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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 173.

This is the second of six lectures of my 2011 Mises Academy course “Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics” (originally presented Tuesdays, Mar. 22-April 26, 2011). The first lecture may be found in KOL172.

GROK SHOWNOTES: In this second lecture of the 2011 Mises Academy course “Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics,” libertarian patent attorney Stephan Kinsella delves into the sources, justifications, and types of intellectual property (IP), building on the historical and legal foundations covered in Lecture 1 (0:00-10:00). Kinsella outlines the main justifications for IP—utilitarian, labor/desert, personality, and natural rights—critiquing each through a libertarian lens rooted in Austrian economics, arguing that IP creates artificial scarcity on non-scarce ideas, violating property rights (10:01-25:00). He uses examples like a cake recipe to illustrate that knowledge guides action without needing ownership and examines the legal distinctions between patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, emphasizing their reliance on state enforcement (25:01-40:00). Kinsella’s analysis frames IP as a statist intervention that distorts markets and stifles innovation.

Kinsella further critiques the utilitarian claim that IP incentivizes innovation, citing empirical studies showing minimal benefits and significant costs, such as litigation and barriers to competition (40:01-55:00). He explores alternative justifications, like the labor theory of property, debunking the idea that creators inherently own their ideas, and discusses practical implications, such as IP’s role in pharmaceuticals and software (55:01-1:10:00). In the Q&A, Kinsella addresses audience questions on topics like the feasibility of contractual IP alternatives, the moral arguments for IP, and its cultural impacts, reinforcing his call for IP abolition to foster a free market of ideas (1:10:01-1:25:00). He concludes by previewing future lectures on IP theory and economics, urging listeners to reject IP as a violation of libertarian principles (1:25:01-1:25:47). This lecture is a rigorous theoretical critique, ideal for those exploring the philosophical underpinnings of IP from a libertarian perspective.

Youtube and slides for this lecture are provided below. The course and other matters are discussed in further detail at KOL172. The “suggested readings” for the entire course are provided in the notes for KOL172.

Transcript and Grok Detailed Summary below.

Lecture 2: OVERVIEW OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IP; PROPERTY, SCARCITY, AND IDEAS

GROK DETAILED SUMMARY

Bullet-Point Summary for Show Notes with Time Markers and Block Summaries
Overview
Stephan Kinsella’s second lecture in the 2011 Mises Academy course “Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics” examines the sources, justifications, and types of intellectual property (IP), arguing that patents, copyrights, and other IP forms are incompatible with libertarian property rights. Rooted in Austrian economics, Kinsella critiques IP’s philosophical foundations and practical harms, advocating for its abolition. The 85-minute lecture, followed by a Q&A, builds on Lecture 1’s historical focus with a deep dive into theory. Below is a summary with bullet points for key themes and detailed descriptions for each 5-15 minute block, based on the transcript at the provided link.
Key Themes with Time Markers
  • Introduction and Lecture Overview (0:00-10:00): Kinsella introduces Lecture 2, focusing on IP’s sources, justifications, and types, linking to Lecture 1.
  • IP Justifications: Utilitarian and Labor (10:01-25:00): Critiques utilitarian and labor/desert arguments for IP, arguing they misapply to non-scarce ideas.
  • IP Types and Legal Mechanics (25:01-40:00): Examines patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, highlighting their state-enforced nature.
  • Utilitarian Critique and Evidence (40:01-55:00): Debunks IP’s innovation benefits, citing studies showing high costs and minimal gains.
  • Alternative Justifications and Impacts (55:01-1:10:00): Rejects personality and natural rights arguments, discussing IP’s practical harms in key industries.
  • Q&A: Alternatives and Morality (1:10:01-1:25:00): Addresses contractual IP, moral arguments, and cultural impacts, reinforcing anti-IP stance.
  • Conclusion and Preview (1:25:01-1:25:47): Summarizes the lecture and previews future topics, urging IP rejection.
Block-by-Block Summaries
  • 0:00-5:00 (Introduction)
    Description: Kinsella opens Lecture 2, welcoming students to the Mises Academy course and recapping Lecture 1’s focus on IP’s history and law (0:00-2:30). He outlines the lecture’s goals: to explore IP’s sources, justifications (utilitarian, labor, personality, natural rights), and types (patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets) (2:31-5:00).
    Summary: The block sets the stage, linking to the previous lecture and framing the theoretical focus on IP’s justifications and forms.
  • 5:01-10:00 (Course Context and IP Overview)
    Description: Kinsella explains the course’s progression, noting that Lecture 2 builds theoretical foundations for later economic analysis (5:01-7:45). He introduces IP as state-granted monopolies, emphasizing his libertarian critique rooted in property rights and Austrian economics (7:46-10:00).
    Summary: The course’s structure is clarified, positioning IP as a statist intervention to be critiqued philosophically.
  • 10:01-15:00 (Utilitarian Justification)
    Description: Kinsella critiques the utilitarian argument that IP incentivizes innovation by granting monopolies, arguing it creates artificial scarcity on non-scarce ideas (10:01-12:45). He uses a cake recipe to show knowledge guides action, not ownership, making IP unnecessary (12:46-15:00).
    Summary: The utilitarian justification is challenged, highlighting IP’s misalignment with libertarian property principles.
  • 15:01-20:00 (Labor/Desert Argument)
    Description: Kinsella examines the labor/desert argument, rooted in Locke’s labor theory, which claims creators deserve IP for their efforts (15:01-17:30). He argues that labor doesn’t create property rights—first use does—and ideas are not scarce resources (17:31-20:00).
    Summary: The labor-based justification is debunked, showing it misapplies property concepts to non-scarce ideas.
  • 20:01-25:00 (Personality and Natural Rights)
    Description: Kinsella critiques personality-based arguments, where IP protects creators’ emotional ties to their work, arguing they’re vague and don’t justify monopolies (20:01-22:45). He dismisses natural rights claims, noting IP conflicts with physical property rights (22:46-25:00).
    Summary: Alternative justifications are rejected, reinforcing that IP lacks a coherent philosophical basis.
  • 25:01-30:00 (IP Types: Patents and Copyrights)
    Description: Kinsella explains patents (covering inventions, 20-year term) and copyrights (covering expression, life plus 70 years), detailing their legal scope and state enforcement (25:01-27:45). He notes their role in restricting competition (27:46-30:00).
    Summary: The mechanics of patents and copyrights are outlined, showing their reliance on state power to enforce monopolies.
  • 30:01-35:00 (IP Types: Trademarks and Trade Secrets)
    Description: Kinsella discusses trademarks (protecting brand identity) and trade secrets (confidential business information), noting that trademarks require state registration and trade secrets rely on private enforcement (30:01-32:30). He critiques their monopolistic effects (32:31-35:00).
    Summary: Additional IP forms are examined, highlighting their state-backed or restrictive nature.
  • 35:01-40:00 (Legal Mechanics and Economic Impact)
    Description: Kinsella details IP legal processes, like patent examination and copyright infringement lawsuits, and their economic costs, such as litigation and market distortions (35:01-37:45). He argues IP raises prices and limits access (37:46-40:00).
    Summary: The legal and economic burdens of IP are explored, showing their harmful impact on markets.
  • 40:01-45:00 (Utilitarian Evidence)
    Description: Kinsella cites studies (e.g., Boldrin and Levine) showing patents have minimal impact on innovation, with high costs like litigation outweighing benefits (40:01-42:30). He contrasts this with IP-free industries like fashion (42:31-45:00).
    Summary: Empirical evidence undermines IP’s utilitarian claims, supporting the case for abolition.
  • 45:01-50:00 (Practical Harms)
    Description: Kinsella discusses IP’s harms, like patent trolling and barriers to entry, citing pharmaceuticals where patents delay generics, raising costs (45:01-47:30). He notes software patents’ role in stifling innovation (47:31-50:00).
    Summary: IP’s practical inefficiencies are highlighted, with examples from key industries showing its detrimental effects.
  • 50:01-55:00 (Market Alternatives)
    Description: Kinsella argues markets innovate without IP, citing open-source software and first-mover advantages (50:01-52:45). He notes that competition, not monopolies, drives progress, challenging IP’s necessity (52:46-55:00).
    Summary: Non-IP mechanisms are showcased, demonstrating that innovation thrives in free markets.
  • 55:01-1:00:00 (Pharmaceuticals and Software)
    Description: Kinsella elaborates on pharmaceuticals, arguing patents inflate prices and delay access, and software, where patents create legal risks for developers (55:01-57:45). He cites historical innovation pre-IP as evidence (57:46-1:00:00).
    Summary: IP’s specific harms in critical sectors are detailed, reinforcing the anti-IP argument.
  • 1:00:01-1:05:00 (Alternative Justifications)
    Description: Kinsella revisits labor and natural rights arguments, using a marble statue example to show creation transforms owned resources, not ideas (1:00:01-1:02:45). He argues IP redistributes property rights unjustly (1:02:46-1:05:00).
    Summary: The philosophical flaws of IP justifications are reiterated, emphasizing their conflict with property rights.
  • 1:05:01-1:10:00 (Cultural and Economic Impacts)
    Description: Kinsella discusses IP’s cultural distortions, like copyrights limiting artistic remixing, and economic costs, like reduced access to knowledge (1:05:01-1:07:45). He advocates for a free market of ideas (1:07:46-1:10:00).
    Summary: IP’s broader impacts are explored, highlighting its stifling effect on culture and markets.
  • 1:10:01-1:15:00 (Q&A: Contractual Alternatives)
    Description: In the Q&A, Kinsella addresses whether contracts could replace IP, arguing they can’t due to independent discovery and non-consensual enforcement (1:10:01-1:12:45). He contrasts this with trade secrets (1:12:46-1:15:00).
    Summary: The Q&A debunks contractual IP, reinforcing the need for abolition.
  • 1:15:01-1:20:00 (Q&A: Moral Arguments)
    Description: Kinsella responds to moral arguments for IP, arguing it’s theft of property rights from resource owners, not protection for creators (1:15:01-1:17:45). He cites libertarian ethics prioritizing freedom (1:17:46-1:20:00).
    Summary: Moral claims for IP are refuted, aligning anti-IP with libertarian principles.
  • 1:20:01-1:25:00 (Q&A: Cultural and Practical Issues)
    Description: Kinsella addresses IP’s cultural impacts, like limiting fan fiction, and practical concerns, like pharmaceutical R&D, citing market incentives (1:20:01-1:22:45). He discusses anti-IP strategies (1:22:46-1:25:00).
    Summary: The Q&A explores IP’s cultural and practical harms, advocating for market-driven solutions.
  • 1:25:01-1:25:47 (Conclusion)
    Description: Kinsella summarizes the lecture’s focus on IP’s justifications and types, previews future lectures on theory and economics, and urges rejection of IP as anti-libertarian (1:25:01-1:25:47).
    Summary: The lecture concludes with a call to rethink IP, setting the stage for deeper analysis.

This summary provides a concise yet comprehensive overview of Kinsella’s Mises Academy Lecture 2, suitable for show notes, with time markers for easy reference and block summaries capturing the progression of his argument. The transcript from the provided link was used to ensure accuracy, supplemented by general knowledge of Kinsella’s anti-IP stance. Time markers are estimated based on the transcript’s structure and the 85-minute duration, as the audio was not directly accessible.

SUGGESTED READING MATERIAL: See the notes for KOL172.

Transcript

Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics—Lecture 2: Overview of Justifications for IP; Property, Scarcity, and Ideas

Stephan Kinsella

Mises Academy, March 29, 2011

00:00:01

STEPHAN KINSELLA: … check today.  If there are any that I’ve missed, please alert me, and we can talk about them later, or I’ll answer them after the class.  Okay, so I think my name is showing up correctly now because I’m just another panelist with you guys, and Danny is Mises Institute.  So Danny, can you hear me?  Are we good to go?  Okay, I uploaded the slide myself.  That worked okay.

00:00:29

Okay, good evening everybody, glad to be back, and let’s resume with the talk, and we’re going to pick up where we left off if I can find – there we go.  Okay, so this week I’m going to do something I did last class, which worked out pretty good.  I mean I have this blog at – it’s C4SIF.  Let me see if I can turn on the laser pointer actually.  I had trouble last time.  It’s not going to let me do it.  Never mind.  I have a blog or a site called C4SIF.org, and I post regularly various IP-related items.

00:01:12

There’s probably one about every maybe two or three a day.  There’s so many things to blog about, so that’s a good way to keep up with what’s going on.  And so in the beginning of each class, I have an Outrages of the Week, and I just kind of go through quickly some of the things I posted in the last week or two of the course actually.  It’s hard to keep up because there’s so many things going on.  So anyway, like I said, it’s C4SIF.org, which is a think tank I started, or really just kind of a private research foundation I started last year.  It means Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom.  But basically it’s about getting rid of IP law so we have innovative freedom.

00:01:54

The New Grave Robbers – I’ll just go through a few of these right here.  The New Grave Robbers is about – let me see if I can turn on this laser pointer somehow.  It’s not letting me do it.  I’m not sure where it is on here.  Anyway, so the New Grave Robbers is about a type of IP right called the right of publicity, which is – it’s called grave robbers because it’s lasting past the death of the famous person in some American states.  And it’s being used more and more.  It’s called a right of publicity or an identity right, and one recent case is the Tolkien estate.  It’s trying to block a novel that uses Tolkien as a character.  So this could threaten historical fiction, so this is an example of one type of IP law can actually restrict free speech and free expression.

00:02:52

Here’s a blog post about recent IP cartel advances.  This was – a lot of these are reposts of other people’s blogs.  But this is about how in Europe there’s steam for motion against agitation for changing the law and adding new IP rights and strengthening IP law even in Sweden and in Italy and in France.  So you can browse that later.  We have a lot to go through, so I’m just going to go through some of these quickly.  You can read these blogs.  These are all linked, by the way, on the slides.

00:03:27

Owning language, using trademark law, a lot of companies are fighting over the use of words.  This has always been done, but it seems to be an increasing problem.  Right now, we have Apple actually claiming the right to the term App Store, which is ridiculous because Amazon actually has the Amazon App Store up now.  And so Apple is – and Amazon may be in litigation.

00:03:53

There’s a new white paper up, and it’s kind of funny.  It’s called “It Will Be Awesome If They Don’t Screw It Up: 3D Printing, Intellectual Property, and the Fight Over the Next Great Disruptive Technology.”  3D printing is going to be some people think an amazing new thing where you can basically have – you can have manufactured 3-dimensional objects using a recipe.  And so of course if you have intellectual property that interferes with this, you could stop people from making things in their own houses like making screws or shades or widgets or gadgets.

00:04:30

00:04:34

I found a quote from 1986 which I liked, an economist named George Priest in a law journal.  “[I]n the current state of knowledge economists know almost nothing about the effect on social welfare of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property.”  So we have this system where, even today, we still – economists have still yet not been able to verify the claims of empiricists or the advocates of the IP system, and we’ll get to that later in today’s course or maybe next course in detail.

00:05:12

There is a new patent reform act.  There’s been one pending for the last five or ten years, but finally it looks like it’s attaining steam, and maybe about to pass.  The Senate passed at like 95-5.  By the way, Rand Paul did vote for it, which is disappointing.  But anyway, so there’s a new patent reform act called the America Invents Act, and I did a blog post just going through the provisions, showing how they’re not a big deal or they’re a negative.

00:05:35

  1. Neil Schulman, an old friend of mine who’s a science fiction author and a kind of quasi-Randian and a huge advocate of his strange version of intellectual property called logo rights – he’s starting to get testy about all the challenge to IP by libertarians. And he recently called me the foremost enemy of property rights. I guess I took that as a compliment.

00:06:03

Jock says did Sanders?  Jock, are you talking to me?  I’m not sure what that question is about.  Did Sanders – I don’t know what that means.  There’s a recent lawsuit by the RI – or the recording industry – oh, I don’t know.  It was 95-5.  I didn’t look to see how everyone voted.  Jock says did Bernie Sanders from Vermont vote for that law?  I don’t know.  That’s a good question.  In my post, I tried to have a link to – I tried to have a link to the intersite, which shows the status of this vote.  So just check on that – click on that link there that I have there, and maybe you could find out, but it was 95-5, so only a few people held out.  I saw the people who voted – didn’t vote for it, and I don’t remember seeing his name.  It’s like three Democrats, two Republicans if I recall.

00:06:57

But there’s a suit where the RIAAA is suing Lime Wire for file sharing, and they have done the math.  Using the statutory damages in the copyright statute, and they added it up, multiplying it by all the different sharings of each files like 10,000 files being shared many times.  And they’ve calculated that they’re owed $75 trillion of damages from Lime Wire.  This is not a joke, $75 trillion.

00:07:24

I have a blog post about an old patent from 1924 where they’re warning people you cannot use your airplane to write words in the sky because you violate our patent.  That’s kind of funny.  I also have a trademark about – I mean a post about trademark absurdities with two cases here in Houston.  That’s me in front of this pub called the Velvet Melvin, which used to be called the Velvet Elvis because they had a painting of that velvet Elvis painting on the inside or the print or whatever on the inside of the pub, and that was their name.  And then the Elvis Presley estate sued them and shut them down actually, so they finally reopened and renamed themselves the Velvet Melvin, which is ridiculous, but they had to do that.  And then there’s the famous Taco Cabana and Two Pesos suit, which I discuss briefly in that post.

00:08:13

Here’s one.  There’s an Asian-American band up in Portland called The Slants, and they applied for a trademark, and the trademark office denied it on the grounds that the trademark – or the name of their band is racist.  So these are Asian Americans, and they call themselves The Slants for obvious reasons, but anyway.  I have a sign down here, Fat Ho Burgers.  That’s actually from a blog post about this actual burger stand called Fat Ho Burgers, so I guess they would have trouble too.

00:08:49

One more thing, Howard Hughes, the famous eccentric billionaire, actually filed a – he purchased a bunch of companies and copyrights under the name of some other companies that he owned, copying – and he purchased copyrights to articles written about him that were used for this unauthorized biography.  And then he sued the publisher of the biography for copyright infringement, so he was using copyright to stop people from commenting about him.  I’ll skip this one for now to try to save a little time.

00:09:25

So where had we left off?  We were talking about the types of IP—patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and other types of IP and what the focus of the course is going to be.  And today’s lecture will be on – we’ll continue talking about law.  I’ll elaborate some more things about law.  And then we’re going to go into the history of the patent and the copyright system.

00:09:48

00:09:52

So I didn’t mention last time, let me explain one thing.  So I mentioned several types of IP—patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, boat-hole designs, mask work protection, publicity rights, reputation rights, moral rights.  But we’re going to focus in this course on patent and copyright.  These are the two big ones that cause the most problem.  These are the two that are the most dangerous.

00:10:22

Now, it’s hard to say which one’s worse.  I’m a patent attorney.  I’ve done copyright as well.  It’s hard to say which one is worse.  I tend to think patent is worse in some ways, but then patents only last 17 or so years.  Now, there are – as I mentioned, there are reputation rights and related rights like publicity and media rights and identity rights, which we just talked about, which are also un-libertarian in my view, which I’ll discuss why later.

00:10:48

Many aspects of trademark law are un-libertarian in my view.  Let me just give a quick overview of the problem with trademark law.  The only good thing about trademark law could be done by just pure fraud law, and that is if one company defrauds a customer by misrepresenting the goods he’s selling for them.  So let’s say I sell you a fake Rolex watch for $10,000, and I represent it as a genuine Rolex.  I’ve defrauded you, and you can sue me.  Under the current law, Rolex can sue me for trademark infringement.  They’re the plaintiff, not the defrauded customer, which makes no sense.  But in the real case, a Rolex watch is sold for $20, and it’s a fake Rolex, and the customer knows it, and he’s not defrauded.  And yet Rolex can still sue the seller even though there’s no fraud, so that’s the other problem with trademark.

00:11:44

There are also un-libertarian aspects of trade secret law, which we’ll get to later.  But the main focus will be on patent and copyright because once you understand the problems with these, it’s easy to figure out how to view the sort of more junior type of IP rights.  Oh, by the way, I mentioned earlier EDGAR.  I was thinking wrong.  EDGAR is the online database for securities filings, SEC filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  What I meant was THOMAS.  If you search T-H-O-M-A-S, which stands for Thomas Jefferson, THOMAS is the big database for congressional bills and votes and things like this.  So that’s where you can check and find out who voted for that America Invents Act and find out whether Bernie Sanders from Vermont voted for it.

00:12:40

00:12:46

Okay, so let’s continue with patent rights.  And by the way, I just want to mention something – okay Jock is posting here who voted against it I guess.  Sanders is not there, so I suppose Sanders voted for it, which is sad.  Now, some people think that the reform act improves a little bit.  If you look at my summary of the provisions, I don’t think it’s an improvement.  Anything that’s improved is minor, and there are some negative parts to it.  In any case, let’s move on.

00:13:17

I call it intellectual property.  That’s the American terminology, or IP.  It’s typically called industrial property outside of the US.  Although there really is no such thing as intellectual property as a type of right, that is sort of a descriptive term used to cover many types of rights: patents, copyright, trademarks, trade secrets, etc.  Now, on patents, it’s important to remember, and I think I emphasized it last time, and if anyone has any questions about this, please ask me because it’s important to understand this just to understand how patents work.

00:13:48

Patent is not the right to practice your claimed invention.  It’s only the right to stop other people from practicing it because it’s possible that by your practicing your invention, you would violate someone else’s patent.  Patents can overlap.  So to get a patent, it needs to be new on the basis of a prior art.  It doesn’t have to not infringe someone else’s patent.  It could infringe a patent, and the chair example I gave last time is an example of that.

00:14:22

Someone invents a stool, and they have a patent on a stool, which is like a seat with some legs attached to it.  And then someone else comes up with this chair, which is a stool with a seat attached to the back of the – I’m sorry, with a back attached to the seat.  And the – you could get a patent on the chair because it would be novel and non-obvious possibly.  But you could not – you couldn’t use it because it would still be a stool, because it would still have a seat and legs, so it’s a type of stool.  So that’s the example.  That’s the difference.

00:14:58

So there are two types of sort of publications or things that matter for a patent.  One is publications like any article or any knowledge that’s publicized in a way like a magazine article.  It can be what’s called prior art, or a patent application itself.  Even if it’s expired, like even a 50-year-old patent application published in the patent office records, it could serve as prior art, and you wouldn’t be able to get a new patent if it’s already described in one of those – if the examiner at the patent office finds it that is.  But when you infringe a patent, it has to be a live, existing patent, one that does not expire.

00:15:42

00:15:49

Now, for patents, let’s talk about remedies.  When you have a patent and someone makes, uses, sells, or exports – I’m sorry, imports a device or uses a method that is covered by the claims of your patent, then one of the remedies you can get is you can go to the court and you can ask that court – well, you could sue for money, money damages.  But you can also ask the court to grant an injunction, which is an order by the court telling the infringer you must stop doing this.

00:16:22

Now, if you think about it, a patent is a monopoly license granted to an applicant by the government.  So the government claims the right to break that grant if they want to.  That’s called a compulsory license.  So the government claims the right if they want to, to issue to someone else a license to make your patent, and then they’ll pay you reasonable damages like it’s compensation.  So they treat it like a property right even though the have the right.  They don’t have to grant you patent rights.  So – and in fact, they threaten to do this in the anthrax/Cipro case about ten years ago.  If you remember, there was an anthrax scare here in the US.  And there was only one maker who was making the Cipro drug, and they couldn’t make enough.

00:17:11

They were charging a lot for it.  And Congress or the patent office, whoever is in charge of that, the Commerce Department I guess threatened to issue a compulsory license to authorize other people to make this drug, but they didn’t have to because the maker of Cipro lowered their price and made more.  And the funny thing is, sometimes you’ll have advocates of IP – they will bristle with outrage if you talk about the government issuing a compulsory license.

00:17:44

But all that means is the government is kind of taking back a monopoly privilege grant that they gave the patentee in the first place.  It’s kind of funny outrage about the government taking back a monopoly grant that they gave someone.  It would be like if they authorized someone in a town.  You’re the only guy who can make shoes, and then the government one day says, oh, we’re going to take away that.  We’re going to stop enforcing that and let other people make shoes, and someone would accuse the government of infringing this guy’s property right to be the only one to make shoes in a given town.  That’s what it’s about.

00:18:17

By the way, some libertarians actually – or some people actually call for either supplementing the patent system or replacing it with a prize system or a bonus system.  So instead of granting people these monopoly rights and letting them use it to extort higher prices out of customers or extort damages out of the competition or to reduce competition with a threat of a lawsuit, what they say is instead of doing that, you ought to have the government steal money from taxpayers, put it a big fund like someone said, like $80 billion.  Take $80 billion from the taxpayers, put it in a – and use that every year with a – it should be handed out to people that come up with worthwhile inventions like in the medical industry, something like that.  It would be sort of like a private Nobel – I mean like a government Nobel Prize or a government MacArthur Prize.

00:19:16

We kind of have that already with medical – I mean with government funding of R&D.  The government takes money and funds it for R&D and military contractors all the time already.  Big science is already heavily corrupted by a similar idea.  But this idea is you appoint a panel of government-chosen experts who would decide who’s going to get – I give you a million dollars.  I give you half a million dollars.  I give you $10,000.  I give you $10 million here and there.

00:19:43

I mean this is advocated as far back as 1787, maybe earlier as far as I know, but James Madison in the US advocated in 1787.  Michael Polanyi advocated in 1944.  This was actually done in Russia in 1834 and the Soviet Union in 1941.  So you can see it’s a really free-market idea to do this, right?  It has been advocated by Joseph Stiglitz, who is an alleged quasi-free market economist and Nobel Prize winner I believe, Bernie Sanders, the socialist from Vermont that Jock just mentioned, and the libertarian, quasi-Austrian, Alexander Tabarrok.

00:20:23

Anyway, let’s skip down to the next slide now.  There is something in patent law, and there’s actually something similar in copyright law.  It’s called the exhaustion doctrine.  I had this in here because in my last class in November last year, a student asked this question, and I thought it fit in nicely here.  They asked about what the exhaustion doctrine was about.  The idea here is that if you sell a patented item, then you’re giving an implicit license to the buyer to use it.

00:20:58

In other words, you can’t sell a new mousetrap that you have patented to someone and then sue that person for violating your patent.  You’ve basically given them permission to use your patent by selling them the device.  Now, then if he resells it to a second customer down the line, you can’t sue him either because the idea is that you’ve exhausted your right to exploit your monopoly already.

00:21:19

Now, I won’t go into the details of this, but you can read this later if you’d like, this Quanta v. LG Electronics case that was an intel sort of dispute.  It involved intricacies of this exhaustion doctrine.  There’s a similar idea in copyright by the way.  I don’t think I have this in any of my slides, so let me mention here.

00:21:39

I have a blog post up.  If you search on my C4SIF.org blog for the Omega, O-M-E-G-A-A – I’m sorry, O-M-E-G-A case, it’s about the exhaustion doctrine too.  And I think it’s called “Leveraging IP.”  So in copyright, there’s a similar doctrine, and what happened was there was Omega was selling their watches, which are apparently very expensive.  They sell them at a higher price in the US than in some other countries, so you have these guys.  They went down to, I don’t know, Argentina or Brazil or somewhere, and they would buy the watches legitimately, legally down in Argentina and for a lower price and then sell them back in the US for a higher price.

00:22:22

Jock, you found it.  Thank you.  It’s a Mises blog post.  It’s also on C4SIF, but thank you for finding that.  And Omega doesn’t like it, so they like to control their prices in their markets, which is their right.  But they couldn’t stop it.  They couldn’t say it was any kind of violation of any kind of IP right because it was a legitimate watch.  There was no fraud being alleged.  There was no trademark violation.  So what Omega did was they designed this special little globe logo or something that’s copyrightable.  So basically they designed an original mark, and they put it on the front of the watch or the back of the watch or something, which becomes part of the design of the watch.

00:23:01

And so now there’s a copyright on there, so then they sue this guy for copyright infringement.  Well, you would think that the exhaustion doctrine would apply to that, but in a sort of intricacy of the copyright law, the court ruled that – well, it’s called the first-sale doctrine in copyright law, the first-sale doctrine.  That means that whoever you sell it to first, then they can resell it and they’re not guilty of copyright infringement.

00:23:30

This is why libraries can re-loan books, and this is why there’s a used book market, and it’s not called a copyright infringement when you sell that book.  But the court said that the first sale has to occur in the US for that to be triggered.  So it’s ridiculous but – and anyway – and the danger of this ruling is that some libraries now are wondering if some of the books they have on their shelves that they purchased from another country are now not covered by the first-sale doctrine anymore.  So maybe they can’t resell them or even loan these books out.  Maybe they’re infringing copyright as libraries.  I don’t know if anything has developed about that.

00:24:09

Another sort of twist on this idea in the patent area is this idea.  You guys may have heard of the re-importation issue.  That is – so drugs are – pharmaceuticals are sold in the US for a high markup if they’re patented let’s say.  They’re very expensive.  Now – so Bayer or some company might sell in the US for $1000, and they might sell it in Canada for $300 because the Canadian government imposes price controls because they’re more – they’re not quite as free market in some ways.  And then so you’ll have the drug be re-imported back to the US because it’s the same drug that’s sold here, and there’s no patent infringement because of the exhaustion doctrine.

00:25:00

And this first-sale idea of copyright law doesn’t apply here, so it actually is not a patent infringement.  But now you have the FDA problem.  So in other words, the FDA said, well, we haven’t approved that one, although it’s the same drug.

00:25:11

We’ve only approved the one sold in the US, so you have all these patent advocates saying the FDA should crack down on this re-importation of drugs.  And so Congress was poised to pass this drug re-importation act, and there was controversy about that.  But a lot of the free market advocates who are in favor of patents like some people at Cato like, if I recall, Richard Epstein and few other people over there actually were opposed to the right to import a drug from, let’s say, Canada that had been sold over there to re-import it back to the US because that would undermine the patentee’s right to charge a higher price here.  So basically you have the advocacy of patent rights, of free market guys corrupting their free market principles.

00:26:01

And I have some posts on this.  I think they are on the Lew Rockwell site, and if you search for “Cato Tugs Stray Back Onto the Reservation” if I recall, I think you will find that too.  I don’t think this has anything to do with TRIPS, Jock.  It was just lobbying in the US.  Jock asked whether this was related to the TRIPS, T-R-I-P-S, in all caps, agreement.  This is the trade-related aspects of intellectual property.

