arguments about the relative non-problem of monopoly absent state intervention, the more libertarian the society, the more substantive self-ownership becomes. We could say, “fine, there would be a problem in a world where one guy bought up all the land,” without really having to abandon much of libertarianism and what makes it attractive at all.
Posted by: Richard Garner at March 9, 2007 11:28 AM
“Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?”
When no one owns anything, no one controls anything. The word, ownership has been bastardized throughout the centuries. When we speak of natural control over resources, we are relley speaking of property ownership.
For their to be peaceful relations between people, their must be agreement on who controls resources, so we are not constantly fighting over resources. agreement over control over resources is contract.
blah blah 🙂
Posted by: jason at March 9, 2007 12:09 PM
Now that it’s been brought up, the fourth alternative (the claim that no-one owns anything) would make a quite intriguing initial situation/plot background for an an-cap Anthem…
Posted by: Daniel M. Ryan at March 9, 2007 2:32 PM
Richard,
“We could say, “fine, there would be a problem in a world where one guy bought up all the land,” without really having to abandon much of libertarianism and what makes it attractive at all.”
Why would there be a problem? If people sell their property, they must surely take responsibility. If original appropriation is rather what is meant, then Cohen and also self-described “left-libertarians” (Hillel Steiner, Peter Vallentyne, Michael Otsuka) have seemingly misunderstood the libertarian theory of acquisition. I think on this point Stephan’s good friend Tom G. Palmer has shown Cohen to wrongly identify Nozick’s proviso as being *the* theory of acquisition, instead of some unnecessary and mistaken addition.
Posted by: ste at March 10, 2007 8:26 AM
Iceberg:
“Or perhaps a fourth unspoken alternative; no one owns anything both individually or collectively. Why isn’t that alternative refuted?”
There are many ways to say it, but basically this “no one owns anything” ethic is not an alternative ethic. The problem is it does not help us answer the question “what am i justified in doing right now and with what?” It in no way helps us avoid conflicts over scarce resources that acting man will necessarily have conflicting ends for.
“For this reason I have a hard time swallowing argumentive ethics, since it only shows that once you accept the normative concept of ownership, you can derive private property as the only defensibly just principle.”
But the act of arguing and justifying anything demonstrates that one accepts these things. Therefore, their validity cannot be disputed. It applies to all who in principle, would argue to justify themselves and ask a justification of another; I.e. humans. And to those beings who in principle would not, or could not in principle present or respect a justification, a property ethic does not and can not apply. But this is exactly why animals have no rights. They can in principle, neither claim any for themselves, nor acknowledge them to others.
Posted by: Paul Edwards at March 10, 2007 3:20 PM
so what then is correct response to the common objection that persons being born into a world where they own no property creates a conflict of rights? e.g. what if nobody wishes to have them on their land, giving them literally nowhere to go. or, are there numerous responses, all with some value? i am certainly not suggesting that such an objection against libertarianism carries any weight, but rather that if we disagree on why the objection isn’t strong, then does that in itself pose a problem?
any thoughts?
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 8:30 AM
ste, try this analogy: What if no store wanted to sell their goods to one particular person? It’s well within a store’s moral rights to refuse to serve someone, but obviously, they only make money by selling their goods, so there would need to be a very strong reason why they wouldn’t want to sell to someone, like if they were a klepto trying to steal their goods.
Same thing with land. Unless a landowner is using their land specifically for their own residence, they want to use land for productive purposes, and would need a strong reason not to allow any particular person on their land.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 11:20 AM
Michael,
but the reply could be that while there is no conflict of rights if every shop refuses to sell food to some person, there is a *necessary* conflict of rights if someone is not permitted to reside anywhere in the world. this difference is one that the self-described “left-libertarians” (Steiner, Otsuka, Vallentyne) pick up on. Steiner, for example, holds that all rights must be simultaneously realisable, or they or not rights. libertarians seemingly want to make this claim too, but your comment does not escape the objection i have outlined.
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 12:22 PM
Well, let’s clarify the issue-what particular right is violated by the situation, and why is it different from the store example?
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 1:06 PM
Michael,
if i have to stand somewhere, and no one wants me to stand on their property, then am i not necessarily trespassing? the store example contains no rights violation that i can see. as i asked earlier, is the best libertarian response that, in practice, this will be highly unlikely to occur? this approach doesn’t seem to rule out unavoidable rights-violations entirely, and hence, seems to be open to attack (as Cohen and others recognise).
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 1:24 PM
Store example is identical, because food is also a necessity of life.
But I want to return to a STE’s statement:
“…there is a *necessary* conflict of rights if someone is not permitted to reside anywhere in the world.”
There is no conflict of “rights” here. You don’t have a right to reside anywhere in the world (thank goodness), simply because I don’t want you in my bedroom. You ask, what if nobody wants me and all land is privatized? Well, even nomadic Gypsies are able to survive while traveling, by entertaining or doing something useful for private owners. Some of them find abandoned parcels and establish adverse possession (their own property) – but we can even assume there is no such land anywhere. If you have nothing to offer to anyone and nobody even wants to give you a shelter – the problem is in you, not in the system of private ownership. The same goes for shops that sell you food: you must offer something in return for their property and if you have nothing to offer you can’t say that your rights are violated by their refusal to serve you.
PS
Also, the example in which one landowner purchases all the land in the world is absurd. People residing on that land cannot go to Mars and they will establish their own adverse possession on that same land if they keep living and working there (also, people would not give-up their land for free and they would not sell their land without some mean of survival and somewhere to go).
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 1:33 PM
Sasha,
rather than a conflict, is it not still true that a rights violation necessarily occurs? and would this not in itself be problematic? as you say, my not having anywhere to go would be a (non-rights-violating) problem for me, but is it not necessarily a rights-violating problem for the unfortunate property owner?
the store example differs in that i could produce, on my own, enough food to survive.
a single person purchasing the entire world is, of course, highly unlikely. but it is not logically impossible (though this is not relevant to the above objection).
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 2:35 PM
Ste,
Quite the contrary:
Rather than a violation of rights, a conflicts may occur in a completely privatized world (any hobo may attack me, in order to get my property without any work for me)… But such violations of private property would be sanctioned. Anyway, a person may have a limited privilege in case of necessity, but he will still own a compensation to the rightful owner (the trespasser will work it out)
I didn’t understand how could you claim that you can produce enough food to survive. What if you own only bare walls and unfertile land as many people do in this world? Are your rights violated if shops don’t want to give you food for free?
PS
Logical impossibility of owning entire livable space in the universe is contained in the adverse possession argument and the fact that people will establish property rights over the land on which they work and live (since they are not slaves and they will use some space on which they will store their compensation for the land they sold). I only mentioned this in the post scriptum as the response to one previous posting.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 2:57 PM
To correct myself (- rather than legalized violation of rights, a number of conflits may occur in a completely privatized world -):
The violation of rights (aggression) can occur in any type of society… The difference is that common law in capitalism would sanction the aggressor, while socialism would legalize the aggressor’s actions.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 3:02 PM
Sasha,
my point is not that violations may occur in a completely privatised world (of course this is true anywhere, as you say) but that we can conceive of a situation which has no solution, whereby a necessary rights violation exists.
in what sense would common law sanction a violation? and, in what sense is this different from it being legalised? if property rights are absolute, why do i have to suffer from having persons on my land? this is the problem that Steiner and others discuss, and i am as keen as you to work out the best libertarian response to it. Richard (above) seems to think that denying the probability of such a situation is the correct response, though you seem to be committed to a different view. are they both valid? or is one more valid than the other? if they are both valid, is only one required to refute the objection?
it is logically possible that we each produce enough food for our survival, so the difficulty of my main point is avoided. as i said, a shop’s refusal to give me food for any price does not infringe my rights. but my being situated on another’s property does, which is precisely the problem. if you could say a little more about the role of common law, i would be grateful.
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 3:53 PM
The point is that one doesn’t have an inherent right to land. Thus, even if no landowner will allow you on their land, no rights are being violated. Trespassing would be a crime, but if there was literally no place for the trespasser to go, I would imagine a just legal system would carve out a solution to the problem, not to mention a humane society. But it wouldn’t be an issue of rights conflict.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 4:03 PM
Michael,
but surely the solution your just legal system will carve out is only necessary to resolve a rights violation. as Sasha pointed out, the objection is not one of conflict. rather, it is that i must be somewhere rather than nowhere.
the objection entirely accepts that we do not have an inherent right to land, i.e. that my rights are not violated by everyone denying me access. the very problem is the one that you point out — for absolute property rights do not seem to be consistent with an inability to remove a trespasser.
however, it is not clear what the court’s decision would be, nor could be. is this a better way of framing the objection?
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 4:14 PM
It’s hard to know what the court’s decision would be a priori without more circumstances. It’s difficult for me to believe that an entirely blameless and unobjectionable person would be refused entrance onto somebody’s land somewhere. Or are we talking about some kind of crisis situation, like extreme overpopulation or the like?
And if the person is, in fact, a criminal of some sort, then the court’s decision and the legal system, should include some way for him to serve his time/work out restitution/redeem himself so that others will eventually allow him onto their lands.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 5:45 PM
Michael,
but if self-ownership does not give us an a priori answer, isn’t this a weakness of the theory? moreover, what circumstances would/could count towards a decision?
the point remains, does it not? whether it is hard for you to believe or not cannot be relevant to the difficulty that the objection poses. absolute property rights dictate that the property owner, and no one else, makes decisions about who can occupy his property, doesn’t it? why should he abide by the decision of any court?
this shows why any talk of a crisis situation is irrelevant (Rothbard correctly refutes Nozick’s use of such a justification) since it admits to the strength the objection i posed.
the person without access to any land need not (otherwise) be a criminal.
one solution, of course, is that the trespasser be executed,but i am not sure this represents a good escape.
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 6:06 PM
Ste says:
“if property rights are absolute, why do i have to suffer from having persons on my land?”
That’s the problem with your entire argument. You falsely presuppose “suffering” that will not be sanctioned in anarcho-capitalism. But it will. In cases of easement or limited privilege in case of necessity, the owner is compensated… trespasser is held responsible.
Also, Ste commits another logical error:
That’s nonsensical. It is logically possible that we each parcel land in ways in which everyone will have a shelter – so the difficulty of my main point is avoided in the same way.
But your point was different, because you asked whether someone rights will be violated “if someone does not have any land,” without actually asking yourself: “what if someone does not own means for food production?”
Just like owner of shops does not violate the right of those who can’t produce food by refusing to give it for free – the landowner does not violate rights of those who hypothetically have nowhere to go and nothing to offer in exchange for shelter.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 6:32 PM
This was cut out with an incorrect HTML code:
It is logically possible that we each produce enough food for our survival, so the difficulty of my main point is avoided.”
That’s nonsensical. It is logically possible that we each parcel land in ways in which everyone will have a shelter – so the difficulty of my main point is avoided in the same way…
But your point was different, because you asked whether someone rights will be violated “if someone does not have any land,” without actually asking yourself: “what if someone does not own means for food production?”
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 6:34 PM
So we have to keep analogies straight.
When Ste wants to prove “inconsistency” in anarcho-capitalism, he tries to play with false analogies.
That’s rather misfortunate, since I’m eager to hear some valid anarcho-communist objections to anarcho-capitalism, when it comes to self-ownership and derived rights.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 6:41 PM
Sasha,
i am merely playing devil’s advocate, in the hope that the objection i’ve stated can be dismissed with more than the claim that it is unlikely to happen.
still, the difference between the two cases will not disappear. without wishing to repeat myself, i think the inconsistency remains. my question is why should anyone be, of logical necessity, forced to house a trespasser? it is all very well that a court sides with the property owner in principle, but the fact is that the person must continue to reside somewhere, thereby violating the rights of a property owner. another way of stating the point is to say that it odd that a series of just decisions could lead to a necessarily unjust situation. i fail to see how self-ownership alone can resolve this logical problem.
which false analogies am i playing with?
Posted by: ste at March 12, 2007 7:12 PM
Nobody should be forced to house a trespasser. So what?
Your “objection” is pure meaningless sophistry.
It’s like asking “what if two plus two was five”? Well, who cares what if – it isn’t!
Posted by: Peter at March 12, 2007 7:50 PM
Ste,
While it is true that many communists are dishonest – I would rather see you not emulating their incorrect analogies (I pointed out which false analogy I refer to, read more carefully), but instead raising some valid objections.
There is no difference between two cases (shop-keepers who refuse the free access to food and landowners who restrict free access to shelter):
In order to survive, a person must reside somewhere — but that person also must eat. Anarcho-capitalists do not believe that a person has an inherent right to survive at someone else’s expense, whether we talk about housing or food needs.
YOU SAID: “but the fact is that the person must continue to reside somewhere, thereby violating the rights of a property owner.”
Forgive me, but that is such a nonsensical assumption that I must question your honesty. Who says that by residing on someone else’s property you necessarily must violate someone else’s property???? I don’t have my own housing and I live on someone else’s property – but I pay for it and I am not a violator. The same goes for food: I don’t own any means for food production, but that does not imply that I will steal to get it. Even if I had no alternative for food and shelter in some unrealistic world, these facts would not change! I own my body and I will offer labor for good like money, with which I would obtain food and shelter…
Anarcho-capitalism would equally sanction any trespasser and there is no inconsistency between markets for food or shelter.
Regards.
….
PS
You say: we can imagine a world in which “each [person] produces enough food for our survival” (the means for production of food are perfectly divided in your imaginary world), so we would not have any conflicts over food in those utopian circumstances…
– but we can also imagine a world in which people have perfectly parceled the land between each person – so there is no conflicts over shelter in those utopian circumstances.
That’s why I pointed inconsistency in your analogy. Anarcho-capitalism is not inconsistent even in such absurd scenarios.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 12, 2007 7:53 PM
but if self-ownership does not give us an a priori answer, isn’t this a weakness of the theory? moreover, what circumstances would/could count towards a decision?
Um, self-ownership is separate from the legal system. Arbitration and mediation will always require knowledge of the circumstances involved. Expecting a system of rights to solve non-rights situations is a little silly, isn’t it? And yes, crisis situations are usually outside of normal legal systems, as well. I was merely trying to find out if you wanted to raise that objection.
Soem people want all human social and ethical conditions to be subsumed under the legal system. Politicizing all aspects of human behavior is not only undesireable, it also has terrible consequences on social, cultural and ethical norms and aspects of society. In short, I don’t think it’s a flaw in a rights system to not have an a priori answer to a non-rights issue. It’s an improvement. To say that someone is not legally required to be charitable is not at all the same thing as saying that people should not be (as in social pressure) or will not be (as in basic human kindness and nature) charitable.
Libertarian rights are a basis for a legal system, not a comprehensive philosophy for all human conduct.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 12, 2007 7:57 PM
Peter,
the objection is not meaningless, and is certainly not akin to saying 2 + 2 = 5, because it is possible that the situation i described can exist, without any assumption of aggression on anyone’s part. i raise it only to suggest a possible difficulty in absolute property rights. if we are to take them seriously, as i certainly do, then doesn’t it help to determine exactly what the best response to doubters is, and to stick to it? there have been different replies to my point, and this is the precisely the issue i wanted to raise. are all valid, or not? if not, it might be worth arguing against those who reject my point but for different reasons. on a practical note, objections like the one i raised are (unsurprisingly) largely accepted in politics departments throughout academia today, and this is even more reason to be clear on exactly why my objection does not count.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 12:18 PM
Sasha,
but i disagree that the analogy holds. i could just as well ask you to read me more carefully.
the difference between the cases is that no shop owner has to provide food (this is plainly obvious), and in doing so the rights of every shop owner are upheld. however, if every land owner refuses the person permission to reside on his land, then necessarily the person will be aggressing against one of them. which part of the distinction are you missing?
if you are saying that the difficulty will quickly disappear because people do not live very long without food, then isnt this just limiting the problem to the number of days that the person survives for? this does not elmiinate the objection posed.
“Forgive me, but that is such a nonsensical assumption that I must question your honesty.”
as i said, i am simply trying to work out the best response. it seems to me that you disagree that saying the situation is very unlikely to happen is the best response, so on that score at least we have made some progress. whether your response it valid is what i’m attempting to determine.
“Who says that by residing on someone else’s property you necessarily must violate someone else’s property???? I don’t have my own housing and I live on someone else’s property – but I pay for it and I am not a violator.”
yes, i understand this. it is, after all, unlikely. the point is that if every property owner justly refused you access, you would have nowhere to go. all of these decisions are just, yet an unjust situation can logically result. this is the basis of the objection.
“The same goes for food: I don’t own any means for food production, but that does not imply that I will steal to get it.”
but the food example requires intentional criminality on your part, whereas the land example does not. ideal theory seems to have a problem here, and assuming that the problem raised will not happen does not seem to be a valid escape, as you seem to suggest.
cheers.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 12:45 PM
Michael,
“Arbitration and mediation will always require knowledge of the circumstances involved. Expecting a system of rights to solve non-rights situations is a little silly, isn’t it?”
but we know all the relevant circumstances, do we not? every property owner is refusing to allow a person to reside on their land. what more could we find out empirically?
are you claiming that trespass isn’t a rights violation? if not, are you inadvertantly claiming a crisis situation?
“Soem people want all human social and ethical conditions to be subsumed under the legal system. Politicizing all aspects of human behavior is not only undesireable, it also has terrible consequences on social, cultural and ethical norms and aspects of society.”
Some people might well do, but the objection does not imply this.
“In short, I don’t think it’s a flaw in a rights system to not have an a priori answer to a non-rights issue.”
why isn’t it a rights issue?
“It’s an improvement.”
Is this saying absolute property rights are imperfect? If so, does it matter? Sasha, do you agree with this Michael here?
“Libertarian rights are a basis for a legal system, not a comprehensive philosophy for all human conduct.”
This is undoubtedly true, but again, my objection is not making this claim.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 12:58 PM
Yes, trespass is a rights violation, but as we’ve already made clear, this is not an issue of rights conflict. As for the circumstances of the situation, there must be some kind of reason why ALL the landowners would refuse to allow someone on their property, or else we are talking about a supremely irrational situation or a crisis situation of some sort. It may be a “possible” situation, but absurd under normal circumstances.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 13, 2007 1:40 PM
Ste,
I read you carefully and that’s why I question your honesty.
You asked: “however, if every land owner refuses the person permission to reside on his land, then necessarily the person will be aggressing against one of them. which part of the distinction are you missing?”
I am not missing anything.
If every land owner refuses the person to reside on his land – that is perfectly analogous to a twisted world in which every shop-owner refuses to give food to a person who does not have means of producing it.
So what’s the problem here? Rights will always get violated when person wants to live at someone else’s expense. Anarcho-capitalism does not eliminate violations of rights – but it is the only system that would sanction these violations. Socialism would try to legalize such parasitism.
STE SAID: “but the food example requires intentional criminality on your part, whereas the land example does not.”
If you use someone’s land and refuse to pay for it – that is also intentional act. When you are starving, you unintentionally (out of necessity) must use someone’s food – but you have to pay for it.
You are insisting on a lie in order to find a flaw in anarcho-capitalism.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 1:49 PM
Michael,
“It may be a “possible” situation, but absurd under normal circumstances.”
Forgive me if i misinterpret, but that sounds like an admission of the strength of my objection, and simply falls back on “it is unlikely.” if this is the best response, then fine, but i hoped we would find a better one.
i don’t see why the (irrational?) reasons for all landowners to refuse access are relevant. if, as you suggest, it might be a crisis situation, then what counts as a crisis? Hoppe says that we should not compromise on the level of theory. what if this peculiar compromise is unavoidable?
