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I was a guest on the Bill Handel Show today discussing the libertarian perspective on blackmail, with reference to the Tiger Woods and other cases. (See my post Blackmail should be legal: the case of David Letterman.) We also touched on common law versus legislation (see my Legislation and Law in a Free Society), intellectual property, reputation rights and defamation law, prostitution, and extortion. Handel, though apparently not a libertarian, was a very smart and fair host. [For files, see the Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 32]. It it will be up later on the Bill Handel Show podcast.

Someone put up YouTube versions:

[Mises; AM]

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[Mises post; AM post; archived comments below]

John Perry Barlow‘s 1994 Wired article, “The Economy of Ideas: A framework for patents and copyrights in the Digital Age,” tagged: “(Everything you know about intellectual property is wrong.)”, is a classic. Written at the dawn of the Internet, it’s amazing how non-dated it is. It’s a fascinating, well-written, and insightful paper about the problems of applying classical notions of IP to the digital age. A few choice nuggets:

Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain digitized expression any more than real estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting spectrum (which, in fact, rather resembles what is being attempted here). We will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances.
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Estoppel – Argumentation Ethics – Aggression

Interesting thread in the Mises Forums, started by “liberty student”: Estoppel – Argumentation Ethics – Aggression.

Update: Another interesting thread is the anti-state.com forum The Great Hoppe Debate, which discussed Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan; see also Hülsmann on Argumentation Ethics; Revisiting Argumentation Ethics, Mises and Argumentation Ethics.

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Estoppel – Argumentation Ethics – Aggression:

First page pasted below:

liberty student Posted: Thu, May 21 2009 12:56 AM

I have a problem with estoppel, it could be a problem only with my ability to understand it, as applied by Stephan Kinsella as part of argumentation ethics.  From wikipedia,

The “estoppel” theory of Stephan Kinsella draws on Hoppe’s theory. Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim’s agents or heirs, i.e. he is “estopped” from withholding consent, because by committing aggression he commits himself to the proposition that the use of force is legitimate, and therefore, his withholding consent based on his right not to be physically harmed contradicts his aggressive legitimation of force.

I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor.  I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.

The problem I have (and could be totally wrong on) is that a particular action can transmute or nullify a principle.

I see this with anti-capitalists/mutualists sometimes, when people claim that you can steal from WalMart because WalMart is a state fiction (corporation) and because the state is illegit, then WalMart technically has no ownership.

But it seems to me that just because the state licenses something, doesn’t invalidate the contract or the title to the property being licensed.  If that was so, it would be an internal contradiction, because if the state is illegit, then how can it legitimately transmute property titles from one form to another?  Surely they revert to their original form (if they ever left their original form at all).

I’m having trouble explaining this with regards to estoppel, but that if someone can create exception to the NAP by aggression, then does aggression invalidate non-aggression?

Anyone with me?

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Nitroadict replied on Thu, May 21 2009 1:38 AM

 

 liberty student:

 

I have a problem with estoppel, it could be a problem only with my ability to understand it, as applied by Stephan Kinsella as part of argumentation ethics.  From wikipedia,

The “estoppel” theory of Stephan Kinsella draws on Hoppe’s theory. Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim’s agents or heirs, i.e. he is “estopped” from withholding consent, because by committing aggression he commits himself to the proposition that the use of force is legitimate, and therefore, his withholding consent based on his right not to be physically harmed contradicts his aggressive legitimation of force.

I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor.  I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.

The problem I have (and could be totally wrong on) is that a particular action can transmute or nullify a principle.

I see this with anti-capitalists/mutualists sometimes, when people claim that you can steal from WalMart because WalMart is a state fiction (corporation) and because the state is illegit, then WalMart technically has no ownership.

But it seems to me that just because the state licenses something, doesn’t invalidate the contract or the title to the property being licensed.  If that was so, it would be an internal contradiction, because if the state is illegit, then how can it legitimately transmute property titles from one form to another?  Surely they revert to their original form (if they ever left their original form at all).

I’m having trouble explaining this with regards to estoppel, but that if someone can create exception to the NAP by aggression, then does aggression invalidate non-aggression?

Anyone with me?

 

Somewhat, yes.  I am only slightly lost since I haven’t read up on estoppel, myself. 

Sleep will probably make this topic easier to tackle.

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liberty student replied on Thu, May 21 2009 1:47 AM

That is my problem.  I’m seeing the same contradiction, although I can’t explain it as clearly (probably because I have only been thinking about this new one, estoppel, for a few days) and perhaps I am completely wrong.

We believe in non-aggression.  We would not commit aggression against someone who hasn’t committed aggression.

But based on estoppel we would aggress against someone who committed aggression first, because their aggression invalidates any claim they have to not be aggressed against.

While I understand the aggressor cannot claim non-aggression is wrong, given that he is an aggressor himself, I do not necessarily see why his aggression validates me, or you, or someone else to use aggression against this individual.  In a sense, we’re saying that if someone aggresses, then it’s on like cheech and chong.  We can all aggress against them.

But my understanding of the non-aggression principle is not based on using aggression as punishment, regardless of the circumstance or justification provided by the guilty party.  Just as my understanding of property rights cannot be altered just because the state has become a licensor.

One further thought for people who understand estoppel well.  If someone aggresses, and that validates aggression as punishment, is this individual now a marked man, where anyone can aggress against him in perpetuity, because his one aggressive act invalidated his claim to non-aggression against himself now and in the future?

 

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hayekianxyz replied on Thu, May 21 2009 3:26 AM

The point is that any coercion against the initial aggressor has to be proportional, moreover, it would have to aimed at restitution, not retribution.

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liberty student replied on Thu, May 21 2009 3:33 AM

 

 GilesStratton:
it would have to aimed at restitution, not retribution.

 

Ok, that is huge.  Basically explains it all then.

Thanks Giles.

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hayekianxyz replied on Thu, May 21 2009 4:59 AM

 

 liberty student:

 

 

 GilesStratton:
it would have to aimed at restitution, not retribution.

 

Ok, that is huge.  Basically explains it all then.

Thanks Giles.

 

 

I was very pleased with myself until I realised you were being sarcastic.

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Jon Irenicus replied on Thu, May 21 2009 5:39 AM

 

I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor.  I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.

 

It doesn’t. It just means the aggressor has no leg to stand on if they do attempt to punish their punisher. It isn’t about what courts will do as opposed to what they won’t do: prosecute any attempt to make good the victim, within the bounds of proportionality. At least I understand it this way.

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Thedesolateone replied on Thu, May 21 2009 8:17 AM

 

 liberty student:
I do not necessarily see why his aggression validates me, or you, or someone else to use aggression against this individual.