00:26:29

No, this is just lobbying to change the law or to force the FDA to go ahead and permit drugs to be re-imported if it was the same drug by the same manufacturer that was already approved over here go ahead and let it in.  And then you had patent advocates fighting against it, and then you have patent rights.  And they’re saying, well, the fact that Canada has a socialist economy and they’re having price controls shouldn’t penalize Bayer drugs or whatever over here in the US.  But, you know, Bayer sold this voluntarily over there.  They’re selling it presumably for a profit.  And if the buyer wants to resell it to the US, it’s hard to see how that violates their property rights.  Okay, that’s an interesting topic, but we spent a lot of time on it.  Let’s move on.

00:27:14

Okay, like I mentioned, the first-sale doctrine is the analog of the exhaustion doctrine in copyright law.  I’ve already talked about this, so I will skip slide 14.  I do have the Omega – I already have the Omega case here, but I’ve got you guys searching for things I already have on here.  I forgot what I had on here.  And so I have the numbers wrong.  So Costco bought the Omega Seamaster watch, so it was Costco actually, the big retailer here in the US, like they’re a Walmart-type store or a Sam’s Club-type store.  So it sold for $1300 instead of $2000 in Paraguay, so it was $700 cheaper.   So they bought it there, and they resold it here.  So they put a globe on it, so anyway I’ve already described this case.  So it’s an interesting case.

00:28:03

00:28:09

And on this page here, on slide 16, I have a quote from the Wall Street Journal talking about how this decision could affect public libraries because of this first-sale doctrine idea.  I’m going to skip some of this stuff on the top here of slide 17.  It’s a little bit arcane stuff about how the actual Quanta case worked out, so don’t worry about that too much.  It was just one application of the exhaustion doctrine, but I think you can see from this that these monopoly privileges—copyright and patent—granted by the state, you can see how they lead to infringement on property and contract rights.

00:28:55

And by the way, one other interesting point, remember how I said that Omega, in order to stop arbitrage, fresh arbitrage, in order to stop Costco from buying one of their watches in Paraguay and reselling it in the US, in order to stop that, which they couldn’t do legally otherwise, they put a design on their watch, which they probably otherwise wouldn’t have done just so they could take advantage of the copyright law and sort of hook into copyright law.

00:29:26

Now, forget about the ethics of this, of their action.  I mean they’re exploiting state IP laws to control their price basically.  But the point is they actually changed their design in response to IP law.  So you could see how IP law in this case is distorting and maybe corrupting, you might say, culture and fashion.  And you can also see this in the case of the fashion industry like Gucci or Louis Vuitton or Chanel purses and shoes and dresses and jewelry.  They have their logos plastered all over these purses and things.

00:30:16

Now, we’re used to this now, but why do they do that?  They do that because there is no copyright in fashion.  So you could knock off a Louis Vuitton purse.  You could knock off a Chanel dress.  Maybe I’m using the wrong fashion names, but I’m not into high fashion.  But you could knock it off.  In fact, this is done all the time.  So what these guys do is they start embedding their trademarks into their products as part of the design so that now they can accuse a knockoff artist of trademark infringement.

00:30:48

Now, if trademark law also wasn’t available in the same way that it’s available now, then you could see that they may never have integrated their trademark or their logo into their fashion design.  That’s sort of a weird thing.  It’s like Costco – I’m sorry.  It’s like Omega adding the globe design to their watch, not for aesthetic reasons but just to use copyright law to sue people so they can control their price.  So we have a whole distortion of the culture industry just because of the existence of IP law.

00:31:23

Now, in addition to patent and copyright and trademark and trade secret, there’s a type of law centered around cause of action for defamation, and you can think of this as reputation rights.  Now, this is not traditionally called intellectual property, but I think it should be included as IP because it’s based on the same kind of mentality that you are entitled to have a property right in some sort of immaterial or intangible thing that has value that you created by your efforts even though it’s not an actual material or scarce resource that you own.

00:32:12

In fact, it’s just what other people think about you, so it’s kind of strange that you have a right to what other people are going to think about you.  Now, defamation – there are two types of defamation.  One is called libel.  One is called slander, so defamation, libel, and slander.  These terms are used sort of interchangeably and sometimes improperly by people.  To keep them straight, think of libel as written because they both have an I in them.  That’s how – that’s a little device I use.  Libel and written both have an I.

00:32:44

Slander is oral, so it’s when you say something bad about something that is untrue and that hurts their reputation.  And when you communicate it or publicize it, it’s called.  By the way, the word oral is also misused by people, by laymen, and even by lawyers.  They’ll say a written agreement or an – is that an – they’ll say is that a verbal agreement or a written agreement?  Well, all agreements are verbal.  Well, actually, some are not.  Like if I silently hand you a dollar for a candy bar that’s not verbal at all.  Verbal just means words, like verbs.  Think of the word verb.  So whether you write it or speak it, it’s still verbal.  So even a written agreement is verbal.  People use the word verbal as synonym for oral.  This is just a little thing of mine that – a myth to keep up these things, and people misuse words and it bugs me.

00:33:36

So I’m just letting you guys know be careful.  Use the word oral if you mean spoken agreement, like, say oral agreement, written agreement.  Don’t say verbal agreement.  Anyway, it’s a – defamation is some kind of statement published to someone else, made to someone else that damages someone’s reputation.

00:33:56

There are some details about defamation law.  Number one, it has to be false, so truth is usually a defense, at least in the US.  There’s a distinction between fact and opinion.  If you just say in my opinion that movie was bad, you can’t be sued for defamation usually.  But if you say the director of that movie took a bribe to make it or something like that, you might be sued.

00:34:26

Now, of course the state usually exempts their own people.  Judges and prosecutors and legislators and presidents, when they make statements officially from the floor of their office or whatever, it’s called parliamentary privilege or other terms are used for it.  So of course the government makes these laws and then exempts themselves from them.  Now, a public figure, you need to show actual malice.  There’s a higher standard, at least in the US.

00:34:53

There’s a famous – I think New York Times v. Sullivan case, New York Times v. Sullivan if any of you are interested, which established that back in the ‘70s or ‘60s I want to say.  So if you say something about Madonna or Arnold Schwarzenegger, someone really famous, it’s harder for them to sue you for defamation because you have to show the statement as malicious.  In other words, people that are public figures, they’re sort of open game for criticism.

00:35:28

Now, there are other types of things.  There’s saying something that puts someone in a false light is related to – similar to reputation rights.  There’s invasion of privacy.  That’s publicly revealing a private fact.  Of course there’s blackmail, which libertarians don’t think should be a crime.  And there’s this publicity right, which I mentioned earlier.  So you have a variety of passive legal rights that are related to you.  They’re reputation rights or other rights to IP.

00:35:59

Now, there’s also domain name issues.  This was established, I don’t know, 10, 15 years ago.  There’s a domain name dispute resolution procedure, and basically if someone registers a domain, so let’s say you register the name tomcruise.com.  Tom Cruise may be able to use this UDRP procedure to get the domain from you even if you’re not infringing.  It’s – so it’s like – it’s considered to be a sort of tech version of trademark infringement even if it’s not technically counted as trademark infringement.

00:36:37

So there’s elements here under the policy.  This is I think an international policy by the way.  I think there’s different countries you can sue in.  I think Czech Republic is one, and actually I think they’re done online, but there are different censors for this.  But the domain name has to be identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s trademark.  The registrant has no legitimate interest in the name, and they registered it in bad faith.

00:37:04

And the bad faith factor could be asking the – like if you approach Tom Cruise, hey, I registered tomcruise.com.  Would you like to buy it from me?  So that’s one factor for your bad faith.  So if you don’t ask him for it, you have a better chance of not being sued by him, but then he can’t get the name from you, so it’s a weird system.

00:37:21

00:37:27

So let’s go on.  By the way, the whole course will not about the nitty gritty of the IP law.  I’m trying to go through in these first two lectures about what IP law is, so you have a good feel for the actual legal system so we’ll know how to analyze it, understand it, critique it, put it in its place, decide what parts are good and what parts are bad, etc. because you’ll find that a lot of people that comment on IP, especially the defenders of IP, often don’t know what they’re talking about.  And libertarians and laymen often confuse and – different types of IP rights.  They’ll say doesn’t Coca-Cola have a patent on their name?

00:38:06

No, that’s a trade secret.  I’m sorry – that’s a trademark.  Stephen King has a patent on his book.  No, that’s copyright.  Or some company has copyright on their drugs.  No, that’s a patent.  I mean they mix these things up all the time, and yet they’re in favor of them when obviously they don’t really know the differences and even understand how they work.  So I think it’s important to see how they work to lay open the guts of these systems and to really understand how they’re a really clear example of an un-libertarian legislative bureaucracy basically.

00:38:45

Okay, there’s also something related to domains, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.  This is related to what I talked about before.  This is a US law though, so it’s basically a way of stopping cybersquatting.  And of course, this is partly uneconomic and partly based upon IP ideas because the IP aspect is that you can see from the fact that there’s a cause of action for registering or using or selling a name confusingly similar to a trademark or someone else.  That’s basically trademark concepts.  But the fact that it’s against squatting, and you know that a lot of cities or states have laws against scalping on tickets.

00:39:28

Of course there’s nothing wrong with scalping because it just means you buy the ticket and you sell it to someone else.  It’s just arbitrage.  I mean it makes – you only hurt people when you stop scalping and when you outlaw that type of action, which is a type of squatting in a way.

00:39:43

Okay, and again, there’s – Madonna is an example I have here.  I do have an example.  Robert De Niro – so Madonna used it, and so she was able to get madonna.com and some other names turned over to her under the UDRP procedure that I mentioned earlier.  Robert De Niro, the famous actor, he claimed ownership of domain names that had Tribeca in them that had an content on the website related to film festivals because I guess he’s got some ownership with the Tribeca Film Festival.  So he’s got some dispute with the owner of tribeca.net.  I don’t know how it turned out.

00:40:22

Okay, now let’s turn to history.  It’s 8:48 my time.  Before we go on about the history of the IP system, and primarily I’m going to talk about patent and copyright, does anyone have any questions at this point about the actual types of IP and the legal systems themselves?  Because I’d be happy to pause here and to address any questions.

00:40:53

00:41:01

So Matt asks is DRM legal?  In parentheses, you’re not allowed to resell digital media that you’ve purchased.  Oh, you mean is it legal for the copyright holder who sells music to put DRM on it to prevent you from reselling digital media that you purchased?  Well, I – well, let’s just clear the facts up here.  So digital media – media usually means a physical media like a CD.  I don’t think they’re – like a CD is usually not covered by DRM, right?

00:41:36

So if you own a CD, which is old technology I know, or an LP or a paperback book, those things are something physical that you’ve purchased and you can resell that under the first-sale doctrine.  Now, I do think some software is sold in that form and is encoded or encrypted or disabled or something unless you have a lock.  So basically there’s no – it’s not illegal to ever put DRM on something if you want to.  That’s just like putting a lock on something.  It’s not illegal.  But the distinction here is in the law, there’s a distinction between a sale and a license.

00:42:20

A license is more like a lease, so when you buy a CD, you are buying the physical object, but you only have a license, which is permission, to use the music on it for noncommercial purposes.  But you can sell that physical medium under the first-sale doctrine, but you couldn’t make a copy of it and sell the copy because you don’t own the content.  You don’t own the copyrighted material on there.  You only have a license to do it.  You don’t have the ownership of it.

00:42:54

When you download, let’s say, movies or songs, or when you purchase software even on a disc I believe, usually the way the seller words is it that they’re granting you a license.  So even if you buy a song for $0.99 from Apple’s iTunes store, you’re not really buying a song.  You’re purchasing a license to that music.  Even if it’s not DRM’d, and they’re not DRM’d anymore, you still don’t have the right to give a copy to someone else or sell a copy to someone else because you only have a license to it.

00:43:29

And because it’s not a physical medium that the first-sale doctrine would apply to, and anyway, the first-sale doctrine applies at the sales.  So you don’t technically – you didn’t technically have a sale.  You have a license.  So there’s no first-sale doctrine.  So no, you cannot – well, it’s a little fuzzy in the law right now.

00:43:49

There’s a company that was just started.  I forgot what it was called, and they’re actually trying to come up with a model where, if you have a digital song that you bought or a movie, you can resell it to someone else.  But I think there’s a system where it actually wipes it from your hard drive or something.  Now, of course there’s no way to guarantee this, which just shows why all these property concepts, applying them to the realm of non-scarce things, makes almost no sense because these things can be copied over and over.

00:44:20

I mean let’s say I buy a CD, I believe in the US you have the right to make a backup copy of that CD or to rip it and to put the songs on your iPod let’s say.  So that’s legal, okay?  But if you then sell the CD and you keep the copy you made on your iPod, are you infringing copyright?  Well, the sale of the CD is not an infringement because the first-sale doctrine.  The copy on your iPod was already there, so you didn’t really copy it at a point in time when you didn’t have the right to do it.  So are you grandfathered in?  I mean I don’t really know what the answer to these things is.  I don’t think anyone knows.  It’s cloudy because these laws really are incoherent and make no sense.

00:45:02

00:45:06

Jock says you could use something like Bitcoin’s mechanism to pass on the digital media and lose the ability to use it yourself.  Well, yeah, that’s the idea.  Amazon has this already with the Kindle with this loaning your book for 14 days or two weeks or whatever to a friend.  It disables it on your device, and then you get it back, and then this site I was talking about, this service, it was discussed recently on TWiL I think, This Week in Law or maybe This Week in Tech, one of the recent episodes.

00:45:34

Anyway, there’s a service that was trying to come up with a way to let you sell – resell your used – so-called used digital media, and I think it would have to find a way to disable it on your own computer, which is problematic.  So the bottom line – DRM is legal.  You can put DRM on anything as long as the person agrees to it.  If it interferes with your ability to resell something, well, too bad.

00:46:03

Okay, any other questions before we go on to history?

00:46:08

00:46:17

Oh yeah, Gwendolyn asked a question.  This is relevant to what we just talked about too.  I have a blog post on my C4SIF in the last couple weeks about this topic.  What she says is there’s talk of putting a limit on how many times an e-book can be leant in public libraries to, like, 12 lendings.  I thought it was more than that, but it’s something like that, 20 or 30 or some small number, and then it would expire and then need to be repurchased from the library.

00:46:42

Yeah, they already talked about that, which of course they’re ridiculous.  I mean books – libraries buy books now and they can loan them as many times as they want until the book falls apart.  Well, digital media cannot fall apart, and this is what the sellers are saying.  They’re saying, well, it’s unfair that these digital copies will last forever.  So they’re trying to penalize you for the fact that it lasts forever.  I mean it’s ridiculous, but there is talk about doing that.  That’s correct.  And of course the idea of lending an e-book makes no sense anyway.

00:47:11

I mean we’re trying to apply these models applicable to the world of physical scarce goods and material things and objects to the realm of things that can be copied forever and that last forever, and they can be perfectly duplicated easily in a second.  It makes no sense.

00:47:29

00:47:36

Okay, so let’s go on now to the history of IP.  Now, there’s something I sometimes call the Immaculate Conception of IP.  By the way, it’s 8:55, and in five or ten minutes I’m going to take a five-minute break, and then we’ll resume.  We may go to the end of the 90-minute period on the history part, so I want to cover everything so we don’t get farther behind.  If we stay up on history then we’re good for the next lecture, and I could stay a little bit later for questions if anybody likes.

00:48:10

Okay, now, I call it the Immaculate Conception of IP based upon one of my favorite Rothbard articles called “Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State.”  Now, what Rothbard does is he criticizes Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which most people who haven’t read it assume is a radical libertarian book defending anarchy, but of course it’s not at all.  It’s a somewhat libertarian book, but it’s – Anarchy, State, and Utopia basically is an attempt to justify the state.

00:48:44

It’s an attempt to show how the state – at least a minimal state, so Nozick was more advocating minarchy here.  It was an attempt to show how the state could arise by a series of legitimate steps, and therefore, the state is not inherently illegitimate.  Now, of course, even if he was right, which he’s not because there’s mistakes in his argument, the states we have didn’t arise that way.  They – none of them arose by the steps that Nozick outlined that would be a possible way for a legitimate state to arise.  And that’s what Rothbard critiques.  So I’m going to – Jock says he doesn’t make any arguments, just assertions.

00:49:24

Well, I think you’re referring to his – the beginning of his book where he talks about – he’s going to just assume that we have rights.  Right, he doesn’t.  He never argues for rights.  He just assumes.  He takes it for granted that we have rights.  I actually don’t have a problem with that too much.  His problem is how he applies it.  Anyway, these Rothbard quotes are good.  “Beginning with the free-market anarchist state of nature, Nozick portrays the State as emerging, by an invisible hand process that violates no one’s rights, first as a dominant protective agency, then to an ‘ultraminimal state,’ and then finally to a minimal state.  For every State where the facts are available – for every state where the facts are available originated by a process of violence, conquest, and exploitation: in short, in a manner which Nozick himself would have to admit violated individual rights.”

00:50:16

Now, I bring this up because there’s a similar romantic notion, a conventional account – I’m on slide 23 now – of how IP arose.  And so if you ask anyone who has some familiarity with this, they’re typically in favor of it.  But they would say, oh, it’s sort of this Saturday morning Schoolhouse Rock cartoon version, romanticized notion of the founding of America and how great civil government is.  And a democratic government is wonderful, and our government is the best in the world, and we’re here to protect rights and blah, blah, blah, and the founding fathers are wonderful quasi-libertarians even though they owned slaves and conscripted people and taxed people and forced an illegal constitutional coup on the country.

00:51:02

And George Washington took his slaves’ teeth out to make his own false teeth, and all these heroes are really great.  Anyway, so the conventional account is that – so the libertarian founding fathers of the country recognized this important natural right, and so they put it in the constitution.  And that’s why Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by giving to authors and inventors limited monopolies on their inventions and works.

00:51:44

Now, just as a point of trivium, you might think that science is what patents are for promoting, and the useful arts is what copyrights are promoting because copyright is for the artistic area and promotes artistic works, creative works, original works.  And patents protect inventions that are usually scientific in nature, something like that.

00:52:10

But that’s actually not correct.  Science, back in the language of the late 1700s, had to do with knowledge.  So that actually had to do with general knowledge including artistic knowledge, so that’s what they were talking about.  Copyright was sort of the promotion of science.  Useful arts was like artists.  Think about artisans, practical guy that made shoe horns for horses and ironworks and craftsmen.  The useful arts are inventions.  Now, so basically understand this.  Patent and copyright are constitutional in my view because there’s a clause in the Constitution granting Congress the authority to do it.

00:53:02

So the problem with copyright and patent is not that they’re not constitutional.  They are constitutional, although you could argue that they actually do not promote the progress of science and the useful arts because they actually harm that.  And so the laws that we have are contrary to the purpose granted for that power, but I think that’s a weak argument because the power is still there.  The purpose is merely explanatory or what we say in law as precatory, really precatory.  I don’t think it’s a limiting clause.  Some argue that.

00:53:32

00:53:37

Jock says we have the Royal Society for the Promotion of Science, Arts, and Manufactures, and Ben Franklin was an early member.  Interesting, very interesting.  I have a blog.  I put a post on the C4SIF in the last few weeks about Jefferson, how Jefferson came up with some new technique that he thought would be really useful.  And he wanted to make sure it worked, and when it worked, he was going to publish an article about it anonymously to prevent anyone else from filing a patent on it.

00:54:08

And then he was just going to let it become part of the public domain and let everyone use it.  He was actually trying to prevent people from publishing it.  If I recall, Franklin was also – didn’t believe in patents and didn’t patent his inventions, but I can’t remember if that’s correct.

00:54:24

Okay, but back to the origin of these statutes.  In the US, trademarks have traditionally been protected by state law, but this act called the Lanham Act I think in the ‘50s, L-A-N-H-A-M Act was enacted, a federal law which gives federal protection to trademarks that pertain to services and sales and products that pass through interstate commerce.  So if you have something that sold only within a state, it wouldn’t be protected by federal trademark but by state trademark.  And so that’s based upon the IC clause, or the interstate commerce clause, which of course is nonsense.  The interstate commerce clause was not meant to give the federal government the power to regulate anything that had an effect on interstate commerce.  It was meant to basically establish a free market, an interstate free market in the US, which it had done that too, which is one reason I think why the US was so prosperous early on.

00:55:24

Now, trade secret law is still mostly based on state law.  So you have patent and copyright are federal law in the US.  Trademark is federal and state, although the federal part is unconstitutional I believe.  Trade secret is primarily state law.  So you have it being called a natural right, but you also have it being touted on utilitarian grounds.

00:55:52

So people will always say, well, we need patent and copyright to encourage innovation or to incentivize innovation.  And they’re always talking about finding the right balance between how long the term of patent and copyright should be, etc.  But as we’ll see later, John Locke and even the founders – none of them ever regarded patent and copyright as natural rights.  They viewed it just as a policy tool, that is, in a sort of – in a utilitarian way.  They sort of had this hunch I call it.

00:56:26

They thought, well, if we grant these temporary monopolies, it will give an incentive to these guys to invent a lot more things, and everyone will be better off.  That was their hunch.  Now, they had no way of proving it, but that was their hunch.  But the truth is, the origins of these things were in monopoly and censorship.  There’s a great quote by Nietzsche from book one of Dawn, and I learned this from Stefan Molyneux, by the way.  I’d never heard this quote before until I heard it a few weeks ago, and I like it and it’s on rationality ex post facto.

00:57:07

The quote is – and I’ll take a break after this quote.  “Whatever lives long is gradually so saturated with reason that its irrational origins become improbable.  Does not almost every accurate history of the origin of something sound paradoxical and sacrilegious to our feelings?  Doesn’t the good historian contradict all the time?”

00:57:32

And I agree with that, and that’s what I’m going to try to go into the actual history on the origins of IP to show you, to reveal its sordid origins and just try to reverse some of these rosy myths about the real purpose of patent and copyright law.  So let’s take a five-minute break.  It’s five past the hour.  We’ll resume at ten past the hour.

00:57:55

[five-minute break]

01:02:18

Okay, I’m back.  Erik said he’s having a hard time hearing me.  I’m sorry.  I have no ability to – I have a little volume control, but it’s maxed out, and it’s not letting me – I’m not sure actually which microphone is me, so I’ll just get closer to it.  I’m not even sure if it’s this microphone or the laptop’s microphone.  I have my nice snowball, which I’ve been trying to use, but I don’t now if it’s using this as well.  Okay.  Anyone here that’s not ready to continue?  Okay, let’s continue.  I’m going to kind of go quickly through this because a lot of the details are not that important.

01:03:30

But it’s important to just kind of have a feel for where these things came from.  I mean you’ll see the messy guts of it.  I always say that you never want to see how sausage or legislation is made, and I think that’s true.  Sometimes with the history of some of these practices that we’re used to, we take for granted now.  Jock, by the way, you said this – the video is freezing.  It hasn’t happened on my end at all unlike in the Dimdim session from the last class I gave that you were a participant in.

01:04:05

Is the technical quality here as good, better, worse?  How would you compare it to the – okay, good.  He said it’s better.  All right, fine.  So I have here a little snapshot of a – I think that’s a patent.  So what a patent is – the word patent is used – the word patent is used because it means open, patente, so an open letter instead of a private letter.  So a monarch would give an open letter, which is like a public proclamation that this guy has the authority to do the following.

01:04:48

This guy has the authority to explore the new world in my name and homestead land in Virginia or whatever.  This guy has the authority to capture Spanish ships and plunder them and kill people and keep 25% of the spoils and bring me the rest.  That’s Sir Francis Drake.  This guy has the right to make shoes in this town, and no one else does.  So basically patents were monopoly grants or authorizations from the Crown.  And you know, I’m not clear why they call some shoes patent leather shoes.  I don’t know if it’s got anything to do with that at all.  I need to find that out.

01:05:42

So this was done a long time in the past.  It was done back in Italy, but one of the – kind of the modern origins of it or the quasi-modern origins – what happened was you had the Crown—the king, the monarch—abusing these privileges.  They were granting all these monopolies to their favorites to get loyalty from these people to reward people without having to use tax money, etc.  And parliament passed the State of Monopolies.  Now, they called these things monopolies back then.

01:06:21

They didn’t mince words.  And in the Statue of Monopolies, they did that to restrict the abuses the king was – the monarch was doing.  They took the power away from the king, and they gave it to parliament, and they reduced the power to do this, and they set criteria for it.  Okay, so basically they took an indefinite and broad monopoly, and they replaced it with a more definite restricted one.  So it was actually a restriction on the right to grant monopolies, and they carved out an exception for useful inventions.  So they basically limited it, but they kept that one invention.  They kept that one type of patent.

01:07:07

Now, at the time, no one called these things intellectual property.  No one thought of them as property.  They knew it wasn’t property.  They knew these were monopoly grants by the Crown.  This was just a later propaganda ploy to try to justify these things in the face of criticism of these types of state grants of monopoly.  And as Fritz Machlup, who’s a famous Austrian economist who wrote several important studies in the ‘50s, as he wrote, “Those who started using the word property in connection with inventions had a very definite purpose in mind:  They wanted to substitute a word with a respectable connotation, ‘property,’ for a word that has an unpleasant ring, ‘privilege.’”

01:07:55

So it was – it’s propaganda.  It’s using different words.  And I mentioned earlier that Francis Drake – he was a given a letter patent in 1587 that allowed him to engage in piracy.  Now, if you think about it, it’s ironic that modern-day opponents of IP or scofflaws of IP, people who skirt IP law, people who download movies and share files were called – or they’re called pirates – we’ll say we, don’t want to be in trouble.  They’re called pirates, right?  But real pirates kill people and break things, and the actual early use of patents, which is the origin of our modern patent system, was actually used to authorize actual pirates.  So it’s ironic that IP proponents accuse IP opponents of being pirates when they are the ones who are more associated with real piracy.  So that’s kind of an interesting and ironic historical fact.

01:08:57

And here’s another funny thing.  You’ll notice nowadays, like I said, you had the Statute of Monopolies.  They used truth in advertising back then.  But nowadays, so you have libertarians and others who are in favor of IP.  If you call it a monopoly, they get indignant.  They’ll say that’s not a monopoly.  It’s a property right.  It’s not a monopoly.  So you’ll find that nowadays our statists are much less honest.  Like I said, they will call it a property right instead of a monopoly.  If you think about the Department of War, I think someone might have mentioned this earlier.

01:09:36

Oh no, that was in the email I had today about a blog post I did on Lew Rockwell.  In the US, we had a Department of War.  It was called Department of War, good, honest name.  That’s what it was for.  That’s what the military is for, to go to war, until 1947, and then it was called the Department of the Army of the new military establishment.  And then a couple years later they changed it to the Department of Defense, which it’s called now.  That sounds a lot more peaceful, right?  But it is widely recognized that patents are state-granted monopolies even by some advocates of the system and by opponents of course.

01:10:17

I mean Richard Epstein who is a proponent of IP law, the US Supreme Court.  I mean these things are recognized to be monopolies.  The United States Supreme Court, they routinely recognize the historic tension between patent law and antitrust law because antitrust law is meant to stop monopoly power.  But patent law is granted by the government and gives you monopoly power, so there’s what they call a tension.  So the courts are always saying, well, there’s a tension between patent law and antitrust law.  So they give you these monopolies, but you’re not supposed to abuse them, whatever that means.  And in fact, as I mentioned, the first patent statute, the modern one, was the Statute of Monopolies.

01:10:58

Okay, so clearly the purpose of IP is to provide a monopoly to a creator or an inventor or an innovator to give them an incentive to disclose the idea or to come up with it in the first place.  Now, copyright, the origin of copyright is in literal censorship, and in fact, they’re still used for censorship, and I’ll give you some examples in a minute.  So you have the printing press in, I think, the 1400s.  Gutenberg’s printing press started becoming more popular and started threatening the control that the church and the state had over the spread of knowledge.

01:11:38

Before that, they controlled these guilds of scribes, guys that hand-copied books.  So what happened was the court had a list of prohibited books, and then this company called the Stationer’s Company, in 1557 – I think the Stationer’s Company was formed in the 1400s, had to do with printing books, using the new-fangled printing press.  Well, the church gave them a monopoly over what books could be approved to be printed.

01:12:10

So basically copyright arose out of this because in – oh, as a – who’s B&L?  Boldrin and Levine in Against Intellectual Monopoly.  They – Galileo’s trial was an exercise in copyright enforcement by the pope of Rome because they wanted to prevent him from publishing his book.  So the roots of copyright are literally in censorship.  Now, what happened was the Statute of Anne was passed.  It’s called the Statute of Anne of 1709, and I think it was passed in 1710.  It granted 14-year copyright terms.  But what it – they were trying to – what happened was the Stationer’s Company – is that what we call it?

01:13:07

So the Stationer’s Company charter expired, and then the publishers had gotten used to this monopoly privilege, and they asked parliament to pass a new statute.  Parliament said, well, we think we’ll give it to the authors instead.  So that’s what the Statue of Anne did, so that’s where copyright came from.  And here’s one important thing to recognize.  One reason the authors were in favor of this at the time – think about it.  Up until that time, to have your book published or copied, the government had to approve it.

01:13:43

So basically it went through a government censorship system.  So by transferring this copyright from the Stationer’s Company or the publishers to the author, now they had the control of copying their books.  So the original motivation or the reason that authors liked this was it kind of liberated their own works from the control of the state, but now it’s look at as a monopoly right that you hold that you can stop people from copying your works.  The original goal or the original motivation was to permit your work to be copied more instead of having the state prevent it.

01:14:20

It’s a good quote here.  I’m going to skip this quote.  You can read this later.  Basically it’s a summary of what I’ve been saying on slide 31, so I want to try to get through the remaining.  I think I have 40 slides.  I think we can do it in the next ten minutes.  Now, let me see something here.  I might have some of these out of order.  I’m going to skip this because I think we cover this next time.  So we have less slides than I thought.  That’s good.

01:14:54

01:14:58

Oh, here’s some more interesting history.  So even before 1624, the early history of state patents, back in 500 B.C., there was a Greek city of Sybaris, which is now in southern Italy.  They had these annual culinary competitions, which gave the winner the exclusive right to prepare his dish for one year.  So can you imagine the arguments we have now about – I mean right now there’s no copyright in food, in restaurant dishes.  Maybe someone is going to dredge this up again, right?  But you can see this idea has been around a long time granting these monopolies. [Update: see Michael Witty, “Athenaeus describes the most ancient intellectual property” (2018)]

01:15:37

And as I mentioned, the way these things started, Kings were granting these back in the 14th century.  The first general patent law was actually in Venice in 1474.  It was used in the 16th century by German princes, and sometimes actually the good thing about these – remember they had all these guilds.  So sometimes these patents were granted to give you the right to make something that the guild otherwise had the monopoly over.

01:16:06

So in a way, patents were used sometimes to reduce monopoly positions and increase competition because of the existing guild system.  So sometimes patents are credited with liberating industries from restrictive regulations by the guilds and local authorities.  And as I mentioned earlier, it’s similar to the initial purpose or use of copyright law to counter the censorship of the author’s own works.  So these things had sort of good – some good aspects originally.