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 2:15 PM
Ste is forgetting that anarcho-capitalism recognizes necessity as a legal concept (some people cannot avoid being present on someone’s land and to use someone’s food – like a shipwrecked person on a private island – but they will have to owe some kind of compensation to this owner.
So there is no “violations” in cases of necessity, unless person refuses to pay some kind of compensation for their use of land and food. The only to avoid the hypothetical possibility of having these violations – is by legalizing theft. That’s the socialist “solution” for a non-existent problem.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 2:17 PM
Ste said: “Forgive me if i misinterpret, but that sounds like an admission of the strength of my objection”
Leave Michael alone for a second…
I just politely showed how absurd your pseudo-arguments are. There is no strength in them… and no readiness for critical thinking either, either.
Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 2:20 PM
All I’m wanting is a clarification of the issue being presented, before we start appealing to Lewis Carroll. The circumstances DO matter, and the appropriate response may well differ depending upon those circumstances.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 13, 2007 2:51 PM
Sasha,
“Ste is forgetting that anarcho-capitalism recognizes necessity as a legal concept (some people cannot avoid being present on someone’s land and to use someone’s food – like a shipwrecked person on a private island – but they will have to owe some kind of compensation to this owner.”
perhaps this is, in part, the answer i was looking for. it certainly sounds more promising than your previous attempts, and is very different from the “unlikely” argument. but also perhaps not. for instance, i do not equate the land example with the food example, and i do not think you necessarily need to in order to argue against my objection. the word “necessity” is being used in two different ways, which could be more important than you allow.
i don’t tthink those who originally made my objection would be convinced by your detailed and thoughtful points, but then maybe i will never convince you of (any of) the merits of my point.
(I am sure Michael can look after himself.)
cheers.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 2:55 PM
Ste,
I consistently raise the same types of objections, so there is nothing “more” or “less” promising in my last posting.
The problem in your argument is that you try not to equate food with land examples – by trying to establish a false analogy between a world in which everyone has enough food to survive (world without scarcity of basic food) – with a world in which we have people without any land to live on. And then you say: look at these different outcomes, hence food and land cannot be compared.
All I said was: let’s imagine the world in which I don’t have any means to produce food (even if I owned unfertile land)! Would my rights be violated if ship-owners refused to give me their food for free? Of course not. Will shop-owners rights be violated if I take their food in order to sustain my life? NOT NECESSARILY. Only if I refuse to pay them at the later time – that would constitute a violation! And trust me: anarcho-capitalism would sanction these violations.
Food and living space are both necessities of life – what goes for one, goes for the other. You can even expand these necessities to clothing, healthcare, education, employment… once you legalize land theft, there’s no end to slippery slope of socialism.
I am sure that communists who made false objections to anarcho-capitalism will not be convinced by my arguments, since most of them are not interested in hearing other people’s ideas.
On the other hand, I carefully considered your arguments, and I am not convinced simply because your objections to anarcho-capitalism are false. Anarcho-capitalism would not cause property right violations – even if all land was privatized and you had nowhere to go. Your necessity use of someone’s food or land – does not imply that you will refuse to pay them. And anarcho-capitalism is not inconsistent in either scenario.
Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 3:55 PM
I think something is being forgotten here.
Nobody can, in a privatized world, simply be “born” into a world where they don’t own any property and thus their presence is a perpetual trespass.
Somebody had to have given birth to the person and that somebody either lives legally, would have either committed a prior trespass, or was a descendant thereof.
One interesting side point that I haven’t read about (perhaps there is an article covering this somewhere–it’d be interesting if anyone knows of such): Say the world is privatized. You own land, your neighbors own theirs. You find someone trespassing on your property.
Now nobody would dispute that you have a right to expel this person, but the question becomes “where to?” Now it may not be any of your business, but what if your expelling of this trespasser simply creates a trespass against your neighbor? Now perhaps there is a private road that permits someone (perhaps your defense agency) to take this trespasser back to their own territory, which is all and good. But, if we assume this is not an option, what options does the landowner or trespasser have other than to further trespass? My initial reaction is to say that the trespasser should, in this example where there are no publicly available options such as roads, return in the reverse order he arrived. Sorry if this is off-topic.
Posted by: Jordan at March 13, 2007 6:00 PM
Jordan,
Someone like me have parents with property (where I lived until I turned 18), but what if they kicked me out of there? Now imagine a hypothetical world in which everything is privatized and I don’t have anyone’s invitation to live on their property (Ste’s scenario). What then?
My response to Ste was: In the anarcho-capitalist world, I would have a limited privilege of necessity to obtain food and shelter, but I would have to compensate the owners… My aggression against owners (refusal to pay) is not presupposed.
The answer to your last question is: a proletarian person would continuously (and unintentionally/out-of-necessity) trespass until he finds a willing host who will accept his labor in exchange for hosting. I won’t get into the debate about common law easements and private roads for public use, because that would take us even farther away from this topic.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 6:19 PM
I remember reading an article where someone argued that commons could and would still arise in AC society. Don’t remember the specifics, though–I’ll have to see if I can find it again. Also, the purpose of a road, even a private road, is to allow people to travel to different locations. Again, it would be quite strange if our trespasser wouldn’t be allowed to travel on a road or path, perhaps to a commons area.
The only thing I can figure is that our opponents expect guarantees and perfection from our theories. If they fall short, even just a little bit, that becomes a justification for them to reject them completely, and to hold on to their own preferred theories.
I can only argue to the best of my ability and knowledge, not being a Rothbard, or Mises, or even a Friedman.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 13, 2007 6:53 PM
Sasha,
perhaps if i change the emphasis of my point.. the objection is not at all concerned with the survival of the person without property — after all, what happens to them is not a problem.
it is instead concerned with the property owner (not?) having to allow the person a place to stand. hence food is not the issue, because the person without property could (logically) decide not to steal any food, but (as a matter of logic) he could not decide to not stand anywhere.
either i do or do not have to allow a person to stand on my property. the compensation idea seems to want to have it both ways, i.e., by maintaining that property rights are absolute, but also admitting there are certain instances where these rights are necessarily violated (albeit with restitution). you say that, providing the person compensates, then no rights are violated. but if no rights are violated, why is compensation necessary? would instead this be described as a “contract”? if not, what is it?
therefore, the specific details of “limited privilege” are interesting, and worth exploring, i think.
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 7:21 PM
Michael,
“The only thing I can figure is that our opponents expect guarantees and perfection from our theories. If they fall short, even just a little bit, that becomes a justification for them to reject them completely, and to hold on to their own preferred theories.”
you seem to accept my objection may have at the least *some* weight, while Sasha does not. my original purpose was to see what differences exists between anarcho-capitalists’ rejections of such objections, and the extent to which this is important. perhaps you agree with Sasha, perhaps not.
i am, of course, not suggesting that we abandon the theory. i am merely pointing to a potential point in need of clarification. some contemporary political theorists attempt to get around what they see as a problem (the one i stated), claiming for example that full self-ownership be combined with some egalitarian world-ownership. i do not think this is possible, of course. nevertheless, their failure does mean that my original objection does not stand.
it’s an interesting issue though, right?
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 7:37 PM
Sasha/ste,
To reply to both of your critiques–does not the right to expel someone from your justly owned property presuppose that there is a location to which that person could be justly expelled?
Also, in reference to Sasha’s example of the parents kicking their child out of the house at 18–a la Rothbard, Hoppe, Kinsella, et al, a child becomes a fully realized self-owner when they express their objective link to their own body by moving/running away. If the parents have been the childs’ caretakers/trustees for 18-years, and they all of a sudden decide they want to rid themselves of this person, they can abrogate their status as caretaker/trustees to which end the child can then choose to express their objective link and move out or, failing that, the title of caretaker/trustee can be taken over by whomever has the next best link (family, etc). At any rate, the child is not a trespasser by mere parental decree.
Posted by: Jordan at March 13, 2007 7:55 PM
Jordan,
well, does it? what are the implications of there not being such a location?
Posted by: ste at March 13, 2007 8:13 PM
Jordan,
we cannot talk about any “child” after the person reaches certain age and it is not anyone’s responsibility to continue to support him and feed him. If, however, that child had a certain autonomy on his parents land, where he worked, made improvements, and lived in separate “quarters” – you may argue that he established an adverse possession and that he can’t be kicked out of there.
—-
Ste,
You are mistaken. My emphasis did not neglect the property owner in your scenario – I quite clearly addressed his rights.
In case that someone uses your property out of necessity (not by intentional trespass) – you will have a claim on compensation from this user. Your rights will only be violated if he refuses to pay – but that theft can happen in any system and it is completely irrelevant to our discussion on anarcho-capitalism.
But I am concerned about your another statement. You said:
“you say that, providing the person compensates, then no rights are violated. but if no rights are violated, why is compensation necessary?”
Why is compensation necessary when you finish your dinner at a restaurant? You used someone good and service and you owe for it. Only if you refuse to pay you committed a theft. In case of necessity, we don’t talk about an “implied contract” but about the exercise of substantive self-ownership, which is absolute and precedes property rights – but do not conflict with other person’s rights (as long as the owner of used property gets compensated).
Due to your unfair objections, I don’t give much weight to your argument. Specific details of “necessity” are worth of exploring to you, because we talk about principles present even in Roman law, yet you completely disregarded them in your initial assumptions.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 8:53 PM
the objection is not meaningless, and is certainly not akin to saying 2 + 2 = 5, because it is possible that the situation i described can exist, without any assumption of aggression on anyone’s part.
What do you mean by “possible”? You mean you can imagine a world in which that situation obtains, in the same way you can imagine a world in which the speed of light is 17mph? Or do you mean it’s actually a possibility in this real world? Because if you mean the latter, you’re wrong. And if you mean the former, it is indeed meaningless.
Posted by: Peter at March 13, 2007 8:59 PM
Sasha: “Someone like me have parents with property (where I lived until I turned 18), but what if they kicked me out of there? Now imagine a hypothetical world in which everything is privatized and I don’t have anyone’s invitation to live on their property (Ste’s scenario). What then?
My response to Ste was: In the anarcho-capitalist world, I would have a limited privilege of necessity to obtain food and shelter, but I would have to compensate the owners… My aggression against owners (refusal to pay) is not presupposed.”
Yeah–someone so unliked, so despicable, such a loser, that their own parent kick them out, they have no friends they can stay with, no charitable groups they can avail themselves of, no job with their own income–such a person is likely to be able to pay compensation for trespass, right? Uh, yeah.
Posted by: Stephan Kinsella at March 13, 2007 9:07 PM
Dr. Kinsella,
Inability to pay does not excuse anyone from legal liability. Such person still owes his body and ability to do at least some kind of labor (any form of useful labor, as demonstrated by the ability to get on someone’s property and feed himself). It is up to the owner to decide whether to forgive a poor person – not up to the legals system.
Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 9:14 PM
Will shop-owners rights be violated if I take their food in order to sustain my life? NOT NECESSARILY. Only if I refuse to pay them at the later time – that would constitute a violation! And trust me: anarcho-capitalism would sanction these violations.
Of course the violation occurs at the time you take the food. Paying for it after the fact is restitutive punishment. (Regarding your earlier post, about a shipwrecked man washing up on a private island, I can’t for the life of me see how he owes the owner anything for that)
[Also note that you’re using the word “sanction” in an unusual way. The normal meaning is “allow” or “approve of”; confusingly, it is sometimes used to mean “punish” recently, which is apparently what you mean, but it’d make a lot more sense if you said “anarcho-capitalism would NOT sanction these violations” (not that it actually makes any sense either way: anarcho-capitalism is a concept, concepts don’t give approval to actions)]
Posted by: Peter at March 13, 2007 9:21 PM
Peter,
OK. You violate rights of restaurant owner when you eat your dinner there – and your payment for it is “restitutive” punishment.
Of course I’m joking, but you demonstrated your ignorance of basic legal concept. If “necessity” was in fact violation, a person would not only owe for something he used, but he would also pay PUNITIVE damages. No such thing exists… sorry.
Also note that a legal definition of “sanction” is “embargo” or “punishment” – hence the term “legal sanction.” I agree that if somebody fell from Mars, he would find my use of term “sanction” unusual. I did not talk about Latin or Indo-European root of this word.
When I say that anarcho-capitalism would not sanction something, I refer to people under such order – which is also clear to everyone.
Thanks for your contribution. Regards.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 13, 2007 9:33 PM
OK. You violate rights of restaurant owner when you eat your dinner there – and your payment for it is “restitutive” punishment.
If the owner doesn’t want to serve you, that would be true. Otherwise, you’re eating there on the understanding that you’ll be paying for it (or someone will), not just taking the food.
If “necessity” was in fact violation, a person would not only owe for something he used, but he would also pay PUNITIVE damages.
It’s certainly a possibility.
Also note that a legal definition of “sanction” is “embargo” or “punishment” – hence the term “legal sanction.”
The term “legal sanction” means exactly the opposite of what you say: legal approval to do something, not punishment. E.g., the first hit on Google, an article entitled “Bush administration seeks legal sanction for torture” – means Bush wants approval to use torture, not that Bush wants to be punished.
Posted by: Peter at March 14, 2007 2:03 AM
Life and self-ownership
Mark Humphrey “I don’t want to precipitate trench warfare with devoted Rothbardians, but I strongly suspect that Rothbard owed his insight about “life as the standard of moral value” to Ayn Rand. I can’t prove this, of course. Sadly, in “The Ethics of Liberty”, (published in the early Eighties) Rothbard chose to, in a sense, blacklist Rand by claiming that NO ONE, other than himself, in the libertarian movement was working to develope a system of rationally defensible ethics. (Maybe Rothbard meant “at the moment I am writing this statement”.)”
Björn That life is an axiomatic value and functions “as the standard of moral value” in an ethical system, Rothbard could, alternatively for example, have gotten this insight from Mises himself through analyzing his statement in his book, “Human Action”, page 11:
“We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will.”
http://www.mises.org/humanaction/chap1sec1.asp
I am not saying that Rothbard did get his insight from Mises; I am only saying that it was possible. Surely, many other possibilities exist which we do not know anything about.
Mark Humphrey “It has been awhile since I’ve read Hoppe, and Rothbard; but I suspect Hoppe’s reasoning goes: either we all own ourselves, or everyone owns everyone else. Since the first proposition is clearly more defensible than the latter absurd proposition, one can affirm self ownership as valid. But if this is the argument, it fails. For that argument assumes that which it sets out to prove, namely that an ethical concept, “ownership”, exists. But on this basis, ownership remains unproven, so that one could just as well assert: “no one owns anything, and anything goes.””
Björn Self-ownership is a natural fact, since a man in his very nature controls his own mind and body (natural disposition), that is, he is a natural self-owner of his own will and person (having a free will) and if this was not true, neither could he effectively control any property and, therefore, not own it. In other words; “nothing could control and own something”.
Naturally, praxeology the science of human action, by itself logically confirms the natural fact of self-ownership, since praxeology is based upon “the acting man consciously intending to improve his own satisfaction” and I quote from answers.com:
“From praxeology Mises derived the idea that every conscious action is intended to improve a person’s satisfaction. He was careful to stress that praxeology is not concerned with the individual’s definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction. The way in which a person will increase his satisfaction is by removing a source of dissatisfaction. As the future is uncertain so every action is speculative.
An acting man is defined as one capable of logical thought — to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes capable of removing, otherwise he cannot act.
Another conclusion that Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being only capable of one decision at a time — even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction.
As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, for every further goal reached, his satisfaction, or utility, is lessened from the preceding goal. This is the rule of diminishing marginal utility.
In human society many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague’s possession than he does for his own. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics, and is the more commonly accepted realm of economics.”
http://www.answers.com/Praxeology?gwp=11&ver;=2.0.1.458&method;=3
Further:
The Ethics of Liberty, page 45:
Footnote:
“[1]Professor George Mavrodes, of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.”
http://www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/eight.asp
Or in my own words from the essay “Normative principles”:
“Why must anybody own anything?
In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:
“Everybody owns themselves and their Justly owned property rights”.
Nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).
This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).
Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.”
http://normativeprinciples.blogspot.com/2006/12/normative-principles-pure-free-market_10.html
An Animated Introduction to the Philosophy of Liberty:
http://www.isil.org/resources/introduction.html
The animation in full-sized window:
http://www.isil.org/resources/introduction.swf
Björn Lundahl
Göteborg, Sweden
Posted by: Björn Lundahl at March 14, 2007 3:28 AM
Peter,
You say: “Otherwise, you’re eating there on the understanding that you’ll be paying for it (or someone will), not just taking the food.
But that is also true of “necessity.” You are eating in order to survive, exercising substantive self-ownership, understanding that you will pay for it.
Coming from the legal definition of “violation” – you cannot say that you must commit it in case of pure necessity, when you acknowledge that you will pay for it. Anarcho-capitalism might hypothetically and unlikely lead to a situation in which a particular person will not have any means for producing his own food – but that does not mean that this person’s act out of necessity can ever be viewed as unlawful and forceful (violation) as long this party does not refuse the responsibility to compensate the owner. There can be no punitive damages when it comes to necessity.
I accept your concerns, but for the most part they were unnecessary.
PS
[As far as term “sanction” goes, it has different meanings and people will understand me from my context, rather than “google”. English has a few other words that can refer to opposites, such as the verbs dust (meaning both “to remove dust from” and “to put dust on”) and trim (meaning both “to cut something away” and “to add something as an ornament”).]
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 8:36 AM
So the last line of defense of anarcho-communism has been reduced to a false assumption that anarcho-capitalism could hypothetically lead to world which is so subdivided that there is no land on which a proletariats (people who own nothing but themselves) can establish an adverse possession or homesteading. But even if this happens – it does not mean that these proletarians will automatically commit any violation if they act out of pure necessity. Dr. Kinsella’s objection that proletarians have no wealth to pay any compensation does not hold – as long as proletarians own themselves (and their body as a valued mean of production).
Communists logically failed and their alternative plan to argue universal co-ownership of the world’s resources was effectively debunked by Rothbard and Hoppe.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 10:41 AM
Sasha,
“But even if this happens – it does not mean that these proletarians will automatically commit any violation if they act out of pure necessity.”
i still think you are ignoring my point. how can non-violation rest on the person agreeing to compensate? as Stephan Kinsella pointed out, it is very possible that the person cannot or will not compensate. but this i think comes after the point at which the objection strikes. i assume that Stephan does not agree with my objection, but this does not necessarily follow from his comment. also, you seem to have some disagreements with Peter now, despite you both disagreeing with me. this is yet more evidence for me of the importance of how anarcho-capitalists successfully refute objections such as the one i raise.
as i already asked, how are you to deny the logical necessity of trespass that pertains when all property owners justly refuse access? in this sense rights are not compossible (all realisable without violation), and herein lies the objection. do you agree that *this* sense of ‘necessity’ is very different to the one used if the person CHOOSES to eat the food of someone else in order to survive?
Posted by: ste at March 14, 2007 11:47 AM
Ste,
My initial impression is that yes, it does pre-suppose that there is either a location to which that person owns or has contracted to reside, or a location to which entry is assumed to be allowed (a “public” place, in the non-governmental sense). I imagine that this scenario only comes up in very primitive, limited cases (if ever) and that in the real world, there would always be a place for the non-landowner to legally stand.
