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Note: An updated and revised version of this article is included as chap. 20 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023). See below.

***

Stephan Kinsella, “Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order. By Anthony de Jasay. London and New York: Routledge, 1997,” Q. J. Austrian Econ. 1, no. 1. (Fall 1998): 85–93. Revised version published as “Review of Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order, by Anthony de Jasay,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (forthcoming 2023).

20

Review of Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order, by Anthony de Jasay

 

Originally published as Stephan Kinsella, “Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order. By Anthony de Jasay. London and New York: Routledge, 1997,” Q. J. Austrian Econ. 1, no. 1. (Fall 1998): 85–93. De Jasay’s book will be referred to herein as Against Politics.

 

 

This is a wonderful collection of previously published articles by Anthony de Jasay who, it turns out, is an undiscovered Austrian, or at least a close cousin. The essays in Against Politics, published between 1989 and 1996, are united around a common theme, the economic and political aspects of government and “ordered anarchy.” The book is full of sparkling insight and penetrating, calm dissections of pro-state arguments. Opponents of the state will find much ammunition here. Statists (even of the minimalist variety) will find much to ponder.

De Jasay’s arguments pack quite a punch, and make it clear that he is a powerful, careful scholar. He also appears to be a quasi-Austrian economist and political theorist, which is surprising given that he does not appear to be very familiar with the work of Austrian theorists, such as Mises and Rothbard. Has he even read Human Action? One wonders. The primary well-known Austrians he cites are Hayek and Wieser, who represent the “Vienna School” instead of the Austrian school.[1] He has apparently come to many Austrian conclusions without the benefit of much exposure to Austrianism. For example, he makes good use of the observation that not only is utility not measurable, but interpersonal utility is also completely incommensurate.[2] He even writes that, “[u]nlike the physical sciences, inference presupposing purposiveness is proper to the study of reasoning beings and cannot be avoided without inordinate loss of content,”[3] which bears an uncanny similarity to Mises’s own epistemology.[4]

The book is divided into two parts. The seven chapters of Part 1 are critical of statism, the view that political action is necessary, efficient, or desirable. In the four chapters of Part 2, our author somewhat tentatively proffers his own politico-economic theories, designed to show that various desirable social institutions are possible without political arrangements. The essays are well-ordered and generally fit together almost as well as chapters of an integrated work, although, as is to be expected in a collection of this kind, there is some repetition and redundancy. (A useful summary of the book’s themes, structure, and arguments is found in the Introduction, at pp. 4–7.)

De Jasay is a master of criticism. A standard technique is to hold a statist’s logic up to standards that the statist himself espouses. In a rare personal glimpse, he reveals an instance of applying this technique in his own life:

The present writer, when a subject of a “people’s democracy” [presumably the author’s country of origin, Hungary], used to taunt his political masters that capitalism had never existed anywhere, that it was yet to come, it was the “wave of the future”—a taunt that reduced them to fury but naturally failed to provoke any refutation.[5]

Given his power of criticism, the critical pieces in Part 1 contain stronger arguments than Part 2, although for some (such as this reviewer), the essays in Part 2 will still be of at least as much or more interest. For although his positive theorizing is weakened by his own moral skepticism (more on this below), it is strengthened by his critique of statist alternatives; further, his basic intuitions and premises are largely sound. Combine this with a multitude of keen insights and critiques of opposing social theories, and Part 2 is of immense interest, even with its deficiencies.

Part 1 opens with “Self-Contradictory Contractarianism,” which addresses the argument that various “intractable” problems of the state of nature, such as prisoner’s dilemmas and free riding,[6] prevent systematic social cooperation. One way out of these dilemmas would be to make “binding” contracts. However, people cannot make binding contracts in the state of nature, since rational actors without fear of sanction will always default, thereby making contracting impossible and requiring the state to provide an effective contract enforcement mechanism.

But, de Jasay asks, “if contracts require an enforcer, how could there be a social contract creating an enforcer without its enforcement being assured by a meta-enforcer created by a meta-social contract, and so on in an infinite regress.”[7] De Jasay recognizes that the proposed solution assumes that the state can act as an “enforcing agent acting as a programmed automaton.”[8] Yet this is to “assume away the principal-agent problem,”[9] since the state has little reason to restrict itself to enforcing the contract. For these and other reasons, “[t]here is … no contractual exit from the state of nature: if the state is to be created by contract, it cannot be created, since it is its own antecedent condition.”[10] Thus this particular ground for the necessity of the state contradicts itself, and advocates of government are hoisted by their own petard.

De Jasay correctly recognizes that the real question is whether ordered anarchy (what we would call anarcho-capitalism) is possible or not, and this question “ultimately boils down to the issue of the enforcement of mutual promises without a final specialized enforcer.”[11] De Jasay seems at home with the somewhat dubious field of game theory, but this helps to make him especially suited to criticize its irrelevance to the actual world. He argues that typical game-theoretical arguments are unrealistic and inapplicable to real life situations, since “[a]nyone who has a name, lives in a place, does something for a living—that is, anyone tied into the fabric of society—would think twice before treating mutual promise as the single-play prisoner’s dilemma says he must.”[12] We can, therefore, expect that contracts can be self-enforcing, without the aid of a centralized enforcing agent, and thus at least some of the dilemmas that are claimed to be part of anarchy are chimerical.[13]

Indeed, as argued in chapter 2, “Is Limited Government Possible?,” it is not proponents of anarcho-capitalism but rather those who advocate limited government who hold unrealistic views. Our author recognizes that “[t]here is a plethora of constitutional devices for ‘rigging’ rules and procedures in such a way as to clip the wings of the state.”[14] However, the real problem is not how to invent such devices but to find the conditions, if possible, that would be likely to be adopted and to stay intact long enough to do any good.[15] De Jasay’s economic reasoning here persuasively demonstrates why no such artificial restriction is likely to succeed, and why any government can be expected to have a tendency to grow.[16]

The other chapters of Part 1 are also interesting and insightful. “Frogs’ Legs, Shared Ends, and the Rationality of Politics”[17] argues that political grounds generally cannot have rational grounds and cannot be rationally defended. This essay, however, seems more hastily written and more poorly organized than most others in the book. “The Twistable is Not Testable,”[18] a review essay of Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies,[19] shows de Jasay at the height of his critical powers. In this piece, de Jasay subjects Popper’s own (socialistic) propositions “to the acid of the very method of which he is the champion,” the test of falsifiability.[20] Popper contended that “[g]enuine propositions are capable of being corroborated, and are criticized by a process of confrontation with the ascertainable facts of the case.”[21] However, Popper advocated both democracy and socialism; yet, as de Jasay shows, this advocacy rests upon the completely unfalsifiable building block descriptions, concepts, and judgments, such as “weak” and “strong.” For example, these concepts are essential to the Popperian proposition that social institutions must be constructed to protect the “economically weak” from the “economically strong.”[22] Thus, de Jasay shows that Popper’s socialism is indefensible by Popper’s very own scientific standards.[23]

In the course of this essay, de Jasay also deflates the myth that Popper was a liberal.[24] Also of interest is de Jasay’s critical treatment of other prominent liberal economists and political theorists, notably James Buchanan, F.A. Hayek, and Robert Nozick. In “Hayek: Some Missing Pieces,”[25] for example, de Jasay argues that Hayek “has no complete theory of the social order to back up his liberal recommendations.”[26] In advocating that government should go beyond the maintenance of law and order to provide amorphous and endless “highly desirable” public goods, Hayek ends up supporting virtually unlimited government. De Jasay will have none of this:

A theory of social order is incomplete if it makes no serious attempt at assessing the long-term forces that make the public sector grow or shrink. This can hardly be done without relying on a defensible theory of public goods. Hayek feels no necessity for one. Strangely, the question seems to have held no interest for him.[27]

In other words, Hayek has not done his homework and his half-baked political theory endangers the very freedom that he is viewed as upholding. (The critiques of Nozick and Buchanan are discussed below in the discussion of Part 2.)

