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• “All that is not permitted is forbidden”

Libertarians are used to thinking in terms of natural law and natural rights. In terms of principles, reason, and justice. That is, that we can use our reason to arrive at ethical or normative conclusions that will allow us to evaluate existing positive law. Laws “exist,” or are in force, in a given legal system; but some are bad, some are good. Some are just, some are unjust. That is, we can identify some legal rule as law, whether good or bad law, and we can then criticize the bad laws. The legal positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart, were right about the former point, and the natural-law lawyers, like Lon Fuller, were wrong. It is possible to identify a law as existing, in-force law, as positive law, even if it is unjust. But the extreme statist and legal positivists are wrong to claim that the only law is that announced by a sovereign which implies that there are no external, “higher law” grounds from which to criticize existing positive law. The natural lawyers are right, here. Libertarians have no problem with accepting the legal positivists’ contention that an unjust law can exist and can be recognized as an existing law, since we believe in a higher law—our libertarian principles—which means we do not condone an unjust law simply by recognizing that is law. ¹

[continue reading…]

1. See my post Higher Law. [↩]

Note: An updated and revised version of this article is included as chap. 20 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023). See below.

***

Stephan Kinsella, “Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order. By Anthony de Jasay. London and New York: Routledge, 1997,” Q. J. Austrian Econ. 1, no. 1. (Fall 1998): 85–93. Revised version published as “Review of Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order, by Anthony de Jasay,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (forthcoming 2023).

20

Review of Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order, by Anthony de Jasay

 

Originally published as Stephan Kinsella, “Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order. By Anthony de Jasay. London and New York: Routledge, 1997,” Q. J. Austrian Econ. 1, no. 1. (Fall 1998): 85–93. De Jasay’s book will be referred to herein as Against Politics.

 

 

This is a wonderful collection of previously published articles by Anthony de Jasay who, it turns out, is an undiscovered Austrian, or at least a close cousin. The essays in Against Politics, published between 1989 and 1996, are united around a common theme, the economic and political aspects of government and “ordered anarchy.” The book is full of sparkling insight and penetrating, calm dissections of pro-state arguments. Opponents of the state will find much ammunition here. Statists (even of the minimalist variety) will find much to ponder.

De Jasay’s arguments pack quite a punch, and make it clear that he is a powerful, careful scholar. He also appears to be a quasi-Austrian economist and political theorist, which is surprising given that he does not appear to be very familiar with the work of Austrian theorists, such as Mises and Rothbard. Has he even read Human Action? One wonders. The primary well-known Austrians he cites are Hayek and Wieser, who represent the “Vienna School” instead of the Austrian school.[1] He has apparently come to many Austrian conclusions without the benefit of much exposure to Austrianism. For example, he makes good use of the observation that not only is utility not measurable, but interpersonal utility is also completely incommensurate.[2] He even writes that, “[u]nlike the physical sciences, inference presupposing purposiveness is proper to the study of reasoning beings and cannot be avoided without inordinate loss of content,”[3] which bears an uncanny similarity to Mises’s own epistemology.[4]

The book is divided into two parts. The seven chapters of Part 1 are critical of statism, the view that political action is necessary, efficient, or desirable. In the four chapters of Part 2, our author somewhat tentatively proffers his own politico-economic theories, designed to show that various desirable social institutions are possible without political arrangements. The essays are well-ordered and generally fit together almost as well as chapters of an integrated work, although, as is to be expected in a collection of this kind, there is some repetition and redundancy. (A useful summary of the book’s themes, structure, and arguments is found in the Introduction, at pp. 4–7.)

De Jasay is a master of criticism. A standard technique is to hold a statist’s logic up to standards that the statist himself espouses. In a rare personal glimpse, he reveals an instance of applying this technique in his own life:

The present writer, when a subject of a “people’s democracy” [presumably the author’s country of origin, Hungary], used to taunt his political masters that capitalism had never existed anywhere, that it was yet to come, it was the “wave of the future”—a taunt that reduced them to fury but naturally failed to provoke any refutation.[5]

Given his power of criticism, the critical pieces in Part 1 contain stronger arguments than Part 2, although for some (such as this reviewer), the essays in Part 2 will still be of at least as much or more interest. For although his positive theorizing is weakened by his own moral skepticism (more on this below), it is strengthened by his critique of statist alternatives; further, his basic intuitions and premises are largely sound. Combine this with a multitude of keen insights and critiques of opposing social theories, and Part 2 is of immense interest, even with its deficiencies.

Part 1 opens with “Self-Contradictory Contractarianism,” which addresses the argument that various “intractable” problems of the state of nature, such as prisoner’s dilemmas and free riding,[6] prevent systematic social cooperation. One way out of these dilemmas would be to make “binding” contracts. However, people cannot make binding contracts in the state of nature, since rational actors without fear of sanction will always default, thereby making contracting impossible and requiring the state to provide an effective contract enforcement mechanism.

But, de Jasay asks, “if contracts require an enforcer, how could there be a social contract creating an enforcer without its enforcement being assured by a meta-enforcer created by a meta-social contract, and so on in an infinite regress.”[7] De Jasay recognizes that the proposed solution assumes that the state can act as an “enforcing agent acting as a programmed automaton.”[8] Yet this is to “assume away the principal-agent problem,”[9] since the state has little reason to restrict itself to enforcing the contract. For these and other reasons, “[t]here is … no contractual exit from the state of nature: if the state is to be created by contract, it cannot be created, since it is its own antecedent condition.”[10] Thus this particular ground for the necessity of the state contradicts itself, and advocates of government are hoisted by their own petard.

De Jasay correctly recognizes that the real question is whether ordered anarchy (what we would call anarcho-capitalism) is possible or not, and this question “ultimately boils down to the issue of the enforcement of mutual promises without a final specialized enforcer.”[11] De Jasay seems at home with the somewhat dubious field of game theory, but this helps to make him especially suited to criticize its irrelevance to the actual world. He argues that typical game-theoretical arguments are unrealistic and inapplicable to real life situations, since “[a]nyone who has a name, lives in a place, does something for a living—that is, anyone tied into the fabric of society—would think twice before treating mutual promise as the single-play prisoner’s dilemma says he must.”[12] We can, therefore, expect that contracts can be self-enforcing, without the aid of a centralized enforcing agent, and thus at least some of the dilemmas that are claimed to be part of anarchy are chimerical.[13]

Indeed, as argued in chapter 2, “Is Limited Government Possible?,” it is not proponents of anarcho-capitalism but rather those who advocate limited government who hold unrealistic views. Our author recognizes that “[t]here is a plethora of constitutional devices for ‘rigging’ rules and procedures in such a way as to clip the wings of the state.”[14] However, the real problem is not how to invent such devices but to find the conditions, if possible, that would be likely to be adopted and to stay intact long enough to do any good.[15] De Jasay’s economic reasoning here persuasively demonstrates why no such artificial restriction is likely to succeed, and why any government can be expected to have a tendency to grow.[16]

The other chapters of Part 1 are also interesting and insightful. “Frogs’ Legs, Shared Ends, and the Rationality of Politics”[17] argues that political grounds generally cannot have rational grounds and cannot be rationally defended. This essay, however, seems more hastily written and more poorly organized than most others in the book. “The Twistable is Not Testable,”[18] a review essay of Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies,[19] shows de Jasay at the height of his critical powers. In this piece, de Jasay subjects Popper’s own (socialistic) propositions “to the acid of the very method of which he is the champion,” the test of falsifiability.[20] Popper contended that “[g]enuine propositions are capable of being corroborated, and are criticized by a process of confrontation with the ascertainable facts of the case.”[21] However, Popper advocated both democracy and socialism; yet, as de Jasay shows, this advocacy rests upon the completely unfalsifiable building block descriptions, concepts, and judgments, such as “weak” and “strong.” For example, these concepts are essential to the Popperian proposition that social institutions must be constructed to protect the “economically weak” from the “economically strong.”[22] Thus, de Jasay shows that Popper’s socialism is indefensible by Popper’s very own scientific standards.[23]

In the course of this essay, de Jasay also deflates the myth that Popper was a liberal.[24] Also of interest is de Jasay’s critical treatment of other prominent liberal economists and political theorists, notably James Buchanan, F.A. Hayek, and Robert Nozick. In “Hayek: Some Missing Pieces,”[25] for example, de Jasay argues that Hayek “has no complete theory of the social order to back up his liberal recommendations.”[26] In advocating that government should go beyond the maintenance of law and order to provide amorphous and endless “highly desirable” public goods, Hayek ends up supporting virtually unlimited government. De Jasay will have none of this:

A theory of social order is incomplete if it makes no serious attempt at assessing the long-term forces that make the public sector grow or shrink. This can hardly be done without relying on a defensible theory of public goods. Hayek feels no necessity for one. Strangely, the question seems to have held no interest for him.[27]

In other words, Hayek has not done his homework and his half-baked political theory endangers the very freedom that he is viewed as upholding. (The critiques of Nozick and Buchanan are discussed below in the discussion of Part 2.)

I have mentioned above that de Jasay’s work could be improved if it built more on and dealt more with contemporary Austrian theory, in particular Misesian economic theory as well as associated political theories, such as those of Rothbard. But this is unfair and somewhat ungrateful. We cannot rightfully criticize him for what he has not done, especially when what he has done is so significant. It might be better to say that, given his obvious acuity and talents, it seems a shame that he has not done so. One can only hope that we see more treatment and use of Austrian work in his further output.

