Related
- Stephan Kinsella, “How We Come To Own Ourselves,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) [LFFS]
- Kinsella, “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” in LFFS, n. 27
- Kinsella, “Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan,” in LFFS, n31
- KOL468 | Is Group Ownership and Co-ownership Communism?
- Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (2023), chs. 2, 4, 23; “Objectivists on Positive Parental Obligations and Abortion,” The Libertarian Standard (Jan. 14, 2011)
- Egads, I hate Georgism
- What Libertarianism Is, App. II: Mutualist Occupancy, in LFFS
- A Critique of Mutualist Occupancy
Query:
Dear Mr. Kinsella,
I hope you are doing well.
I consider the homesteading principle to be one of the most consistent and justified foundations for property rights. However, I have recently encountered a concern that I am struggling to resolve.
It seems reasonable to argue that an individual who the homesteading an unowned resource gains a stronger claim due to the labor invested. However, I am unsure how to evaluate the role of timing in this process.
Specifically, someone who is born earlier may have the opportunity to appropriate unowned resources simply because they exist in a world with lower population density. In contrast, those born later may find that most valuable resources have already been claimed, leaving them without similar opportunities.
This leads me to wonder: does the advantage of being “earlier” introduce a form of unfairness that challenges the moral justification of first appropriation? Or is this difference better understood as a neutral fact of reality rather than a problem for property theory?
I think a communist system of property and common use is inefficient and immoral, but this “problem brought about by the times” does confuse me.
I would greatly appreciate your thoughts on whether this concern poses a serious challenge to libertarian property theory.
Thank you for your time and for your work.
Kinsella:
No, because the only way to use resources that were never used is to be the first to use them, and this gives you a better claim to it than others. People born into the world later have to survive by trade and productivity if there is no virgin land left. It’s not unfair; there is no alternative other than preventing humans from ever acting.
Keep in mind that any parent who has a child had some positive obligations to support the child initially. See
- Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (2023), chs. 2, 4, 23; “Objectivists on Positive Parental Obligations and Abortion,” The Libertarian Standard (Jan. 14, 2011)
On the former, see:
From Stephan Kinsella, “How We Come To Own Ourselves,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) [LFFS]:
In the text above, I noted that “first use” is not the ultimate test for the “objective link” in the case of body ownership, but that rather it is a person’s direct and immediate control over his body. See also, on this, Rothbard, who argues in favor of self-ownership because the only logical alternatives are “(1) the ‘communist’ one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or (2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another—a system of rule by one class over another.”[26] However, Alternative (2) cannot be universal, as it is partial and arbitrary; and Alternative (1) either breaks down in practice and reduces to Alternative (2), or, if actually implemented, would result in the death of the human race. As Rothbard writes:
Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish. But if a world of zero or near-zero self-ownership spells death for the human race, then any steps in that direction also contravene the law of what is best for man and his life on earth.[27]
Hoppe also writes on this:
If a person A were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods voluntarily (contractually) acquired from another previous owner, then only two alternatives exist. Either another person B must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or else all persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.
In the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object of exploitation.… such a ruling must be discarded as a human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being (rational animal). From the very outset, any such ruling can be recognized as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law. For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a just rule—it is necessary that such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone.
Alternatively, in the second case of universal and equal co-ownership, the requirement of equal law for everyone is fulfilled. However, this alternative suffers from another even more severe deficiency, for if it were applied, all of mankind would instantly perish. (And since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative must be rejected.)
