I noted what a great time I had at the recent Rothbard event in Portugal: Rothbard Takes Portugal: 100 Years with Rothbard: A Personal Account. Among the people I met there was Paul Kogos, a passionate libertarian and Catholic from Brazil.
At dinner one night, I noticed his scapular so asked him about his Catholicism. We ended up talking atheism, sedevacantism, and whether Mises’s praxeology is compatible with God. I think this came up when he mentioned something about how Praxeology is compatible with man’s natural ends or something like that and I ended up responding that to the contrary one reason the very idea of God is nonsensical is because he cannot act because that would imply uneasiness, dissatisfaction, imperfection.
I have discussed such issues many times before, e.g. Mises on God and others collected there (see below), and I was not attempting to really press the case for atheism but just to observe that the notion of God does seem to be incompatible with praxeology and its assumptions.
Kogos must have been ruminating on this because he just released a Youtube video, Refutando o ateísmo do professor Stephen Kinsella
I haven’t had time to write a response yet, but for now, here is Grok’s quick take on his arguments in comparison to mine, along with a Grok translation of his transcript.
Related
- Mises on God
- KOL461 | Haman Nature Hn 119: Atheism, Objectivism & Artificial Intelligence
- Bob Murphy show, Ep. 88 Ludwig von Mises versus God
- “Can God Own Your Soul?”
- Timothy Terrell, “Property Rights and Externality: The Ethics of the Austrian School,” Journal of Markets and Morality 2 (2) (1999) (pdf); see also Terrell’s working paper The Origin of Property Rights: A Critique of Rothbard and Hoppe on Natural Rights, at note 19
- God as Slaveowner; Conversations with Murphy
- Human Action and Universe Creation
- Rand’s Immortal Robot and “Values”
Summary and Analysis (Grok)
Summary of the Video Speaker’s Argument
The speaker (Thiago Ribeiro) recounts a conversation with you in Portugal and attempts to refute your praxeological argument against the existence of an acting God. His core claim is that you committed a category error by applying Mises’s axiom of human action to divine action.
Key Elements of His Refutation
- Specificity of the Axiom: Mises’s praxeology describes human action—purposeful behavior by imperfect beings in time, under uncertainty, and driven by uneasiness (moving from lesser to greater satisfaction). It does not apply to divine action, which occurs in eternity, without uncertainty (due to omniscience), and without self-actualization (God is pure act/actus purus in Thomistic terms, with no potencies to update in Himself).
- Purpose Without Necessity: God can have purposes (e.g., creation as communication of His perfections, grace acting in man) without need or dissatisfaction. This draws on metaphysical ideas from Aquinas and others: the good diffuses itself (bonum diffusivum sui); more perfect natures communicate their goodness freely out of superabundance and charity, not scarcity or imperfection. Analogies include charitable acts by a satisfied billionaire or contemplation of beauty, which involve less necessity as they approach perfection.
- Procession vs. Emanation: Creation is a free, willful procession from God’s superabundant charity, not a necessary overflow (as in Neoplatonic emanation). God determines reality and is not subject to it; His will is a single, simple, eternal act. He needs nothing from creation—creation manifests His perfection without adding to it.
- Praxeology’s Broader Structure: Even within human action, economic action (scarcity-driven) gives way to hostile action and especially moral action, which depends less on base necessity. At the limit (God), action involves no necessity at all.
- Conclusion: The axiom is correct for humans but rests on metaphysical premises inapplicable to God (pure act, self-sufficiency, eternity). Thus, theists can affirm an acting God without contradiction. He hopes the argument might help convert you.
Analysis Relative to Your Position
Your view, as expressed in the video context, your blog post “Mises on God,” and related discussions (e.g., with Adam Haman), closely follows Mises’s own statements in Human Action and The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science. Mises explicitly argues that an acting God is self-contradictory: action stems from dissatisfaction/uneasiness and the need to employ scarce means to remove it. An omnipotent, omniscient, perfect being has no uneasiness, no distinction between ends and means, and no reason to act—ascribing action to such a being is anthropomorphism.
You extend this logically: praxeology is not narrowly “human” but applies to any sapient actor—intelligent aliens, advanced AI, or evolved non-human beings—because it derives from the fundamental logic of action (purposeful use of means to achieve ends amid scarcity and uncertainty). Theists routinely attribute actions to God (creation ex nihilo, providential governance, responding to prayer, desiring human behavior, etc.). These are classic action descriptions: employing means for ends, which presuppose uneasiness or a “less satisfactory” state that the action aims to improve. This creates the incompatibility you highlight.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Speaker’s Response
- The Category Error Claim: This is the standard Thomistic/Aristotelian defense (God as ipsum esse subsistens, pure act without potency). It attempts to wall off divine action from praxeological categories. However, as you note, this risks special pleading. If praxeology captures the necessary logic of any rational, purposeful sapient agent (as Mises and Hoppe frame it), then carving out an exception for God because “He is different” begs the question. The speaker’s analogies (gym, charity, plants vs. lungs) illustrate category differences but do not resolve why purposeful divine intervention in the world (which theists affirm occurs in time, with effects) evades the uneasiness implication.