For example, his discussions of the so-called public goods “dilemma”[28] could have profited from the trenchant insights of Austrians Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, among others.[29] His discussion of why government will tend to grow[30] could also be usefully supplemented by recent Austrian politico-economic theory.[31] Rothbard (relying on Schütz) criticized the empiricist assumption that only “verifiable” (or falsifiable) propositions are “scientific,” and thus the existence of human action and even other human actors cannot be scientifically maintained, on the grounds that the principle of verifiability itself requires other human beings to exist to replicate experimental results.[32] This insight could have been used with profit in de Jasay’s Popper critique.[33] De Jasay’s critiques of Nozick[34] (discussed below) and Hayek[35]could have also fit well with Austrian analysis.[36]

A more serious objection lies in de Jasay’s moral skepticism. His general skepticism serves him well as a critic, since it leads him invariably to put the burden of proof on those who advocate the state and to find their proof wanting. However, his own skepticism goes too far and is itself unwarranted. It also undercuts his own positive theorizing, since even that, as tentative as it is, depends on some modicum of moral judgment or assumptions.

De Jasay seems to believe that the only meaningful propositions are those that are subject to rational criticism, and that only falsifiable propositions that can be corroborated or not, fall into this category. One exception is that “value judgments” that are not merely ad hoc, i.e., that fit into some coherent hierarchy or system, can also be criticized if they are not internally consistent.[37] I may be too hasty here and may be unfairly attributing to him a kind of Popperian scientism that he means to present and critique rather than adopt. However, over and over, de Jasay denigrates the idea that ends or values can be rational. Thus, “[w]hat is ultimately unfalsifiable, immune to rational criticism and useless except as a piece of gratuitous self-expression, is the stand-alone, ad hoc value judgment.”[38]

Here is where perhaps the greatest improvement could be made to de Jasay’s thought by careful consideration of important Austrian work. In particular, Hoppe’s extension of praxeology into the field of ethics, the importance of which cannot be overstated, demonstrates that there is indeed an unchallengeable, rational basis for ethics.[39] In fact, in his skepticism and his subsequently deficient political theorizing, de Jasay has more in common with Mises than just economics. For Mises himself, as Rothbard has pointed out, as an opponent of objective ethics, presented a very weak, half-hearted, and, ultimately, unsuccessful, utilitarian defense of liberalism.[40]

The most important and interesting essay of Part 2 is “Before Resorting to Politics,”[41] which de Jasay admits is “the book’s most ambitious.”[42] In this chapter, he criticizes consequentialism and other problems that, as he sees it, plague modern liberal theory. In its stead he “proposes three, admittedly sketchy, ‘principles of politics,’” which are “entailed in the liberal ethic” and which must be incorporated into the foundations of any coherent liberal theory.[43]

As noted above, however, de Jasay does not seem to believe that normative propositions can be justified, and he does not really try to do so. He just uses the occasional “should” and normative premise where it is unavoidable, and appears to simply presume that the reader shares these (uncontroversial) premises, perhaps counting on the reader’s own good will or love of consistency. For example, he merely asserts that “[i]t is dubious in the extreme that a political authority is entitled to employ its power of coercion for imposing value choices on society … and on individual members.”[44] Yet the force of the normative concepts “dubious” and “entitled” here is diluted by the lack of even an attempt at justification.

De Jasay’s argument is thus a hypothetical one—and I am not sure if he would disagree, for I am not sure he thinks anything better is possible—for it relies for its persuasiveness on the listener already valuing (for some reason) the goals of justice, efficiency, and order. Nevertheless, because most of these principles are certainly sound and justifiable anyway (for example, using Rothbard’s or Hoppe’s ethical theory), and because de Jasay’s critical and analytical skills are so acute, much of interest emerges from this essay.

His three principles of politics are: (1) if in doubt, abstain from political action;[45](2) the feasible is presumed free;[46] and (3) let exclusion stand.[47] The justification of principle (1) begins with a vigorous critique of consequentialism. De Jasay notes that most political action requires assessing the worth or value of various policies. Drawing on the idea that interpersonal utility and values are incommensurate, de Jasay points out that we can rarely know if any proposed government measure is really “worth it” or not.[48] Thus, government action, which necessarily employs the power of coercion, should be avoided where possible; the burden of proof should be on those agitating for it. This entails a corollary principle, “that applying coercion is legitimate when it is positively invited by the prospective coercee.” [49]

Next, in principle (2), “the feasible is presumed free,” de Jasay asserts that “[t]he basic rule is that a person is presumed free to do what is feasible for him to do,”[50] as long as the proposed feasible action is not ruled out by his own obligations or the possibility of harm to others. We should live by right and not by permission, presumably in part because the former situation is more workable and efficient. If a feasible action is thus presumed free, then the actor need not prove that the action is permissible; rather, the burden is on he who challenges the permissibility of the action.[51] Otherwise, an actor might be unable to ever act since it would be essentially very difficult to prove a negative by showing that no one will be harmed.[52]

Incidentally, de Jasay offers an interesting critique of Nozick’s conception of rights here. By viewing rights as “permissions” to do something, rather than as claims for performance by another, Nozick perhaps unwittingly endorses a system in which action is not presumed free, as action is undertaken with “permission” by others, which presumably must first be granted.[53]

I found the justification of principle (3), “let exclusion stand,” to be of most interest, especially the discussion of homesteading or appropriation of unowned goods.[54] De Jasay equates property with its owner’s “excluding” others from using it, for example by fencing in immovable property (land) or finding or creating (and keeping) movable property (corporeal, tangible objects). Thus, the principle means “let ownership stand,” i.e., that claims to ownership of property appropriated from the state of nature or acquired ultimately through a chain of title tracing back to such an appropriation should be respected.

The basic defense of the Lockean proposition that the first or original appropriator of property is entitled to appropriate it draws on his previous “feasible” principle (2) as well as his distinction between rights and liberties. Others have objected to the idea that one can appropriate unowned property on the grounds that such an action unilaterally (and thus unjustifiably) imposes on others moral duties to refrain from interfering.

The basic defense, however, is quite general and straightforward. It is that if a prospective owner can in fact perform it, taking first possession of a thing is a feasible act of his that is admissible if it is not a tort (in this case not trespass) and violates no right; but this is the case by definition, i.e., by the thing being identified as “unowned.”[55]

Thus, by treating individuals as being free to act unless it contravenes a right (claim) of another, there is simply no reason not to allow a person to appropriate unowned property. For who could object, if not another, prior owner? To be entitled to object is to be able to “exclude” the claimant, but the right to exclude is an incident of ownership, and the property is by presumption unowned. No one can validly object to my appropriating unowned property, then, because, assuming feasible actions are free, any objection itself must claim a right, and this itself raises a type of ownership claim.[56]

The beauty of this approach is that it avoids the troublesome “Lockean proviso,” which allows homesteading of unowned goods only so long as “enough and as good is left to others.”[57] Nozick, on the other hand, allowed appropriation of an unowned object only if it did not worsen the situation of others. However, de Jasay points out, in a world with finite resources, this condition would make it impossible for any unowned property to be ever used, since any appropriation causes a loss of opportunity for others to homestead the object and thereby worsens their situation. By contrast, de Jasay’s position “does not require that nobody loses as a result of first possession, as long as the losses were not vested interests.”[58]

De Jasay’s application of his appropriation rule to two basic types of appropriation is also worth study. These two types are “finding and keeping” and “enclosure.”[59] The former appears to apply primarily to movable objects that may be found, taken, and hidden or used exclusively. Since the thing has no other owner, prima facie, no one is entitled to object to the first possessor claiming ownership. Other grounds for opposing this might be that the thing was found at least partly by luck, and was thus undeserved. But for this to be relevant, there would have to be a general rule requiring the lucky in life to compensate the unlucky. But such a rule rests on a simply unsupportable assertion.

For immovable property (land), possession is taken by “enclosing” the land and incurring exclusion costs, e.g., erecting a fence. As in the case with movables, others’ loss of the opportunity to appropriate the property does not give rise to a claim sufficient to oust the first possessor (if it did, it would be an ownership claim). However, for those who used to occasionally enjoy access to and use of the property, they do lose an actual benefit.[60] De Jasay admits that he cannot do full justice to this difficult issue, but offers a tentative solution. If some people previously used the property merely in passing, on an ad hoc basis, no right of theirs is violated by the homesteader enclosing it. However, if some identifiable, closed set of persons have used the property regularly enough to establish a precedent on which they rely, compensation must be paid them by the new owner.[61] (It is unclear why this regular use and “precedent” does not itself establish an ownership claim on behalf of the prior users; but de Jasay is here speaking of borderline cases.)

Other chapters in Part 2 argue that rational choices by individuals in the state of nature can be expected to lead to enforcement of property rights and contractual promises.[62] This chapter also shows that James Buchanan’s interpretation of Hobbes and history is incorrect, and that proper understanding of both supports the idea that markets can exist prior to and without states, contra Buchanan.[63] In the last chapter, “Liberties, Rights, and the Standing of Groups,”[64] one has to agree with his conclusion that “group rights” are problematic, and the proper bearers of rights are individuals.