… This insight into the praxeological impossibility of “universal communism,” as Rothbard referred to this proposal, brings us immediately to an alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original appropriation and private property as the only correct solution to the problem of social order.[28]
And in another work, Hoppe adds:
What is wrong with this idea of dropping the prior-later distinction as morally irrelevant? First, if the late-comers, i.e., those who did not in fact do something with some scarce goods, had indeed as much of a right to them as the first-comers, i.e., those who did do something with the scarce goods, then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything, as one would have to have all of the late-comers’ consent prior to doing whatever one wanted to do. Indeed, as posterity would include one’s children’s children—people, that is, who come so late that one could never possibly ask them—advocating a legal system that does not make use of the prior-later distinction as part of its underlying property theory is simply absurd in that it implies advocating death but must presuppose life to advocate anything. Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do, or will survive and say or argue anything if one were to follow this rule. In order for any person—past, present, or future—to argue anything it must be possible to survive now. Nobody can wait and suspend acting until everyone of an indeterminate class of late-comers happens to appear and agree to what one wants to do. Rather, insofar as a person finds himself alone, he must be able to act, to use, produce, consume goods straightaway, prior to any agreement with people who are simply not around yet (and perhaps never will be).[29]
Marxist philosopher G.A. Cohen acknowledges:
people can do (virtually) nothing without using parts of the external world. If, then, they require the leave of the community to use it, then, effectively…, they do not own themselves, since they can do nothing without communal authorization.[30]
Regarding this remark by Cohen, libertarian philosopher Jan Narveson comments: “It is testimony to the strength of our position that even someone so ideologically opposed gives it clear recognition as an argument that must be confronted.”[31]
John Locke also rejected the idea that people can only use unowned resources by getting the consent of everyone else as absurd:
By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one’s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part.[32]
For a point related to those mentioned above, see Hoppe, in the Foreword:
[It is] clear what a human ethic or a theory of justice worth its salt must accomplish. It must give an answer to the question of what am I and what is every other person permitted (or not permitted) to do, right now and right here, wherever a person may find himself and whatever his external surroundings of men and materials may be.
[26] Murray N. Rothbard, “Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression,” in The Ethics of Liberty (https://mises.org/library/crusoe-social-philosophy), p. 45.
[27] Ibid., p. 46.
[28] Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Rothbardian Ethics,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pp. 383–84. See also similar comments in David Boaz, The Libertarian Mind: A Manifesto for Freedom (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 140. See also related discussion in “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society” (ch. 14), n.27 and “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7), at n.31. See also R.W. Bradford’s inane criticism of this reasoning in R.W. Bradford, “A Contrast of Visions,” Liberty 10, no.4 (March 1997; https://perma.cc/7FDT-G7FD): 57–63, at 57–58.
[29] Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 169–70 (emphasis added). See also idem, “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property,” in The Great Fiction, p. 17.
[30] G.A. Cohen, “Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality,” in Frank Lucash, ed., Justice and Equality, Here and Now (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 113–14; also in G.A. Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 93–94.
[31] Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, reissue ed. (Broadview Press, 2001), p. 74.
[32] John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690; https://www.johnlocke.net/2022/07/two-treatises-of-government.html), §29.
From Kinsella, “Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan,” in LFFS, n31:
See also Rothbard’s criticism of the “communist” rule of universal equal and other-ownership:
Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish. But if a world of zero or near-zero self-ownership spells death for the human race, then any steps in that direction also contravene the law of what is best for man and his life on earth.
Murray N. Rothbard, “Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression,” in The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 45–46, at 46, reproduced in substantially similar form in idem, “A Crusoe Social Philosophy,” Mises Daily (December 7, 2021; https://mises.org/library/crusoe-social-philosophy). See also related discussion in “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4), n.14 and “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society” (ch. 14), n.27.
For a related insight regarding the importance of the prior-later distinction and the necessity that property rights be able to answer the question of who can use what resource now, rather than waiting for some future information, otherwise people would not be able to survive because they could not use resources to produce and consume in the present, see Hoppe, “From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pp. 328–30; Hoppe, “On the Ultimate Justification of the Ethics of Private Property,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 345 (“Nobody advocating a wait-for-the-outcome ethic would be around to say anything if he took his own advice seriously. Also, to the extent that utilitarian proponents are still around, they demonstrate through their actions that their consequentialist doctrine is and must be regarded as false. Acting and proposition-making require private property rights now and cannot wait for them to be assigned only later.”); Hoppe, “Appendix: Four Critical Replies,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 407; idem, “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property,” in The Great Fiction, at section III, “Misconceptions and Clarifications.” See also Rothbard, “Beyond Is and Ought” (emphasis added):
In the modern libertarian movement, only the natural-rights libertarians have come to satisfyingly absolute libertarian conclusions. The different wings of “consequentialists”—whether emotivists, utilitarians, Stirnerites, or whatever—have tended to buckle at the seams. If, after all, one has to wait for consequences to make a firm decision, one can hardly adopt a consistent, hard-nosed stance for liberty and private property in every conceivable case.