 

The key problem for me with regards to action vs. previously occurred (and not ongoing) aggression is of knowledge/uncertainty.

Every judicial judgement is subjective not only in its terms, but also in its verdict (i.e. guilty or not guilty). There is no objective proof that one can provide that an individual is an aggressor. Thus, while there me be some situations where it would be moral to aggress against an “aggressor” after the event; we can never practically experience any of these situations because we will be unable to say someone is indubitably guilty.

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Brainpolice replied on Thu, May 21 2009 8:41 AM

Here was my short critique of the estoppel argument:

 

 

One of the more recent attempts to provide a foundation for punishment and proportionality has been what Stephen Kinsella calls ―the estoppel argument. Kinsella has summarized the estoppel argument as follows:

“I will thus seek to justify punishment exactly where it needs to be justified: at the point at which we attempt to inflict punishment upon a person who opposes the punishment. In short, we may punish one who has initiated force, in a manner proportionate to his initiation of force and to the consequences thereof, exactly because he cannot coherently object to such punishment. It makes no sense for him to object to punishment, because this requires that he maintain that the infliction of force is wrong, which is contradictory because he intentionally initiated force himself. Thus, he is estopped, to use related legal terminology, or precluded, from denying the legitimacy of his being punished, from withholding his consent.”

 

 

The first thing to point out about this line of argument is that it seems to presume precisely what it must prove, namely, that the individual in question cannot or does not have a rational argument against punishment. It does not make sense to proclaim that the very act of the individual arguing implicitly justifies Kinsella‘s argument; that would be little more than a rhetorical trick. We must note that Kinsella‘s statement here simplifies the non-aggression principle and assumes it as a common starting point with the same meaning or implication to all parties. At best, his argument may intuitively make sense in that it would be hypocritical for someone to murder someone and then demand not to be murdered.

 

 

Yet the problem with this argument is that it falls prey to itself, via something we have pointed out already in our exposition of the issue of punishment and proportionality: veiled behind the rhetoric of the argument, the proponent of the estoppel argument is trying to claim that the initiation of force is wrong and that it is justified for them (or some other individual or group) to initiate force at the same time, because someone else has initiated force. In other words, it could equally be argued that the proponent of punishment is being a hypocrite because they are claiming the right (or the right of some 3rd party of punishment enforcers) to aggress (not in self-defense) while simultaneously trying to make a non-aggression argument. Hence, the proponent of the estoppel argument could likewise be ―estopped‖. While the estoppel argument is an attempt at justifying a particular view of justice by making use of consistency, it is not consistent itself.

 

 

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JackCuyler replied on Thu, May 21 2009 8:56 AM

 

 liberty student:
We believe in non-aggression.  We would not commit aggression against someone who hasn’t committed aggression.

 

This statement, logically, leaves open the possibility of aggression against someone who has committed aggression.

 

 liberty student:
But based on estoppel we would aggress against someone who committed aggression first, because their aggression invalidates any claim they have to not be aggressed against.

 

This provides, or attempts to provide, justification for using agression against someone who has committed aggression.  There is no contradiction from the first statement, as the first statement only deals with “someone who hasn’t committed aggression.”

As for being a “marked man”, I would say, no.  It’s closer to the two-fold restitution Rothbard calls for.  That is, if I steal $50 from you, you have every right to that $50 back, and further, I have no moral standing to stop you from taking an additional $50 from me.

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whipitgood replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:11 AM

 

 Kinsella:
It makes no sense for him to object to punishment, because this requires that he maintain that the infliction of force is wrong, which is contradictory because he intentionally initiated force himself.

 

What if the individual in question believes that his initiation of force was legitimate, but any attempt to coerce him would be illegitimate? Perhaps this is what Kinsella was addressing when he said that the aggressor cannot make a ‘coherent’ argument in his favor?

 

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ivanfoofoo replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:20 AM

I believe that the initial aggressor can be punished only proportionally to the aggressive act he commited. The “right” to engage in “self-defense” or “punishment” (it doesn’t matter what the objective of the aggression is, because what it actually matters is the “proportionality” boundary) is property of the assaulted. He is in full liberty to do what he wants to his right. Every argument that the aggressor puts in his favor, should be voluntarily accepted or ignored by the rightful proprietor of the right.

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whipitgood replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:20 AM

 

 JackCuyler:
As for being a “marked man”, I would say, no.  It’s closer to the two-fold restitution Rothbard calls for.  That is, if I steal $50 from you, you have every right to that $50 back, and further, I have no moral standing to stop you from taking an additional $50 from me.

 

Could I also steal $50 from you? Could anyone take $50 from you, since your actions would preclude you from claiming the right to not be aggressed against? Where do you draw the line between two-fold restitution, and the ‘marked man’ situation that LS was worried about?

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ivanfoofoo replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:24 AM

 

 liberty student:

 

One further thought for people who understand estoppel well.  If someone aggresses, and that validates aggression as punishment, is this individual now a marked man, where anyone can aggress against him in perpetuity, because his one aggressive act invalidated his claim to non-aggression against himself now and in the future?

 

 

He is a marked man while his action is not restituted to the victim.

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Brainpolice replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:27 AM

Well it seems like you guys have reached the classic dillema of: who exactly has the “right to punish”? Is punishment like a “commons” that anyone can “homestead” and thereafter it is “consumed” or “used up”? Is punishment the exclusive right of the victim to enforce (and what if the victim is dead)? Is punishment the exclusive right of a particular legal body or organization (and how would this meaningfully differ from the state as we know it)? Morever, there’s the question of whether or not many so-called “punishments” in general may actually constitute unecessary initiations of aggression.

Personally, I’ve yet to see a fully satisfying answer to this. As far as I’m concerned, the vast majority of theories of punishment (violent punishment in particular) are like a huge hole in the non-aggresion principle. I’m tempted to simply say that noone officially has a “right to punish” and that there may very well be something wrong with the traditional notion of punishment altogether (by the very least, I fully reject all retribution theories). This puts my views on violence closer to that of Robert LeFevere and Roy Halliday, although I’m actually not a pacifist.

 

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ivanfoofoo replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:40 AM

The right to punish belongs to the victim. If I (and I wasn’t the victim) punish the aggressor, then I will have to argue with the victim, to check if the punishment I gave “used up” some of his right of aggression to him, or not (this means that now I became a new aggressor).

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Brainpolice replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:46 AM

 

 ivanfoofoo:

The right to punish belongs to the victim. If I (and I wasn’t the victim) punish the aggressor, then I will have to argue with the victim, to check if the punishment I gave “used up” some of his right of aggression to him, or not (this means that now I became a new aggressor).