This is a thought-provoking book. I have only been able to touch upon some of the nuances and important insights it contains. This work is an important contribution to economic and political literature; it should be read and studied by the serious student.

Endnotes

[some formatting, such as italics, missing]

^[1] Against Politics, p. 162.

^[2] See, e.g., ibid., 81–81, 92, 98, 144

^[3] Ibid., 74.

^[4] See, e.g., Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar’s ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1998; https://mises.org/library/human-action-0); idem, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962; https://mises.org/library/ultimate-foundation-economic-science); idem, Epistemological Problems of Economics, 3d ed., George Reisman, trans. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2003; https://mises.org/library/epistemological-problems-economics).

^[5] Against Politics, pp. 108–9.

^[6] Ibid., pp. 11–12.

^[7] Ibid., p. 5.

^[8] Ibid., p. 19

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Ibid., p. 22

^[11] Ibid., p. 29.

^[12] Ibid., p. 33.

^[13] Further, as Alfred G. Cuzán has insightfully pointed out, the existence of the state itself is evidence that anarchy is possible, for officials of the state “voluntarily” abide by certain hierarchies and rules, e.g., the American president is physically less powerful than his armies, yet they tend to obey him rather than vice-versa. Alfred G. Cuzán, “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?,” J. Libertarian Stud. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1979; https://mises.org/library/do-we-ever-really-get-out-anarchy): 151–58. See also idem, “Revisiting ‘Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?’”, J. Libertarian Stud. 22, no. 1 (2010; https://mises.org/library/revisiting-do-we-ever-really-get-out-anarchy): 3–21.

^[14] Against Politics, p. 53.

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] Ibid., p. 57ff.

^[17] Ibid., chap. 3.

^[18] Ibid., chap. 5.

^[19] Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, 4th rev. ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

^[20] Against Politics, p. 105.

^[21] Ibid.

^[22] Ibid., pp. 114–15.

^[23] As has been pointed out, logical positivism is inherently contradictory since it fails its own test, as it is not itself falsifiable. Mises, for example, writes:

The essence of logical positivism is to deny the cognitive value of a priori knowledge by pointing out that all a priori propositions are merely analytic. They do not provide new information, but are merely verbal or tautological, asserting what has already been implied in the definitions and premises. Only experience can lead to synthetic propositions. There is an obvious objection against this doctrine, viz., that this proposition that there are no synthetic a priori propositions is in itself a—as the present writer thinks, false—synthetic a priori proposition, for it can manifestly not be established by experience.

Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p. 5. See also Hoppe, “Austrian Rationalism in the Age of the Decline of Positivism,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 363; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 271; idem, Economic Science and the Austrian Method (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1995; www.hanshoppe.com/esam), pp. 33–34; idem, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 126–27; and Martin Hollis & Edward J. Nell, Rational Economic Man: A Philosophical Critique of Neo-Classical Economics (Cambridge, 1975), p. 110.

^[24] Against Politics., p. 114.

^[25] Ibid., chap. 6.

^[26] Ibid., p. 120.

^[27] Ibid., p. 125. See also Walter Block, “Hayek’s Road to Serfdom,” J. Libertarian Stud. 12, no. 2 (Fall 1996; https://perma.cc/5NZM-QLCV): 327–50.

^[28] Ibid., pp. 20, 124.

^[29] See, e.g., Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006 [1993]; www.hanshoppe.com/eepp), chap. 1; idem, “The Private Production of Defense,” in The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, Second Expanded Edition (Auburn, Ala.: MisesInstitute, 2021; www.hanshoppe.com/tgf); Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, with Power and Market, Scholars ed., 2d ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009; https://mises.org/library/man-economy-and-state-power-and-market); idem, “The Myth of Neutral Taxation,” in Rothbard, Economic Controversies (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2011; https://mises.org/library/economic-controversies).

^[30] Against Politics, p. 57 et seq.

^[31] See, e.g., Hoppe, “Time Preference, Government, and the Process of De-Civilization—From Monarchy to Democracy,” in John Denson, ed., The Costs of War (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997; https://perma.cc/N7NA-24C8).

^[32] Murray N. Rothbard, “Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences,” in Economic Controversies.

^[33] Against Politics, chap. 5.

^[34] Ibid., p. 170, 174.

^[35] Ibid., chap. 6.

^[36] On Nozick, see Rothbard, “Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State,” The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998; https://perma.cc/5BU9-YLXD); on the error in the Lockean proviso and Nozick’s adoption thereof, see Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 410. On Hayek, see Hoppe, “F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique,” in The Great Fiction, and Block, “Hayek’s Road to Serfdom.” Hoppe also criticizes Nozick in “Murray N. Rothbard and the Ethics of Liberty,” in Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (www.hanshoppe.com/publications).

^[37] Against Politics, p. 106.

^[38] Ibid., p. 106; see also pp. 16–17, 36 n. 2, 66.

^[39] See, e.g., Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Instittue, 2010 [1989]; www.hanshoppe.com/tsc), chap. 7; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, chaps. 8–11; The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism” (ch. 22); “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5); “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6); Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty; idem, For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, 2d ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006; https://mises.org/library/new-liberty-libertarian-manifesto).

^[40] Rothbard, “Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy,” in Economic Controversies.

^[41] Against Politics, chap. 8.

^[42] Ibid., p. 6.

^[43] Ibid., p. 147.

^[44] Ibid., p. 151.

^[45] Ibid., pp. 147 et seq.

^[46] Ibid., pp. 158 et seq.

^[47] Ibid., pp. 171 et seq.

^[48] Ibid., pp. 149, 151.

^[49] Ibid., p. 156.

^[50] Ibid., p. 160.

^[51] Ibid.

^[52] For criticism of norms that would not permit actors to act now because they would be unable to get permission, see “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4), at n.14; “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7), n.31; and “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society” (ch. 14), at n.27.

^[53] Against Politics, p. 170.

^[54] See also “What Libertarianism Is” (ch. 2), at n.27.

^[55] Ibid., p. 173.

^[56] Similar reasoning is employed in my estoppel theory of rights to preclude someone from denying the rights that they necessarily presume exist in a certain context (punishment). This theory is related to and draws on Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5); “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6), the section “Estoppel.” Hoppe’s insights into why the first appropriator has a better moral claim than latecomers is also of relevance here. See Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 168 et seq.; idem, Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pp. 328–30.

^[57] Against Politics, p. 188, n.15; see also p. 195.

^[58] Ibid., p. 188, n. 15. For other libertarian critiques of the Lockean Proviso, see the reference in note 36, above; Kinsella, “Down With the Lockean Proviso,” Mises Economics Blog (Aug. 26, 2009); and Michael Makovi, “The ‘Self-Defeating Morality’ of the Lockean Proviso,” Homo Oeconomicus 32, no. 2 (2015; https://perma.cc/G8PQ-LJ85): 235–74.

^[59] Ibid., p. 174.

^[60] Ibid., p. 176–77.

^[61] Ibid., p. 177.

^[62] Ibid., chap. 9.

^[63] Ibid., p. 198.

^[64] Ibid., chap. 11.

Note: Updated and revised version included as chap. 12 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023).

***

“Reply to Van Dun: Non-Aggression and Title Transfer,” J. Libertarian Stud. 18, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 55–64. (Summary of this JLS issue.)

This article is a reply to Frank van Dun, “Against Libertarian Legalism: A Comment on Kinsella and Block,” J. Libertarian Stud. 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 63–90, commenting on Kinsella, “Against Intellectual Property,” J. Libertarian Stud. 15, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 1–53 and Walter Block, “Toward a Libertarian Theory of Blackmail,” J. Libertarian Stud. 15, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 55–88. Block’s reply is “Reply to ‘Against Libertarian Legalism’ by Frank van Dun,” J. Libertarian Stud. 18, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 1–30.

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 408.

This is my appearance on The Soul of Enterprise, Episode 432, with hosts Ed Kless and Greg Tirico. Recorded Friday, March 24, 2023. Their shownotes are below.

[continue reading…]

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 407.

This is a short conversation I had with James Cox about copyright and fair use back in 2016 (Feb. 26). We also talk about the safe harbor in the DMCA and the §230 safe harbor in the CDA.

https://www.youtube.com/live/wJ2sYz70gc4?feature=share

 

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 406.

This is my appearance on Robert Breedlove’s What Is Money podcast, Ep. WiM282 (Youtube channel). This is Ep. 6 of the “Stephan Kinsella Series” (released March 8, 2023).

From Robert’s Episode notes:

In this episode, Stephan Kinsella joins me for an in-depth conversation about the book “A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics” by Hans-Hermann Hoppe. We discuss the harmful effects of socialism, how to take proper action in an increasingly uncertain future, and the alternative to socialism. ¹

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1. From my friend Greg Morin: “Apropos your recent post about people mispronouncing words. Listening to KOL 406 and you horribly mispronounce “verstehen” lol. It’s like this: fair-shtay-en. Next time we talk I can say it for you. At least I got something out of my learning German over all these years.” [↩]

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 405.

This is my appearance on Robert Breedlove’s What Is Money podcast, Ep. WiM235 (Youtube channel). This is Ep. 5 of the “Stephan Kinsella Series” (released Nov. 9, 2022).

From Robert’s Episode notes:

Stephan Kinsella is an American intellectual property lawyer, author, and deontological anarcho-capitalist. He joins me for an in-depth conversation about the book “A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics” by Hans-Hermann Hoppe.