See also Hoppe, “The Justice of Economic Efficiency,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, at 337:
While every person can have control over whether or not his actions cause the physical integrity of something to change, control over whether or not one’s actions affect the value of someone’s property to change rests with other people and their evaluations. One would have to interrogate and come to an agreement with the entire world population to make sure that one’s planned actions would not change another person’s evaluations regarding his property. Everyone would be long dead before this could ever be accomplished.
For more on the prior-later distinction, see “What Libertarianism Is” (ch. 2), at notes 32–36 and accompanying text, et pass.
From Kinsella, “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” in LFFS, n. 27:
As Rothbard argues, there are only two alternatives to self-ownership either:
1. a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B; or
2. everyone has the right to own his equal quota share of everyone else.
The first alternative implies that, while class A deserves the rights of being human, class B is in reality subhuman and, therefore, deserves no such rights. But since they are indeed human beings, the first alternative contradicts itself in denying natural human rights to one set of humans. Moreover, allowing class A to own class B means that the former is allowed to exploit and, therefore, to live parasitically at the expense of the latter; but, as economics can tell us, this parasitism itself violates the basic economic requirement for human survival: production and exchange.
The second alternative, which we might call “participatory communalism” or “communism,” holds that every man should have the right to own his equal quota share of everyone else. If there are three billion people in the world, then everyone has the right to own one-three-billionth of every other person. In the first place, this ideal itself rests upon an absurdity—proclaiming that every man is entitled to own a part of everyone else and yet is not entitled to own himself. Second, we can picture the viability of such a world—a world in which no man is free to take any action whatever without prior approval or indeed command by everyone else in society. It should be clear that in this sort of “communist” world, no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish.
Murray N. Rothbard, “Justice and Property Rights,” in Samuel L. Blumenfeld, ed., Property in a Humane Economy by (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974; https://mises.org/library/property-humane-economy), at 107–108 (emphasis added) (also published in Murray N. Rothbard, Economic Controversies (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2011; https://mises.org/library/economic-controversies)). A similar version of this article under the same title was published in Rothbard, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays, 2d ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2000 [1974]; https://mises.org/library/egalitarianism-revolt-against-nature-and-other-essays). Interestingly, the former piece, published shortly after the latter piece, appended a crucial final paragraph distancing Rothbard from some of the more leftish implications from the latter piece. See Kinsella, “Justice and Property Rights: Rothbard on Scarcity, Property, Contracts…,” The Libertarian Standard (Nov. 19, 2010) and idem, “Rothbard on the ‘Original Sin’ in Land Titles: 1969 vs. 1974,” StephanKinsella.com (Nov. 5, 2014). See Hoppe’s similar argument, discussed in “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4), n.14, and similar comments in David Boaz, The Libertarian Mind: A Manifesto for Freedom (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 140.
On Rothbard’s critique of this “communist” approach to property rights assignment, see also “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4), at n.14; “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7), at n.31; and Kinsella, “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide,” Mises Daily (May 27, 2011), at n. 1.
Comments from others:
Not a “problem brought about by times”, just a feature of reality. Is okay. Not a ruinous problem.
***
My two cents to this would be that in some ways it more unfair to the earlier homesteaders – it requires an enormous amount of effort and risk taking to locate and secure (“emborder”) a previously novel resource (crossing an ocean say, who knows what you will find).
Acquiring resources through trade is somewhat “eaiser” in that all the heavy lifting has been done. Similar to the different between buying vacant land and building on it vs simply buying an already built house.
The only situation where I could see he has a point would be in an environemnt where population expands rapidly, more rapidly than the rate of folks dying and freeing up their previously owned resources. Similar to the situation in bitcoin mining, if there is a fixed qyt of some resource (land) then it doesn’t matter how many more people you throw at it, it’s not going to expand supply (Musk winks and nods at Mars)… but this would tend to drive prices up high enough that many folks might then release those scarce goods into the market.
***
Me:
Yes. Of course, all the heavy lifting has been done. If anything we should be grateful to the pioneers. Homesteading is hard work! We get to simply trade our labor in a catallactic division-of-labor society for wealth.
I imagine that behind such questions there lurks some desire to find a Lockean proviso to make for some Georgist or leftist-mutualist crap. On that see:
- Egads, I hate Georgism
- What Libertarianism Is, App. II: Mutualist Occupancy, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023)
- A Critique of Mutualist Occupancy