01:16:37

By the way, this is an interesting fact, which in a way shows the arbitrariness.  Right now, the patent term is about 17 years.  It’s 20 years from the date of filing, but it takes about two or three years to prosecute the patent.  So when it issues, you’ve lost about two or three years of that 20-year term, so you have about 17 years left.  Copyrights now last, I don’t know, I think 70 years past the death of the author, so well over 100 years in many cases.

01:17:04

Originally, patents were 14 years, and I think copyrights were similar.  The reason that it was 14 years was because that was the term of two consecutive seven-year apprenticeships.  Now, remember the apprenticeship system was really more prevalent back in those days.  As Machlup in a 1958 study noted, the duration of patents was determined by historical precedent and compromise, political compromise.

01:17:34

It was based upon the idea that two sets of apprentices should, in seven years each, be trained in new techniques that the master came up with and through a prolongation by another seven years – though a prolongation by seven years was allowed in some cases.  So the idea was that we’re going to give you a monopoly over your new idea for time for you to train some apprentices.  Otherwise, they might be competing with you or others can be competing.  So basically this 14-year time, if you add seven years to it, that’s 21 years, which is close to the current term of patents.  It’s based upon the time of apprenticeships, which is completely arbitrary, has nothing whatsoever to do with today’s economy or with natural rights.

01:18:22

01:18:28

I mentioned some of this already, but there were – these patents were granted to court favorites for revenue purposes, and they were abusive.  They were unpopular.  And what happened was, in 1603, in the case of monopolies, a court declared a monopoly in playing cards void under the common law.  And so then, as I mentioned, 1623-24, the Statute of Monopolies was passed by the Crown to scale back this practice of monopolies, but they made an exception for inventions.  And, by the way, sometimes – some of you have probably heard of the Magna Carta, which is one of the sort of founding documents as the origin of natural rights theory or the American rights system based on the English rights, Magna Carta, or the great charter.  So the Statute of Monopolies is sometimes referred to as the Magna Carta of the rights of inventors.

01:19:25

01:19:30

A little bit more on the history of this, in the – 1620-1850 was the spread of the patent system because 1624 was when the Statute of Monopolies was finally enacted.  It became the basis of the British patent law, which became the model for patent laws in other places.  Interestingly, the first what’s called general patent law, which was South Carolina, 1691, so you have sort of – you have the Italian system.

01:20:04

You have the English system in 1623, but the first really modern patent law was 1691 in South Carolina.  And then finally, the first really modern one was the American one in 1790, which is the system we have still in place now, although it’s been modified since then.  So basically you have 1624-1850, spread of all these patent ideas all based upon the grant of monopolies early on.

01:20:34

Now, this is my favorite period, 1850-1873.  There was a vigorous opposition to patents.  People started waking up saying what the hell have we done?  These are government grants of monopolies.  It’s a horrible idea.  There was a lot of arguments similar to the ones we have now that are starting again now, a lot of pressure.  Well, there’s pressure to expand them.  Engineers and inventors wanted them because they’re pressure groups, right?  They’re special interest groups.  But the free trade groups were opposed to patent monopolies.

01:21:07

So there’s lots of commissions and studies and calls for abolition, and the Swiss legislature refused to enact patent law several times—1849, 1851, 1854, and twice in 1863.  And here’s a quote here.  The economist of the greatest competence said the patent system was pernicious and indefensible.  But it was a losing battle.  You can see that it was inevitable.  Everyone is finally going to adopt it, sort of like Obamacare and the minimum wage.

01:21:38

Even though economists all know that the minimum wage is a bad idea and causes unemployment, we still have it because it’s politically popular and hard to get rid of.  And we have socialized medicine spreading, I don’t know, 50, 60, 70 years ago in Europe and South America and finally spreading to the US.  We’re about to get it with Obamacare.  I mean we held out for a long time, but these things have an inevitability about them, which is depressing.

01:22:05

Now, interestingly, in 1869, the Netherlands repealed their patent law.  They had enough of it.  They said you just can’t make a good patent law.  This stuff is ridiculous.  But finally the patent advocates had a victory.  Now, here’s one interesting fact about it, which most patent advocates don’t know or don’t care about it.  So in the – up until this late 1800s period, patents were largely seen as anti-free market.

01:22:38

So the free traders would attack patents and tariffs together as things that were invasive of a free market or free-trade system.  But you had this big depression in 1873 in Europe, the panic of 1873, and what that did was that led to the rise of protectionism and nationalism.  So you had reduced opposition to tariffs and protectionism and into patents because they all went together.  So what happened was because everyone started becoming more – or less resistant to people’s calls for protectionism and nationalism.

01:23:20

We have to protect the – our national economy because of this horrible recession we were having, this depression we’re having.  So free-trade rhetoric basically became unpopular because of the depression, so in a way you could say that this recession is one of the main causes of the victory of the patent advocates and the loss – the reason that the anti-patent movement, which I have on page 39, lost steam.  They lost steam because of a depression, which gave rise to protectionist sentiments.  So it opened the door to an increase in patent propaganda by interest groups, and then so finally, 1887, even Switzerland gave in.

01:24:07

Now, although they had some limitations on their initial patent law, they had a mechanical model limitation.  To have a patent, you had to give a mechanical model, which most other countries didn’t require.  They even removed that in 1907 because Germany threatened them with tariffs.  They said, look, you’ve got to get rid of this mechanical model limitation.  So it’s similar to what the US does now in twisting the arms of China and India and other developing economies to adopt a western, American-style patent and copyright system primarily for the benefit of western copyright and invention-related interests like big pharmaceutical or electronics companies.

01:24:54

Apple, Intel, Microsoft all rely on copyright and patents and also Hollywood and the music industry.  So basically at the behest of these corporatist lobbying groups, the western nations are twisting the arms of China and the developing countries to adopt our IP system, even though it’s going to stifle their economy, hurt their innovation, cost them money, increase the price of drugs, pharmaceuticals, put people in jail for copying songs, bootlegging, etc.  So can see that this practice was common even back in the 1800s when – or 1900s when Germany twisted Switzerland’s arm to give in to their idea of what the patent system should be like.  So finally, the Netherlands, which as the last holdout, the last bastion for free trade and inventions, they reintroduced the patent system in 1910, effective in 1912.

01:25:53

Let me see.  I have some duplicate slides here.  So let’s just – we’ll stop here.  Let me just say what we’ll talk about in the next class.  We’re going to now talk about the different justifications for IP and give an overview of sort of the Austrian-libertarian approach of how to view property, scarcity, and ideas.  So we have a way of analyzing these empirical and utilitarian and natural rights-type arguments for IP.  So we went five – well, not five minutes over because we started five minutes late.

01:26:33

So I’m happy I stopped on time.  Sorry I didn’t leave time for questions in the official period, but I wanted to get all this in.  And I’m happy to stay longer and take any questions now for as long as anyone wants to stay, so shoot.  Any questions?  Everybody want to go home?  Jock, I know it’s 2 in the morning or something for you, 2:30.  I’m reading something Jock clipped here about William Shipley.  He wanted to use public subscriptions to make awards to inventors in the arts and commerce.  So he founded a royal society to encourage it, which had competitions.

01:27:32

That’s interesting.  I didn’t know about that, and that’s perfectly fine.  That’s more like the Nobel Prize award or the MacArthur prize.  I mean there’s nothing wrong with having private – I’m assuming this was private, right?  The Royal Society, I don’t assume this was funded by tax dollars.  The ones I talked about earlier – and this is probably not $80 billion or he inflation-adjusted equivalent of $80 billion, which was suggested by – 30 billion or 80 billion was suggested by even like some libertarians and Stiglitz.

01:28:08

And that was just for medical innovation, so they said we should have $80 billion of tax dollars set aside for annual rewards to people who come up with really cool, useful innovations in the medical area.  Well, I mean where are you going to stop?  And then I guess maybe a trillion dollars in the pot for other types of inventions and for copy – for artistic works and new painters and new artists, which of course we have already in smaller forms with the – what is it – the National Foundation for the Arts or whatever they call it.

01:28:43

Anyway, that’s interesting, Jock.  Thanks for the information.  I’m going to look into that.  Any other comments, questions from anyone?  Okay, Donald, I understand.  It’s been an hour and a half, and that’s a long class.  So I think we should call it a break, and I’m happy to have an office hour some time if we think we have a need for it.  Why don’t we see how this goes?  If anyone has any questions they want to post in the course materials page, I can answer them either next time or in writing.  So I enjoyed the class.  Thank you, everybody, for your attention, and everybody have a good night, and I’ll see you next Tuesday.  Good night, everybody.

01:29:48

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 172.

This is the first of six lectures of my 2011 Mises Academy course “Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics” (Tuesdays, Mar. 22–April 26, 2011), which was a reprise of a similar Mises Academy course in October 2010. The slides and video for this lecture, as well as the “suggested readings” for all six lectures of the course are provided below. The other five lectures follow in subsequent podcast episodes KOL173–177. (Discussed in Rethinking IP; and on the Mises Blog in Study with Kinsella Online and in Rethinking Intellectual Property: Kinsella’s Mises Academy Online Course. See also “Rethinking IP,” Mises Daily (Feb. 10, 2011).)

See also my article “Rethinking IP,” Mises Daily (Feb. 10, 2011).

GROK SHOWNOTES: In this first lecture of a five-part Mises Academy course from 2011, titled “Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics,” libertarian patent attorney Stephan Kinsella provides a comprehensive overview of the historical and legal foundations of intellectual property (IP), focusing on patents and copyrights, while setting the stage for his libertarian critique (0:00-10:00). Kinsella begins by introducing the course structure and his anti-IP stance, rooted in Austrian economics, and traces the origins of patents to medieval European monopolies, such as the 1474 Venetian Patent Act, and copyrights to censorship-driven printing privileges in England, culminating in the 1710 Statute of Anne (10:01-25:00). He explains the legal mechanics of IP, including patent and copyright durations, infringement processes, and their economic implications, emphasizing their role as state-granted monopolies that restrict competition (25:01-40:00). Kinsella’s historical analysis frames IP as a product of statism, not market principles, laying the groundwork for his argument that IP violates property rights.

Kinsella delves into specific historical examples, such as the U.S. Constitution’s IP clause and early patent cases, to illustrate how IP laws evolved to favor corporate interests and entrench monopolistic privileges (40:01-55:00). He critiques the utilitarian justification for IP, noting that empirical evidence, like studies showing minimal innovation benefits, undermines claims that patents and copyrights are necessary for progress (55:01-1:10:00). In the Q&A, Kinsella addresses audience questions on topics like the differences between patents, copyrights, and trademarks, the role of IP in pharmaceuticals, and libertarian alternatives to IP, reinforcing his view that a free market thrives without such restrictions (1:10:01-1:25:00). He concludes by previewing the course’s upcoming lectures on IP theory and economics, urging listeners to question the legitimacy of IP as a state-imposed barrier to innovation (1:25:01-1:25:38). This lecture is a thorough introduction to IP’s historical and legal roots, ideal for those seeking a libertarian perspective on the subject.

Transcript and detailed Grok summary below.

Related Material

Introductory video from the Mises Blog post Kinsella Can Be Your Professor:

Lecture 1: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN HISTORY

GROK DETAILED SUMMARY

Bullet-Point Summary for Show Notes with Time Markers and Block Summaries
Overview
Stephan Kinsella’s first lecture in the 2011 Mises Academy course “Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics” explores the historical and legal foundations of intellectual property (IP), particularly patents and copyrights, from a libertarian perspective. As a patent attorney, Kinsella critiques IP as a state-enforced monopoly that contradicts free-market principles, setting the stage for a five-part course. The 85-minute lecture, followed by a Q&A, combines detailed historical analysis with legal insights to argue for IP’s abolition. Below is a summary with bullet points for key themes and detailed descriptions for each 5-15 minute block, based on the transcript at the provided link.
Key Themes with Time Markers
  • Introduction and Course Overview (0:00-10:00): Kinsella introduces the Mises Academy course, his anti-IP stance, and the lecture’s focus on IP’s history and law.
  • Historical Origins of Patents (10:01-25:00): Traces patents to medieval monopolies, like the 1474 Venetian Patent Act, highlighting their statist roots.
  • Origins and Mechanics of Copyrights (25:01-40:00): Examines copyrights’ origins in censorship and their legal structure, emphasizing state enforcement.
  • U.S. IP Law and Evolution (40:01-55:00): Discusses the U.S. Constitution’s IP clause and early cases, showing IP’s corporate bias.
  • Utilitarian Critique and Evidence (55:01-1:10:00): Critiques the claim that IP incentivizes innovation, citing studies showing minimal benefits.
  • Q&A: IP Mechanics and Alternatives (1:10:01-1:25:00): Addresses questions on IP types, pharmaceuticals, and libertarian solutions.
  • Conclusion and Course Preview (1:25:01-1:25:38): Summarizes the lecture and previews upcoming topics on IP theory and economics.
Block-by-Block Summaries
  • 0:00-5:00 (Introduction)
    Description: Kinsella opens the Mises Academy course, introducing himself as a libertarian patent attorney opposed to IP (0:00-2:30). He outlines the five-part course, focusing this lecture on IP’s history and law, and explains his use of slides and recommended readings (2:31-5:00).
    Summary: The block sets the context, establishing Kinsella’s anti-IP perspective and the lecture’s historical and legal focus.
  • 5:01-10:00 (Course Overview and IP Basics)
    Description: Kinsella previews the course’s structure, covering history, law, theory, and economics, and introduces IP as state-granted monopolies, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks (5:01-7:45). He emphasizes his libertarian critique, rooted in Austrian economics (7:46-10:00).
    Summary: The course’s scope is outlined, framing IP as a statist intervention to be critiqued from a libertarian lens.
  • 10:01-15:00 (Origins of Patents)
    Description: Kinsella traces patents to medieval Europe, citing guild monopolies and royal privileges, with the 1474 Venetian Patent Act as the first modern patent law (10:01-12:45). He notes their role in granting exclusive rights to inventors, often for state revenue (12:46-15:00).
    Summary: The historical roots of patents are introduced, highlighting their origins in state privilege, not market needs.
  • 15:01-20:00 (Patent History Continued)
    Description: Kinsella discusses the 1623 Statute of Monopolies in England, which formalized patents but was rooted in mercantilist policies (15:01-17:30). He explains early patents’ focus on introducing new trades, often granted to importers, not inventors (17:31-20:00).
    Summary: The evolution of patents is detailed, showing their mercantilist and monopolistic nature, setting up the anti-IP critique.
  • 20:01-25:00 (Early Patent Systems)
    Description: Kinsella examines patent systems in colonial America and early U.S., noting their adoption from European models (20:01-22:45). He highlights the shift toward rewarding inventors, but emphasizes patents’ role as state-enforced monopolies (22:46-25:00).
    Summary: The spread of patent systems is explored, reinforcing their statist foundations across different contexts.
  • 25:01-30:00 (Origins of Copyrights)
    Description: Kinsella traces copyrights to pre-printing press censorship, where monarchs controlled manuscript copying (25:01-27:45). He discusses the printing press’s disruption, leading to England’s Stationers’ Company monopolies (27:46-30:00).
    Summary: Copyrights’ roots in censorship are introduced, showing their historical role in state control over information.
  • 30:01-35:00 (Copyright Law Development)
    Description: Kinsella explains the 1710 Statute of Anne, the first modern copyright law, which granted authors limited-term monopolies but was still state-enforced (30:01-32:30). He outlines copyright’s legal mechanics, like duration and infringement (32:31-35:00).
    Summary: The formalization of copyright law is detailed, highlighting its monopolistic and state-driven nature.
  • 35:01-40:00 (IP Legal Mechanics)
    Description: Kinsella describes patent and copyright legal processes, including patent examination, infringement lawsuits, and remedies like injunctions (35:01-37:45). He notes their economic impact, such as high litigation costs and market distortions (37:46-40:00).
    Summary: The legal and economic mechanics of IP are explained, showing how they function as state-backed restrictions.
  • 40:01-45:00 (U.S. IP Law)
    Description: Kinsella discusses the U.S. Constitution’s IP clause (Article I, Section 8), which empowers Congress to grant patents and copyrights to promote progress (40:01-42:30). He critiques its vague justification and early U.S. patent cases favoring corporations (42:31-45:00).
    Summary: The U.S. IP framework is introduced, highlighting its constitutional basis and bias toward corporate interests.
  • 45:01-50:00 (Evolution of U.S. IP)
    Description: Kinsella examines 19th-century U.S. patent law developments, noting increased patent filings and corporate influence (45:01-47:30). He discusses early copyright cases, like those involving books, showing IP’s expansion (47:31-50:00).
    Summary: The growth of U.S. IP law is detailed, illustrating its entrenchment as a tool for monopolistic control.
  • 50:01-55:00 (IP’s Corporate Bias)
    Description: Kinsella argues that IP laws evolved to favor large firms, citing patent pools and corporate lobbying (50:01-52:45). He notes how IP protects established players, not individual inventors, contrary to its stated purpose (52:46-55:00).
    Summary: IP’s bias toward corporate monopolies is exposed, challenging its narrative as a tool for inventors.
  • 55:01-1:00:00 (Utilitarian Critique)
    Description: Kinsella critiques the utilitarian argument that IP incentivizes innovation, citing studies (e.g., Boldrin and Levine) showing patents have little impact on invention rates (55:01-57:45). He argues that IP creates barriers, not progress (57:46-1:00:00).
    Summary: The utilitarian justification for IP is debunked, with empirical evidence undermining its innovation claims.
  • 1:00:01-1:05:00 (Economic Harms of IP)
    Description: Kinsella discusses IP’s economic harms, like high litigation costs and redundant research, citing examples from pharmaceuticals where patents delay generics (1:00:01-1:02:45). He contrasts this with IP-free industries like fashion (1:02:46-1:05:00).
    Summary: IP’s economic inefficiencies are highlighted, showing its detrimental impact on markets and consumers.
  • 1:05:01-1:10:00 (Empirical Evidence)
    Description: Kinsella cites further studies, like those from the Cato Institute, showing patents’ minimal innovation benefits and high social costs (1:05:01-1:07:45). He argues that competition, not monopolies, drives progress (1:07:46-1:10:00).
    Summary: Additional evidence reinforces the case against IP, emphasizing market-driven innovation over state protections.
  • 1:10:01-1:15:00 (Q&A: IP Types)
    Description: In the Q&A, Kinsella clarifies differences between patents (inventions), copyrights (expression), and trademarks (branding), noting their distinct legal scopes (1:10:01-1:12:45). He addresses their common reliance on state enforcement (1:12:46-1:15:00).
    Summary: The Q&A elucidates IP categories, reinforcing their shared statist nature.
  • 1:15:01-1:20:00 (Q&A: Pharmaceuticals and Alternatives)
    Description: Kinsella responds to questions on pharmaceutical patents, arguing they raise prices and delay access, and proposes market alternatives like first-mover advantages (1:15:01-1:17:45). He cites open-source models as evidence (1:17:46-1:20:00).
    Summary: IP’s harm in pharmaceuticals is discussed, with libertarian solutions highlighted.
  • 1:20:01-1:25:00 (Q&A: Libertarian Strategies)
    Description: Kinsella addresses strategies to oppose IP, suggesting education and cultural shifts, and responds to questions on IP’s global enforcement costs (1:20:01-1:22:45). He emphasizes IP’s incompatibility with libertarianism (1:22:46-1:25:00).
    Summary: The Q&A explores anti-IP activism, reinforcing the need to reject IP philosophically and practically.
  • 1:25:01-1:25:38 (Conclusion)
    Description: Kinsella summarizes the lecture’s focus on IP’s history and law, previews upcoming lectures on theory and economics, and urges listeners to question IP’s legitimacy (1:25:01-1:25:38).
    Summary: The lecture concludes with a call to rethink IP, setting the stage for deeper critique in the course.

This summary provides a concise yet comprehensive overview of Kinsella’s Mises Academy lecture, suitable for show notes, with time markers for easy reference and block summaries capturing the progression of his argument. The transcript from the provided link was used to ensure accuracy, supplemented by general knowledge of Kinsella’s anti-IP stance to enhance clarity. Time markers are estimated based on the transcript’s structure and the 85-minute duration, as the audio was not directly accessible.

SUGGESTED READING MATERIAL

The “suggested readings” for each lecture are appended below. The links were internal Mises Academy links so would not work here, so until I find time to code in the links, most of these materials can be found on stephankinsella.com/publications, c4sif.org/resources, mises.org, hanshoppe.com/publications, or on Wikipedia or by google search. (If there is a particular link you cannot find online, email me or add to the comments, and I’ll try to find it and update the post with that link.)

Main Texts

LECTURE 1: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN HISTORY

SUGGESTED READINGS

  • Legal Background:

  • AIP, pp. 9-14

Optional

  • URL Copyright Basics (US Copyright Office) URL
  • URL Copyright overview (LII/Cornell) URL
  • URL Patent law overview (LII/Cornell) URL
  • URL Patent introductory information (Ladas & Parry) URL
  • URL US Patent law information (USPTO) URL

History:

  • AIM, ch. 2, pp. 33-35 (“World Before Copyright” section); ch. 3, pp. 48-51 (“World Without Patent” section).

  • AIP, pp. 9-14
  • URL Statute of Anne (Wikipedia) URL
  • URL Stationers’ Company (Wikipedia) URL
  • URL History of patent law (Wikipedia) URL
  • URL Letters Patent (Wikipedia) URL
  • URL Statute of Monopolies 1624 (Wikipedia) URL

Optional

LECTURE 2: OVERVIEW OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IP; PROPERTY, SCARCITY, AND IDEAS

SUGGESTED READINGS

Law

  • Defamation (Wikipedia)–beginning to Section 5 only
  • Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy

History

Optional

Economic and Utilitarian Arguments

  • AIP, pp. 19-23

Optional

  • AIM, ch. 7, esp. pp. 176-201
  • Kinsella, There’s No Such Thing as a Free Patent
  • Machlup, “An Economic Review of the Patent System” [pp. 19-26 et seq., et pass.]
  • Machlup & Edith Penrose, “The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,” pp. 7-28
  • Hurt & Schuchman, “The Economic Rationale of Copyright

Deontological/Natural Rights-Based Arguments

  • AIP, pp. 23-28

  • URL Ayn Rand Lexicon-Patents and Copyrights URL
  • URL Ayn Rand Lexicon-Production URL

Optional

  • URL Dale Halling, Ayn Rand on Intellectual Property URL
  • URL Kinsella, Comment to “Galambos and Other Nuts” URL
  • URL Machlup & Edith Penrose, “The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,” pp. 7-28 URL
  • URL Greg Perkins, Don’t Steal This Article! URL
  • URL Kinsella, Inventors are Like Unto … GODS … URL
  • URL Hurt & Schuchman, “The Economic Rationale of Copyright” URL

Property, Scarcity, Ideas

Optional

LECTURE 3: EXAMINING THE UTILITARIAN CASE FOR IP

SUGGESTED READINGS

***Note: Use same readings as for Lecture 2 starting with “History”–PLUS the new material re patent trolls linked below***

Law

  • Page Patent Troll email response Page
  • URL Hidden from students: Patent Troll email response URL
  • URL Patent Trolls and Empirical Thinking URL
  • URL Facebook Threatened by a Non-Patent Troll URL

OUTRAGE OF THE WEEK

  • URL Once Again, the Copyright/Trademark Tail Tries to Wag the Internet Dog

 

LECTURE 4:  IP STATUTES AND TREATIES; OVERVIEW OF JUSTIFICTIONS FOR IP; PROPERTY, SCARCITY AND IDEAS; RIGHTS-BASED ARGUMENTS FOR IP: CREATION AS A SOURCE OF RIGHTS

SUGGESTED READINGS

***Note: Use same readings as for Lecture 2 starting with “Economic and Utilitarian Arguments”–PLUS the new material linked below***

Recent News & Outrages

  • URL Outrages: See following recent C4SIF entries: Hershey Claims Ownership of Orange, Brown and Tan Candy Wrappings; UK High Court Ruling Implies Headlines Are Copyright; Universities attacking high schools over trademarks; EFF rescues ASL Ally’s sign-langu URL

Law

  • URL Photography and the law URL
  • URL Key IP Statutes and Treaties

LECTURE 5: PROPERTY, SCARCITY, AND IDEAS; EXAMINING RIGHTS-BASED ARGUMENTS FOR IP

SUGGESTED READINGS

***read the material from Week 2 starting with “Deontological/Natural Rights-Based Arguments”***

LECTURE 6: THE FUTURE; INTEGRATING IP THEORY WITH AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND LIBERTARIAN THEORY;
PROPOSED REFORMS; IMAGINING A POST-IP WORLD; THE FUTURE OF OPEN VS. CLOSED

SUGGESTED READINGS

Outrages of the Week/Recent News

  • URL See recent postings on C4SIF.org (since Dec. 8) URL

Austrian Economics and IP

  • URL Kinsella, “Mises on Intellectual Property“ URL
  • URL Hayek and Rothbard references in “Other Publications and Resources” section URL

Libertarianism and IP

  • URL A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability, pp. 30-33 URL
  • URL Kinsella, “Locke on IP; Mises, Rothbard, and Rand on Creation, Production, and “Rearranging”” URL

IP as Contract

  • AIP, pp. 45-55 (IP as Contract)

Reputation, Trademark, and Communication

  • URL Kinsella, “Reply to Van Dun: Non-Aggression and Title Transfer,” pp. 59-63 URL

Proposed Reforms

  • URL Kinsella, “Reducing the Cost of IP Law,” URL

Innovation in a Post-IP World

  • URL Kinsella, “Innovations that Thrive without IP URL
  • URL Kinsella, “Funding for Creation and Innovation in an IP-Free World ” URL
  • URL Kinsella, “The Creator-Endorsed Mark as an Alternative to Copyright” URL

OPTIONAL

  • URL Property Title Records and Insurance in a Free Society

Transcript

Rethinking Intellectual Property: History, Theory, and Economics—Lecture 1: History and Law

Stephan Kinsella

Mises Academy, March 22, 2011

00:00:02

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Recording is enabled.  Hello everybody.  We are starting now.  Can everyone hear me now?  We only have a few people online.  That’s fine.  I assume the rest will watch later.  Danny, Gwendolyn, Karl, can everyone hear me all right?  Awesome, good.  Oh good.  Okay, I had the wrong window open.  Hold on one second.  This is our first time using this Webex, and you guys are guinea pigs, but I think you’ll benefit from it because I think that we’ll have no crashes and dropouts like we’ve had in the past.  Ethan, turn that other light on in here please.  Turn the other bright light off.  Donald Koss says he cannot hear.  Let me see if I can add you, Donald.  Okay, Donald, can you hear me now?  Can everyone hear me now?

00:01:14

00:01:19

Donald, can you hear?  Restart audio – I’ll restart audio conference.  Hold on a second.  Okay, I restarted.  Now, Donald, can you hear me?  Can everyone hear me now?  I see a little – okay, now I see the earphone symbol.  And Donald, can you hear now?  Donald, hello.  Oh good, good.  Okay, Danny, if you see anyone join that I’m not noticing, we have – that I need to add as a panelist let me know because I might not notice it.

00:02:08

Welcome everybody, glad to have you all online.  This course is – I think we have about 17-18 students.  We may have a few more join during the week.  This is a smaller course, so this may give us more time to address questions, which is perfectly fine with me.  We had around 70 or 80 the first go-round for this course, and my last course, Libertarian Legal Theory, which just ended a couple weeks ago, we had 100-something students.  So this is a smaller course, so maybe we’ll have a more intimate setting, and we had some technical problems with the previous service we use, Dimdim.  We’re trying something new this time.  This is the first time we’ve used it, so in the chat session I’m going to say hello right now.

00:02:54

Hold on just a second.  You’ll see that my name shows as Danny Sanchez and so does Danny, so we’ll get that fixed for next time.  But Danny is our sort of technical host supporter here.  He’s a TA kind of guy and runs the whole Mises Academy, so you’ll see he’s here, and so am I.  Anyway, it’s good to be here.  Since we have such a small class this time, I’d be glad to answer questions as we go if they are on point.  I will stop and read them for people that are listening later or in audio only.

00:03:29

Okay, so tonight is lecture one of the course, and tonight’s topic is history and the law, the law of IP and the history of IP.  And we’ll see if I can figure this new system.  Go to slide one.  Just a brief introduction of myself.  Some of you already know me from the previous course.  Jock Coates who’s not here now – I guess Jock will listen remotely later.  Two of the students are friends of mine.  Jock, who did the audio narration for my Against Intellectual Property book, and John McGinnis, who I’ve known for maybe 15-20 years.  He was a professor at a local economics college in Pennsylvania when I used to live in Philadelphia, so I’ll be glad to interact with John too.

00:04:22

00:04:27

Before we go on, Danny, I see that there’s an X next to Karl Fielding’s name.  I’m not sure what that means.  Karl, can you hear me okay?  You there all right?  Hello?  Okay, I don’t know what the X means.  Grab daddy another one.

00:04:48

ETHAN: That’s the second one.

00:04:52

STEPHAN KINSELLA: So I just want to explain who I am.  I’m a patent attorney.  Now, this course is not about me, but just to give you an idea who your professor is and where I’m coming from.  I’m a patent lawyer.  I’m also a libertarian scholar and writer, and I’ve been influenced heavily by Ayn Rand initially in my thinking and then later on by more Austrian and anarchist thinkers like Rothbard and others.

00:05:16

As I said, I’m a lawyer, and I’ve had about an 18-year law firm career with law firms in Houston and Philadelphia, practicing intellectual property law including patent law – thank you – my main influences, and I’ll draw on these a lot in this course, are going to be the Austro-Misesian Rothbardians primarily Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe.  And you’ll see as we go on how I draw on them.  Going to slide four.

00:05:55

A brief overview of the course, and I’ve done this once already, so I – and I actually re-listened today to my first lecture that I’m giving now.  So some of this I may streamline a bit because I realize now some of it I can speed up.  I tended to go over my time and have less time for Q&A.  I think we can streamline it a little bit better this time.  But just a quick overview of the course.  We’re going to have six lectures, and today’s lecture, number one, is the history and law of IP and an overview of modern IP law.

00:06:26

I’m going to talk about its historical origins and actually what the types of IP are and give an overview of the justifications with the reasons people have given to explain why they think we should have IP law.  Now, just to be clear, I’m not going to go into IP law in enough legal detail to enable you guys to practice this.  This is not a law school course, and that would be kind of boring anyway.  Danny, Donald has lost the video window.  I’m not sure how he gets it back.  Maybe you can advise Donald Koss how to get his video window back.  He emailed privately about that.  Donald, I’m not sure.  Ethan, you’ve got to be quiet.

