This includes intellectuals coming “up with theories justifying state institutions before or after they are created” as well as “Mainstream media and intellectuals … drastically narrow[ing] the terms of acceptable debate by taking statism as a given.”
as a state emerges, then, it does so in spite of the fact that it is neither in demand nor efficient.Instead of being constrained by cost and demand conditions, the growth of an exploiting firm is constrained by public opinion: non-productive and non-contractual property acquisitions require coercion, and coercion creates victims. It is conceivable that resistance can be lastingly broken by force in the case of one man (or a group of men) exploiting one or maybe two or three others (or a group of roughly the same size). It is inconceivable, however, to imagine that force alone can account for the breaking down of resistance in the actually familiar case of small minorities expropriating and exploiting populations ten, hundreds, or thousands of times their size. For this to happen a firm must have public support in addition to coercive force. A majority of the population must accept its operations as legitimate. This acceptance can range from active enthusiasm to passive resignation. But acceptance it must be in the sense that a majority must have given up the idea of actively or passively resisting any attempt to enforce non-productive and non-contractual property acquisitions. Instead of displaying outrage over such actions, of showing contempt for everyone who engages in them, and of doing nothing to help make them successful (not to mention actively trying to obstruct them), a majority must actively or passively support them. State-supportive public opinion must counterbalance the resistance of victimized property owners such that active resistance appears futile. And the goal of the state, then, and of every state employee who wants to contribute toward securing and improving his own position within the state, is and must be that of maximizing exploitatively acquired wealth and income by producing favorable public opinion and creating legitimacy.
There are two complementary measures available to the state trying to accomplish this. First, there is ideological propaganda. Much time and effort is spent persuading the public that things are not really as they appear: exploitation is really freedom; taxes are really voluntary; non-contractual relations are really “conceptually” contractual ones; no one is ruled by anyone but we all rule ourselves; without the state neither law nor security exists; and the poor would perish, etc.
Second, there is redistribution. Instead of being a mere parasitic consumer of goods that others have produced, the state redistributes some of its coercively appropriated wealth to people outside the state apparatus and thereby attempts to corrupt them into assuming state-supportive roles.
But not just any redistribution will do. Just as ideologies must serve a—statist—purpose, so must redistribution. Redistribution requires cost-expenditures and thus needs a justification. It is not undertaken by the state simply in order to do something nice for some people, as, for instance, when someone gives someone else a present. Nor is it done simply to gain as high an income as possible from exchanges, as when an ordinary economic business engages in trade. It is undertaken in order to secure the further existence and expansion of exploitation and expropriation. Redistribution must serve this strategic purpose. Its costs must be justified in terms of increased state income and wealth. The political entrepreneurs in charge of the state apparatus can err in this task, as can ordinary businessmen, because their decisions about which redistributive measures best serve this purpose have to be made in anticipation of their actual results. And if entrepreneurial errors occur, the state’s income may actually fall rather than rise, possibly even jeopardizing its own existence. It is the very purpose of state politics and the function of political entrepreneurship to avoid such situations and to choose instead a policy that increases state income.
While neither the particular forms of redistributive policies nor their particular outcomes can be predicted, but change with changing circumstances, the nature of the state still requires that its redistributive policy must follow a certain order and display a certain structural regularity.
As a firm engaged in the maximization of exploitatively appropriated wealth, the state’s first and foremost area in which it applies redistributive measures is the production of security, i.e. of police, defense, and a judicial system. The state ultimately rests on coercion and thus cannot do without armed forces. Any competing armed forces—which would naturally emerge on the market in order to satisfy a genuine demand for security and protection services—are a threat to its existence. They must be eliminated. To do this is to arrogate the job to itself and become the monopolistic supplier and redistributor of protection services for a defined territory. Similarly, a competing judicial system would pose an immediate threat to a state’s claim to legitimacy. And again, for the sake of its own existence the judicial system must also be monopolized and legal services included in redistributive schemes.
The state’s nature as an institution engaged in organized aggression also explains the importance of the next field of redistributive activities: that of traffic and communication. There can be no regular exploitation without monopolistic control of rivers, coasts, seaways, streets, railroads, airports, mail and telecommunication systems. Thus, these areas, too, must become the object of redistribution.
Of similar importance is the field of education. Depending as it does on public opinion and its acceptance of the state’s actions as legitimate, it is essential for a state that unfavorable ideological competition be eliminated as far as possible and statist ideologies spread. The state attempts to accomplish this by providing educational services on a redistributive basis.
Furthered by a system of state education, the next crucial area for redistribution is that of redistributing state power itself, i.e., the right assumed by the state to expropriate, exploit and redistribute non-productively appropriated assets. Instead of remaining an institution which restricts entry into itself and/or particular government positions, a state increasingly, and for obvious strategic reasons, adopts an organizational structure which in principle opens up every position to everyone and grants equal and universal rights of participation and competition in the determination of state policy. Everyone—not just a privileged “nobility”—receives a legal stake in the state in order to reduce the resistance to state power.
