[From my Webnote series]
From a tweet:
Not really. First, in practice most don’t. Even honest Randians eventually admit this — e.g. David Kelley, annoying pest Jan “Helfeld,” Rand’s attorney Murray Franck, Marsha Enright (I think), and many others. https://t.co/wKbx8ijabC
Second, to have a criminal state you don’t…
— Stephan Kinsella (@NSKinsella) July 12, 2025
From this tweet:
Not really. First, in practice most don’t. Even honest Randians eventually admit this — e.g. David Kelley, annoying pest Jan “Helfeld,” Rand’s attorney Murray Franck, Marsha Enright (I think), and many others. stephankinsella.com/2016/05/david-
Second, to have a criminal state you don’t need taxes. A monopoly on violence is sufficient. The ability to outlaw competition implies monopoly prices and thus is functionally equivalent to taxation. And vice-versa, if you can tax, you can effectively eliminate competition since you can outcompete them by subsidizing your service, just as most people use public schools since they are “free”; only the rich can afford to use private schools, after being already taxed to pay for government schools. (stephankinsella.com/2025/07/the-po) Of course in practice every state does both: it taxes and it outlaws competition; and of course in practice every state is large and unjust and criminal; there has never been a minarchist government and there never will be. Minarchists who criticism anarchism for being unrealistic are dishonest or stupid; it is minarchy that is impossible and unrealistic.
Finally, no reason to think she is a minarchist, instead of some rah rah constitutionalist. But if she is a minarchist who opposes taxes on principle–good on her.
Another reason why “voluntary” and tax-free minarchism is a chimera.
As Hoppe notes:
Based on this analysis, Rothbard considered the classical-liberal solution to the fundamental human problem of protection—of a minimal or night-watchman state, or an otherwise “constitutionally limited” government—as a hopelessly confused and naive idea. Every minimal state has the inherent tendency to become a maximal state, for once an agency is permitted to collect any taxes, however small and for whatever purpose, it will naturally tend to employ its current tax revenue for the collection of ever more future taxes for the same and/or other purposes. Similarly, once an agency possesses any judiciary monopoly, it will naturally tend to employ this privileged position for the further expansion of its range of jurisdiction. Constitutions, after all, are state-constitutions, and whatever limitations they may contain—what is or is not constitutional—is determined by state courts and judges. Hence, there is no other possible way of limiting state power except by eliminating the state altogether and, in accordance with justice and economics, establishing a free market in protection and security services.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Introduction,” in Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. xxi (https://hanshoppe.com/2014/12/murray-n-rothbard-and-the-ethics-of-liberty/)
And:
Let me begin with the definition of a state. What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state? This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving himself be adjudicated by him or his agent. And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent’s power to tax: to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.
Based on this definition of a state, it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist. For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws. And he who can legislate can also tax. Surely, this is an enviable position.[8]
And see, on this, Rothbard:
But, in addition to the historical inaccuracy of the view that the State is needed for the development of law, Randy Barnett has brilliantly pointed out that the State by its very nature cannot obey its own legal rules. But if the State cannot obey its own legal rules, then it is necessarily deficient and self-contradictory as a maker of law. In an exegesis and critique of Lon L. Fuller’s seminal work The Morality of Law, Barnett notes that Professor Fuller sees in the current thinking of legal positivism a persistent error: “the assumption that law should be viewed as a . . . one-way projection of authority, originating with government and imposing itself upon the citizen.”5 Fuller points out that law is not simply “vertical”—a command from above from the State to its citizens, but also “horizontal,” arising from among the people themselves and applied to each other. Fuller points to international law, tribal law, private rules, etc. as pervasive examples of such “reciprocal” and non-State law. Fuller sees the positivist error as stemming from failure to recognize a crucial principle of proper law, namely that the lawmaker should itself obey its own rules that it lays down for its citizens, or, in Fuller’s words, “that enacted law itself presupposes a commitment by the government authority to abide by its own rules in dealing with its subjects.”[6]
But Barnett correctly points out that Fuller errs significantly in failing to apply his own principle far enough: in limiting the principle to the procedural “rules by which laws are passed” rather than applying it to the substance of the laws themselves. Because of this failure to carry his principle to its logical conclusion, Fuller fails to see the inherent inner contradiction of the State as maker of law. As Barnett puts it,
Fuller fails in his attempt because he has not followed his own principle far enough. If he did, he would see that the state legal system does not conform to the principle of official congruence with its own rules. It is because the positivists see that the State inherently violates its own rules that they conclude, in a sense correctly that State-made law is sui generis.[7]
However, Barnett adds, if Fuller’s principle were carried forward to assert that the “lawmaker must obey the substance of his own laws,” then Fuller would see “that the State by its nature must violate this commitment.”