 

By “punish” do you mean “to enact violence on an offender, but for reasons other than self-defense”? Or do you mean “an attempt at either repossesion or restitution, in which violence is necessary only in conditions of escalation and explicit resistance”? My view would be closer to the latter – I support the right of victims (or 3rd parties contracted by victims) to engage in repossession and restitution, but I don’t think the explicit use of violence is necessary in the process of reposession or restitution, except in rare circumstances in which there is escalation and an overt threat of violent resistance.

I do not support any form of death penalty or torture as punishment, however – it is dubious to me that these somehow are consistent with the non-initiation of aggression. For the most part, I do not think that violence is necessary for justice beyond explicit self-defense, and I categorically distinguish self-defense from violent punishment. Violent punishment, as traditionally concieved, seems to be a form of ex-post facto violence that is not necessarily the same thing as self-defense at all.

 

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ivanfoofoo replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:53 AM

By “punish” if refer to “an attempt at either repossesion or restitution, or to enact violence on an offender, given the proportionality of the aggression.” I only support torture to torturers, and death penalty to murderers, to make myself clear. Given that, I do not “morally” support them, it’s in the victim’s decision what to do.

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Stephen replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:56 AM

 

 liberty student:
I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor.  I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.

 

 

 liberty student:
I’m having trouble explaining this with regards to estoppel, but that if someone can create exception to the NAP by aggression, then does aggression invalidate non-aggression?

 

I know exactly what you mean. But, I don’t think that punishment can be considered aggression. aggression is always invasive and initiatory. Punishment is a response. They are both a use of force, but they not moral equivalents. One can be justified and the other cannot, which is the entire point of the estoppel argument in the first place.

Also, the criminal implicitly consents to punishment because he demonstrates that he considers the use of force acceptable.

 

 

Thus A, because of his earlier action, is estopped from claiming that aggression is wrong. (And if he cannot even claim that aggression — the initiation of force — is wrong, then he cannot make the subsidiary claim that retaliatory force is wrong.) He cannot assert contradictory claims; he is estopped from doing so. The only way to maintain consistency is to drop one of his claims. If he retains (only) the claim “aggression is proper,” then he is failing to object to his imprisonment, and thus the question of justifying the punishment does not arise. By claiming that aggression is proper, he consents to his punishment.

 

 

 

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Brainpolice replied on Thu, May 21 2009 9:59 AM

 

 ivanfoofoo:

By “punish” if refer to “an attempt at either repossesion or restitution, or to enact violence on an offender, given the proportionality of the aggression.” I only support torture to torturers, and death penalty to murderers, to make myself clear. Given that, I do not “morally” support them, it’s in the victim’s decision what to do.

 

On a certain level, I support “the right of vigilantaism” in the sense of victims themselves having a right to repossess stolen property or to extract restitution. However, I do not support explicitly violent vigalantaism, and think that half the reason why organized defense of some sort becomes preferable is precisely because vigilantaism has tended to involve the perpetuation of a bunch of small-scale violent feuds, while organized defense provides the strength of numbers that makes violent resistance a futile endeavor for an offender. I would view a purely vigilantai justice system as impractical and perhaps sometimes a bit too much of a license to the arbitrary whims of victims to then go on to enact excessive and unecessary violence or destruction.

 

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Brainpolice replied on Thu, May 21 2009 10:02 AM

 

 Stephen Forde:

 

 liberty student:
I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor.  I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.

 

 

 liberty student:
I’m having trouble explaining this with regards to estoppel, but that if someone can create exception to the NAP by aggression, then does aggression invalidate non-aggression?

 

I know exactly what you mean. But, I don’t think that punishment can be considered aggression. aggression is always invasive and initiatory. Punishment is a response. They are both a use of force, but they not moral equivalents. One can be justified and the other cannot, which is the entire point of the estoppel argument in the first place.

Also, the criminal implicitly consents to punishment because he demonstrates that he considers the use of force acceptable.

 

 

Thus A, because of his earlier action, is estopped from claiming that aggression is wrong. (And if he cannot even claim that aggression — the initiation of force — is wrong, then he cannot make the subsidiary claim that retaliatory force is wrong.) He cannot assert contradictory claims; he is estopped from doing so. The only way to maintain consistency is to drop one of his claims. If he retains (only) the claim “aggression is proper,” then he is failing to object to his imprisonment, and thus the question of justifying the punishment does not arise. By claiming that aggression is proper, he consents to his punishment.

 

 

 

 

“Also, the criminal implicitly consents to punishment because he demonstrates that he considers the use of force acceptable.”

Here’s the problem: this very same argument can be used against the proponent of punishment or the punisher. They have clearly used force and they clearly think that the use of force is acceptable. This leads to an infinite regress and a potential defacto excuse for anyone’s claim to a “right to punish”. Punishment certainly *cannot* be absolutely categorically separated from aggression. Punishment in the form of inflicting physical harm or death onto someone is clearly a form of aggression. Someone who claims the right to shoot someone to death as “punishment” is just as prone to this form or type of argument as anyone else.

The estoppel argument thus reduces to this: because person A has inflicted physical harm or death onto person B, person A cannot have a reasonable objection to anyone else in the world inflicting physical harm or death on them. The way that the estoppel argument is phrased, this should be its implicit conclusion.

On the other hand, if this is meant to be restricted to being exclusively a matter between person A and person B, we run into the problem of the fact that person B’s ex-post facto violence on person A no longer is “self-defense” in any explicit sense, and if person B is dead, choosing their family as suddenly gaining a “right to punish” seems arbitrary and biased.

 

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JackCuyler replied on Thu, May 21 2009 10:04 AM

 

 whipitgood:
Could I also steal $50 from you? Could anyone take $50 from you, since your actions would preclude you from claiming the right to not be aggressed against? Where do you draw the line between two-fold restitution, and the ‘marked man’ situation that LS was worried about?

 

As quoted by the OP, “Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim’s agents or heirs….”  I thought it quite clear, then, that Kinsella’s estoppel theory involves only the victim and/or the victim’s agents or heirs.

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wilderness replied on Thu, May 21 2009 10:12 AM

 

 Brainpolice:

 

I do not support any form of death penalty or torture as punishment, however – it is dubious to me that these somehow are consistent with the non-initiation of aggression. For the most part, I do not think that violence is necessary for justice beyond explicit self-defense, and I categorically distinguish self-defense from violent punishment. Violent punishment, as traditionally concieved, seems to be a form of ex-post facto violence that is not necessarily the same thing as self-defense at all.