I have mentioned above that de Jasay’s work could be improved if it built more on and dealt more with contemporary Austrian theory, in particular Misesian economic theory as well as associated political theories, such as those of Rothbard. But this is unfair and somewhat ungrateful. We cannot rightfully criticize him for what he has not done, especially when what he has done is so significant. It might be better to say that, given his obvious acuity and talents, it seems a shame that he has not done so. One can only hope that we see more treatment and use of Austrian work in his further output.

For example, his discussions of the so-called public goods “dilemma”[28] could have profited from the trenchant insights of Austrians Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, among others.[29] His discussion of why government will tend to grow[30] could also be usefully supplemented by recent Austrian politico-economic theory.[31] Rothbard (relying on Schütz) criticized the empiricist assumption that only “verifiable” (or falsifiable) propositions are “scientific,” and thus the existence of human action and even other human actors cannot be scientifically maintained, on the grounds that the principle of verifiability itself requires other human beings to exist to replicate experimental results.[32] This insight could have been used with profit in de Jasay’s Popper critique.[33] De Jasay’s critiques of Nozick[34] (discussed below) and Hayek[35]could have also fit well with Austrian analysis.[36]

A more serious objection lies in de Jasay’s moral skepticism. His general skepticism serves him well as a critic, since it leads him invariably to put the burden of proof on those who advocate the state and to find their proof wanting. However, his own skepticism goes too far and is itself unwarranted. It also undercuts his own positive theorizing, since even that, as tentative as it is, depends on some modicum of moral judgment or assumptions.

De Jasay seems to believe that the only meaningful propositions are those that are subject to rational criticism, and that only falsifiable propositions that can be corroborated or not, fall into this category. One exception is that “value judgments” that are not merely ad hoc, i.e., that fit into some coherent hierarchy or system, can also be criticized if they are not internally consistent.[37] I may be too hasty here and may be unfairly attributing to him a kind of Popperian scientism that he means to present and critique rather than adopt. However, over and over, de Jasay denigrates the idea that ends or values can be rational. Thus, “[w]hat is ultimately unfalsifiable, immune to rational criticism and useless except as a piece of gratuitous self-expression, is the stand-alone, ad hoc value judgment.”[38]

Here is where perhaps the greatest improvement could be made to de Jasay’s thought by careful consideration of important Austrian work. In particular, Hoppe’s extension of praxeology into the field of ethics, the importance of which cannot be overstated, demonstrates that there is indeed an unchallengeable, rational basis for ethics.[39] In fact, in his skepticism and his subsequently deficient political theorizing, de Jasay has more in common with Mises than just economics. For Mises himself, as Rothbard has pointed out, as an opponent of objective ethics, presented a very weak, half-hearted, and, ultimately, unsuccessful, utilitarian defense of liberalism.[40]

The most important and interesting essay of Part 2 is “Before Resorting to Politics,”[41] which de Jasay admits is “the book’s most ambitious.”[42] In this chapter, he criticizes consequentialism and other problems that, as he sees it, plague modern liberal theory. In its stead he “proposes three, admittedly sketchy, ‘principles of politics,’” which are “entailed in the liberal ethic” and which must be incorporated into the foundations of any coherent liberal theory.[43]

As noted above, however, de Jasay does not seem to believe that normative propositions can be justified, and he does not really try to do so. He just uses the occasional “should” and normative premise where it is unavoidable, and appears to simply presume that the reader shares these (uncontroversial) premises, perhaps counting on the reader’s own good will or love of consistency. For example, he merely asserts that “[i]t is dubious in the extreme that a political authority is entitled to employ its power of coercion for imposing value choices on society … and on individual members.”[44] Yet the force of the normative concepts “dubious” and “entitled” here is diluted by the lack of even an attempt at justification.

De Jasay’s argument is thus a hypothetical one—and I am not sure if he would disagree, for I am not sure he thinks anything better is possible—for it relies for its persuasiveness on the listener already valuing (for some reason) the goals of justice, efficiency, and order. Nevertheless, because most of these principles are certainly sound and justifiable anyway (for example, using Rothbard’s or Hoppe’s ethical theory), and because de Jasay’s critical and analytical skills are so acute, much of interest emerges from this essay.

His three principles of politics are: (1) if in doubt, abstain from political action;[45](2) the feasible is presumed free;[46] and (3) let exclusion stand.[47] The justification of principle (1) begins with a vigorous critique of consequentialism. De Jasay notes that most political action requires assessing the worth or value of various policies. Drawing on the idea that interpersonal utility and values are incommensurate, de Jasay points out that we can rarely know if any proposed government measure is really “worth it” or not.[48] Thus, government action, which necessarily employs the power of coercion, should be avoided where possible; the burden of proof should be on those agitating for it. This entails a corollary principle, “that applying coercion is legitimate when it is positively invited by the prospective coercee.” [49]

Next, in principle (2), “the feasible is presumed free,” de Jasay asserts that “[t]he basic rule is that a person is presumed free to do what is feasible for him to do,”[50] as long as the proposed feasible action is not ruled out by his own obligations or the possibility of harm to others. We should live by right and not by permission, presumably in part because the former situation is more workable and efficient. If a feasible action is thus presumed free, then the actor need not prove that the action is permissible; rather, the burden is on he who challenges the permissibility of the action.[51] Otherwise, an actor might be unable to ever act since it would be essentially very difficult to prove a negative by showing that no one will be harmed.[52]

Incidentally, de Jasay offers an interesting critique of Nozick’s conception of rights here. By viewing rights as “permissions” to do something, rather than as claims for performance by another, Nozick perhaps unwittingly endorses a system in which action is not presumed free, as action is undertaken with “permission” by others, which presumably must first be granted.[53]

I found the justification of principle (3), “let exclusion stand,” to be of most interest, especially the discussion of homesteading or appropriation of unowned goods.[54] De Jasay equates property with its owner’s “excluding” others from using it, for example by fencing in immovable property (land) or finding or creating (and keeping) movable property (corporeal, tangible objects). Thus, the principle means “let ownership stand,” i.e., that claims to ownership of property appropriated from the state of nature or acquired ultimately through a chain of title tracing back to such an appropriation should be respected.

The basic defense of the Lockean proposition that the first or original appropriator of property is entitled to appropriate it draws on his previous “feasible” principle (2) as well as his distinction between rights and liberties. Others have objected to the idea that one can appropriate unowned property on the grounds that such an action unilaterally (and thus unjustifiably) imposes on others moral duties to refrain from interfering.

The basic defense, however, is quite general and straightforward. It is that if a prospective owner can in fact perform it, taking first possession of a thing is a feasible act of his that is admissible if it is not a tort (in this case not trespass) and violates no right; but this is the case by definition, i.e., by the thing being identified as “unowned.”[55]

Thus, by treating individuals as being free to act unless it contravenes a right (claim) of another, there is simply no reason not to allow a person to appropriate unowned property. For who could object, if not another, prior owner? To be entitled to object is to be able to “exclude” the claimant, but the right to exclude is an incident of ownership, and the property is by presumption unowned. No one can validly object to my appropriating unowned property, then, because, assuming feasible actions are free, any objection itself must claim a right, and this itself raises a type of ownership claim.[56]

The beauty of this approach is that it avoids the troublesome “Lockean proviso,” which allows homesteading of unowned goods only so long as “enough and as good is left to others.”[57] Nozick, on the other hand, allowed appropriation of an unowned object only if it did not worsen the situation of others. However, de Jasay points out, in a world with finite resources, this condition would make it impossible for any unowned property to be ever used, since any appropriation causes a loss of opportunity for others to homestead the object and thereby worsens their situation. By contrast, de Jasay’s position “does not require that nobody loses as a result of first possession, as long as the losses were not vested interests.”[58]

De Jasay’s application of his appropriation rule to two basic types of appropriation is also worth study. These two types are “finding and keeping” and “enclosure.”[59] The former appears to apply primarily to movable objects that may be found, taken, and hidden or used exclusively. Since the thing has no other owner, prima facie, no one is entitled to object to the first possessor claiming ownership. Other grounds for opposing this might be that the thing was found at least partly by luck, and was thus undeserved. But for this to be relevant, there would have to be a general rule requiring the lucky in life to compensate the unlucky. But such a rule rests on a simply unsupportable assertion.