Podcast (kinsella-on-liberty): Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:12:21 — 66.2MB)

From Facebook:

Libertarian Answer Man time:
Deepfakes, Revenge Porn, etc.

Someone asked me if I had written or had any thoughts on the issue of whether AI and applications like deepfake videos or photos could be a rights violation, for example if it is used to make a fake video of someone depicting them doing things that they actually did not do. This could be done to titillate some audience or even for financial gain, and/or to tarnish someone’s reputation, for revenge, and so on. Apparently some states are considering legislation to ban deep-fake porn, and so on But new laws in California and the demand for new legislation against Deep-fake pornography make me take pause at the unintended consequences this may have on artwork, film, political cartoons and expression itself.

[continue reading…]

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 404.

This was my Webinar presentation at the Freedom Hub Working Group, billed as: “For Over-Drugging of our Bodies and Food, Blame INTELLECTUAL Property” (Wed., Feb. 9, 2023), with co-hosts Jim Grapek and Charles Frohman. It was released under the title “How Humanity’s Progress Has Been Held Back: The Case Against IP (Intellectual Property).”

Rumble:

Youtube:

[continue reading…]

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Note: Updated and revised version included as chap. 10 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023). Text below.

***

“Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith,” J. Libertarian Stud. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998–99): 79–93.

Revised version in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (forthcoming 2023).

10

Inalienability and Punishment:
A Reply to George Smith

George H. Smith published “A Killer’s Right to Life” in Liberty magazine in 1996, making various arguments and claims about inalienability.^* I responded in the Journal of Libertarian Studies,^† in a piece which complements and supplements my previous articles on the inalienability and punishment issues, now chapters 5 and 9 in the present volume. Despite my disagreements with Smith on this issue, I respect and have learned from his work, such as his great essay “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market.”^††

^*    George H. Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” Liberty 10, no. 2 (Nov. 1996; https://perma.cc/8U8C-ZTAR): 49–54 & 68–69.

^†   Stephan Kinsella, “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith,” J. Libertarian Stud. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998–99): 79–93. Smith’s article was also criticized in the May 1997 issue of Liberty. See John C. Goodman, “Do Inalienable Rights Outlaw Punishment?”, Liberty 10, no. 5 (May 1997; https://perma.cc/4TMF-2S5R): 47–49; Timothy Virkkala, “The Hollow Ring of Inalienability,” Liberty 10, no. 5 (May 1997; https://perma.cc/4TMF-2S5R): 49–50. Smith’s response was “Inalienable Rights?,” Liberty 10, no. 6 (July 1997; https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK): 51–56; Virkkala’s response was “The Stilted Logic of Natural Rights,” Liberty 10, no. 6 (July 1997; https://perma.cc/48NM-UAPK): 56.

^††  George H. Smith, “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market,” in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1991). Smith, who passed away in 2022, was a thoughtful and provocative libertarian theorist. See, for example, idem, Atheism: The Case Against God (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1979); idem, Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies.

 

It can reasonably be argued that capital punishment is immoral or problematic because of the danger of executing an innocent person by mistake.^[1] George Smith, in a recent Liberty magazine article in which he argues against capital punishment, does not take this approach. Instead, Smith states that capital punishment is never permissible, even where “reasonable doubt is impossible and where the crimes have been especially heinous.”^[2] In other words, even if we know beyond all doubt that someone has committed murder, it is impermissible to execute him (and also, presumably, to inflict less severe punishment).

Smith bases his argument on the concept of “inalienable rights,” rights that “cannot be transferred, surrendered, or forfeited.”^[3] The argument runs roughly as follows. Libertarians must adopt one of two positions: (1) everyone has inalienable rights, in which case even a (known) murderer may not be executed; or (2) certain crimes may be punished with death, in which case the theory of inalienable rights must be abandoned. In Smith’s opinion, position (2) “would be catastrophic, for we cannot construct a libertarian theory of justice except on a foundation of inalienable rights.” ^[4]

Smith’s entire argument, then, rests on the notion that libertarianism and justice require inalienable rights. There are either “inalienable” rights, or there are no rights at all. Yet Smith’s arguments for why libertarianism requires that rights be inalienable are unpersuasive.

STANDING THREATS

One of Smith’s approaches is to provide an argument for capital punishment based on the notion of self-defense and then to attack this argument as insufficient. Smith writes:

Some years ago during a summer conference, Randy Barnett and I sat down to see whether we could manufacture a defense of capital punishment. The best we could come up with was the notion of a “standing threat.” This is based on John Locke’s treatment of reparation and restraining, which “are the only reasons, why one Man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment.”^[5]

Thus, according to Locke, we may kill an aggressor in self-defense, since he has placed the victim and aggressor in a “state of war.” Similarly, a case could be made that a convicted aggressor may be executed, on the grounds that he is a “standing threat” to others.

Rejecting this argument, Smith notes:

To kill someone as a “standing threat” in the name of self-defense may amount to little more than a surreptitious effort to smuggle capital punishment in through the back door of libertarian theory, having denied it entrance through the front.^[6]

Smith is correct here: it is not for reasons of self-defense that a victim has a right to punish an aggressor.^[7] However, this does not mean punishment (retribution or retaliation) is impermissible, only that self-defense is not sufficient to justify punishment.

BARNETT ON PUNISHMENT

Let me briefly note the following. Smith states:

For years [Barnett] has brilliantly elaborated on the pure theory of restitution as the only acceptable model of libertarian punishment, and he recognizes that the death penalty cannot be incorporated within this model.”^[8]

Admittedly, Barnett does appear to believe that even guilty aggressors have a right against punishment. But he does not claim to have justified such a right in his writings on restitution. In his published works on this issue, Barnett opposes a punishment-based system because he believes it may deter crime less than would a restitution-based system, and also because the unavoidable possibility of error can lead to “infliction of harm on the innocent.”^[9] He does not, however, provide a strong argument that punishing an actual aggressor violates his rights. Indeed, in his book The Structure of Liberty, Barnett states: “this analysis cannot conclusively prove that no combination of compensation or punishment can ever address effectively the compliance problem.”^[10] And further: “I do not claim to have completely demonstrated this proposition [that justice requires restitution, not punishment] either in my earlier writings, or in this book.”^[11]

Thus, although Barnett opposes punishment for a variety of reasons,^[12] those that are given to buttress his case in favor of restitution do not rest on viewing rights as inalienable and, in my view, Barnett has never demonstrated that rights are inalienable in the sense used by Smith.^[13]

DEFENSE, RESTITUTION, AND INALIENABILITY

Another problem with Smith’s assertion that rights are inalienable is just that: it is merely an assertion. Simply labeling rights over and over again with the modifier “inalienable” does not make it so.^[14] Libertarians do not typically view rights as “inalienable” in Smith’s sense, or put much weight on this concept. In fact, viewing rights as alienable is perfectly consistent with—indeed, implied by—the libertarian non-aggression principle.^[15] Under this principle, only the initiation of force is prohibited; defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory force—more generally, “responsive” force—is not. One does alienate or forfeit certain rights by committing acts of aggression.^[16] This is exactly why it is permissible to use force to defend against or punish aggression, or to obtain restitution. One has a natural, not inalienable, right to be free from aggression.

Both defensive and restitutive force, like punitive (retributive or retaliatory) force, imply some alienation of rights. This is just why defensive or restitutive force is considered to be permissible: because the aggressor has alienated his right to be free of such force. If one is opposed to punishment on inalienability grounds, how can one then endorse defensive or restitutive force? As John Goodman correctly notes, Smith’s argument against the death penalty is an argument against punishment as such, and even against defensive or restitutive force.^[17] Thus, to be consistent, Smith has to either object to any use of force against an aggressor, including even self-defense, or admit that rights are not truly inalienable.^[18]

So which is it? Is Smith inconsistent, or does he consistently object to all force? Smith has apparently flip-flopped on this issue. At first, he seems to acknowledge that rights are not really inalienable: “I agree with Locke that reparation (restitution) and restraint (self-defense) are the only justified uses of violence in a free society.”^[19] But a justified use of violence implies some alienation of rights. Yet later, Smith appears to change his mind:

Goodman argues that my case against capital punishment, if consistently applied, would militate against all forms of punishment, such as fines and imprisonment. I freely concede that this is a major problem for the libertarian theory of restitution.… Can we imprison someone and compel him to work off his debt? … These and other questions have not been adequately examined, much less answered, by libertarians, and I remain uncertain about how to deal with them.^[20]

Smith’s view of the inalienability of rights has clearly led him down a dead end. If he is consistent, he must condemn all uses of force, even defensive and restitutive. (Such a position might be referred to as “stupid,” or, perhaps, “Darwinian,” pacifism.)^[21] If, however, he admits that defensive and restitutive force are permissible, he has admitted rights are not inalienable, and thus, he cannot oppose punishment on grounds of inalienability.