 

 

I see this difference in definition between self-defense and (violent) punishment.  I’m not sure though how somebody not initiating aggression is consistent with death penalty and torture.  That’s a big leap in deciding how any individual will handle aggression, in other words, looks too modeled instead of relying on first hand accounts of the event.

I wouldn’t even say the NAP and punishment are contradictions.  NAP and self-defense/punishment are two different concepts of context.  Stephen Forde gave good definitions in this thread.  NAP is not to initiate force.  Self-defense and punishment are not initiating force, for the answer to this is in your own post here – they are “ex-post facto”.  Where’s the conflict in this rational?

 

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Brainpolice replied on Thu, May 21 2009 10:21 AM

 

 wilderness:

 

 Brainpolice:

 

I do not support any form of death penalty or torture as punishment, however – it is dubious to me that these somehow are consistent with the non-initiation of aggression. For the most part, I do not think that violence is necessary for justice beyond explicit self-defense, and I categorically distinguish self-defense from violent punishment. Violent punishment, as traditionally concieved, seems to be a form of ex-post facto violence that is not necessarily the same thing as self-defense at all.

 

 

I see this difference in definition between self-defense and (violent) punishment.  I’m not sure though how somebody not initiating aggression is consistent with death penalty and torture.  That’s a big leap in deciding how any individual will handle aggression, in other words, looks too modeled instead of relying on first hand accounts of the event.

I wouldn’t even say the NAP and punishment are contradictions.  NAP and self-defense/punishment are two different concepts of context.  Stephen Forde gave good definitions in this thread.  NAP is not to initiate force.  Self-defense and punishment are not initiating force, for the answer to this is in your own post here – they are “ex-post facto”.  Where’s the conflict in this rational?

 

 

Here’s how I would categorize the matter: I would contend that self-defense is not initating force, but the traditional notion of “punishment” has the initiation of force implied in it. That is, to me, a death penalty or to torture someone would be an initiation of force, whether it is called “punishment” or not. And to me, “ex-post-facto” violence is the initiation of force, while self-defense is something that takes place during the period in which the initial crime is taking place.

To be clear, I am using Roy Hallidays definition of punishment as “the infliction of physical harm on an offender or their property because they are an offender, but for reasons other than self-defense”. So, for example, if I steal your lighter and you proceed to simply shoot me in the head, that would be “punishment” by this definition. It would be ex-post facto, it would not be “self-defense” in any explicit sense, and it would consequentially seem to be a defacto initiation.

The only kind of “punishment” I support is repossesion and restitution, although the way I categorize the matter this is outside of Halliday’s definition of “punishment”, since it is not meant to be for the purpose of inflicting harm on on offender; violence or incapaciation only comes into play in rare, escalated situations, not as a general rule. It is a “victim’s side” approach to justice, which is to say that the emphasis is on making victims whole rather than simply inflicting harm on offenders or “punishment for the sake of punishment”. I also generally don’t support any kind of prison system as we’d commonly understand it.

 

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Stephen replied on Thu, May 21 2009 10:38 AM

 

 liberty student:

 

I see this with anti-capitalists/mutualists sometimes, when people claim that you can steal from WalMart because WalMart is a state fiction (corporation) and because the state is illegit, then WalMart technically has no ownership.

But it seems to me that just because the state licenses something, doesn’t invalidate the contract or the title to the property being licensed.  If that was so, it would be an internal contradiction, because if the state is illegit, then how can it legitimately transmute property titles from one form to another?  Surely they revert to their original form (if they ever left their original form at all).

 

 

 

 liberty student:
That is my problem.  I’m seeing the same contradiction, although I can’t explain it as clearly (probably because I have only been thinking about this new one, estoppel, for a few days) and perhaps I am completely wrong.

 

I think the error with the anti-caps is that they assume that because the state commits crimes, that it doesn’t provide any legit services, such a registering an incorporation. And because of this they think they have a carte blanche to justify any adolescent position regarding any property the state touches, like stealing from Walmart (Which must also be a criminal entity. The state incorporated it, right?!). Another error is assuming that they have a right, as an uninvited third party, to punish a criminal entity. Shouldn’t a victim get first dibs? Otherwise there may not be enough property left to the victim to claim as restitution. Even if one of the owners of Walmart did commit a crime against someone, they still wouldn’t be justified in restitutional shoplifting since this would be ripping off some innocent owners as well. I’m sure there are more problems as well.

If, for the sake of argument, Kinsella has made an error, I don’t think you could consider it the same error.

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hayekianxyz replied on Thu, May 21 2009 10:47 AM

 

 Stephen Forde:
I think the error with the anti-caps is that they assume that because the state commits crimes, that it doesn’t provide any legit services, such a registering an incorporation

 

Kinsella has argued quite convincingly that such errors are the result of a lack of any coherent theory of causality and liability, his own theory being praxeological.

“You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows”

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wilderness replied on Thu, May 21 2009 11:20 AM

 

 Brainpolice:

 

 

 wilderness:

 

 

 Brainpolice:

 

I do not support any form of death penalty or torture as punishment, however – it is dubious to me that these somehow are consistent with the non-initiation of aggression. For the most part, I do not think that violence is necessary for justice beyond explicit self-defense, and I categorically distinguish self-defense from violent punishment. Violent punishment, as traditionally concieved, seems to be a form of ex-post facto violence that is not necessarily the same thing as self-defense at all.

 

 

I see this difference in definition between self-defense and (violent) punishment.  I’m not sure though how somebody not initiating aggression is consistent with death penalty and torture.  That’s a big leap in deciding how any individual will handle aggression, in other words, looks too modeled instead of relying on first hand accounts of the event.

I wouldn’t even say the NAP and punishment are contradictions.  NAP and self-defense/punishment are two different concepts of context.  Stephen Forde gave good definitions in this thread.  NAP is not to initiate force.  Self-defense and punishment are not initiating force, for the answer to this is in your own post here – they are “ex-post facto”.  Where’s the conflict in this rational?

 

 

 

 

Here’s how I would categorize the matter: I would contend that self-defense is not initating force, but the traditional notion of “punishment” has the initiation of force implied in it. That is, to me, a death penalty or to torture someone would be an initiation of force, whether it is called “punishment” or not. And to me, “ex-post-facto” violence is the initiation of force, while self-defense is something that takes place during the period in which the initial crime is taking place.

To be clear, I am using Roy Hallidays definition of punishment as “the infliction of physical harm on an offender or their property because they are an offender, but for reasons other than self-defense”. So, for example, if I steal your lighter and you proceed to simply shoot me in the head, that would be “punishment” by this definition. It would be ex-post facto, it would not be “self-defense” in any explicit sense, and it would consequentially seem to be a defacto initiation.