With the monopolization of law and security production, traffic, communication and education, as well as the democratization of state rule itself, all features of the modern state have been identified but one: the state’s monopolization of money and banking. …
Comments (17)
Silas Barta
You mean you have inhibitions against just pirating it?
Published: February 3, 2010 6:29 PM
Bruce Koerber
I can’t believe that these authors think that their ebook is worth $45.
I can guarantee you that some of the information in their book is built upon a worn-out paradigm which significantly reduces its value.
I suggest saving between $32 and 38.50 and instead read about the divine economy theory, which is cutting edge.
Published: February 3, 2010 7:44 PM
Gil
Is this the part where anti-I.P. folk argue that although lack of I.P. where a shady competitor can threaten the reputation of a reputable doesn’t really matter as I.P. is wrong and some loss of innovation is okay.
Published: February 3, 2010 8:31 PM
newson
gil,
at least silas can argue properly. watch him and learn.
Published: February 4, 2010 1:55 AM
clay barham
Innovators come from pebble droppers with courage to pursue their dreams as cited in Save Pebble Droppers & Prosperity on Amazon and claysamerica.com. They are the stand-alone visionaries who are self-reliant, like Howard Roark in his jury summation in Ayn Rand’s Fountainhead, in an environment where individual self interests are more important than are community interests, the latter which Obama, Rousseau and Marx prefer. claysamerica.com
Published: February 4, 2010 11:54 AM
Curt Howland
Silas,
I’ve noticed that “illegally” downloading material is the common reply of those who do not understand the negatives of government monopoly grants.
…and Microsoft apologists. Really. In many, many forums where I have suggested that the price of commercial software is far above its utility, that the free (as in no cost) F/OSS programs like Linux and OpenOffice.org have a much greater return on investment, the people who say that commercial software is “so much better” answer with “if you don’t like the price of the software, just pirate it.”
Asking how someone who objects to government monopoly grants on principle why they don’t “just pirate”, is ignoring that the argument is being made by a person to whom principle matters.
Published: February 4, 2010 12:30 PM
Silas Barta
@Curt_Howland: I was just pointing out that Stephan_Kinsella’s principles don’t require him to respect others’ IP (well, except when he delegates his IP rights out to publishers in exchange for money), so why is he acting like it’s some kind of rule he has to obey?
And if it’s against your principles to copy the works of those who don’t want them to be copied without permission … um, gee, how exactly would an IP free world be different to you? You’d still have to respect the wishes of those who ask that their work not be copied, right? Or are you willing to secretly violate “hey, don’t copy our stuff, please” but not “hey, don’t copy our stuff, it’s under copyright”?
Published: February 4, 2010 3:14 PM
Peter Surda
Dear Silas,
> so why is he acting like it’s some kind of rule he
> has to obey?
Beats me. Maybe because he does not have the spare money for a copyright infringement trial or prefers not to go to jail. But you’re right, it makes so much sense to assume some deep philosophical dichotomy as a reason for his inaction.
> … gee, how exactly would an IP free world be
> different to you? You’d still have to respect the
> wishes of those who ask that their work not be
> copied, right?
You would not have to respect them. Some still might. But the outcome would be different. The threat of a trial or jail would only be present if there was an underlying contract. Otherwise, there might be loss of reputation, economic and social boycott and other indirect activities. You would have a choice just like you have now, merely there would be less violence involved in the options.
Published: February 4, 2010 7:20 PM
Silas Barta
@Peter_Surda:
Exactly. Contra Curt_Howland, it’s not some kind of *principled* decision on Stephan_Kinsella’s part. That’s all I was trying to establish.
But that’s exactly how you intend to enforce *physical* property in the absence of the State. So, um, how does your position on IP actually *differ* from your position on physical property?
-You want them both “enforced”, to the extent they can be, without the government.
-Everything you find wrong with both of them, has to do with the government’s involvement.
I’ve asked this question to less intelligent posters and gotten muddles answers. Can you do better?
Published: February 4, 2010 7:35 PM
Anonymous
I actually was just given this book and asked to review it. I’d like free-market opinions on it if there are others out there who are actually going to read it.
Also, anyone have another source of a possibly more rigorous refutation of “public goods theory”?? While Hoppe is logically convincing, I was hoping for something more. To take the lighthouse scenario…
Let’s say some not-so-nice guy in our free-market economy has bought the lighthouse. This guy also owns a pharmaceutical company. His pharmaceutical competitors are across the ocean. He starts charging enormous fees for use of the lighthouse to make it prohibitively expensive to import the rival firm’s medicine. People get sick, he charges higher prices, etc. He starts buying up other businesses whose competitors are also across the sea and starts the same tactics. Pretty soon our area around the lighthouse looks like North Korea…
Ok, maybe not so simple, but can’t we envision such a scenario where the private ownership of certain goods is less desirable for the well being of everyone and therefore we can distinguish it as a public good (owned or supported by a government kept in check by a democratic system).