THE RIGHT OF PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT

As I have argued at greater length elsewhere,^[22] an individual has a right to use force against an aggressor in response to aggression. This right to use force can be utilized for a variety of purposes: for self-defense during or before the act of aggression, for revenge, to obtain restitution (or rectification), to prevent the aggressor from committing further crimes, or to deter others from committing crimes. What the victim wants to use the right for is his business. But the reason why a victim has a right to retaliate or defend against an aggressor is that the aggressor cannot coherently withhold his consent to retaliatory, defensive, or restitutive force (these may be considered different types of responsive force, that is, non-initiated force, force which is in response to initiated force). To use related legal terminology, the aggressor is “estopped,” or precluded, from denying the victim’s right to use (proportional) responsive force, since such a denial would contradict the aggressor’s view that the use of force is permissible (the view ineluctably demonstrated by the act of aggression).^[23]

Thus, eye-for-an-eye type proportional punishments are legitimate in response to aggression. A murderer, therefore, is estopped from objecting to his own capital punishment. He can no longer claim a right to be free from such treatment. Since he previously had such a right, the right that he previously had must have evaporated. We may say, then, that his right to not have force used against him has been alienated (or forfeited, waived, abandoned, relinquished, surrendered, or lost; the terminology is not important).^[24]

THE UTILITY OF PUNISHMENT

There are further errors in Smith’s article. Consider, for example, Smith’s view that restitution is superior to punishment as a basis for criminal justice. Smith argues that punishing an aggressor “does not restore or equalize rights; it simply wipes out another set of rights,” and that allowing retaliation only provides, at most, “a sense of emotional balance” to the victim. Several responses to this argument can be made. First, Smith here begs the question of whether rights are inalienable by assuming that the aggressor has a set of rights to be violated. If the aggressor’s rights were alienated, proportionally punishing him does not “wipe out his rights,” as he had none left to wipe out.

Second, just because punishment does not restore rights, it is not clear why restitution is automatically superior, since restitution does not restore rights either. It is true that the consequences and fact of an act of aggression can never be undone. The indignity will always have been suffered. Any response by a victim, including restitution and retribution, will always be an imperfect remedy. Indeed, this is one reason why aggression is impermissible: because the harm done thereby is literally undoable, incalculable, and not subject to an adequate remedy.^[25] A victim will always remain, to some extent, a victim.

This does not, however, dictate that the victim should be artificially restricted in choosing among various imperfect remedies. Admittedly, both inflicting punishment on an aggressor (retribution) and extracting monetary damages from him (restitution) are imperfect remedies. But why not let the victim decide which one, or which combination of these, he prefers?^[26] After all, the victim did not ask to be made a victim. He did not ask to be put in the position of having only two imperfect possible remedies available to him. If a victim prefers to torture his torturer, who is Smith to say that the victim’s preference is not rational? Unlike Smith, I am not so unwilling to allow victims to attempt to attain “a sense of emotional balance,” if that is all that is possible to them. (Like Barnett, however, I am concerned about the unavoidable possibility of mistakenly punishing the innocent, and thus admit the appeal of a restitution-based system in order to avoid punishing innocents, but not for reasons of inalienability.)^[27]

The right to inflict (proportional) punishment on one’s aggressor can be useful in other ways as well. Most significantly, perhaps, it may be utilized to reach a more objective determination of the proper amount of restitution. For example, the victim may trade all or part of his right to retaliate for a payment (“ransom”) or other service by the aggressor, i.e., the aggressor buys his way out of punishment.^[28] A serious aggression leads to the right to inflict more severe punishment on the aggressor, which would thus tend to be traded for a higher average amount of ransom or restitution than for comparatively minor crimes. Further, a victim especially offended or traumatized by aggression (and thus subjectively “damaged” more severely) will tend to bargain for a higher ransom. Also, richer aggressors will tend to be willing to pay more ransom to avoid the punishment the victim has a right to inflict.^[29] Thus, allowing punishment to be traded for damages solves the so-called millionaire or billionaire problem faced under a pure restitution system, where a rich man may commit crimes with impunity, since he can simply pay easily-affordable restitution after committing the crime.

For these reasons, allowing the option of punishment can help arrive at a more objective measure of restitution damages.^[30] And even if punishment is banned and is not an actual option—because of the possibility of mistakenly punishing innocents, say—an award of restitution can be based on the model of punishment. E.g., a jury could be instructed to award the victim an amount of money it believes he could bargain for, given all the circumstances, if he could threaten to punish the aggressor. This can lead to more just and objective restitution awards than would result if the jury is simply told to award the amount of damages it “feels” is “fair.”^[31]

The right to retaliate could also be used to justify “enslaving” the aggressor and putting him to work for a time to generate income for the victim (restitutionists like Barnett support this use of force against the aggressor, but do not consider it to be punitive, but rather necessary to enforce restitution).^[32] Or suppose an aggressor is very poor and otherwise unable to pay monetary damages to the victim. In this case, the threat of inflicting severe punishment on the aggressor may induce the aggressor’s relatives or friends to pay off the victim to spare the aggressor from being punished. The victim would thereby be compensated even though the aggressor is penniless, whereas the victim would be totally uncompensated if no threat of punishment were available to motivate the aggressor’s relatives to chip in. (In a restitution-based system, a poor aggressor who is imprisoned in a work-facility designed to generate income payable to the victim may also find friends and relatives to pay off part of his debt to have him released earlier. However, as the aggressor in this case faces only a limited and usually temporary form of “slavery” and not more severe punishment, the motivation for others to bail him out would probably be reduced.)^[33]

INALIENABILITY

The theory of inalienability has been plagued by confusion, vagueness, and inconsistency. The concept is typically applied to the issue of whether a non-aggressor can alienate his rights by a mere contract or promise, i.e., by a peaceful action. For example, may one sell oneself into slavery or enter into a binding, enforceable contract to perform services? Libertarians come down on both sides of this question, but tend to say that rights are “inalienable,” i.e., one may not sell oneself into slavery.^[34] Most libertarians hold this view of inalienability, which I will refer to as the standard or “limited” view of inalienability, since adherents of this view usually also maintain that acts of aggression do alienate rights.^[35] In this view, only violent actions serve to alienate rights. Smith has used the label “inalienability” in an idiosyncratic way to mean that even aggressive actions do not alienate rights.

What, then, is the correct, libertarian view of inalienability and rights? Consent is the crucial element to focus on here. If a person consents to an action that would otherwise violate his rights, there is no rights violation. Boxers in a ring, or duelers dueling, do not have their rights violated when struck by fist or bullet. This is because they consented to these exchanges of force.^[36] To alienate one’s right means that one is unable to withhold consent to some action that would otherwise infringe the right if there were no consent. Thus, a right is alienated by somehow rendering it impossible to object to the action that the alienated right would otherwise prohibit. One does something now that prevents one from withholding consent in the future, thereby effectively alienating the relevant right. To alienate a right, then, is to irrevocably grant the relevant consent to another.

Is it possible to irrevocably grant consent? Smith, an advocate of what may be called the “strong” view of inalienability, would say it is not possible under any circumstances (except, perhaps, for defensive or restitutive force). Proponents of the limited view of inalienability, by contrast, hold that it is possible to do this by aggressing, but not by merely making an agreement or promise. (Those rare libertarians, like Walter Block, who believe rights may be alienated even by a non-violent action like agreement, hold what may be viewed as a “weak” view of inalienability.)^[37]

Let us examine the three ways that consent possibly could be irrevocably granted: by physical means, by aggression, and by voluntary agreement. The physical, or physiological, means refers to a person voluntarily undergoing some process that literally places him under the power of another (e.g., drugs, surgery, technology).^[38] This is akin to committing an act of suicide or “zombicide,” and is not of particular interest, since after the zombicide is complete, the zombie presumably does not even try to run away or withhold consent from his master.

Committing an act of aggression is a clear-cut means for alienating (some of) one’s rights. As explained above,^[39] an aggressor is estopped from withholding consent to the victim’s proposed use of (proportional) retaliatory force, since such a denial would contradict the aggressor’s view that the use of force is permissible. An act of aggression is a way of irrevocably granting consent to punishment. This is exactly why an act of aggression serves to alienate rights: because the act of aggression conclusively demonstrates the aggressor’s view that aggression is proper, thus precluding him from consistently objecting to the victim’s use of (proportional) retaliatory force. The strong view of inalienability (Smith’s view) is, for this reason, untenable.^[40] So which view is correct, the limited view or the weak view?

This depends on the answer to the following question: Can one irrevocably grant consent by voluntary agreement, such as a promise or contract to be another’s slave? Barnett recognizes the importance of consent here:

The crucial question … is whether Ann’s current consensual choices can limit her right to revoke her consent in the future. Having consented to let Ben touch her or to enter the [boxing] ring with him, may she be forced to carry through with her commitment after she has changed her mind?”^[41]

This is a difficult and complicated question. Some argue that a contract is a contract, and may be enforced.^[42] This view is based on the theory that one is a self-owner, entitled to full control of all of one’s property, including one’s body, and that this control comprises the ability to sell one’s body.^[43] Most libertarians, however, seem to hold the limited view of inalienability, whereby aggression does alienate rights, but promising to be someone’s slave does not. Advocates of this view typically argue that such contracts are not enforceable because there is some sort of logical impossibility involved in voluntarily alienating all of one’s rights in this manner.^[44] For example, some argue that it is literally impossible to transfer one’s actual will to another, and thus a promise to do so is null and void; title thereto cannot be transferred. It is like contracting to sell the sun to someone. Such a contract, having an impossible object, would be null and void from the outset.