For immovable property (land), possession is taken by “enclosing” the land and incurring exclusion costs, e.g., erecting a fence. As in the case with movables, others’ loss of the opportunity to appropriate the property does not give rise to a claim sufficient to oust the first possessor (if it did, it would be an ownership claim). However, for those who used to occasionally enjoy access to and use of the property, they do lose an actual benefit.[60] De Jasay admits that he cannot do full justice to this difficult issue, but offers a tentative solution. If some people previously used the property merely in passing, on an ad hoc basis, no right of theirs is violated by the homesteader enclosing it. However, if some identifiable, closed set of persons have used the property regularly enough to establish a precedent on which they rely, compensation must be paid them by the new owner.[61] (It is unclear why this regular use and “precedent” does not itself establish an ownership claim on behalf of the prior users; but de Jasay is here speaking of borderline cases.)

Other chapters in Part 2 argue that rational choices by individuals in the state of nature can be expected to lead to enforcement of property rights and contractual promises.[62] This chapter also shows that James Buchanan’s interpretation of Hobbes and history is incorrect, and that proper understanding of both supports the idea that markets can exist prior to and without states, contra Buchanan.[63] In the last chapter, “Liberties, Rights, and the Standing of Groups,”[64] one has to agree with his conclusion that “group rights” are problematic, and the proper bearers of rights are individuals.

This is a thought-provoking book. I have only been able to touch upon some of the nuances and important insights it contains. This work is an important contribution to economic and political literature; it should be read and studied by the serious student.

Endnotes

[some formatting, such as italics, missing]

[1] Against Politics, p. 162.

[2] See, e.g., ibid., 81–81, 92, 98, 144

[3] Ibid., 74.

[4] See, e.g., Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar’s ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1998; https://mises.org/library/human-action-0); idem, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962; https://mises.org/library/ultimate-foundation-economic-science); idem, Epistemological Problems of Economics, 3d ed., George Reisman, trans. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2003; https://mises.org/library/epistemological-problems-economics).

[5] Against Politics, pp. 108–9.

[6] Ibid., pp. 11–12.

[7] Ibid., p. 5.

[8] Ibid., p. 19

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. 22

[11] Ibid., p. 29.

[12] Ibid., p. 33.

[13] Further, as Alfred G. Cuzán has insightfully pointed out, the existence of the state itself is evidence that anarchy is possible, for officials of the state “voluntarily” abide by certain hierarchies and rules, e.g., the American president is physically less powerful than his armies, yet they tend to obey him rather than vice-versa. Alfred G. Cuzán, “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?,” J. Libertarian Stud. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1979; https://mises.org/library/do-we-ever-really-get-out-anarchy): 151–58. See also idem, “Revisiting ‘Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?’”, J. Libertarian Stud. 22, no. 1 (2010; https://mises.org/library/revisiting-do-we-ever-really-get-out-anarchy): 3–21.

[14] Against Politics, p. 53.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., p. 57ff.

[17] Ibid., chap. 3.

[18] Ibid., chap. 5.

[19] Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, 4th rev. ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

[20] Against Politics, p. 105.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., pp. 114–15.

[23] As has been pointed out, logical positivism is inherently contradictory since it fails its own test, as it is not itself falsifiable. Mises, for example, writes:

The essence of logical positivism is to deny the cognitive value of a priori knowledge by pointing out that all a priori propositions are merely analytic. They do not provide new information, but are merely verbal or tautological, asserting what has already been implied in the definitions and premises. Only experience can lead to synthetic propositions. There is an obvious objection against this doctrine, viz., that this proposition that there are no synthetic a priori propositions is in itself a—as the present writer thinks, false—synthetic a priori proposition, for it can manifestly not be established by experience.

Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p. 5. See also Hoppe, “Austrian Rationalism in the Age of the Decline of Positivism,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 363; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 271; idem, Economic Science and the Austrian Method (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1995; www.hanshoppe.com/esam), pp. 33–34; idem, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 126–27; and Martin Hollis & Edward J. Nell, Rational Economic Man: A Philosophical Critique of Neo-Classical Economics (Cambridge, 1975), p. 110.

[24] Against Politics., p. 114.

[25] Ibid., chap. 6.

[26] Ibid., p. 120.

[27] Ibid., p. 125. See also Walter Block, “Hayek’s Road to Serfdom,” J. Libertarian Stud. 12, no. 2 (Fall 1996; https://perma.cc/5NZM-QLCV): 327–50.

[28] Ibid., pp. 20, 124.

[29] See, e.g., Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006 [1993]; www.hanshoppe.com/eepp), chap. 1; idem, “The Private Production of Defense,” in The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, Second Expanded Edition (Auburn, Ala.: MisesInstitute, 2021; www.hanshoppe.com/tgf); Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, with Power and Market, Scholars ed., 2d ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009; https://mises.org/library/man-economy-and-state-power-and-market); idem, “The Myth of Neutral Taxation,” in Rothbard, Economic Controversies (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2011; https://mises.org/library/economic-controversies).

[30] Against Politics, p. 57 et seq.

[31] See, e.g., Hoppe, “Time Preference, Government, and the Process of De-Civilization—From Monarchy to Democracy,” in John Denson, ed., The Costs of War (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997; https://perma.cc/N7NA-24C8).

[32] Murray N. Rothbard, “Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences,” in Economic Controversies.

[33] Against Politics, chap. 5.

[34] Ibid., p. 170, 174.

[35] Ibid., chap. 6.

[36] On Nozick, see Rothbard, “Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State,” The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998; https://perma.cc/5BU9-YLXD); on the error in the Lockean proviso and Nozick’s adoption thereof, see Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 410. On Hayek, see Hoppe, “F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique,” in The Great Fiction, and Block, “Hayek’s Road to Serfdom.” Hoppe also criticizes Nozick in “Murray N. Rothbard and the Ethics of Liberty,” in Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (www.hanshoppe.com/publications).

[37] Against Politics, p. 106.

[38] Ibid., p. 106; see also pp. 16–17, 36 n. 2, 66.

[39] See, e.g., Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Instittue, 2010 [1989]; www.hanshoppe.com/tsc), chap. 7; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, chaps. 8–11; The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism” (ch. 22); “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5); “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6); Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty; idem, For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, 2d ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006; https://mises.org/library/new-liberty-libertarian-manifesto).

[40] Rothbard, “Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy,” in Economic Controversies.

[41] Against Politics, chap. 8.

[42] Ibid., p. 6.

[43] Ibid., p. 147.

[44] Ibid., p. 151.

[45] Ibid., pp. 147 et seq.

[46] Ibid., pp. 158 et seq.

[47] Ibid., pp. 171 et seq.

[48] Ibid., pp. 149, 151.

[49] Ibid., p. 156.

[50] Ibid., p. 160.

[51] Ibid.

[52] For criticism of norms that would not permit actors to act now because they would be unable to get permission, see “How We Come to Own Ourselves” (ch. 4), at n.14; “Defending Argumentation Ethics” (ch. 7), n.31; and “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society” (ch. 14), at n.27.

[53] Against Politics, p. 170.

