Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 407.
This is a short conversation I had with James Cox about copyright and fair use back in 2016 (Feb. 26). We also talk about the safe harbor in the DMCA and the §230 safe harbor in the CDA.
https://www.youtube.com/live/wJ2sYz70gc4?feature=share
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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 406.
This is my appearance on Robert Breedlove’s What Is Money podcast, Ep. WiM282 (Youtube channel). This is Ep. 6 of the “Stephan Kinsella Series” (released March 8, 2023).
From Robert’s Episode notes:
In this episode, Stephan Kinsella joins me for an in-depth conversation about the book “A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics” by Hans-Hermann Hoppe. We discuss the harmful effects of socialism, how to take proper action in an increasingly uncertain future, and the alternative to socialism. 1
Podcast (kinsella-on-liberty): Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:05:07 — 59.6MB)
Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 405.
This is my appearance on Robert Breedlove’s What Is Money podcast, Ep. WiM235 (Youtube channel). This is Ep. 5 of the “Stephan Kinsella Series” (released Nov. 9, 2022).
From Robert’s Episode notes:
Stephan Kinsella is an American intellectual property lawyer, author, and deontological anarcho-capitalist. He joins me for an in-depth conversation about the book “A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics” by Hans-Hermann Hoppe.
Podcast (kinsella-on-liberty): Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:12:21 — 66.2MB)
From Facebook:
Libertarian Answer Man time:
Deepfakes, Revenge Porn, etc.
Someone asked me if I had written or had any thoughts on the issue of whether AI and applications like deepfake videos or photos could be a rights violation, for example if it is used to make a fake video of someone depicting them doing things that they actually did not do. This could be done to titillate some audience or even for financial gain, and/or to tarnish someone’s reputation, for revenge, and so on. Apparently some states are considering legislation to ban deep-fake porn, and so on But new laws in California and the demand for new legislation against Deep-fake pornography make me take pause at the unintended consequences this may have on artwork, film, political cartoons and expression itself.
Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 404.
This was my Webinar presentation at the Freedom Hub Working Group, billed as: “For Over-Drugging of our Bodies and Food, Blame INTELLECTUAL Property” (Wed., Feb. 9, 2023), with co-hosts Jim Grapek and Charles Frohman. It was released under the title “How Humanity’s Progress Has Been Held Back: The Case Against IP (Intellectual Property).”
Youtube:
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Note: Updated and revised version included as chap. 10 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023). Text below.
***
“Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith,” J. Libertarian Stud. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998–99): 79–93.
Revised version in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (forthcoming 2023).
Inalienability and Punishment:
A Reply to George Smith
George H. Smith published “A Killer’s Right to Life” in Liberty magazine in 1996, making various arguments and claims about inalienability.* I responded in the Journal of Libertarian Studies,† in a piece which complements and supplements my previous articles on the inalienability and punishment issues, now chapters 5 and 9 in the present volume. Despite my disagreements with Smith on this issue, I respect and have learned from his work, such as his great essay “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market.”††
* George H. Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” Liberty 10, no. 2 (Nov. 1996; https://perma.cc/8U8C-ZTAR): 49–54 & 68–69.
† Stephan Kinsella, “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith,” J. Libertarian Stud. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998–99): 79–93. Smith’s article was also criticized in the May 1997 issue of Liberty. See John C. Goodman, “Do Inalienable Rights Outlaw Punishment?”, Liberty 10, no. 5 (May 1997; https://perma.cc/4TMF-2S5R): 47–49; Timothy Virkkala, “The Hollow Ring of Inalienability,” Liberty 10, no. 5 (May 1997; https://perma.cc/4TMF-2S5R): 49–50. Smith’s response was “Inalienable Rights?,” Liberty 10, no. 6 (July 1997; https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK): 51–56; Virkkala’s response was “The Stilted Logic of Natural Rights,” Liberty 10, no. 6 (July 1997; https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK): 56.
†† George H. Smith, “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market,” in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1991). Smith, who passed away in 2022, was a thoughtful and provocative libertarian theorist. See, for example, idem, Atheism: The Case Against God (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1979); idem, Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies.
It can reasonably be argued that capital punishment is immoral or problematic because of the danger of executing an innocent person by mistake.[1] George Smith, in a recent Liberty magazine article in which he argues against capital punishment, does not take this approach. Instead, Smith states that capital punishment is never permissible, even where “reasonable doubt is impossible and where the crimes have been especially heinous.”[2] In other words, even if we know beyond all doubt that someone has committed murder, it is impermissible to execute him (and also, presumably, to inflict less severe punishment).
Smith bases his argument on the concept of “inalienable rights,” rights that “cannot be transferred, surrendered, or forfeited.”[3] The argument runs roughly as follows. Libertarians must adopt one of two positions: (1) everyone has inalienable rights, in which case even a (known) murderer may not be executed; or (2) certain crimes may be punished with death, in which case the theory of inalienable rights must be abandoned. In Smith’s opinion, position (2) “would be catastrophic, for we cannot construct a libertarian theory of justice except on a foundation of inalienable rights.” [4]
Smith’s entire argument, then, rests on the notion that libertarianism and justice require inalienable rights. There are either “inalienable” rights, or there are no rights at all. Yet Smith’s arguments for why libertarianism requires that rights be inalienable are unpersuasive.
STANDING THREATS
One of Smith’s approaches is to provide an argument for capital punishment based on the notion of self-defense and then to attack this argument as insufficient. Smith writes:
Some years ago during a summer conference, Randy Barnett and I sat down to see whether we could manufacture a defense of capital punishment. The best we could come up with was the notion of a “standing threat.” This is based on John Locke’s treatment of reparation and restraining, which “are the only reasons, why one Man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment.”[5]
Thus, according to Locke, we may kill an aggressor in self-defense, since he has placed the victim and aggressor in a “state of war.” Similarly, a case could be made that a convicted aggressor may be executed, on the grounds that he is a “standing threat” to others.
Rejecting this argument, Smith notes:
To kill someone as a “standing threat” in the name of self-defense may amount to little more than a surreptitious effort to smuggle capital punishment in through the back door of libertarian theory, having denied it entrance through the front.[6]
Smith is correct here: it is not for reasons of self-defense that a victim has a right to punish an aggressor.[7] However, this does not mean punishment (retribution or retaliation) is impermissible, only that self-defense is not sufficient to justify punishment.
BARNETT ON PUNISHMENT
Let me briefly note the following. Smith states:
For years [Barnett] has brilliantly elaborated on the pure theory of restitution as the only acceptable model of libertarian punishment, and he recognizes that the death penalty cannot be incorporated within this model.”[8]
Admittedly, Barnett does appear to believe that even guilty aggressors have a right against punishment. But he does not claim to have justified such a right in his writings on restitution. In his published works on this issue, Barnett opposes a punishment-based system because he believes it may deter crime less than would a restitution-based system, and also because the unavoidable possibility of error can lead to “infliction of harm on the innocent.”[9] He does not, however, provide a strong argument that punishing an actual aggressor violates his rights. Indeed, in his book The Structure of Liberty, Barnett states: “this analysis cannot conclusively prove that no combination of compensation or punishment can ever address effectively the compliance problem.”[10] And further: “I do not claim to have completely demonstrated this proposition [that justice requires restitution, not punishment] either in my earlier writings, or in this book.”[11]
Thus, although Barnett opposes punishment for a variety of reasons,[12] those that are given to buttress his case in favor of restitution do not rest on viewing rights as inalienable and, in my view, Barnett has never demonstrated that rights are inalienable in the sense used by Smith.[13]
DEFENSE, RESTITUTION, AND INALIENABILITY
Another problem with Smith’s assertion that rights are inalienable is just that: it is merely an assertion. Simply labeling rights over and over again with the modifier “inalienable” does not make it so.[14] Libertarians do not typically view rights as “inalienable” in Smith’s sense, or put much weight on this concept. In fact, viewing rights as alienable is perfectly consistent with—indeed, implied by—the libertarian non-aggression principle.[15] Under this principle, only the initiation of force is prohibited; defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory force—more generally, “responsive” force—is not. One does alienate or forfeit certain rights by committing acts of aggression.[16] This is exactly why it is permissible to use force to defend against or punish aggression, or to obtain restitution. One has a natural, not inalienable, right to be free from aggression.
Both defensive and restitutive force, like punitive (retributive or retaliatory) force, imply some alienation of rights. This is just why defensive or restitutive force is considered to be permissible: because the aggressor has alienated his right to be free of such force. If one is opposed to punishment on inalienability grounds, how can one then endorse defensive or restitutive force? As John Goodman correctly notes, Smith’s argument against the death penalty is an argument against punishment as such, and even against defensive or restitutive force.[17] Thus, to be consistent, Smith has to either object to any use of force against an aggressor, including even self-defense, or admit that rights are not truly inalienable.[18]
So which is it? Is Smith inconsistent, or does he consistently object to all force? Smith has apparently flip-flopped on this issue. At first, he seems to acknowledge that rights are not really inalienable: “I agree with Locke that reparation (restitution) and restraint (self-defense) are the only justified uses of violence in a free society.”[19] But a justified use of violence implies some alienation of rights. Yet later, Smith appears to change his mind:
Goodman argues that my case against capital punishment, if consistently applied, would militate against all forms of punishment, such as fines and imprisonment. I freely concede that this is a major problem for the libertarian theory of restitution.… Can we imprison someone and compel him to work off his debt? … These and other questions have not been adequately examined, much less answered, by libertarians, and I remain uncertain about how to deal with them.[20]
Smith’s view of the inalienability of rights has clearly led him down a dead end. If he is consistent, he must condemn all uses of force, even defensive and restitutive. (Such a position might be referred to as “stupid,” or, perhaps, “Darwinian,” pacifism.)[21] If, however, he admits that defensive and restitutive force are permissible, he has admitted rights are not inalienable, and thus, he cannot oppose punishment on grounds of inalienability.