The only kind of “punishment” I support is repossesion and restitution, although the way I categorize the matter this is outside of Halliday’s definition of “punishment”, since it is not meant to be for the purpose of inflicting harm on on offender; violence or incapaciation only comes into play in rare, escalated situations, not as a general rule. It is a “victim’s side” approach to justice, which is to say that the emphasis is on making victims whole rather than simply inflicting harm on offenders or “punishment for the sake of punishment”. I also generally don’t support any kind of prison system as we’d commonly understand it.

 

 

I personally don’t see a need for a prison system either.  Of course much would have to change to bring the coercion level down cause if we let everybody that has committed a violent crime out of prison right now we as a society would have had to have serious considerations and planning to handle this potential influx of violence.  I’m also personally not for torture and not for the death penalty.  I do foresee a very squirmy criminal who murders and when approached by others to bring in for charges against him or her this squirmy criminal will not fight back.  Go through the proceedings and left to go free.  Then murders again.  This could continue until either this murderer is killed during self-defense or when people go to round him or her up he does fight back on that particular occasion and the people can kill him/her out of self-defense.

Self-defense though has another inclination.  To think of it in terms of immediacy of the act restricts the concept of self-defense.  Somebody commits a murder everybody else is now in self-defense mode indefinitely.  Once the murderous act has been committed then the murderer is that – a murderer and everybody else has the right to self-defense indefinitely against this person.  Now this scenario leads into vigilantes roaming about looking for a bounty on this person’s head.  They are all threatened now and all are committing self-defense.  The initial act of murder doesn’t disappear it is current.  Doesn’t matter when the news of the event reaches the ears of the community.  I could find out tomorrow about the murder and thus to me this murder is new and present whereas yesterday when the murder actually happened I had no idea about this murder and to me it never happened.

So I see two directions to approach this at the moment.

 

“Do not put out the fire of the spirit.” 1The 5:19
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DBratton replied on Thu, May 21 2009 11:27 AM

 

 Brainpolice:
I’m tempted to simply say that noone officially has a “right to punish” and that there may very well be something wrong with the traditional notion of punishment altogether

 

It bothers me as well. The notion that some sequence of events can create a right to the future involuntary use of someone else’s body strikes me as a good starting point for a justification of slavery.

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wombatron replied on Thu, May 21 2009 11:39 AM

 

 wilderness:
Self-defense though has another inclination.  To think of it in terms of immediacy of the act restricts the concept of self-defense.  Somebody commits a murder everybody else is now in self-defense mode indefinitely.  Once the murderous act has been committed then the murderer is that – a murderer and everybody else has the right to self-defense indefinitely against this person.  Now this scenario leads into vigilantes roaming about looking for a bounty on this person’s head.  They are all threatened now and all are committing self-defense.  The initial act of murder doesn’t disappear it is current.  Doesn’t matter when the news of the event reaches the ears of the community.  I could find out tomorrow about the murder and thus to me this murder is new and present whereas yesterday when the murder actually happened I had no idea about this murder and to me it never happened.

 

That depends on the nature of the murder, and the murderer.  A crime of passion, for example, will generally mean the perpetrator is not a continuing threat to others.  A serial killer, on the other hand, probably does (obviously there is a continuum problem here).  Also, such a “continuing self-defense” argument really only justifies either the “death penalty” (for lack of a better name), imprisonment of some sort, or exile.  Randy Barnett has an article here that discusses this issue, among other things.

Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.

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twistedbydsign99 replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:00 PM

I think the problem here is how you are using the word aggression. Aggression has a negative connotation just like the word murder. It implies injustice. Talk in terms of force. Is force always wrong? No its not always wrong, as libertarians will likely bring up force is fine if used for self defense. Forced used for punishment asks the question is punishment always wrong? No punishment is not always wrong. If someone has stolen can I not punish the thief by taking back both my property, the interest I could have gained on the property while the thief was in possession of it, and the cost of justice. So in the interest of fairness I would say that someone who uses force illegitimately (an aggressor) should be punished to the degree that fairness would allow.

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Brainpolice replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:11 PM

 

 twistedbydsign99:

I think the problem here is how you are using the word aggression. Aggression has a negative connotation just like the word murder. It implies injustice. Talk in terms of force. Is force always wrong? No its not always wrong, as libertarians will likely bring up force is fine if used for self defense. Forced used for punishment asks the question is punishment always wrong? No punishment is not always wrong. If someone has stolen can I not punish the thief by taking back both my property, the interest I could have gained on the property while the thief was in possession of it, and the cost of justice. So in the interest of fairness I would say that someone who uses force illegitimately (an aggressor) should be punished to the degree that fairness would allow.

 

I’m not objecting to repossession or restitution, but I’m defining “punishment” in a way that inherently has an implication of violence that is not in self-defense built into it. The act of repossession or restitution itself need not be a matter of “force” or “aggression” per se, for the purpose is victim’s side. If we want to call repossession and restitution “punishment”, that’s fine, but I would contend that it becomes a violation of the NAP as soon as it becomes an explicit non-defensive or unecessary use of force in the process of repossession and restitution. If the offender complies, “force” isn’t really necessary. It is only in conditions of escalation when an offender violently refuses to comply that violence might become necessary. So what I’m objecting to is really “punishment” in the sense of a pre-emptive rule of thumb to use force regaurdless of the circumstances. If the offender complies and you start beating him up anyway, it is hard to see how this isn’t just you initiating aggression against their person.

 

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liberty student replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:12 PM

 

 GilesStratton:
I was very pleased with myself until I realised you were being sarcastic.

 

I wasn’t being sarcastic.

“The Nation-State: Apartheid without political incorrectness.” NN Taleb
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hayekianxyz replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:15 PM

 

 liberty student:

 

 

 GilesStratton:
I was very pleased with myself until I realised you were being sarcastic.

 

I wasn’t being sarcastic.

 

 

Glad to be of some help in that case.

“You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows”

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 liberty student:
I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor.  I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.

 

Well, aggression is initiatory. What we have rights against is the threat or use of initiatory physical force. So retaliatory force against an aggressor will not necessarily be aggression (although it could be if it is disproportionate).

But to get the the main point, assuming estoppel is a correct theory, from the fact that an aggressor can’t coherently complain if his victim retaliates against him (in the same or equivalent manner) this doesn’t necessarily justify the victim doing so. It doesn’t necessarily mean the victim should. And even if such retaliation is morally optional for the victim, I don’t see that it is the case that the aggressor being estopped is the sole necessary and sufficient condition for justifying responding in kind. Say B was raped by A. Does B have the right to rape A back simply because A can’t coherently complain about it seeing as how he endorsed such behavior himself?