My view is that the impossibility reasoning typically given to argue that consent cannot be irrevocably granted is fallacious and has helped to muddle the issue of inalienability. For example, if the “impossibility” of literally alienating one’s will means that it is impossible to be bound by contract to act as someone’s slave, why is it not “impossible” to imprison an aggressor to enforce restitution? After all, even a convicted aggressor still has a will. Why is it not “impossible” to defend oneself with force? And yet it is not impossible for consent to be irrevocably granted, as we have seen; this condition exists for a justly imprisoned aggressor. Recipients of defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory force all retain a will, which is overwhelmed with some type of responsive force.

The key here is to focus on force and consent, for to keep someone as a slave, it is not necessary that the will be physically alienated. Rather, in order to enslave someone, the slave-owner must be entitled to use (justified in using) force against the slave if the slave disobeys or tries to run away. The impossibility of actually alienating one’s faculty of volition is irrelevant. It is the legitimacy of using force that matters, and this depends on consent.

Putting the issue this way, however, provides a different argument why consent cannot irrevocably be granted by mere agreement or promise—why the prospective slave may change his mind in the future and withdraw his consent. If A promises (or contracts, or agrees; the terminology is not important) to be B’s slave, this is no doubt an attempt to consent now to force inflicted in the future. If A later changes his mind and tries to run away, may B at that point use force against A?

This is the crucial question. If the answer is yes, this means that A has no right to object and has effectively alienated his rights. I would say no, however, simply because there is no reason why A cannot withdraw his consent. Libertarianism does not say one cannot change one’s mind. When we ask about consent, it is the most recent expression of consent that is most relevant. Unlike the case of aggression, where the aggressor’s prior aggression estops him from objecting to the use of retaliatory force, A has not committed aggression against B. Thus it is not inconsistent for A to later object to the use of force. All A did previously was utter words to B such as “I agree to be your slave.” But this does not aggress against B at all, any more than does uttering the insult, “You are ugly.” Words per se do not aggress, which is one reason there is a (derivative, not independent) “right” to free speech. In a nutshell, a would-be slave-owner must be entitled to use force against the would-be slave in order for the slavery agreement to be enforceable and for rights to be alienated in this manner; but the would-be slave has simply not initiated force against the would-be slave-owner. The would-be slave-owner is thus not entitled to use force against the slave; hence no rights were alienated.^[45]

Thus, I conclude that a slavery agreement is not enforceable. Rights are not completely inalienable, as Smith contends, for aggression can alienate rights. We must reject the strong view of inalienability. However, rights are inalienable in the limited (and more conventional) sense that one cannot irrevocably grant consent to aggression in the future by way of a mere promise or agreement. This is not because of any impossibility in alienating one’s will, but because a promisor has not committed aggression. One retains the right to change one’s mind, absent special circumstances.^[46] The limited view of inalienability seems to be the most sensible.

The right to alienate external resources is not limited, however, because of crucial differences between rights pertaining to one’s body and rights of ownership in previously-unowned, homesteaded resources. The right to appropriate external resources is derivative of and distinct from the basic right against non-aggression (self-ownership). External scarce resources are appropriated and acquired, and held by intention (it is this that distinguishes ownership from possession),^[47] and thus can be abandoned or alienated by a sufficient expression of intention, e.g., a contract or act of abandonment. For this reason, under the libertarian title-transfer theory of contract, one can alienate particular property titles, i.e., titles to external (homesteadable) scarce resources. In this sense there is a distinction between title to property, which is alienable by mere contract; and rights related to one’s body, which are not alienable by promise or contract (speech act) but are alienable by acts of aggression.^[48]

To summarize, then, one may object to certain acts of aggression; or one may grant consent to allow the otherwise-prohibited action to take place. The right against aggression may be alienated, but only by irrevocably granting consent, which may be done only by committing an act of aggression. A non-violent action such as a promise or agreement to do something with one’s body, on the other hand, does not alienate rights, because the consent may be withdrawn at any time in the future, with certain exceptions. This is because a promise now to consent in the future to violence does not commit aggression against the promisee, and because a future change of mind revokes the consent.

CONCLUSION

If Smith is right that even a murderer has a right to not be killed, then it is wrongful aggression to kill the aggressor, just as it is wrongful aggression for a murderer to kill the victim. Then it is no longer the initiation of force that is impermissible; it is force in general, even retaliatory, defensive, or restitutive force. Without a right to respond to aggression, the non-aggression principle goes out the window, as does the distinction between aggressor and victim. Smith’s defense of the strong version of inalienable rights thus undermines what is surely the heart of libertarianism, the non-aggression principle.

 

APPENDIX
LEFEVRE’S PACIFISM

As noted above, the material here was originally intended to appear in footnote 21, above. Due to its length, I include this material in this appendix.

As noted in the text, the consistent pacifist must condemn all uses of force, even defensive and restitutive, and that libertarian Robert LeFevre has been accused of holding such views. However, as alluded to above, it is not clear that LeFevre took his pacifism so far. As LeFevre writes:

Protection is what we do prior to the commission of a criminal act which does, in fact, prevent such an act from occurring.…

Protection, because of the fact that it prevents a trespass from occurring, is always moral.…

Defense, on the other hand, is what we do during an attack by someone else. It is what takes place in what is called the “hot encounter.” You are walking down the street and a man comes up to you, sticks a gun in your face, and demands your money. Now you are face to face with an attacker. You cannot protect yourself (i.e., prevent the attack); it is too late for that. Now you must defend yourself (i.e., ward off the attack).

As long as your actions are for the sole purpose of warding off the attack, you would not be guilty of an immoral act yourself. But if your actions serve the purpose of attacking the criminal, you are guilty of a trespass even though the other man initiated the attack.…

Suppose, in the situation outlined above, the other man takes a swing at you. Clearly, you can raise your arm to ward off his blow. This is defense. If, however, you then bring your arm down upon his head and begin attacking him, you are no longer defending yourself, but attacking the other man. This would be immoral, as it is a trespass upon the other person.^[49]

Although I disagree with this pacifist view, it seems some libertarians mischaracterize LeFevre as opposing violence in self-defense. E.g., writes Rothbard:

If every man has the absolute right to his justly-held property it then follows that he has the right to keep that property—to defend it by violence against violent invasion. Absolute pacifists who also assert their belief in property rights—such as Mr. Robert LeFevre—are caught in an inescapable inner contradiction: for if a man owns property and yet is denied the right to defend it against attack, then it is clear that a very important aspect of that ownership is being denied to him. To say that someone has the absolute right to a certain property but lacks the right to defend it against attack or invasion is also to say that he does not have total right to that property.^[50]

This implies LeFevre opposes the right to self-defense, to “defend … against attack.” See also the comments of Todd Lewis:

While most libertarians view the right to use lethal force to defend one’s body and physical property as naturally flowing from a strict reading of the Non-Aggression Principle, there is at least one little-known libertarian, the late great Robert LeFevre, who took an even more radical position on violence. Not only did he eschew the initiation of violence; he also eschewed the use of violence in one’s own self-defense.^[51]

Neither Rothbard nor Lewis provide any citations to LeFevre to back up this characterization of his views on violence used in self-defense.^[52] Thus, in the absence of any further writing by LeFevre on this subject (which may well exist), I have to conclude that the accusations of him adopting such an extreme pacifist view are unfounded.

[ENDNOTES; SOME FORMATTING E.G. ITALICS MAY BE MISSING]

^[1] See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.84 and Kinsella, “Fraud, Restitution, and Retaliation: The Libertarian Approach,” StephanKinsella.com (Feb. 3, 2009). For a related commentary related to disputes in general, see Kinsella, “On the Obligation to Negotiate, Compromise, and Arbitrate,” StephanKinsella.com (April 6, 2023).

^[2] Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 46 (emphasis added).

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Ibid., p. 48.

^[5] Ibid., p. 68.

^[6] Ibid., p. 69.

^[7] That said, I do agree that in certain cases someone who is a standing threat to others may be dealt with appropriately, in which case self-defense principles come into play. See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.F. But not everyone who has committed an act of aggression is necessarily a standing threat.

^[8] Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 68.

^[9] Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford, 2014), p. 228 (emphasis added).

^[10] Ibid., p. 237 (emphasis added).

^[11] Ibid., p. 186 n. 36. See also p. 321: “If men were gods, then perhaps imposing rewards and punishments on the basis of desert would be a workable theory.” Also: “It has been noted that one who wishes to extinguish or convey an inalienable right may do so by committing the appropriate wrongful act and thereby forfeiting it.” Idem, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” Social Pol’y &Phil. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1986; https://tinyurl.com/44adafte): 179–202, p. 186, and idem, “Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract,” in Frey & Morris, eds., Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals, pp. 156–57, both citing Diana T. Meyers, Inalienable Rights: A Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 14. But if a criminal has forfeited his rights (to not be punished, say), then it does not violate his rights to punish him.

^[12] As pointed out in note 33, below, I also oppose institutionalized punishment for many of the pragmatic reasons given by Barnett, though it is not because rights are inalienable, and it is not because (proportional) punishment would violate the rights of actually guilty criminals.