THE RIGHT OF PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT
As I have argued at greater length elsewhere,[22] an individual has a right to use force against an aggressor in response to aggression. This right to use force can be utilized for a variety of purposes: for self-defense during or before the act of aggression, for revenge, to obtain restitution (or rectification), to prevent the aggressor from committing further crimes, or to deter others from committing crimes. What the victim wants to use the right for is his business. But the reason why a victim has a right to retaliate or defend against an aggressor is that the aggressor cannot coherently withhold his consent to retaliatory, defensive, or restitutive force (these may be considered different types of responsive force, that is, non-initiated force, force which is in response to initiated force). To use related legal terminology, the aggressor is “estopped,” or precluded, from denying the victim’s right to use (proportional) responsive force, since such a denial would contradict the aggressor’s view that the use of force is permissible (the view ineluctably demonstrated by the act of aggression).[23]
Thus, eye-for-an-eye type proportional punishments are legitimate in response to aggression. A murderer, therefore, is estopped from objecting to his own capital punishment. He can no longer claim a right to be free from such treatment. Since he previously had such a right, the right that he previously had must have evaporated. We may say, then, that his right to not have force used against him has been alienated (or forfeited, waived, abandoned, relinquished, surrendered, or lost; the terminology is not important).[24]
THE UTILITY OF PUNISHMENT
There are further errors in Smith’s article. Consider, for example, Smith’s view that restitution is superior to punishment as a basis for criminal justice. Smith argues that punishing an aggressor “does not restore or equalize rights; it simply wipes out another set of rights,” and that allowing retaliation only provides, at most, “a sense of emotional balance” to the victim. Several responses to this argument can be made. First, Smith here begs the question of whether rights are inalienable by assuming that the aggressor has a set of rights to be violated. If the aggressor’s rights were alienated, proportionally punishing him does not “wipe out his rights,” as he had none left to wipe out.
Second, just because punishment does not restore rights, it is not clear why restitution is automatically superior, since restitution does not restore rights either. It is true that the consequences and fact of an act of aggression can never be undone. The indignity will always have been suffered. Any response by a victim, including restitution and retribution, will always be an imperfect remedy. Indeed, this is one reason why aggression is impermissible: because the harm done thereby is literally undoable, incalculable, and not subject to an adequate remedy.[25] A victim will always remain, to some extent, a victim.
This does not, however, dictate that the victim should be artificially restricted in choosing among various imperfect remedies. Admittedly, both inflicting punishment on an aggressor (retribution) and extracting monetary damages from him (restitution) are imperfect remedies. But why not let the victim decide which one, or which combination of these, he prefers?[26] After all, the victim did not ask to be made a victim. He did not ask to be put in the position of having only two imperfect possible remedies available to him. If a victim prefers to torture his torturer, who is Smith to say that the victim’s preference is not rational? Unlike Smith, I am not so unwilling to allow victims to attempt to attain “a sense of emotional balance,” if that is all that is possible to them. (Like Barnett, however, I am concerned about the unavoidable possibility of mistakenly punishing the innocent, and thus admit the appeal of a restitution-based system in order to avoid punishing innocents, but not for reasons of inalienability.)[27]
The right to inflict (proportional) punishment on one’s aggressor can be useful in other ways as well. Most significantly, perhaps, it may be utilized to reach a more objective determination of the proper amount of restitution. For example, the victim may trade all or part of his right to retaliate for a payment (“ransom”) or other service by the aggressor, i.e., the aggressor buys his way out of punishment.[28] A serious aggression leads to the right to inflict more severe punishment on the aggressor, which would thus tend to be traded for a higher average amount of ransom or restitution than for comparatively minor crimes. Further, a victim especially offended or traumatized by aggression (and thus subjectively “damaged” more severely) will tend to bargain for a higher ransom. Also, richer aggressors will tend to be willing to pay more ransom to avoid the punishment the victim has a right to inflict.[29] Thus, allowing punishment to be traded for damages solves the so-called millionaire or billionaire problem faced under a pure restitution system, where a rich man may commit crimes with impunity, since he can simply pay easily-affordable restitution after committing the crime.
For these reasons, allowing the option of punishment can help arrive at a more objective measure of restitution damages.[30] And even if punishment is banned and is not an actual option—because of the possibility of mistakenly punishing innocents, say—an award of restitution can be based on the model of punishment. E.g., a jury could be instructed to award the victim an amount of money it believes he could bargain for, given all the circumstances, if he could threaten to punish the aggressor. This can lead to more just and objective restitution awards than would result if the jury is simply told to award the amount of damages it “feels” is “fair.”[31]
The right to retaliate could also be used to justify “enslaving” the aggressor and putting him to work for a time to generate income for the victim (restitutionists like Barnett support this use of force against the aggressor, but do not consider it to be punitive, but rather necessary to enforce restitution).[32] Or suppose an aggressor is very poor and otherwise unable to pay monetary damages to the victim. In this case, the threat of inflicting severe punishment on the aggressor may induce the aggressor’s relatives or friends to pay off the victim to spare the aggressor from being punished. The victim would thereby be compensated even though the aggressor is penniless, whereas the victim would be totally uncompensated if no threat of punishment were available to motivate the aggressor’s relatives to chip in. (In a restitution-based system, a poor aggressor who is imprisoned in a work-facility designed to generate income payable to the victim may also find friends and relatives to pay off part of his debt to have him released earlier. However, as the aggressor in this case faces only a limited and usually temporary form of “slavery” and not more severe punishment, the motivation for others to bail him out would probably be reduced.)[33]
INALIENABILITY
The theory of inalienability has been plagued by confusion, vagueness, and inconsistency. The concept is typically applied to the issue of whether a non-aggressor can alienate his rights by a mere contract or promise, i.e., by a peaceful action. For example, may one sell oneself into slavery or enter into a binding, enforceable contract to perform services? Libertarians come down on both sides of this question, but tend to say that rights are “inalienable,” i.e., one may not sell oneself into slavery.[34] Most libertarians hold this view of inalienability, which I will refer to as the standard or “limited” view of inalienability, since adherents of this view usually also maintain that acts of aggression do alienate rights.[35] In this view, only violent actions serve to alienate rights. Smith has used the label “inalienability” in an idiosyncratic way to mean that even aggressive actions do not alienate rights.
What, then, is the correct, libertarian view of inalienability and rights? Consent is the crucial element to focus on here. If a person consents to an action that would otherwise violate his rights, there is no rights violation. Boxers in a ring, or duelers dueling, do not have their rights violated when struck by fist or bullet. This is because they consented to these exchanges of force.[36] To alienate one’s right means that one is unable to withhold consent to some action that would otherwise infringe the right if there were no consent. Thus, a right is alienated by somehow rendering it impossible to object to the action that the alienated right would otherwise prohibit. One does something now that prevents one from withholding consent in the future, thereby effectively alienating the relevant right. To alienate a right, then, is to irrevocably grant the relevant consent to another.
Is it possible to irrevocably grant consent? Smith, an advocate of what may be called the “strong” view of inalienability, would say it is not possible under any circumstances (except, perhaps, for defensive or restitutive force). Proponents of the limited view of inalienability, by contrast, hold that it is possible to do this by aggressing, but not by merely making an agreement or promise. (Those rare libertarians, like Walter Block, who believe rights may be alienated even by a non-violent action like agreement, hold what may be viewed as a “weak” view of inalienability.)[37]
Let us examine the three ways that consent possibly could be irrevocably granted: by physical means, by aggression, and by voluntary agreement. The physical, or physiological, means refers to a person voluntarily undergoing some process that literally places him under the power of another (e.g., drugs, surgery, technology).[38] This is akin to committing an act of suicide or “zombicide,” and is not of particular interest, since after the zombicide is complete, the zombie presumably does not even try to run away or withhold consent from his master.
Committing an act of aggression is a clear-cut means for alienating (some of) one’s rights. As explained above,[39] an aggressor is estopped from withholding consent to the victim’s proposed use of (proportional) retaliatory force, since such a denial would contradict the aggressor’s view that the use of force is permissible. An act of aggression is a way of irrevocably granting consent to punishment. This is exactly why an act of aggression serves to alienate rights: because the act of aggression conclusively demonstrates the aggressor’s view that aggression is proper, thus precluding him from consistently objecting to the victim’s use of (proportional) retaliatory force. The strong view of inalienability (Smith’s view) is, for this reason, untenable.[40] So which view is correct, the limited view or the weak view?
This depends on the answer to the following question: Can one irrevocably grant consent by voluntary agreement, such as a promise or contract to be another’s slave? Barnett recognizes the importance of consent here:
The crucial question … is whether Ann’s current consensual choices can limit her right to revoke her consent in the future. Having consented to let Ben touch her or to enter the [boxing] ring with him, may she be forced to carry through with her commitment after she has changed her mind?”[41]
This is a difficult and complicated question. Some argue that a contract is a contract, and may be enforced.[42] This view is based on the theory that one is a self-owner, entitled to full control of all of one’s property, including one’s body, and that this control comprises the ability to sell one’s body.[43] Most libertarians, however, seem to hold the limited view of inalienability, whereby aggression does alienate rights, but promising to be someone’s slave does not. Advocates of this view typically argue that such contracts are not enforceable because there is some sort of logical impossibility involved in voluntarily alienating all of one’s rights in this manner.[44] For example, some argue that it is literally impossible to transfer one’s actual will to another, and thus a promise to do so is null and void; title thereto cannot be transferred. It is like contracting to sell the sun to someone. Such a contract, having an impossible object, would be null and void from the outset.