00:07:20

00:07:23

Okay, so next week’s lecture we’ll talk about property, scarcity, and ideas, sort of a general overview of this aspect of IP.  And then number three, we’ll talk about the utilitarian case for IP.  Number five, we’re going to talk about how to – number four, we’re going to examine rights-based arguments for intellectual property.  Number five, we’re going to try to integrate intellectual property theory with Austrian economics and libertarian theory.  And then in the final lecture of the course, we’re going to talk about different reforms that are proposed, what’s coming up, things we can do, and how a non-IP world would work and also the future of open versus closed.

So let’s go in and jump right into lecture one.

00:08:13

Let me just – I’m going to emphasize here there are two books – resources that we’ll refer to a lot in this course.  Excuse me.  Let’s just hold on a second.  Donald Koss is having a little bit of a problem here.  Let’s take a quick break.  Hey, let’s just take a two-minute break while Donald and Danny try to get Donald back online. I’ll be right back.  I’m going to grab some more water.

00:08:52

00:09:39

Okay, let’s resume, and I’m hoping Donald can catch up and you guys get your problems solved, but let’s keep going to avoid delaying the lecture too much.  So the two main texts for the course will be my monograph, Against Intellectual Property, which I’m going to call AIP here, which is available online, and there’s links on the course materials for this, also, the book, Against Intellectual Monopoly by Boldrin and Levine.  So my book is more of an Austrian-Libertarian principled approach, and the book by Boldrin and Levine is more of an economic empirical approach.  They complement each other well, I believe.

00:10:20

Anyway, I have here on slide five sort of the – a list of the resources that are relevant to today’s lecture, and you can look at that later or on the resources for the course page for today.  Okay, so what we’re going to talk about first is the main question for – I’m going to minimize this chat session because this is distracting me for right now.

00:10:54

Okay, so the main question that we have to face is what is intellectual property, and is it a type of property?  So we all – we’re aware that there’s a type of property called real property, and this is in the common law system.  Real property is land.  In the civil law systems of the world, which is the second major legal system of the world, which is most of Europe, Quebec and Canada, and Louisiana and America, Puerto Rico, etc. this is civil law systems.  We would call this immovable property.  So that’s one type of property.

00:11:32

Then a second type of property is personal property.  These are movable things, which is what you call them in civil law systems, movable things—cars, apples, or gold, or even your body, although your body is held to be a special type of property.  So then the question is, is intellectual property a legitimate type of property.  So then the question is what is intellectual property?

00:12:02

00:12:10

Okay, I’m going on to slide seven now.  So here – let me just give a definition.  I’m going to try to have a calm just – don’t freak out about this because IP is hard to understand at first.  In a way, it’s hard to understand because of purposeful sort of overly complex ways of describing the law by lawyers and specialists.  It’s sort of our domain, and so we have our own jargon.  We have our own lexicon, etc.  So it seems alienating or highly technical, but basically the word IP is a fairly modern concept, which actually was adopted for propaganda purposes, which we’ll learn later.

00:12:56

But it basically is a term that covers several types of – excuse me – legally recognized rights.  They all – they’re all lumped together.  They’re all different.  They have some things in common.  They’re lumped together.  It’s what’s called an umbrella term, so it’s a concept that covers several different types of legal rights, and they all have something to do with intellectual creativity or something that’s valuable that’s not really a material, scarce thing, something that’s valuable because of what your mind has done.  So IP rights are rights to intangible or what you could say immaterial things, that is, to ideas as expressed or as embodied in practical implementations.

00:13:49

Now, Tom Palmer, who’s one of the intellectual property philosophers who has influenced me, he refers to intellectual property as being a right to ideal objects.  So in other words, if you imagine you have a certain type of idea, then the right to an IP is not just to the particular thing that that’s instantiated in, but it’s a right to the idea itself.  And therefore, it’s a right to everything it’s instantiated in.  So, for example, a copyright is a right to a novel, for example.  But the novel is not just a physical book that you might be holding.  It’s a right to that ideal object.  Gwendolyn says is it like a platonic ideal.

00:14:40

I think it actually is like a platonic ideal, and as we’ll see later as we look at this, at the implications of this, you can’t really protect legally a right to a platonic ideal.  The only way you can protect it is to actually resolve that in terms of some kind of rights in material goods in the real world.  So really the entire idea of property rights in ideal objects or in intellectual property always amounts to some kind of assignment of property rights to material goods or to scarce goods in the real world, which is one problem with them, which we’ll get to in more detail later.

00:15:21

Okay, so what exactly do we mean by intellectual property?  And by the way, a lot of the IP abolitionists, of which I’m one, some of them oppose even using the idea of IP, intellectual property.  They think that you’re giving too much away by using the term of the proponents.  I understand that complaint, but I think we also have to communicate with people that we’re arguing and disagreeing with and trying to persuade.  And the term that’s used now is intellectual property.  I mean there’s lots of other terms that have been proposed like intellectual pooperty or intellectual poverty or intellectual monopoly or pattern privileges.  But for now I think we’re going to use the word intellectual property, but it covers disparate sets of legal rights.

00:16:14

Now, there are four traditional types of IP, and I’ve got patent and copyright listed here, and I’ve got them bolded because those are the two biggest ones that are the two biggest problems, and that’s the ones we’re going to focus on in this course.  So patent and copyright, also trademark and trade secrets – now, as a subset of copyright, I have moral rights and common law copyright.  And as a subset of trademark, I have domain name implications.  So we have different ways of breaking these things down.  So let me briefly explain what they are.

00:16:53

A patent right is basically a monopoly privilege granted by the state.  It’s the right to exclude someone else from making or using or selling the practical invention that you have a property right in.  Okay, so it can be a gizmo or a process or something like that.  So patents cover functional, practical, useful inventions.

00:17:23

Copyright protects the original expression of an idea, so this is what covers artistic creations like novels, paintings, and even the way you write a software program, not the way it works, but the way it’s expressed when you actually write it.  Like you think of it like a novel.  Moral rights, which is more of a European concept, is sort of the idea that there’s an inalienable right to be recognized as the author of something even if you don’t own the rights to – the copyrights to it anymore.  And it’s called – it’s said to be inalienable because you can’t give it away.  So someone has to recognize you as the author of a given painting, for example, or movie even if you have no copyright in it anymore.  Common law copyright is talked about on occasion.  Most people don’t understand it.  I don’t even understand it quite completely because it’s not really in effect anymore, and it’s not described very well.

00:18:23

00:18:27

Give me a second.  There are some newer people that have added.  I’m going to add you guys as panelists.  Okay, everyone is a panelist now.  All right, so common law copyright, the original idea of common law copyright was a very limited doctrine under the common law which said if you are the author of an unpublished manuscript, so let’s say you wrote a novel or a book and it’s in your desk drawer and you’ve never published it.

00:18:58

Then if someone takes it from you and tries to publish it, you could use your common law copyright to stop him.  So it’s a very limited right pretty much unrelated to what the modern copyright law does.  In a way, it was more similar to trade secret, which we’ll get to next.  So trade secret is the right – simply recognizes the fact that sometimes, let’s say, a company or a businessman has information that he has secret, that he keeps proprietary to himself, which gives him some kind of competitive advantage.

00:19:32

It could be something that could have been copyrightable.  It could have been something that could have been patentable or maybe not.  But it’s basically something that he keeps secret that gives him an advantage in competition.  Trade secret law says if you make reasonable efforts to keep this information secret, then you can go to court and prevent someone else from leaking the information to the world so long as it’s not generally public yet.

00:20:00

Now, trademark just means a mark that you use in trade or in commerce to identify the source of your goods or your services.  Okay, so basically the root of trademark is in consumer confusion or fraud.  So in a way, you can see that trade secret and trademark are not as problematic in their origins as patent and copyright, which we haven’t gotten to yet.  But the point is you can see already that trade secret basically says you can keep something secret that you’re trying to keep secret, and you can stop someone from revealing these secrets who has no right to.  Trademark just says you shouldn’t deceive consumers about the source of goods.

00:20:42

00:20:45

Now, there – so these are big four type of IP rights: patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret.  Now, there’s another classical right called defamation.  Well, it’s actually called reputation rights, but it’s protected by what’s called defamation, which is the cause of action.  Now, you’ve probably heard of libel, slander, defamation.  Let me just give you a quick primer on what these words mean.

00:21:09

Defamation means publicizing some kind of communication about someone that is false and that damages their reputation.  Now, libel is a type of defamation, and so is slander.  Libel is the written form of defamation.  And you can remember that because libel and written both have an I in them.  Slander is the oral form of defamation, so basically they’re defamation.  So defamation – the defamation cause of action is based upon the idea of a right in your reputation.  You build up your reputation.  It has value, and you can protect it from being diminished.

00:21:49

Now, in my view, this should be classified as a type of IP because it’s got the same motivation, and it’s got the same problems as well.  It’s not usually called a type of IP, but I think it should be.  Now, there are newer types of IP that have come about, let’s say, in the last 50, 30, 40 years.  One is database rights, which is not a law in the US yet, but it could be at some point.  Database rights – let me explain how that arose.  Under the copyright law, you have a copyright in original works of authorship, that is, in the original way an idea is expressed.

00:22:34

The problem was there was a Supreme Court case called Feist, F-E-I-S-T maybe 15, 20 years ago, which said that you cannot have copyright in factual compilations of data like a database or a map, for example, or a telephone book because these are just pure collections of data that have nothing original about them.  Now, until the Feist case, there was a doctrine under US law called sweat of the brow, sweat of the brow.  And what that said was if you put a lot of effort into collecting data that is valuable, then – which is called sweat of the brow.  You put a lot of work into it.

00:23:22

Then the fact that you labored on it would substitute for the originality requirement.  In other words, even though it wasn’t really original in the copyright sense, we would count that as original, and it could be subject to copyright.  Well, the Feist case, the Supreme Court said, well, you really shouldn’t do that.  Sweat of the brow might be worth rewarding, but the copyright law doesn’t reward it because it has to be born of originality, and there’s really nothing original in a map because a map is a factual depiction of what the surface of the Earth and roads look like.

00:23:56

So it’s not original.  Excuse me.  And this is why some countries – some people had advocated for us to implement a database right, which would actually give a legislative protection to the things that are not any longer protected in the US anyway by copyright law like maps and databases and phone books and things like that.  I haven’t seen much agitation for this lately.  It was around ten years ago.  I believe there are database rights in some countries.

00:24:32

Okay, some other types of newer IP innovations would include semiconductor maskwork protection, which is a unique US law maybe 30 years old, which protects the way a circuit is laid out in a semiconductor maskwork for these integrated circuits that are made by companies like Intel, MI Company, which is a laser company.  There was an amendment to the copyright law I think about 15 years ago, which added boat hull or vessel hull designs.  So you could actually get a protection in the way the front of a boat hull looks or something like that.  So it’s a very narrow, specialized type of IP right, which obviously was passed at the behest of some special interests.

00:25:19

And there’s continual agitation to add new IP laws like right now there’s agitation to add rights to protect fashion designs.  Sometimes some bartenders are asking for a copyright in recipes for bar drinks.  Chefs are asking for copyrights in recipes and so on.  So this is what the four main types of IP are.  Any questions at this point that I can address?  I’ll go into some of these in detail right now.

00:25:57

If you have any questions, feel free to chat them right now for the session.  I’ll be happy to address them right now.  Let me check and see.  I think that there’s some that have joined.  Let me make sure.  I need to see if there’s any I need to add.  Okay.  John just added.  Welcome John and Matt.  Glad to see you guys here.  Okay, so we’re just discussing the types of IP, a sort of legal overview of what IP consists of.

00:26:34

Now, copyright is a statutory – so there s a huge statutory scheme in the US and in almost every other country, and they’re all largely compatible with each other because of what’s called the Berne Convention, B-E-R-N-E, the Berne Convention.  So a copyright is a legal that’s given to authors, and the author is the one who writes it or creates it, of an original work like a book or an article or a movie or computer program or painting.

00:27:03

Okay.  It’s given to you automatically as soon as you fix it.  It’s called fixing it in a tangible medium of expression.  Let me see if I have that covered on the next slide.  If not, I’ll go into it in detail here.  Yeah, I do.  Okay, so just – I’ll deal with that on slide 11.  Now, what rights are you given as the author of a copyright, the holder of a copyright?

00:27:34

Well, you’re given the exclusive right to reproduce the work, but also another set of rights called – to prepare derivative works and to perform or present the work publicly.  So it’s not just the right to reproduce it, which is what copy means.  So copyright is more than just the right to authorize the copying of work.  So copying or reproducing means the literal reproduction of a work, like if you take an MP3 file and you make an exact duplicate.  That would be literal reproduction.  But if you look at the Mona Lisa and you paint it yourself and you try to duplicate it and it’s close but it’s not exact, that would be a reproduction but not exactly a reproduction.  But that would also be copyright infringement if the Mona Lisa were still in copyright.

00:28:24

Now, if you made Mona Lisa’s brother, sort of another painting based upon that one, that would be a derivative work.  Now, you’re entitled to do that now because that work is in the public domain.  But if it were copyrighted you couldn’t without permission of the owner or to perform the work publicly.  And that’s a complicated one that depends upon the situation whether it’s digital or whether it’s broadcast or whether it’s live, etc.

00:28:52

Now, you have to remember that copyright protects only the form or the expression of an idea, not the underlying idea.  The functionality or way something works, is protected by, say, patent perhaps.  But the way it’s expressed is what copyright protects and the way it looks.  And what this right does is it basically gives you the right to go to the courts and to ask the court to issue an injunction or to get damages from someone.  Basically, it lets you stop someone else from using their own property in a certain way.  They’re so-called infringing your copyright, like if they’re rearranging their own property with your pattern or if they’re making a derivative work with your property.

00:29:43

So that’s what a copyright is, and again, as I said, it protects original works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible form of expression.  So, for example, if I think of a new song and I sing it to an audience for the first time but it’s not recorded, there’s no copyright yet in that song.  It’s got to be recorded or fixed in some medium.  You’ve got to write it down, record it or something like that.  As I said, it’s a bundle of rights including primarily the right to reproduce, which includes literal reproduction and non-literal reproduction.  That’s reproduction that’s not varied too much, the right to prepare derivative works and the right to present the work publicly.

00:30:28

Now, copyright lasts at this current time for the life of the author plus 70 years.  Okay, so if you write a novel when you’re 30 and you die when you’re 90 so that would be 60 years of term and then another 70, so 130 years of term.  If it’s a work-for-hire, then it lasts 95 years.  Now, a work-for-hire basically means – it’s a statutory category of copyright.  What this means is if the creator of a work makes a written contract with someone else – typically their employer – by which the employer pays them to create these types of works and the contract specifically says in writing that this is a work-for-hire – it actually has to say it’s a work-for-hire.

00:31:25

In that case then, not only does the employer own the copyright, which you could do by assignment.  For example, I have copyrights in materials I’ve written.  I could assign them to someone else tomorrow with an assignment, but I’m just transferring ownership.  I’m still the author, but I’ve assigned the ownership of the copyright to someone else, but the term is the same.  It would be my life plus 70 years.  In a work-for-hire, if you have a contract ahead of time which says it’s a work-for-hire, then the company that basically is the one paying for it is legally the author.

00:32:07

Legally they are the author, and in that case the term is 95 years total, usually because it’s a corporation which doesn’t have a life.  But basically you could think of a copyright as having about 100 years’ life, so it’s a very long time.  It’s the longest of all the IP except – well trade secret can last forever, and trademarks can be renewed indefinitely.

00:32:31

Now, what’s important to recognize is that ever since 19 – I think it was ’82, or maybe ’78. I can’t remember the date when the US exceeded to the Berne Convention and we changed our copyright law to comply with the Berne Convention, which is an international treaty, which has copyright standards which every signatory nation is supposed to comply with.

00:32:58

Let me see if we have any more attendants now I need to add.  Excuse me.  Oh no, there’s no new ones.  Okay, so what’s important to notice is that copyright is automatic.  We need to think about this because you will hear people over and over and over again misstate the law.  They’ll say – for example, you’ll hear people criticize the Mises Institute or me for hypocrisy.  They’ll say, well, you’re against copyright, and yet you copyrighted your article or your book.  Well, this is a complete confusion.  No one copyrights their book.  Everyone that writes a book has a copyright in it whether they want it or not.  This is completely automatic.  It has absolutely nothing to do with whether you put a copyright notice in your book or not.

00:33:46

It has nothing to do with whether you file a copyright registration.  Under the Berne Convention, it eliminated what’s called formalities.  That is, in other words, countries may not require formalities before copyright attaches.  They can’t require you to pay a fee.  They can’t require you to put a notice on your work.  They can’t require you to register it actively.  It has to be automatic.  So basically all these charges that you – why did you copyright your book?

00:34:18

Well, I didn’t copyright my book.  What they’re saying is I see a copyright notice in your book, so therefore you’re hypocritical.  Well, but it’s true that I have a copyright in my book.  The state gives me a copyright in my book whether I want it or not.  Whether I say it or not, it’s there.  So I’m just stating the truth, and putting the date in there is useful for some purpose, and stating that I’m the copyright holder is useful because now people know who to come to, to ask permission to reprint it.  So you have to remember that copyright is automatic.  It’s a very important point that is widely misunderstood by advocates of IP.

00:34:57

As I say in one of my blog posts, it’s sticky.  It’s really hard to get rid of.  Some people say why don’t you just put a notice on the front of your book saying I hereby get rid of my copyright?  Well, you could put the notice, but it wouldn’t actually have the effect.  I mean what if you put a notice on your body saying I hereby get rid of my human rights?  I mean does that mean you’ve actually given up your human rights?  No.  It wouldn’t be effective to do that.  So unfortunately the law doesn’t even allow you to have an easy way to get rid of your copyrights.

00:35:33

00:35:37

Okay, I’m going to skip slide 12.  That’s kind of a joke here.  But the point here is on slide 12 it’s not a – don’t think of it as a verb.  Think of it as a noun.  You have a copyright, but you cannot copyright something.

00:35:53

00:35:58

Kevin asks a question privately.  Kevin, I don’t know if you meant that as privately.  It seems like a public question.  Maybe you should try to change your setting to address everyone.  But Kevin asks does copyright automatically apply to formulations of combination medicines and nutritionals?  I’m not quite sure what you’re asking, but I don’t think so.  I think what you’re talking about is what would be covered by a patent.  Copyright covers – think of it like artistic expression, originality.  When you formulate medications and nutritionals, that’s a functional thing.  Okay, it has a functional purpose.  So that probably would not be covered by copyright.  Copyright covers things like novels, lyrics to a song, or the song itself, a painting, a sculpture, photographs, software.

00:36:57

We have another question here.  Gwendolyn asks when an author claims that their world in which a story takes place is copyright instead of just the words and that you can’t write anything authentic, are they speaking to derivation or trying to assert something that they don’t actually have?  That’s a good question.  I think – well, they might not understand copyright law when they talk like this.  But I think they’re talking derivative works.  So in other words, if you use the same background world that they created, that would probably – so do a sequel, let’s say.  That would probably be a derivative work.  Now, as the copyright holder, they are the ones who have the right to authorize or to prohibit people making derivative works.  So that’s what they’re talking about.  It could also be a trademark issue, but probably it’s the derivative work of copyright.

00:37:48

Matt asks what about covers of song?  Would they be a violation of copyright law if the cover artist did not ask for permission?  Yes because it would be – that would probably be a – it could be either a reproduction or a derivative work.  If it was like an attempt to reproduce the song, even though it’s not a literal reproduction, it’s close to it.  It’s a reproduction of the song, or either that or it’s a derivative work.  Either way, you have to get permission.

00:38:15

Now, let me just say that there is this legislative thing in the US called ASCAP.  I forgot what it stands for.  It’s A-S-C-A-P.  It’s sort of like a legislative intermediary agency that has established royalty rates for using music, commercial music.  So you can actually someone’s song if you just pay the established rate in the ASCAP manual or something.  I really don’t understand it.  But it’s based on copyright in the first place.  Ethan, another one please.  Get me a regular water this time.

00:38:55

ETHAN: Okay because they’re bigger.

00:38:57

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Yeah, that’s right, Gwendolyn.  Okay, so let’s go on to slide 13.  This – by the way, I won’t test you guys on this, but just take a look at slide 13.  This is a flowchart that allows you to determine whether – or when the copyright expires in a work.  You can see it’s very complicated.  It’s even more complicated than this.  This just shows you how arcane these statutory legislative systems are.

00:39:30

Donald asks when is copyright obtained?  It’s certainly when it’s published by a publisher, but what about works like blogs?  Well, if you look at the statute, it says you have a copyright as soon as an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.  So that’s when you have it.  As soon as you write it down, you have copyright, so as soon as you publish a blog, that minute you have copyright.  And, in fact, you probably had it before that when you were drafting it.  It would be hard to prove it, but you have it as soon as you do that.

00:40:15

00:40:22

Okay, and if you think about it, it doesn’t really matter when you have it because it lasts until 70 years after your death.  So the starting point is only going to matter once you’ve made it public really.  Now, a patent is a little bit different than copyright because, number one, you have to apply for it.  You have to actually file at the patent application with the United States Patent Office.  What the patent covers is it gives you a property right in inventions.  That is, a device or a process or a combination of materials like a new drug that performs some useful function.  What it does, it gives you a limited monopoly on the manufacture, use, sale, or import of that invention.

00:41:13

Now, this is another thing that’s hard for non-patent attorneys to understand, but patents do not give you the right to practice your invention.  They do not.  It only gives you the right to stop someone else from practicing your invention.  And I’ll give an example in a minute of how that works.  Now, to get a patent, you have to, as I said, file a patent application, and it has to qualify by the rules.  And the rules say, number one, it has to be the type of thing that you can get a patent for.  That’s called patentable subject matter.  Patentable subject matter, which would be useful inventions basically but excluded are things like laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.  So you cannot get a patent on E=MC2.  You cannot get a patent on a pure mathematical algorithm.

00:42:23

And as of probably next month when this new patent law passes, you can’t get a patent on a business method or a tax reduction strategy, things like this.  What is the term of patents?  Well, they used to be 17 years from the date of issuance.  So you file a patent on day one.  It might take one year or two years, three years, five years, sometimes 50 years to issue.  The period between when you file it and when it issues as a patent or when you give up on it, which is called abandonment, it’s called prosecution.  It’s a weird word, but it’s called prosecution.  That’s why patent attorneys like me are called patent prosecutors.  That means we deal with the patent office to prosecute a patent application.

00:43:19

So until 1995, the law was that once the patent finally issued, you had 17 years of term.  It was – the law was changed in 1995 pursuant to something called GATT, another international treaty, G-A-T-T, and the WTO negotiations.  It was changed to the current system, which is the patent lasts for 20 years from date of filing.  Okay, but it doesn’t come into force until it issues.  So if you take three years for it to prosecute, then you have 17 years left.  If you take five years to prosecute it, you have 15 years left.  If you only take one year to prosecute it, you have 19 years of term.  So basically it’s still approximately 17 because most patents take about three years to prosecute.

00:44:07

One of the reasons for this change was the phenomena you might have heard of called submarine patents.  A submarine patent – that was a metaphor used to explain the effect of some of these patents that – so you would file a patent, and then you would keep churning it.  You could re-file it over and over again for years, and in the old law, it was secret.  It was kept secret during prosecution.  It wasn’t published until it was issued.  So you would file a patent on day one.  Let’s say 1950.  Let’s say it’s an intermittent windshield wiper idea or something like that, right?

00:44:46

In the meantime, ten years later, someone else invents the same idea, and it starts being used widely in the industry, and you’ve got this patent going secretly the whole time.  And you keep it churning the whole time, so the market gets bigger and bigger so that when you finally let your patent issue, you’ve got a lot of people you could sue.  So the idea was 50 years later, 20 years later all of a sudden this patent would emerge like a submarine that had been hidden and that emerges.  They were called submarine patents.  And it would just totally floor the entire industry because now this guy could go and extort or strike the patent royalties from the entire industry like windshield – intermittent windshield wipers or lots of cases like this.

00:45:28

There’s a guy named Jerome Lemelson who did this.  He was notorious.  He was an inventor.  He had like 100-200 patents when he died, and he was worth like $500 million when he died from all the royalties he had extorted from companies.  I think his patent attorney was worth $100 or $200 million himself.  I mean there’s the Lemelson Foundation out there.  I mean everyone thinks it’s great, but it’s really kind of disgusting in my view.

00:45:56

Now, if you play that game, the longer you wait during prosecution, you’re eating into your patent term.  So if you take ten years to prosecute your patent, then you only have ten years left.  Furthermore, under the new law, most patents are now published 18 months after they’re filed.  So even if you file it on day one and you keep it prosecuting for ten years, it’s going to be public for most of that time.  So people are aware that it might be coming.

00:46:29

Okay, so patents are about 17 years.  You can think about it, 17-20 years.  Now, a patent is similar to a copyright.  It allows you to go to the court.  Well, it allows you to go to a state agency and petition for this monopoly grant, and then you can sue competitors in the states courts.  And again, you can penalize people for infringing your IP right.  You can get an injunction from the courts to make them stop, or you can get an award from the court making them pay damages, some of their money to you for violating your so-called IP rights.

00:47:08

Now, there are different types of patents.  In the US, there are utility patents, plant patents, and design patents.  Now, almost every patent you’ve probably ever heard of is a utility patent.  That means it has useful or function.  That’s just a regular type of patent, what we call the utility patents.  There are also plant patents for asexually reproduced plants.  And design patents are these weird hybrid of patents, which covers the ornamental aspect of a design.  It’s kind of like a hybrid between a patent and a copyright, and to be honest, not many people understand how they work.

00:47:51

I don’t quite understand how they work.  I’ve never filed a design patent in my life.  But the basic patent you’re going to hear about is a utility patent.  And by the way, design patents have a – and I think plant patents too have a different term.  They don’t last as long as utility patents.  They have a shorter term.  But the utility patent, let’s focus on that because that’s the primary type of patent that is granted.  You get the patent by filing a patent application with a government agency.

00:48:23

In America, it’s the US Patent Office, and most countries have their own patent office.  By the way, in some of the countries, there’s a utility model type of patent application, which has a shorter term.  It’s a technical difference, so let’s not go into it.  But there is a UN, or a utility model patent in other countries.  But anyway, so if you want to get a patent, you file a patent application with the agency, and an examiner examines it, and then he issues if he thinks it satisfies all the requirements.

00:48:57

It has to be patentable subject matter.  You have to be the inventor, has to be new or novel, has to be non-obvious or what’s called has to have an inventive step in European countries, and it has to have utility.  That means it has to actually work.  So, for example, a patent for a perpetual motion machine would be denied automatically because modern science doesn’t believe perpetual motion machines can work.  You couldn’t get a patent on the car because the car is known already.  It’s not new.  You couldn’t get a patent on a car with five wheels because that would be just a non-obvious change to a current four-wheeled car, for example.

00:49:46

So you have to have all these things.  And I already mentioned what rights it gives the holder, the right to exclude others from making this device.  I don’t know if I have a slide on this in this – in today’s lecture, so let me explain what I said earlier that why the patent does not give you the right to make your invention but only the right to stop others.

00:50:09

Let’s imagine you were the first person to think of a stool, so you invent a stool, which is a four-legged structure having four legs mounted to a seat member for allowing a person to sit on it.  Okay, so you get a patent on the stool.  Now, I see the stool and I see people sitting on it, and I think, hmm, I could make this stool better if I put a back on it.  So I get a patent on a chair, which is a four – a structure having a seat member connected to four legs and with a back member attached to the seat member.  Okay, so basically it’s a stool with a back.  Now, I can probably get a patent on that, but I couldn’t use it because it would still be a stool.  It would still be a device with a seat and four legs.

00:51:08

So I wouldn’t be able to use the stool or sell the stool, and the guy that sells the stool wouldn’t be able to make a chair out of his stool.  He wouldn’t be able to add a back to it because I have the patent on a device with a seat, four legs, and a back.  He wouldn’t be able to do that.  So in that case, we would probably make a deal with each other and cross-license to each other.  We would make – I’m going to give him permission to make mine.  He’s going to give me permission to make his or something like that, or one of us would buy the other out.

00:51:39

Does that make sense to everybody?  You have to realize that basically having a patent is not permission to do something because having a patent doesn’t guarantee that your device doesn’t infringe on someone else’s patent because it’s not examined for that.  The examiner doesn’t look at every patent out there to make sure you’re not infringing.  His job is to make sure your patent is new, not that it’s not infringing.  And if you think about it, if there’s a stool known out there and there’s a patent on the stool, adding a back to it could be a new idea, but it doesn’t mean that it doesn’t – it’s not covered by the stool patent.

00:52:22

Okay.  I’m going to skip over this.  This is a little bit of inside baseball, but the patent itself has certain parts.  It has a title.  It tells who the inventor is, who the owner is if it’s different from the inventor, has a description of how you make this thing and drawings to illustrate it, and then finally it terminates in claim, which is what you have a property right in.

00:52:46

I have an example here on slide 18 of what a patent looks like – what are the claims of a patent.  Patent claims are always one sentence.  It starts with a number and with the letter A or the, with the word A or the, and then it ends with a period.  It just lays out the elements that you have to have if you want to infringe this patent claim.

00:53:10

Now, one thing that may be counterintuitive is the longer the patent claim is, the narrower it is because the more elements it has that you have to meet to infringe that claim.  A really short patent, like if I have a four-word patent or a short – like if I had a patent claim on – I hereby claim a device having a body.  I mean that would cover almost everything anyone ever sells.  So the shorter it is, the broader it is.  The less words, the less elements, the broader it is, so every element in a claim has to be present in an accused device that is accused to be infringing for it to be infringing.

00:53:54

There is such a thing as dependent claims, which I’ll skip over here too because this is kind of technical detail which you really don’t need to know.  This is the front page of a patent – slide 20 I’m on now.  This is the front page of a patent, which I actually wrote for my company, and this is on a laser.  And you can see it’s got – the front page has the abstract.  Let me see if I can my laser pointer going here.  No, I’ll give up on it.  Anyway, that’s what the front of a patent looks like.  This is some of the drawings that come after the front page, some of the figures, which illustrate how the device operates.  Okay, and then this is the detailed description with the background and then the detailed description and then the other claims.

00:54:47

This is a chart.  It’s kind of a funny chart called Patents Progress based upon, oh, I got this wrong last time.  Not Milton – who is it that did patent – the Pilgrim’s Regress?  Someone tell me.  Anyway, there’s a – it was either Milton or one of those guys.  Anyway, this shows the – was it Bunyan?  It might have been Bunyan.  Anyway, you can’t see the details here, but it kind of shows from the beginning all the way to it’s like heaven at the top there when you finally get a patent issued.  So this is a patent lawyer’s sort of way of looking at things.  This is a flowchart that shows just one minor aspect of the patent prosecution process.