[54] See also “What Libertarianism Is” (ch. 2), at n.27.

[55] Ibid., p. 173.

[56] Similar reasoning is employed in my estoppel theory of rights to preclude someone from denying the rights that they necessarily presume exist in a certain context (punishment). This theory is related to and draws on Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. See “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” (ch. 5); “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights” (ch. 6), the section “Estoppel.” Hoppe’s insights into why the first appropriator has a better moral claim than latecomers is also of relevance here. See Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 168 et seq.; idem, Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pp. 328–30.

[57] Against Politics, p. 188, n.15; see also p. 195.

[58] Ibid., p. 188, n. 15. For other libertarian critiques of the Lockean Proviso, see the reference in note 36, above; Kinsella, “Down With the Lockean Proviso,” Mises Economics Blog (Aug. 26, 2009); and Michael Makovi, “The ‘Self-Defeating Morality’ of the Lockean Proviso,” Homo Oeconomicus 32, no. 2 (2015; https://perma.cc/G8PQ-LJ85): 235–74.

[59] Ibid., p. 174.

[60] Ibid., p. 176–77.

[61] Ibid., p. 177.

[62] Ibid., chap. 9.

[63] Ibid., p. 198.

[64] Ibid., chap. 11.

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Reply to Van Dun: Non-Aggression and Title Transfer

Note: Updated and revised version included as chap. 12 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023).

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Reply to Van Dun: Non-Aggression and Title Transfer,” J. Libertarian Stud. 18, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 55–64. (Summary of this JLS issue.)

This article is a reply to Frank van Dun, “Against Libertarian Legalism: A Comment on Kinsella and Block,” J. Libertarian Stud. 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 63–90, commenting on Kinsella, “Against Intellectual Property,” J. Libertarian Stud. 15, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 1–53 and Walter Block, “Toward a Libertarian Theory of Blackmail,” J. Libertarian Stud. 15, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 55–88. Block’s reply is “Reply to ‘Against Libertarian Legalism’ by Frank van Dun,” J. Libertarian Stud. 18, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 1–30.

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Libertarian Answer Man: Deepfakes and Revenge Porn

From Facebook:

Libertarian Answer Man time:
Deepfakes, Revenge Porn, etc.

Someone asked me if I had written or had any thoughts on the issue of whether AI and applications like deepfake videos or photos could be a rights violation, for example if it is used to make a fake video of someone depicting them doing things that they actually did not do. This could be done to titillate some audience or even for financial gain, and/or to tarnish someone’s reputation, for revenge, and so on. Apparently some states are considering legislation to ban deep-fake porn, and so on But new laws in California and the demand for new legislation against Deep-fake pornography make me take pause at the unintended consequences this may have on artwork, film, political cartoons and expression itself.

[continue reading…]

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Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith

Note: Updated and revised version included as chap. 10 of Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023).

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Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith,” J. Libertarian Stud. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998–99): 79–93.

Revised version in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (forthcoming 2023).

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Yuri Maltsev, R.I.P.

As reported at Mises.org, Yuri Maltsev, the great anti-commie Soviet defector, libertarian and Austrian scholar, editor of Requiem for Marx, has passed away. David Gordon has some nice words about Yuri there. Other obituaries/comments:

I was friends with Yuri for years, since the mid 1990s from Mises Institute events. He also attended the first Property and Freedom Society Annual Meeting in 2006 and others as well, such as:

At the inaugural PFS meeting in 2006, I brought my sister, Crystal, and she delighted in meeting Yuri. I told my wife and son stories about Yuri and they laughed and laughed. He was really a joyous and life-loving man. Yuri regaled me with so many tales over the years. He became a legend in my family just from my stories about him. I recall my son clapping in glee at my re-telling of some stories from Yuri. He would have me repeat my imitations and mimicry of Yuri and his tales.

Yuri, Andy Duncan, and I were invited to speak at Mises Brasil in São Paolo in 2017, and we three had a great time together. 1 I recall we spent one late night in my hotel room eating sardines of some kind from Yuri’s stash, with our fingers, since we had no utensils. Late at night, as we delved into “deep” matters like grad students in a dorm room, he told me one of his biggest philosophical influences was an obscure and eccentric Russian philosopher, Pyotr Chaadayev, in particular his Philosophical Letters & Apology of a Madman, which I did obtain, but have not yet found the stamina to dive into. Maybe it’s time I take the leap. At the same conference, Andy and I tried to talk Yuri into eating a bit healthier to lose weight, to as to live longer. Not that we were any models of physical fitness. But we wanted Yuri to slim down and get healthier, and to live longer. He listened to Andy’s hortations with patience and promised to look into it. But, … it was not to be.

He told us funny stories about how he would fly weekly from Wisconsin to DC on a Sunday or Monday to teach his weekly class at the US Naval Academy in Maryland, and he would often fly with then-Congressman Paul Ryan, whom he ended up getting to do an occasional lecture for some of his classes. He was always joyous and, like Ayn Rand, hated communism and what it had done to his country, Russia; he loved America, a bit too much, perhaps, but it’s understandable.

[continue reading…]

  1. My talks there were: KOL222 | Mises Brasil: Intellectual Property Imperialism Versus Innovation and Freedom and KOL221 | Mises Brasil: State Legislation Versus Law and Liberty. []
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Orality and Literacy: Classifications in Preliterate Societies

Interesting findings in Walter J. Ong’s classic work Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, 30th anniv. ed. (Routledge, 2012), pp. 50–51:

(1) Illiterate (oral) subjects identified geometrical figures by assigning them the names of objects, never abstractly as circles, squares, etc. A circle would be called a plate, sieve, bucket, watch, or moon; a square would be called a mirror, door, house, apricot drying-board. Luria’s subjects identified the designs as representations of real things they knew. They never dealt with abstract circles or squares but rather with concrete objects. Teachers’ school students on the other hand, moderately literate, identified geometrical figures by categorical geometric names: circles, squares, triangles, and so on …. They had been trained to give school-room answers, not real-life responses.

[continue reading…]

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[From my Webnote series]

Related:

Related:

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State vs. Government

If government means the state, it’s criminal; but it clearly means something different: the governing institutions, law and order. The state has coopted government like it has coopted roads and transportation, money, education. But just as roads are not inherently statist, neither is government. We anarcho-libertarians do not oppose law and order and the institutions of “governance”; just state control thereof. We oppose our enemy, the state.

“Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), n.2:

In this book, I sometimes use the term government to refer to what should more precisely be referred to as the state, although, as I have argued elsewhere, to be precise, government (or the institutions of governance) is conceptually distinct from the state. The state commandeers various natural and private institutions in society, such as communication, transportation, defense, education, healthcare, and law and order (institutions of governance), and over time the populace associates these institutions with the state. But just as libertarians are only against state-provided roads and education, but not against roads and education, we are not against “government,” meaning institutions or law and order. We are against the state. We anarchist libertarians are not for chaos and do not think law is impossible without the state; indeed, we think true, just law is only really possible without the state. Thus we anarchist libertarians do not oppose law and order, or even “government,” properly understood. Nonetheless, I sometimes use “government” in this book in the conventional sense to more or less mean the state, to avoid tedium. See, on this, “Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?” (ch. 25); Kinsella, “The Nature of the State and Why Libertarians Hate It,” StephanKinsella.com (May 3, 2010) ….

“Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?”, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023):

Let me give some examples of metaphors or uncareful use of terms, things that can lead to equivocation by our opponents, things that can lead to confusion when we try to analyze difficult issues.

So one is, for example, most libertarians have always been against what we call “public schools.” And in recent years, maybe in the last decade or two, I’ve heard libertarians say, they’ve used the term “government schools,” because they want to make clear, “I’m against government schools.” They’re trying to call to the attention of the proponents of “public” schools that they’re really in favor of the government being in charge of educating people.