My view is that the impossibility reasoning typically given to argue that consent cannot be irrevocably granted is fallacious and has helped to muddle the issue of inalienability. For example, if the “impossibility” of literally alienating one’s will means that it is impossible to be bound by contract to act as someone’s slave, why is it not “impossible” to imprison an aggressor to enforce restitution? After all, even a convicted aggressor still has a will. Why is it not “impossible” to defend oneself with force? And yet it is not impossible for consent to be irrevocably granted, as we have seen; this condition exists for a justly imprisoned aggressor. Recipients of defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory force all retain a will, which is overwhelmed with some type of responsive force.
The key here is to focus on force and consent, for to keep someone as a slave, it is not necessary that the will be physically alienated. Rather, in order to enslave someone, the slave-owner must be entitled to use (justified in using) force against the slave if the slave disobeys or tries to run away. The impossibility of actually alienating one’s faculty of volition is irrelevant. It is the legitimacy of using force that matters, and this depends on consent.
Putting the issue this way, however, provides a different argument why consent cannot irrevocably be granted by mere agreement or promise—why the prospective slave may change his mind in the future and withdraw his consent. If A promises (or contracts, or agrees; the terminology is not important) to be B’s slave, this is no doubt an attempt to consent now to force inflicted in the future. If A later changes his mind and tries to run away, may B at that point use force against A?
This is the crucial question. If the answer is yes, this means that A has no right to object and has effectively alienated his rights. I would say no, however, simply because there is no reason why A cannot withdraw his consent. Libertarianism does not say one cannot change one’s mind. When we ask about consent, it is the most recent expression of consent that is most relevant. Unlike the case of aggression, where the aggressor’s prior aggression estops him from objecting to the use of retaliatory force, A has not committed aggression against B. Thus it is not inconsistent for A to later object to the use of force. All A did previously was utter words to B such as “I agree to be your slave.” But this does not aggress against B at all, any more than does uttering the insult, “You are ugly.” Words per se do not aggress, which is one reason there is a (derivative, not independent) “right” to free speech. In a nutshell, a would-be slave-owner must be entitled to use force against the would-be slave in order for the slavery agreement to be enforceable and for rights to be alienated in this manner; but the would-be slave has simply not initiated force against the would-be slave-owner. The would-be slave-owner is thus not entitled to use force against the slave; hence no rights were alienated.[45]
Thus, I conclude that a slavery agreement is not enforceable. Rights are not completely inalienable, as Smith contends, for aggression can alienate rights. We must reject the strong view of inalienability. However, rights are inalienable in the limited (and more conventional) sense that one cannot irrevocably grant consent to aggression in the future by way of a mere promise or agreement. This is not because of any impossibility in alienating one’s will, but because a promisor has not committed aggression. One retains the right to change one’s mind, absent special circumstances.[46] The limited view of inalienability seems to be the most sensible.
The right to alienate external resources is not limited, however, because of crucial differences between rights pertaining to one’s body and rights of ownership in previously-unowned, homesteaded resources. The right to appropriate external resources is derivative of and distinct from the basic right against non-aggression (self-ownership). External scarce resources are appropriated and acquired, and held by intention (it is this that distinguishes ownership from possession),[47] and thus can be abandoned or alienated by a sufficient expression of intention, e.g., a contract or act of abandonment. For this reason, under the libertarian title-transfer theory of contract, one can alienate particular property titles, i.e., titles to external (homesteadable) scarce resources. In this sense there is a distinction between title to property, which is alienable by mere contract; and rights related to one’s body, which are not alienable by promise or contract (speech act) but are alienable by acts of aggression.[48]
To summarize, then, one may object to certain acts of aggression; or one may grant consent to allow the otherwise-prohibited action to take place. The right against aggression may be alienated, but only by irrevocably granting consent, which may be done only by committing an act of aggression. A non-violent action such as a promise or agreement to do something with one’s body, on the other hand, does not alienate rights, because the consent may be withdrawn at any time in the future, with certain exceptions. This is because a promise now to consent in the future to violence does not commit aggression against the promisee, and because a future change of mind revokes the consent.
CONCLUSION
If Smith is right that even a murderer has a right to not be killed, then it is wrongful aggression to kill the aggressor, just as it is wrongful aggression for a murderer to kill the victim. Then it is no longer the initiation of force that is impermissible; it is force in general, even retaliatory, defensive, or restitutive force. Without a right to respond to aggression, the non-aggression principle goes out the window, as does the distinction between aggressor and victim. Smith’s defense of the strong version of inalienable rights thus undermines what is surely the heart of libertarianism, the non-aggression principle.
APPENDIX
LEFEVRE’S PACIFISM
As noted above, the material here was originally intended to appear in footnote 21, above. Due to its length, I include this material in this appendix.
As noted in the text, the consistent pacifist must condemn all uses of force, even defensive and restitutive, and that libertarian Robert LeFevre has been accused of holding such views. However, as alluded to above, it is not clear that LeFevre took his pacifism so far. As LeFevre writes:
Protection is what we do prior to the commission of a criminal act which does, in fact, prevent such an act from occurring.…
Protection, because of the fact that it prevents a trespass from occurring, is always moral.…
Defense, on the other hand, is what we do during an attack by someone else. It is what takes place in what is called the “hot encounter.” You are walking down the street and a man comes up to you, sticks a gun in your face, and demands your money. Now you are face to face with an attacker. You cannot protect yourself (i.e., prevent the attack); it is too late for that. Now you must defend yourself (i.e., ward off the attack).
As long as your actions are for the sole purpose of warding off the attack, you would not be guilty of an immoral act yourself. But if your actions serve the purpose of attacking the criminal, you are guilty of a trespass even though the other man initiated the attack.…
Suppose, in the situation outlined above, the other man takes a swing at you. Clearly, you can raise your arm to ward off his blow. This is defense. If, however, you then bring your arm down upon his head and begin attacking him, you are no longer defending yourself, but attacking the other man. This would be immoral, as it is a trespass upon the other person.[49]
Although I disagree with this pacifist view, it seems some libertarians mischaracterize LeFevre as opposing violence in self-defense. E.g., writes Rothbard:
If every man has the absolute right to his justly-held property it then follows that he has the right to keep that property—to defend it by violence against violent invasion. Absolute pacifists who also assert their belief in property rights—such as Mr. Robert LeFevre—are caught in an inescapable inner contradiction: for if a man owns property and yet is denied the right to defend it against attack, then it is clear that a very important aspect of that ownership is being denied to him. To say that someone has the absolute right to a certain property but lacks the right to defend it against attack or invasion is also to say that he does not have total right to that property.[50]
This implies LeFevre opposes the right to self-defense, to “defend … against attack.” See also the comments of Todd Lewis:
While most libertarians view the right to use lethal force to defend one’s body and physical property as naturally flowing from a strict reading of the Non-Aggression Principle, there is at least one little-known libertarian, the late great Robert LeFevre, who took an even more radical position on violence. Not only did he eschew the initiation of violence; he also eschewed the use of violence in one’s own self-defense.[51]
Neither Rothbard nor Lewis provide any citations to LeFevre to back up this characterization of his views on violence used in self-defense.[52] Thus, in the absence of any further writing by LeFevre on this subject (which may well exist), I have to conclude that the accusations of him adopting such an extreme pacifist view are unfounded.
[ENDNOTES; SOME FORMATTING E.G. ITALICS MAY BE MISSING]
[1] See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.84 and Kinsella, “Fraud, Restitution, and Retaliation: The Libertarian Approach,” StephanKinsella.com (Feb. 3, 2009). For a related commentary related to disputes in general, see Kinsella, “On the Obligation to Negotiate, Compromise, and Arbitrate,” StephanKinsella.com (April 6, 2023).
[2] Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 46 (emphasis added).
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., p. 48.
[5] Ibid., p. 68.
[6] Ibid., p. 69.
[7] That said, I do agree that in certain cases someone who is a standing threat to others may be dealt with appropriately, in which case self-defense principles come into play. See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.F. But not everyone who has committed an act of aggression is necessarily a standing threat.
[8] Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 68.
[9] Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford, 2014), p. 228 (emphasis added).
[10] Ibid., p. 237 (emphasis added).
[11] Ibid., p. 186 n. 36. See also p. 321: “If men were gods, then perhaps imposing rewards and punishments on the basis of desert would be a workable theory.” Also: “It has been noted that one who wishes to extinguish or convey an inalienable right may do so by committing the appropriate wrongful act and thereby forfeiting it.” Idem, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” Social Pol’y &Phil. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1986; https://tinyurl.com/44adafte): 179–202, p. 186, and idem, “Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract,” in Frey & Morris, eds., Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals, pp. 156–57, both citing Diana T. Meyers, Inalienable Rights: A Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 14. But if a criminal has forfeited his rights (to not be punished, say), then it does not violate his rights to punish him.
[12] As pointed out in note 33, below, I also oppose institutionalized punishment for many of the pragmatic reasons given by Barnett, though it is not because rights are inalienable, and it is not because (proportional) punishment would violate the rights of actually guilty criminals.
[13] A second, less significant point, relates to Smith’s doubts about the propriety of killing or imprisoning someone who has shown himself to be a “standing threat” to others. Smith notes: “Objective standards and procedures seem problematic in this case, to say the least. (Perhaps I am lacking in imagination; if so, I have little doubt that more imaginative libertarians will come to my aid with ingenious solutions.)” Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 69. Barnett seems to have done just this. Barnett argues that the principle of “extended self-defense” justifies imprisoning (sometimes for life) those who have made a sufficiently unambiguous communication of a threat to another. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty, pp. 188–193. On pp. 213–14, Barnett points out that because of problems of enforcement abuse and rule of law considerations, however, this remedy should be limited to those persons who have communicated a threat to others by their past criminal behavior (i.e., those who have been convicted, perhaps multiple times, of a crime), and only if the previous crimes had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Randy E. Barnett, “Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction,” Boston U. L. Rev. 76 (February/April 1996; www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 157–68. I believe this limitation on the principle of extended self-defense is unduly restrictive, but that is neither here nor there. See, e.g., my post “Stalking and Threats as Aggression,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 10, 2021).