For Barnett correctly points out that the two unique and essential features of the State are its power to tax—to acquire its revenue by coercion and hence robbery—and to prevent its subjects from hiring any other defense agency (compulsory monopoly of defense).[8] But in doing so, the State violates its own laws that it sets down for its subjects. As Barnett explains,
For example, the State says that citizens may not take from another by force and against his will that which belongs to another. And yet the State through its power to tax “legitimately” does just that. . . . More essentially, the State says that a person may use force upon another only in self-defense, i.e. only as a defense against another who initiated the use of force. To go beyond one’s right of self-defense would be to aggress on the rights of others, a violation of one’s legal duty. And yet the State by its claimed monopoly forcibly imposes its jurisdiction on persons who may have done nothing wrong. By doing so it aggresses against the rights of its citizens, something which its rules say citizens may not do.
The State, in short, may steal where its subjects may not and it may aggress (initiate the use of force) against its subjects while prohibiting them from exercising the same right. It is to this that the positivists look when they say that the law (meaning State-made law) is a one-way, vertical process. It is this that belies any claim of true reciprocity.[9]
Barnett concludes that, interpreted consistently, Fuller’s principle means that in a true and proper legal system, the lawmaker must “follow all of its rules, procedural and substantive alike.” Therefore, “to the degree that it does not and cannot do this it is not and cannot be a legal system and its acts are outside the law. The State qua state, therefore, is an illegal system.”[10]
5. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press), p. 204; quoted in Randy E. Barnett, “Fuller, Law, and Anarchism,” The Libertarian Forum (February 1976): 6.
6. Fuller, Morality of Law, p. 32.
7. Barnett, “Fuller, Law, and Anarchism,” p. 66.
8. Both features are essential to the historical category of the State; various Utopian schemes to dispense with the first trait and keep the second would still come under the present strictures as applied to the second trait.
9. Barnett, “Fuller, Law, and Anarchism,” p. 7.
10. Ibid.
Note Rothbard does not quite see that the power to tax implies the power to outlaw competition, and vice-versa, when he writes: “8. Both features are essential to the historical category of the State; various Utopian schemes to dispense with the first trait and keep the second would still come under the present strictures as applied to the second trait.”
See also: “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), p. 378 and n.53:
Such an agency necessarily commits aggression against either human bodies or owned property (usually both), either by taxing or by outlawing competition (usually both).53
53 States invariably claim both powers, but either one alone is sufficient to give the state its unique status, and in fact each power implies the other. The power to tax alone would provide the agency with the ability to outcompete competing agencies that do not have this power, in the same way that public (government) schools outcompete private schools. Thus, the power to tax gives the taxing agency the practical ability to monopolize the field and outlaw or restrict competition. And the power to exclude competition alone would permit the monopolizing agency to charge monopoly prices for its services, akin to a tax.
Rothbard on the state: Murray N. Rothbard, “The Nature of the State,” The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic-Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), p. 172:
The State may therefore be defined as that organisation which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area.
KOL154 | “The Social Theory of Hoppe: Lecture 2: Types of Socialism and the Origin of the State”
What must an agent be able to do to qualify as the state? He must be able to insist that all conflicts – now remember, this goes back to his view of conflict as conflicts over the use of a conflictable or rivalrous or scarce means. All conflicts among the inhabitants in a given territory must be brought to him for ultimate decision-making for his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving himself be adjudicated by him or his agent.
00:35:20
Now, implied in this power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent’s power to tax, that is, to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services. Now, you can see that this actually applies to any state, even a minarchy, and Hans says in other places – he combines the power to tax with the power to have a monopolistic decision-making power in a given territory. And these are actually sort of both sides of the same coin. And in fact, either one is sufficient for the other.