^[13] A second, less significant point, relates to Smith’s doubts about the propriety of killing or imprisoning someone who has shown himself to be a “standing threat” to others. Smith notes: “Objective standards and procedures seem problematic in this case, to say the least. (Perhaps I am lacking in imagination; if so, I have little doubt that more imaginative libertarians will come to my aid with ingenious solutions.)” Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 69. Barnett seems to have done just this. Barnett argues that the principle of “extended self-defense” justifies imprisoning (sometimes for life) those who have made a sufficiently unambiguous communication of a threat to another. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty, pp. 188–193. On pp. 213–14, Barnett points out that because of problems of enforcement abuse and rule of law considerations, however, this remedy should be limited to those persons who have communicated a threat to others by their past criminal behavior (i.e., those who have been convicted, perhaps multiple times, of a crime), and only if the previous crimes had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Randy E. Barnett, “Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction,” Boston U. L. Rev. 76 (February/April 1996; www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 157–68. I believe this limitation on the principle of extended self-defense is unduly restrictive, but that is neither here nor there. See, e.g., my post “Stalking and Threats as Aggression,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 10, 2021).

^[14] Smith says Jeremy Bentham held the theory of “inalienable rights” to be “nonsense upon stilts,” and thus wonders if anyone who rejects inalienable rights must follow Bentham to his anti-libertarian conclusions. Smith, “Inalienable Rights?”, p. 51. Yet Bentham said that rights were nonsense, and that natural rights were nonsense upon stilts. He did not use the modifier “inalienable” that Smith subtly puts in his mouth (though he does use the adjective “imprescriptible”). Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies,” in Human Rights, A.I. Melden, ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970), p. 28. Bentham opposed natural rights on the grounds that they were anterior to government, and thus his criticism is applicable to both alienable and inalienable natural rights. Thus, one can oppose Bentham’s rights-skepticism by being in favor of alienable natural rights, which means that rejecting inalienability does not mean following Bentham down a non-libertarian path, as long as one advocates natural rights.

^[15] Many, probably most, libertarians maintain that rights are strictly “alienable,” i.e., some actions are sufficient to alienate rights (although they usually also maintain that rights are “inalienable” sometimes, e.g., promising to be another’s slave, as opposed to the commission of an act of aggression, does not serve to alienate rights; see section “Inalienability,” and note 34, below. In fact, any libertarian who advocates the right to punish (or, really, even the right to self-defense) at least implicitly endorses that rights can be alienated, to some extent. See, e.g., Murray N. Rothbard, “Self-Defense,” in The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998; https://mises.org/library/right-self-defense), p. 81, where he says “the criminal … loses his right to the extent that he has deprived another man of his” (emphasis in original); Barnett, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” p. 186 (quoted in note 11 above); Roger Pilon, “Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Retribution, or Both?,” Ethics 88, no. 4 (July 1978): 348–57, 353 (“The criminal act has created rights in the victim; in the criminal it has both alienated rights and created obligations correlative to the newly created rights of the victim.”); John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690; https://www.johnlocke.net/2022/07/two-treatises-of-government.html), § 172 (power over one man’s life “is the effect only of forfeiture which the aggressor makes of his own life when he puts himself into the state of war with another”); Auberon Herbert, “Part XI,” in Auberon Herbert & J. H. Levy, Taxation and Anarchism: A Discussion between the Hon. Auberon Herbert and J.H. Levy (London: The Personal Rights Association, 1912; https://perma.cc/LX8H-MZFH), p. 38 (“Am I right in saying that a man has forfeited his own rights (to the extent of the aggression he has committed) in attacking the rights of others? … It may be very difficult to translate into concrete terms the amount of aggression, and of resulting restraint; but all just law seems to be the effort to do this. We punish a man in a certain way if he has inflicted an injury which lays me up for a day; in another way if he takes my life…. [T]he punishment or redress … should be measured by the amount of aggression; in other words that the aggressor—after a rough fashion—loses as much liberty as that of which he has deprived others.”), also ibid., pp. 39–40; also other sources quoted in “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.43; also Kinsella, “Quotes on the Logic of Liberty,” StephanKinsella.com (June 22, 2009).

^[16] For more on forfeiture or alienation of rights, see “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law” (ch. 19), n.81 and “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.88 and Appendix: The Justice of Responsive Force; also “What Libertarianism Is” (ch. 2), n.17; “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4), n.15; also, in general, “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5) and “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6).

^[17] Goodman, “Do Inalienable Rights Outlaw Punishment?”, p. 47.

^[18] The following thought-experiment, from the ever-fertile libertarian mind of Walter Block (as relayed to me by Joe Salerno), illustrates why a proponent of restitution must, in principle, be willing to support capital punishment as well. Block asks, what if it were possible to actually provide true restitution to a murder victim—to restore his life—by connecting a “life-sucking” machine to the murderer and transferring his life essence to the dead victim? This would bring the dead victim back at the cost of the killer’s life. Surely, a restitutionist would have to be in favor of this, as it is simply a type of force used to enforce restitution, and the purpose of restitution is to “restore” the victim. But what is the difference, in principle, between killing the aggressor to “restore” the victim and killing the aggressor as punishment? In both cases, the aggressor is intentionally killed, against his will, in response to his earlier aggression. It would seem that in this case, the restitutionist, like the retributionist, supports executing murderers, and thus cannot claim that a murderer has, in principle, an inalienable right to life. See Walter Block & Roy Whitehead, “Taking the Assets of Criminals to Compensate Victims of Violence: A Legal and Philosophical Approach,” Wayne State U. L. Sch. J. Law Soc. 5 (2003, www.walterblock.com/publications): 229–53, pp. 249–51; Walter E. Block, “The Death Penalty,” LewRockwell.com (November 11, 2003; www.lewrockwell.com/2003/11/walter-e-block/the-death-penalty).

^[19] Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 69

^[20] Smith, “Inalienable Rights?,” p. 55 (emphasis added). Note that Smith here confusingly refers to “fines and imprisonment”—presumably forms of restitution—as “punishment,” even though a supposed advantage of restitution is that it is not punitive.

^[21] Libertarian Robert LeFevre has been accused of holding such views. But his pacifism was perhaps a bit more nuanced. In revising this chapter, this footnote grew to unmanageable length. I have placed the relevant commentary in the Appendix, below.

^[22] See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5) and “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6).

^[23] For a discussion of proportionality, see “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.A

^[24] Another error lies in the very title of Smith’s article: “A Killer’s Right to Life.” Under libertarianism, one has a right against the initiation of force—against aggression. But punishment is not initiatory force; it is force in response to initiated force. Part of Smith’s confusion here lies in thinking that libertarianism upholds some actual right to life. There is no right to life. There is no right to “free speech.” The ability to enjoy your life or engage in speech is a consequence of a system where your property rights are respected. As I wrote previously:

If I own … 100 acres of land, I can prance around naked on it, not because the land is imbued with some “right-to-prance-naked,” but because I own the land and it does not (necessarily) violate the property rights of others for me to use my property in this fashion.

Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2008), p. 53. See also Rothbard’s criticism of the “right to free speech” in Murray N. Rothbard, “Human Rights as Property Rights,” in The Ethics of Liberty (https://mises.org/library/human-rights-property-rights).

Likewise, there is no abstract “right to life.” There is a right against aggression, that is, to not have one’s property rights violated. That is why libertarians advocate the non-aggression axiom or principle, not the “life axiom.” An innocent person can use his right against aggression to protect his life, if he so chooses; or he may commit suicide or waste his life in other ways. Thus, an innocent person may be said to have a right to life, if it is kept in mind that the so-called “right to life” is merely derivative of—a consequence of—the primary right against aggression, just as the right to free speech is derivative of the right to own private property and the right against aggression. An aggressor, on the other hand, no longer has a right against the imposition of force, and thus his life is in peril. The aggressor, therefore, no longer has a “right to his life,” such that it was.

^[25] Barnett, an advocate of restitution and opponent of punishment, recognizes this, and for this reason emphasizes the importance of crime prevention. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 185–92. As does LeFevre, as discussed in the Appendix.

^[26] On giving victims the option of what type of punishment to apply or whether to seek restitution or some blend of punishment and restitution, see “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.B; Pilon, “Criminal Remedies,” p. 356; Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 184 n.32; Joseph Ellin, “Restitutionism Defended,” J. Value Inquiry 34, no. 2 (Sept. 2000): 299–317.

^[27] See note 33, below.

^[28] For previous suggestions of the possibility of criminals buying their way out of punishment, see Rothbard, “Punishment and Proportionality,” in The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 86, 89; Pilon, “Criminal Remedies,” p. 356.

^[29] See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part IV.G. See also Randy E. Barnett, “Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice,” Ethics 87, no. 4 (July 1977; https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1558/): 279–301, pp. 297–98, reprinted in Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process, Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), pp. 379–380; Roger Pilon, “Criminal Remedies,” p. 351. For a “law-and-economics” discussion of this issue, see David D. Friedman, “What Is ‘Fair Compensation’ for Death or Injury?”, Int’l Rev. L & Econ. 2 (1982; https://perma.cc/W5BU-K6PL): 81–93; idem, “Reflections on Optimal Punishment, or: Should the Rich Pay Higher Fines?,” Research in L. & Econ. 3 (1981): 185–205; idem, “Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment,” J. Pol. Econ. 107, no. S6 (December 1999; https://perma.cc/3M2H-68N2), pp. S259–S269.

^[30] On the issue of determination of the proper amount of damages, see Bruce L. Benson, “Restitution in Theory and Practice,” J. Libertarian Stud. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1996; https://mises.org/library/restitution-theory-and-practice): 79–83; Rothbard, “Punishment and Proportionality,” pp. 88–89. See also references in the preceding note.