[14] Smith says Jeremy Bentham held the theory of “inalienable rights” to be “nonsense upon stilts,” and thus wonders if anyone who rejects inalienable rights must follow Bentham to his anti-libertarian conclusions. Smith, “Inalienable Rights?”, p. 51. Yet Bentham said that rights were nonsense, and that natural rights were nonsense upon stilts. He did not use the modifier “inalienable” that Smith subtly puts in his mouth (though he does use the adjective “imprescriptible”). Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies,” in Human Rights, A.I. Melden, ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970), p. 28. Bentham opposed natural rights on the grounds that they were anterior to government, and thus his criticism is applicable to both alienable and inalienable natural rights. Thus, one can oppose Bentham’s rights-skepticism by being in favor of alienable natural rights, which means that rejecting inalienability does not mean following Bentham down a non-libertarian path, as long as one advocates natural rights.
[15] Many, probably most, libertarians maintain that rights are strictly “alienable,” i.e., some actions are sufficient to alienate rights (although they usually also maintain that rights are “inalienable” sometimes, e.g., promising to be another’s slave, as opposed to the commission of an act of aggression, does not serve to alienate rights; see section “Inalienability,” and note 34, below. In fact, any libertarian who advocates the right to punish (or, really, even the right to self-defense) at least implicitly endorses that rights can be alienated, to some extent. See, e.g., Murray N. Rothbard, “Self-Defense,” in The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998; https://mises.org/library/right-self-defense), p. 81, where he says “the criminal … loses his right to the extent that he has deprived another man of his” (emphasis in original); Barnett, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” p. 186 (quoted in note 11 above); Roger Pilon, “Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Retribution, or Both?,” Ethics 88, no. 4 (July 1978): 348–57, 353 (“The criminal act has created rights in the victim; in the criminal it has both alienated rights and created obligations correlative to the newly created rights of the victim.”); John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690; https://www.johnlocke.net/2022/07/two-treatises-of-government.html), § 172 (power over one man’s life “is the effect only of forfeiture which the aggressor makes of his own life when he puts himself into the state of war with another”); Auberon Herbert, “Part XI,” in Auberon Herbert & J. H. Levy, Taxation and Anarchism: A Discussion between the Hon. Auberon Herbert and J.H. Levy (London: The Personal Rights Association, 1912; https://perma.cc/LX8H-MZFH), p. 38 (“Am I right in saying that a man has forfeited his own rights (to the extent of the aggression he has committed) in attacking the rights of others? … It may be very difficult to translate into concrete terms the amount of aggression, and of resulting restraint; but all just law seems to be the effort to do this. We punish a man in a certain way if he has inflicted an injury which lays me up for a day; in another way if he takes my life…. [T]he punishment or redress … should be measured by the amount of aggression; in other words that the aggressor—after a rough fashion—loses as much liberty as that of which he has deprived others.”), also ibid., pp. 39–40; also other sources quoted in “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.43; also Kinsella, “Quotes on the Logic of Liberty,” StephanKinsella.com (June 22, 2009).
[16] For more on forfeiture or alienation of rights, see “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law” (ch. 19), n.81 and “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.88 and Appendix: The Justice of Responsive Force; also “What Libertarianism Is” (ch. 2), n.17; “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4), n.15; also, in general, “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5) and “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6).
[17] Goodman, “Do Inalienable Rights Outlaw Punishment?”, p. 47.
[18] The following thought-experiment, from the ever-fertile libertarian mind of Walter Block (as relayed to me by Joe Salerno), illustrates why a proponent of restitution must, in principle, be willing to support capital punishment as well. Block asks, what if it were possible to actually provide true restitution to a murder victim—to restore his life—by connecting a “life-sucking” machine to the murderer and transferring his life essence to the dead victim? This would bring the dead victim back at the cost of the killer’s life. Surely, a restitutionist would have to be in favor of this, as it is simply a type of force used to enforce restitution, and the purpose of restitution is to “restore” the victim. But what is the difference, in principle, between killing the aggressor to “restore” the victim and killing the aggressor as punishment? In both cases, the aggressor is intentionally killed, against his will, in response to his earlier aggression. It would seem that in this case, the restitutionist, like the retributionist, supports executing murderers, and thus cannot claim that a murderer has, in principle, an inalienable right to life. See Walter Block & Roy Whitehead, “Taking the Assets of Criminals to Compensate Victims of Violence: A Legal and Philosophical Approach,” Wayne State U. L. Sch. J. Law Soc. 5 (2003, www.walterblock.com/publications): 229–53, pp. 249–51; Walter E. Block, “The Death Penalty,” LewRockwell.com (November 11, 2003; www.lewrockwell.com/2003/11/walter-e-block/the-death-penalty).
[19] Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 69
[20] Smith, “Inalienable Rights?,” p. 55 (emphasis added). Note that Smith here confusingly refers to “fines and imprisonment”—presumably forms of restitution—as “punishment,” even though a supposed advantage of restitution is that it is not punitive.
[21] Libertarian Robert LeFevre has been accused of holding such views. But his pacifism was perhaps a bit more nuanced. In revising this chapter, this footnote grew to unmanageable length. I have placed the relevant commentary in the Appendix, below.
[22] See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5) and “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6).
[23] For a discussion of proportionality, see “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.A
[24] Another error lies in the very title of Smith’s article: “A Killer’s Right to Life.” Under libertarianism, one has a right against the initiation of force—against aggression. But punishment is not initiatory force; it is force in response to initiated force. Part of Smith’s confusion here lies in thinking that libertarianism upholds some actual right to life. There is no right to life. There is no right to “free speech.” The ability to enjoy your life or engage in speech is a consequence of a system where your property rights are respected. As I wrote previously:
If I own … 100 acres of land, I can prance around naked on it, not because the land is imbued with some “right-to-prance-naked,” but because I own the land and it does not (necessarily) violate the property rights of others for me to use my property in this fashion.
Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2008), p. 53. See also Rothbard’s criticism of the “right to free speech” in Murray N. Rothbard, “Human Rights as Property Rights,” in The Ethics of Liberty (https://mises.org/library/human-rights-property-rights).
Likewise, there is no abstract “right to life.” There is a right against aggression, that is, to not have one’s property rights violated. That is why libertarians advocate the non-aggression axiom or principle, not the “life axiom.” An innocent person can use his right against aggression to protect his life, if he so chooses; or he may commit suicide or waste his life in other ways. Thus, an innocent person may be said to have a right to life, if it is kept in mind that the so-called “right to life” is merely derivative of—a consequence of—the primary right against aggression, just as the right to free speech is derivative of the right to own private property and the right against aggression. An aggressor, on the other hand, no longer has a right against the imposition of force, and thus his life is in peril. The aggressor, therefore, no longer has a “right to his life,” such that it was.
[25] Barnett, an advocate of restitution and opponent of punishment, recognizes this, and for this reason emphasizes the importance of crime prevention. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 185–92. As does LeFevre, as discussed in the Appendix.
[26] On giving victims the option of what type of punishment to apply or whether to seek restitution or some blend of punishment and restitution, see “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.B; Pilon, “Criminal Remedies,” p. 356; Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 184 n.32; Joseph Ellin, “Restitutionism Defended,” J. Value Inquiry 34, no. 2 (Sept. 2000): 299–317.
[27] See note 33, below.
[28] For previous suggestions of the possibility of criminals buying their way out of punishment, see Rothbard, “Punishment and Proportionality,” in The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 86, 89; Pilon, “Criminal Remedies,” p. 356.
[29] See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.G. See also Randy E. Barnett, “Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice,” Ethics 87, no. 4 (July 1977; https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1558/): 279–301, pp. 297–98, reprinted in Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process, Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), pp. 379–380; Roger Pilon, “Criminal Remedies,” p. 351. For a “law-and-economics” discussion of this issue, see David D. Friedman, “What Is ‘Fair Compensation’ for Death or Injury?”, Int’l Rev. L & Econ. 2 (1982; https://perma.cc/W5BU-K6PL): 81–93; idem, “Reflections on Optimal Punishment, or: Should the Rich Pay Higher Fines?,” Research in L. & Econ. 3 (1981): 185–205; idem, “Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment,” J. Pol. Econ. 107, no. S6 (December 1999; https://perma.cc/3M2H-68N2), pp. S259–S269.
[30] On the issue of determination of the proper amount of damages, see Bruce L. Benson, “Restitution in Theory and Practice,” J. Libertarian Stud. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1996; https://mises.org/library/restitution-theory-and-practice): 79–83; Rothbard, “Punishment and Proportionality,” pp. 88–89. See also references in the preceding note.
[31] I believe this latter approach is consistent with and supplements Barnett’s theory of a restitution-based justice system, since Barnett nowhere specifies any objective standards or criteria by which a judge or jury is to determine the amount of restitution a victim is to receive for a non-economic crime like murder, rape, and the like. He specifies only that the aggressor must “compensate” the victim for the “harm caused,” to “restore” the victim. Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 161, 187. Of course, how much compensation is needed to compensate for various violent crimes is a difficult question, and, of course, no amount of restitution can ever “restore” a murdered victim, nor can it “undo” other types of battery.
[32] Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 176–86.