That’s just my initial impression, however. I haven’t given it a lot of thought–In a moment of haste, I’ve thought 53 and 28 made 71 as well…
Posted by: Jordan at March 14, 2007 12:49 PM
I’ve got to agree with Peter, Sasha. It’s quite different for a restaurant to allow you to order and eat with the expectation that you’ll pay at the end of the dinner than it is to have somebody trespass out of necessity, and then pay compensation.
And I still have to go with “unlikely” on the trespass problem, simply because I’m not going to be absolutist and say it’s impossible when it’s possible but absurd. Still, I think the analogy to a restaurant is fair. Under what circumstances would a restaurant, from a high-class French joint to your local McDonald’s, deny a person to dine on their premises? Their whole raison d’etre is to sell their food/service to customers. There would be no good, rational reason to denying a thorougly unobjectionable person with the means to pay from dining. They would only reject him if they knew that he couldn’t pay, or he was a health risk (Typhoid Mary?), or he was a danger, or he was a known restaurant thief, or SOMETHING like that.
Land, of course, has various and sundry uses, and use as rental property is only one of them. But the same considerations apply, at least to landlords. They must have some good reason for denying someone on their property, not because I say so, but because they, like the restaurants, want to make money.
Thus, like I said, the circumstances of the situation matter. It might be entirely understandable, even to the most ardent anti-AC’er, why some particular person would not be legally allowed on people’s property. Without knowing the circumstances, it’s hard to make blanket, generalized statements that will be true.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 14, 2007 1:23 PM
Michael,
You didn’t surprise me with siding with Peter. You don’t understand that principle of necessity does not imply “violation” as long as you pay for your use. I only used the restaurant example, because in many cases people who don’t have money to pay in a restaurant – get a deal with the manager to wash the dishes and compensate him in that way. But in case of necessity, self-ownership (which cannot be exercised if you starve to death) will be protected – but the owner will be compensated (there will be no injured side).
—–
Ste,
I did not ignore any of your objections. Self-ownership is absolute, and property ownership is the only ethical way to exercise it.
You mentioned Dr. Kinsella’s objection that a person who act out of necessity perhaps will not be able to pay for his use. Hold on one second… There is nothing criminal about not being able to pay. How can you classify it as a “violation” then? “Violation” by its legal meaning is something criminal (check the definition) – and “necessity” can never be classified as such.
You also mention the possibility that the proletarian will refuse to pay for his use of someone else’s property. HOLD ON ONE SECOND! Such criminal act would be punishable in anarcho-capitalism, and such violations would occur in any system (except that socialism would legalize such unlawful acts). The fact that you point out such irrelevant nonsense only illustrates you lack of ideas.
Despite of disagreements from some people here, they did not raise any valid objections to anarcho-capitalism. The only possible way to prove that self-ownership could theoretically create a conflict with property rights in anarcho-capitalism – is by claiming that use in case of necessity is a crime (implying that it would yield some punitive damages). Unfortunately for anarcho-communists, such assumption would be nothing but a lie.
You asked: “how are you to deny the logical necessity of trespass that pertains when all property owners justly refuse access?”
Who said I would do something so silly. Trespasses are always possible – and that’s how people obtain adverse possessions and easements. Anarcho-capitalists do not claim that they would eliminate trespass. We only claim that self-ownership would not be conflicted with property rights, because even necessity will be countered by liability compensation.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 6:04 PM
I merely agreed with Peter that there’s a difference between a common expectation and an unexpected use, such as an emergency or crisis situation.
I think that the idea of necessity has validity under certain, limited circumstances, but
I’m not sure if the land example would be such an application, given the lack of circumstancial evidence.
Posted by: Michael A. Clem at March 14, 2007 6:36 PM
There was actually no need to create such absurd scenario in which there is no space for adverse possession of a proletarian…
Ste could have created a more realistic example in which one parcel of unfertile land is completely surrounded by its neighbors’ land. According to an ignorant view of anarcho-capitalism, this person will starve to death, unless he commits a “violation” against his neighbors. However, there is such a thing called “easement” or “right-of-way,” which will allow to this person to leave his property – but he will in turn have to compensate his neighbor(s). So we cannot talk about “violations,” when we talk about non-criminal exercise of self-ownership rights – and compensation for such use of someone else’s property. Accidents (unintentional trespasses) cannot be called “violations” in legal terms (anarcho-capitalism would not eliminate accidents against property of others, either), but this fact does not mean that a victim of an accident would not be entitled to a compensation.
Anarcho-communist simply doesn’t have a valid objection and they can’t find a contradiction in our views – as long as we insist on compensation for any property use, even if such use is absolutely necessary. Roman law, from the Twelve Tables to the Theodosian Code and the Justinian Corpus, recognized the right of private property as near absolute. Property stemmed from unchallenged possession…
– BUT prior usage always established easements and necessity yielded limited privileges. In either case, owners would not be uncompensated. Is the objection to anarcho-capitalism reduced to the statement that in perfectly privatized world we would not be able to eradicate the principles of privileged necessity and easements? Well, thank dear God that we would not get rid of these wonderful principles – even if only 1% of the world was privatized.
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 7:22 PM
But that is also true of “necessity.” You are eating in order to survive, exercising substantive self-ownership, understanding that you will pay for it.
In the case of the ordinary diner at the restaurant, you could consider it a (very short term) credit situation; but for the guy claiming “necessity”, the restaurateur hasn’t agreed to extend credit. You say “understanding that you will pay for it” – but how much is he expected to pay? The restaurateur doesn’t want to serve him. Or maybe he could say “fine, you can eat here, but all the menu prices will be in units of $1000 instead of $1” – if he decides to walk away and then take the food anyway and claim “necessity”, would you have him pay the replacement cost for the food, the menu price, the menu price multiplied by 1000, or what? No; there’s no question he’s stealing in this situation, regardless of any willingness/intent to pay – the restaurant owner could demand “punitive damages” (“two eyes for an eye”), but if the theft was “necessary” I’d expect the owner who did so to come under fire (figuratively, not literally) from the majority of his customer base.
Posted by: Peter at March 14, 2007 7:25 PM
Peter,
You can say that eating somewhere out of necessity is a credit situation. While the restaurant owner can demand “punitive damages” against someone who eats and refuses to pay for the heck of it – someone who is in dire need cannot be liable for any punitive damage (no intent of wrongdoing), but he will be liable for the property he used.
You ask: how much a person owes to the owner? If the owner cannot reach an agreement with the user, it’s up to the courts to decide what would be expected compensation of regular customer (to determine how much would person in need pay if he had money in wallet).
Trying to compare “necessity” with theft is nonsensical. It can only be compared to unintentional trespass, since the person in need does not have a choice in his decision to use someone else’s property. In other words, anarcho-communists cannot prove that proletarians would be forced to become thieves by the virtue of self-ownership – even if the entire world was privatized and unwelcoming. As I said, the principle of limited privilege in case of necessity is like an easement for self-ownership right, which precedes all property.
It seems to me that libertarian-communists think that anarcho-capitalists are senseless bastards who would create an order in which some people could starve to death in the middle of unused paradise of wealth. They forget that our property theory includes concepts like adverse possession, necessity, and easement.
Like I said – even if only 1% of world was privatized, these principles would still hold for anarcho-capitalists. There is no need to imagine absurd scenarios like Ste’s (or Cohen’s).
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 9:30 PM
When it comes to those libertarian-communists who try to invent the arguments against anarcho-capitalism by playing devil’s advocate and pretend that they are concerned about property owners who could be theoretically placed in a “horrible” situation in which a proletarian is forced to cross over their property, while looking for a shelter – all I can say is this:
————————————————–
Dear advocates of the extinction of the mankind,
There is no need for you to invent absurd scenarios in which there is not even a single spot on which someone can find a land to establish his own adverse possession. Even a capitalist world with plenty of unused land that “waits” for homesteading will unavoidably have issues which you try to dishonestly exploit:
– Even if we had an entire new planet ready for settlement, here on Earth we will have private properties that get completely surrounded by other private properties — and they will need path to communicate with the outside world.
– Even in such world in which there is unused abundance of food, there will be shipwrecks, plane-crashes, or any case of dire poverty, which will force some people to use other people’s property in order to survive.
– There will always be possibility of car-crashes, accidents with weapons, people who loose direction, and other unintentional trespasses (accidents) against people’s property — as long as property exists.
Yes, private property rights necessarily leads to these situations, even if only a small portion of Earth was inhabited – but even in Roman times, law based on absolute protection of private property provided solutions for these situations. People who use their privilege of necessity in order to survive on someone else’s property, as well as people who use easement right to cross someone else’s property, will legally be liable to compensate the owner whose land they used. Law in anarcho-capitalism will not tolerate any injury to this owner.
However, this does not mean that law can guarantee that the person who owes compensation will have means to pay his debt. Debt default situation is possible in any system in which property exists – but the fact remains: the rightful owner will still have a legal claim and ownership of goods for which he awaits delivery. As long as indebted side owns his body and capability to work, there are ways in which this debt can be repaid.
So what’s the problem with this? If you seek to avoid theoretical possibility of accidental injuries to your body (for which you would be compensated) – simply kill yourself! If you want to be spared from someone crossing your property and paying you for that – abolish your right to any property (to control anything but your body) and simply starve to death! If you can’t cope with the fact that someone in dire need may use your property to survive – you can simply decide that we all co-own everything in this world, and don’t take another breath before you get permission from everyone — and simply starve to death. You see, anarcho-capitalism allows you to practice what you preach.
What anarcho-capitalism does not allow — is to use your property right to deny substantive property rights of someone else, but no one can cause any injury to your property without owing the adequate remedy for that action. Prior usage always establishes easement for which the other side will be compensated — and the oldest “prior usage” is self-ownership. No contradiction exists there.
Regards,
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at March 14, 2007 11:51 PM
I want to emphasise this regarding my above comment with the headline “Life and self-ownership”:
In a world without any property rights there wouldn’t be any property rights at all which, naturally, excludes any state or public property rights too.
That would mean that no one would have a right to anything not even to themselves.
Without any property rights the human race would quickly vanish.
This is a logical conclusion which can not, therefore, be refuted by empiricism.
Björn Lundahl
Posted by: Björn Lundahl at March 15, 2007 2:27 AM
This might instead be clearer:
Why must anybody own anything?
In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:
“The existence of property rights”:
In a world without any property rights nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).
This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).
Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.
Please read some of Hans-Hermann Hoppe´s excellent writing from the book “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property”:
http://www.mises.org/etexts/hoppe5.pdf
And to:
ON THE ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION OF THE ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY:
http://www.hanshoppe.com/publications/econ-ethics-10.pdf
Björn Lundahl
Posted by: Björn Lundahl at March 15, 2007 3:04 AM
Sasha,
You know, I’m still not convinced.
“If you want to be spared from someone crossing your property and paying you for that – abolish your right to any property (to control anything but your body) and simply starve to death! If you can’t cope with the fact that someone in dire need may use your property to survive – you can simply decide that we all co-own everything in this world, and don’t take another breath before you get permission from everyone — and simply starve to death. You see, anarcho-capitalism allows you to practice what you preach.”
Does absolute private property require that I allow someone to cross my property? Why can’t I shoot them dead? In any case, that was not my objection, which instead centred on certain necessary trespasses (see above posts). In Hillel Steiner’s words, the first come, first served ethic is incompossible. That is, that the mutual consistency of all the rights in the proposed set of rights is at least a necessary condition of that set being a possible one.
“What anarcho-capitalism does not allow — is to use your property right to deny substantive property rights of someone else, but no one can cause any injury to your property without owing the adequate remedy for that action. Prior usage always establishes easement for which the other side will be compensated — and the oldest “prior usage” is self-ownership. No contradiction exists there.”
Again, if adequate remedy is required, that would suggest a rights violation occurred. None of what I said implies the correctness of any other set of rights. Anyone else?
ste.
Posted by: ste at June 3, 2007 4:22 PM
STE said:
“Does absolute private property require that I allow someone to cross my property? Why can’t I shoot them dead? In any case, that was not my objection, which instead centred on certain necessary trespasses (see above posts). In Hillel Steiner’s words, the first come, first served ethic is incompossible. That is, that the mutual consistency of all the rights in the proposed set of rights is at least a necessary condition of that set being a possible one.”
You are confusing the issues here. Private property only stems from self-ownership rights, and you cannot violate this right of others even if they cross your private property. You cannot shoot someone dead just because he uses his easement rights in order to leave his own property and/or sustain his life. You also cannot “evict” a passenger from your airplane at 41000 feet, even if you don’t want him there at the moment. Hillel Steiner forgets that we have absolute self-ownership rights, while all other property serves as a mean of sustaining these rights. As H.H. Hoppe brilliantly showed, only Lockean principle of property acquisition is ethical and all other alternatives (when completely applied) would lead to the extinction of mankind.
Again, if adequate remedy is required, that would suggest a rights violation occurred. None of what I said implies the correctness of any other set of rights.”
Not true sir. Compensation for use of someone else’s property does not presuppose any “violation”. We can talk about violations only if a user refuses to compensate the owner for his use. Use of someone property is not a violation in itself.
Anyway, anarcho-capitalism includes the concepts of necessity and easement, simply because property rights are means of sustaining self-ownership — and these rights can never serve as a mean of violating someone else’s self-ownership.
Anyhow, the existence of easement and necessity rights do not prove any inconsistency or logical problem in anarcho-capitalism. Likewise, the fact that there will always be plane crashes or accidental entries on someone else’s property does not “prove” that there is any problem with the Lockean view of private property rights. Anyone else?
Posted by: Sasha Radeta at June 8, 2007 5:29 AM
Ethics involves discovering norms by which people ought to guide their choices; “property” is such a norm, a moral good. But the Moral Good must be derived from the challenge peculiar to human experience, namely the responsibility of making appropriate choice for the purpose of sustaining and advancing one’s life. What other standard of the good makes the least bit of sense?
To attempt to devise ethical shortcuts in defense of property, skipping over the reality of human nature and the necessity of human choice, leads to Nowhere Land. It amounts to building sandcastles to the sky. The result might look impressive, or even grand; but it’s still only a sand castle, not good for much of anything.
Published: August 15, 2007 8:15 PM
Published: August 15, 2007 9:13 PM
Published: August 15, 2007 11:14 PM
Published: August 15, 2007 11:53 PM
TokyoTom: “Stephan, your analysis excludes recognition of the facts of that we are strongly tribal in our perceptions and instincts and that much of our property rights are not truly private but held communally by groups (see Ostrom).”
Hey, you’ve been in Japan too long. Too much ant-like hive-think. 🙂
Published: August 16, 2007 12:20 AM
Published: August 16, 2007 2:49 AM
Published: August 16, 2007 2:50 AM
Published: August 16, 2007 6:14 AM
Published: August 16, 2007 6:20 AM
Moral values are objective secondarily, in that people are individuals, endowed with personal traits, talents, and limitations. To be happy, one’s personal moral values should be congruent with one’s personal goals steming from one’s uniqueness. This facet of human nature does not contradict the broader requirements of successful human living that apply to everyone.
These ideas are concerned with moral philosophy, which provides the necessary framework to any subsequent discussion of ethical norms. For ethics is morality applied specifically to the realm of relationships among people. Without first establishing what purpose morality serves–that is, exactly what it is about being human that raises the need for moral values, exactly what these values do for people–one could not establish the nature and purpose of ethics. Nor could one establish the existence of particular ethical principles such as individual rights, including to property, at least in any compelling or persuasive way.
While Murray Rothbard was a brilliant economist and often an insightful social critic, he and his followers want to dispense with moral philosophy–and with the more abstract groundwork of epistemology and metaphysics–and simply infer “natural law” in the area of political philosophy.
I doubt that this can be accomplished sucessfully. All of knowlege is logically integrated, a logical hierarchy of increasingly abstract concepts, constructed on the foundation of the evidence of the senses. To dispense with the foundations of moral philosophy as though it were arbitrary or subjective–different somehow for Christians than for atheists, or for Objectivsts versus philosophical agnostics–is an absurdity. Without proven foundations in philosophy, assertions about politics and natural rights are wasted effort. Without first performing the necessary groundwork in moral philosophy, one can’t prove anything about individual rights. One can only postulate.
Published: August 16, 2007 1:59 PM
Moral values are objective secondarily, in that people are individuals, endowed with personal traits, talents, and limitations. To be happy, one’s personal moral values should be congruent with one’s personal goals steming from one’s uniqueness. This facet of human nature does not contradict the broader requirements of successful human living that apply to everyone.
These ideas are concerned with moral philosophy, which provides the necessary framework to any subsequent discussion of ethical norms. For ethics is morality applied specifically to the realm of relationships among people. Without first establishing what purpose morality serves–that is, exactly what it is about being human that raises the need for moral values, exactly what these values do for people–one could not establish the nature and purpose of ethics. Nor could one establish the existence of particular ethical principles such as individual rights, including to property, at least in any compelling or persuasive way.
While Murray Rothbard was a brilliant economist and often an insightful social critic, he and his followers want to dispense with moral philosophy–and with the more abstract groundwork of epistemology and metaphysics–and simply infer “natural law” in the area of political philosophy.
I doubt that this can be accomplished sucessfully. All of knowlege is logically integrated, a logical hierarchy of increasingly abstract concepts, constructed on the foundation of the evidence of the senses. To dispense with the foundations of moral philosophy as though it were arbitrary or subjective–different somehow for Christians than for atheists, or for Objectivsts versus philosophical agnostics–is an absurdity. Without proven foundations in philosophy, assertions about politics and natural rights are wasted effort. Without first performing the necessary groundwork in moral philosophy, one can’t prove anything about individual rights. One can only postulate.
Published: August 16, 2007 2:02 PM
Published: August 16, 2007 5:45 PM
I only dimly understand your comment about argumentation ethics circumventing the necessity of elaborating and proving moral philosophy. I assume you mean that to deny the existence of property rights forces the denier to advocate an abridgement of his right to exist, which he presumes when he speaks.
However, such reasoning fails to establish individual rights because the argument is circular. It assumes that ethical rights exist: either everyone has the right to “own” everyone else, or we all “own” ourselves. Since the latter proposition is more plausible, individual rights are held to exist. But this proves nothing important, because it begs the big issue: do moral values and their derivative, ethical principles, including the individual right to property ownership, really exist? Or are they imaginary or cultural inventions?
Without good moral philosophy, one can’t prove that anyone “ought” to do anything. In the absence of good moral philosophy, one could argue that moral values are non-objective, in which case our choices and actions would be non-moral. We might then refer to “ownership” in a purely descriptive sense, i.e. Jones “owns” (posseses) that house, or Al Capone “owns” (has control of) that Mansion, or the US federal government “owns” (prohibits private ownership within) 2/3 of the American West. But “ownership” would lose its normative meaning, in which ownership is ascribed to proper ethical conduct.
But if “ownership” were non-normative and merely descriptive, then arguments spun out from the fact that people exist and have possessions would go nowhere.
I hope I understood your comments.
Published: August 16, 2007 7:24 PM
http://hooverhog.typepad.com/hognotes/2007/06/initial_harm_pa.html
http://hooverhog.typepad.com/hognotes/2007/06/initial_harm_pa_1.html
http://hooverhog.typepad.com/hognotes/2007/07/initial-harm-pa.html
Published: August 16, 2007 8:09 PM
Published: August 16, 2007 8:17 PM
Now assume there’s no copyright law. Would the seller still write the book? (Assume there’s no leisure value to writing the book.) The answer is yes if it can be sold for the same amount, which it could because it’s unique at that point, i.e. cannot be reproduced.