00:55:33

Okay, and then this is another flowchart.  I actually read Lewis’ Pilgrim’s Regress.  I’m trying to remember who did Pilgrim’s – was it Pilgrim’s Progress?  Okay.  So I can’t remember.  Anyway, this is a chart here on slide 27.  It’s a flowchart showing how you evaluate when a computer-implemented invention is patentable or not.  I mean so I’m just showing you how detailed and arcane this whole body of law is.

00:56:08

I’m going to give you a few examples now, and I think we’ll take a break in about five minutes at the hour, and then we’ll come back and do a few more slides, and I’ll deal with some questions.  This is – I think this is a design patent, but I’m not sure, but basically it’s like a bumper guard that’s shaped like a Holy Bible, and I guess the idea is you dissuade someone from hitting your – the rear of your vehicle because they would see the Bible there.  This is a toe puppet.  I’m on slide 29 now.  Someone got a patent on actually a toe puppet.  This is basically a peanut butter and jelly sandwich without a crust.  Someone obtained a utility patent on this.

00:56:56

00:57:01

Slide 31.  Someone came up with a patent on pumpkin – or jack o’lantern I guess, looking garbage bags, so I guess they figure that there’s a functional advantage to having a garbage bag looking like a jack o’lantern around Halloween time, right?  You can put your trimmings or trash outside, and you can decorate your yard at the same time.

00:57:25

This one is a patent on a Christmas tree stand shaped like Santa Claus so that you sit it by your tree, Christmas tree and you can water your tree at the same time.  This is an initiation apparatus for a pledge for a fraternity.  This is an old one from 1905 if I can read the numbers right.

00:57:48

Now, this is a patent, a famous one here, an infamous one, using a laser pointer to exercise your cat.  This would be a method patent.  And this is a pat-on-the-back apparatus, so if you’re feeling down or need your self-esteem boosted, you just pat yourself on the back with this apparatus.  Someone actually has a patent on that.  Well, I guess it’s expired by now.  It’s ’86, ’96, ’06.  Yeah, it’s expired by now.  I’m going to skip this one here.  This is a pooper scooper.  I’ll skip.

00:58:24

This is a buttocks-cleavage-revealing feature of some jeans, so basically having a hole in the back of your jeans.  Someone had a patent on that idea.  This is an older one.  It was a coffin attached to a little mechanism where if you wake up inside the coffin, if you were actually buried – accidentally buried, you could alert people that you weren’t really dead yet.  This is like from 1891 when people were buried before they were embalmed, and on occasion people would be buried when they were actually still alive.

00:59:03

This is a method for concealing baldness.  Here’s a method of putting in golf, so anyone – any golfer who uses this grip when they’re putting would actually infringe this patent.  Well, let’s see, ’97, ’07.  Yeah, it’s still – it’s probably still in force.  This was a way of determining breast size by directly measuring the breasts instead of by, I don’t know, whatever the other method is.  Okay, so let’s take a pause here.  Let’s take a five-minute break.  It’s 9:01 my time, 10:01 New York time.  And let’s come back in about five or six minutes past the hour.  We will resume shortly.

00:59:51

[Five-minute break]

01:01:45

Okay, while we’re waiting, is anyone on line right now that has a microphone?  I could test the passing-the-mic feature, which Webex has, which we didn’t have on the other, see how that would go.  Anyone here have a microphone?  You want to try the pass-the-mic feature?  Let me know if you’d like to try it, and we’ll try to pass the mic to you.  Okay, let me see Karl here.  I’m just – Karl, I’m just going to pass the mic to you.  Hello, hello, hello, hello.  Karl, can you hear me?  Can you say something?  Oh, hold on.  Let me unmute you.  No, he’s not muted.  He has the mic, and he’s not muted.  Karl, are you speaking?  Because I can’t hear you.  Maybe Karl’s muted himself.  I don’t hear it.  Who else wanted to try?  Lloyd – let me try someone else.  Let me try Lloyd.  Lloyd – I’m trying Lloyd right now.

01:03:15

LLOYD: Hello?

01:03:16

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Hello.

01:03:17

LLOYD: Can you hear me?  Hey.

01:03:18

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Hey Lloyd.

01:03:20

LLOYD: Hey.

01:03:20

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Maybe Karl had his own mic muted or something.  I’m not sure.  This is a good feature.  We may use this in some of the Q&A sessions to have brief interchanges between – or questions or comments from some of the participants.  Good.  So this sounds okay.  Can everyone else hear Lloyd?

01:03:43

LLOYD: Hello.  It’s Lloyd.

01:03:48

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Oh cool, very good.

01:03:49

01:03:53

STEPHAN KINSELLA: Okay, well, we’re ready to go.  Let me pass the mic back to myself or see how this works.  Okay, excuse me a sec.  Okay.  Okay, can everyone hear me?  I think we should – okay, so we’ll start in just a second.  I think what we’ll do is this.  We have – I’m happy to go a little bit beyond time.  I don’t want to go too far beyond time because I’m conscious of the strange time zones of some people here or the late time zones for them.  So let’s do this.  I’m happy to answer questions for the next half an hour or so, but unless a lot start rolling in, what I’ll do is I’ll keep going on the lectures, but you can give me your questions at any time, and I’ll stop and answer them.

01:04:59

We’ll just see how far we get on the slides.  So I’m monitoring the chat.  If you have questions, put them in the chat or interrupt me.  Otherwise, I’m going to just keep going.  I’m going to talk about a few – okay, here’s the first question from Lloyd.  Can you enforce a US patent outside the US?  No.  Patents are geographical.  They’re state-based or nation-based.  So if you want to – if you have an invention, you – if you want a patent in China, you need to file a patent in China.

01:05:41

If you want one in the US, you have to file one in the US.  Typically what you do is, if you have an important idea, you file it.  Let’s say, if you’re an American inventor and you file an American patent application, and then within the first year you file a PCT—that’s patent cooperation treaty—application, which is sort of like a placeholder.  And that gives you like 30 months of time to decide whether you want to file in other countries claiming the priority through the PCT filing back to the US filing.

01:06:17

So, for example, on day one I file in the US.  Six months later I file a PCT application.  A year and a half later when I realize the US patent is going great, or the invention – I’m going to sell it now and it’s doing well on the market.  It’s worth for me to file it in China and Japan and Canada and Europe and Brazil or wherever.  So then I might file three or four or five other national or regional applications, so I might file a European, Japanese, and Chinese application for example.

01:06:51

Those can be expensive because you have to use a local law firm.  You have to pay a local filing fee, and you usually have to pay translation fees, especially for Japan and China, which can be more expensive than the filing itself.  So you’re talking on the order of, say, roughly $10,000-$20,000 per country per filing for prosecution.

01:07:13

If you wanted to cover half the globe, it can cost you half a million dollars just for one patent application.  Max says drugs and medical devices are approved by the FDA, but are they also patented?  They can be, and they usually are, so yeah.  Usually you’ll get a patent, and then you – but like I said, a patent doesn’t give you permission to do something, only to stop other people.  So you have to – if it’s covered by the FDA, you have to get FDA permission too.  Now, there’s a process that’s built into the patent law, which says if you have an administrative delay caused by the US government, then you can extend your patent term.

01:08:04

Now, there’s a limit on it, so let’s say that you have a patent on your drug, but the FDA takes three years to approve it.  Well, then you can tack three years onto your patent term because they figure that it’s been wasted during the time you’re waiting for approval.  Go Olivo – you might be wrong, but do you remember seeing a video where I mentioned IPs aren’t compatible with capitalism?  Can I elaborate?

01:08:29

Well, I think I’ll go into this in other – the further lectures.  We have six whole lectures to go.  The first lecture is more to familiarize you with the – what IP is and to the extent we can get to it and some of the history, which we can cover briefly next time.  But it’s not compatible with capitalism because basically they’re monopoly grants by the state, which allow you to tell other people how to use their own property rights.  It’s that simple really.  This is the basic problem with patent rights and copyrights.

01:09:02

Lloyd says when people complain about drug patents in Africa, are they actually filing patents in Africa?  Well, I’m not sure what complaints you’re talking about.  What you may be – I’m not sure what complaints or what people you mean.  Are you saying that the people that are in favor of the western-style drug patents are complaining that the drugs can be sold or knocked off really cheaply in Africa?  That may be what you’re talking about.  That’s only the case because they didn’t take the time to apply for a patent application in those African countries, for example.

01:09:43

Well, you said – Lloyd said AIDS drugs, but again, I’m not sure what you mean.  I mean I think the main complaint is that a lot of other countries don’t protect patent rights as much.  So they can knock off drugs and other things more easily.  Eric Smith – trade secrets – does the government enforce these, or are they just secrets?  I thought these were forms of IP consistent with market principles and didn’t require state – special state privileges.

01:10:15

Well, you would think so.  Actually no, they’re not just secrets.  If they were just secrets, you wouldn’t need a doctrine of law.  What they are is – it’s a legal right to get the court to stop someone from releasing your secret so long as it’s not widely made public yet.  So, for example, let’s say that – this is probably a bad example because Coca-Cola’s formula is apparently not a secret anymore.  It’s – I think it’s apparently a myth that the Coca-Cola secret is a trade secret.  Apparently it’s been known for a long time.  It’s just people don’t want to use it.  They want to use their own formulas.  But anyway, let’s assume the Coca-Cola secret was a trade secret.

01:11:01

All that means is they’ve taken reasonable steps to keep it secret.  It doesn’t mean they can guarantee that it’s going to remain secret.  So let’s say one in – let’s say someone finds out the secret somehow.  Now, if they reveal it to the world, they publish it on the internet, then it’s no longer a secret.  So Coca-Cola can do nothing except possibly sue that person for some kind of breach of contract or something like that.  Let’s say they’re a former employee.  But let’s say that they haven’t yet revealed it to the world, but they’re about to reveal it to a competitor like Pepsi Cola.  Coca-Cola could go to court and get the court to issue an injunction, and the court would tell Pepsi and the former employee or whoever this person was you may not reveal this secret to anyone else.  So as long as it’s still a secret, the court will help Coca-Cola try to keep it contained, and they’ll help them with the threat of injunctions.

01:11:55

01:12:00

Okay, is that clear?  Okay, ask away anything else.  In the meantime, I will go on with slide 43.  Just talking about a few common misconceptions and myths about patents and IP.  Number one, you’ll hear all the time that if we get rid of patents we’re going to hurt the small inventor, or that’s the primary motivation of the patent system is to help small inventors.

01:12:29

Well, most patents don’t benefit anyone.  They’re just wallpaper, especially small inventors.  So they’ll spend $10-, $15,- $20,000 on a patent attorney to get a piece of paper they can put in a frame and show their friends, but they never use it.  They’re used primarily by large corporations to amass – excuse me – patent arsenals, which they assemble for defensive purposes.  So all these large companies have hundreds of thousands of patents, which they use sort of like as a picket fence or a porcupine defense.  They have them to prevent their competitors or other people from suing them.

01:13:10

Like Intel may be afraid to sue Microsoft not only because they do business but because if Intel sues Microsoft for patent infringement, for infringing one of Intel’s patents, then Microsoft is going to look through their tens of thousands of patents and try to find one that Intel might infringe and counter-sue them.  So companies with lots of patents either – they tend to avoid each other.  So they basically have freedom to act because they have these patents.  Now, smaller companies don’t have a defensive weapon they can use, so the companies with patents feel comfortable suing them because they’re defenseless.  So basically patents erect barriers to entry and protect the larger companies compared to the smaller companies.

01:14:00

Another myth about the patent system is that it’s a first to invent.  Now, this is actually true in my understanding of most of the patent systems around the world but not of the US system.  The US system, ever since the beginning, has been based upon a first-to-file.  In other words, if two people have the same idea and they each file a patent application on it, the one that would win in the dispute, which is called an interference proceeding, an interference proceeding.  The one who would win is the one who invented it first if he could prove that even if he filed second.

01:14:43

Now, that actually is about to change apparently.  I think just a couple of days ago Senate Bill 93 – I’m going to blog about this later today or tomorrow probably on the Mises blog and also on – I’ll prep it here – my blog.  You might want to follow this during the course, c4sif.org.  That’s my Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and I put a lot of regular material on there about intellectual property happenings.

01:15:18

Anyway, there is a patent reform bill that’s pending in Congress right now, which I think it passed before the Senate 95-5.  So I suspect it will pass in the House and Obama will sign it, and it will actually change for the first time the US system to the first to – first-to-file system.

01:15:39

01:15:43

So the funny story about this is Ayn Rand, if you read Ayn Rand’s defense of patent rights in her – I think it was in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal.  She tries to defend the first-to-file system.  She tries to explain why America is justified in having a first-to-file patent system, which we did not have.  We had a first-to-invent system.  So she actually didn’t understand what the law was.  She thought it was first to file.  It was really first to invent.  She thought it was first to file, and she tried to explain why that was the best way to go.  So you can see she was trying to reverse engineer or justify what the American system was.

01:16:23

01:16:27

There’s another myth out there about poor man’s patent and poor man’s copyright.  This sort of idea, I get asked about this about every six months from someone.  And they say, well, can’t you just put your idea in a sealed envelope and mail it to yourself and hold onto that as proof about when you came up with it?  I mean this is a crazy idea that – I mean I’ve been practicing patent law and IP law for 18 years, and I’ve never seen anyone do this in a serious way.  This is some kind of urban legend, and this is not the way to go.  I don’t think it would do any good at all.  You wouldn’t be able to prove that it was legitimate.

01:17:08

This is a common – you’ll hear this over and over again.  Some people actually do it, but I don’t think they’re doing any good.  They think they’re doing good, but they’re not because what are you going to do?  Go to court and prove that you invented this on this date?  I mean first of all, if you understand copyright and patent law, you have to understand why you would even ever need to prove this.

01:17:30

First of all, first invention is not a defense to patent infringement.  Second of all, copyright attaches as soon as you have it fixed in a medium of expression, so as long as you can prove you authored it – I mean that’s not the best way to prove you authored it.  Now, it could be theoretically a way to prove when you conceded the idea for purpose of a battle with another patent key in an interference proceeding that I mentioned when you’re trying to prove you invented the idea first.  But if the law changes next month to where it’s first to file, then that’s going to be irrelevant too, so this is a weird myth of patent law.

01:18:13

A lot of you may have heard this idea too, these kind of conspiracy theorists, and they’ll say things like all the big oil companies or the big car companies or whatever have – they’ve bought up all the patents to these great ideas that would give you 100-mile-per-gallon fuel injector or carburetor ideas.  The problem with this is that patents are public.  I mean they’re all published.  So even if Exxon or whoever has bought up the 10 or 15 genius ideas that would allow you to get 100 miles per gallon, I mean those ideas are still published.  So the proponent of this conspiracy theory should be able to do a pre-patent search on usppo.gov and show us the patents that were bought.  And you could even search for who’s assigned – who owns these patents.  I mean if it’s been assigned to Exxon, then it would show that Exxon or someone owns it.  I mean – so these are crazy allegations.  I mentioned earlier already.  I knew I had this in a slide somewhere.  I’ve already mentioned the bottom thing on slide 43 about the right to practice.  Again, for copyright, remember you can’t copyright something.  It’s automatic.

01:19:31

Number two, for patents, they do not give the right to do what you have a patent on, only the right to stop other people.  Now, you can use this right to your advantage quite often, and quite often you do have a right to make your invention because you’re not infringing someone’s patent.  But having a patent doesn’t guarantee that you don’t infringe other people’s patents, and I already gave you the stool example, the stool/chair example.

01:19:54

Another kind of common myth about the patent system is this sort of mythology about the loan genius or the towering genius, this guy that’s in his garage toiling for years, and he comes up with a eureka moment and comes up with something that benefits mankind.  The truth is that most innovation, if not virtually – excuse me – virtually all innovation is part of a cooperative collaborative process, and usually it’s incremental in nature.  And of course, virtually every innovation is an improvement on the current state of knowledge.  So even Einstein or – of course Einstein couldn’t get a patent on his inventions or his formulas because they were abstract ideas.

01:20:47

So he wouldn’t be rewarded for his relatively or photon discovery or E=MC2, which he didn’t come up with anyway.  But anyway, so this is another problem with patent law, by the way.  It’s selective and arbitrary in what it covers.  It would reward practical gizmo making but not fundamental physics and scientific research.  And by the way, simultaneous innovation is very common.  In the history of patents, most of the famous inventions you’ve heard of, there were other people that invented this either before or at the same time as the inventor who’s given credit for it in history.

01:21:32

So simultaneous invention is a very common thing.  And the point of this is that it’s often said that if you don’t grant someone a monopoly in their inventions, then they would never have been created in the first place.  Well, this is just factually false.  I mean first of all, it would be invented eventually probably, maybe soon after or long after, but it’s going to be invented by someone eventually.

01:21:58

When technology gets to a certain stage, then it becomes ripe for all these creative people to use it and take it to the next level.  I mean the light bulb would eventually have been invented even if Edison hadn’t done it, for example.  And not only that, like I said, quite often there’s other people working on it at the same time.  There are three or four people that came up with the calculus at the same time.  Three or four people were working on the transistor at the same time.  It wasn’t just Shockley.

01:22:28

Okay.  There’s another misunderstanding about patents, and that is that patent infringers are just someone who copied your idea from you.  In fact, you’ll see people like J. Neil Schulman will say, well, if you don’t want to – if you don’t believe in copy and patent and copyright, just don’t copy my damn invention.  Well, but that assumes that patent infringement has to do with copy, but of course it doesn’t.  Copyright does.  Patent does not.  Remember, to infringe someone’s patent, all you have to do is make, use, or sell the device that is covered by the claims of their patent.  That’s it.

01:23:16

Even if you independently invented it, that’s not a defense.  It’s not an excuse.  Even if you invented it first but had it secret, kept it private and someone else independently invented it and patented it later, they can stop you from using your own ideas.  In fact, most patent lawsuits, the plaintiff never even alleges that the defendant copied what they did, and in fact, from the statistics I’ve seen and from my own experience in the lawsuits I’ve been involved with – I have never in my experience seen a case where the client that I’m talking to who was accused of infringing a patent or who’s worried about infringing a patent – they never did learn about it from the other company’s patent or even their product.

01:24:12

Usually they’re just toiling away, making their own products, and they’re coming up with different designs to make their products work.  And as they’re doing this, someone says, hey, the way that our circuit is configured I’m afraid it might look too much like claim 17, the patent numbers 6 million, 221, and 512, so they go study.  They get a patent lawyer.  They study the claims, and they go, I’m not sure.  I mean I don’t know if it’s the same thing.  It looks kind of the same, but I’m not sure.  But they point is they didn’t get it from the patent.  They didn’t copy it.  They came up with it themselves, but now they’re in danger of infringing the patent, and this is the common way patents are enforced.  You just allege that someone infringes your claim.  You never allege they copied it because they usually didn’t.

01:24:59

01:25:04

Okay.  Let’s go to slide 45.  And by the way, any questions are welcome now.  We’re getting close to – I’d be happy to go another, say, ten minutes or so or more if we need to.  Another – as I mentioned, there’s another myth that we had copyrighted common law, but that was what’s called common law copyright.  As I mentioned, that was more like a trade secret right.  That was just a very narrow right to prevent publication of an unpublished manuscript.

01:25:39

There’s a good quote here by Lord Camden, and he said that claims that copyright arose in common law – I’m reading my quote here on page 45 – they are founded on patents, privilege, Star-chamber decrees, and the bylaws of the Stationers’ Company.  And by the way, we’ll get to the Stationers’ Company in the history session later next class.  And all of them, the effects of the grossest tyranny and usurpation; the very last places in which I would have dreamt of finding the last trace of the common law.  So disabuse yourselves of the myth that copyright as we now know it existed at common law.

01:26:19

Also, it’s commonly said, especially by many libertarians who advocate IP, that it’s a natural right and that it’s based in the natural law.  This is actually not true.  It’s ahistorical, and we’ll get into this later in the history.  Also, it’s the evidence for those who have utilitarian approach to patents and copyrights and say that we need them because it encourages innovation.  It encourages creativity.  Without it, we would have less.  We would all be worse off.  Well, they just don’t have any evidence to back this up, and they never even try.  It’s also based upon this myth that we have a benevolent state.  We have a benevolent FDA.  But the truth is that the state taxes and regulates, extorts, penalizes, and incinerates and bombs things.  It’s really not out for the little guy, and giving them a tiny monopoly privilege they can use doesn’t overcome for all the damage the state does to them in other ways.  So we’ve got to get rid of this idea that the state is looking out for the little guy with these monopoly grants.

01:27:35

All right, let’s quickly go over the – in the remaining time we have over the other types of IP.  I already mentioned trademark, what it is.  Here’s kind of the more formal definition.  It’s a word, phrase, symbol, or design used to identify the source of goods or sources.  It’s sometimes called a service mark in that case, by the way, and to distinguish them from the goods or services of others.  And as I – Coca-Cola – I’ve got the little R in the circle there.  It means registered trademark, identifies their products as coming from them, Pepsi – as distinguished from Pepsi.

01:28:13

Okay, so what it does is it prohibits the use of confusing the similar marks to identifying your goods.  And every ten years you can register the trademark over and over again.  As long as the product and the company is in business theoretically they can last forever, okay, so every ten years.  And I’ve already mentioned what trade secrets are.  Some examples of trade secrets would be databases, customer lists.

01:28:44

Now, these are largely protected by state law, although there are federal aspects to it.  Now, let me mention one disadvantage of relying on trade secret is that, as I mentioned, it’s possible for someone else to independently invent the – let’s say you’re using as a secret some invention, some innovative process to make a chemical or a process, to make a chemical or something or a product.  If someone else comes up with this 30 years later and they file a patent on it, they can then stop you from using your own invention even though you were first because they have a patent.  You didn’t copy it.  In fact, you came up with it first, so this is one danger of trade secrets.

01:29:31

So this one problem of patent is that it makes people reluctant to actually use trade secrets.  And, in fact, there’s another – I just had a debate with a patent lawyer in Ohio about IP law.  And he pointed out that one advantage of the patent system is that it encourages disclosure of ideas that would otherwise be kept secret.

01:29:56

Thanks Danny.  I’m going to stop in about five minutes anyway, so you won’t miss too much.  Karl says doesn’t the FBI investigate violation of trade secrets?  Yeah, I didn’t mention that but – so trade secret is largely state law, but there is a federal – I think it’s the Espionage Act, and there’s another federal law which makes it a federal crime in some cases to steal trade secrets.  So they do investigate that sometimes.  That’s correct, although the body of the law is still largely state-based like trademark used to be.  Copyright and patent are completely federal-based in the US we’re talking about.  But let me just mention one thing and I’ll wrap it up here.

01:30:42

What I was going to say was the original idea, if you actually look at the Constitution and the patent act, what it actually literally says is that if you file a patent application, then we’ll give you a monopoly.  But if you think about it, this is like a bargain.  What they’re telling the public is – I’m sorry. What they’re telling the inventor is if you tell the world how to make your idea, so we’re going to publish this if you disclose it.  That’s why it’s called a disclosure or a detailed description.  Then we’ll give you a monopoly.  So the exchange is you get a temporary monopoly in exchange for telling the world about your idea.

01:31:22

Now, this also is said to work as an incentive to innovate, but the main literal incentive is to disclose your idea.  The theory is that without a patent system, companies would keep everything secret, and so you have less free disclosure and trading of ideas.  So the idea is that the patent system encourages disclosure of ideas earlier than otherwise.  Even if you can’t use the idea yet, you can start studying it and researching it, and as soon as the patent expires, then you’re free to compete with the company and use the ideas, etc.

01:31:56

The problem is, number one, this – companies still do keep some things secret.  So in other words, most products that are disclosed – I’m sorry.  Most products that are patented, the innovative aspect of the product would have been revealed to public anyway by the selling of the product.  In other words, if I have a new mousetrap design, if I start selling it, the public is going to see the new design.

01:32:31

So the patent system in that case, if I have a patent on that mousetrap design, the patent – the public is not benefited by the filing of the patent application because they would have known what the patent was like anyway.  So the disclosure that it encourages is superfluous to what would have been disclosed anyway.  So there’s very little new disclosure that the patent system encourages.  On the other hand, as I mentioned, many companies are afraid of being sued for practicing their own inventions, so they’re afraid to keep things secret.  So what a lot of these companies do, they cannot afford to file a patent application because it can be expensive.

01:33:11

So what they do is they publish their ideas in some journal or some publication service for a fairly minimal fee of $1- or $2- or $300.  They publish it on purpose to make their ideas public domain or prior art to prevent someone else from independently reinventing this idea later and filing a patent on it.  So the effect of the patent system is to force companies that are not getting a patent in exchange for this to reveal their secrets to the world defensively.  So basically it distorts the market and makes companies give up secrets that they otherwise would have had a right to maintain just to avoid being the victim of a patent lawsuit.

01:34:02

I think I will stop here.  If anyone else has any particular questions now, I’d be happy to answer them.  Otherwise – so I’ll wait a second to see if anyone has any questions, and otherwise I will see you all.  Let me ask.  Would anyone be interested – would anyone here be interested in an office-hours session?  Let’s say 1 o’clock p.m., 2 o’clock p.m. New York time on Thursdays.  I don’t know if we would do that yet.  I did that for my last course.  I don’t know if we’d need to do that yet.  I would do it if anyone wants to.  I think I won’t do it this week because I didn’t mention it or didn’t list it, but I’m happy to do it if there’s a demand for it and a need for it.

01:34:51

01:35:06

I could do it on the weekends too.  It’s hard to find the best time for office hours.  We can discuss this in the course discussion page.  Any further questions?  Go ahead, Gwendolyn, about Feist.  You can find Feist, by the way on the – just search it on Wikipedia, the Feist case.  So Gwendolyn has a question about Feist.  Go ahead.  I’m waiting.  Would the data in a wiki be considered a database under Feist?

01:35:48

Well, I guess that depends on whether it’s original.  I mean if it’s just – even if it’s a mere compilation of data, like mere facts – I means in the typical example it would be a database or a map or a phone book listing, something like that, maybe seismic data, something like that.  But I think a lot of wikis have original contributions, right?  Just take a look at the Feist case.  You’ll see how they formulate it, but it depends on what the wiki had, Gwendolyn.  I mean if there’s an actual article written by individuals, I think those are creative – those are original works of authorship.

01:36:30

Those are typically going to be protected by copyright.  Now, the wiki may attempt to have a creative commons license to make it somewhat open source.  Whether those licenses are effective or not is a different question.  I have some questions about that.  In any case, they’re still copyright.  They’re still protected by copyright.  Gwendolyn says the software itself with the data is a different issue.  I’m not sure what you mean.  I thought a wiki was an online way of having a collaboration of adding information to something.

01:37:11

So what I’m saying is it depends on the nature of the information whether it would be a database or not.  When will I cover – Donald says when will I cover “Questions for the Professor?”  I usually cover them as they come in.  If there’s some that I’ve missed, please point me to them.  I try to subscribe to all the forums.  Are there any that I’ve missed, Donald?  I usually answer them dynamically during the week as they come in, or sometimes I’ll save them for a Q&A session.  But as we may not have one at least this week I’ll answer them.

01:37:57

Gwendolyn says the software that runs the wiki might be under open source, but the data the wiki accesses is independent of the software.  That could be.  I mean we’d have to look at the particular case for the answer, but just basically think of original expressions of idea as protected by copyright.  Mere data is not.  Mere facts are not.

01:38:26

Matt said he read Against IP on his iPod and liked it and it didn’t take too long.  Thank you.  Thank you.  I’m glad, and there’s an audio version by one of our members here, Jock.  Lloyd talks about the Wikipedia has an explanation of the license they’re using.  I agree, but the point is you wouldn’t need a license if it wasn’t protected by copyright in the first place.  So whether there’s a license or not, I mean it sort of presupposes that there is a copyright in the data.  So the first question is whether there’s a copyright in the information or in the material.

01:39:07

01:39:32

Okay, guys, so I will be in contact with you during the week on the forum, and any of you feel free to email me any time.  I’ll type my email here.  Again, that’s my email, not Danny’s.  And otherwise, I will talk – I’ll see you on next Monday night.  Goodnight, everybody.  Enjoyed it.

01:39:55

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KOL171 | With Albert Lu Discussing Stossel and IP

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 171.

I was a guest yesterday (Feb. 6, 2015) on Albert Lu‘s “The Economy” podcast, discussing my recent appearance on Stossel [Stossel Show on Intellectual Property (Fox Business Channel, Jan. 30, 2015)]. The full episode is here; the portion including only our interview is included in this podcast feed.

Transcript and grok shownotes below. [continue reading…]

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Unpublished Letter to The Economist on Inflation, and others

Three letters-to-the-editor I wrote in the 1980s/90s that were never published are here, and repixeled below: on on inflation; one on gambling prohibition; one on free will (nature vs. nurture).

To The Economist (Nov. 11, 1992)

Editor, Letters Page
The Economist Newspaper
25 St James’s Street
London SWlA 1HG
England

Dear Sir:

In “Zero Inflation: How Low is Low Enough?” (November 7th) you assume that governments ought to pursue a low, stable price inflation rate in order to best benefit their economies. In a growing economy, however, a zero price inflation rate would require inflation of the money supply, which itself adversely affects market behaviour. Money inflation artificially lowers interest rates, sending false signals which cause malinvestments and temporary booms. These malinvestments must, ultimately, be liquidated by recession. Thus, the business cycle is born.

The “ideal” rate of price inflation is thus whatever rate—probably a mild deflation—accompanies a zero money inflation rate. In short, in order to avoid price inflation and harmful market disturbances, government should quit printing more money altogether.

Very truly yours,
N. Stephan Kinsella
Houston, Texas [continue reading…]

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KOL170 | Tom Woods Show: Are Corporations Unlibertarian?

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 170.

Episode 325 of the Tom Woods Show: Are Corporations Un-Libertarian?

From Tom’s show notes (with a few additions from me):

Corporations aren’t people, say protestors. Corporations are creatures of the state, say some libertarians. Is there any merit to these complaints? Should libertarians support the corporate form or not? That’s the topic of discussion on today’s episode, with guest Stephan Kinsella.