I say not necessarily for two reasons:

1) The use of aggression in some circumstance does not necessarily entail the aggressor accepting the use of aggression in any and all circumstances. Argumentation ethicists and estoppel proponents tend just assume that it does. In reality, AE and estoppel are much more limited than their proponents realize.

2) Being a virtue ethicist, for whom the obligation to respect rights (and in part their very conception) as well as our other moral obligations derive primarily (but not exclusively) from facts about the moral agent (what kind of person whould I be?), what conduct is virtuous or vicious for me is not entirely/solely dependent upon the actions of others. Sure, the initiation of violence against me justifies legally my using violence in return for the purposes of self-defense and acquiring restitution – to put a stop to the rights violation. But it doesn’t justify atavistic and sadistic barbarism.

Yours in liberty,
Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.
Adjunct Instructor
Buena Vista University

“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”
(Who watches the watchmen?)
-Juvenal, Satires VI.347

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Stephen replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:20 PM

 

 whipitgood:

 

 

 Kinsella:
It makes no sense for him to object to punishment, because this requires that he maintain that the infliction of force is wrong, which is contradictory because he intentionally initiated force himself.

 

What if the individual in question believes that his initiation of force was legitimate, but any attempt to coerce him would be illegitimate? Perhaps this is what Kinsella was addressing when he said that the aggressor cannot make a ‘coherent’ argument in his favor?

 

 

Read section D, “Potential Defenses by the Aggressor.” This is the second potential defense.

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Stephen replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:28 PM

 

 liberty student:
One further thought for people who understand estoppel well.  If someone aggresses, and that validates aggression as punishment, is this individual now a marked man, where anyone can aggress against him in perpetuity, because his one aggressive act invalidated his claim to non-aggression against himself now and in the future?

 

I would say he is ‘marked’, and that anyone can take a pound of flesh so long as there is enough left over for the victim, but once the criminal has been punished up to the limits of proportionality, any further would constitute aggression. But you already know and don’t approve of my position.

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liberty student replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:30 PM

I need a drink and a comfy chair to sort through all of these responses.  Thanks folks, I am sure there is some more comfort and understanding within.

Re: Anti-caps, strictly for illustrative purposes.  I’d rather avoid that side debate right now.

“The Nation-State: Apartheid without political incorrectness.” NN Taleb
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Stephen replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:30 PM

 

 ivanfoofoo:
The right to punish belongs to the victim. If I (and I wasn’t the victim) punish the aggressor, then I will have to argue with the victim, to check if the punishment I gave “used up” some of his right of aggression to him, or not (this means that now I became a new aggressor).

 

Why?

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wilderness replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:32 PM

 

 wombatron:

 

 

 wilderness:
Self-defense though has another inclination.  To think of it in terms of immediacy of the act restricts the concept of self-defense.  Somebody commits a murder everybody else is now in self-defense mode indefinitely.  Once the murderous act has been committed then the murderer is that – a murderer and everybody else has the right to self-defense indefinitely against this person.  Now this scenario leads into vigilantes roaming about looking for a bounty on this person’s head.  They are all threatened now and all are committing self-defense.  The initial act of murder doesn’t disappear it is current.  Doesn’t matter when the news of the event reaches the ears of the community.  I could find out tomorrow about the murder and thus to me this murder is new and present whereas yesterday when the murder actually happened I had no idea about this murder and to me it never happened.

 

That depends on the nature of the murder, and the murderer.  A crime of passion, for example, will generally mean the perpetrator is not a continuing threat to others.  A serial killer, on the other hand, probably does (obviously there is a continuum problem here).  Also, such a “continuing self-defense” argument really only justifies either the “death penalty” (for lack of a better name), imprisonment of some sort, or exile.  Randy Barnett has an article here that discusses this issue, among other things.

 

 

Yes, that’s why I incline to my first possibility, which seemed to only allow for a squirmy criminal.  And a squirmy criminal is actually proof that a utopia is not the discussion here as much as many would rather strive for excellence in their lives than become deviant to a libertarian society.  I guess I didn’t say which one I liked best, but this doesn’t mean there could be something even better.

This also is very close to how I would deal with a cougar or wolf that kills somebody’s cow or pet dog.  To round up a bunch of people to go after the animal after the fact is forgetting the nature of these animals to prey upon other animals.  I don’t like seeing people get together and go off hunting these animals in retribution.  First of all they don’t know if they actually killed the animal that did it.  Secondly it tends to turn into a let’s kill all the wolves and cougars so we don’t have to worry about this anymore mentality.  It disheartens me.  And I think a criminal during the act has degenerated into an animal nature and is no longer flourishing their human intellect.  This is no defense of insanity for they know what they are doing like any other animal and have not lost control of their actions (insanity pleas are a whole other issue that I don’t want to tangent upon).

So a criminal like any other animal at this point has violated rights and self-defense in no way counters NAP which is merely defining the non-initiation.  But a criminal has initiated force, but as you point out to go after them after the fact seems to open up a whole other ball of wax.  Now say this criminal lives next door.  I would not want to live next to somebody or deal with somebody that murdered and tends to become an animal.  And unlike the wolf, cougar, or roaming human-criminal I know who the murderer is.  They are in plain sight.  So if they don’t leave, then I might have too or else the property line might turn into the North-South Korea border region.  I wouldn’t sleep well otherwise.  So if they force me to move cause I know they killed somebody, but nothing can be done about it cause it’s no longer a self-defense situation makes living uneasy there anymore so yes, I would move and feel that person forced me to move due to the threat I see.

 

“Do not put out the fire of the spirit.” 1The 5:19
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Stephen replied on Thu, May 21 2009 12:34 PM

 

 Thedesolateone:

 

 

 liberty student:
I do not necessarily see why his aggression validates me, or you, or someone else to use aggression against this individual.

 

The key problem for me with regards to action vs. previously occurred (and not ongoing) aggression is of knowledge/uncertainty.

Every judicial judgement is subjective not only in its terms, but also in its verdict (i.e. guilty or not guilty). There is no objective proof that one can provide that an individual is an aggressor. Thus, while there me be some situations where it would be moral to aggress against an “aggressor” after the event; we can never practically experience any of these situations because we will be unable to say someone is indubitably guilty.

 

 

What if someone mugs you? Innocent unless absolutely proven guilty. You would still want to error on the side of caution?

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I’m often stunned when an Objectivist is bold enough to be explicit–as when they occasionally admit they are really in favor of one-world government; or when they admit that they are in favor of legislation, or that scarcity has nothing to do with property or, yes, that they think “values” are some kind of real things floating around people can homestead.