If anyone can help me here it would be appreciated.
Published: February 4, 2010 9:49 PM
Peter Surda
Dear Silas,
the difference, as I envision it, in enforcing rights in a stateless society with physical versus immaterial goods is in initiation of force as a retribution for damages by a third party. With physical goods, retribution by force is not an initiation of force, with immaterial it is. For an example see the “Cartoon Wars” episodes of South Park ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartoon_Wars_Part_I and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartoon_Wars_Part_II ).
Published: February 5, 2010 2:23 AM
Stephan Kinsella

Peter, good point. Here’s another way to think about the incoherence of IP (and of pro-IP “arguments”): I’ve pointed out many times the hypocrisy of IP advocates, who denigrate the need for scarcity as a criteria for property; they say that intangible, non-scarce “creations” are “just as much” property as are real things. In fact, some say they are MORE fundamental than rights in lowly material things–Rand and Galambos say this; Tibor Machan even implies it. Yet, when they want to enforce rights in IP they want to use physical force, against physical things–the body or property of the IP “infringer.” Why the need to stoop down into the lowly physical world to enforce these IP rights, if IP “things” are “ontologically” “types of things” that “can be owned”?
Consider a world without scarcity. Scarcity means rivalrousness–the possibility of conflict. So a world with no scarcity is hard to imagine exactly but it could be one in which people are sort of ghostly; or, one in which people are super-invulnerable and have the ability to create at will whatever objects they want, in the blink of an eye. A world so that no one can force others to do anthing, or harm them, or “take” anyting from them. If I see your “car” I can conjure up one for myself–yours is not taken. Etc.
Now, in such a world–and don’t call it absurd, since the IP advocates assure us that things other than scarce things are ontologically “real” too–the IP advocates would still say that there are property rights in intellectual creations. Right? If I create a painting, then if others duplicate it without my permission they are “trespassing.” But how would such a right even in principle be enforced, in a non-scarce world? You could not use force to stop the infringer. You could not penalize him. You could not “take” any of his property as “damages.” So IP would be completely unenforceable in a world without scarcity.
In other words, IP needs a world of scarcity in order to exist. Yet IP proponents claim that IP “objects” have independent existence, that scarcity is not necessary, etc. They even claim IP is more primary than property in lowly material things. Ridiculous.
Published: February 5, 2010 11:03 AM
Silas Barta
@Peter_Surda:
Ah, they’d be different because you’d defined them that way. That clears things up … I think. (Though not why Curt_Howland would respect IP in a state-free society.)
@Stephan_Kinsella: It wasn’t a good point.
You’re saying there’s no conflict between pro- and anti-IP with respect to an intellectual work??? Then what are we arguing over?
Look, there’s a difference between justifying one side’s claims (say, the anti-IP side’s) in a conflict by appeal to some other principle, versus claiming that his position is necessarily justified because … there is no conflict. The latter is just a category error: you can’t justify a position in a conflict by saying there is no conflict. That’s just not how it works.
You can sure write an 80 page essay amplifying that confusion, though!
Published: February 5, 2010 11:24 AM
Stephan Kinsella

Silas:
“You’re saying there’s no conflict between pro- and anti-IP with respect to an intellectual work??? Then what are we arguing over?”
Depends on what the IP guys are asking for. If they really think ideas are real objects, let them use those objects for enforcement. I don’t mind. But if you then start asking to control my physical resources, in a way that conflicts with the Lockean homesteading principle, as a libertarian, I object.
“Look, there’s a difference between justifying one side’s claims (say, the anti-IP side’s) in a conflict by appeal to some other principle, versus claiming that his position is necessarily justified because … there is no conflict.”
Actually, we dont have to justify anti-IP. We just point out that IP is not justified. The burden is on you. You are the ones proposing a homesteading rule for scarce resources that undercuts the libertarian one.
Published: February 5, 2010 11:57 AM
Peter Surda
Dear Stephan,
you wrote exactly what I realised after writing my previous post. There is only one more thing I’d like to add to show the inconsistency in IP theory: assuming a restitution should be proportionate to the “damage” caused, then IP infringments should be compensated by immaterial goods too instead of material ones. So a consistent IP proponent should either retaliate by “infringing back” just like in the cartoon I mentioned, or by demanding immaterial goods that the infringer “owns”. Obviously, this approach, while consistent, would make IP practically irrelevant. Indeed, as those infringed upon demand material goods as a restitution, they themselves demonstrate that they value them higher than the immaterial.
Published: February 5, 2010 12:09 PM
Curt Howland
Silas, you seem able to tell what other people’s thoughts and motivations are. Why don’t you tell me why I’m not interested in the products of people who don’t want me as a customer?
Published: February 5, 2010 12:23 PM
Peter Surda
Dear Silas,
I think you interpret my argument too “deep”. I was not explaining the why, but what, as it was my impression that this was your question.
Published: February 5, 2010 3:52 PM