At this point, copyright law cannot be justified as a necessary incentive to write the book.
The (wholesale) buyer now possesses a piece of intangible property that he intends to convert into tangible property through retail sales. With no copyright law in effect, he stages a “Harry Potter” sale designed to sell all the books at one time(expected sales that justified his purchase amount from the author).
If all the books sell, he recovers his cost plus a normal profit. (Note the author could have done this as well.) Beyond this point, retail purchasers of the books copy, sell or give away further editions of the book at will with no harm to the author or first wholesale purchaser of the book in regards to full cost recovery and incentives to produce further books.
However, if all the books do not sell, it may be because the retail purchasers conspired to purchase only a few books and copy them at much lower cost for the rest of the group. This changes everything and may stifle production of the book in the first place.
In order for the author to recover whatever minimum amount is necessary to stimulate writing of the book, retail buyers must be isolated from each other to prevent resale to each other. This is also what monopoly sellers do to segment the market in order to discriminate prices.
If a copyright law was in place but expired at just the time the author and wholesale purchaser recovered just enough cost to inspire the book in the first place, that would be considered by some as the appropriate point to draw the line between protected and unprotected intangible property.
If government funds were used to induce the production of this book instead of copyright law, the reservation price needed to generate the book should just equal the present value of sales described above.
However, the problem is how to prevent many other authors and books of less value attempting to claim the amount as well – how to select who is paid or not. But overall, it may still be superior to using copyright law to induce books.
A good example is how pharmaceutical drugs are developed both, at the NIH as well as privately. Most agree the situation is grossly inefficient due largely to patent abuse and needs an overhaul.
One way to do it is to set reservation prices with government funds to develop certain desired drugs, for which production rights would be placed in the public domain. This would wipe out economic profit, copycat drugs and genetic buy-backs and encouraging much more innovation.
Published: August 16, 2007 9:51 PM
But this is even more the case with respect to struggles of resources BETWEEN societies, as opposed to within them. On the international scene, where the race for resources continues, kleptocrats rule, and “there is no such thing as ownership; there is only possession. ‘Might makes right,’ so to speak.”
Regards,
Tom
Published: August 16, 2007 10:38 PM
Published: August 16, 2007 10:48 PM
“Argumentation ethics” is impoverished, first because it assumes without proof that ethical principles exist; and second, because it fails to explain their source and nature. Having made this giant leap of faith, we’re told to believe these mysterious floating “principles” uphold private property as “more plausible” than collective ownership.
But not only does this short-cut fail to prove that this particular ethical principle, in favor of private property, exists; it utterly fails to demonstrate that ethical principles exist as objective features of the natural human order.
This is a huge shortcoming, in light of the following: A) Moral skepticism has been on the ascendancy for perhaps 300 years, and B) Political philosophy, of any ideology or persuasion, reduces to claims about ethics.
If normative values did not exist (objectively), no one could assert a right to anything, including libertarian natural individual rights. So individualism and freedom would lack moral value, as would various forms of coerced collectivism. One might think this reinforces libertarianism, but in fact it destroys it. For on what grounds would one object to the imposition of a dictatorship? On the grounds of starvation? Tell that to Lenin, or to fervent Greens, or to Hitler-worshipping Nazis, or to Pol Pot. The rise of moral skepticism has been used to justify the tidal wave of totalitarian carnage that swept over the Twentieth Century.
There is good reason why libertarianism gains only a tiny following, in spite of brilliant economic reasoning by Austrians. Libertarians know what they’re against–coercive state meddling–but they do not know what they are for! Lacking a sound moral philosophy, it is not possible to advocate the good. Lacking a concept of the good, libertarians cannot persuade others that their cause is good and just.
This is why libertarians tend often to cede crucial ideological ground to their enemies–on war, on environmentalism, and on questions of personal morality. John Stuart Mill was a fervent libertarian, a brilliant economist, and, like most Austrians and Chicago Boys, a utilitarian. Mill, of course, ended his career as an advocate of socialism, the rising fashion of his times.
Published: August 16, 2007 10:54 PM
__________________________________________________
There is a fundamental reason why life-destroying values cannot be moral values. Moral values are identified as such because they are consistent with an ultimate value standard, a standard that defines the principle of the moral good.
There is only one ultimate moral standard consistent with common sense: one’s own life. For that fact that one lives is the source of one’s values; cease living and one has no need of values. So the concept of moral values presupposes the life of the valuer as the standard of value. Moral values exist to further one’s life.
In contrast, self-destructive values contradict their logical source, the valuer’s life. Values exist to serve life; life doesn’t exist to serve values.
Published: August 16, 2007 11:38 PM
I haven’t read anything written by Hoover Hog. But if the Hog himself “claims that there is no objective basis for ethics”, why bother to read him about this? One version of subjective ethics is as “good” (read:”as meaningless”) as another.
Published: August 16, 2007 11:49 PM
A-E elaborates on these undeniable presuppositions of argumentation, which include a value of reason and truth, peaceful cooperation, homesteading of previously un-owned resources, survival, and acknowledgment of the necessity of universalizable propositions.
“and second, because it fails to explain their source and nature.”
False again. The reasons why it is precisely the libertarian ethic and no other ethic that is presupposed in argumentation are completely laid out.
“Having made this giant leap of faith, we’re told to believe these mysterious floating “principles” uphold private property as “more plausible” than collective ownership.”
Perhaps you would care to select one or two of these principles and demonstrate just why they do not uphold private property – they are the essence of private property. Make an argument and let’s see how it goes.
“But not only does this short-cut fail to prove that this particular ethical principle, in favor of private property, exists; it utterly fails to demonstrate that ethical principles exist as objective features of the natural human order.””
It rather demonstrates that the logical implication of argumentation is exactly these ethical principles. No one can dispute them without presupposing them while in the act of disputing them. Therefore this very act acknowledges them and validates them.
Published: August 17, 2007 2:25 AM
Published: August 17, 2007 6:21 AM
Published: August 17, 2007 7:45 AM
For what it’s worth, my argument regarding the ethics of libertarian nonaggression contextually assumes a deontological grounding. But I disagree with your assertion that subjectivity nullifies any need for further discussion. Ethics is like music, math, and masturbation; we do it because we are imaginitive beasts, evolved to solve problems, and bound by socially predicated frustration. It seems vaguely insulting – to thought, not to me – to devalue moral reasoning on the merit that it may lack some transendent provenance. After all, aesthetic pursuits are subject to rigorous qualitative analysis and standards for the simple reason that art matters to human beings. Why should normative propositions then so surely drift into relativistic meaninglessness? If moral conduct matters, it matters for reasons that are traceable to our predicament as sentient mortals. Start there and already some ethical ideas will be more defensible than others, even if they remain subject to revision.
Ethics is born in our brains. Objectivity – that’s capital “O” Objectivity – is a phantom opiate, not much different from a god. All you have to do is reason and choose, and play the game.
Published: August 17, 2007 8:29 AM
After private property was formalized in agricultural societies, the direct link between survival effort, individuals and resource acquisition was severed.
Cultural influences of property acquisition combined with heroic (libertarian-like?) individualism are powerful and distort reality. If individuals have equal property rights, how could Christopher Columbus “discover” a place already inhabited by two million people?
The impasse in most libertarian arguments is that the starting point of a Hobbesian Jungle cannot be recreated to match individuals with their productive capabilities going forward. Accumulated property and all its complicated manifestations stand in the way.
Instead, we use sports and other cultural activities to simulate the level playing fields and competition we (and some libertarians) want to see but do not exist.
Published: August 17, 2007 8:53 AM
Tom, if I read you right, I find the views you are expressing here utterly confused and incorrect. You are making several errors. Eg., you are blaming the victim; equating might with right; etc. TGGP’s point is NOT “well-said”–he is saying that libertarians “will not be able to persuade” certain criminals; and that since this is “the biggest problem,” “it would be sensible for libertarians to devote more time to considering how to deal with them rather than ethical philosophers.” This is so astoundingly stupid I almost do not know how to respond to it. First, it is indeed true that responding to a thug is a technical problem. Why this should be the job of libertarian ethicists is beyond me. Libertarian principles *are directed at ethical people not at criminals*. If you establish there are rights against non-aggression and subsidiary rights to defend or retaliate, then the civilized person who is threatened or victimized by criminals knows he is justified in banding toghether with other civilized people to treat the criminals as technical problems. The comments above betray no awareness of the division of labor.
TokyoTom compounds TGGP’s positivistic, nihilistic error when he writes, “You guys want to talk about ethical systems, but what really counts is the ability to defend one’s property.” What ‘really counts”!? For who? For what purpose? You might as well argue that libertarianism is flawed since it does not tell you what kind of lock to put on your house! Ridicoulous.
Published: August 17, 2007 9:31 AM
Published: August 17, 2007 5:24 PM
Published: August 17, 2007 6:18 PM
Published: August 17, 2007 8:22 PM
I have no idea what your criticism is. You yourself here are engaged in a type of libertarian discussion that is not focused on how to solve technical problems of criminality. Should you shut up and change your focus? If so, go ahead. If not, what in the world are you jabbering about?
Published: August 17, 2007 10:24 PM
Published: August 18, 2007 11:51 AM
Second, it is clear that in this example of Rothbard’s argumentation ethics, Rothbard assumed that which he set out to prove: namely that ethical principles, in his example the principle of property ownership, exist.
Third, in Rothbard’s analysis that purports to demonstrate the absurdity of any proposition that denies self ownership, he fails to define what exactly ethical principles ARE: What purpose do they serve? Why must one observe them? Where do they come? What the hell ARE THEY? (I’m not shouting in caps; I’m seeking emphasis to convey a point that I seem unable to communicate effectively.)
I don’t understand this statement of yours: A-E elaborates on these undeniable presuppositions of argumentation, which include a value of reason and truth, peaceful cooperation, homesteading of previously un-owned resources, survival, and acknowledgment of the necessity of universalizable propositions”. I don’t think that argumentation presupposes homesteading, cooperation, or any of the values you mention, other than reason and truth.
If you present me with a short argument from your ethics, I’ll be glad to explain why I think it fails to prove what you believe it proves. If you can demonstrate that I’m wrong about all this, I’ll be happy to learn.
To Chip Smith: Your comment suggests you’re defending subjectivity and dismissing objectivity as a “phantom opiate”? What on earth is “capital O Objectivity”? And I forget what deontological means.
If I read you correctly, your comment is a case study in self-refuting absurdities. A few thousand years ago, Aristotle explained the objectivity inherent in the law of identity, and demonstrated beautifully and clearly that everyone assumes the validity of the law of identity when they speak, or point, or even move. They do so even when they claim that Objectivity is “a phantom opiate”.
If I have misunderstood or unintentionally twisted the meaning of your comment, I’m sorry.
By Objectivity, do you mean the philosophy of Objectivism?
We need ethics because we are conceptually thinking, choosing, acting creatures. This observation doesn’t stem from some profound spiritual experience that transcends explanation; its simply commonsense. We need the principles of ethics to live well.
Published: August 19, 2007 1:59 PM
Published: August 19, 2007 5:58 PM
What the hell does that mean? You can get a lot of “is” just by observing, where does any “ought” come in?I believe by “capital O”, Chip was referring to Ayn Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism.
Published: August 19, 2007 6:20 PM
Up to a point, I sympathize with Austrian efforts to infer broad natural laws, such as the moral value of private property, from the nature of axioms. However, it’s rather a stretch to identify private property as morally good, meaning in this context objectively valuable and morally defendable, without first establishing the nature of the good, why good and bad exist, what exactly good and bad mean.
Austrian attempts to defend private property skip over such questions entirely. I might employ a
broadly similar philosophical approach if I were to argue, for example, that anthropological global warming is all Blarney (it is!) because carbon, the same chemical contained in Co2, is the essential building block to all forms of life!
Published: August 19, 2007 7:05 PM
Man’s reasoning powers consist of forming and integrating concepts, on the foundation of the evidence of the senses, using logic across every step of the process. Because knowlege is a logically integrated hierarchy of increasingly abstract concepts, man’s knowlege is, of necessity, built around the discovery of principles. Principles integrate all of man’s concepts, on the basis of deductions or inferrences from less abstract concepts.
Without principles, human knowlege would not be possible; each new idea would remain logically disintegrated, out of context, unproven, in relation to other ideas. So principles are essential to man’s ability to think, to learn, and to live. Principles of ethics guide man through the challenge of making good choices consistent with the unique requirements of human life.
In summary, when man chooses to live in ways congruent with his nature, his choices are good. Thus, moral values are implicit in the nature of man. So what man ought to do is an aspect of the nature of what is, meaning the nature of reality and human nature.
Published: August 19, 2007 7:48 PM
Published: August 19, 2007 10:58 PM
YOu had written previously:
Those groups that most effectively controlled and made productive use of resources gradually have won out against other groups in these ongoing resource struggles – largely societies that internally have controlled tragedy of the commons and rent-seeking problems by establishing rules of ownership. This historical result is not proof that “the very idea of “ownership” implies that only libertarian principles are justifiable”, but simply that these principles help societies to function more smoothly and productively than societies without them.
But you see, I do not agree with you. You think it just obviously follows from your proposed history of humankind that ownership does not imply the libertarian principles. But it does not follow at all. Your commments, it seems to me, are utterly irrelevant to what I’ve said about what is implied in the notion of ownership. You really seem to fail to distinguish between is and ought–which you seem to admit when you later say that “‘Might makes right,’ so to speak” (though I admit I can’t tell whether you’re endorsing this notion or not, or trying to limit it to the “international sphere”). What is amazing is you don’t even seem to realize how your collectivist positivism is not compatible with libertarianism. Or maybe you do, and are not even a libertarian at all–is that the case? I thought we were having an intra-libertarian discussion here, not debating socialists.
I said that the very concept of ownership implies the libertarian notion, not “merely asserting it”. It is very simple, TT: ownership means more than mere possession. Whoever the owner is, he is entitled not to have his property taken from him by force by some latecomer. That is inherent in the idea of ownership. If the latecomer is entitled to become the new owner merely by taking the thing from a previous owner, then we don’t have ownership, but merely might-makes-right possession. So from this simple idea that the latecomer does not acquire ownership by merely taking the thing from a previous possessor-owner, you can see a regression-type argument all the way back to the first homesteader. It’s beautiful.
Published: August 20, 2007 7:37 AM
It sounds like you are committing the naturalistic fallacy here. Just because it is my nature to kill, rape and steal does not make any of those actions “good”.I was surprised to see this i.p address is still banned. I’d thank God for proxies if I believed in him.
Published: August 20, 2007 12:15 PM
What kind of life is normal for human beings? To begin, a life that is directed by a continual effort to be rational; that is, to be in firm and clear contact with the facts of reality. Rationality is a cardinal virtue, because it is fundamentally necessary to the challenge of living. One must choose to act in order to live, but if one fails to identify and understand facts, how can one choose properly? Rationality is also the cardinal virtue, because it is necessary to the fullfillment of all other virtues, such as honesty, productivity, integrity, generosity, etc.
The profound insight of classical liberalism, which flowed from the values and insights of the Enlightenment, is that there is a natural harmony of interests among men who are reasonable. The idea of a natural and benevolent harmony of interests is essential to free market economics, which explains why the division of labor, the free price system, and free competition naturally produce a great outpouring of abundance that showers its benefits on everyone, rich and poor.
Clearly, if man’s natural state were murder, rape, and pillage, a free market would be incapable of delivering the benefits of social cooperation to anyone.
Published: August 20, 2007 2:24 PM
What the hell does that mean? You can get a lot of “is” just by observing, where does any “ought” come in?”You ought to eat if you want to live.An ought by observation.
If you value life as the ultimate source of value “ought” is infact the same thing as “is”.
Ethics aren’t really that complicated once you decide whether to live or die.
The one thing you can’t say in objectivist ethics is, “you ought to live”. Everyone must choose tha path themselves. Ethics come after that main decision.
Published: August 20, 2007 3:13 PM
Life does not have objective value. Chip may have his anti-natalist/pro-mortalist position and “the party of death” theirs. I do not value the lives of bacteria that infect me, and an alien civilization that viewed humanity analogously to how I view bacteria could not be convinced it is immoral to use something like anti-biotics (see how even rationality can lead to “anti-life” results) against us.“ought” is infact the same thing as “is”.
Sounds like the naturalistic fallacy, enshrining the status quo as moral.
Published: August 20, 2007 4:21 PM
Regards, TT
Published: August 21, 2007 8:09 AM
My chief point was simply that such distinctions and principles do not, in fact represent the real world,
What does this mean, that the principle does not “represent the real world”?
What if I said, “you should not commit murder.” Does this principle “represent the real world,” or does it not?
I think it does neither; it is not meant to “represent” the real world. It is not descriptive; it is prescriptive. Do you not see the difference between is and ought, fact and value, description and prescription?
You again are conflating different things. You seem to think that the fact that rights are not automatically enforced, that oughts are not always followed, has some relevance. Of course some people can, and will, disregard–act contrary to–moral laws and rules. So what? For them, of cousre we need practical techniques. For example, people tend to put locks on the doors of their homes. The fact that locks are used does not mean that burglars are not immoral. I think you are just confusing different realms of inquiry. If you are merely trying to state the obvious–that we need to find ways to defend against criminals–well, okay.
Published: August 21, 2007 9:14 AM
Published: August 21, 2007 9:48 AM
Published: August 21, 2007 10:27 AM
Published: August 21, 2007 10:29 AM
http://hanshoppe.com/publications/liberty_symposium.pdf
When I speak of Argumentation Ethics, I am always thinking of Hans Hoppe’s explication of it. With that as the framing, my further comments are below.
M: In “Man Economy and State”, Murray Rothbard wrote about his proof for “self ownership”, to along the following lines: There are two mutually exclusive alternatives: either everyone owns themselves, and by extension their own products and achievements; or everyone owns everyone else, together with their products and achievements, but not themselves. Clearly, the first of the two alternatives is more plausible than the second, which is absurd. Therefore, self ownershipand property exist.
M: I assume this is an example of “argumentation ethics”–exploring the implications of ideas. If this is not argumentation ethics, I would be interested in learning why not. Assuming this to be an instance of argumentation ethics, my criticism stands: First, there is a third possibility that Rothbard ignored in his analysis of “two mutually exclusive propositions”; this third possibility is that, as Mises and Hayek and Friedman and most other neo-classical economists contend, objective normative standards do not exist. (I think they do exist, but Rothbard failed to prove that they exist.)
P: Mises had been known to write something to the following effect: That which promotes peace and cooperation is just and in keeping with justice. That which tends to disrupt peace and cooperation is unjust. Therefore, I would argue that Mises had an objective concept of social justice in mind. When he made these observations, he did not mean “maybe”. On this basis it is my contention that implied in what Mises calls justice, is a justifiable ethic. This is a set of social norms which can be objectively or intersubjectively agreed on which will, in fact, promote peace. This is in fact, the bedrock on which capitalism and the free market rests. There is no possibility that peace can be achieved without an agreement on normative standards.
P: Therefore, if our goal is to promote peace and allow for conflict avoidance, we must agree to adopt a set of social norms which is in keeping with this objective. Mises apparently thought this was possible and necessary; Hoppe has demonstrated a proof confirming it is.