This comment by Greg Perkins is illustrative:

Cpx, you ask in #115 that I try to imagine the impossible (i.e., infinite abundance of anything we might want), to see how the notion of property would arise from lack of infinite abundance. I genuinely can’t imagine the impossible. But I think I can see how the lack of infinite abundance of values (notably, both tangible and not) relates to the need for the concept of property: We must identify and pursue values in order to live, and that requires work because values do not exist intrinsically apart from us, ready to instantly and automatically serve our lives. Notably, some of the values we pursue are instrumental to the pursuit of other values; the need to secure such instrumental values in a social context is, I suspect, the basic fact that gives rise to the concept of property.

And what I meant by “physical exclusion necessitated by mechanics” is just what you mean — the physics of things is the metaphysically given; I couldn’t have been referring to the man-made, like laws or whatever. Anyway, again, I genuinely cannot imagine an impossible world with simultaneous contradictory uses of things (and note that when you posit the existence of such contradictions, it goes broadly: not just this crop and that on the same piece of land, but this thing of any kind, used for anything, in any place, at any time, by anybody or anything). The fact that contradictions cannot exist in the use of things does line up with the above observations on lack of infinite abundance.

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It’s no wonder that Obama sounds no different than George W. Bush on war: the left are just as warlike as the right. Example: On the December 11 Slate Political Gabfest, the hosts discuss B. Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize speech, including his remarks that we should honor American soldiers “not as makers of war, but as wagers of peace.”  David Plotz (around 25:00-25:45) says:

you may want, or think, that US [soldiers] are the best killing machines the world has ever seen–and, I certainly hope that they are–but the fact is that most people in the US military don’t spend their days killing people.

[LRC post]

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F**K THE DRAFT

Great piece by Henry Mark Holzer, Ayn Rand’s former attorney.

F**K THE DRAFT

Here is where I part company with some of my conservative and patriotic friends. [continue reading…]

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Tom Paine, Copyright Statist

Great comment about Thomas Paine by Bill Stepp on this thread:

Paine forfeited his copyright in “Common Sense” so that any printer could publish it (this was prompted by a dispute with his printer, if memory serves), but he later defended copyright. For what it’s worth, he also defended the evil Pennsylvania Test Oaths, and expounded a variant of socialism in land in “Agrarian Justice.” A few more libertarians like Paine, and we’ll be laboring in slave camps.

I could never figure out why libertarians are so quick to embrace Paine (ditto for Andrew Jackson, who didn’t put an end to the 2BUS for any high-minded libertarian reasons, but so that its deposits would go into the pet banks owned by his political backers and cronies).

Stepp was right. Paine argued in a 1782 pamphlet that “the works of an author are his legal property,” and that it was critical for the country “to prevent depredation on literary property.” See The Life and Writings of Thomas Paine: Containing a Biography (Daniel Edwin Wheeler, ed., 1908) vol. 8, pp. 180, 182, quoted in Paul Clement, Viet Dinh & Jeffrey Harris, “The Constitutional and Historical Foundations of Copyright Protection,” Center for Individual Freedom [sic] (2012). Paine here refers to the unauthorized copying and publishing as piracy, fraud, embezzlement, purloinment, and so on.

See also Paine Was A Socialist. But see Jeff Tucker’s comments to X-Treme Thomas Paine, where he writes:

I’m not a Paine scholar but it seems obvious that the application of his principles ebb and flowed a bit here and there. He wrote in favor of the inheritance tax after he exiled from England and before his arrest in France. I do know this: he is one of the greatest champions of liberty ever. No one of his generation wrote as powerfully on the relationship between the individual and the state; and I also know that it is extremely difficult to find any thinker in any country who pure by modern standards who wrote before the age of Rothbard. So give the guy a break and learn what you can from him.

Update: See Paine’s complete writings, here; and also the fascinating series of V76 lectures by Andrew Galambos, which focused on the significance of Paine’s thought and his crucial role in the American Revolution (and Galambos’s contention that Paine was the actual author of the Declaration of Independence, not merely its intellectual inspiration). See Galambos on Paine (July 4, 2022).

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The Worst Blog Post of 2009

This Huffington Post piece by Alan Kaufman, “Google Books And Kindles: A Concentration Camp Of Ideas“. I thought this piece was a joke at first, but realizing it’s not only reminds of how terrible the left remains. Utterly hostile to technology, commerce, progress, industry, individuality, freedom, and modernity. A few choice sentences are enough to turn one’s stomach:

When I hear the term Kindle I think not of imaginations fired but of crematoria lit. And when I hear the term “hi-tech” I think not of helpful androids efficiently performing household chores or light-speed rockets gliding seamlessly through space but of the fact that between 1933-45, modern technology was used to perform in ever more efficient ways the mass murder of six million of my people. The instruments of so-called progress, placed in the hands of the modern state, disappeared six million Jewish men, women and children, into a void from which they will never return and in which a majority of them remain forever unidentified. This was done in the name of progress by means of technology for the creation of a better world. [continue reading…]

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Carson on French Versus American Socialized Medicine

A brilliant post by Kevin Carson, Honest Statism Beats a Fake “Free Market” Every Time, discussing an article by Matt Welch in the January issue of Reason, makes a persuasive case that there is little reason to think that the French “socialized” healthcare system is inferior to the nominally “private” American healthcare system. Yes, a real free market system would be preferable to either the French, or the current American system. “But enemies of Obamacare need to drop the bullshit about the American healthcare system being ‘the best in the world,’ and defending it as ‘our free market system.’ … there’s really nothing all that astonishing about a comparatively well-run socialized system beating a really incompetent and slipshod mixed government-private system.”

They have a point. I am not sure if I believe that the Western welfare states’ socialized healthcare systems are so obviously superior to the current American system, as distorted as it is by state involvement, but it’s not hard to believe that the kluged “public/private” system that Congress is about to produce will be even worse than straight-out socialized medicine. And suppose we do get a version of socialized medicine, and the typical person likes it better than our current bastardized system–they’ll then believe socialism is superior to the market! That’s a reason we opponents of socialism need to make it clear that the current system is not a free market system, that most of the things people dislike about the current system are due to state involvement, and that increasing state involvement will only make matters worse than it could be under a free market system.

Update: See Welch, Matt Welch on C-SPAN’s “Washington Journal” at 7:30 AM EDT Saturday to Talk French & U.S. Health Care and Carson, Honest Statism Beats a Fake “Free Market” Every Time, both below:

 

Welch, Matt Welch on C-SPAN’s “Washington Journal” at 7:30 AM EDT Saturday to Talk French & U.S. Health Care:

Because what better things do you have to do at the crack of the weekend? Subject will be this column, which has provoked some interesting reaction from Kevin Carson and Stephan Kinsella, among others. Show will last a half-hour, and we’ll be taking phone calls.