[33] Note: although I still believe Smith is wrong about this aspect of inalienability of rights, and that it does not violate the rights of an aggressor for the victim or his agents/heirs to proportionately punish him for his crime (for more on this, see “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7), text at notes 35–36), I nonetheless sympathize with the idea of a restitution-based system being preferable and even likely in any free society, as noted in “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.85, and Kinsella, “Fraud, Restitution, and Retaliation: The Libertarian Approach.” For related discussion about disputes in general, see Kinsella, “On the Obligation to Negotiate, Compromise, and Arbitrate.”
[34] See, e.g., Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 78–83; idem, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” pp. 186–95; Rothbard, “Interpersonal Relations: Voluntary Exchange,” in The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 40–41 (https://mises.org/library/crusoe-social-philosophy) and “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts,” 134–136 (https://mises.org/library/property-rights-and-theory-contracts); Tibor R. Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1975), pp. 116–17; Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 49; idem, “Inalienable Rights?,” p. 54.
[35] See note 15 above.
[36] As Richard Epstein explains,
The case for the recognition of consent as a defense in case of the deliberate infliction of harm can also be made in simple and direct terms. The self-infliction of harm generates no cause of action, no matter why inflicted. There is no reason, then, why a person who may inflict harm upon himself should not, prima facie, be allowed to have someone else do it for him.
Richard A. Epstein, “Intentional Harms,” J. Legal Stud. 4 (1975): 391–442, p.411. See also “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part II. For an unorthodox libertarian view that duelers do not actually “consent” since a duel is only engaged in due to the “threat of disgrace,” see T. Patrick Burke, No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market (New York: Paragon House, 1994), pp. 192, 268 n.15, which I criticize in my “Book Review,” Reason Papers No. 20 (Fall 1995; https://reasonpapers.com/archives/): 135–46, and Kinsella, “‘Aggression’ versus ‘Harm’ in Libertarianism,” Mises Economics Blog (Dec. 16, 2009). See related comments in “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.16 and “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6), n.3.
[37] I critique Block’s views in “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11).
[38] See, e.g., discussions of this in Smith, “Inalienable Rights?,” p. 54:
Moral agency is inalienable, and so must be the right to exercise that agency.… This does not mean, however, that moral agency cannot be extinguished, which brings us to another kind of slavery contract. Suppose that Murphy agrees to have a computer chip implanted in his brain, which will enable me to control him with a joystick, moving him around like a robot. (Perhaps in exchange for this dubious privilege, I have agreed to pay one million dollars to his destitute family.) Here, Murphy has voluntarily extinguished his moral agency, not transferred it to me. What he has transferred is physical control over his body, which becomes my property after he has taken leave of it. Therefore, since the body, like all physical objects, is transferable, I regard this kind of slavery contract as possible and valid.
See also Barnett, Structure of Liberty, 78 & n. 39, who writes:
Suppose that Ann consented to transfer partial or complete control of her body to Ben. Absent some physiological change in Ann (caused, perhaps, by voluntarily and knowingly ingesting some special drug or undergoing psycho-surgery) there is no way for such a commitment to be carried out.… Arthur Kuflik offers these examples to undercut this type of argument for inalienability. See Arthur Kuflik, “The Inalienability of Autonomy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, no. 4 (1984): 271–98, p. 281: “This suggests that the impropriety of an autonomy-abdicating agreement has more to do with the impropriety of autonomy-abdication itself than with some general fact that we have no right to make commitments we know we will be unable to keep.” But arguments based on impropriety and one based on the impossibility of such agreements are not mutually exclusive. Kuflik’s examples only show that this reason for inalienability is limited to those commitments to alienate the future control over one’s person which are not made possible by mind-altering drugs, brainwashing techniques, or psychosurgery.
[39] See note 22 above, and accompanying text.
[40] See notes 11 and 15 above.
[41] Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 81. Rothbard also realizes the importance of being able to change one’s mind. In a discussion about voluntary slave contracts, he writes: “The problem comes when, at some later date, Smith changes his mind and decides to leave. Shall he be held to his former voluntary promise?” Rothbard, “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts,” p. 136 (emphasis added).
[42] But see, of course, the dissenting view expressed in chapter 9.
[43] A view I criticize in “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11).
[44] See note 34 above; also “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability” (ch. 9), Part III.C.
[45] Proponents of the weak view of inalienability, like Walter Block, on the other hand, would argue that the sale of one’s body confers ownership of it to another person and that subsequent violence against the sold body by the new owner is no more aggression than is self-mutilation. I remain to be convinced by this line of argument, primarily because there seems to be a relevant difference between the rights related to one’s body and rights in homesteaded resources, due to the different justifications for and nature of these rights. For more on this, see “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11).
[46] E.g., an airplane pilot may be forcibly restrained by passengers from parachuting out in mid-flight. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 81; also idem, “Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract,” in R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris, eds., Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 163 n.52. The reason the parachuting is arguably aggression is that this action can be considered to be the cause of the physical harm that will befall the passengers, much like one who shoots a gun or drops a bomb is an aggressor. Alternatively, in the airplane example, it could be argued that the ownership of the airplane is contractually granted in common to the passengers for the duration of the flight, and they could thus use force to stop the pilot from opening the door since they “own” it and do not grant him permission to use it for this purpose.
For more on causation, see “Causation and Aggression” (ch. 8). Arguments could be constructed for other special cases, such as agreeing to donate an organ which causes the recipient to rely on this, or enlisting in a volunteer army at a time of peril. I do think there is room for more development of ideas related to such issues by future scholars.
[47] See “A Libertarian Theory of Contract” (ch. 9), at n.40 and accompanying text.
[48] See also Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 82. There has been great confusion in the area of contract theory, which has perhaps contributed to the confusion in inalienability reasoning. For example, the “impossibility” reasoning seems to be based on the groundless assumption that contracts are based on the concept of “binding promises” or on an improper analogy between homesteadable scarce resources, which can be acquired or abandoned, and rights against aggression, which relate to one’s body. However, contracts need have nothing to do with promises, and there is a difference between rights to acquired external resources and rights to one’s body. For more on the libertarian theory of contracts, see Randy E. Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract,” Colum. L. Rev. 86 (1986; www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 269; Rothbard, “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts”; Williamson M. Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts,” J. Libertarian Stud. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1977; https://mises.org/library/toward-reformulation-law-contracts): 3–13. Thus, the framework for rights, punishment, and consent put forward herein also has implications for other aspects of libertarian theory, which cannot be addressed in detail here. For example, the view of the unenforceability of slavery contracts also applies to contracts for personal services, and, indeed, to all promises in general, and thus to the theory of contracts. The theory of detrimental reliance is also relevant here. In my view, promises per se are not enforceable, and contracts are not best viewed as enforceable promises but as exchanges or alienations of titles to acquired tangible property external to one’s body. Some promises may be enforceable, due to detrimental reliance, but only in cases where the reliance is not circular, and thus plays a causal role in harming another, and such enforceable promises are something different from contract itself. This view of contracts, inalienability, and rights presented herein also has implications for the distinction between the alienability of homesteadable property versus the (limited) inalienability of rights related to one’s body. Elaboration of these ideas will have to await a subsequent article.
Author’s note (2023): I have chosen to retain the above note instead of updating it. The original article was written in 1998–99, when I anticipated I would need to elaborate on these ideas subsequently. This is what I did. The next year, in 1999, I started developing the ideas noted above, which ultimately became “A Libertarian Theory of Contract (ch. 9).
[49] Robert LeFevre, Fundamentals of Liberty (Santa Ana, California: Rampart Institute, 1988; https://archive.org/details/LeFevre-TheFundamentalsOfLiberty), pp. 354–55.
[50] Rothbard, “Self-Defense,” p. 77.
[51] Todd Lewis, “Protection, Defense, Retaliation, and Self-Ownership,” Libertarian Christian Institute (July 11, 2021; https://perma.cc/9SB2-XJC7).
[52] Lewis did not respond to an email I sent him asking for further clarification or support of his accusation of LeFevre.
Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 403.
I was a guest today (Jan. 27, 2023) on The Bitcoin Group #343, on the World Crypto Network (Youtube channel), hosted by Thomas Hunt @MadBitcoins.
The other panelists included the CryptoRaptor (Dan Eve); Ben Arc; Martin @generalbyltes. We discussed a variety of topics.
Podcast (kinsella-on-liberty): Play in new window | Download (Duration: 19:43 — 18.1MB)
As reported at Mises.org, Yuri Maltsev, the great anti-commie Soviet defector, libertarian and Austrian scholar, editor of Requiem for Marx, has passed away. David Gordon has some nice words about Yuri there. Other obituaries/comments:
I was friends with Yuri for years, since the mid 1990s from Mises Institute events. He also attended the first Property and Freedom Society Annual Meeting in 2006 and others as well, such as:
At the inaugural PFS meeting in 2006, I brought my sister, Crystal, and she delighted in meeting Yuri. I told my wife and son stories about Yuri and they laughed and laughed. He was really a joyous and life-loving man. Yuri regaled me with so many tales over the years. He became a legend in my family just from my stories about him. I recall my son clapping in glee at my re-telling of some stories from Yuri. He would have me repeat my imitations and mimicry of Yuri and his tales.
Yuri, Andy Duncan, and I were invited to speak at Mises Brasil in São Paolo in 2017, and we three had a great time together. 1 I recall we spent one late night in my hotel room eating sardines of some kind from Yuri’s stash, with our fingers, since we had no utensils. Late at night, as we delved into “deep” matters like grad students in a dorm room, he told me one of his biggest philosophical influences was an obscure and eccentric Russian philosopher, Pyotr Chaadayev, in particular his Philosophical Letters & Apology of a Madman (Grok summary; Deschamps Vargas, “AI Alignment from First Principles: Why Current AI Cannot Be Conscious, Why Strong AGI Requires Consciousness, and Why This Resolves the Alignment Problem”), which I did obtain, but have not yet found the stamina to dive into. Maybe it’s time I take the leap. At the same conference, Andy and I tried to talk Yuri into eating a bit healthier to lose weight, to as to live longer. Not that we were any models of physical fitness. But we wanted Yuri to slim down and get healthier, and to live longer. He listened to Andy’s hortations with patience and promised to look into it. But, … it was not to be.