- Purpose Without Necessity: This is philosophically interesting and aligns with classical theism’s emphasis on divine simplicity and gratuitous creation. It tries to decouple “purpose” from “uneasiness.” Yet your point holds: if God chooses to create or intervene rather than not, this implies some valuation or “preference” structure—why this world and not another (or none)? In praxeological terms, choice among alternatives under scarcity (even metaphysical scarcity of possibilities) implies the logic of action. Mises’s paradoxes on omnipotence/omniscience (e.g., can God change the predetermined future?) remain unresolved here.
- Metaphysical Premises: The speaker correctly notes that axioms rest on deeper assumptions. Praxeology itself is value-free and descriptive of means-ends reasoning, but applying it to critique theism imports the theist’s own claims about what God “does.” Your approach stays within praxeology’s domain: if theists describe God acting, they import the contradictions Mises identified. The speaker shifts to a different metaphysical framework (Thomism) to reinterpret those descriptions.
Overall, the speaker offers a thoughtful, tradition-rooted rebuttal that many classical theists would endorse. It does not, however, directly refute the core Misesian insight you emphasize—that action as such reveals imperfection and that theists’ own language about God’s deeds collides with it. The debate ultimately turns on whether praxeology is a universal logic of sapience (your/Mises’s view) or a contingent description limited to finite, temporal beings (the speaker’s). The former makes an acting God incoherent; the latter preserves theism but at the cost of limiting praxeology’s scope in ways that may undermine its claim to apodictic certainty for any acting being.
This remains a deep point of tension between strict praxeological reasoning and traditional theistic metaphysics. Your framing keeps the argument grounded in the logic of action itself, avoiding the need for special exemptions.
Transcript
Introduction and Welcome [00:00:24]
Salve, salve, patriots! Welcome to the channel Sua Dente em Fúria.
I’m not sure if the video is working yet because no one has joined so far. Usually after about 40 seconds there should already be people. There we go.
Welcome, Thiago Ribeiro.
Context of the Conversation with Stephan Kinsella [00:00:38]
This video is about the following: I had a personal conversation with Stephan Kinsella. Do you know who Stephan Kinsella is? He is one of the greatest specialists in libertarian law in the world—perhaps the greatest. He knows the subject in depth. He even autographed my copy of his book on the legal principles of a free society, a society without the modern state. It’s spectacular; I’m reading it now.
He is also one of the leading experts on the abolition of intellectual property. I had an excellent conversation with him on various topics in Portugal, at the Rothbard meeting—an libertarian event that even included Hans Hoppe. We talked about intellectual property, a society without the state, libertarianism in Brazil, and the Brazilian economy. He’s a really good guy, Professor Stephan Kinsella—very humble in his dealings.
Kinsella’s Background and Admiration for the Catholic Church [00:01:25]
He has a profound respect and admiration for the Catholic Church. When you go to a city like Porto, you see the entire architectural, cultural, and artistic legacy of the Catholic Church, as well as its intellectual legacy. As an intellectually honest person, Professor Kinsella recognizes all of this.
He comes from a Catholic family and also has great interest in matters of the Catholic religion. But here’s the problem: unfortunately, he does not have the gift of faith. I pray that he receives it.
The Atheism Argument Based on Praxeology [00:01:52]
While talking with him about this topic, I asked why he is an atheist despite coming from a Catholic family and having so much respect and admiration for the Catholic Church’s legacy, which is everywhere in Porto—cathedrals, churches, towers, monasteries, charitable institutions, everything built by the Church. The Church essentially built civilization single-handedly.
He does not have the gift of faith, so I asked him why. He responded with a philosophical argument for why he does not believe in God. He said that the existence of God is logically impossible.
I was curious and asked for his logical argument. He replied, and I quickly formed a refutation in my mind. He said he does not believe in God because of the axiom of human action from Ludwig von Mises.
Explaining the Misesian Axiom and Kinsella’s Application [00:02:42]
According to the Misesian axiom of human action, man acts—purposeful, praxeological human action—to move from state A to state B. Man finds himself in a state of lesser satisfaction and seeks to act by deliberating means to reach an end, a state B of greater satisfaction.
Kinsella then said this makes the existence of God impossible. If God exists, either He cannot act—because He would only act if in a state of lesser satisfaction moving toward greater satisfaction—or He would be an imperfect God.