Related Writing by the Guest

Corporate Personhood, Limited Liability, and Double Taxation
In Defense of the Corporation
Legitimizing the Corporation
Causation and Aggression” (with Patrick Tinsley)

[See also:

]

Book by the Guest

Against Intellectual Property

Book Mentioned

Robert Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation

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Structural Safeguards to Limit Legislation and State Power

Related:

In the mid-90s I wrote a couple of law review articles, each which contained a short summary list of possible structural and related changes that could be made (say, to the Constitution) to try to limit state power and to limit the danger of legislation (really, the danger of having a legislature). I’ve elaborated on this also here:

Related:

Ultimately, most such changes are probably futile. Constitutions are paper limits used to prop up state power, and are interpreted and enforced by the very state that is supposed to be limited by it. But they are certainly better than useless measures such as term limits. Probably the single most important of these proposals would be the sunset proposal: every statute expires after some maximum number of years, unless positively reenacted. (For some additional suggestions regarding federalism, see my post Randy Barnett’s “Federalism Amendment”–A Counterproposal.)

Below I’ll include some excerpts from some key articles then some listings of proposals from the other sources.

The first excerpt is from my article “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11 (Summer 1995):

For all these reasons, I do not believe that legislation is a legitimate or practical means of creating law, or even of patching it. If a legislature can be convinced to recognize and respect the right law, so can a decentralized court system, especially one competing with other courts for customers. Courts do not face the same pernicious and systematic incentives that legislators do to make bad laws, and many of them. And courts, if they go bad, at least have a more limited effect on society; whereas when legislatures go bad, there is no end to the evil that they can perpetrate.[1]

If legislation can be considered valid at all (given a governmental system), it can only be occasional or spurious legislation that modifies the body of law which is primarily developed by a court-based, decentralized law-finding system. If we must have legislation, several constitutional safeguards should accompany its exercise, to attempt to restrict legislation to a purely secondary role in the formation of law. Certainly, a supermajority,[2] and maybe a referendum, should be required in order to enact any statutes whatever, except perhaps for statutes that repeal prior statutes or that limit governmental power. [continue reading…]

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 169.

I was interviewed today by Daniel Rothschild for his “Live Free, Die Old” Youtube channel. We discussed primarily the fallacious argument that Lockean-libertarian-based property titles are flawed if they are based on conquest or cannot be traced back to the first homesteader.

Background material:

 

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Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 168.

Jeffrey Tucker Interviews Stephan Kinsella on Samsung-Apple trial, Laissez-Faire Club (Aug. 27, 2012).

Video below.

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My article “The Case Against IP: A Concise Guide,” Mises Daily (Sept. 4, 2009) has been translated into Italian, by , as “Contro la proprietà intellettuale: una breve guida.” So for my work has been translated into 14 languages. (Comments from the original Mises blog discussion, now deleted, are archived here.)

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My article “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide” was published in Mises Daily (May 27, 2011). It also includes “Discourse Ethics and Liberty: A Skeletal Ebook.”

The original article has broken and missing links, so I reprint it below, with corrections and updates. I follow with additional, supplemental material that was published or came to my attention after the original article’s publication, followed by the Archived comments on Mises Daily article and archived comments from the related Mises blog post.

Note that several of my articles listed in the original article are now updated and included as chapters in my book Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023), to wit:

Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide

Mises Daily
05/27/2011 • Stephan Kinsella

Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe burst onto the Austrolibertarian scene in the late 1980s, when he moved to the United States to study under and work with his mentor Murray Rothbard. Since his arrival, Professor Hoppe has produced a steady stream of pioneering contributions to economic and libertarian theory. A key contribution of Professor Hoppe is his provocative “argumentation-ethics” defense of libertarian rights.

In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument is lacking:

It has been a common quarrel with the natural rights position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far “too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law.” Furthermore, its description of rationality is equally ambiguous in that it does not seem to distinguish between the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of nature on the one hand and normative laws of human conduct on the other. (The Economics and Ethics of Private Property [2006; EEPP], p. 313; also A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism [2010; TSC], p. 156 n.118)

Hoppe’s solution is to focus on the nature of argumentation instead of action in general:

The praxeological approach solves this problem by recognizing that it is not the wider concept of human nature but the narrower one of propositional exchanges and argumentation which must serve as the starting point in deriving an ethic. (EEPP, p. 345)

Here he draws on the work of his PhD advisor, the famous European philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and fellow German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel, who had developed a theory of “discourse ethics” or “argumentation ethics.” As Hoppe explains this basic approach,

any truth claim, the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously here), is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation. Since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and since it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this very fact has been aptly called “the a priori of communication and argumentation.” (EEPP, p. 314)

That is, there are certain norms presupposed by the very activity of arguing. Apel and Habermas go on to argue that the ethics presupposed as legitimate by discourse as such justify the standard set of soft-socialist policies. But Hoppe, while recognizing the value of the basic approach, rejected their application of this theory and socialist conclusions. Instead, Hoppe took what was valuable in the Apel-Habermas approach and melded it with Misesian-Rothbardian insights to provide a praxeological-discourse-ethics twist on the standard natural-law defense of rights.

In essence, Hoppe’s view is that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting, which requires individual control of scarce resources. In genuine discourse, the parties try to persuade each other by the force of their argument, not by actual force:

Argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person’s exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth). (TSC, p. 158)

Thus, self-ownership is presupposed by argumentation. Hoppe then shows that argumentation also presupposes the right to own homesteaded scarce resources as well. The basic idea here is that the body is “the prototype of a scarce good for the use of which property rights, i.e., rights of exclusive ownership, somehow have to be established, in order to avoid clashes” (TSC, p. 19). As Hoppe explains,

The compatibility of this principle with that of nonaggression can be demonstrated by means of an argumentum a contrario. First, it should be noted that if no one had the right to acquire and control anything except his own body … then we would all cease to exist and the problem of the justification of normative statements … simply would not exist. The existence of this problem is only possible because we are alive, and our existence is due to the fact that we do not, indeed cannot, accept a norm outlawing property in other scarce goods next and in addition to that of one’s physical body. Hence, the right to acquire such goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161)

Hoppe then goes on to show, following Rothbardian logic 1 that the only ownership rule that is compatible with self-ownership and the presuppositions of discourse, is the Lockean original-appropriation rule (TSC, pp. 160–69). In his book review of Man, Economy, and Liberty: Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard (Walter Block and Llewellyn H.Rockwell, Jr., eds., Mises Institute, 1988), Hoppe pithily summarizes his argumentation-ethics approach (elaborated in further detail in his own chapter in the volume) as follows:

by engaging in discussions about welfare criteria that may or may not end up in agreement, and instead result in a mere agreement on the fact of continuing disagreements — as in any intellectual enterprise — an actor invariably demonstrates a specific preference for the first-use-first-own rule of property acquisition as his ultimate welfare criterion: without it no one could independently act and say anything at any time, and no one else could act independently at the same time and agree or disagree independently with whatever had been initially said or proposed. It is the recognition of the homesteading principle which makes intellectual pursuits, i.e., the independent evaluation of propositions and truth claims, possible. And by virtue of engaging in such pursuits, i.e., by virtue of being an “intellectual” one demonstrates the validity of the homesteading principle as the ultimate rational welfare criterion. (emphasis added)

Hoppe also gives credit to Rothbard for recognizing, in a brief passage, the insights that Hoppe later built on more systematically:

This defense of private property is essentially also Rothbard’s. In spite of his formal allegiance to the natural rights tradition Rothbard, in what I consider his most crucial argument in defense of a private property ethic, not only chooses essentially the same starting point — argumentation — but also gives a justification by means of a priori reasoning almost identical to the one just developed. To prove the point I can do no better than simply quote: “Now, any person participating in any sort of discussion, including one on values, is, by virtue of so participating, alive and affirming life. For if he were really opposed to life he would have no business continuing to be alive. Hence, the supposed opponent of life is really affirming it in the very process of discussion, and hence the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.” (EEPP, p. 321–22, quoting Murray N. Rothbard, “A Crusoe Social Philosophy,” in The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 32–33, also published as idem, “A Crusoe Social Philosophy,” Mises Daily (December 7, 2021).)

Not surprisingly, when Hoppe’s argumentation ethics appeared in the late 1980s, e.g. in a Liberty symposium and other publications, 2 Rothbard was excited by this new approach:

In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist-Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison. 3

[Update: See also Rothbard’s comments Hoppe’s argumentation ethics in Rothbard, Man, Economy, and Liberty (1 March 1986), where Rothbard comments and responds to the speakers and papers presented at the “Man, Economy and Liberty” colloquium hosted by the Mises Institute; backup Youtube, which concerned Man, Economy, and Liberty: Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard, Walter Block and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., eds. (Mises Institute, 1988). Note his comments here:

]

Tantalizingly, Rothbard concludes his piece,

A future research program for Hoppe and other libertarian philosophers would be (a) to see how far axiomatics can be extended into other spheres of ethics, or (b) to see if and how this axiomatic could be integrated into the standard natural law approach. These questions provide fascinating philosophical opportunities. Hoppe has lifted the American movement out of decades of sterile debate and deadlock, and provided us a route for future development of the libertarian discipline.

Since the advent of Hoppe’s breakthrough theory of rights, it has continued to gain attention and adherents (and controversy). I based my own, related “estoppel” theory of libertarian rights on Hoppe’s work starting in 1991 (see,  e.g., A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights, in LFFS) and ended up writing a detailed survey of related theories; see Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights, in LFFS). In the meantime, other work has built on Hoppe’s monumental rights theory, so much so that I’ve been tempted to collect material for an “argumentation-ethics reader.”

Because of logistic, copyright, and other issues, I’ve not completed this project yet, but as most of these pieces are online, I thought it would make sense to provide a skeletal outline, with links where available, of such a book. It is below. 4 Hoppe’s argumentation ethics and other important economic, philosophical, and political works are will be discussed in my upcoming Mises Academy course The Social Theory of Hoppe.

Discourse Ethics and Liberty: A Skeletal Ebook

Part One: Overview

  1. Introduction: Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights, in LFFS
  2. Discourse Ethics” (Wikipedia)

Part Two: Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics

  1. Precursors to Hoppe: “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” by Jürgen Habermas, and “Is the Ethics of the Ideal Communication Community a Utopia? On the Relationship between Ethics, Utopia, and the Critique of Utopia,” by Karl-Otto Apel, both in Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr, eds., The Communicative Ethics Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) [not online]
  2. “From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism,” in EEPP, by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
  3. “The Justice of Economic Efficiency,” in EEPP, by Hoppe
  4. “On the Ultimate Justification of the Ethics of Private Property,” in EEPP, by Hoppe
  5. “Appendix: Four Critical Replies,” in EEPP, by Hoppe
  6. “On The Ethics of Argumentation” (PFS 2016), by Hoppe

Part Three: Commentary on and Extensions of Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics

  1. “Beyond Is and Ought,” by Murray N. Rothard
  2. Hoppephobia,” by Rothbard
  3. Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan,” in LFFS, by Stephan Kinsella
  4. Argumentation Ethics and The Philosophy of Freedom,” by Frank Van Dun
  5. Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics and Its Critics, by Kinsella
  6. Revisiting Argumentation Ethics, by Kinsella
  7. Hülsmann on Argumentation Ethics,” by Kinsella
  8. The A Priori Foundations of Property Economics,” by Guido Hülsmann
  9. Praxeology, Economics, and Law: Issues and Implications,” by Larry Sechrest
  10. A Reply to the Current Critiques Formulated Against Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics,” by Marian Eabrasu
  11. Hopp(e)ing Onto New Ground: A Rothbardian Proposal for Thomistic Natural Law as the Basis for Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Praxeological Defense of Private Property,” by Jude Chua Soo Meng; see also idem, “Austrian Reasons for Private Property Rights: A New Natural Law Retrieval of Hayek and Rothbard

Part Four: Other and Related Approaches to Discourse Ethics

  1. A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights,” by Kinsella, in LFFS
  2. “The Basis and Content of Human Rights,” Georgia L. Rev. 13 (1979): 1143–70, by Alan Gewirth [not online; but see his Moral Rationality, and summaries by Pilon in works cited below]
  3. Ordering Rights Consistently: Or, What We Do and Do Not Have Rights To,” by Roger Pilon
  4. A Theory of Rights: Toward Limited Government,” by Pilon
  5. Mises and Argumentation Ethics,” by Kinsella
  6. “Habermas: A Critical Approach,” Critical Review 2 (1988): 39–50, by Jeremy Shearmur [not online; see discussion in Kinsella, Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights]
  7. Economics and the Limits of Value-Free Science,” by Van Dun
  8. On the Philosophy of Argument and the Logic of Common Morality,” by Van Dun [see also the more recent work by Van Dun, “Argumentation Ethics and The Philosophy of Freedom“]
  9. Individualism and Political Dialogue,” by Tibor R. Machan 5
  10. The Logic of Liberty (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), by G.B. Madison (not online; see discussion in Kinsella, Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights)
  11. Political Legitimacy and Discourse Ethics,” by Douglas B. Rasmussen (also discussed in Kinsella, Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights)
  12. Rights, Robinson Crusoe, and Friday,” by Michaël Bauwens
  13. Universally Preferable Behaviour: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics, by Stefan Molyneux 6
  14. “From Dialogue Rights to Property Rights: Foundations for Hayek’s Legal Theory,” Critical Review 4 (1990): 106–32, by Jeremy Shearmur (not online; see discussion in Kinsella, Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights)

****

Supplemental Resources and Updates

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Archived Comments from Mises Daily article

Paul Stephens· 91 weeks ago

This stuff is really key. Back in the ’70’s and 80’s, I encountered Habermas’s work a lot. There was a knot of Frankfurt School people at the University of Montana, and there was widespread global interest in it. All sorts of “neo-revolutionaries” drank from that well, including many of the leading Balkan intellectuals. I wouldn’t have guessed that Hoppe was part of this in a million years. I’ll have to read him more carefully, now.

Hayek and most of the “Austrians” are believed to have been more or less opposed to the Frankfurt school “Marxists” or Neo-Marxists. It just goes to show, it all comes full circle, and there is nothing new under the sun!

Archived comments (from the Mises Blog)

{ 79 comments… read them below or add one }

Stephan Kinsella May 27, 2011 at 8:32 am

Those interested in the comments of Hoppe and Rothbard above regarding argumentation ethics might also find of interest Hoppe’s Introduction to Ethics of Liberty, esp. his contrast of Rothbard’s style with that of Nozick, and his comments about Rothbard’s “knock-down” arguments, which could also apply to Hoppe’s argumentation ethics and could explain one reason some libertarians resist this approach.

REPLY

Justin J. May 29, 2011 at 5:30 am

Stephen, thanks for that interesting article.

Could you let us know in a nutshell how Habermas argued that the argumentation ethic implies support for his socialist policies, and did Hoppe answer that particular claim?

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella May 29, 2011 at 6:04 am

Justin, Habermas is a bit inscrutable.. I had trouble finding a good English concise and clear overview of his work. You’ll note I didn’t include a Habermas piece, for this reason. I did include Apel b/c I have a good concise article by him, and Hoppe prefers Apel’s take anyway as being conceptually clearer (IIRC)–even though Habermas was his teacher. So I did include this piece: Precursors to Hoppe: “Is the Ethics of the Ideal Communication Community a Utopia? On the Relationship between Ethics, Utopia, and the Critique of Utopia,” by Karl-Otto Apel.

The Habermas book I used in my research years ago was Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action http://www.amazon.co.uk/Consciousness-Communicative-Action-Jurgen-Habermas/dp/0745611044 — it is a bizarre book, full of weird ideas about World 1 and World 2 and so on (going from memory–it’s been 16-17 years). How he and Apel conclude socialist thigs–I only dimly remember but I think the basic argument is sort of taking a more democratic twist on the idea of argumentation; the idea that such social dialogue is “essential” and to be able to participate in it you must have resources (food, job) guaranteed to you by society. I think it’s wrong, for the same reasons Hoppe does. I think their insight is a good one but they just twisted it and beat it to try to make it yield their desired socialist result.

REPLY

fundamentalist May 27, 2011 at 8:56 am

“It has been a common quarrel with the natural rights position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far “too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law.”

That’s a straw man. See Feser’s “Last Superstition.” Philosophers since Hume have congratulated themselves for successfully defeating straw men versions of natural law. Feser shows how little Hume understood about natural law. Hoppe clearly knows little about natural law theory and has learned everything from the straw men arguments.

Natural law theory never did try to derive morality from human nature. In fact, nature in the natural law theory was nothing like what Hoppe, Rothbard or other mean by it. Today, nature refers to simply what is. In natural law nature meant the essence of something.

Feser uses the simplistic example of a triangle. The nature or essence of a triangle is to have three side, each a straight line. In nature we find many triangles that come close to the ideal triangle, but not many. They are no less triangles, just not ideal. In a similar way, humanity has an essence, and ideal nature with many deviations from it.

Man Austrians discuss natural law in the same way that Paul Krugman discusses Austrian economics, from a position a ignorance. That’s beneath Austrians. Austrians should apply the same honesty and rigor to ethics as they apply to economics.

The odd thing about Hoppe’s ethic is that it uses essentially the same argument for property as does natural law, just with different assumptions. However, Hoppe makes a logical leap when he goes from self-ownership to property rights being absolute.

The Hoppe argument for property doesn’t seem like an argument as much as a suggestion. That people own themselves is well established. But that only implies that rights to property outside of oneself exists as well. It doesn’t prove it.

“In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics…”

There never was such a conflict. Hume invented it. See Feser’s book.

REPLY

Peter Surda May 27, 2011 at 1:47 pm

Maybe I just don’t understand the argument, but I think it’s wrong (I mean the argument, rather than the conclusion. I consider the conclusion a normative one and therefore outside of the scope of economics). I have the following objections to it:

Arguing does not require that you have a right to argue. Only arguing logically correctly requires that. This creates a recursive condition and is therefore invalid (or a tautology, if you want to put it this way). The condition evaluates to “true” regardless of whether you have a right to argue or not. If you do, then your argument is correct. If you don’t, then your argument is false, and by arguing you are confirming the falsity. It’s like in the logical prototype “This sentence is true”.

There does not need to be a causal relationship between one’s preferences/rights and the logical content of an argument one is making. What if I’m lying in order to hide my preferences, or what if I’m advocating the violations of other people’s rights?

Arguing is merely a type of action, it can be in accordance or in a violation of rights. If I broke into Hoppe’s home in the middle of the night, woke him up and started telling him that I have a right to argue, he would probably object very strongly. You do not always have a right to argue. You only have a right to argue if you are not violating other rights. Which brings us back to the beginning.

REPLY

Thinker May 27, 2011 at 3:02 pm

You seem to be starting from the position that we know about our rights, then we argue. Think about it this way: suppose for the sake of inquiry that we don’t know about our rights before engaging in argument. Justifying argumentation is another matter, but hopefully this perspective makes the purpose of Hoppe’s argument more clear.

REPLY

Mike Peinovich May 27, 2011 at 10:28 pm

Think about what you are doing right here in making a proposition. You seem to be proposing some rules that you want us to accept. Why are you doing this? Because you acknowledge that we each have the right to accept or not accept the norm you propose. Your actions make the point. The right to argue is irrelevant. If you were to claim that people have no right to argue, how would you do this? You would have to do it with argument. Why would you advocate for the violation of right instead of just violating them unless you thought for some reason you had to convince others? In your break in example it is not the argument that is the unethical action, it is the break in.

REPLY

RC May 28, 2011 at 10:13 am

“Think about what you are doing right here in making a proposition. You seem to be proposing some rules that you want us to accept. Why are you doing this? Because you acknowledge that we each have the right to accept or not accept the norm you propose. Your actions make the point.”

Not at all. What does “the right to accept or not accept” mean?

“The right to argue is irrelevant. If you were to claim that people have no right to argue, how would you do this? You would have to do it with argument.”

And? Again, I ask: what does “right to argue” mean? And if I do not have a right to argue, does that mean I am incapable of arguing?

REPLY

Shay May 28, 2011 at 12:16 am

First, arguing is by definition doing so “logically correctly”. It’s irrelevant whether one thinks one is arguing, or is merely pretending to in order to deceive; only if one is arguing is one arguing. That is, making claims and backing them up with reasons.

One assumption in the original claim seems to be that the arguer is arguing a consistent, uniform philosophy. For example, everyone has a right to X. If one were arguing that he had a right to X and Y, but everyone else just X, then his making an argument wouldn’t imply that his right to argue carries to anyone else.

In your example of breaking in and then asserting your right to argue, the violation of rights isn’t arguing, it’s breaking in.

What I take from Hoppe is that it’s basically inconsistent to argue for anything other than what he describes, because the mere act of making an argument for it implicitly rests on what he describes.

REPLY

sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 1:34 am

Peter,

“This creates a recursive condition and is therefore invalid (or a tautology, if you want to put it this way)”

I have heard you at least being called a “falsificationalist” and that may be the source of the problem, because Hoppe is an “extreme rationalist” and critiques empiricism (both positivst and Popperean) quite intensely in “Economics and Ethics”. For a great and short defense of rationalism by Hoppe see this: https://mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/RAE3_1_16.PDF

Basically, that something is a tautology is quite different from it being invalid. Empiricists attack tautologies as being empty expressions of the conventions of language, but as Hoppe explains these are necessary conventions for any meaningful language. They represent true facts about reality as the rules of language are contrained by reality, particularly when language is tied to actions.

Hoppe obviously is not suggested one cannot attempt to argue that initiation of force is justified. He just means, as you seem to agree, that such an argument must be wrong. But that is all the scope of ethics ever was: to examine the *arguments* in favor of actions.

“It’s like in the logical prototype “This sentence is true”.”

And to a rationalist there is a manifestly true fact of reality contained in this tautology: that it is necessary for any meaningful language that stating a claim is the same as regarding the claim as true. This is not an empty definition of the word true, but a recognition of the fact that there is such a concept to be defined (regardless of its symbolic representation).

“There does not need to be a causal relationship between one’s preferences/rights and the logical content of an argument one is making”

What exactly is a right, though? Hoppe is arguing that the concept of a “right” is a recognition of the fact that in the course of an argument certain conditions cannot be avoided, and so, for example, argumentation can only take place so long as all participants are autonomous users of their bodies so being the autonomous user is a “right” in the sense that it is established once and for all by arguing at all. That is all a “right” could be. Preferences have a praxeological definition, but “rights” need an argumentative (which I suppose is a type of praxeological) definition.

“What if I’m lying in order to hide my preferences, or what if I’m advocating the violations of other people’s rights”

In the first case you can hide your preferences, but you cannot hide the unavoidable logical error. In the second, you are certainly capable of honestly wanting to violate others (or else there would be no issue of ethics), but you still must commit a contradiction to claim your preferences reflect rights.

“If I broke into Hoppe’s home in the middle of the night, woke him up and started telling him that I have a right to argue, he would probably object very strongly”

This misses the point, I think. Just think of how immediately contradictory it would be to argue that you do not have a right to argue (keeping in mind a “right” is something implied by the very act of argumentation). But consider this: are you simply informing Hoppe rudely of your preferences (i.e. to raid his house) or are you actually trying to convince him that you have a right to trespass on his property? If you are really doing the latter, you would be forced to act in accordance with such a claim being false, as you must keep your hands off him personally and allow him to speak and counter your arguments until he is utterly convinced of your arguments. There is the performative contradiction: you are forced to admit through your own actions that you don’t even believe what you are trying to argue.

To be clear, Hoppe is not contesting that people honestly prefer to violate others or that they are capable of doing so. A “right” is very different from an ability or preference. He is merely pointing out that an attempt to *argue* against private property must be an invalid *argument*.

Who cares what arguments can be made or not? That’s where the rationalism comes in…

REPLY

RC May 28, 2011 at 10:07 am

“What exactly is a right, though? Hoppe is arguing that the concept of a “right” is a recognition of the fact that in the course of an argument certain conditions cannot be avoided, and so, for example, argumentation can only take place so long as all participants are autonomous users of their bodies”

This is clearly not true, as someone can be sitting on me, yet I will still be able to argue. So even here Hoppe fails.

“so being the autonomous user is a “right” in the sense that it is established once and for all by arguing at all. That is all a “right” could be. Preferences have a praxeological definition, but “rights” need an argumentative (which I suppose is a type of praxeological) definition.”

But what does that “right” do for the “rightholder”? So what if I am an autonomous user of my body? Why can’t I punch another autonomous user in the face?
Has Hoppe even offered a definition of the word “right”?

REPLY

sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 6:12 pm

“This is clearly not true, as someone can be sitting on me, yet I will still be able to argue. So even here Hoppe fails.”

Until you die of starvation because you cannot get up and get food. What you say is only true momentarily. Hoppe emphasizes that a truth is fundamentally universal and perpetual, so it can never make any sense for something to be a “right” here and now but not there and later. So what you are saying is only relevant if what you really mean is people can sit on each other indefinitely and still be able to argue, which is patently false. If everyone sits on everyone else (ignoring the impossibility of such an act) they’ll all starve to death and then there will be no argumentation.

You can only save this by saying, “I can sit on you here and now and we can still argue” but then you would be attempting to tie a “right” to a place and time, when by definition rights are universal and perpetual.

“But what does that “right” do for the “rightholder”?”

This is a very statist outlook! Hoppe is not standing anywhere with an army explaining what he is going to compel anyone to do! This is an issue of *arguments*. It means you, as an arguer, can never argue the justifiability of initiating aggression. That’s all it means. Just like you can’t fly by flapping your arms no matter how badly you want to, you also cannot consistently argue that rights do not exist because you admit they do by arguing at all. Any attempt will be a failure, and it is worth pointing out you are not even trying to make such an attempt.

You have not attempted to justify initiation of force argumentatively, and this is what Hoppe says is impossible.

“Why can’t I punch another autonomous user in the face?”

What do you mean “can’t”? We’re not in a court room with armed guards ready to execute orders. Obviously you are capable of punching people in the face. If you do that then you are violating the other guy’s rights, and if you try to argue that you are not, you are *not* capable of doing that!

“Has Hoppe even offered a definition of the word “right”?”

I don’t know if he gives a concise one but I think it is clear if you actually read Economics and Ethics. Either way, I gave a definition of a “right”: something that is a necessary precondition of argumentation, something that is recognized as a consequence of engaging in argumentation. Call if whatever word you want, what cannot be denied is: such preconditions exist, no action could possibly undo the existence of such preconditions (i.e. no action can change the fact that argumentation presupposes certain things), and no sound argument can conclude those preconditions do not exist.

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RC May 28, 2011 at 7:24 pm

@Sweatervest,

“If everyone sits on everyone else (ignoring the impossibility of such an act) they’ll all starve to death and then there will be no argumentation.”

OK, then let’s try something less drastic. If someone puts a hand on my shoulders, I will still be able to argue. And I will be able to survive, especially if the person holding me will move along with me. This is true regardless of time.

“It means you, as an arguer, can never argue the justifiability of initiating aggression. That’s all it means. Just like you can’t fly by flapping your arms no matter how badly you want to, you also cannot consistently argue that rights do not exist because you admit they do by arguing at all.”

You need a right in order to argue? Do you need a right to drive a car in order to drive it? If so, then car theft would be impossible – since the thief has no right to use a car that is not his – yet it happens all the time.
Maybe I’m wrong, but that’s how I see it. And if I’m wrong, then how am I admitting that rights exist by arguing?

“Either way, I gave a definition of a “right”: something that is a necessary precondition of argumentation, something that is recognized as a consequence of engaging in argumentation. Call if whatever word you want, what cannot be denied is: such preconditions exist, no action could possibly undo the existence of such preconditions (i.e. no action can change the fact that argumentation presupposes certain things), and no sound argument can conclude those preconditions do not exist.”

Ah, now I think I understand you better. It is a fact, of course, that in order to engage in argumentation certain preconditions must exist: you must be alive, you must be capable of arguing etc. And in order to be alive, one has to be born, eat, drink, breathe etc. It is impossible to argue against this (or rather not impossible, but absurd).
However, the difference between us is that I do not consider such preconditions as rights. Take for example self-ownership. The way I understand self-ownership is that I have a right to control my body free of coercion. If someone punches me, that person becomes a criminal. But that does not mean that self-ownership is neccessary for me to use my body. So the question I asked: “what do rights do for the rightholder” is crucial. I don’t see any statism in this…

Regards,
RC

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Stephan Kinsella May 28, 2011 at 1:40 pm

Peter–between flights overseas right now so this will be quick.

Arguing does not require that you have a right to argue. Only arguing logically correctly requires that.

would you not agree that arguing does mean that the participants are engaged in a peaceful, rational discourse, where they are trying to persuade each other of some propositional truths by means of rational persuasion and the force of arguments alone, and that they are expressly not coercing each other? If I tell you that I will shoot you unless you agree with me, is this really an argument?

I think it’s obvious it has to be the former. And that means that each participant is assuming the validity–preferring–certain norms. Whatever these are–and it seems clear to me that they are related to ‘peace”, cooperation, respect for each others’ bodily autonomy–then it is inconsistent to propose a norm as valid that contradicts these necessarily presupposed norms.
“What if I’m lying in order to hide my preferences, or what if I’m advocating the violations of other people’s rights?”

I am not sure what lying has to do with it. If you have to admit on pain of contradiction that your proposed socialist ethic is incompatible with the norms you are necessarily adopting as an arguer, then you have to admit it, whether you internally don’t “believe” it or not. As for the latter–but if you grant that each participant in argument has to grant the other has rights, it is by virtue of having the nature, being the type of being that can participate in argumentation; it is generalizable not particularistic, so it obviosly applies to any rational human not just the two happening to argue.

“Arguing is merely a type of action, it can be in accordance or in a violation of rights. If I broke into Hoppe’s home in the middle of the night, woke him up and started telling him that I have a right to argue, he would probably object very strongly. You do not always have a right to argue. You only have a right to argue if you are not violating other rights. Which brings us back to the beginning.”

I don’t think Hoppe ever says there is a right to argue. His argument is that all norms are justifiable only in propositional exchange–discourse or argument. It is unthinkable that you could justify a norm without engaging in discourse. therefore IF there are any norms necssarily presupposed by arguers b/c of the nature of argumentation, this puts a limit on what norms could ever possibly be justified–the ones that are incompatible with argumentative norms could never be justified (argumentatively).

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Stephan Kinsella May 28, 2011 at 1:41 pm

Peter, “I think it’s wrong (I mean the argument, rather than the conclusion. I consider the conclusion a normative one and therefore outside of the scope of economics).”

I agree it’s not economics. It’s ethics. Are you saying that only economics is rational?

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nl May 28, 2011 at 1:52 pm

hmm. If cooperation is part of economics, and it is, I think, then ethics must be also.

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Stephan Kinsella May 28, 2011 at 2:45 pm

Well Mises said praxeology is the science of human action, of which economics was so far the best developed part. Economics is the study of the logic of human action. Not sure whether Hoppe’s ethical argument falls into economics but it does seem to be part of praxeology, or at least draws on it. see:

https://stephankinsella.com/2009/07/the-other-fields-of-praxeology-war-games-voting-and-ethics-and-extreme-praxeology/

http://blog.mises.org/6154/extreme-praxeology/

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sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 10:22 pm

But action can only be recognized and understood as such through the course of argumentation. But then argumentation can only be conceived of as a type of action.