He told us funny stories about how he would fly weekly from Wisconsin to DC on a Sunday or Monday to teach his weekly class at the US Naval Academy in Maryland, and he would often fly with then-Congressman Paul Ryan, whom he ended up getting to do an occasional lecture for some of his classes. He was always joyous and, like Ayn Rand, hated communism and what it had done to his country, Russia; he loved America, a bit too much, perhaps, but it’s understandable.
Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 402.
This is my presentation (audio only) at the Austrian Economics Discord Conference: “Inflation, Money, and the State,” Austrian Economics Discord Server (Jan. 7–8, 2023); my talk was “Inflation: Its Causes, Effects, Parallels and Death in a Bitcoin World.”
Previous appearance: KOL371 | Austrian Economics Discord Conference: Law, Decentralized and Centralized.
My talk is below.
Update: See also thoughts on the nature of money, the barter problems solves, etc., in:
On the issue if why money needs only solve these problems, and why the idea of smart contracts as one of the useful features of functions of an advanced money is confused, see:
Podcast (kinsella-on-liberty): Play in new window | Download (Duration: 44:13 — 40.5MB)
Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 401.
I appeared on a Twitter Spaces discussion Jan. 12, 2023 for Sazmining, for the topic “Bitcoin & Property Rights,” with Kent Halliburton and Logan Chipkin. A variety of questions were fielded. A synopsis and transcript are here, and re-pixeled below.
Synopsis:
Lawyer and libertarian theorist Stephan Kinsella joins Logan Chipkin and Kent Halliburton to discuss Bitcoin from a property rights perspective. If Bitcoin is not physical, how can anyone own it, if at all? [continue reading…]
Podcast (kinsella-on-liberty): Play in new window | Download (118.1MB)
Interesting findings in Walter J. Ong’s classic work Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, 30th anniv. ed. (Routledge, 2012), pp. 50–51:
(1) Illiterate (oral) subjects identified geometrical figures by assigning them the names of objects, never abstractly as circles, squares, etc. A circle would be called a plate, sieve, bucket, watch, or moon; a square would be called a mirror, door, house, apricot drying-board. Luria’s subjects identified the designs as representations of real things they knew. They never dealt with abstract circles or squares but rather with concrete objects. Teachers’ school students on the other hand, moderately literate, identified geometrical figures by categorical geometric names: circles, squares, triangles, and so on …. They had been trained to give school-room answers, not real-life responses.
[From my Webnote series]
Related:
Related:
If government means the state, it’s criminal; but it clearly means something different: the governing institutions, law and order. The state has coopted government like it has coopted roads and transportation, money, education. But just as roads are not inherently statist, neither is government. We anarcho-libertarians do not oppose law and order and the institutions of “governance”; just state control thereof. We oppose our enemy, the state.
“Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), n.2:
In this book, I sometimes use the term government to refer to what should more precisely be referred to as the state, although, as I have argued elsewhere, to be precise, government (or the institutions of governance) is conceptually distinct from the state. The state commandeers various natural and private institutions in society, such as communication, transportation, defense, education, healthcare, and law and order (institutions of governance), and over time the populace associates these institutions with the state. But just as libertarians are only against state-provided roads and education, but not against roads and education, we are not against “government,” meaning institutions or law and order. We are against the state. We anarchist libertarians are not for chaos and do not think law is impossible without the state; indeed, we think true, just law is only really possible without the state. Thus we anarchist libertarians do not oppose law and order, or even “government,” properly understood. Nonetheless, I sometimes use “government” in this book in the conventional sense to more or less mean the state, to avoid tedium. See, on this, “Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?” (ch. 25); Kinsella, “The Nature of the State and Why Libertarians Hate It,” StephanKinsella.com (May 3, 2010) ….
“Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?”, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023):
Let me give some examples of metaphors or uncareful use of terms, things that can lead to equivocation by our opponents, things that can lead to confusion when we try to analyze difficult issues.
So one is, for example, most libertarians have always been against what we call “public schools.” And in recent years, maybe in the last decade or two, I’ve heard libertarians say, they’ve used the term “government schools,” because they want to make clear, “I’m against government schools.” They’re trying to call to the attention of the proponents of “public” schools that they’re really in favor of the government being in charge of educating people.
Well, even the word “government,” in my view, is a dangerous word to use. I use it from time to time but I increasingly try to use the word “state” to make it clear that I’m against the state because the state has a definition. It’s a monopoly in a geographic area over the provision of law, justice, and force.[31] The word government has ambiguous meanings. And your opponent—either a minarchist, which we can call a mini-statist, or a regular statist—by the word government, they mean the governing institutions in society. And they also use it as an equivalent to the state because they believe the state is necessary for these governing institutions. So they are smuggling in their presuppositions, a type of question-begging.
So if you say, as an anarchist, I’m against the government (meaning: against the state), they will take you to mean you’re against law and order. So if they ask you, “Well, do you believe in law?”
You say, “Yes.”
Then they say, “Well, then you believe in government.”
And I say, “Well, I believe in government as law and order.”
And then they say, “Well, then you must believe in the state.”
You see there’s that trick there. So we have to stay focused on being opposed to the state, defined in a certain way.
[31] Writes Hoppe:
Let me begin with the definition of a state. What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state? This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving himself be adjudicated by him or his agent. And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent’s power to tax: to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.
Based on this definition of a state, it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist. For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws. And he who can legislate can also tax. Surely, this is an enviable position.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Reflections on the Origin and the Stability of the State,” LewRockwell.com (June 23, 2008; https://archive.lewrockwell.com/hoppe/hoppe18.html), quoted in in Kinsella, “The Nature of the State and Why Libertarians Hate It,” StephanKinsella.com (May 3, 2010). Hoppe’s article was based on his 2008 speech, available at Hoppe, “PFP020 | Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Reflections on the Origin of the State (PFS 2008),” Property and Freedom Podcast (Dec. 24, 2021; https://propertyandfreedom.org/pfp).
As I pointed out over 20 years ago (7/14/2005), in External Posts: Sciabarra, Horwitz; definition of Socialism; the “case” for anarchy:
It is not “government” per se that is the problem, as Tibor Machan has noted. We can say that a free society with no states has “government” but no states. The question is whether there is a state. A state is an entity that both taxes people and forcibly outlaws competition. There is no reason to say that private justice agencies would have these characteristics.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Role of Intellectuals and Anti-intellectual Intellectuals,” in The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline (Second Expanded Edition, Mises Institute, 2021):
Let me begin with the definition of a state. What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state? This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving himself be adjudicated by him or his agent. And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent’s power to tax: to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.
Based on this definition of a state, it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist. For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws. And he who can legislate can also tax. Surely, this is an enviable position. 1
Hoppe, “Reflections on State and War,” LewRockwell.com (Dec. 2, 2006): 2
Conventionally, the state is defined as an agency with two unique characteristics. First, it is a compulsory territorial monopolist of ultimate decision-making (jurisdiction). That is, it is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict, including conflicts involving itself. Second, the state is a territorial monopolist of taxation. That is, it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price citizens must pay for its provision of law and order.
Predictably, if one can only appeal to the state for justice, justice will be perverted in favor of the state. Instead of resolving conflict, a monopolist of ultimate decision-making will provoke conflict in order to settle it to his own advantage. Worse, while the quality of justice will fall under monopolistic auspices, its price will rise. Motivated like everyone else by self-interest but equipped with the power to tax, the state agents’ goal is always the same: to maximize income and minimize productive effort.
Nock, Our Enemy, The State:
It may…be easily seen how great the difference is between the institution of government, as understood by [Thomas] Paine and the Declaration of Independence, and the institution of the State … The nature and intention of government … are social. Based on the idea of natural rights, government secures those rights to the individual by strictly negative intervention, making justice costless and easy of access; and beyond that it does not go. The State, on the other hand, both in its genesis and by it primary intention, is purely anti-social. It is not based on the idea of natural rights, but on the idea that the individual has no rights except those that the State may provisionally grant him. [emphasis added]
But see: Nicholas Dykes, “The Facts of Reality: Logic and History in Objectivist Debates about Government,” J. Ayn Rand Stud. 7, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 79–140, p. 79:
in this essay, rightly or wrongly, the words ‘state’ and ‘government’ are used interchangeably to refer to any geographically-defined monopoly on the use of force—including ‘limited government’ or ‘minarchy.’ ‘Anarchism’ refers to libertarian anarchism, the philosophical advocacy of a future society without such a monopoly.
Dykes goes on (pp. 132–133):
A devoted fan of Ayn Rand since 1963, I am sympathetic to those who uphold minarchy or limited government. For thirty years, I did the same. But when in 1992 enforced early retirement gave me the leisure to read more widely, and after a friend, the British libertarian Kevin McFarlane, suggested I should read Bruce Benson’s The Enterprise of Law, I suddenly felt one day like Keats’s Cortez, staring out over an unknown horizon with the ‘wild surmise’ that social life without government might be possible. In the years since, everything I have read has made that surmise seem more and more like the true facts of reality, “a state of affairs that is and works whether or not anybody recognises it” (Mises 1944, 113).