Well, even the word “government,” in my view, is a dangerous word to use. I use it from time to time but I increasingly try to use the word “state” to make it clear that I’m against the state because the state has a definition. It’s a monopoly in a geographic area over the provision of law, justice, and force.[31] The word government has ambiguous meanings. And your opponent—either a minarchist, which we can call a mini-statist, or a regular statist—by the word government, they mean the governing institutions in society. And they also use it as an equivalent to the state because they believe the state is necessary for these governing institutions. So they are smuggling in their presuppositions, a type of question-begging.

So if you say, as an anarchist, I’m against the government (meaning: against the state), they will take you to mean you’re against law and order. So if they ask you, “Well, do you believe in law?”

You say, “Yes.”

Then they say, “Well, then you believe in government.”

And I say, “Well, I believe in government as law and order.”

And then they say, “Well, then you must believe in the state.”

You see there’s that trick there. So we have to stay focused on being opposed to the state, defined in a certain way.

[31] Writes Hoppe:

Let me begin with the definition of a state. What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state? This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving himself be adjudicated by him or his agent. And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent’s power to tax: to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.

Based on this definition of a state, it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist. For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws. And he who can legislate can also tax. Surely, this is an enviable position.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Reflections on the Origin and the Stability of the State,” LewRockwell.com (June 23, 2008; https://archive.lewrockwell.com/hoppe/hoppe18.html), quoted in in Kinsella, “The Nature of the State and Why Libertarians Hate It,” StephanKinsella.com (May 3, 2010). Hoppe’s article was based on his 2008 speech, available at Hoppe, “PFP020 | Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Reflections on the Origin of the State (PFS 2008),” Property and Freedom Podcast (Dec. 24, 2021; https://propertyandfreedom.org/pfp).

As I pointed out over 20 years ago (7/14/2005), in External Posts: Sciabarra, Horwitz; definition of Socialism; the “case” for anarchy:

It is not “government” per se that is the problem, as Tibor Machan has noted. We can say that a free society with no states has “government” but no states. The question is whether there is a state. A state is an entity that both taxes people and forcibly outlaws competition. There is no reason to say that private justice agencies would have these characteristics.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Role of Intellectuals and Anti-intellectual Intellectuals,” in The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline (Second Expanded Edition, Mises Institute, 2021):

Let me begin with the definition of a state. What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state? This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving himself be adjudicated by him or his agent. And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent’s power to tax: to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.

Based on this definition of a state, it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist. For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws. And he who can legislate can also tax. Surely, this is an enviable position. 1

Hoppe, “Reflections on State and War,” LewRockwell.com (Dec. 2, 2006): 2

Conventionally, the state is defined as an agency with two unique characteristics. First, it is a compulsory territorial monopolist of ultimate decision-making (jurisdiction). That is, it is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict, including conflicts involving itself. Second, the state is a territorial monopolist of taxation. That is, it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price citizens must pay for its provision of law and order.

Predictably, if one can only appeal to the state for justice, justice will be perverted in favor of the state. Instead of resolving conflict, a monopolist of ultimate decision-making will provoke conflict in order to settle it to his own advantage. Worse, while the quality of justice will fall under monopolistic auspices, its price will rise. Motivated like everyone else by self-interest but equipped with the power to tax, the state agents’ goal is always the same: to maximize income and minimize productive effort.

Nock, Our Enemy, The State:

It may…be easily seen how great the difference is between the institution of government, as understood by [Thomas] Paine and the Declaration of Independence, and the institution of the State … The nature and intention of government … are social. Based on the idea of natural rights, government secures those rights to the individual by strictly negative intervention, making justice costless and easy of access; and beyond that it does not go. The State, on the other hand, both in its genesis and by it primary intention, is purely anti-social. It is not based on the idea of natural rights, but on the idea that the individual has no rights except those that the State may provisionally grant him. [emphasis added]

But see: Nicholas Dykes, “The Facts of Reality: Logic and History in Objectivist Debates about Government,” J. Ayn Rand Stud. 7, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 79–140, p. 79:

in this essay, rightly or wrongly, the words ‘state’ and ‘government’ are used interchangeably to refer to any geographically-defined monopoly on the use of force—including ‘limited government’ or ‘minarchy.’ ‘Anarchism’ refers to libertarian anarchism, the philosophical advocacy of a future society without such a monopoly.

Dykes goes on (pp. 132–133):

A devoted fan of Ayn Rand since 1963, I am sympathetic to those who uphold minarchy or limited government. For thirty years, I did the same. But when in 1992 enforced early retirement gave me the leisure to read more widely, and after a friend, the British libertarian Kevin McFarlane, suggested I should read Bruce Benson’s The Enterprise of Law, I suddenly felt one day like Keats’s Cortez, staring out over an unknown horizon with the ‘wild surmise’ that social life without government might be possible. In the years since, everything I have read has made that surmise seem more and more like the true facts of reality, “a state of affairs that is and works whether or not anybody recognises it” (Mises 1944, 113).

Sechrest (1999, 87) has noted psychological elements in the anarchy/minarchy debate. This seems eminently correct, for children are usually raised to revere their country’s history and its form of government. Thus most Britons are loyal to their monarchy and most Americans unquestioningly support the Uncle Sam they are accustomed to. As Nock ([1935] 1950, 44) observed wryly: “There appears to be a curious difficulty about exercising reflective thought upon the actual nature of an institution into which one was born and one’s ancestors were born.” It may be that this ‘inheritance factor’—unconscious, and therefore impervious to reason—has always been the greatest obstacle to the spread of ideas.” Citing Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University, 1944); Larry Sechrest, “Rand, anarchy, and taxes,” J. Aуn Rand Stud. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 87–105; Nock, Our Enemy, The State. ))

This comment about psychology annoyed Machan. See Tibor Machan, “Reconciling Anarchism and Minarchism,” in Roderick Long and Tibor Machan, Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country? (2008), n. 10:

One cannot do Dykes’ piece justice with any kind of brief reply. But his equivocation is a serious flaw in it. The paper also ends on a dubious note, from a scholarly standpoint, when it suggests that those defending minarchism suffer emotional or psychological problems (like having an affinity for paternalism from their childhood). Such psychologising is very bad form—how can one defend oneself against it when there is no proof or evidence for the thing other than its having been suggested in a respectable forum?

Note that Machan flips back and forth on the state and government, without justifying equating these terms. E.g. he talks about government even after quoting Weber’s definition of state:

Government has been rejected by anarcho-libertarians on grounds that its very nature involves fundamental injustices (such as taxation or exclusive legal jurisdiction).13 Legal services consist of enforcing laws, and laws are supposed to uphold justice. If, as libertarians hold, justice consists of respecting and protecting individual rights, then legal services involve the adjudication of disputes about rights violations, overseeing conviction of criminals, and providing for some of the police protection and military defense for people who live within the relevant jurisdiction, all in the effort to give freely consented-to protection to these rights.

Rights are the objective criteria by which just adjudication is to be conducted, so far, at least, as libertarians understand them. This, as they tell it, fulfills the requirement of a civilised legal system whereby the rule of law rather than of (the will of) human beings (as rulers) is followed. So government is criticised by libertarian anarchists because it is considered impossible for it to pursue and achieve justice without also breaching it.

If the provision of legal services is to be just, the argument goes, not only must government enjoy the full consent of the governed (which may be explicit or, some have argued, implicit—based not only on overt but tacit agreement implied by one’s actions14) but refrain from establishing a monopoly in the provisions of its services. This second reason for why government is coercive by its very nature is often explained by reference to Max Weber’s definition of it: “A state is defined by the specific means peculiar to it, the use of physical force. The state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Politics, then, means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.”15 In short, government is supposedly an imposed monopoly.