M: Second, it is clear that in this example of Rothbard’s argumentation ethics, Rothbard assumed that which he set out to prove: namely that ethical principles, in his example the principle of property ownership, exist.
P: The argument is not that they exist, but rather that they are required to allow for peace, and that no other contradictory ethical principles can be justified. The starting point is to recognize that we wish to live in peace, and we wish to discuss how to do so. Those who do not share this interest are logically excluded from the discussion on the topic, because, for one thing, discussions and argumentations presuppose an appreciation and acknowledgment of the need for peace.
P: I view the issue as two part. The first is in landing on and asserting what is actually not really all that contentious: That is that the libertarian ethic: self-ownership, homesteading, production combining homesteaded property with one’s labor, and voluntary contracting between property holders are THE means of allowing for survival, conflict avoidance and peaceful cooperation.
P: The second part is to recognize that recognizing the truth – or falsehood – in this proposition must be done via argumentation. It is here that we recognize that it is argumentation itself which logically presupposes the very thing we are striving to attain: peace and cooperation with the avoidance of conflict. Once we recognize this, all there is to do is to show that these above propositions are true, false, incomplete, or whatever. And the other thing to do is to recognizing that any propositions that lead to conflict, or in any other way contradict the presuppositions of argumentation, are an invalid contradiction.
M: Third, in Rothbard’s analysis that purports to demonstrate the absurdity of any proposition that denies self ownership, he fails to define what exactly ethical principles ARE: What purpose do they serve? Why must one observe them? Where do they come? What the hell ARE THEY? (I’m not shouting in caps; I’m seeking emphasis to convey a point that I seem unable to communicate effectively.)
P: The goal of an ethic is to allow for conflict avoidance. To present a set of social norms and rules which allow us to intersubjectively ascertain who owns what scarce and valuable resources, and therefore who has a right to exclusive control over them. A valid ethic allows us, in principle, to know at every given moment what each of us has a right to do and with what.
M: I don’t understand this statement of yours: A-E elaborates on these undeniable presuppositions of argumentation, which include a value of reason and truth, peaceful cooperation, homesteading of previously un-owned resources, survival, and acknowledgment of the necessity of universalizable propositions”.
P: What I really meant, if I managed to neglect to mention it, is that Hoppe’s elaboration of Argumentation Ethics elaborates on these presuppositions. If you reflect on this question, you will agree. The question is this: How do you both survive, and avoid conflict? The application of the above principles answers the question adequately. If there are others, add away. But those are believed to be the long and the short of it. Many other principles violate these and lead to conflict or prevent our survival. Those cannot be justified on those grounds alone.
M: I don’t think that argumentation presupposes homesteading, cooperation, or any of the values you mention, other than reason and truth.
P: But it does implicitly and here is how: it presupposes freedom to argue – a right to argue – and to apply only the force of reason, cooperatively, rather than physical violence against the other’s person, to arrive at a truthful conclusion. And it presupposes survival, yet it presupposes peace. The right to homesteading is an integral part of this as it is plain to see that if no one has the right to appropriate things in nature to one’s self, that death is close at hand. And homesteading allows for such appropriations conflict free – and conflict avoidance is another requirement. Clearly homesteading must be a part of a valid ethic that allows both survival and conflict avoidance. Similarly voluntary cooperation is the logical essence of an argumentation, as it is also the goal of an ethic. Before one sets out to apply reason to land on the truth, one implicitly assumes the activity will be peaceful and cooperative – not physically violent and void of threats of coercion.
M: If you present me with a short argument from your ethics, I’ll be glad to explain why I think it fails to prove what you believe it proves. If you can demonstrate that I’m wrong about all this, I’ll be happy to learn.
P: Let me know how I did. I do recommend Hoppe on the topic though. His discussion on it is better than mine.
Published: August 21, 2007 3:07 PM
If you’re a subjectivist, TGGP, and if you decide to think carefully and long about the implications of that position (no disrespect intended, here), I am willing to bet you’ll discover big inconsistencies of that position with your own experience in life, and with your own attitudes about what is proper in life. For example, when was the last time you blamed or congratulated someone?
Published: August 21, 2007 3:49 PM
Published: August 21, 2007 3:52 PM
I don’t believe in free-will.One can look around and see people who develope their abilities and confidence, their success and happiness, to a high degree
Like Bill Clinton or Robert Mugabe?others lead morally impoverished lives burdoned by tragedy partly or mostly of their own choosing
Are there not people who lead “morally impoverished” lives with no tragedy and people who lead blameless but tragic lives?
Again, that which is natural to an individual of a species is that which fullfills the potential of that species.
If I use nanobots and steroids to create an artificial apple that is redder, plumper and juicier than any apple that has ever before existed, is that then “natural”? You should also recognize that disease and death are “natural” and that since they are possible they must be considered “potentials”, and it is no more objective to describe their potential as “fulfilled” when they have one outcome than another. We should also not deny that diseases and other parasites fulfill their potential at the expense of others!
If you’re a subjectivist, TGGP, and if you decide to think carefully and long about the implications of that position (no disrespect intended, here), I am willing to bet you’ll discover big inconsistencies of that position
I do not believe in any normative truths that could conflict with anything. I have thought long on it and have not discovered what you believe I would.
your own attitudes about what is proper in life.
I regard those as subjective preferences, just as my tastes in food, music and movies are.
For example, when was the last time you blamed or congratulated someone?
I will blame and congratulate when I think doing so will lead to results I desire.
Published: August 21, 2007 7:34 PM
Your assertions about my speaking implying freedom to speak doesn’t follow logically. If I hold up a married couple at night in their home, and demand to see the contents of their safe, my speaking this ddemand certainly does not presuppose my value of freedom, or peace, or the avoidance of conflict.
I like your observation that without objective–that means capable of being proven through reason–moral values, normative standards, people could never avoid conflicts. Ayn Rand wrote a great essay: “The Roots of War”, wherein she explains why people must uphold reason as man’s only proper means of acquiring knowlege, objective normative standards are not possible. Without reason, no ultimate epistemological standard
eexists for people to determine what is knowlege and what is unfounded fantasy or belief.
TCCP: If we lack free will, there is no point in discussing anything. For the idea of proof, of evidence, or logic, of KNOWLEGE, all presuppose the ability of the thinker to distinguish between truth and falsehood.
Published: August 24, 2007 4:40 PM
Published: August 24, 2007 5:30 PM
the first place, by what reasonable criteria would one protest the imposition of a dictatorship? By what reasonable criteria would one argue that environmentalist policy that creates human suffering for the sake of “nature” is wrong? True, political collectivists cannot prove that their hegemony is just, but that hasn’t stopped them in the past. Our only means of turning back statism is to demonstrate that statism is morally wrong. AE doesn’t accomplish that.
A second difficulty with AE is that it doesn’t prove that one affirms the existence of “libertarian ethics” by the act of living, or speaking, or possessing property, or defending oneself from attack by another. What those actions implicitly demonstrate is that one chooses to live, or speak, or etc. The actions demonstrate nothing beyond this preference. The actions do not prove that one “should” live, or speak, or etc.
A third problem resides in the phrase “peaceful argumentation”. This phrase refers, I assume, to talk aimed at persuading another. But the talker doesn’t affirm natural rights by talking. How could he possibly do so? The thinker who imagines that the talker has affirmed natural rights cannot define the identity, or source, or nature of the principle he claims the talker is implicitly affirming!
A fourth problem is the notion that by speaking, one thereby asserts “ownership” over oneself. This is meaningless, because it confuses and merges together two entirely distinct uses of the term “ownership”. The first use refers to possession descriptively, but non-normatively; without regard to ethical considerations. The second use refers to an ethical norm; one is justified in possession. But recognizing that a human being may think and act of his own initiative does not establish that his doing so is “just”. For what is “libertarian justice”? Thinking and acting of one’s own initiative. Why? No answer is given.
Published: August 25, 2007 2:26 PM
To make sense of ethics, there are no shortcuts to understanding. That implies understanding of why objective moral values exist, why people need moral values (including someone stranded on a desert island, where no other people live), why moral values are a requirement for human living.
In his book on ethics, Rothbard admits that he doesn’t deal with underlying problems of moral philosophy. Rothbard tried to skip over those problems to establish “libertarian ethics” justifying private property. He failed in this endeavor.
Published: August 25, 2007 2:43 PM
M: You offer no proof that your premises about ethics are true. You want them to be true, but you haven’t proven them to be true. For example, you assert that peace is the ultimate standard of ethical principles, i.e. ethics is rules designed to achieve peace. But why? Many people want peace, but they consider that value less important than environmentalism, or getting Hitler or Saddam, or redistributing other people’s money. Why should they prefer peace to ending global warming?
Ok, why indeed should they not prefer anything at all over peace? After all, it is also true that your common criminal obviously has at least a few priorities that trump in his mind, the goal of peace and justice. Why should his ethic as well as any other not prevail either? We do need an answer.
The answer is this: none of any of these other ethics can be justified. So see if you can agree with me here: whatever ethic you wish to propose or suggest, you’re going to have to propose or suggest it, and also defend it; and each of these can only be done via argumentation. So as long as you agree that an ethic is about a set of normative rules of social interaction, and this is what we agree we will discuss, it immediately becomes apparent that we must and implicitly will adopt and agree to some fundamental normative rules if only to discuss what normative rules we wish to agree to. You see where i’m going already, I think. What does and must argumentation presuppose? Do you not agree that it is and must be a cooperative undertaking involving the peaceful interaction of at least two people who are and logically must be pursuing truth and valid conclusions based on reason and logic and necessarily not by threat of force? And that this is to say that argumentation presupposes precisely the ethic that I claim is the purpose of an ethic in the first place?
So we recognize that argumentation itself logically presupposes a set of rules of interaction that are peaceful, and it presupposes the use of logic and universalizability of propositions. Yet on top of this, argumentation is a practical affair, meaning it also presupposes survival. All propositions that come out of argumentation must logically be consistent with these presuppositions or they are a dialectical contradiction and therefore invalid.
So then what status does all this render the fight for say, coercive egalitarianism? It cannot be justified on several fronts. It violates private property, which is demonstrated to be a presupposition of peaceful survival, a presupposition of argumentation. It violates the following: self-ownership: it claims to be able to partially enslave some to the advantage of others. Homesteading: it claims latecomers to have an arbitrary claim on the first user’s property. Contract: it destroys the nature of contract which stipulates that both parties to an agreement must be voluntarily participating. Finally, it violates the other peaceful mode of survival we know: that only those who add their own labor to their own property own the property that results. In short, egalitarianism violates the fundamental presuppositions of argumentation. It cannot be justified.
M: You state that ethics exists to avoid conflicts. But why? Many people seek conflict, for political and personal goals. Perhaps they don’t like the costs associated with conflict, but they like the results, when they win. Often, they think–and they’re right–that conflict is necessary to their pursuit of certain values. One can show that those values are warped–are non-values–but not by positing that the purpose of ethics is to spare people conflict. This idea doesn’t explain where ethics comes from, and why it applies to everyone, even if they don’t understand that ethics is objectively real.
Yes. You are describing the psychology of the politician, the thief, murderer, socialist, rapist and the mob under the influence of democratic mentality. Their disregard for peaceful cooperation and justice is not really relevant to the question. The question is what rules can be justified. As I described above, the rules that can be justified are only the rules that are consistent with the rules logically and necessarily assumed during argumentation – the only act that gives us a chance to attempt to justify our rules of social conduct.
M: Your assertions about my speaking implying freedom to speak doesn’t follow logically. If I hold up a married couple at night in their home, and demand to see the contents of their safe, my speaking this ddemand certainly does not presuppose my value of freedom, or peace, or the avoidance of conflict.
My assertions are not in regard to speaking in general, or threats, or even making verbal sounds that are incomprehensible to others. My assertions are in regard specifically to argumentation, which is both logically, and practically a cooperative matter of applying logic in the pursuit of truthful conclusions. If one intends to persuade by the force of logic, then he necessarily cannot be threatening.
M: I like your observation that without objective–that means capable of being proven through reason–moral values, normative standards, people could never avoid conflicts. Ayn Rand wrote a great essay: “The Roots of War”, wherein she explains why people must uphold reason as man’s only proper means of acquiring knowlege, objective normative standards are not possible. Without reason, no ultimate epistemological standard eexists for people to determine what is knowlege and what is unfounded fantasy or belief.
I think that the missing key that AE provides is that argumentation demonstrates the arguer’s logical acknowledgment of the value of the libertarian ethic. From there, reason dictates not only that such an ethic is exclusively justified, but that it is the ethic that all those who wish to justify their actions should follow.
Published: August 25, 2007 5:55 PM
Published: August 25, 2007 6:24 PM
Published: August 26, 2007 2:08 AM
Secondly, the world is ruled by ideas. If we understand this we have laid a foundation for change. If we do not understand it people like Mr. Mugabe will be powerful. To argue that this is not so is contradictious as this is an idea itself.
How could “libertarians devote more time considering how to deal with them” if ideas are powerless”? How to consider something and make a conclusion if it is not allowed to be an idea?
Does anyone really doubt the influence that Karl Marx’s ideas once had (and still have)? Or religious believes? Does it not exist people who believe in the principle of democracy? Is the concept of democracy powerless or powerful in today’s world?
Wouldn’t the world be different if most of the adults believed in a libertarian ethic from a world in which most of the adults believed in Nazism?
Did Marxists try to convince John D. Rockefeller of the rightfulness of Marxism or did they try to get support elsewhere? Why should libertarians be any different in this regard and try to convince criminals like Mr. Mugabe of the rightfulness of justice?
Apart from this I would also like to mention that I believe that very foundation for cooperation among people is that they gain by cooperating and not because of “tribal sentiments”. I think Mises was correct in believing this.
From the book Human Action, by Ludwig von Mises:
“Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man’s most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring.
The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man’s reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.”
http://www.mises.org/humanaction/chap8sec1.asp#p143
From history we cannot either derive objective property rights, only logics can. “Communal systems” and “collective ownership” can be justified as much as individual ownership as long as they remain voluntarily arrangements and are derived from a libertarian ethic.
Published: August 26, 2007 6:19 AM
Published: August 26, 2007 8:19 AM
Yes, Stephan you are absolutely right. Their “points” are utterly ridiculous and silly.
Published: August 26, 2007 11:36 AM
Rasmussen seems to think that if I could get an “ought” derived from somewhere (something that Yeager claims I am trying to do, though I explicitly denied this), then things would be improved. But this is simply an illusory hope. For even if Rasmussen had proven the proposition that one “ought” to be reasonable and “ought” to act according to the libertarian property ethic this would be just another propositional argument. It could no more assure that people will do what they ought to do than my proof can guarantee that they will do what is justified. So where is the difference; and what is all the fuss about? There is and remains a difference between establishing a truth claim and installing a desire to act upon the truth – with “ought” or without it. It is great, for sure, if a proof can install this desire. But even if it does not, this can hardly be held against it. And it also does not subtract anything from its merit if in some or even many cases a few raw utilitarian assertions prove more successful in persuading of libertarianism than it can do. A proof is still a proof: and socio-psychology remains socio-psychology.”
Rasmussen. “But why should we be reasonable, is the next come-back.”
Björn: This “question” could also serve as an “answer” to any argument for anything and why should we not be reasonable?
Hoppe wrote (see above) that “Rasmussen seems to think that if I could get an “ought” derived from somewhere.”
Björn: If everyone or at least if most people believed that the proof is a valid proof, it would be almost impossible for governments to act against it and ignore it or should they “argue” “we know that our activity is criminal but we believe it is good for society anyway. We are criminals but so what?”
In other words, in practise an “is” can, in such a case, therefore be derived to also be an “ought.”
Published: August 26, 2007 11:52 AM
“Do you not agree that it is and must be a cooperative undertaking involving the peaceful interaction of at least two people who are and logically must be pursuing truth and valid conclusions based on reason and logic and necessarily not by threat of force?”
This is clearly false. Two religious zealots argue about their beliefs about morality and God’s will; each tries to impress upon the other the importance of accepting on faith his fervently held convictions about right and wrong. Their discussion is about ethics, based on faith rather than on reason. Because they reject reason as somehow misleading or “limited” as concerns any inquiry into ultimate issues, they thereby renounce the ultimate and objective standard by which thinking people can acquire knowlege, including answers to highly abstract and difficult questions about what is morally right and wrong. Having renounced the ultimate and objective standard of reason, their disagreements about issues of faith–of God’s will and of proper religious moral doctrine–lead to disputes about how the other should act. These disputes can ultimately be resolved only through violence. Ayn Rand wrote about this idea in her famous essay entitled “The Roots of War”.
Philosophical shortcuts do not work, because our knowlege is logically integrated. One cannot devise valid rules of “libertarian ethics” without prior careful thinking about the kind of being to which the rules are supposed to apply. In other words, good concepts in ethics must stand on good concepts in personal morality, which stand on good concepts in epistemology (the nature of knowlege), which stand on good concepts in metaphysics (the nature of reality). With no disrespect for Rothbard and Hoppe, they have tried to fashion “axioms” of “libertarian ethics”, built upon a foundation of intellectual neglect.
Finally, just as there is no “libertarian math” or “libertarian biology”, but only good principles of math or biology; it is non-sensical to write of “libertarian economics” or “libertarian morality”. There is only good or bad economics, valid or false ideas about moral philosophy. Knowlege, including about ethics, doesn’t start with political philosophy, as Rothbard and Hoppe believe. Political philosophy flows logically from prior knowlege in philosophy.
Religious faith cannot provide this knowlege.
Published: August 26, 2007 1:34 PM
M: As I have tried to make clear, this staement is false because of logical incoherency. How do I know this? Show me a rule that you contend both parties to a discussion implicitly agree to, and I’ll be happy to show you that both parties need not agree to this “implicit rule”.
M: “Do you not agree that it is and must be a cooperative undertaking involving the peaceful interaction of at least two people who are and logically must be pursuing truth and valid conclusions based on reason and logic and necessarily not by threat of force?”
M: This is clearly false. Two religious zealots argue about their beliefs about morality and God’s will; each tries to impress upon the other the importance of accepting on faith his fervently held convictions about right and wrong. Their discussion is about ethics, based on faith rather than on reason.
If their talk is devoid of reason, then it is not argumentation. It is merely brow-beating and appeal to authority. I will repeat my contention: the logical – logical – and necessary assumption of true argumentation is that we must appeal to reason and the nature of things to support our conclusions. It is irrelevant that people do not do this, or that they have a psychologically different intention in mind when they supposedly argue. A true and valid argument presupposes resort only to facts, logic, and reason. To say that people pretend to do this and yet do not does not alter the fundamental nature and definition of the argument. I am certain that you, for instance, would not acknowledge that you are intentionally invoking anything but reason in your argument to me. And this is as it should be, because you would not otherwise be participating in true argumentation.
M: Because they reject reason as somehow misleading or “limited” as concerns any inquiry into ultimate issues, they thereby renounce the ultimate and objective standard by which thinking people can acquire knowlege, including answers to highly abstract and difficult questions about what is morally right and wrong. Having renounced the ultimate and objective standard of reason, their disagreements about issues of faith–of God’s will and of proper religious moral doctrine–lead to disputes about how the other should act. These disputes can ultimately be resolved only through violence. Ayn Rand wrote about this idea in her famous essay entitled “The Roots of War”.