Sechrest (1999, 87) has noted psychological elements in the anarchy/minarchy debate. This seems eminently correct, for children are usually raised to revere their country’s history and its form of government. Thus most Britons are loyal to their monarchy and most Americans unquestioningly support the Uncle Sam they are accustomed to. As Nock ([1935] 1950, 44) observed wryly: “There appears to be a curious difficulty about exercising reflective thought upon the actual nature of an institution into which one was born and one’s ancestors were born.” It may be that this ‘inheritance factor’—unconscious, and therefore impervious to reason—has always been the greatest obstacle to the spread of ideas.” Citing Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University, 1944); Larry Sechrest, “Rand, anarchy, and taxes,” J. Aуn Rand Stud. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 87–105; Nock, Our Enemy, The State. ))
This comment about psychology annoyed Machan. See Tibor Machan, “Reconciling Anarchism and Minarchism,” in Roderick Long and Tibor Machan, Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country? (2008), n. 10:
One cannot do Dykes’ piece justice with any kind of brief reply. But his equivocation is a serious flaw in it. The paper also ends on a dubious note, from a scholarly standpoint, when it suggests that those defending minarchism suffer emotional or psychological problems (like having an affinity for paternalism from their childhood). Such psychologising is very bad form—how can one defend oneself against it when there is no proof or evidence for the thing other than its having been suggested in a respectable forum?
Note that Machan flips back and forth on the state and government, without justifying equating these terms. E.g. he talks about government even after quoting Weber’s definition of state:
Government has been rejected by anarcho-libertarians on grounds that its very nature involves fundamental injustices (such as taxation or exclusive legal jurisdiction).13 Legal services consist of enforcing laws, and laws are supposed to uphold justice. If, as libertarians hold, justice consists of respecting and protecting individual rights, then legal services involve the adjudication of disputes about rights violations, overseeing conviction of criminals, and providing for some of the police protection and military defense for people who live within the relevant jurisdiction, all in the effort to give freely consented-to protection to these rights.
Rights are the objective criteria by which just adjudication is to be conducted, so far, at least, as libertarians understand them. This, as they tell it, fulfills the requirement of a civilised legal system whereby the rule of law rather than of (the will of) human beings (as rulers) is followed. So government is criticised by libertarian anarchists because it is considered impossible for it to pursue and achieve justice without also breaching it.
If the provision of legal services is to be just, the argument goes, not only must government enjoy the full consent of the governed (which may be explicit or, some have argued, implicit—based not only on overt but tacit agreement implied by one’s actions14) but refrain from establishing a monopoly in the provisions of its services. This second reason for why government is coercive by its very nature is often explained by reference to Max Weber’s definition of it: “A state is defined by the specific means peculiar to it, the use of physical force. The state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Politics, then, means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.”15 In short, government is supposedly an imposed monopoly.
13 Rothbard discusses the issue in The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic-Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), pp. 162-63. For his definition, see p. 171, where he says, “The State may therefore be defined as that organisation which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area.”
15 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978), p. 56. [See also Kinsella, The Power to Tax and the Power to Outlaw Competition Imply Each Other.]
Rothbard on the state: Murray N. Rothbard, “The Nature of the State,” The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic-Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), p. 172:
The State may therefore be defined as that organisation which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area. 3
see also France, at an Impasse, Heads Toward Another Government Collapse, NY Times 2025 Sep 8: using “government” not to refer to the French state but to its “government,” which Americans refer to as the “administration” or something like that. Or Congress splinters into unlikely factions over looming government shutdown, where (a) “government shutdown” does not refer to a shutdown of the entire (federal, or general) government, ie. not a “shutdown,” really, and (b) where “government” here clearly means something other than the US state.
See also David Kelley on the Necessity of Government:
William Thomas, “Libertarianism and Objectivism: Compatible?“, Atlas Society (June 29, 2010): “One important difference is that Objectivism holds that man needs government, a point many libertarians deny. Freedom requires an enforceable system of adjudication that establishes, though objective principles, when force has been used and allows for the rational settlement of disputes on the basis of individual rights to life, liberty, and property. Only an institution that effectively dominates and regulates the use of force in a given geographic area can provide and enforce such a system of law. So we all need government to set us free from force.”
This is a good example of the danger of using using the term “government” instead of “state.” What the Objectivist believes is that government—the institutions of governance, i.e. law and order—is impossible without a state, just as many people believe that roads are impossible without the state. Thus when a libertarian anarchist says they oppose institutionalized aggression and therefore they oppose the state, the minarchist, in conflating the terms, hears that we oppose government, since they do not believe “government” is possible without a monopoly, that is, without the state. But this is dishonest equivocation. The minarchist is free to argue that government is not possible in anarchy, but the concepts are distinct and the difference between the anarchist and minarchist is on this issue: whether order is possible without the state and its monopoly on force. It is dishonest equivocation to use semantics to argue a substantive point just as it’s somewhat dishonest for anti-abortion activists to label their position “pro-life” and for the other side to call their position “pro-choice”, since there, the real debate is over whether fetuses have rights and whether it is a crime to abort a fetus. Thus to keep the debate on substance, the anarchist should make it clear that they oppose the state not “government,” to keep the mini-statist from falsely accusing us of opposing “government” i.e. law and order. Make the mini-statist, who claims to oppose aggression, explain why the state (not “government” which is ambiguous) does not commit aggression. This also helps make it clear why their claims that government is “necessary” is simply irrelevant; the question is not whether the state, or government, is “necessary”; it is whether aggression is justified and, if so, whether the state does, or does not, commit aggression. (See, on this, The State is not the government; we don’t own property; scarcity doesn’t mean rare; coercion is not aggression, What It Means To Be an Anarcho-Capitalist and The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Anarcho-Libertarianism.)
See also this Grok summary:
Étienne de la Boétie (Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, 1576)
Étienne de la Boétie views the state as a tyrannical structure maintained through the voluntary obedience of the populace rather than brute force alone. Tyranny thrives on habit, fear, and the complicity of subjects who surrender their natural liberty, allowing a small elite to dominate. The state’s power is fragile and illusory, collapsible through mass withdrawal of consent via non-violent disobedience. He emphasizes that true freedom requires rejecting servitude to rulers.
De la Boétie does not explicitly distinguish between “state” and “government,” using terms like “tyranny” and “government” somewhat interchangeably to describe coercive rule. However, his focus on voluntary submission implies a potential for non-coercive governance based on natural reason, without formalized institutions of domination.
Westphalian Conception (Peace of Westphalia Treaties, 1648)
The Westphalian conception portrays the state as a sovereign territorial entity with absolute authority over internal affairs, emphasizing non-intervention, territorial integrity, and equality among states. It establishes the state as the central actor in international relations, monopolizing legitimate violence within borders and interacting via diplomacy in an anarchic global system.
This framework does not distinguish between “state” and “government”; it treats them synonymously as the apparatus of sovereign rule, focusing on the state’s external sovereignty rather than internal governance structures.
Herbert Spencer (Social Statics, 1851)
Herbert Spencer sees the state as an evolving coercive institution, transitioning from militant, war-driven societies to industrial, voluntary ones. It oversteps by infringing on individual liberties through excessive legislation, violating the “law of equal freedom.” The state’s coercive nature hinders moral and social progress, and it should minimize to essential functions as society advances.
Spencer does not sharply distinguish “state” from “government,” often using them interchangeably to critique coercive authority. However, he implies a preference for voluntary social organization over state compulsion, suggesting governance could exist without aggressive intervention.
Auberon Herbert (A Politician in Trouble about His Soul, 1884)
Auberon Herbert views the state as a coercive violator of self-ownership, imposing compulsory taxation and laws that treat individuals as tools for collective goals. It is inherently immoral, relying on force rather than consent. He advocates voluntaryism: a society where services like protection are funded consensually, without monopolies.
Herbert explicitly distinguishes “government” from “state.” Government can refer to voluntary cooperative arrangements for social order, while the state is organized compulsion and aggression. He calls for a “voluntary State” or true government based on non-aggression and secession, rejecting the state’s monopoly.
Franz Oppenheimer (The State, 1908)
Franz Oppenheimer defines the state as the “organization of the political means”—a predatory entity born from conquest, where conquerors exploit the conquered through tribute and class division. It contrasts with peaceful “economic means” of production and exchange, maintaining a monopoly on violence for ongoing parasitism.
Oppenheimer does not explicitly distinguish “state” from “government,” but his analysis implies government could theoretically be non-predatory if based on economic means. However, he sees historical governments as synonymous with the state, arising from coercion rather than consent.
Albert Jay Nock (Our Enemy, the State, 1935)
Albert Jay Nock portrays the state as an anti-social, exploitative institution that grants provisional rights at its whim, originating in conquest and usurpation. It expands by absorbing social power, fostering dependency and enabling class exploitation. Drawing on Paine and Jefferson, he contrasts this with natural societal organization.
Nock explicitly distinguishes “government” from “state.” Government, as a social institution, provides negative intervention to secure natural rights without cost or coercion. The state, however, is anti-social, positive intervention that exploits and controls, perverting true governance for elite benefit.
Bertrand de Jouvenel (On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth, 1945)
Bertrand de Jouvenel sees the state as an accumulative power entity that grows inexorably through history, from feudal origins to modern bureaucracies absorbing societal roles. It centralizes authority via war and conquest, eroding liberties and risking totalitarianism, even under democracy.
De Jouvenel does not clearly distinguish “state” from “government,” using them to describe the same expanding power apparatus. His focus is on power’s dynamics rather than terminological separation, though he critiques both absolutist and welfare-oriented forms.
Murray Rothbard (Man, Economy, and State, 1962)
Murray Rothbard characterizes the state as a “criminal organization” that coercively taxes (theft) and monopolizes violence and decision-making over a territory. It perverts justice by self-adjudicating and expands via wars and interventions, violating property rights.
Rothbard distinguishes “state” from “government” in libertarian discourse: government can mean institutions of law and order in a free society, achievable via private agencies. The state, however, is the aggressive monopolist, and anarcho-capitalism supports governance without the state’s coercion.