13 Rothbard discusses the issue in The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic-Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), pp. 162-63. For his definition, see p. 171, where he says, “The State may therefore be defined as that organisation which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area.”

15 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978), p. 56. [See also Kinsella, The Power to Tax and the Power to Outlaw Competition Imply Each Other.]

Rothbard on the state: Murray N. Rothbard, “The Nature of the State,” The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic-Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), p. 172:

The State may therefore be defined as that organisation which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area. 3

see also France, at an Impasse, Heads Toward Another Government Collapse, NY Times 2025 Sep 8: using “government” not to refer to the French state but to its “government,” which Americans refer to as the “administration” or something like that. Or Congress splinters into unlikely factions over looming government shutdown, where (a) “government shutdown” does not refer to a shutdown of the entire (federal, or general) government, ie. not a “shutdown,” really, and (b) where “government” here clearly means something other than the US state.

See also David Kelley on the Necessity of Government:

William Thomas, “Libertarianism and Objectivism: Compatible?“, Atlas Society (June 29, 2010): “One important difference is that Objectivism holds that man needs government, a point many libertarians deny. Freedom requires an enforceable system of adjudication that establishes, though objective principles, when force has been used and allows for the rational settlement of disputes on the basis of individual rights to life, liberty, and property. Only an institution that effectively dominates and regulates the use of force in a given geographic area can provide and enforce such a system of law. So we all need government to set us free from force.”

This is a good example of the danger of using using the term “government” instead of “state.” What the Objectivist believes is that government—the institutions of governance, i.e. law and order—is impossible without a state, just as many people believe that roads are impossible without the state. Thus when a libertarian anarchist says they oppose institutionalized aggression and therefore they oppose the state, the minarchist, in conflating the terms, hears that we oppose government, since they do not believe “government” is possible without a monopoly, that is, without the state. But this is dishonest equivocation. The minarchist is free to argue that government is not possible in anarchy, but the concepts are distinct and the difference between the anarchist and minarchist is on this issue: whether order is possible without the state and its monopoly on force. It is dishonest equivocation to use semantics to argue a substantive point just as it’s somewhat dishonest for anti-abortion activists to label their position “pro-life” and  for the other side to call their position “pro-choice”, since there, the real debate is over whether fetuses have rights and whether it is a crime to abort a fetus. Thus to keep the debate on substance, the anarchist should make it clear that they oppose the state not “government,” to keep the mini-statist from falsely accusing us of opposing “government” i.e. law and order. Make the mini-statist, who claims to oppose aggression, explain why the state (not “government” which is ambiguous) does not commit aggression. This also helps make it clear why their claims that government is “necessary” is simply irrelevant; the question is not whether the state, or government, is “necessary”; it is whether aggression is justified and, if so, whether the state does, or does not, commit aggression. (See, on this, The State is not the government; we don’t own property; scarcity doesn’t mean rare; coercion is not aggression, What It Means To Be an Anarcho-Capitalist and The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Anarcho-Libertarianism.)

See also this Grok summary:

Étienne de la Boétie (Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, 1576)

Étienne de la Boétie views the state as a tyrannical structure maintained through the voluntary obedience of the populace rather than brute force alone. Tyranny thrives on habit, fear, and the complicity of subjects who surrender their natural liberty, allowing a small elite to dominate. The state’s power is fragile and illusory, collapsible through mass withdrawal of consent via non-violent disobedience. He emphasizes that true freedom requires rejecting servitude to rulers.

De la Boétie does not explicitly distinguish between “state” and “government,” using terms like “tyranny” and “government” somewhat interchangeably to describe coercive rule. However, his focus on voluntary submission implies a potential for non-coercive governance based on natural reason, without formalized institutions of domination.

Westphalian Conception (Peace of Westphalia Treaties, 1648)

The Westphalian conception portrays the state as a sovereign territorial entity with absolute authority over internal affairs, emphasizing non-intervention, territorial integrity, and equality among states. It establishes the state as the central actor in international relations, monopolizing legitimate violence within borders and interacting via diplomacy in an anarchic global system.

This framework does not distinguish between “state” and “government”; it treats them synonymously as the apparatus of sovereign rule, focusing on the state’s external sovereignty rather than internal governance structures.

Herbert Spencer (Social Statics, 1851)

Herbert Spencer sees the state as an evolving coercive institution, transitioning from militant, war-driven societies to industrial, voluntary ones. It oversteps by infringing on individual liberties through excessive legislation, violating the “law of equal freedom.” The state’s coercive nature hinders moral and social progress, and it should minimize to essential functions as society advances.

Spencer does not sharply distinguish “state” from “government,” often using them interchangeably to critique coercive authority. However, he implies a preference for voluntary social organization over state compulsion, suggesting governance could exist without aggressive intervention.

Auberon Herbert (A Politician in Trouble about His Soul, 1884)

Auberon Herbert views the state as a coercive violator of self-ownership, imposing compulsory taxation and laws that treat individuals as tools for collective goals. It is inherently immoral, relying on force rather than consent. He advocates voluntaryism: a society where services like protection are funded consensually, without monopolies.

Herbert explicitly distinguishes “government” from “state.” Government can refer to voluntary cooperative arrangements for social order, while the state is organized compulsion and aggression. He calls for a “voluntary State” or true government based on non-aggression and secession, rejecting the state’s monopoly.

Franz Oppenheimer (The State, 1908)

Franz Oppenheimer defines the state as the “organization of the political means”—a predatory entity born from conquest, where conquerors exploit the conquered through tribute and class division. It contrasts with peaceful “economic means” of production and exchange, maintaining a monopoly on violence for ongoing parasitism.

Oppenheimer does not explicitly distinguish “state” from “government,” but his analysis implies government could theoretically be non-predatory if based on economic means. However, he sees historical governments as synonymous with the state, arising from coercion rather than consent.

Albert Jay Nock (Our Enemy, the State, 1935)

Albert Jay Nock portrays the state as an anti-social, exploitative institution that grants provisional rights at its whim, originating in conquest and usurpation. It expands by absorbing social power, fostering dependency and enabling class exploitation. Drawing on Paine and Jefferson, he contrasts this with natural societal organization.

Nock explicitly distinguishes “government” from “state.” Government, as a social institution, provides negative intervention to secure natural rights without cost or coercion. The state, however, is anti-social, positive intervention that exploits and controls, perverting true governance for elite benefit.

Bertrand de Jouvenel (On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth, 1945)

Bertrand de Jouvenel sees the state as an accumulative power entity that grows inexorably through history, from feudal origins to modern bureaucracies absorbing societal roles. It centralizes authority via war and conquest, eroding liberties and risking totalitarianism, even under democracy.

De Jouvenel does not clearly distinguish “state” from “government,” using them to describe the same expanding power apparatus. His focus is on power’s dynamics rather than terminological separation, though he critiques both absolutist and welfare-oriented forms.

Murray Rothbard (Man, Economy, and State, 1962)

Murray Rothbard characterizes the state as a “criminal organization” that coercively taxes (theft) and monopolizes violence and decision-making over a territory. It perverts justice by self-adjudicating and expands via wars and interventions, violating property rights.

Rothbard distinguishes “state” from “government” in libertarian discourse: government can mean institutions of law and order in a free society, achievable via private agencies. The state, however, is the aggressive monopolist, and anarcho-capitalism supports governance without the state’s coercion.

Antony de Jasay (The State, 1985)

Antony de Jasay depicts the state as a rational maximizer of discretionary power, using democracy and redistribution to expand while creating dependencies. It rejects consent theories, emerging from asymmetries and growing inefficiently through interventions.

De Jasay does not emphasize a distinction between “state” and “government,” treating them as the same adversarial entity to liberty. His public-choice lens views it as a “capitalist” investor in control, without separating voluntary governance.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe (A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, 1989)

Hans-Hermann Hoppe defines the state as a territorial monopolist of taxation and ultimate arbitration, enabling expropriation and conflict provocation. It is inherently socialistic, aggressing against property and degrading justice quality.