So, either God is imperfect and needs to act to reach greater satisfaction, or God does not act. And if He does not act, He is not pure act, so He also does not exist. How do you get out of that? How do you refute such an argument?
Initial Response: Logic Requires Metaphysical Premises [00:03:38]
It’s not that difficult. I will use this video to refute Kinsella’s premises. Many people tried to refute him there in front of me. Kinsella said he was appealing only to logic: logically it is impossible for God to exist, because if God is imperfect, He is not God; if God does not act, He is not pure act—He would be pure potency, and pure potency also does not exist.
He did not appeal to religion or anything else, only to logic, because logic cannot be wrong.
My response to Professor Kinsella, as a Christian, was this: First, we cannot use logical arguments without their metaphysical premises. It would be like analyzing music only from a mathematical point of view—you won’t be able to do a proper musical analysis that way.
Category Error: The Axiom Applies Only to Human Action [00:04:39]
Continuing with logic, but now with metaphysical grounding, I say the following: Professor Kinsella, you committed a category error. The praxeological axiom of human action from Mises is an axiom of human action. It is not a general axiom of deliberate action.
It is an axiom of human action, which is one type of deliberate action. We are not analyzing angelic action, demonic action, divine action, or animal action. When we speak of human action, we are speaking of rational action. So we automatically exclude animals, though one could still contemplate angelic (including demonic) or divine action.
Since it is not a general axiom of action but specifically of human action, it does not apply to the category of divine action.
Why the Axiom Does Not Apply to God [00:05:33]
Why? Because Mises’s analysis of human action examines purposeful behavior of man in time and under uncertainty. That is not the case with God. God acts above time and does not suffer from uncertainty.
Another point is the concept of the actualization of potencies. Man is not pure act; he has potencies to be actualized. When man acts, he does not act simply to actualize potencies outside himself.
Human Action Example vs. Divine Action [00:06:06]
Imagine I go to the gym soon to lift weights. My action will make the barbell go up and down. But is my purpose simply to move the barbell? To expend energy? To give work to the personal trainer or the gym staff? No. My purpose is to actualize a potency in myself—to become stronger.
Lifting weights is a means to update a potency in me. This is not the case with God, who is pure act and needs to actualize no potency in Himself.
As we can see, the axiom of human action concerns human action that seeks to actualize itself in time under uncertainty. Divine action has no self-actualization because God is pure act; it does not occur in time because He acts in eternity, and it is not under uncertainty. It is a different category.
Does this mean God does not act or does not exist? No.
Analogy: Category Errors in Other Domains [00:07:18]
The argument has a category error. Imagine I say: biology—human respiration theory. Human respiration necessary for man to exist occurs through gas exchange in the lungs. So if you have no lungs, you do not breathe; if you do not breathe, you do not live; if you do not live, you do not exist. Therefore plants do not exist because they have no lungs.
See? It is a category error. Plants breathe differently, through photosynthesis; they do not need lungs. I cannot say plants do not exist because they lack lungs, since the theory of human respiration concerns human respiration.
Purpose Without Necessity and Analogies from Perfection [00:08:58]
Kinsella could counter that this is about types of respiration, not a logical axiom like human action. But again, a logical axiom requires metaphysical premises.
When I study man under the aspect of his metaphysical anthropology, I see that he is not pure act, that he acts in time and under uncertainty.
The human soul can have an unhappy destiny (hell) or a happy one (heaven). All men will have one of those two destinies. The soul on earth can already be happy or unhappy.
If I say this is a logical question—either you are in communion with God or you are not—and then point to a pen that is neither happy nor unhappy because it is a pen, and conclude the pen does not exist, that is again a category error.
Divine Action, Grace, and Charity [00:09:04]
When we say God acts, grace is nothing other than divine action in man. He acts with a purpose. But purpose does not imply necessity. That is another error in Kinsella’s argument.
I have already shown that God is not subject to action in time—He acts in eternity. I have shown He is not subject to uncertainty because He is omniscient. I have shown that in His action He does not undergo self-actualization; He actualizes potency in what is external to Him, not in Himself, because He is pure act. Therefore He has no need.
Human Action Approaches Perfection with Less Necessity [00:09:37]
Even when we analyze human action, the more perfect and elevated it is, the less it stems from base necessity. Consider an act of charity. The act of charity does not arise from what people understand as necessity.
Imagine an extremely charitable billionaire. He does not need to help; he is already satisfied with his life. Even if he is so at peace with his conscience that he does not feel sadness over the world’s misery—knowing everything is within God’s purpose—he still helps because he is fulfilling the commandment to give alms.