I do not claim that people will necessarily not resort to violence, nor that they necessarily will resort to reason and argumentation and an appeal to justice. All I am contending is that true argumentation which depends on peace and reason towards the pursuit of truth and justice, logically rules out of court the application of violence or the threat of violence to this end. I also contend that it is only through the act of reasoned argumentation that anything at all, including an ethic, can be justified.
M: Philosophical shortcuts do not work, because our knowlege is logically integrated. One cannot devise valid rules of “libertarian ethics” without prior careful thinking about the kind of being to which the rules are supposed to apply.
By all means, do this careful thinking and then devise away. My claim is that when you are done, you will agree with HHH and his A-E thesis.
M: In other words, good concepts in ethics must stand on good concepts in personal morality, which stand on good concepts in epistemology (the nature of knowlege), which stand on good concepts in metaphysics (the nature of reality). With no disrespect for Rothbard and Hoppe, they have tried to fashion “axioms” of “libertarian ethics”, built upon a foundation of intellectual neglect.
Okie dokie. LOL.
M: Finally, just as there is no “libertarian math” or “libertarian biology”, but only good principles of math or biology; it is non-sensical to write of “libertarian economics” or “libertarian morality”. There is only good or bad economics, valid or false ideas about moral philosophy. Knowlege, including about ethics, doesn’t start with political philosophy, as Rothbard and Hoppe believe. Political philosophy flows logically from prior knowlege in philosophy.
Religious faith cannot provide this knowlege.
Published: August 26, 2007 2:09 PM
Published: August 26, 2007 9:09 PM
1) The debaters are alive
2) The debaters can “think”
3) The debaters think reason is the proper means of figuring stuff out.Do these implications lead anywhere? I don’t think so. Why not? Because what two particular people happen to think, or how they choose to argue, doesn’t inform us about the particulars of man’s nature. Implications flow, not from the “act” or “choice” of two people engaging in reasoned debate, but from the fact that man is a particular sort of being living in a world that is non-mysterious and intelligible. The particular choice one makes, to argue reasonably, or to play football or pool, or to build bridges or houses, or to steal and murder, doesn’t by itself imply the realm of moral values. Moral values are implied by the fact that man must choose appropriately, in ways congruent with the requirements of his nature, to be able to live a proper life. Moral values are not implied by a particular choice; they’re implied by the fact that man can only live by thinking and choosing.
But let’s set that issue aside for a moment, and consider the implications of the fact that a person, ANY person, has the natural ability to think properly, i.e. to form concepts based on evidence, facts, and logical integration. Let’s assume that one infers that man has this unique ability from observing himself, and another, in reasoned debate. Several implications follow, including all of moral philosophy. These include: 1) Man is a thinking being, who must choose to risk the effort to think. Thinking and the choice it implies are individual activities.
2) Therefore one man cannot command the thought processes of another man.
3) No one can figure anything out, or make choices necessary to living, without reasoning.
4) Therefore, the kind of thinking one engages in, whether or not one thinks logically and coherently, whether or not one respects facts as such, or chooses to selectively ignore facts, is crucially important to being able to figure stuff out and succeed at the challenge of living.
5) Therefore, one should think properly, i.e. one should be rational.
Here we’ve arrived at the cardinal virtue in service to the ultimate standard of value: one’s life. The fact that one ought to be rational, in clear mental contact with reality, implies ethical individualism.
However, if one were less careful in his observations about the kind of creature that man happens to be, less insightful in his observations about the sort of universe that man inhabits, he might conclude that man can acquire knowlege through various forms of faith–religious or secular–or various forms of mysticism and superstition. Or he might beleive that knowlege was impossible to man. Such false ideas about man and the world imply collectivist, rather than individualist, ethical implications. If learning ultimately depends on revelation from God, or from a political leader, or from the collective unconscious (interpreted and revealed by a political or religious leader), then each individual is unimportant, because his individual thinking is unimportant to his survival. In this case, ethical behavior flows from proper subordination and obediance to the authority through whom revelation is achieved.
If Rothbard and Hoppe thought that ethical individualism is implied by an act of reasoned debate, then they could reach this conclusion only by explicitly identifying reason as an epistemological absolute, i.e. as man’s only proper means of learning. Thus, rationality would be an objective moral value to R&H.; That is, their route to ethical norms would necessarily presuppose PERSONAL MORAL VALUES, such as rationality. That is, without first figuring out a code of personal moral values that necessarily apply to everyone, H&R; could not proceed to a system of “libertarian ethics”.
The fact that Mr. Edwards, in his defense of R&H;, found it necessary to identify reason as the prerequisite to reaching valid implications about ethics, supports my point.
However, Rothbard (and I assume Hoppe) explicitly deny the relevance or fundamental importance of personal morality to their system of “libertarian ethics”. In fact, I have the impression from reading an earlier post about an exchange between Hoppe and Rasmussen, that Hoppe really thinks he can reach normative conclusions about property, without asserting that one “should” choose to respect private property. I think that is incoherent. (But this may well be unfair to Hoppe, whose book on property I have not read.)
Published: August 27, 2007 5:02 PM
1) The debaters are alive
2) The debaters can “think”
3) The debaters think reason is the proper means of figuring stuff out.
“Do these implications lead anywhere? I don’t think so….”
Sure they do, Mark. Logically, those things imply the following:
1. The debaters presume they each and the other exists, has a right to exist and to control themselves, which acknowledges not only self-ownership during the argumentation, but a prior right to appropriate for themselves the means to survive to participate in the argumentation.
2. The debaters presume that each will depend on reason, and peaceful cooperation, and not violence, to come to a truthful reasoned conclusion. They logically presume peace to pursue truth.
In as far as they intend to actually carry out what can be logically described as argumentation, they will implicitly, and before they even begin discourse, agree to these norms. These norms, when all fleshed out and fully elaborated, are known as the libertarian ethic.
Because they are logically presupposed during argumentation, all normative proposals that contradict any of these presuppositions represent a performative contradiction and are ruled out of court by force of logic during the discussion. Therefore, no propositions that are contrary to libertarian principles can be justified during argumentation. And since argumentation is the only method humans have of producing a justification of anything, if it can’t be justified during argumentation, it simply cannot be justified ever, and remains forever unjustifiable, or unjustified, period.
All of what I have just said is true independent of “what two particular people happen to think or how they choose to argue”. Either they subscribe to reason or they don’t. If they don’t, they exist outside of anything we can reasonably claim to be a system of justice and if they are aggressive in libertarian lights, then they are merely technical problem to be dealt with violently, just as any irrational animal such as a wolf or a cougar would be.
The a priori of argumentation is a fundamental reflection of the rational nature of man. As HHH has pointed out, because it is an action, it is a sub-category of human action and in that sense it is lesser than it. On the other hand it is in another sense it is superior and preeminent over action in that it is the one action necessary to allow us to discuss and understand the idea of action in the first place.
Therefore, understanding the logical nature of argumentation, and its presuppositions can be instrumental in understanding the fundamental nature of acting man. It is indisputably instrumental in determining a valid ethic for social interaction.
Published: August 27, 2007 7:27 PM
Computers can distinguish between true and false. In a sense, that is all they can do. Just 0 and 1. The enzymes that replicate DNA can distinguish between A and T, C and G. None have free will.Collectivists always assert knowlege about ethics and politics by some form of revalation, divine or secular.
They wouldn’t consider it “revelation” any more than anyone here’s acceptance of libertarianism. Argumentation ethics were invented by Habermas, who is notoriously left-wing.Yes. You are describing the psychology of the politician, the thief, murderer, socialist, rapist and the mob under the influence of democratic mentality. Their disregard for peaceful cooperation and justice is not really relevant to the question.
They are extremely relevant to my well-being, since they are the ones who threaten to harm it.
Why “deal with them” if they could not ethically be proven to be doing anything wrong? Without any ethical norms we could not really tell why we should “deal with them” in the first place.
For the same reason I do anything: I am subjectively dissatisfied with the status quo.
Secondly, the world is ruled by ideas. If we understand this we have laid a foundation for change. If we do not understand it people like Mr. Mugabe will be powerful. To argue that this is not so is contradictious as this is an idea itself.
Most of Mugabe’s supporters are likely illiterate. He did not get where he is because he wrote philosophy, and it is not philosophy that will unseat him. People have tried protesting his actions, but his thugs drive them off. What use are all your ideas when he has the power?
Does anyone really doubt the influence that Karl Marx’s ideas once had (and still have)? Or religious believes? Does it not exist people who believe in the principle of democracy? Is the concept of democracy powerless or powerful in today’s world?
Karl Marx thought communism was a historical inevitability, the logical end result of capitalism. He was wrong and his ideas went nowhere until the Leninist Bolsheviks deviated from Marxist orthodoxy and created a revolutionary vanguard that would implement the dictatorship of the proletariat where they could, even if that place lacked capitalism. Murray Rothbard considered himself a disciple of Lenin’s strategy, but his vanguard was not a vanguard like Lenin’s vanguard (to paraphrase a commie saying). The Bolsheviks did not wait for their ideas to gain majority support (the Mensheviks outnumbered them among Russian marxists, and not all revolutionaries were marxists). They took the initiative and seized power when the opportunity presented itself. Libertarians have no idea how to do that.
Wouldn’t the world be different if most of the adults believed in a libertarian ethic from a world in which most of the adults believed in Nazism?
I have been reading Bertrand de Jouvenel’s “On Power”, and it seems to me that beliefs and philosophy offer no defense against the state. All will be seized by it for its own use, even those formulated to oppose it. The people who believed in a libertarian ethic might decide they must spread it around the world, and powerless Nazis might decide just to create nasty propaganda rather than actually doing anything. I don’t know. The Chinese and Vietnamese are still officially communist, Singapore is run by the “People’s Action Party” and English people I come across are glad they gave up on Cromwell’s commonwealth to go back to monarchy, but none of those things seem relevant.
Did Marxists try to convince John D. Rockefeller of the rightfulness of Marxism or did they try to get support elsewhere? Why should libertarians be any different in this regard and try to convince criminals like Mr. Mugabe of the rightfulness of justice?
I don’t think Mugabe will be convinced, that’s my point. What is needed is the capability to evade or deter his depradations.
Apart from this I would also like to mention that I believe that very foundation for cooperation among people is that they gain by cooperating and not because of “tribal sentiments”. I think Mises was correct in believing this.
Primitive peoples give up things to other tribe members, so the others benefit at their expense. The state was not formed through a social contract, it was created by acts of domination. Tribal sentiment still runs high. Daniel Klein talked about this in “The People’s Romance“, which I think even Rothbard was a victim of (see his writings on populism and the American war of independence).
It is merely brow-beating and appeal to authority.
Illogical, fallacious argument is still argument.
Published: August 27, 2007 10:54 PM
Human Action:
“The nineteenth-century success of free trade ideas was effected by the theories of classical economics. The prestige of these ideas was so great that those whose selfish class interests they hurt could not hinder their endorsements by public opinion and their realization by legislative measures. It is ideas that make history, and not history that makes ideas.”
Ludwig von Mises
http://www.mises.org/humanaction/chap3sec3.asp#p84
A proposition made by Hans-Hermann Hoppe:
“States, as powerful and invincible as they might seem, ultimately owe their existence to ideas and, since ideas can in principle change instantaneously, states can be brought down and crumble practically overnight.”
http://www.freelythinking.com/quotes.htm
A quote from the book “The Ethics of Liberty”, by Murray Rothbard:
“Ideology has always been vital to the continued existence of the State, as attested by the systematic use of ideology since the ancient Oriental empires. The specific content of the ideology has, of course, changed over time, in accordance with changing conditions and cultures. In the Oriental despotisms, the Emperor was often held by the Church to be himself divine; in our more secular age, the argument runs more to “the public good” and the “general welfare.”But the purpose is always the same: to convince the public that what the State does is not, as one might think, crime on a gigantic scale, but something necessary and vital that must be supported and obeyed. The reason that ideology is so vital to the State is that it always rests, in essence, on the support of the majority of the public. This support obtains whether the State is a “democracy,” a dictatorship, or an absolute monarchy. For the support rests in the willingness of the majority (not, to repeat, of every individual) to go along with the system: to pay the taxes, to go without much complaint to fight the State’s wars, to obey the State’s rules and decrees. This support need not be active enthusiasm to be effective; it can just as well be passive resignation. But support there must be. For if the bulk of the public were really convinced of the illegitimacy of the State, if it were convinced that the State is nothing more nor less than a bandit gang writ large, then the State would soon collapse to take on no more status or breadth of existence than another Mafia gang. Hence the necessity of the State’s employment of ideologists; and hence the necessity of the State’s age-old alliance with the Court Intellectuals who weave the apologia for State rule”.
http://www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/twentytwo.asp
“Human history is in essence a history of ideas.” (H.G. Wells)
“In every great time there is some one idea at work which is more powerful than any other, and which shapes the events of the time and determines their ultimate issues.” – Francis Bacon
Because of the power of ideas, the following can be concluded:
If an amount of people that supports the state is great enough, the state will be powerful.
If an amount of people that supports the democratic principle is great enough, the democratic principle will be powerful.
If an amount of people that supports communism is great enough, communism will be powerful.
If an amount of people that supports religion is great enough, religion will be powerful.
If an amount of people that supports libertarian ethics is great enough, libertarian ethics will be powerful.
Published: August 28, 2007 1:05 AM
All the weaponry might supports and harmonizes with those ideas that are prevailing.
Published: August 28, 2007 1:29 AM
Man cannot exist without any thoughts-ideas.
Published: August 28, 2007 1:46 AM
Published: August 28, 2007 6:31 AM
Because the Iraq War is so different from World War 1, because we are not transitioning from an agrarian economy and because for all their stupidity the Bush regime is still craftier about seizing and holding power than the Romanovs were.
Man cannot exist without any thoughts-ideas.
Sure they can. Jellyfish can exist without them. If I caused enough brain damage to some men to make them like jellyfish, they would still exist.
If some libertarians cannot appreciate the value of it and are so intent on strategizing, then they ought to publish some works with their own ideas on the matter and work to agitate the public, instead of complaining about work concerning ideology.
I already explained above, you must not have been paying attention. I am not a “professional libertarian”, I just comment in my spare time. I am not engaged in either ethical philosophy or strategy, but if I was going to be an activist I would put my efforts into the latter since it could actually obtain liberty. I criticize those libertarians who believe themselves to be altruistically working for liberty when they contribute nothing to strategy and instead expend their efforts in areas that do not actually bring anybody any liberty.
Published: August 28, 2007 11:55 AM
Published: August 28, 2007 12:29 PM
Published: August 28, 2007 2:36 PM
For a New Liberty:
“The species man, therefore, has a specifiable nature, as does the world around him and the ways of interaction between them. To put it with undue brevity, the activity of each inorganic and organic entity is determined by its own nature and by the nature of the other entities with which it comes in contact. Specifically, while the behavior of plants and at least the lower animals is determined by their biological nature or perhaps by their “instincts,” the nature of man is such that each individual person must, in order to act, choose his own ends and employ his own means in order to attain them. Possessing no automatic instincts, each man must learn about himself and the world, use his mind to select values, learn about cause and effect, and act purposively to maintain himself and advance his life. Since men can think, feel, evaluate, and act only as individuals, it becomes vitally necessary for each man’s survival and prosperity that he be free to learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act upon his knowl¬edge and values.”
http://www.mises.org/resources/12ea1d7b-28fd-4706-943d-c6100639a5eb
Human Action:
“Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego’s meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person’s conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. Such paraphrases may clarify the definition given and prevent possible misinterpretations. But the definition itself is adequate and does not need complement of commentary.”
http://www.mises.org/resources/4979fc72-aa02-407e-9604-7904fbc9b872
From answers.com:
“Humans, or human beings, are bipedal primates belonging to the mammalian species Homo sapiens (Latin: “wise man” or “knowing man”) in the family Hominidae (the great apes).[1][2] Humans have a highly developed brain capable of abstract reasoning, language, and introspection. This mental capability, combined with an erect body carriage that frees their upper limbs for manipulating objects, has allowed humans to make far greater use of tools than any other species. Humans originated in Africa about 200,000 years ago, but now they inhabit every continent, with a total population of over 6.5 billion as of 2007.
Like most primates, humans are social by nature; however, humans are particularly adept at utilizing systems of communication for self-expression, the exchange of ideas, and organization. Humans create complex social structures composed of cooperating and competing groups, ranging in scale from small families and partnerships to species-wide political, scientific and economic unions. Social interactions between humans have also established an extremely wide variety of traditions, rituals, ethics, values, social norms, and laws which form the basis of human society. Humans also have a marked appreciation for beauty and aesthetics which, combined with the human desire for self-expression, has led to cultural innovations such as art, literature and music.
Humans are also noted for their desire to understand and influence the world around them, seeking to explain and manipulate natural phenomena through science, philosophy, mythology and religion. This natural curiosity has led to the development of advanced tools and skills; humans are the only known species to build fires, cook their food, clothe themselves, and use numerous other technologies.”
http://www.answers.com/topic/human?cat=health
Well, then, if those characteristics of man cease to exist, man ceases also to exist. Some other organism might be left but not the human species.
Or in other words:
Murray Rothbard, “Fundamentals of human action” (praxeology):
“All human beings act by virtue of their existence and their nature as human beings. We could not conceive of human beings who do not act purposefully, who have no ends in view that they desire and attempt to attain. Things that did not act, that did not behave purposefully, would no longer be classified as human.”
Published: August 28, 2007 3:45 PM
Published: August 28, 2007 4:56 PM
The point I make is that the libertarian ethic is justifiable and that contradictory ethics cannot be justified. We agree that criminals of all stripes, private and public pose a threat to our property and our well being. I further contend that it is worthwhile to know what acts are criminal and on what basis, so that we can more confidently and appropriately respond to them.
Published: August 28, 2007 5:31 PM
I have spent time at Mencius Moldbug’s site criticizing him. However my main problem with libertarian strategists is not so much that their plans are bad (though they may be) but that there are so few of them and so many ethicists!You may not appreciate the role libertarian ethicists (and other philosophers) play, but they are crucial in the battlefield of intellectual ideas.
I do not believe this is the case. Do you have any evidence to present against that of Philip Converse?And I fail to see how man qua man can exist without thoughts without being reduced to some sort of vegetable.
Perhaps in comparison to philosophers the majority of humanity is semi-vegetative. So now what do we do?
Now we are jellyfishes. Mans typical characteristics (or mans nature) are the same as jellyfishes. Who could tell the difference?
I would consider a man with brain damage to still be a man, because I would use genetics to determine species rather than philosophy. Intelligence is normally distributed (i.e a Gaussian or bell-curve). Many people are not really capable of following the arguments of Marx or Rand (who weren’t even professional philosophers able to obtain academic posts). Even among people that are intelligent, many don’t put much thought into such issues for the good reason that they derive no benefit from it. Your response may be to say that they are not acting like man qua man which must be a reasonable, rational thinking person living a fully examined life. So what, I say. We must deal with reality as it is, and if men are actually sheep we must focus on sheep.
All human beings act by virtue of their existence and their nature as human beings. We could not conceive of human beings who do not act purposefully, who have no ends in view that they desire and attempt to attain. Things that did not act, that did not behave purposefully, would no longer be classified as human.
Many human actions are not thought out but rationalized post-facto. They are like kicking when the doctor hits your knee with the reflex-mallet. In addition, a free-market can function with mindless automatons. See this.