^[31] I believe this latter approach is consistent with and supplements Barnett’s theory of a restitution-based justice system, since Barnett nowhere specifies any objective standards or criteria by which a judge or jury is to determine the amount of restitution a victim is to receive for a non-economic crime like murder, rape, and the like. He specifies only that the aggressor must “compensate” the victim for the “harm caused,” to “restore” the victim. Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 161, 187. Of course, how much compensation is needed to compensate for various violent crimes is a difficult question, and, of course, no amount of restitution can ever “restore” a murdered victim, nor can it “undo” other types of battery.

^[32] Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 176–86.

^[33] Note: although I still believe Smith is wrong about this aspect of inalienability of rights, and that it does not violate the rights of an aggressor for the victim or his agents/heirs to proportionately punish him for his crime (for more on this, see “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7), text at notes 35–36), I nonetheless sympathize with the idea of a restitution-based system being preferable and even likely in any free society, as noted in “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.85, and Kinsella, “Fraud, Restitution, and Retaliation: The Libertarian Approach.” For related discussion about disputes in general, see Kinsella, “On the Obligation to Negotiate, Compromise, and Arbitrate.”

^[34] See, e.g., Barnett, Structure of Liberty, pp. 78–83; idem, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” pp. 186–95; Rothbard, “Interpersonal Relations: Voluntary Exchange,” in The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 40–41 (https://mises.org/library/crusoe-social-philosophy) and “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts,” 134–136 (https://mises.org/library/property-rights-and-theory-contracts); Tibor R. Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1975), pp. 116–17; Smith, “A Killer’s Right to Life,” p. 49; idem, “Inalienable Rights?,” p. 54.

^[35] See note 15 above.

^[36] As Richard Epstein explains,

The case for the recognition of consent as a defense in case of the deliberate infliction of harm can also be made in simple and direct terms. The self-infliction of harm generates no cause of action, no matter why inflicted. There is no reason, then, why a person who may inflict harm upon himself should not, prima facie, be allowed to have someone else do it for him.

Richard A. Epstein, “Intentional Harms,” J. Legal Stud. 4 (1975): 391–442, p.411. See also “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), Part II. For an unorthodox libertarian view that duelers do not actually “consent” since a duel is only engaged in due to the “threat of disgrace,” see T. Patrick Burke, No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market (New York: Paragon House, 1994), pp. 192, 268 n.15, which I criticize in my “Book Review,” Reason Papers No. 20 (Fall 1995; https://reasonpapers.com/archives/): 135–46, and Kinsella, “‘Aggression’ versus ‘Harm’ in Libertarianism,” Mises Economics Blog (Dec. 16, 2009). See related comments in “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5), n.16 and “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6), n.3.

^[37] I critique Block’s views in “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11).

^[38] See, e.g., discussions of this in Smith, “Inalienable Rights?,” p. 54:

Moral agency is inalienable, and so must be the right to exercise that agency.… This does not mean, however, that moral agency cannot be extinguished, which brings us to another kind of slavery contract. Suppose that Murphy agrees to have a computer chip implanted in his brain, which will enable me to control him with a joystick, moving him around like a robot. (Perhaps in exchange for this dubious privilege, I have agreed to pay one million dollars to his destitute family.) Here, Murphy has voluntarily extinguished his moral agency, not transferred it to me. What he has transferred is physical control over his body, which becomes my property after he has taken leave of it. Therefore, since the body, like all physical objects, is transferable, I regard this kind of slavery contract as possible and valid.

See also Barnett, Structure of Liberty, 78 & n. 39, who writes:

Suppose that Ann consented to transfer partial or complete control of her body to Ben. Absent some physiological change in Ann (caused, perhaps, by voluntarily and knowingly ingesting some special drug or undergoing psycho-surgery) there is no way for such a commitment to be carried out.… Arthur Kuflik offers these examples to undercut this type of argument for inalienability. See Arthur Kuflik, “The Inalienability of Autonomy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, no. 4 (1984): 271–98, p. 281: “This suggests that the impropriety of an autonomy-abdicating agreement has more to do with the impropriety of autonomy-abdication itself than with some general fact that we have no right to make commitments we know we will be unable to keep.” But arguments based on impropriety and one based on the impossibility of such agreements are not mutually exclusive. Kuflik’s examples only show that this reason for inalienability is limited to those commitments to alienate the future control over one’s person which are not made possible by mind-altering drugs, brainwashing techniques, or psychosurgery.

^[39] See note 22 above, and accompanying text.

^[40] See notes 11 and 15 above.

^[41] Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 81. Rothbard also realizes the importance of being able to change one’s mind. In a discussion about voluntary slave contracts, he writes: “The problem comes when, at some later date, Smith changes his mind and decides to leave. Shall he be held to his former voluntary promise?” Rothbard, “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts,” p. 136 (emphasis added).

^[42] But see, of course, the dissenting view expressed in chapter 9.

^[43] A view I criticize in “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11).

^[44] See note 34 above; also “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability” (ch. 9), Part III.C.

^[45] Proponents of the weak view of inalienability, like Walter Block, on the other hand, would argue that the sale of one’s body confers ownership of it to another person and that subsequent violence against the sold body by the new owner is no more aggression than is self-mutilation. I remain to be convinced by this line of argument, primarily because there seems to be a relevant difference between the rights related to one’s body and rights in homesteaded resources, due to the different justifications for and nature of these rights. For more on this, see “Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection” (ch. 11).

^[46] E.g., an airplane pilot may be forcibly restrained by passengers from parachuting out in mid-flight. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 81; also idem, “Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract,” in R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris, eds., Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 163 n.52. The reason the parachuting is arguably aggression is that this action can be considered to be the cause of the physical harm that will befall the passengers, much like one who shoots a gun or drops a bomb is an aggressor. Alternatively, in the airplane example, it could be argued that the ownership of the airplane is contractually granted in common to the passengers for the duration of the flight, and they could thus use force to stop the pilot from opening the door since they “own” it and do not grant him permission to use it for this purpose.

For more on causation, see “Causation and Aggression” (ch. 8). Arguments could be constructed for other special cases, such as agreeing to donate an organ which causes the recipient to rely on this, or enlisting in a volunteer army at a time of peril. I do think there is room for more development of ideas related to such issues by future scholars.

^[47] See “A Libertarian Theory of Contract” (ch. 9), at n.40 and accompanying text.

^[48] See also Barnett, Structure of Liberty, p. 82. There has been great confusion in the area of contract theory, which has perhaps contributed to the confusion in inalienability reasoning. For example, the “impossibility” reasoning seems to be based on the groundless assumption that contracts are based on the concept of “binding promises” or on an improper analogy between homesteadable scarce resources, which can be acquired or abandoned, and rights against aggression, which relate to one’s body. However, contracts need have nothing to do with promises, and there is a difference between rights to acquired external resources and rights to one’s body. For more on the libertarian theory of contracts, see Randy E. Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract,” Colum. L. Rev. 86 (1986; www.randybarnett.com/pre-2000): 269; Rothbard, “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts”; Williamson M. Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts,” J. Libertarian Stud. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1977; https://mises.org/library/toward-reformulation-law-contracts): 3–13. Thus, the framework for rights, punishment, and consent put forward herein also has implications for other aspects of libertarian theory, which cannot be addressed in detail here. For example, the view of the unenforceability of slavery contracts also applies to contracts for personal services, and, indeed, to all promises in general, and thus to the theory of contracts. The theory of detrimental reliance is also relevant here. In my view, promises per se are not enforceable, and contracts are not best viewed as enforceable promises but as exchanges or alienations of titles to acquired tangible property external to one’s body. Some promises may be enforceable, due to detrimental reliance, but only in cases where the reliance is not circular, and thus plays a causal role in harming another, and such enforceable promises are something different from contract itself. This view of contracts, inalienability, and rights presented herein also has implications for the distinction between the alienability of homesteadable property versus the (limited) inalienability of rights related to one’s body. Elaboration of these ideas will have to await a subsequent article.

Author’s note (2023): I have chosen to retain the above note instead of updating it. The original article was written in 1998–99, when I anticipated I would need to elaborate on these ideas subsequently. This is what I did. The next year, in 1999, I started developing the ideas noted above, which ultimately became “A Libertarian Theory of Contract (ch. 9).

^[49] Robert LeFevre, Fundamentals of Liberty (Santa Ana, California: Rampart Institute, 1988; https://archive.org/details/LeFevre-TheFundamentalsOfLiberty), pp. 354–55.

^[50] Rothbard, “Self-Defense,” p. 77.

^[51] Todd Lewis, “Protection, Defense, Retaliation, and Self-Ownership,” Libertarian Christian Institute (July 11, 2021; https://perma.cc/9SB2-XJC7).

^[52] Lewis did not respond to an email I sent him asking for further clarification or support of his accusation of LeFevre.

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 403.

I was a guest today (Jan. 27, 2023) on The Bitcoin Group #343, on the World Crypto Network (Youtube channel), hosted by Thomas Hunt @MadBitcoins.

The other panelists included the CryptoRaptor (Dan Eve); Ben Arc; Martin @generalbyltes. We discussed a variety of topics.

[continue reading…]

Podcast (kinsella-on-liberty): Play in new window | Download (Duration: 19:43 — 18.1MB)