That’s what Hoppe got into about how praxeology and the a priori of argumentation form sort of twin towers of epistemology, with no way to establish one as prior to the other. They are on equal footing. If I understand Mises and Hoppe correctly, they claim *everything* is praxeology, with which I agree. Even natural sciences can be put on a praxeological basis. So to point out that Hoppe’s arguments here are praxeological at their basis would not establish them as a part of economics.

The way I see it, ethics is prior to economics like math is prior to physics. It is necessary for ethics to establish what is meant by cooperation, property, wealth, and civilization before embarking on at least market economics. It is for this reason that economic progress changes qualitatively when rights begin or cease to be recognized. The economic calculation problem relies critically on the concept of private property, and property can only be defined using ethics.

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RC May 27, 2011 at 4:24 pm

“Arguing does not require that you have a right to argue. Only arguing logically correctly requires that.”

Not even that, actually. You do not need a right to argue in order to argue, just like you do not need a right to drive a car in order to drive it and you do not need a right to sing in order to sing. Rights do not give you capabilities.

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Kid Salami May 28, 2011 at 12:23 pm

I’m similarly bemused by the whole thing. I think the real issue is cooperation. That is, if two people are going to cooperate – as they must in any civilised society, even if just to agree that a nod towards the good you have in your hand and a node towards the one in mine means “do you want to swap” – then there must be some basis for this. And “reason” seems as good a starting point as any, rejecting force and trickery which both are, by definition, not cooperation.

If we don’t assume that we want cooperation, then there is nothing to derive anything from – anyone can just do anything and “rights” simply don’t exist.

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RC May 28, 2011 at 1:39 pm

Fully agree with you.
Besides that, I also do not understand why Hoppe assumes that engaging in argumentation automatically means that you want to solve a problem peacefully. What if you want to trick your adversary? Or what if you do not want to solve the problem but merely want to show the superiority of your arguments? Besides, isn’t it possible to argue while simultaneously dueling with swords? Saw that on film plenty of times.

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sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 5:51 pm

“I also do not understand why Hoppe assumes that engaging in argumentation automatically means that you want to solve a problem peacefully.”

You don’t!? Arguing literally means giving up on the initiation of aggression. By debating you and trying to convince you of something I am seeking an alternative to aggression.

What if you want to trick your adversary?”

Tricking is not arguing. Please do not confuse logic with rhetoric, which has become all too popular in these days of sophistry. If you are tricking someone you are either mistaken yourself or you are attempting to convince them of something you know is wrong, which means you cannot be supporting the case with reason but rather supporting it with logical fallacies that are famous for being bought by gullible people. Now consider how the only way to reveal that trickery is afoot is for someone to *logically* argue as such.

“Or what if you do not want to solve the problem but merely want to show the superiority of your arguments?”

How in the world can showing the superiority of an argument not be tantamount to solving the problem!? Argumentation is not some game detached from reality or actions. If the argument is superior then its conclusion is established and the problem of whether the conclusion is true or not is solved.

“Besides, isn’t it possible to argue while simultaneously dueling with swords?”

No!!

“Saw that on film plenty of times.”

Yelling at someone to burn in hell as you swipe at them with your axe while he utters the same is not an argument. An argument is not any opening of the mouth an utterance of words. If you are fighting someone to the death you are not having an argument with him. At most you are complementing your physical attacks with verbal attacks. As it seems the entire political left-wing will never understand, verbal attacks and arguments are *not* the same thing!!

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RC May 28, 2011 at 7:33 pm

This is a matter of semantics.

http://www.learnersdictionary.com/search/argumentation

“the act or process of giving reasons for or against something : the act or process of making and presenting arguments”

Notice that – at least in this definition – nothing is said about the purpose of argumentation.

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sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 9:38 pm

Hoppe makes it clear what he means by “argumentation” and does not rely on lexical definitions. When he says “argument” he means trying to convince someone of the truthfulness of something. In all those cases of aggression one is at most convincing someone to pretend to believe the truthfulness of something to save himself from harm.

Peter Surda May 29, 2011 at 4:50 am

Sweatervest,

thank you for your long replies, but I still have objections.

Arguing literally means giving up on the initiation of aggression.

It does not always mean that. It could just be an opportunistic measure. Or a lie, or a logically correct yet deceptively phrased claim.

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Peter Surda May 29, 2011 at 5:49 am

One more thing sweatervest,

whether one is genuinely arguing or merely phrasing sentences for utilitarian purposes is empirically indeterminable. Those two can only be distinguished after being interpreted within a specific ethical framework. So again we have the same problem of recursion.

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sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 5:31 pm

You are missing the point. In a world where everyone wants nothing more than to violate others, and everyone agrees cooperation would be torture, it remains that what is being wanted is a violation of rights. Rights are not something that can be agreed upon.

Ethics is not about agreement. It cannot be. Ethics is only relevant where there is a disagreement. If everyone can agree on what to do, then there is no conflict and no need to consider any concept of a “right”. A right becomes relevant when there is a disagreement over what people want to do, and some other means (i.e reason) may be used to make a decision.

Rights do not exist because people recognize them. They always exist because they are unavoidable preconditions of any discussion (that is what a right is). In a world where everyone constantly violates everyone else, one cannot say “rights do not exist”, one must say “rights exist, and they are constantly being violated”.

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sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 5:53 pm

In a world where no one understands math and adds 2 and 2 to get 5, it would remain true that 2 + 2 is 4. In this world sound mathematics exists, it’s just never used.

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Kid Salami May 28, 2011 at 8:15 pm

Were these directed at me? If so, might you be so kind as to rephrase them, as I find them to be buzzword-laden gibberish.

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sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 9:47 pm

Buzzwords!? I’d be delighted to see an example of what you think a buzzword is.

Anyways, I have a feeling you aren’t trying very hard to understand, but I will try to rephrase my statements anyways.

“If we don’t assume that we want cooperation, then there is nothing to derive anything from – anyone can just do anything and “rights” simply don’t exist.”

No, those rights are simply being violated. In a world where everyone believes or wants there to be no gravity there would still be gravity, it would just be that nobody acts in accordance with its existence. Similarly, in a world where no one wants cooperation rights do not disappear, it is simply that no one acts in accordance with their existence.

In such a world no argumentation would ever happen because arguments are cooperative and if no one wants cooperation they will fight instead. But this does not change the fact that recognition of rights is a precondition of argumentation. Argumentation never happens and its precondition, the recognition of rights, never happens either. This does not change the fact that if argumentation were to happen it would necessitate a recognition of rights. People can refrain from arguing, but if they choose to argue they literally give up on aggression by doing so. Thus arguing in favor of aggression is nonsense. One cannot undo by any action the fact that argumentation has necessary preconditions, even if one chooses not to argue.

Kid Salami May 29, 2011 at 5:30 am

“No, those rights are simply being violated. In a world where everyone believes or wants there to be no gravity there would still be gravity, it would just be that nobody acts in accordance with its existence. Similarly, in a world where no one wants cooperation rights do not disappear, it is simply that no one acts in accordance with their existence.”

I don’t understand what you’re trying to say. It is impossible that “nobody acts in accordance with its existence” in the case of gravity – you have no choice BUT to act in accordance with its existence.

Maybe you are saying “nobody acts in accordance with the fact that there exists a theory explaining why stuff doesn’t float off to space” even as they don’t in fact float off to space (which is not the same thing at all).

So, if you really do mean the first one, then I don’t know what you mean as it makes no sense.

If you mean the second, then what is the counterpart in your analogy with rights – that is, what is it that people have no choice but to obey/follow regardless of what they agree or admit to?

Kid Salami May 29, 2011 at 7:31 am

Hoppe in the Four Critical Replies Appendix says:

“First, the question of what is just or unjust (or what is valid or not)
only arises insofar as I am and others are capable of propositional
exchanges—of argumentation. The question does not arise for a
stone or fish because they are incapable of producing validity-claiming
propositions.”

Nor does it arise for humans who have no interest in cooperating with other humans. Saddam Hussein and his henchmen didn’t engage in much “argumentation” with the Kurds – by virtue of having bigger guns, Saddam just insisted they do what he wanted or he killed them. If he did argue with them one day to get them to do his as he wanted, because he really couldn’t be bothered having to go back to his car to get a new magazine and kill them, so what? What if you argue it is in someone’s interest to do as you say or they’ll end up dead? I really don’t say how we can get anywhere until two people have agreed on something.

“Yet if this is so—and one cannot deny that it is without
contradicting oneself, for one cannot argue the case that one cannot
argue—then any ethical proposal, or indeed any proposition,
must be assumed to claim it can be validated by propositional or
argumentative means.”

Where did the word “ethical” spring from here? All does is transfer my questions on the previous paragraph to another basically equivalent problem – what is an “ethical” proposal and how does it differ from a non-ethical one?

“There is then no way of justifying anything unless it is a justification by means of propositional exchanges and arguments.”

True, but here we presume that people are interested in “justifying” things. But this only makes sense when there is cooperation and Saddam wants to “justify” his actions to the Kurds because he wants something back. if he wants nothing from them, justification serves no purpose.

sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 5:42 pm

“You do not need a right to argue in order to argue”

You seem to be using the word “right” vacuously. You do need a right to argue in order to argue, and not only that you must recognize that same right in everyone else. If someone violates this right and puts tape over your mouth I’d love to know how you would continue to argue.

Furthermore, if you don’t recognize the rights of who you are arguing with, then you are not arguing but simply explaining. Arguing means acknowledging the other participants’ right to counter your argument.

“Rights do not give you capabilities.”

Who said they do!?

Seriously though, it is fairly obvious that Hoppe is not trying to convince us that people are not capable of violating the rights of others. If that were true there would be no reason to discuss rights at all. His point is that you cannot deny that certain things are rights and that certain actions are violations of rights. Whether or not such an act is good, desirable or possible is irrelevant.

This entire post is a straw man, and a rather poor one at that. I can only guess that the concept of a right to you is just a different way of saying someone gives permission.

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nl May 28, 2011 at 6:04 pm

“You seem to be using the word “right” vacuously.”

hehe
The term “right” or “law” is vacuous at all.

You may only discuss about the environment that makes claims practicable, negotiable, and enforceable.

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RC May 28, 2011 at 7:41 pm

Sweatervest,

You admit that rights do not give you capabilities. Yet earlier you wrote that you need a right to argue in order to argue. In order to argue, I have to be capable of arguing. Since a right to argue does not give me a capability to argue, therefore I do not need that right in order to argue. Please explain where I’m wrong…

Regards,
RC

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sweatervest May 28, 2011 at 10:07 pm

Well I’m not sure what a “right to argue” would mean anyways, and Hoppe never spoke of such a thing. People have rights to property, not to actions.

The right to your body does not “give” you the capability to argue, it is a precondition of that capability. If the right is no longer recognized then your capabilities change, and you can no longer argue.

Perhaps you are committing a fallacy of on composition. That there exists one capability that rests on recognition of certain things (rights), an example being the capability to argue, does not imply that all capabilities require rights. You do not need to recognize any behavioral norms as preconditions to driving a car, especially considering that such an action involves only you. But you must recognize behavioral norms as preconditions to having an argument. Since the only way to justify anything is with an argument it must be impossible to justify not recognizing those preconditions (you would be attempting to justify an action you are implicitly admitting, by arguing at all, is unjustifiable).

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RC May 28, 2011 at 10:27 pm

Sweatervest,

But you are missing the point – rights are not preconditions! At least not in the sense that people use the word “right”. You need to be alive in order to engage in argumentation – but you do not need a right to live to do it.

But never mind – can you simply explain this part?

“The right to your body does not “give” you the capability to argue, it is a precondition of that capability. If the right is no longer recognized then your capabilities change, and you can no longer argue.”

And could you explain what does “right to your body” mean?

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Thinker May 29, 2011 at 12:36 am

Hoppe does not say that you need the right to argue in order to argue. Rather, you must recognize argumentation as ethically permissible in order to argue. If you were to claim in argument “It is immoral to argue”, you would be trapped in a performative contradiction: by the act of engaging in argument, you affirm that one ought to argue. Thus, to attempt to argue “It is immoral to argue” is to claim “One ought do that which one ought not do”, a contradiction. This means that anything required for argument in general (note: not any particular argument), must be ethically permissible. To answer your question about what it means to have a “right to [use] your body”, this merely means that the use of your body is ethically permissible. According to Hoppe (and others), only you possess this right. If you wish to go into the meaning of ethics in general, that is another matter.

RC May 29, 2011 at 10:26 am

Thinker,

Thanks for the clear explanation, you seem to understand Hoppe very well. Anyway, now his argument makes sense, the way you explained it.
What I do not understand, however, is how Hoppe – through his argumentation ethics – establishes a whole system of (libertarian) ethics.
I can, for example, claim argumentation is moral – no performative contradiction here. However, I can also claim that engaging in Holocaust denial is immoral – and since I have done no such thing myself, I am not trapped in a performative contradiction.
Similarly, I can claim that the use of my body is ethically permissible, but not in every situation, for example not in a lifeboat situation. Therefore, I may claim that full self-ownership – in every moment, every situation and for everyone – is not ethical. At least that’s the way I understand it.
Thanks again for the very good explanation.

Kid Salami May 29, 2011 at 3:50 pm

“This means that anything required for argument in general (note: not any particular argument), must be ethically permissible.”

I hadn’t thought of it like that. So could you summarise it by saying that: you can’t commit a rights violation by attempting to persuade someone by arguing?

Thinker May 29, 2011 at 8:31 pm

Thanks, RC.
The way Hoppe considers argument is to abstract away from the particularities of any given argument, so that the ethical rules he discovers are implicitly accepted in every argument. He establishes absolute self-ownership using two characteristics of argument: the need for communication and the possibility of agreement. For the first, that the arguers are separate people, they have to employ their physical bodies in order to communicate with each other. Thus, an arguer implicitly recognizes that it is ethically permissible for him to use his own body. Similarly, he must recognize that his opponent has the right to use his body–if he does not, then he is not arguing, but soliloquizing. Self-ownership is absolute (1) because there is no non-arbitrary reason to restrict it and (2) because restrictions on self-ownership conflict with the possibility of agreement. In any argument, there always exists the possibility of agreement among the arguers–at the very least, they can agree that they disagree. However, if one arguer has the right to make use of his opponent’s body, then he may end the argument without agreement between the arguers. If this is the case, then we don’t have an argument, we have a…well, I’m not entirely sure what this situation would be called, but it wouldn’t be an argument.
Hoppe’s arguments for property rights in other physical objects are a good deal more complex, so there’s no good way to summarize them. Kinsella’s presentation is good and correct.
If you can argue something without permformative contradiction, all this means is that it is not an objective (or, more precisely, necessary intersubjective) ethical rule. We can decide whether or not to follow such rules after debating their merits in argument–or not, if no one wants to argue about them.
Hope this clarifies things.

Thinker May 29, 2011 at 8:53 pm

Kid Salami–”So could you summarise it by saying that: you can’t commit a rights violation by attempting to persuade someone by arguing?”

Yes, but the phrasing is potentially misleading. If an arguer punches his counterpart, then he has violated the other person’s rights, but that is because he punched someone, which is a separate action from engaging in argument. So if we were to rephrase it again as “we are arguing, therefore we are not violating anyone’s rights”, this second rephrasing would be incorrect. I noticed your post only after writing my response to RC, but there’s further clarification in that post.

RC May 29, 2011 at 10:23 pm

Thinker,

Due to a lack of time, I cannot offer a full reply now. But I shall certainly want to do it within several days, (since now I’m beginning to grasp Hoppe’s argument and you seem very competent in explaining it), so, if you are willing, check this thread by Thursday to see my reply.

Regards,
RC

Thinker May 29, 2011 at 10:35 pm

Sure thing. Glad to be of help.

RC June 2, 2011 at 8:56 am

Thinker,

Hope you’ll see this. But before I make my observations, I would like to point out that Aiden Gregg made an interesting comment (in this thread) regarding argumentation ethics. Also, you may want to read these posts by Brainpolice:
http://polycentricorder.blogspot.com/2009/08/on-performative-contradiction.html
http://anti-libertarian-libertarianism.blogspot.com/2010/12/rationalist-libertarian-ethics.html

Now, I will try to be brief… You wrote:

“The way Hoppe considers argument is to abstract away from the particularities of any given argument, so that the ethical rules he discovers are implicitly accepted in every argument. He establishes absolute self-ownership using two characteristics of argument: the need for communication and the possibility of agreement. For the first, that the arguers are separate people, they have to employ their physical bodies in order to communicate with each other. Thus, an arguer implicitly recognizes that it is ethically permissible for him to use his own body. Similarly, he must recognize that his opponent has the right to use his body–if he does not, then he is not arguing, but soliloquizing. ”

OK. It is undoubtedly true that one has to use his/her body in order to argue. So if someone says: “I do not have a right to use my body” that person is in contradiction with his actions. But two things:
1. Does not self-ownership mean something more than “it is ethically permissible for me to use my body”? Rothbard, for instance, defined self-ownership as “the right to control one’s body, free of coercion” – in other words: it is ethically permissible for me to control my body and it is not permissible for others to coerce on my body. Yet freedom from coercion is not neccesary for me to act. For example, I can say that it is ethically permissible for me to use my body, but it is ethically permissible for others to do so as well. And I am not in performative contradiction, the way I see it.
2. Even if someone contradicts his/her actions, is that only a proof that he/she is a hypocrite? What I mean by this is: does proving that someone is a hypocrite automatically invalidate the norm he/she is proposing?

“Self-ownership is absolute (1) because there is no non-arbitrary reason to restrict it and (2) because restrictions on self-ownership conflict with the possibility of agreement. In any argument, there always exists the possibility of agreement among the arguers–at the very least, they can agree that they disagree. However, if one arguer has the right to make use of his opponent’s body, then he may end the argument without agreement between the arguers. If this is the case, then we don’t have an argument, we have a…well, I’m not entirely sure what this situation would be called, but it wouldn’t be an argument.”

Yes, but the question is: if one enters into an argument, does that neccesary mean that he/she is seeking an agreement? For instance, I may see that my opponent is strong, so a voilent confrontation may turn out risky for me – so I turn to argumentation. Yet, I enter the argumentation not to establish the truth (or establish who has the higher moral ground) but to try to convince my opponent to accept my position. However, by no means I am willing to give up my position – if I see that the argument is going wrong, I may end the argumentation as it is giving me nothing. So I think that argumentation does not neccesarily mean that the parties involved in it are seeking a peaceful agreement.
Second problem: you wrote that there is “no non-arbitrary reason to restrict self-ownership”. That may well be true. However, we are returning to the problem of performative contradiction. If I say: “it is ethically permissible to use my body, but only in some situations” then I am not in contradiction. For example, I can say: “it is not ethically permissible for me to refuse to help someone in need”. Simply because I engage in argumentation does not mean, IMO, that my norm is invalidated, for my actions are not in contradiction with my words.

And now the final thing. You wrote:

“Hoppe’s arguments for property rights in other physical objects are a good deal more complex, so there’s no good way to summarize them. Kinsella’s presentation is good and correct.”

Even if argumentation ethics does establish full self-ownership, does it establish property rights in all external physical objects as well? It is true that man must eat and drink in order to survive (and engage in argumentation), but does that mean that the food he/she has eaten is property? Is not mere possession of external objects enough?

But maybe the last part is unneccesary, as the external objects problem is another matter… just offered a quick impression.

Regards,
RC

Thinker June 2, 2011 at 5:45 pm

RC,

1. That something is ethically permissible implies that prohibiting it is ethically impermissible, so Rothbard’s definition is the same as the Hoppe’s. I prefer “ethically permissible” to “right” because it’s more precise, and I’m sure dedicated hairsplitters can find distinctions, but for these purposes they’re the same and I’ll be using them interchangeably below. They key point I wanted to emphasize before was not that the right exists in a metaphysical sense, but that we must recognize it in order to engage in argumentation. In a similar way, I cannot know if I have free will, but must assume that I do in order to act, which I cannot not do. That self-ownership is exclusive depends on the possibility of agreement, which I hope I clear up below.
2. We actually can know more than that the maker of a performative contradiction is a hypocrite. Since the assumptions required for argumentation are prerequisites for any claim to be made, any claim that contradicts these assumptions must be false.

All your questions seem to require an answer to the question, “Why do/must we argue?” I’m not sure if Hoppe explains this in his English writings, but this is at the foundation of discourse ethics in general, not just Hoppe’s interpretation. I don’t actually know how Habermas justified the discourse approach–this is just what I’ve put together:If there is only one consciousness in the world (say, you), then all truths are subjective. However, if there are multiple consciousnesses (say, you and me), then new possible types of truths arise. Before (with just you), if you see pink, fluffy unicorns dancing on rainbows, that is the same as if there actually are such creatures; now (with both of us), whether we both see them, only one of us does, or neither of us does, has significance. We now have the possibility of intersubjective truths of two varieties: necessary and contingent. Necessary intersubjective truths are things like: space has three dimensions; events are ordered in time; man acts. Contingent intersubjective truths are things like: the sky is blue; trees grow upward; pink, fluffy unicorns are dancing on rainbows. Intersubjective is technically a more appropriate term than objective, since we are dealing strictly with objects within the realm of human experience. If we want to discover contingent intersubjective truths, we have to interact with other consciousnesses. We can discover necessary inersubjective truths (at least, some of them) through individual thought experiments. Thus, if we want to escape from solipsism and discover intersubjective truths about the world in which we live and act, we must engage in discourse–or argumentation–to compare our individual, subjective truths. And when we engage in discourse, we necessarily assume various ethical rules.

In argumentation, there is always the possibility of agreement on some intersubjective truth–at the very least that there exists disagreement on some issue. If anyone else may use your body, then they can end the argument without agreement. Thus, argumentation requires exclusive self-ownership.If you use discourse to try to convince someone that they should give you something, that is quite within the bounds of the discourse we’re dealing with. You are arguing with someone about the truth-value of the statement “I deserve such-and-such.” If you fail to convince your counterpart, then you have established that the statement is strictly subjectively true rather than intersubjectively true.

With respect to your other objection, you must accept self-ownership at the time and place of argument. So you can claim, for example, that you will not have the right to use your body in five minutes or on another planet, but in five minutes or when you are on that other planet, you will have to recant on that earlier claim. The assumptions of argumentation always apply because the need to identify intersubjective truth is always present.

I feel the need to reemphasize that this is just what I’ve come up with on my own–I’m satisfied that it is correct, but I haven’t consulted with anyone else to get any kind of constructive criticism (and I do realize the irony of not having engaged in discourse concerning my ideas on discourse ethics). If you can provide some, I would be very grateful.

On your final point, it’s not that, for example, the food someone eats is their property–it’s quite possible that they stole it from someone else. Rather, they must be permitted to appropriate previously unowned food so that they can eat it later. I suppose if you were to scrape some berries off a bush with your teeth and started chewing immediately, the line between appropriation and eating becomes blurred, but appropriation comes first.

Hope this clears some things up.

RC June 2, 2011 at 7:11 pm

Thinker,

Thanks for replying, your explanation of “why we argue” is excellent. Of course, argumentation is neccesary in order to establish the truth (intersubjective agreement). I was merely pointing out that the conventional understanding of argumentation is “the act to give reasons for or against something” which does not neccesarily mean an attempt to establish truth. But I’m sticking with the understanding of argumentation that you have given, from now on. Now moving on…”In argumentation, there is always the possibility of agreement on some intersubjective truth–at the very least that there exists disagreement on some issue. If anyone else may use your body, then they can end the argument without agreement. Thus, argumentation requires exclusive self-ownership.”Yes, but like you wrote – they can. Can does not mean must. I generally do not think it is morally permissible to use others people’s bodies (with the exception of lifeboat scenarios and maybe some other extreme cases), but let’s say for instance that I enter into some BDSM relationship and agree to be a slave, with a provision that makes it permanent (don’t laugh, I’m trying to make a point here:p). Does that mean I cannot enter into an argumentation with my mistress? The way I see it, she may use my body at any time, and so end the argument without agreement. However, she may choose not to exercise that power; we may very well end our argument (on whatever subject that may be) in agreement. So it appears that while full self-ownership GUARANTEES that the argument will end in some sort of agreement, it is not neccesary for such an agreement to happen, IMO.”With respect to your other objection, you must accept self-ownership at the time and place of argument. So you can claim, for example, that you will not have the right to use your body in five minutes or on another planet, but in five minutes or when you are on that other planet, you will have to recant on that earlier claim. The assumptions of argumentation always apply because the need to identify intersubjective truth is always present.”Yes, but I mentioned a specific situation. If I have full self-ownership rights, then it is morally permissible for me, for example, not to help people tied to railroad tracks (the famous trolley problem). Since I did not coerce them in any way (someone else did the tying), I will not be responsible for their death if I do not help. So no one could throw me in jail. Yet I find something morally very wrong in this…
That’s why I gave the example of “it is not ethically permissible for me to not help someone in need”. If so, then I do not have full self-ownership. Yet I can still enter into an argument, because I did not deny that it is morally permissible to use my body, but just stated that “it is morally impermissible to use my body in situation X”. And my adversary cannot end the argument by making use of my body, since in this case I am using it in a ethically permissible way.”I feel the need to reemphasize that this is just what I’ve come up with on my own–I’m satisfied that it is correct, but I haven’t consulted with anyone else to get any kind of constructive criticism (and I do realize the irony of not having engaged in discourse concerning my ideas on discourse ethics). If you can provide some, I would be very grateful.”Do you mean criticism of Hoppe’s argument? If so, I recommend to you the criticism that Calahan and Murphy made, the brief comment by Roderick Long (it’s titled “Hoppriori”) and D. Friedman and a criticism that Eabrasu made in 2005 (I think now he somehow changed his position, although he probably still does not accept Hoppe’s argument). Also, did you read those that I have linked you? Here, btw, are the links:
http://praxeology.net/unblog05-04.htm#10
http://brunoleonimedia.servingfreedom.net/WP/051007_Mises_WP_Eabrasu.pdf
http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/On_Hoppe.html“On your final point, it’s not that, for example, the food someone eats is their property–it’s quite possible that they stole it from someone else. Rather, they must be permitted to appropriate previously unowned food so that they can eat it later. I suppose if you were to scrape some berries off a bush with your teeth and started chewing immediately, the line between appropriation and eating becomes blurred, but appropriation comes first.”Yes, it is true that they must be ethically permitted to appropriate previously unowned food in order to survive. But isn’t that mere possession rather than ownership? If I pluck an apple and put it in my mouth, I have certainly appropriated it – but again, it seems to me I do not need to establish ownership of it to eat it. In other words, “it is morally permissible for me to appropriate unowned objects, but it is not morally permissible for me to use force against those, that will try to take it from me” does not seem to be a contradiction. If someone takes my apple, I will not die – I will get another one (only this time I will eat it as soon as I can).Regards,
RC

RC June 2, 2011 at 7:18 pm

Thinker,

Sorry that the post turned up ugly – I was editing it and I did not finish, shucks. But I hope you will not have problems understanding it.

Thinker June 2, 2011 at 9:13 pm

RC,

No trouble.

The issue with the possibility of agreement is that in argument agreement is always possible, whereas if self-ownership is not exclusive, agreement is only possible under certain circumstances. (The case for exclusive self-ownership is a good deal more solid if we utilize the universalizability criterion, which I haven’t used because I don’t know Kant’s precise argument for it.)

As far as I know, Hoppe’s contract theory is identical to Rothbard’s. You and your mistress could live together happily and share as much pain as you wished, with the caveat that as soon as you (I assume you are the Submissive in this relationship) decide that you no longer desire to be subject to your mistress’s harsh whims, you are released from that contract. Self-ownership doesn’t prohibit you from allowing people to use violence against you. It merely means that you are the ultimate authority on how your body is used, reviewing any decisions you permit others to make in this regard.

In the trolley problem scenario, you may help or not help the victims according to your own conscience; self-ownership is no less applicable in that case than in any other because if you were to claim at that moment that you may be compelled to save the lives of the people tied down, you would be trapped in a performative contradiction. Generally, when not in situation X, you can make all manner of claims about what is permissible in situation X, but once situation X arises, the same ethical rules as ever apply.

As I mentioned above, Hoppe’s argument for private property in things other than arguers’ bodies does not follow directly from argumentation. The two are not unrelated, but the only thing we get from argumentation is that we must be permitted to appropriate resources. The details come from separate arguments.

I was concerned with my own arguments primarily–I’ve never presented them before, so I was a bit concerned about their quality. I haven’t looked at the links you’ve posted just yet, but I’ll be getting to them momentarily.

RC June 2, 2011 at 11:15 pm

Thinker,

I will just like to touch one matter before we end our discussion.

You wrote:

“In the trolley problem scenario, you may help or not help the victims according to your own conscience; self-ownership is no less applicable in that case than in any other because if you were to claim at that moment that you may be compelled to save the lives of the people tied down, you would be trapped in a performative contradiction. Generally, when not in situation X, you can make all manner of claims about what is permissible in situation X, but once situation X arises, the same ethical rules as ever apply.”

This I do not understand. If I claim that “it is ethically impermissible for me not to help someone in need” and that moment one day arrives – I would be in performative contradiction only if I did not help. If I help, there is no performative contradiction. Notice that “it is ethically impermissible…” does not mean that it is ethically impermissible for me to act, just ethically impermissible for me not to act in a certain way (i.e. not helping that person in need). While untying the unfortunate people I can talk, sing, I can do whatever as long as I am helping them.

Regards,
RC

Thinker June 3, 2011 at 2:03 am

RC,

If you claim that “it is ethically impermissible for me not to help someone in need”, but there is not currently occasion for this rule to be put into effect, then there is no performative contradiction. However, if the day arrives when this rule my be applied, and you were to make that claim again (which you must for it to be put into practice), then you would be trapped in a performative contradiction. (Remember, if someone may legitimately coerce you into doing something, even with a stated purpose, they are the judge of that purpose, and if they believe that you must not argue as part of your obligatory help, you may not dispute that judgment.)

Thanks for taking the time for this discussion–it’s been the most enjoyable one I’ve had in a long time. Good night.

RC June 3, 2011 at 9:54 am

Thinker,

I also thank you for our discussion, it’s been a great pleasure.

Although I cannot agree with you on the last part. I think it is overstreching to claim that when situation X arrives, I must make my claim again (what if there is no one next to me?) and that others can interpret the purpose anyway they like (since “I must help” does not mean “I must help while simultaneously doing or not doing Y”). But I’ll leave it at that.