Hoppe distinguishes “state” from “government”: government refers to governance institutions like law and order, which anarchists support in private forms. The state is the coercive monopolist; opposition to it does not mean opposing governance but rejecting its aggression.

Martin van Creveld (The Rise and Decline of the State, 1999)

Martin van Creveld traces the state from Westphalian sovereignty as a bureaucratic monopolist of violence and welfare, peaking through nationalism and wars but declining due to globalization, nuclear deterrence, and non-state actors. It faces fragmentation into supranational and subnational entities.

Van Creveld does not distinguish “state” from “government,” using them interchangeably for the territorial sovereign entity. His historical analysis focuses on the state’s evolution and decline without separating voluntary governance concepts.

Legal and Legislative Positivism

See also this Grok analysis:

My queries:

Consult the attached [Shael Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the United States (Louisiana Bar Foundation, 1993)] and Legislative Positivism and Rationalism in the Louisiana and French Civil Codes, Samuel Read on Legal Positivism and Capitalism in 1829, Logical and Legal Positivism, On the Role of Commentators and Codes and the Oracles of the Law, Epstein on Roman Law, Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society, Another Problem with Legislation: James Carter v. the Field Codes, when was the first modern civil code enacted. Was this about the same time as the beginning of the domination of legislative positivism? Is it fair to say that until the beginning of the 20th century, most people would be aware statutes and legislation as one source of law but were generally aware also of law as developed in the English or Anglo-American common law and somewhat compatible with common notions of justice, common sense, natural law, intuition, and custom, and so on; and that in the 1800s, with the rise of legislated European civil codes such as the French Code Napoleon, even though these were legislated they were mostly codifications of previous customary and Roman law, so private law was still roughly identified commonly as related to justice, but that starting in the early 1930s or so with the rise of statutes, regulations, legislation, and the administrative state, gradually more and more people came to think of law as written law synonymous with statutes and legislation, with decrees and commmands of the state, so that nowadays the average person thinks of law as statutory law and is only dimly aware, at best, of the connection with ancient evolved Roman and common law.Also, is it accurate to say that modern civil codes are based in large part on the Roman Law but also partly on customary European law that developed in the centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire and before the rediscovery of the Justinian Codes?

Combined Summary of Previous Responses

This response synthesizes and reiterates the key elements from our prior discussions on the historical development of modern civil codes, their relationship to legislative positivism, evolving perceptions of law, the foundations of civil codes in Roman and customary law, and the persistence of natural law influences as illustrated in the 1839 Louisiana case Reynolds v. Swain. The synthesis draws directly from the provided document by Shael Herman (“The Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the United States,” 1993) and related sources (e.g., Stephan Kinsella’s analyses on positivism and Roman law), emphasizing Louisiana’s unique civil law tradition as a bridge between European antecedents and American legal experience.

1. The First Modern Civil Code and Its Link to Legislative Positivism

The first modern civil code is widely recognized as the Code Napoléon (French Civil Code), enacted in 1804 under Napoleon Bonaparte. This code represented a revolutionary shift: unlike earlier compilations (e.g., the Code of Hammurabi or medieval “Barbarian” codes), it was a comprehensive, logically organized system of general principles derived from Roman law, designed for deduction and application by analogy. It centralized law under legislative authority, embodying Enlightenment ideals of rationalism, social unification, and governmental centralization (as detailed in Herman’s document, pages 5–7, 11–12, 16–18).

This enactment coincided with the rise of legislative positivism—a philosophy viewing law primarily as the product of sovereign (state) commands, rather than natural, customary, or divine sources. Positivism gained traction in the late 18th and early 19th centuries amid the French Revolution’s secular reforms, subordinating custom and judicial discretion to statutes. The Code Napoléon exemplified this by establishing legislation as supreme, though it retained some ties to natural reason. In the U.S., Louisiana’s Digest of 1808 (revised as the Civil Code of 1825) mirrored this, drawing heavily from French, Spanish, and Roman sources while declaring legislation and custom as primary sources (Articles 1–3). However, Louisiana’s version allowed equity and natural law as gap-fillers when statutes were silent (Article 4), reflecting a milder positivism. Critiques like Samuel Read’s 1829 work and James Carter’s 1884 opposition to codification highlight how positivism dominated by the mid-19th century, shifting law from “discovered” (organic) to “made” (state-decreed), though debates persisted between natural lawyers and positivists.

2. Historical Perceptions of Law and the Shift Toward Statutory Dominance

Until the early 20th century, most people viewed statutes as one source of law alongside others, such as English/Anglo-American common law (evolved through precedents), natural law (rooted in reason, justice, and morality), common sense, intuition, and custom. Law was seen as compatible with notions of equity and societal norms, “discovered” through experience rather than solely invented by the state (echoing Ferdinand Stone’s dichotomy in Herman’s document, pages 6–7, where civil lawyers use codes as blueprints, while common lawyers rely on case-by-case solutions).

In the 1800s, the rise of legislated European civil codes like the Code Napoléon changed this subtly: these were mostly codifications of prior customary and Roman law, preserving a link to justice. Private law (e.g., contracts, property) remained tied to evolved norms, not arbitrary commands—Roman principles from Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis (529–534 AD) blended with post-Roman customs (e.g., French coutumes from the 15th–16th centuries). Louisiana’s code, as a “European artifact” (Herman, pages 1–3, 5), exemplified this hybrid, providing intellectual bridges to global civil law traditions (e.g., Quebec, Latin America).

However, starting in the early 20th century—accelerating in the 1930s with the administrative state’s expansion (e.g., U.S. New Deal regulations)—perceptions shifted. Statutes, regulations, and decrees proliferated, leading people to equate “law” with written, state-issued commands. Today, the average person sees law as statutory, with only dim awareness of its roots in ancient Roman/common law evolutions. This evolution wasn’t uniform; civil systems like Louisiana retained stronger ties to justice-oriented codes, while common law areas faced more tension from bureaucratic growth.

3. Foundations of Modern Civil Codes in Roman and Customary Law

Modern civil codes are indeed based largely on Roman law but also incorporate customary European law from the centuries after the Roman Empire’s fall (476 AD) until the rediscovery of Justinian’s texts around 1070 AD. Roman elements—via Justinian’s compilations—provide core institutions like property, obligations, family law, and delicts (e.g., “usufruct,” “servitudes,” “delictual liability” in Herman’s document, pages 9–11, 37–55). Post-Roman customary law, including “Barbarian” codes (e.g., Visigothic, blending Roman remnants with Germanic tribal practices), filled gaps and adapted to feudal realities. Medieval glossators and commentators (11th–15th centuries) synthesized this into the ius commune, influencing Enlightenment jurists like Domat and Pothier, who shaped the Code Napoléon. Louisiana’s code imported this hybrid: Roman foundations through Spanish/French colonial influences, plus local customs, making it a synthesis rather than a pure Roman revival (Herman, pages 27–32; Kinsella on Roman law and commentators).

4. Persistence of Natural Law in Codified Systems: The Case of Reynolds v. Swain (1839)

Even after civil codes enshrined legislative supremacy, links to natural law persisted in some systems, as shown in Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839). This Louisiana Supreme Court case involved a redhibitory action over a defective enslaved person’s sale, where the buyer (Reynolds) sued the seller (Swain) for rescission due to a hidden vice (consumption). The suit exceeded the one-year prescriptive period under Article 2512 of the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, leading the trial court to dismiss it based on positive (enacted) law.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding fraud by Swain interrupted prescription. Crucially, the court’s reasoning invoked natural law and equity as foundational sources when codes were silent or unjust. Justice Martin emphasized that Louisiana’s civil law drew from Romanist traditions, where “unwritten law” (natural equity, reason) supplemented statutes. Citing Article 21 of the modern Louisiana Civil Code (echoing the 1825 version’s Article 4), the court held that judges must apply equity, natural law, and received usages in gaps, preventing rigid positivism from overriding justice. This rejected a strict positivist view (law as only what is enacted), affirming that fraud “shocks the conscience” under natural principles. The case illustrates how Louisiana’s mixed jurisdiction retained natural law as a “gap-filler,” balancing legislative dominance with moral intuition—contrasting with purer positivist systems like France’s, where custom could not abrogate legislation (Herman, pages 17–19; Kinsella on logical/legal positivism).