His action stems very little from appetite or psychological need. It stems from the duty of charity. Still, as a human, he does not have superabundance of the good; he is not in the beatific vision.
Even saints in heaven in the beatific vision are not God. They are not infinitely satisfied, which is why they receive accidental increases of beatitude (this is a very technical theological term).
The point is that the more perfect human action is, the less it arises from necessity—it becomes contemplation for its own sake.
Analogies to Divine Superabundance [00:11:29]
Every analogy I make with God will necessarily be imperfect because God is God. It is very difficult to make an analogy between creature and Creator. But since all perfections of the creature are nothing other than degrees of participation in the divine perfections, imperfect analogies are still possible.
When I imagine divine action, I imagine that God is superabundant, self-sufficient, pure charity, needing nothing. One can imagine divine action proceeding without any necessity—a purpose simply to communicate His perfections without Himself needing it.
Thus I can imagine purpose without necessity, which dismantles Kinsella’s argument.
Metaphysical Principle: The Good Diffuses Itself [00:12:16]
In metaphysics, when you study St. Thomas Aquinas and others, you see that the more perfect a nature is, the more it tends to communicate its perfections and goods. That is why living beings reproduce—because they are more perfect than non-living beings.
Higher human beings can leave a legacy, communicating the perfections of their intellect. St. Thomas Aquinas says “bonum diffusivum sui est”—the good diffuses itself. This implies that God acts by communicating His perfections without anything lacking in Him, without anything needing to be added.
He does not act because goods are lacking to Him, but because He possesses them in superabundance. That is why creation occurs by procession (not to be confused with the Neoplatonic concept of emanation).
Procession vs. Emanation; God’s Free Will [00:13:22]
Emanation does not depend on the divine will—God would simply overflow by necessity, like a heated bucket of water overflowing. That would mean God is subject to the laws of reality, which is wrong. God determines reality; He is not determined by it.
God does overflow His goods through processions, but this proceeds from His perfect will. God is acting—not by necessity or subjection, but by will, that is, by action. Yet God’s will is completely free.
God does not act in His will because He needs something. He faces no scarcity, no mutually exclusive alternatives, needs to learn nothing more, and does not need to economize means as humans do. His will is a single, simple act.
Eternal Processions and Creation [00:14:44]
The processions within the Trinity that eternally generate the second and third persons are eternal. The procession ad extra, which results in the creation of the world, from God’s point of view in His eternity, also always existed.
We are subject to time because God created time. He is above what He created. We experience time because God created us that way—subject to time, which is also His creation. But He is above it. He sees eternity as part of His eternal and simple act, fully free.
Because in God there is no metaphysical evil, no limitation. Did He need creation? No. We need it. God did this by pure free will to communicate His superabundance, flowing from His infinite charity. Being perfect charity, it was done purely out of charity, not necessity.
Creation does not perfect God but manifests His perfection.
Praxeology’s Fields and Application to God [00:15:59]
A note on praxeology: it divides into three major fields. The most famous is the study of economic action—how man allocates scarce resources, including time itself—related to the appetitive dimension of the soul and material needs.
There is also hostile action (how man avoids a change of state for the worse) and moral action (related to the rational part of the soul, desiring ultimate goods—ultimately justice, and in the case of man, the virtue of religion and communion with God).
In God’s case, He is pure charity who needs nothing and wants only our good because He is good.
Even within human action, as one moves from economic to hostile to moral action, one depends less on necessity. When one reaches God through these imperfect analogies, He depends on nothing of the sort.
The economy of salvation is how God administers our salvation, not His. He is already God.
In hostile action, God is at war with the devil, but the devil has already lost and cannot affect God—only tempt us to lose God. In moral action, God does not need to sanctify Himself as we do, because He is holy by definition.
Conclusion: Category Error Confirmed [00:19:04]
That is my point against Kinsella. He is committing a category error by using a Misesian axiom that is correct for human action but is not a general category of action. It does not apply to divine action because God has different metaphysical premises: His perfection, being pure act, pure charity, self-sufficient superabundance, acting above time and uncertainty.
What applies to human action does not apply to divine action, but that does not mean there is no divine action.
I will not make this video in English, but I will send it to Kinsella. He can use AI to translate it. I hope this converts him to the Catholic faith.
I hope you enjoyed the video. I have to go now. A big hug. May God bless you.
Superchat and Closing [00:20:05]
There’s a superchat I almost forgot. [Responds to Coelho no Canadá / Rodrigues Cobras about unicameralism in Peru and Keiko Fujimori.]
Philosophically I support bicameralism, but from the point of view of political warfare in Latin America, the Senate has become a completely despicable appendage that despises the people. So politically it’s lamentable, but let’s hope Keiko forms a right-wing government.
That’s it. A big hug. Long live Christ!