***

Carson, Honest Statism Beats a Fake “Free Market” Every Time:

Honest Statism Beats a Fake “Free Market” Every Time

In an article for the January issue of Reason, Matt Welch compared his experiences in the “private” American healthcare system and the French “socialized” system, and found the latter a lot more attractive from the perspective of the average healthcare consumer.  The “waiting lines” were a lot less of a problem in France than in the U.S., and the French system was a lot more user-friendly and simple from the standpoint of bureaucratic hassle.  While people rich enough to pay for major procedures out of pocket might prefer the American system, the average American insurance policyholder would probably find the French system heaven on earth.

The point, Welch said, is not that a socialized system is better than a private system.  The point is that their honestly socialized system is better than our socialized corporate system masquerading as a “private” one.  He’d prefer a genuinely free market system to either the French or American system.  But enemies of Obamacare need to drop the bullshit about the American healthcare system being “the best in the world,” and defending it as “our free market system.”  Anyone with direct experience of foreign healthcare systems will be more than happy to expose such lies.

One of the commenters on Welch’s article, at Reason Hit&Run blog, made a good point:  there’s really nothing all that astonishing about a comparatively well-run socialized system beating a really incompetent and slipshod mixed government-private system.  But a genuine free market system wasn’t even in the running.

The fact that we’re dealing in the U.S. with a choice between two or more alternative state-private mixes is one reason I haven’t gotten too worked up about the whole Obamacare debate.

I especially don’t understand why the public option, of all things, is where self-described opponents of a “government takeover of healthcare” chose to draw a line in the sand.

The features of the plan that the Democrats, Republicans and Blue Dogs all agree on are far more statist than the public option as such.

An individual mandate, coupled with taxpayer subsidies of hundreds of billions over a ten year period to people at various multiples of the poverty rate strikes me as about as statist as you can get–especially when the “reform” maintains the insurance cartel’s jacked-up prices.  As far as I’m concerned, a “private” insurance company that gets a huge share of its income from the taxpayers, and “sells” insurance to people who were forced to buy it, is as much a component of the state ruling class as a straightforward government agency.  Even more so, in a sense, because the taxpayer-funded overhead includes an additional layer of parasites known as “shareholders.”

Prohibitions against denial of coverage for preexisting conditions, and other forms of denial of coverage, don’t bother the insurance companies at all.  Since the entire industry is  required to do these things it’s not a competitive issue, and the lack of cost controls means they can simply pass on increased costs to policyholders with a generous markup.  They will subsidize coverage of the sick and currently uninsured by increasing everyone else’s premiums.

Consider this in light of the principles of dialectical libertarianism.  A particular government measure is not to be evaluated on an atomistic basis, but in light of its contribution to the level of statism in the system of the whole.  As Brad Spangler pointed out, when you’re held up at gunpoint the bagman who collects your money is just as much a robber as the guy holding your gun.  The corporate bagmen who lobby for government intervention and profit from it are, therefore, part of the government.  And when government intervenes to grant special privileges for nominally “private” actors, that is a net increase in statism.  On the other hand, when a second government intervention qualifies or limits the exercise of this grant of privilege for the sake of ameliorating the worst effects of privilege, it is a net decrease in statism.

In this light, the public option would actually have represented a net decrease in statism.  The major components of the healthcare “reform” that everyone agreed on were a naked power grab by a state-enforced cartel, forcing the entire population to purchase insurance at cartel prices and taxing the public to buy it for those who can’t afford it.  The public option, on the other hand, would have been entirely self-financed after the initial seed money of a few billion, and nobody would have been forced to buy it.  But it would have offered price competition to members of the insurance cartel.

It’s interesting, don’t you think, that all the professed enemies of “big government” and friends of “our free market system” objected to the public option of all things.

Lieberman and others explicitly said that competition to “private” insurance companies was what they couldn’t abide.  But holding up taxpayers and forcing them to buy insurance at gunpoint, at whatever price the insurance companies choose to charge, with no competition–why, that’s not “big government” at all.  Because the insurance companies are businesses, you see, and anything that benefits business is part of “our free market system.”

Whenever you see a Republican or beltway “libertarian” talking about “our free market system,” remember that they’d have been using the same rhetoric about Krupp and I. G. Farben if they’d lived in Nazi Germany.

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Tigers in Print: The Case of Hoppe

lsumagwinter09_tip

In the Winter 2009 issue of LSU Alumni Magazine, “Tigers in Print” section. Undoubtedly LSU’s first connection to Hoppe!

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Randian Dislikes Me

Objectivist Diana Hsieh says:

Kensella [sic] is an unhinged and dishonest bit of nastiness, and he deserves to be shunned by all reasonable people — not treated as a civilized interlocutor.”

I can’t say I’m very bothered by this: this is the same person who officially announces her change in allegiance from David Kelley to Leonard Peikoff (both the decision, and the Official Public Announcement, is enough to raise eyebrows), the same person who says people who oppose aborting “mentally defective” fetuses “worship retardation,” 1 and who writes:

On this Memorial Day, I would like to honor the three men of the American Civil War who understood the terrible need for total war: President Abraham Lincoln, General Ulysses S. Grant, and General William T. Sherman. Their vigorous prosecution of the war preserved the Union, the very first nation founded on the principles of individual rights — and, at the time, the only such nation. In so doing, they ended the most loathsome violation of rights ever known to man: chattel slavery. Without them, without the brave Union soldiers who fought under them, America would not exist today.

So thank you, Mssrs. Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman. We are forever in your debt.

  1. Objectivist Hate Fest. []
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Objectivists: “All Property is Intellectual Property”

Related:

From Mises blog; archived comments below (1, 2).

So says Adam Mossoff, Objectivist law professor, here:

Just FYI, I am just about to complete my first draft of my article, tentatively titled, “A Value-Based Theory of Intellectual Property,” in which I explain why intellectual property rights are a fundamental property right. In fact, my thesis can be summed up as: All Property is Intellectual Property. As far as I’m aware, this will be the first full-length academic treatment of IP that is not only based on Rand’s ethical and political theory, but also contextualizes this IP theory vis-a-vis both the Lockean labor theory of property and the utilitarian scarcity theory of property.

Of course, Kinsella and the other scarcity-based advocates for property rights with the libertarian movement, such as Timothy Sandefur, are appropriately taken down in my paper. I’m presenting my draft at the APA meeting at the end of this month in NYC, and, hopefully, I’ll have a draft up on the SSRN website by the spring. So, people will either have to come to the APA meeting or they’ll have to wait a few more months to download a draft.

[continue reading…]

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