00:35:58
Imagine an agency that didn’t have a monopolistic right to outlaw competition in adjudication services but it has the power to tax. Well, if it has the power to tax, then it can outcompete all other agencies because it can take money from the people and use it to subsidize its services, similar to the way that public or state schools, government schools in, say, the US are hard for private schools to compete with, and that’s why private schools are a minority. Conversely, if you didn’t have the power to tax but you had the power to outlaw competition, then the agency could simply charge a monopoly price for its services, which people will be forced to use because you’re preventing them from using competing services. So that’s the same as a tax. So basically, taxing implies monopoly, and monopoly implies taxes.
An Objectivist IP Argument for Taxation:
Objectivists say they are against taxation; they say that you can fund a state by some kind of contract fee or lottery system. Obviously, you can’t, not without the state compelling membership or outlawing competitors, which permits them to charge monopoly prices which amounts to a tax.
But Objectivists are strongly pro-intellectual property (see Why Objectivists Hate Anarchy; IP: The Objectivists Strike Back!). They believe you deserve to be rewarded for creative, innovative, inventive action. But note that they also are extremely fond of the American Constitution and Founders; they believe the Constitution is a great achievement of the intellect–this corresponds with their belief that a proper state, such as the original American state, is a great value to man. Well, put two and two together: the Founders gave us a great creation: the Constitution, and our system of government. We all benefit from it. It’s only fair that the Founders charge us a royalty for our use of their creation–and naturally, the state itself is the agency as the natural successor to its parent-creators, the Framers and Founders, to inherit and manage this royalty-collecting right. Don’t call it a tax–call it a royalty.
Objectivists: “All Property is Intellectual Property”:
Force that is consented to, or that is in response to initiated force, is perfectly legitimate.
The problem with the state is that it engages in aggression. You cannot oppose aggression, and favor the state. PEriod. IF the “state” does not commit aggression, then it is not a state, and we do not oppose it. You say that you oppose taxation. This is not really true, because your alternative funding mechanisms are either ridiculous and non serious (a lottery!?) or tantamount to a tax (charging a contract enforcement fee–after monopolizing the courts! … say, I guess the price charged will be Objectively Reasonable!). If your state outlaws competing defense agencies, it does this by committing aggression to stop them. Once it does this, it’s the only game in town. This permits it to charge monopoly prices, and to provide bad service. Anyone who is aware of the problem of state monopolies knows this. Any person who wants protection and justice has no choice but to use the state, and pay whatever fees it sets. This is the same as a tax, and in any event is aggression.
If you do not support this, surpise–you’re an anarchist too! If you do support this, you cannot claim to be against the initiation of force. Choose.
Stephan Kinsella, “What It Means To Be an Anarcho-Capitalist,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023):
States always tax their citizens, which is a form of aggression. They always outlaw competing defense agencies, which also amounts to aggression.
KOL231 | Let’s Talk Ethereum—Libertarianism, Anarcho-Capitalism & Blockchains
So it has to be the monopolistic provider of law and justice and force in a given community. And those two things combined, and actually either one of them implies the other – that’s far afield, but those two things are both acts of aggression. They’re basically acts of violence against innocent people who have done nothing wrong.
Kinsella comments to Steve Horwitz, Thoughts on Sciabarra, HNN:
It is not “government” per se that is the problem, as Tibor Machan has noted. We can say that a free society with no states has “government” but no states. The question is whether there is a state. A state is an entity that both taxes people and forcibly outlaws competition. There is no reason to say that private justice agencies would have these characteristics. See on this, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Private Production of Defense, http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/Hoppe.pdf
Update: See also Is Taxation Theft? with Professor Richard Salsman, where Richard Salsman argues that not only is taxation justified but so is subpoena power. This buttresses my point that once you believe in state monopoly power, this implies taxation. Note that Liebowitz here says he opposes taxation, yet they cannot decide what a charge for government services would be anyway–it is based on wealth, a flat rate, or what? I.e. whatever services the state monopolizes, it can charge whatever it wants and in any case there is no way do know what is a fair charge, so that it is impossible for the state, once it monopolizes justice services (by outlawing competition) to ever charge a fair price since it simply cannot know what to charge, just as central economic planners under socialism are always groping in the dark since they do not operate with the benefit or free market prices arrived at through competition.
I debated Salsman on whether taxation is theft:https://t.co/pHHY2gLopQ
— Michael Liebowitz (@Lieboisout) October 29, 2025
- Murray N. Rothbard, “The Inner Contradictions of the State,” in The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 179–180, citing Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press) and Randy E. Barnett, “Fuller, Law, and Anarchism,” The Libertarian Forum (February 1976): 6, at p. 7. [↩]
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