Overall Concluding Summary

In summary, the modern civil code era began with the 1804 Code Napoléon, marking the ascent of legislative positivism while codifying Roman and post-Roman customary law into rational, justice-oriented frameworks. Louisiana’s 1808/1825 code adapted this European legacy, creating a unique U.S. jurisdiction that bridges continental traditions with American pragmatism (as Herman’s book portrays it as a “social blueprint” from cradle to grave, pages 1–3, 7). Historical perceptions of law as multifaceted (tied to natural justice and custom) gave way to statutory dominance by the mid-20th century, yet cases like Reynolds v. Swain demonstrate natural law’s enduring role in filling statutory gaps and ensuring equity. This evolution underscores law’s dynamic nature: from organic discovery to state-made commands, with civil codes like Louisiana’s preserving intellectual depth and global relevance amid positivist shifts. As Herman notes (pages 2–3), appreciating this “difference” fosters self-knowledge and cross-cultural legal insights in an increasingly interconnected world.

***

On Owning Property

On Scarcity and Rivalrousness

On Coercion and aggression

On the Right Term for Libertarianism

On Government Schools

“Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?”, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023):

Let me give some examples of metaphors or uncareful use of terms, things that can lead to equivocation by our opponents, things that can lead to confusion when we try to analyze difficult issues.

So one is, for example, most libertarians have always been against what we call “public schools.” And in recent years, maybe in the last decade or two, I’ve heard libertarians say, they’ve used the term “government schools,” because they want to make clear, “I’m against government schools.” They’re trying to call to the attention of the proponents of “public” schools that they’re really in favor of the government being in charge of educating people. [But see above re state vs. government]

***

See also Is Taxation Theft? with Professor Richard Salsman, where Richard Salsman argues that not only is taxation justified but so is subpoena power. He/they also conflate terms like government/governance and state; voluntary vs. consensual, and so on. Salsman also adopts a version of the Chicago-Epsteiun “free rider” arguments.

  1. Originally published in Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Reflections on the Origin and the Stability of the State,” LewRockwell.com (June 23, 2008), based on Hoppe, “PFP020 | Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Reflections on the Origin of the State (PFS 2008),” Property and Freedom Podcast (Dec. 24, 2021); also quoted in Stephan Kinsella, “Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?”, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), in the section “Danger of Unclear Language and Metaphors”; and in Kinsella, “The Nature of the State and Why Libertarians Hate It,” StephanKinsella.com (May 3, 2010). []
  2. Also in Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Idea of a Private Law Society,” Mises Daily (July 28, 2006). []
  3. See also Kinsella, The Power to Tax and the Power to Outlaw Competition Imply Each Other. []
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Roman Law and Hypothetical Cases

[From my Webnote series]

Related:

Any free society needs law—private law based on libertarian principles. This means that there is a need to identify and clarify our basic libertarian principles, and for law to develop to implement and apply these principles. As discussed in KOL345 | Kinsella’s Libertarian “Constitution” or: State Constitutions vs. the Libertarian Private Law Code (PorcFest 2021), any law code that libertarian theorists devise cannot be hyper-detailed and all-encompassing.

For one thing, many of the particular rules in a given setting will depend on contractual relationships and choices. Libertarian theorists, such as Rothbard, David Friedman, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, envision various territorial enclaves whose internal legal rules are based on local preferences, custom, and contract. For example, in Hoppe’s “covenant communities”: “a libertarian world could and likely would be one with a great variety of locally separated communities engaging distinctly different and far-reaching discrimination” (“e.g. nudists discriminating against bathing suits,” as Jeff Tucker points out in Idiot Patrol). 1 [continue reading…]

  1. See Hoppe on Covenant Communities and Advocates of Alternative Lifestyles. []
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Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty

Murray Rothbard’s treatise, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998) is online in a couple of obscure places, and some of its individual chapters or portions is available online in separate articles. I’ve listed below those I am aware of: [continue reading…]

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The Dawn of Knowledge (1980)

A short story I wrote in high school, 1980-82 or so. Around the time I decided to stop hunting.

The Dawn of Knowledge

The boy impatient clicked the safety of his 20 gauge shotgun on and off. As he struggled down the trail through the weeds and briers in an open patch of the forest, he tore his arms and legs constantly against the unrelenting pull of the briers’ spindly appendages. He stumbled clumsily into a branch, causing a downpour of dew to drench him. He nervously blazed down the trail, knowing with a pessimistic confidence that the rabbit would cross the trail ahead of him. The negative mood was enhanced by the dour expression of the sun behind clouds smeared with dirty yellow. The barking of his dogs seems so close that he knew the rabbit had already passed. But, as he buried his way around an end in the crude path, the rabbit, ears back and fleeing for his life, sped across the trail from the right. [continue reading…]

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The Basset Hound (1981)

A short story I wrote in high school, 1980-82 or so.

The Basset Hound

The Basset Hound leisurely trotted down the center of the railroad tracks. The sky was vast, pale, and blue, and curved down an left and right to meet the green lines of trees in the forest. The wind was dry and brisk and smelled of pine. The only sounds were the few sounds of the forest, the wind rushing past his long, drooping, soft ears, and the clicking of his toenails on the rocky gravel between the planks in the tracks.

A hawk soaring over caught the corner of his eyes, and before his brain had time to recognize and identify it as harmless, curiosity or instinct or fear gave him a small jolt into running. Normally, he  have just have increased his speed for a step or two until the signal “slow down again—false alarm” reached his legs. But, as in most dogs, his life was very simple and moment by moment.

The new heat and invigoration felt good, so he kept running. He increased his speed even more. The heat and the fantastic sensation of sucking, almost viciously, the delicious air into his lungs, along with the engagement and thrill of the perfect and ecstatically painful act of running, caused him to run faster and faster,

The heat was building up. The planks rushed past, and he was breathing in quick, desperate gulps. The roar of the wind grew louder and louder, too loud. A sub-conscious feeling crept into his awareness; the running didn’t only feel good, it had some other purpose also. but the dog was so involved in running, breathing, and enjoying life that he paid no heed to the intuitive little signals being given to him,

There was a pounding all about, and then something definitely went wrong, too strong to be ignored. In the midst of this rare and strange experience, a whistle could be heard in the background. As he cocked his head instinctively to place the source and identity of the out of place sound, the train, with a thundering, cataclysmic climax, came rushing over him.

[Dedicated to Fernando Muñoz]

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From my substack:

Marc Victor’s Arizona Senate Run: A Lesson for Future Libertarian Party Strategy?

The Libertarian Party1 has long been controversial among libertarians, since its founding in 1971. Should it have a broad tent or a purist message? Minarchist or anarchist—or both? Should it try to elect candidates, and water down its radical principles to do so, or run purist, principled candidates to use their platform to get the message out?

One problem the LP in the United States has always faced is that unlike the parliamentary systems in European and other countries, in which minority parties can form coalitions with others, the US system tends to be a binary winner-take-all system. In this system even libertarian-sympathetic voters know that the LP candidate cannot win so and they don’t want to “waste their vote”. So the LP candidates rarely get a significant percentage of the votes cast.

Read more>>

 

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