To the extent that this is true, it is true only from an irrelevant psychological standpoint. From a logical standpoint argumentation presupposes only valid logic and the pursuit of truth. Only with logic can a true justification be given and so therefore, it is only from a logical standpoint that A-E addresses and reveals the ethic that argumentation implies.
If two people actually disagree, at least one must be incorrect. Does that mean no more than one person is actually arguing?
The questions I would ask you is Do you subscribe to a just social order? Do you not think that what you do and what others do should be justifiable? Logically, the fact that you do attempt to justify your views on this forum implies you do.
I am an emotivist/Stirnerite egoist. I do not believe anything is objectively justifiable. I do not believe normative statements have any truth value.
You cannot justify a position that justification is not worthy or valid – it is a contradiction.
Worthy and valid are two different things. Validity is not justified, it is shown. I am not trying to say here that normative beliefs are good or bad, only that they are unfalsifiable and thus cannot be correct or incorrect.
The point I make is that the libertarian ethic is justifiable and that contradictory ethics cannot be justified.
I will agree with the latter point, but not the former because I do not believe anything is objectively justifiable. Even Hoppe and Kinsella rather than justifying anything only attempt to show that something else is unjustified.
I further contend that it is worthwhile to know what acts are criminal and on what basis, so that we can more confidently and appropriately respond to them.
I do not need to know that the man attacking me is unjustified, only that I do not want to be attacked. Knowing I am “justified” does not make me more confident. If being “righteous” in an ethical libertarian sense resulted in success, the thugs we see running countries would not be so successful.
Published: August 28, 2007 6:51 PM
Published: August 28, 2007 7:07 PM
Published: August 28, 2007 7:09 PM
Therefore, the determinist’s thoughts/feelings about any and every subject are, by the meaning of his argument, determined. Therefore, the determinst’s thoughts/feelings about the issue of freewill versus determinism are beyond his control, determined by elements outside his mental capabilities. And so it follows that if determinism were true, the determinist, like everyone else, would lack the personal power to distinguish between falsehoods and truth, facts and fantasy, good and bad, etc. All those distinctions, according to the determinist, are merely illusions, inexorable consequences of the forces that supposedly rule human life.
I don’t intend to be condescending when I emphasize to you: there’s no way around this fallacy.
However, when you criticize others on this thread, as we all do, you assume that which you deny: that we all have the capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood. For if we lacked this ability, and if you truly believed that we lack this ability, what basis would you have to criticize (or praise) anyone for anything?
There is a great book by Nathaniel Branden that discusses this issue, entitled “The Art of Living Consciously”. The book discusses the intersection of the philosophy of epistemology and psychology.
Published: August 28, 2007 7:09 PM
Published: August 28, 2007 7:18 PM
Published: August 28, 2007 7:24 PM
Propaganda is something handed down from a propagandist. Many (like the illiterates of Zimbabwe) don’t know what it says. The beliefs of the general public are more gut-feelings. They are remarkably consistent and don’t fit squarely into virtually any ideology (ideologists tend to think more and have coherent, if wrong, beliefs). Economists have been complaining about the same errors (protectionism, anti-market bias) from the days of Smith and Bastiat and they just don’t seem to die. They are found all around the world where people believe in many different things. No propagandist accomplished this coup.I am sure that the particulars of man’s nature and the nature of the universe we live in (no contradictions, the law of identity) logically implies a clearly defineable moral code and esthetic and ethical norms.
Why are you so sure?the primacy of consciousness over the primacy of existence
I have no idea what that means. That’s how positivist I am!
The fallacy is assuming the ability to make conscious distinctions, logical or otherwise, for yourself, the determinist; while simultaneously denying that this ability to make conscious distinctions exists for anyone else.
Quote me where I do so. I fully admit all my actions are pre-determined and I have no free-will, and furthermore that my conception of a platonic self is merely the subjective product of my brain evolved to enhance the likelihood of the spread of my genes.
In other words, you posit that one’s feelings and thoughts are ultimately determined by some influence–however you choose to define it–outside the province of one’s will or mind.
“The state of the universe billions of years ago plus some quantum coin flips” is something like how Greene & Cohen put it.
Therefore, the determinist’s thoughts/feelings about any and every subject are, by the meaning of his argument, determined. Therefore, the determinst’s thoughts/feelings about the issue of freewill versus determinism are beyond his control, determined by elements outside his mental capabilities.
Mostly true, although I would say that my mental capabilities are pre-determined and that they are a major factor in my beliefs and actions.
And so it follows that if determinism were true, the determinist, like everyone else, would lack the personal power to distinguish between falsehoods and truth, facts and fantasy, good and bad, etc.
False, remember my mention of computers and DNA/RNA which I hope you will agree do not have free will.
All those distinctions, according to the determinist, are merely illusions, inexorable consequences of the forces that supposedly rule human life.
No, there really is information: “a difference that makes a difference“. If you really want to get into issues of fallibility and subjectivism you might note that we could be living in a simulation and I have no idea what the “real” world is like, but in that case I don’t care about the “real” world, but only what I experience and believed had been real.
However, when you criticize others on this thread, as we all do, you assume that which you deny: that we all have the capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood.
I certainly don’t believe anyone here or elsewhere is infallible, but given that you have read and responded to my comments I know that you can detect and remember difference and make actions based on it.
For if we lacked this ability, and if you truly believed that we lack this ability, what basis would you have to criticize (or praise) anyone for anything?
On what basis do I criticize Gone With the Wind or praise King Crimson? Because I like or dislike them!
There is a great book by Nathaniel Branden that discusses this issue, entitled “The Art of Living Consciously”. The book discusses the intersection of the philosophy of epistemology and psychology.
Given my views of the Rands/Brandens and my Szaszian take on psychology, I think I’ll put that off for a while.
In reference to the above, I forget to make this clear: Since the determinist can’t make non-illusory distinctions, he can’t establish that determinism is true and valid.
To test determinism we could look for indeterminacy in the brain. It does in fact exist there, in the form of quantum behavior. Since this is not a special characteristic of the brain but is in fact involved everywhere matter/energy (same thing according to Einstein) exist, it would be rather meaningless to refer to it as “consciousness” or “free-will”.
This criticism applies as well to your ideas about computers and DNA, because your ideas presuppose your ability to think and choose.
So do they have free-will or are they unable to detect difference?
A parrot is blathering.
Way to contribute, Björn.
Published: August 28, 2007 11:40 PM
Subjectivist or jellyfish. No, no, no, I am a subjectivist and a positivist too for that matter, so I do not believe in that. It is so easy and so good to be a subjectivist, positivist and a moral relativist. I can always say that you are wrong. For example how do you know that you exist? Prove it.
Helicopter Ben. But you are arguing, you cannot argue if you do not exist. You must accept the fact that you exist.
Subjectivist or jellyfish. I am not arguing. Prove that. And as I said I am a subjectivist so I do not believe in things like the existence. Don’t you read my comments? I have already told you so. How many times do I need to do that?
Helicopter Ben. A parrot is blathering.
Subjectivist or jellyfish. That was easy. Now I have proved that Hoppe and Rothbard are dead wrong.
Published: August 29, 2007 1:52 AM
Published: August 29, 2007 6:56 AM
Published: August 29, 2007 7:03 AM
Jellyfish and imbeciles do not have those characteristics, yet they exist.It is so easy and so good to be a subjectivist, positivist and a moral relativist.
Just wait a darn tootin’ second, I don’t believe in any objective good so it cannot therefore be good to be those things!For example how do you know that you exist?
I have not been arguing that anyone does not exist. I admit the possibility that I could be a simulation, but then when I say “exists” it should be taken to mean not what actually exists outside the simulation but what is being simulated in the world I experience, since that is all I am aware of and can talk about.
I am not arguing.
I was actually the one for a very open definition of “arguing”, as others stated that using fallacies or incorrect logic did not constitute arguing. I say as long as one expresses that they disagree and offers statements (however nonsensical) in support of that disagreement, they are arguing.
And as I said I am a subjectivist so I do not believe in things like the existence.
Mises was a subjectivist. That did not mean he thought he or anyone else did not exist. I just don’t think normative statements have any truth value. It is not “existence” (keeping in mind the caveat in the third paragraph of this post) that I am skeptical of, but consciousness. I think it is ill-defined.
Regarding Hoppe and Rothbard, they do not have any scientific expertise on human beings so I don’t see any reason to take them as authorities. Perhaps they know a lot about economics, but as the Catallarchy link showed many truths of economics are still valid for mindless automatons. I have pointed to Converse for real evidence of what humans are actually like, and those who want to make claims about the nature of man are welcome to provide evidence rather than unsupported statements to the contrary.
Yes, but literacy has never been a requirement for more subtle, pervasive form of propaganda (radio broadcasts, TV etc.)
Neither of those existed in the days of Adam Smith and Bastiat, but the same dumb ideas were still extremely popular.
in the West such propaganda certainly does exist.
Do you mean like public service announcements or Partnership for a Drug-Free America types of things? Those don’t seem significant to me. There is Fox News, but it’s massively popular because it fills a niche that wasn’t being satisfied before. People watch it of their own accord because it tells them things they already believe. Many Fox News viewers thought Saddam was responsible for 9/11 and WMDs were discovered in Iraq, even though Fox News itself does not make such ridiculous claims. People who believe such things are simply more inclined to watch Fox News.
Socialism is an example of a primacy of consciousness ideology.
I don’t usually hear socialists talk much about consciousness. Marxists talk about “class consciousness”, but they seem to have given up on that angle a while back since the proletariat didn’t behave like they expected.
Published: August 29, 2007 9:27 AM
And it is also funny that people who easliy deny reality like TGGP can do so only when they talk about it.
When it comes to living they, maybe not knowingly, acknowledge reality and act upon it.
I cant imagine TGGP thinking, “this might be a simulation” and not get away when a car is coming at him on the street.
He would just get out of the way, otherwise he wouldnt be here typing words devoid of reason.
Published: August 29, 2007 9:53 AM
I mean news reports, television programmes, radio broadcasts, tabloids, anything that can be put to such use. Perhaps some people see these sources as a confirmation of what they already “knew”. Perhaps they are also a means of making sure that that belief does not fade away.
“I don’t usually hear socialists talk much about consciousness. Marxists talk about “class consciousness”, but they seem to have given up on that angle a while back since the proletariat didn’t behave like they expected.”
You admitted you do not understand what the term means. How, then, can you proceed to say whether or not socialism is described by it? Primacy of consciousness is a viewpoint, which according to Rand, ignores reality entirely and seeks to mould it according to utopian desires (e.g. ignoring the calculational impossibility of socialism.)
Ktibuk, it’d be handy if most socialists admitted that they are not appealing to reason. 😛
Published: August 29, 2007 12:15 PM
In introductory philosophy classes in lower institutions of learning–public high schools or community colleges, for example–a simple little problem is presented to uncurious students, as follows: “If a tree falls in the forest, and nobody happens to be there to witness this event, did the tree actually fall?”
I’ll leave it to readers (if there are any) to ponder this profound and weighty issue.
Published: August 29, 2007 2:23 PM
The simulation angle isn’t important to my argument and it seems to have caused enough confusion that I regret mentioning it. I was only acknowledging it to dismiss it. If it is actually the case that I am living in a simulation, then I do not care about the “real” world outside the simulation, only the old world I had been experiencing, so it is as if the simulation is real (it seems that way to me), so I will indeed move my simulated self out of the way of the simulated truck.tabloids
The government wants us to believe in bat-boy? Seriously, imagine there are two kinds of media providers. Type 1 focuses on giving the customers what they want. Type 2 has some compromise between that and propagandizing. Who is going to succeed in the market? Type 1.You admitted you do not understand what the term means. How, then, can you proceed to say whether or not socialism is described by it?
I don’t have to know what a term means in order to remember whether people use the word “consciousness”.
which according to Rand
I haven’t read Rand, so it is best to explain a term like that before using it in order for others to understand.
“If a tree falls in the forest, and nobody happens to be there to witness this event, did the tree actually fall?” I’ll leave it to readers (if there are any) to ponder this profound and weighty issue.
I like what Eliezer Yudkowsky had to say about that one.
Published: August 29, 2007 3:58 PM
“I am an emotivist/Stirnerite egoist. I do not believe anything is objectively justifiable. I do not believe normative statements have any truth value.”
Would you contend then, that your desire or willingness to violently defend yourself and your family from murderers, rapists and thieves has not an iota of a superior moral justification over the criminal actions of these murderers and thieves in the first place? I doubt you subscribe to such a morally vacuous philosophy, given how much time and effort you appear to put to justifying your views on this forum.
“Worthy and valid are two different things. Validity is not justified, it is shown.”
Semantics. How will you “show” that validity is shown rather than justified? Perhaps you will present a justification for such a proposal?
“I am not trying to say here that normative beliefs are good or bad, only that they are unfalsifiable and thus cannot be correct or incorrect.”
So therefore, is the belief that murder is bad on an equal logical footing to the belief that murder is good? Are such things, in your mind, really merely in the eye of the beholder? Is the torture and murder carried out on Hitler’s orders, in reality, on an equal moral foundation as peaceful cooperation?
“I will agree with the latter point, but not the former because I do not believe anything is objectively justifiable. Even Hoppe and Kinsella rather than justifying anything only attempt to show that something else is unjustified.”
They demonstrate what is unjustified by showing it to be a contradiction to that which can be justified. So, yes, they in fact do justify the libertarian ethic. They do this by demonstrating that it is the libertarian ethic that must logically be presupposed during the logical act of argumentation – the act that must be carried out in order to attempt to present any justification.
“I do not need to know that the man attacking me is unjustified, only that I do not want to be attacked. Knowing I am “justified” does not make me more confident. If being “righteous” in an ethical libertarian sense resulted in success, the thugs we see running countries would not be so successful.”
And yet conversely, your attacker may only need to know that he wants to attack you – in fact we know this to be the case. I would argue that your knowing that you are “justified” in defending yourself makes it possible for you to answer your peace loving critics when they ask you why they should not attack you in compensation for your violent act (your defense). When you put up a valid justification of self defense, they will see reason, given that they seek peace just as you do. As another consolation, you can look at your family in the eyes when you tell them your reason for acting violently was consistent with justice, and not injustice. It may matter.
Published: August 29, 2007 6:13 PM
I don’t see where we disagree there. I was merely pointing out that arguing and arguing correctly are two distinct things.Would you contend then, that your desire or willingness to violently defend yourself and your family from murderers, rapists and thieves has not an iota of a superior moral justification over the criminal actions of these murderers and thieves in the first place?
Not objectively.I doubt you subscribe to such a morally vacuous philosophy, given how much time and effort you appear to put to justifying your views on this forum.
Well, it turns out you were wrong to assume so.
Semantics.
Indeed.
How will you “show” that validity is shown rather than justified?
Validity is correctness, or truth. The truth is what is rather than what ought. What is is demonstrated all the time and if one person’s judgement is not trusted a machine can analyze it objectively. Worthiness entails value judgements, which are subjective rather than objective.
So therefore, is the belief that murder is bad on an equal logical footing to the belief that murder is good? Are such things, in your mind, really merely in the eye of the beholder? Is the torture and murder carried out on Hitler’s orders, in reality, on an equal moral foundation as peaceful cooperation?
In an objective sense, yes. I happen to disapprove of such things, but my opinion does not count for much.
They demonstrate what is unjustified by showing it to be a contradiction to that which can be justified. So, yes, they in fact do justify the libertarian ethic. They do this by demonstrating that it is the libertarian ethic that must logically be presupposed during the logical act of argumentation – the act that must be carried out in order to attempt to present any justification.
Aside from my belief that nothing can be justified, there are still flaws with the argument. It presupposes that correct things are argued, when it might the case that the set of things that may be argued are all false (I am not saying this is the case, only that they do not consider this). Furthermore, it is not true that one must presuppose anything in order to argue. I can believe I am in the right to bash you over the head for disagreeing with me, but have merely elected not to do so at the present (or perhaps I am incapable of doing so, such as with arguments over a distance on the internet). The “master arguing with a slave” was the best example I can remember there.
I would argue that your knowing that you are “justified” in defending yourself makes it possible for you to answer your peace loving critics
If they are peace loving I am probably not that concerned with what they think since they are less likely to attack me.
when they ask you why they should not attack you
Peace loving attackers, how odd!
When you put up a valid justification of self defense
Or an invalid but convincing one, they might be easily fooled.
they will see reason
People have not seen reason for quite a long time. You do realize that libertarianism is a very unpopular ideology, right?
given that they seek peace just as you do.
If I sought peace I wouldn’t have attacked, and neither would they.
As another consolation, you can look at your family in the eyes when you tell them your reason for acting violently was consistent with justice, and not injustice. It may matter.
If my family believed in the god Quetzcoatl the rainbow serpent I could justify my actions by saying I had his blessing, even though I do not believe he exists and I don’t think you do either. They would probably be satisfied that mean Mr. Mugabe is off our backs without much explanation from me though.
Published: August 29, 2007 11:34 PM
P: But presuming I value the truth, is it not true that I ought to agree with the above, if it is indeed the truth?
T: What is is demonstrated all the time and if one person’s judgement is not trusted a machine can analyze it objectively. Worthiness entails value judgements, which are subjective rather than objective.
P: Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.
T: “In an objective sense, yes. I happen to disapprove of such things, but my opinion does not count for much.”
P: What your opinion counts for in the grand scheme of things in this world, is not actually the issue; it is whether or not your professed view is logically consistent with how you present that view. Is this “objective sense” as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler? Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right? Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other? I guess you have already answered in the affirmative to this. Not everyone has such courage of their convictions. My hat is off to you.
T: It presupposes that correct things are argued,
P: Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.
T: when it might the case that the set of things that may be argued are all false (I am not saying this is the case, only that they do not consider this).
P: Pardon the repetition, but, if a true justification is to be given, argumentation must proceed with truth and reason. Again this is not something that requires psychological “buy-in” by the participants of argumentation. It is something that simply stands as a logical requirement of true argumentation. One cannot logically argue that one cannot argue – although he can certainly physically attempt to do so. And one cannot logically present a successful justification based on force and fraud. It must proceed with reason and truth. Both of these are fundamental necessary truths.
T: Furthermore, it is not true that one must presuppose anything in order to argue. I can believe
P: What you might believe is irrelevant. You might be insane, or perhaps a criminal who is not interested in truth or justice. You might be a compulsive liar, or simply intent on demonstrating your cleverness by misleading another. This is all quite beside the point. What is relevant is the logical presupposition of argumentation. And that is peaceful cooperative logical reasoned discourse directed towards arriving at truthful propositions.
T: I am in the right to bash you over the head for disagreeing with me, but have merely elected not to do so at the present
P: All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification. In this case, you are the ethical equivalent of the wolf or cougar, fit to be dispensed with according to the violent threat that you pose to civilized humans. The question of justification is only pertinent to those interested in it and willing and capable of respecting civilized laws of justice.
T: (or perhaps I am incapable of doing so, such as with arguments over a distance on the internet). The “master arguing with a slave” was the best example I can remember there.
P: So to recap, this argument that some people are uninterested in justice is merely a tangential irrelevant observation turned sideways and made to look relevant to the discussion. What is relevant is that among those who are interested in justification of their behavior must do their justifying through argumentation, and to do this, they must – logically – in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions. And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.
Published: August 30, 2007 12:35 AM
My conclusion was that the principle of none violence and theft which regulates the relations between people are objectively true borders of justice but within those spheres that is the lives of the individuals, are only guided and subjectively undertaken and are also only a matter of individual tastes.