Antony de Jasay (The State, 1985)
Antony de Jasay depicts the state as a rational maximizer of discretionary power, using democracy and redistribution to expand while creating dependencies. It rejects consent theories, emerging from asymmetries and growing inefficiently through interventions.
De Jasay does not emphasize a distinction between “state” and “government,” treating them as the same adversarial entity to liberty. His public-choice lens views it as a “capitalist” investor in control, without separating voluntary governance.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe (A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, 1989)
Hans-Hermann Hoppe defines the state as a territorial monopolist of taxation and ultimate arbitration, enabling expropriation and conflict provocation. It is inherently socialistic, aggressing against property and degrading justice quality.
Hoppe distinguishes “state” from “government”: government refers to governance institutions like law and order, which anarchists support in private forms. The state is the coercive monopolist; opposition to it does not mean opposing governance but rejecting its aggression.
Martin van Creveld (The Rise and Decline of the State, 1999)
Martin van Creveld traces the state from Westphalian sovereignty as a bureaucratic monopolist of violence and welfare, peaking through nationalism and wars but declining due to globalization, nuclear deterrence, and non-state actors. It faces fragmentation into supranational and subnational entities.
Van Creveld does not distinguish “state” from “government,” using them interchangeably for the territorial sovereign entity. His historical analysis focuses on the state’s evolution and decline without separating voluntary governance concepts.
See also this Grok analysis:
My queries:
Combined Summary of Previous Responses
This response synthesizes and reiterates the key elements from our prior discussions on the historical development of modern civil codes, their relationship to legislative positivism, evolving perceptions of law, the foundations of civil codes in Roman and customary law, and the persistence of natural law influences as illustrated in the 1839 Louisiana case Reynolds v. Swain. The synthesis draws directly from the provided document by Shael Herman (“The Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the United States,” 1993) and related sources (e.g., Stephan Kinsella’s analyses on positivism and Roman law), emphasizing Louisiana’s unique civil law tradition as a bridge between European antecedents and American legal experience.
1. The First Modern Civil Code and Its Link to Legislative Positivism
The first modern civil code is widely recognized as the Code Napoléon (French Civil Code), enacted in 1804 under Napoleon Bonaparte. This code represented a revolutionary shift: unlike earlier compilations (e.g., the Code of Hammurabi or medieval “Barbarian” codes), it was a comprehensive, logically organized system of general principles derived from Roman law, designed for deduction and application by analogy. It centralized law under legislative authority, embodying Enlightenment ideals of rationalism, social unification, and governmental centralization (as detailed in Herman’s document, pages 5–7, 11–12, 16–18).
This enactment coincided with the rise of legislative positivism—a philosophy viewing law primarily as the product of sovereign (state) commands, rather than natural, customary, or divine sources. Positivism gained traction in the late 18th and early 19th centuries amid the French Revolution’s secular reforms, subordinating custom and judicial discretion to statutes. The Code Napoléon exemplified this by establishing legislation as supreme, though it retained some ties to natural reason. In the U.S., Louisiana’s Digest of 1808 (revised as the Civil Code of 1825) mirrored this, drawing heavily from French, Spanish, and Roman sources while declaring legislation and custom as primary sources (Articles 1–3). However, Louisiana’s version allowed equity and natural law as gap-fillers when statutes were silent (Article 4), reflecting a milder positivism. Critiques like Samuel Read’s 1829 work and James Carter’s 1884 opposition to codification highlight how positivism dominated by the mid-19th century, shifting law from “discovered” (organic) to “made” (state-decreed), though debates persisted between natural lawyers and positivists.
2. Historical Perceptions of Law and the Shift Toward Statutory Dominance
Until the early 20th century, most people viewed statutes as one source of law alongside others, such as English/Anglo-American common law (evolved through precedents), natural law (rooted in reason, justice, and morality), common sense, intuition, and custom. Law was seen as compatible with notions of equity and societal norms, “discovered” through experience rather than solely invented by the state (echoing Ferdinand Stone’s dichotomy in Herman’s document, pages 6–7, where civil lawyers use codes as blueprints, while common lawyers rely on case-by-case solutions).
In the 1800s, the rise of legislated European civil codes like the Code Napoléon changed this subtly: these were mostly codifications of prior customary and Roman law, preserving a link to justice. Private law (e.g., contracts, property) remained tied to evolved norms, not arbitrary commands—Roman principles from Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis (529–534 AD) blended with post-Roman customs (e.g., French coutumes from the 15th–16th centuries). Louisiana’s code, as a “European artifact” (Herman, pages 1–3, 5), exemplified this hybrid, providing intellectual bridges to global civil law traditions (e.g., Quebec, Latin America).
However, starting in the early 20th century—accelerating in the 1930s with the administrative state’s expansion (e.g., U.S. New Deal regulations)—perceptions shifted. Statutes, regulations, and decrees proliferated, leading people to equate “law” with written, state-issued commands. Today, the average person sees law as statutory, with only dim awareness of its roots in ancient Roman/common law evolutions. This evolution wasn’t uniform; civil systems like Louisiana retained stronger ties to justice-oriented codes, while common law areas faced more tension from bureaucratic growth.
3. Foundations of Modern Civil Codes in Roman and Customary Law
Modern civil codes are indeed based largely on Roman law but also incorporate customary European law from the centuries after the Roman Empire’s fall (476 AD) until the rediscovery of Justinian’s texts around 1070 AD. Roman elements—via Justinian’s compilations—provide core institutions like property, obligations, family law, and delicts (e.g., “usufruct,” “servitudes,” “delictual liability” in Herman’s document, pages 9–11, 37–55). Post-Roman customary law, including “Barbarian” codes (e.g., Visigothic, blending Roman remnants with Germanic tribal practices), filled gaps and adapted to feudal realities. Medieval glossators and commentators (11th–15th centuries) synthesized this into the ius commune, influencing Enlightenment jurists like Domat and Pothier, who shaped the Code Napoléon. Louisiana’s code imported this hybrid: Roman foundations through Spanish/French colonial influences, plus local customs, making it a synthesis rather than a pure Roman revival (Herman, pages 27–32; Kinsella on Roman law and commentators).
4. Persistence of Natural Law in Codified Systems: The Case of Reynolds v. Swain (1839)
Even after civil codes enshrined legislative supremacy, links to natural law persisted in some systems, as shown in Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839). This Louisiana Supreme Court case involved a redhibitory action over a defective enslaved person’s sale, where the buyer (Reynolds) sued the seller (Swain) for rescission due to a hidden vice (consumption). The suit exceeded the one-year prescriptive period under Article 2512 of the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, leading the trial court to dismiss it based on positive (enacted) law.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding fraud by Swain interrupted prescription. Crucially, the court’s reasoning invoked natural law and equity as foundational sources when codes were silent or unjust. Justice Martin emphasized that Louisiana’s civil law drew from Romanist traditions, where “unwritten law” (natural equity, reason) supplemented statutes. Citing Article 21 of the modern Louisiana Civil Code (echoing the 1825 version’s Article 4), the court held that judges must apply equity, natural law, and received usages in gaps, preventing rigid positivism from overriding justice. This rejected a strict positivist view (law as only what is enacted), affirming that fraud “shocks the conscience” under natural principles. The case illustrates how Louisiana’s mixed jurisdiction retained natural law as a “gap-filler,” balancing legislative dominance with moral intuition—contrasting with purer positivist systems like France’s, where custom could not abrogate legislation (Herman, pages 17–19; Kinsella on logical/legal positivism).
Overall Concluding Summary
In summary, the modern civil code era began with the 1804 Code Napoléon, marking the ascent of legislative positivism while codifying Roman and post-Roman customary law into rational, justice-oriented frameworks. Louisiana’s 1808/1825 code adapted this European legacy, creating a unique U.S. jurisdiction that bridges continental traditions with American pragmatism (as Herman’s book portrays it as a “social blueprint” from cradle to grave, pages 1–3, 7). Historical perceptions of law as multifaceted (tied to natural justice and custom) gave way to statutory dominance by the mid-20th century, yet cases like Reynolds v. Swain demonstrate natural law’s enduring role in filling statutory gaps and ensuring equity. This evolution underscores law’s dynamic nature: from organic discovery to state-made commands, with civil codes like Louisiana’s preserving intellectual depth and global relevance amid positivist shifts. As Herman notes (pages 2–3), appreciating this “difference” fosters self-knowledge and cross-cultural legal insights in an increasingly interconnected world.
***
“Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?”, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023):
Let me give some examples of metaphors or uncareful use of terms, things that can lead to equivocation by our opponents, things that can lead to confusion when we try to analyze difficult issues.
So one is, for example, most libertarians have always been against what we call “public schools.” And in recent years, maybe in the last decade or two, I’ve heard libertarians say, they’ve used the term “government schools,” because they want to make clear, “I’m against government schools.” They’re trying to call to the attention of the proponents of “public” schools that they’re really in favor of the government being in charge of educating people. [But see above re state vs. government]
***
See also Is Taxation Theft? with Professor Richard Salsman, where Richard Salsman argues that not only is taxation justified but so is subpoena power. He/they also conflate terms like government/governance and state; voluntary vs. consensual, and so on. Salsman also adopts a version of the Chicago-Epsteiun “free rider” arguments.
I debated Salsman on whether taxation is theft:https://t.co/pHHY2gLopQ
— Michael Liebowitz (@Lieboisout) October 29, 2025
Stephan Kinsella is a libertarian writer and retired patent attorney in Houston, Texas. He has published widely on various areas of libertarian legal theory and on legal topics such as intellectual property law and international law. His publications include Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Papinian Press, 2023), Against Intellectual Property (Mises Institute, 2008), International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford, 2020), and The Universal Principles of Liberty (2025).
My Failed Libertarian Speaking Hiatus; Memories of Mises Institute and Other Events, 1988–20192025
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