The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies.
Published: August 30, 2007 2:08 AM
If, when you involve yourself in “argument” using fallacies or incorrect logic, your opponent points out the problem, you can recognize that you were making an error and correct it, that’s a legitimate argument. If there was no disagreement, there’d be no need for argument in the first place; and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion), there must obviously have been some fallacy in at least one of the participants’ initial positions. If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you’re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (“are too!”, “am not!”, “are too!”, “am not!”), are you?! That’s all anyone is saying.
Published: August 30, 2007 3:31 AM
Published: August 30, 2007 10:01 AM
Presuming you value rape and murder, is it not true that you ought to agree with those who support rapists and murderers? It begs the question of whether you ought to support your beliefs and whether you ought to believe in something like truth.Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.
I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.Is this “objective sense” as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler?
Yes, I only subjectively dislike Hitler and his actions. I also disagree with Hitler on certain positive issues (will war and massacre bring Germany back to prominence and save it from Bolshevism? history showed that was not the case). If given the opportunity I might attempt to argue with Hitler using such positive points of disagreement, but in his final days he expressed a willingness to destroy Germany as it had failed to achieve his aims, so perhaps that would not work.
Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right?
Yes, there is no way to resolve the issue.
Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other?
I don’t know what Hitler would do, but I would recognize that we have very different values. Mencius Moldbug discussed those values here.
Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.
The mathematician Kurt Godel proved that there are infinitely many truths that cannot be proved. A great book on this is “Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid” by Douglas Hofstadter.
true argumentation
I hope we’re not getting in No True Scotsman territory here.
It must proceed with reason and truth.
Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?
What you might believe is irrelevant.
Presuppositions are beliefs, and since you said I must presuppose something, my beliefs are relevant.
All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification.
The fact that someone who desires to bash you over the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!
and to do this, they must – logically – in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions.
The master may elect not to do this before arguing with is slave.
And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.
If, hypothetically, the libertarian ethic is objectively false, perhaps one could justify something contrary to it.
I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft.
No they don’t, they have instances where it is ok and instances where it is not. Except perhaps odd groups like the Amish or Jains.
If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft
If taste is subjective, why do all societies believe bread tastes better than mud? If they encountered a species that believed mud is tastier than bread and could converse, could they prove bread is in fact more delicious?
Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not.
Societies are ultimately guided by people, and people are prone to self-serving post-facto rationalizations.
In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.
And I thought this place was full of anarchists!
Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn’t logically be defended as true and just.
I believe in neither, but I don’t see where you showed it was obvious.
Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not.
Hooray, you’ve discovered that argumentum ad populum is a fallacy.
What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended.
How is any ethical axion shown to be true?
The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies.
You haven’t even proved a correlation, let alone causation. Also, I think you need to read some Steven Pinker.
No they can’t.
0 is false, 1 is true conventionally. Even if they distinguished them incorrectly they would still be distinguishing them. Our brains are ultimately not that different from computers and operate according to the same laws of physics.
If there was no disagreement, there’d be no need for argument in the first place
But people will still argue, perhaps believing incorrectly that there is disagreement. I plug this from Eliezer Yudkowsky again.
and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion)
I believe all normative arguments are of the latter type.
If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you’re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (“are too!”, “am not!”, “are too!”, “am not!”), are you?!
Arguing in the childish sense is still arguing, and a person who was incorrect at first might also incorrectly argue against those who claim they made incorrect claims.
TLWP Sam, you are right on the first part. However, I don’t see why ethical philosophy is necessary to live your life without contradictions.
Published: August 30, 2007 11:14 AM
Presuming you value rape and murder, is it not true that you ought to agree with those who support rapists and murderers? It begs the question of whether you ought to support your beliefs and whether you ought to believe in something like truth.Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.
I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.Is this “objective sense” as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler?
Yes, I only subjectively dislike Hitler and his actions. I also disagree with Hitler on certain positive issues (will war and massacre bring Germany back to prominence and save it from Bolshevism? history showed that was not the case). If given the opportunity I might attempt to argue with Hitler using such positive points of disagreement, but in his final days he expressed a willingness to destroy Germany as it had failed to achieve his aims, so perhaps that would not work.
Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right?
Yes, there is no way to resolve the issue.
Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other?
I don’t know what Hitler would do, but I would recognize that we have very different values. Mencius Moldbug discussed those values here.
Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.
The mathematician Kurt Godel proved that there are infinitely many truths that cannot be proved. A great book on this is “Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid” by Douglas Hofstadter.
true argumentation
I hope we’re not getting in No True Scotsman territory here.
It must proceed with reason and truth.
Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?
What you might believe is irrelevant.
Presuppositions are beliefs, and since you said I must presuppose something, my beliefs are relevant.
All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification.
The fact that someone who desires to bash you over the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!
and to do this, they must – logically – in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions.
The master may elect not to do this before arguing with is slave.
And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.
If, hypothetically, the libertarian ethic is objectively false, perhaps one could justify something contrary to it.
I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft.
No they don’t, they have instances where it is ok and instances where it is not. Except perhaps odd groups like the Amish or Jains.
If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft
If taste is subjective, why do all societies believe bread tastes better than mud? If they encountered a species that believed mud is tastier than bread and could converse, could they prove bread is in fact more delicious?
Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not.
Societies are ultimately guided by people, and people are prone to self-serving post-facto rationalizations.
In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.
And I thought this place was full of anarchists!
Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn’t logically be defended as true and just.
I believe in neither, but I don’t see where you showed it was obvious.
Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not.
Hooray, you’ve discovered that argumentum ad populum is a fallacy.
What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended.
How is any ethical axion shown to be true?
The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies.
You haven’t even proved a correlation, let alone causation. Also, I think you need to read some Steven Pinker.
No they can’t.
0 is false, 1 is true conventionally. Even if they distinguished them incorrectly they would still be distinguishing them. Our brains are ultimately not that different from computers and operate according to the same laws of physics.
If there was no disagreement, there’d be no need for argument in the first place
But people will still argue, perhaps believing incorrectly that there is disagreement. I plug this from Eliezer Yudkowsky again.
and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion)
I believe all normative arguments are of the latter type.
If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you’re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (“are too!”, “am not!”, “are too!”, “am not!”), are you?!
Arguing in the childish sense is still arguing, and a person who was incorrect at first might also incorrectly argue against those who claim they made incorrect claims.
TLWP Sam, you are right on the first part. However, I don’t see why ethical philosophy is necessary to live your life without contradictions.
Published: August 30, 2007 11:15 AM
A while ago when I thought of the subjectivist point of view I also thought of exactly the same example. Subjectivists do not really act in accordance with their beliefs. As Mises said “We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will.”
Peter “If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you’re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (“are too!”, “am not!”, “are too!”, “am not!”), are you?! That’s all anyone is saying.”
This is also a correct statement, very childish “arguments” indeed. Why bother to answer childish statements in return for another one? A waste of energy I would say. He does a terrible job in “defending” the nihilist/moral relativist/subjectivist points of view. Actually in reality he does a good job in defending the opposite point of view as it seems that no real argument exist for subjectivism regarding ethical principles.
Published: August 30, 2007 1:08 PM
Therefore, what we have been doing here has been to play a game void of purpose aside from perhaps the entertainment value we derive from it.
Fair enough. I cannot convince you of the rational foundation of justice because reason is not relevant to you on this question. And likewise, you do not attempt to, and indeed cannot even hope to convince me of the validity of your position, and for the very same reason.
I think this discussion has been a battle of psychology, with one participant refusing to do what the other insists is necessary for a logical argumentation: to acknowledge and admit the necessary element of logic and reason to the discussion.
Published: August 30, 2007 1:12 PM
Published: August 30, 2007 1:17 PM
For the last time, argumentation ethics is not about what people want; it is about what is presupposed in the action of argumentation. Argumentation is specifically defined for the purposes of AE. All ethical justifications take the form of argumentation, that is they seek to reach some truth. There exist childish arguments, but these are not what the term subsumes. If you don’t like the term argumentation, imagine some other word to take its place.
Published: August 30, 2007 1:26 PM
It is my belief that normative statements are unfalsifiable and thus have no truth value. This meta-ethical statement is in principle falsifiable: in order to falsify it, falsify a normative statement.So we really are logically, because of justice, forced to brush aside their “opinions.”
Logic does not seem to have applied many pounds of force on you as you continue to converse with me! Also, I like how you put scare-quotes around “opinion” (those aren’t scare-quotes, remember the use-mention distinction) as if somebody else was claiming I had an opinion but you are not willing to concur! You might like this blog: http://quotation-marks.blogspot.com/A while ago when I thought of the subjectivist point of view I also thought of exactly the same example. Subjectivists do not really act in accordance with their beliefs. As Mises said “We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will.”
I already explained why I would get out of the way of the truck if I were in a simulation, and I have never stated that I actually believe I am in a simulation (Robin Hanson suggests there is a 5% probability and I am willing to defer to his expertise).
This is also a correct statement, very childish “arguments” indeed.
Now this is a proper use of quotation marks! The issue was whether what the child was doing constitutes argument and by your use of quotation marks you indicate it does not.
Why bother to answer childish statements in return for another one? A waste of energy I would say. He does a terrible job in “defending” the nihilist/moral relativist/subjectivist points of view.
So you have slipped from discussing the hypothetical child to me? Where have I said “am not/are too” or used any logical fallacies? You disagree with my premise, that normative statements do not have truth value, and now you say it is useless to argue with me. Wasn’t it your position that false beliefs need to be met with true arguments?
Actually in reality he does a good job in defending the opposite point of view as it seems that no real argument exist for subjectivism regarding ethical principles.
Above I point out how to argue against emotivism: falsify a normative statement. You will not be able to do that if you start by assuming another normative statement, because its truth has not yet been established. Either it is elephants all the way down or you will have to derive a normative from a positive somewhere.
I think this sums up what we you doing here. You do not think it is possible to, much less are you inclined to, demonstrate that there is any truth to your argument regarding ethics.
My meta-ethical belief that ethical beliefs have no truth value is itself a positive belief and does have truth value. If I stated you ought to believe the truth, that would be a normative statement. So even though I believe that belief of mine is true, it is not then objectively the case that you ought to believe it, and subjectively I would not be too concerned if you didn’t.
In this field, you are content to describe your position, which to you is hardly a justification
I don’t think there are any justifications, and it would be odd (though not impossible) to demonstrate the validity of statement X without understanding what statement X actually says.
Naturally, according to this view, any justification showing your ethical position is incorrect is impossible as well, as reason and logic are both outside the domain of such considerations.
It is a meta-ethical position, and can be correct or incorrect.
Therefore, what we have been doing here has been to play a game void of purpose aside from perhaps the entertainment value we derive from it.
I can’t speak for you guys, but I know I’ve been entertained.
Fair enough. I cannot convince you of the rational foundation of justice because reason is not relevant to you on this question.
Whatever happened to the primacy of existence over consciousness? Or was that someone else? At any rate, I am looking to observe something so that I can say “Ah, there is such a thing as justice!”. Imaginary things in your head will not cut the mustard.
And likewise, you do not attempt to, and indeed cannot even hope to convince me of the validity of your position, and for the very same reason.
Oh, I wouldn’t assign a probability of 0 to that, but since you display a reluctance to engage in conversation here I would certainly put the likelihood that you will accept my position at less than 0.5.
I think this discussion has been a battle of psychology
That sounds a bit overdramatic.
with one participant refusing to do what the other insists is necessary for a logical argumentation: to acknowledge and admit the necessary element of logic and reason to the discussion.
I don’t have any beef with logic and reason though I hold Bayesian rationality above all those (they can be considered special cases of Bayes), I just think it is a non-standard use of the term “argument” to refer only to logical argumentation. Otherwise arguments would consist of at most one arguer.
We were referring to the formulation of libertarian ethics vs. libertarian strategy (i.e. proselytization.)
None of the examples I gave (Bell, Moldbug, Patri Friedman) were of proselytizers. I don’t think certain thugs can’t be successfully proselytized into accepting libertarianism. Bell wants to set up a market for anonymously killing rights-violators which will deter people from violating our rights. Patri Friedman wants to dramatically decrease exit costs and allow us to get away from governments we want no part in. Mencius Moldbug (who perhaps advocates proselytizing to government, but not convincing them to give up their power!) wants to formalize the State into a joint-stock corporation that will avoid idiotic and destructive actions in favor of those which provide value to its customers (the tax-payers) because this in turn will maximize revenue for the shareholders (those who currently but informally hold power).
My point was simply that in order to combat contrary ethics, a well-formulated libertarian ethic is needed.
Leonard Reed said communism was a problem to argued away, not shot or blown up. I think some communists cannot be argued with and must be shot or blown up. If you can convince any communists by arguing, go for it, but I don’t think much of your chances.
For the last time, argumentation ethics is not about what people want; it is about what is presupposed in the action of argumentation.
If I can show that person is 1 arguing and 2 not presupposing the libertarian ethic then that would show that the ethic is not a necessary presupposition of argument.
There exist childish arguments, but these are not what the term subsumes. If you don’t like the term argumentation, imagine some other word to take its place.
The common definition of “arguing” includes the childish type. If you want to refer to something else it is up to you to use a different term!
Published: August 30, 2007 7:51 PM
If force in self-defence against their hate preaching is necessary, then so be it. Otherwise I prefer the field of intellectual inquiry. Are you a market anarchist, minarchist, something else perhaps, or what?
“If I can show that person is 1 arguing and 2 not presupposing the libertarian ethic then that would show that the ethic is not a necessary presupposition of argument.”
You’d have to show that the action of argumentation does not presuppose certain things logically.
“The common definition of “arguing” includes the childish type. If you want to refer to something else it is up to you to use a different term!”
Well AE provides a definition of the term to go with it, so it is not really ambiguous at all. Terms are used in certain differing ways all the time.
Published: August 30, 2007 9:09 PM
Intellectual inquiry doesn’t seem to have made a dent on the Mugabes and Castros of the world.Are you a market anarchist, minarchist, something else perhaps, or what?
Like Randall Holcombe, I do not think anarchy can be sustained and would like a minimal state to fill the power vacuum.You’d have to show that the action of argumentation does not presuppose certain things logically.
How is that different from what I said?
Well AE provides a definition of the term to go with it, so it is not really ambiguous at all. Terms are used in certain differing ways all the time.
If they aren’t actually talking about arguing in the common sense of the term, perhaps it’s not really all that relevant.
Published: August 31, 2007 9:40 AM
From what I can tell you seem to be thinking that if one can show that the motivations of the individual involved in argumentation are contrary to what it states that they are, then AE does not hold. However, AE is solely based on the presuppositions inherent in argumentation itself and the demonstrated preferences involved. If you mean that you can show that the presuppositions it claims exist in argumentation in fact do not, then that is an entirely different matter.
“If they aren’t actually talking about arguing in the common sense of the term, perhaps it’s not really all that relevant.”
For any ethical theory to be proposed, argumentation in the sense used in AE must be engaged in. So it is relevant for such purposes.
Published: August 31, 2007 9:58 AM
Because when you say you “believe” something is true, it means as much to you as to say you “believe” apples taste better than oranges. It’s subjective and arbitrary – not based on reasons which justify it. This is why you do not think that people who value the truth should necessarily agree with you. Because you do not think it ultimately is the truth – just your belief – and you don’t think you can justify your believe with reason. Again, I get it.
“I don’t think there are any justifications,” Yes, I now recognize this is what you believe. This is why it is futile for me to attempt to present you with one. The criminal has his own beliefs as well. Perhaps he also doesn’t think there are any justifications.
“It is a meta-ethical position, and can be correct or incorrect.” I know, I know. LOL!
“I can’t speak for you guys, but I know I’ve been entertained.” This I believe. And this is a fine thing. It just doesn’t get you any closer to the truth.
“At any rate, I am looking to observe something so that I can say “Ah, there is such a thing as justice!”. Imaginary things in your head will not cut the mustard.”
To observe that there is such a thing as justice requires first observing that there is such a thing as reason and that the two are implied in each other and in the act of argumentation geared to the determining of truth. Why did I just say that? – another impossible justification.
“…but since you display a reluctance to engage in conversation here”
Finally, this conversation gets entertaining.
“I would certainly put the likelihood that you will accept my position at less than 0.5.”
Given that I require a logical justification for an ethical truth, and your contention that such a justification is utterly impossible, I would put the likelihood at considerably less than that.
“That sounds a bit overdramatic.” That is entertaining as well. I don’t call our discussions a psychological battle to dramatize, but rather to distinguish it from logical argumentation: which I claim must presuppose the pursuit of truth via the cooperative application of reason. Something you persistently contend is not necessary. And I see that you perhaps unintentionally demonstrate what you mean by that in the course of our discourse. However all this confirms to me is that we have not been engaged in argumentation.
Published: August 31, 2007 2:12 PM
Published: August 31, 2007 3:21 PM
I don’t know about you, but I am an American which means I do not encounter them either. They serve as extreme examples. However, I do live under the rule of American politicians, who might be said to be a tastier flavor of dirt.From what I can tell you seem to be thinking that if one can show that the motivations of the individual involved in argumentation are contrary to what it states that they are, then AE does not hold. However, AE is solely based on the presuppositions inherent in argumentation itself and the demonstrated preferences involved.
How is it inherent in argumentation itself if people argue without it?For any ethical theory to be proposed, argumentation in the sense used in AE must be engaged in.
“Might makes right. Finders keepers, losers weepers, nana-nana boo-boo you poopie-pants.” That is clearly proposing an ethical theory and arguing in a childish way.
And no amount of reason can persuade you otherwise. I understand this now.
I already explained what could change my mind.
Because when you say you “believe” something is true, it means as much to you as to say you “believe” apples taste better than oranges. It’s subjective and arbitrary – not based on reasons which justify it.
No, it is a meta-normative belief, not a normative one.
This is why you do not think that people who value the truth should necessarily agree with you.
The post Two Cheers for Ignoring Plain Facts greatly angered me from the title alone, but I must concede there are situations in which I would prefer for people not to believe the truth because of the consequences of their belief. I think if Hitler had more accurate beliefs about the probability of military success, he might have been more cautious and stayed in power. I cannot answer for your perspective because I am not and can never be you.
To observe that there is such a thing as justice requires first observing that there is such a thing as reason
I don’t intend on denying reason here!
and that the two are implied in each other and in the act of argumentation geared to the determining of truth.
I do not concede that part.
Given that I require a logical justification for an ethical truth
But I am not arguing for an ethical truth but a meta-ethical one!
And I see that you perhaps unintentionally demonstrate what you mean by that in the course of our discourse. However all this confirms to me is that we have not been engaged in argumentation.
What have I said that was a logical fallacy? I bet if there was a poll of random web users in which they read our posts up until now and were asked if we were engaged in argumentation, a huge majority would say we were.
Mr. Lundahl, if you hadn’t posted substantive comments before your most recent one, I would have assumed your were a spam-bot!
Published: August 31, 2007 4:17 PM
“How is it inherent in argumentation itself if people argue without it?”Argue without what spefically?
” “Might makes right. Finders keepers, losers weepers, nana-nana boo-boo you poopie-pants.” That is clearly proposing an ethical theory and arguing in a childish way.”
Sure, with no justification behind it. Anyone serious about reaching the truthfulness of an ethic will aim at justifying it.
Published: August 31, 2007 7:23 PM
Published: August 31, 2007 9:27 PM
Published: August 31, 2007 10:18 PM