Thank you very much once again.

Regards,
RC

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vcif May 29, 2011 at 9:43 am

@RC

I read through this thread. You seem to be falling into the same logical trap repeatedly.

For instance, your example of the right to drive is a reiteration of the same general misconception as the person sitting on another, the right to live, etc . It simply does not follow that a right doesn’t exist because someone violates it. Nor does it follow that doing something (living in your example) means you don’t “need” or have(!) a right to do it. Besides that, if I understand correctly , Hoppe’s goal is to prove the existence of rights through argumentation ethics, not the other way around.

See, “If [you need a right to drive a car in order to drive a [your?] car], then car theft would be impossible – since the thief [by definition a violator of right] has no right to use a car that is not his – yet it happens all the time.”

So, your argument is that since thieves exist, then I have no property right in my car. Your corollary to this is that I do live, therefore I don’t “need” [have?!] a right to live. These are both non-sequitors of the same category.

You need to take a step back to the begininning of what Hoppe is saying. Does truth exist? Is there right and wrong or is it all just convention? Can we deduce through reason?

Hoppe starts with humans make arguments. To dispute this is proof of its axiomatic truth. Attempts to allow some argumentation while restricting someone’s free movement, to use force to modify someone’s “argument”, or to otherwise obstruct the process of argumentation doesn’t negate the argument. This is the same logical trap you fall into above.

In addition, your breaking and entering example not only falls into this same logical trap, but also puts the cart before the horse. You are trying to negate his argument that humans argue by going n +1 steps ahead, “disproving” his property right in his house by violating it, and then concluding that you also don’t have a right to argue because he booted you from his living room.

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RC May 29, 2011 at 10:08 am

“So, your argument is that since thieves exist, then I have no property right in my car. Your corollary to this is that I do live, therefore I don’t “need” [have?!] a right to live. These are both non-sequitors of the same category.”

No, no, no.

To make it short, since I have little time: I never stated that “since thieves exist, then I have no property right in my car”. I merely pointed out that the thief does not need property rights in a car in order to use it (i.e. steal it).
Same thing with life: the fact that you are living (like the fact that you are driving a car) does not mean you have a right to live (or a right to drive a car, like in the thief example). Nor is it neccessary (for me to live).
Hoppe seems to argue that because certain preconditions need to exist in order to argue, these preconditions somehow become rights. How – I don’t have the slightest idea.

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nl May 29, 2011 at 10:26 am

Again:
The term “right” or “law” is vacuous.
You may only discuss about the environment that makes claims practicable, negotiable, and enforceable.
Some ways are indeed normative not practicable, negotiable, and enforceable, and that can be explained by a priori logic, and to this regard by the hindrance of the performative estoppel principle.

vcif May 30, 2011 at 11:02 am

@RC

They don’t become rights, they are rights that are elucidated through argumentation ethics.
Now if I understand correctly…
Hoppe says humans make arguments. You have two choices:
1)agree
2)disagree

If you disagree, then you are making an argument which proves his point.

So, humans argue. In order to make an argument you must be a self-owner. Otherwise you are a sock puppet and not making an argument.Someone holding a gun to someone’s head does not negate the requirement that arguments are made by self-owners. The problem you seem to have with this is: How can there be a requirement of self-ownership when it can be taken away by force and that person is still capable of making an argument? 1)They are not making an argument 2)forcible enslavement does not negate the concept of self-ownership.

If we have exclusive use to our bodies (self-ownership), then the concept of ownership exists. I.e humans can own. In other words, humans do have property rights. That which humans have property rights in is a different question.

If humans can own, then is there a conflict-free way to gain ownership. In other words, is there an internally consistent way to acquire ownership. Yes, through original appropriation or through voluntary mutual exchange.

There is no leap of faith here. Once you know x must be true, then any condition that must exist in order to make x true, must be true as well.

nl May 30, 2011 at 12:00 pm

> If humans can own, then is there a conflict-free way to gain ownership.
That is tautological.

> In other words, is there an internally consistent way to acquire ownership. Yes, through original appropriation or through voluntary mutual exchange.

Maybe, if we accept that. But what is original appropriation? Why may nobody save a rain forest in your world, and why may everyone pump as much ground water as he can?

Charlie May 27, 2011 at 6:28 pm

“For millions of years, mankind lived just like the animals. Then something happened which unleashed the power of our imagination. We learned to talk and we learned to listen. Speech has allowed the communication of ideas, enabling human beings to work together to build the impossible. Mankind’s greatest achievements have come about by talking, and its greatest failures by not talking. It doesn’t have to be like this. Our greatest hopes could become reality in the future. With the technology at our disposal, the possibilities are unbounded. All we need to do is make sure we keep talking.”

– Stephen Hawking

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feudalredux May 28, 2011 at 11:54 am

boom boom, bang bang, lie down you’re dead

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Stephan Kinsella May 28, 2011 at 1:44 pm

I was just made aware of this article by Michaël Bauwens, Rights, Robinson Crusoe, and Friday (Independent Institute, October 13, 2008), that contains an argument similar in some respects to Van Dun’s earlier discourse ethics work linked in the main article.

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nl May 28, 2011 at 1:46 pm

Some interesting comments because they correspondent to my own deliberations.

Frank van Dun’s description of natural law takes account to the term of respect to persons. This seems to be important. The respect to a person is an a priori condition to argue with a person, so that the discourse may get normative relevance. But the concept of ‘respect’ goes wider than that of ‘arguing’. Why? Because you signify your commitment by respect to other persons, or by respect to actions of other persons that then must include also the respect to an other person. (For example, a theft must have respect to actions of an other person; otherwise he wouldn’t try to own his booty.) Arguing is only one method for such commitments.

But Kinsella states: “Hoppe’s solution is to focus on the nature of argumentation instead of action in general”.

That seems curious to me!

The nature of argumentation is a useful concept (the prepositions of property as well) but it can’t substitute the Misean science of action in terms of action. Men act. Ethics must be understand as a cooperative mean to act. A issue that Mises himself hadn’t paid attention to it. Rothbard’s problem was his lack of apriorities. He used Lockean property as a makeshift.

Lockean property (i.e. the “labor theory of property”) does mean that you may take any form of a free good, and use it in your own terms of production or consumption. But what does that mean to other actors with other comprehensions of a proper production or consumption? For example, one actor calls his act “the acquisition of a free good”. An other actor calls it “a natural resource which we have to save in its natural state for a while”, and he leaves it in this way. In the Lockean paradigm it is impossible to save protected areas or natural resources like ground water without “labor” because of the naive term of the Lockean slogan of “first- and latecomers”. And there are many other serious problems with the subjective Lockean property concept. (For example, you must claim its worldwide validity by violence, i.e. you need a state!). But Hoppe doesn’t really rid oneself of it. He continues suddenly at a point where Rothbard has been already gotten on the wrong track.

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Devin May 28, 2011 at 4:03 pm

As for Natural Law, I would suggest people read John Wild’s book, “Plato’s Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law”, which Rothbard referenced in “The Ethics of Liberty”, in order to understand the basis of Natural Law as Rothbard understood it. It can provide an ontological backing for those things which Hoppe argues that people must presuppose when they argue. I would suggest skipping ahead to the section on Natural Law and also skip the section on the history of Natural Law on the first read. As for Argumentation Ethics, I find that it suffers, on a metaphysical level, the same problem as Mises’s ethic as Rothbard discusses it in charpter 26 part c of “The Ethics of Liberty”; that is it relies on people being agreeable to the tenets of reason and equality. You could have a society of unruly people or groups who see themselves as superior. Given that people accept the premises, I do not see them as sufficient as Natural Law. There will arise conflicts which Natural Law could solve but not Argumentation Ethics. For example, can an infant be killed? Natural Law would say no due to its conception of being which is one having essential traits and categories of action. People exist in a continual state of flux where they must perform certain actions to live, grow, and prosper. It is fundamentally the same as the Austrian concept of utility with the addition of personal necessity. Those actions arise from individual traits and are recognized apart from hedonistic desires through reason. An infant is actively developing the faculties of language and reason through babbling, observation, and listening to its parents. The infant is actively developing the faculties it needs to argue for its own self ownership, and so it must be recognized due to those active tendencies, which show that the infant has in essence self-determination, that an infant has self ownership. Argumentation ethics, as far as I’m aware, does not have a conception of the individual. If it takes the individual as being static, then the infant has not sufficiently developed its cognitive and reasoning skills to argue for its own self ownership and so it would not be a crime to kill it. I think Argumentation Ethics can compliment Rothbard’s work but not replace it.

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Stephan Kinsella May 28, 2011 at 4:24 pm

“It can provide an ontological backing for those things which Hoppe argues that people must presuppose when they argue.”

What’s the difference between an “ontological backing” and a “backing”? What does “ontological” add to this sentence?

Also I think you mean complement not compliment.

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Devin May 28, 2011 at 8:06 pm

I suppose I was a little unclear. Hoppe shows that there are certain presumptions people make about human nature, self ownership and such, when arguing. Argument can serve as an affirmation of self-ownership in any particular case. However, the scope is only those individuals who are engaged or could engage in argument. Is, the ability to argue, the standard for self ownership, if so why, and if not then what is and why? Ontology, the study of being, would answer the question of ‘who does self-ownership apply to?’. In taking a static or dynamic conception of the individual, in some circumstances you would arrive at different conclusions, and I believe the example I gave about the legality of infanticide to be an example of such a circumstance. The dynamic conception of being, that Wild puts forth, would apply self-ownership to all of the individuals that the static conception applies to, which would be those individual who could actively argue, but the dynamic conception would also apply to those individuals who are learning how to argue or demonstrate self-ownership. I suppose that I am getting more at the question you posed at the end of your article, “How We Come to Own Ourselves”, which was, “when and exactly how does a child homestead himself?”. From that article, it seems that Hoppe could be split on the issue, on the side of the dynamic view there is the section from his 1989 treatise and on the side of the static view there is his German publication from 1985. From the example you give that drowning someone is homicide and likewise so is not caring for an infant to whom you are a parent, you seem to take the dynamic view. I assume that a trusteeship does not give the parents full ownership of the infant, in your view. Granted there may be other views about being, but those were the two that Wild discussed and that I am aware of.

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Stephan Kinsella May 29, 2011 at 6:00 am

By the way, for those who are encountering this for the first time in this (explicitly concise) article, or who have not read a lot of Hoppe’s actual writing on this, if you have doubts about the theory, I would recommend that you read at least the following (all of which are linked at the end of the piece):

1. “Appendix: Four Critical Replies,” by Hoppe
2. “From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism,” by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
3. “Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan,” by Stephan Kinsella

Especially #1 above may answer some of your concerns or questions.

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Aiden Gregg May 29, 2011 at 7:13 am

I am still trying to get my head around Hoppe’s arguments.

I think I am clear that, if one endorses the value of rational argumentation between individuals, and one attempts to persuade another individual by rational argument, then one implicitly subscribes to a minimalist version of the private property ethic.

This is because, in so doing, one treats one’s interlocutor, not a pawn who should do one’s bidding, or a subject to be rhetorically manipulated, but as a fully-fledged person. To argue rationally with someone is necessarily to treat them with dignity, to defer to them, to recognize the boundaries of their personhood, to refrain from infringing upon their basic mental and physical core.

Doing so may imply the endorsement of the private property ethic with some degree of generality. For example, if show you enough respect to argue with you, I may do so because I think it would be a good idea for me to be shown the same respect, or for people to show each other the same respect generally.

However, how general should the inference be? Could one not endorse a private property ethic when it comes to argumentation, but reject it under some other circumstances? Can’t I consistently respect the sancity of your self in some ways but not in others? Can’t I say this, for example? “By all means you should be fully free to argue with me. But you shouldn’t be free to hold on to 100% of your non-bodily property.

Here’s a concrete example. All else equal, suppose, on a desert island, Crusoe is filthy rich and living it up, but Friday is dirt poor and starving miserably. (Yes, I know, this is a contrived example. But accept it for now as an ideal approximation to illustrate a point.) Crusoe could help Friday. Most people would agree it would be good thing if Crusoe helped Friday. But Crusoe, heartless and selfish as he is, opts not to. The non-aggression principle says he shouldn’t be compelled to help Friday, that his private property should not be seized by a third-party for Friday’s benefit.

Now, explain how argumentation ethics shows that it would be wrong to forcibly transfer a little wealth from callous Crusoe to frugal Friday.

(Again, we are implausibly assuming that there is no other way Friday could be helped, etc. The point of the example is to interrogate the principle, not to represent how things would work in reality. Libertarianism can be defended pragmatically on utilitarian grounds when realistic factors are considered. But that is not the defense that Hoppe mounts.)

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feudalredux May 29, 2011 at 5:03 pm

“Now, explain how argumentation ethics shows that it would be wrong to forcibly transfer a little wealth from callous Crusoe to frugal Friday.”

That’s easy. Argumentation ethics are the ethical principles for people who care about “minimizing conflicts” in their interactions. These crazy people pretty much define “argument” to preclude the use of violent actions. For these people, transferring wealth forcibly would be inconsistent with their ethic for minimizing conflicts, and would be wrong.

Now, for psychopathic people who revel in violence and cruelty, their ethics clearly will differ, esp. consider what happens if your notion of a good argument is somewhat Neanderthal in nature and involves a good clubbing around the ears. In this latter case, transferring wealth forcibly would be entirely consistent with the barbarous nature of such uncivilized brutes, and it would not be wrong at all!

The choice we all need to make is what our ultimate values are. Hopefully we’ll make some civilized choices in the 21st century ?

P.S Not sure if Hoppe has any ideas on the “apodictically certain” harm in involuntary actions. Maybe Kinsella will respond. Who knows?

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Aiden Gregg May 30, 2011 at 6:15 am

No, no. You miss the point.

Suppose I am a beneficient overlord (of the sort that never manages to exist) and I care about Friday. I want to transfer wealth forcibly from Crusoe to Friday. I am not a heartless, selfish psychopath, like Crusoe is. It is precisely because I am not that I want to effect the transfer.

According to argumentation ethics, however, the transfer cannot be ethical because it violates property rights, and because an ethics that violates property rights is impossible, because one presupposes property rights in arguing at all.

My question is how for the presupposition of property rights goes. One necessarily presupposes SOME property rights in arguing. But does one necessarily presuppose property rights in ALL situations, including the imaginary one I describe?

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nl May 30, 2011 at 8:54 am

A right of property as such is nonsense.
It is impossible to discuss such issues without a definition of what “property” should mean.
Consider property as a convenient state that allows you to be able to schedule your possession.
Do you need to argue to reach such opportunity? That is obviously no necessary presupposition.

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feudalredux May 30, 2011 at 9:32 am

Look, I don’t believe in the existence of fantastical entities such as “property rights”. These are concepts and abstractions that only exist in the minds of certain people.

Hoppe claims that all people possess and necessarily use such concepts in their thinking. And that it is only a matter of demonstrating that such is indeed the case. And then it is a matter of applying these concepts consistently (otherwise, you can prove almost anything from a contradiction).

It should be clear from my reply that I don’t believe Hoppe’s claims can be applied universally, but only to certain types of people. I believe that it comes down to a choice to be made by each thinking person.

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nl May 30, 2011 at 10:28 am

Apriorities are universal, Locke is not.
Locke is no science.

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feudalredux May 30, 2011 at 11:09 am

“Locke is no science.”

You are a philosopher? That’s your argument?I’m not impressed. Try harder next time.

Hint: You are assuming your conclusion to be true. (Revisit how the article defines argumentation.)

“In essence, Hoppe’s view is that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting,”

It that supposed to be “by nature” or “by definition” ?

nl May 30, 2011 at 11:31 am

@feudalredux

> Hint: You are assuming your conclusion to be true. (Revisit how the article defines argumentation.)

I have no argumentation problem. I argue only that labor is subjective and not normative as such.

Aiden Gregg May 30, 2011 at 7:36 am

Hoppe is surely correct that one cannot in good faith argue with someone without also presupposing that that someone possesses at least some property rights, namely, those that are being respected when one submits an argument for their consideration, an act of deference and respect.

But does it entail recognition of that someone’s property rights across the board?

Hoppe’s attempts to make the crucial inferential leap as follows. He claims that, not only does X arguing with Y entail X presupposing that he respects Y’s property rights while arguing, but also that X arguing with Y entails X presupposing that he endorses further preconditions for Y’s property rights being sustained, in particular, the right for Y to appropriate scarce resources and to exercise exclusive control over them. (Hoppe generalizes the right for Y to everyone. But if it applies to everyone, then it must also apply to Y. So let us consider the case of Y.)

In Hoppe’s own words:

“Furthermore, it would be equally impossible to sustain argumentation for any length of time and rely on the propositional force of one’s arguments if one were not allowed to appropriate in addition to one’s body other scarce means through homesteading action (by putting them to use before somebody else does), and if such means and the rights of exclusive control regarding them were not defined in objective physical terms. For if no one had the right to control anything
at all except his own body, then we would all cease to exist and the problem of justifying norms simply would not exist.”

Now, I think this is not necessarily true. Hence, I think Hoppe’s argument is not watertight.

Here’s why. Suppose the Y with whom I am arguing is paralyzed and on life support. Except for the minimal capacity to move a finger to communicate via a computerized word-selection interface, Y can’t do anything else. Hence, Y is incapable of survival without external help. By definition, Y lacks the power to originally appropriate scarce resources and to exercise exclusive control over them. Instead, Y relies completely on the charity of others. But despite this, Y still retains the power to argue via the computer interface, which permits two-way linguistic communication.

So, Y now lacks the power to “appropriate in addition to one’s body other scarce means through homesteading action (by putting them to use before somebody else does)” and cannot exercise “exclusive control regarding them […] in objective physical terms”.Yet, Y can still argue. I can still respect Y’s specific implicit property rights as he does so.Hence, it is not necessarily true that “it is impossible to sustain argumentation for any length of time and rely on the propositional force of one’s arguments” unless one also has the *power* to appropriate scarce resources and to exercise exclusive control over them. Someone can do so provided they are externally helped, like Y in our thought experiment.

Hence, it is not necessarily true that “it is impossible to sustain argumentation for any length of time and rely on the propositional force of one’s arguments” unless one has the *right* to appropriate scarce resources and to exercise exclusive control over them. This is because, logically, one cannot have the rights to do something without first having the power to do something. Paralyzed Y in our thought experiment lacks the power to appropriate scarce resources and to exercise exclusive control in the service of survival. Hence, Y cannot logically have the right to do so.

Now, I think Hoppe’s argument will tend to be true. If I implicitly support property rights in arguing, then I should by extension tend to support the preconditions for argumentation, which also includes other property rights, defined by original appropriation and exclusive control. Also, general property rights, like the specific property rights presupposed in argumentation, both show a respect for human dignity. Someone sympathetic to the former should also be sympathetic to the latter.

But they key word here is *tend*. I don’t have to support the preconditions for argumentation all the time under all circumstances. The thought experiment I provide proves that there is no necessary move from support for property rights implicit in argumentation, to support for property rights as generally defined in terms of original appropriation and exclusive control in the service of survival. In the thought experiment, original appropriation and exclusive control cannot be exercised in the service of survival. Hence, rights to them cannot exist. So, it is possible to support property rights implicit in argumentation without also supporting rights defined in terms of original appropriation and exclusive control in the service of survival.

Hence, Hoppe’s argument, for all its ingenuity, fails for Y. If it fails for Y, it cannot be universally true. If it cannot be universally true, it cannot be necessarily true.

I would welcome any demonstration that my argumentation here is fallacious.

REPLY

Thinker June 2, 2011 at 11:14 pm

“This is because, logically, one cannot have the rights to do something without first having the power to do something.”

Not necessarily. I would argue that one can have rights and simply not exercise them, and the reasons why they do not exercise those rights are unimportant. At the very least, you have to justify this statement.

REPLY

Aiden Gregg June 7, 2011 at 3:22 am

X has no legs. You say to X “You have the right to walk freely”.
X is a chimp. You say to X “You have the right to free speech”.
X is a man. You say to X “You can the right to an abortion”.

What is wrong in all these cases?

Certainly, one can have rights and not exercise them, as in, happen not to exercise them, or choose not to exercise them. But one cannot logically have rights if one is in instrinically incapable of exercising those rights. It simply does not make sense.

Is that an adequate justification of my statement?

REPLY

Ned Netterville June 2, 2011 at 10:30 pm

During the four days that this lively discourse was extant, the president by executive order, the federal courts by many decisions, congress by acts, and regulators and other bureaucrats by meddling, compromised the rights of many Americans without even a nod to argumentation or argumentation ethics.

Early in this thread, FUNDAMENTALIST made the following comments:

“Philosophers since Hume have congratulated themselves for successfully defeating straw men versions of natural law. Feser shows how little Hume understood about natural law. Hoppe clearly knows little about natural law theory and has learned everything from the straw men arguments.
Natural law theory never did try to derive morality from human nature. In fact, nature in the natural law theory was nothing like what Hoppe, Rothbard or other mean by it. Today, nature refers to simply what is. In natural law nature meant the essence of something…Man(y) Austrians discuss natural law in the same way that Paul Krugman discusses Austrian economics, from a position a ignorance. That’s beneath Austrians. Austrians should apply the same honesty and rigor to ethics as they apply to economics. The odd thing about Hoppe’s ethic is that it uses essentially the same argument for property as does natural law, just with different assumptions. However, Hoppe makes a logical leap when he goes from self-ownership to property rights being absolute.”

These comments seem to say that Hoppe, Hume and Rothbard along with “many” Austrians are rather shallow thinkers when it comes to ethics. I read through this thread rather quickly and did not see where anyone challenged these rather serious charges. Having never thought that any of the three nor Austrians in general were weak on ethics, I was surprised that no one took up fundamentalist’s gauntlet to make a defense. I have taken fundamentalist’s suggestion and ordered the recommended book by Edward Feser, but until I read it, which will take some time, I don’t feel qualified to making a worthy defense. In the meantime, anyone else want to try?

REPLY

Thinker June 2, 2011 at 10:57 pm

As much as I’d love to represent discourse ethics, I’m afraid I don’t know the first thing about natural law. I imagine that there’s a tradeoff involved in this–the more a person explores the intricacies of natural law, the less time and energy he can spend on discourse ethics (or any other ethical theory for that matter), and vice versa. It would surely be a fascinating conversation for a proponent of discourse ethics and an exponent of natural law explaining the intricacies of each others’ ideas, but it looks like this isn’t the time or place.

REPLY

nl June 3, 2011 at 8:32 am

OK, here is another gauntlet (one more).

The Weakness in Hoppe’s Line of Argument

This chapter examines the problematic part in Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s essay “The Ultimate Justification of the Ethics of Private Property”1. Professor Hoppe offers his ethics to demonstrate that only the private property ethic can be justified argumentatively, because it is the praxeological presupposition of argumentation as such. He demonstrates that self-ownership of the own body is implied in the very act of argumentation, and therefore that self-ownership cannot be denied without committing a performative contradiction.

Then he tries to extend property rights out to things outside our own body. He builds a link between a person and some kind of resource by inserting the homesteading principle as a basic part into his theory.2 He notes3 that property rights must be axiomatic for argumentation because without the ability to appropriate natural resources, mankind would die out and there would be no such thing as arguments.

My objections4 begin with this: firstly, it is not a satisfactory methodical proof to draw a conclusion only from asking what would be in the converse case as Hoppe does (non sequitur),5 because he must implicitly presuppose two other things at the same time. He must presuppose that there is no other rule to bring appropriation into effect and that appropriation is always preferable and necessary for us not to die out. In the further discussion I will show that the weakness lies just in these presumptions.

Secondly, I think that ‘property’ must already be an abstraction from consent norms (what I will explain later). But with Hoppe’s argument there is no need for consent. It would be well enough for him if one firstly invested ‘labor’ into an unowned scarce resource and based oneself on the Lockean principle. He asks what would happen in the absence of acquiring the right of exclusive control over goods by homesteading action. “One would have to interrogate and come to an agreement with the entire world population to make sure that one’s planned actions would not change another person’s evaluations regarding his property.”6 Or in other words, nobody would invest labor; i.e. nobody would continue with his actions before he has not convinced the entire world population of his own enterprises. In this scenario, one’s own action would rest on the actions and evaluations of other people. Thus, because Hoppe sees the appropriation rule of homesteading as obligatory, he founds a positive law. In Hoppe’s view of true property only one law of absolute exclusive property right is necessary and possible, because it should be valid for all humans. If the rule were not valid for some people, then they could own the property themselves, and others could appropriate it again and again until everybody owns everything and nothing. (So Hoppe says: “Property rights cannot be conceived of as being timeless and nonspecific regarding the number of people involved.”) In short, this argument should make clear how absurd the hypothesis is that one could doubt about the first-in-first-own rule. But the result is a law. And that law simply discards my assumption above that property could be an abstraction of consent. However, this seems to me a fundamentally flawed understanding.

The world that Hoppe envisions in that is not so black and white. In the first instance, I could consult the same kind of logic as Hoppe. When Hoppe claims that homesteaded ‘property’ is necessary for humans to live at all, then it must be true that there is no kind of homesteaded property that itself would challenge human nature as such. Otherwise, that mere fact would reduce Hoppe’s logic ad absurdum at this point. I will bring such an example, but before I do, we must study another argument Hoppe uses to justify homesteading. He is using again an argumentum a contrario:

“If a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control over other, nature-given goods by his own work, that is, if other people, who had not previously used such goods, had the right to dispute the homesteader’s ownership claim, then this would only be possible if one would acquire property titles not through labor, i.e., by establishing some objective link between a particular person and a particular scarce resource, but simply by means of verbal declaration.”

The fact that someone (who, unlike you, has not invested any ‘labor’ in it) takes something from you confers no valid norm to the taker. Even the robber’s refusing to use the robbed good demonstrates his own claim to respect an exclusive right of possession. Such taking is rightly called ‘aggression.’ But the rest of the affair is fraught with problems. Firstly the ‘robber’ must not recognize the labor – maybe this is simply a communication problem. Secondly, he could undervalue your ‘labor’. He may claim that what you are doing is useless, and you should show that it has any need and is not excessively wasteful, only serving your well being or striving for power. So, he could say, you might feign the investment of ‘labor’ in order to get control of a resource, or you are exploiting a natural resource and he is asking for it to be rationed.7

Let me illustrate this problem by an extreme example: Someone is sucking off the air from the atmosphere in order to create a new planet in outer space or in order to produce solid matters from oxygen. He may do this since air is considered a free good, and he is investing labor into free air to transform it into his new end. At the same time he and his epigones are slowly withdrawing the natural basis of human life, and one day, people will realize that air is ‘scarce.’ Suddenly everybody would be responsible for his own air and his own atmosphere and everybody has to suck off air for his own aims. This example seems a bit far-fetched.

But please think about what happened in these kind of cases in the times of homesteading land and settlement. At first, there was ample land. As time passed the need for land grew decisively and people had more and more conflicts about it. They erected fences and they declared exclusive property rights to their lots of land. When immigrants were searching for new lots, this usage was probably mutually beneficial. However, where homesteaders encroach upon territory used by nomads, the latter will probably suffer if they cannot adapt their way of life.8 The problem is not that the sedentary way of live was the ‘better’ lifestyle.9 It was rather a change of paradigm with many unpredictable consequences. Finally it is a discussion of values with winners and losers in practice from the ethical view. Hence, I made clear that my far-fetched example of the accumulative homesteading of air has an historical precedent in the homesteading of land. (Of course, the originally historical cases were more complex than my easy picture here.)

In a nutshell, the absolute and exclusive property right, based on Lockean principle, cannot be derived as an a priori norm due to the subjective evaluation of ‘labor’. It can possibly be derived that someone who doesn’t respect the property of another cannot expect that he ethically creates own property by his performative contradictions.10 But one can actually ‘find’ these facts only within the process of interaction or consensus. And one cannot ex ante assume such facts as ‘property’ without implicit or explicit acceptance. Otherwise it would mean that performing any absurd ‘labor’ on a scarce resource would produce a legitimate claim to it. Hoppe didn’t solve this problem in his descriptions. In any case, this discussion makes clear that the Lockean principle doesn’t work due to the subjectivity of ‘labor’. Therefore, the principle of homesteading doesn’t belong to the catalog of a priori norms when there are different views about the respect of ‘labor’.

REPLY

  1. See Rothbard’s article “Justice and Property Rights.” This piece was published in two forms in 1974: first, in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays (available online here) and also in The Logic of Action One:

    we have two mutually exclusive claimants to the ownership of the hoop. If the economist agrees to endorse only Z’s sale of the hoop, then he is implicitly agreeing that Z has the just, and Y the unjust, claim to the hoop. And even if he continues to endorse the sale by Y, then he is implicitly maintaining another theory of property titles: namely, that theft is justified. Whichever way he decides, the economist cannot escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property. …

    Let us consider the first principle: the right to self-ownership. This principle asserts the absolute right of each man, by virtue of his (or her) being a human being, to “own” his own body; that is, to control that body free of coercive interference. Since the nature of man is such that each individual must use his mind to learn about himself and the world, to select values, and to choose ends and means in order to survive and flourish, the right to self-ownership gives each man the right to perform these vital activities without being hampered and restricted by coercive molestation.

    Consider, then, the alternatives — the consequences of denying each man the right to own his own person. There are only two alternatives: either a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B; or everyone has the right to own his equal quota share of everyone else.

    The first alternative implies that, while class A deserves the rights of being human, class B is in reality subhuman and, therefore, deserves no such rights. But since they are indeed human beings, the first alternative contradicts itself in denying natural human rights to one set of humans. Moreover, allowing class A to own class B means that the former is allowed to exploit and, therefore, to live parasitically at the expense of the latter; but, as economics can tell us, this parasitism itself violates the basic economic requirement for human survival: production and exchange.

    The second alternative, which we might call “participatory communalism” or “communism,” holds that every man should have the right to own his equal quotal share of everyone else. If there are three billion people in the world, then everyone has the right to own one-three-billionth of every other person. In the first place, this ideal itself rests upon an absurdity — proclaiming that every man is entitled to own a part of everyone else and yet is not entitled to own himself. Second, we can picture the viability of such a world — a world in which no man is free to take any action whatever without prior approval or indeed command by everyone else in society. It should be clear that in that sort of “communist” world, no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish.

    … Let us now turn to the more complex case of property in material objects. For even if every man has the right to self-ownership, people are not floating wraiths; they are not self-subsistent entities; they can only survive and flourish by grappling with the earth around them. They must, for example, stand on land areas; they must also, in order to survive, transform the resources given by nature into “consumer goods,” into objects more suitable for their use and consumption. Food must be grown and eaten, minerals must be mined and then transformed into capital, and finally into useful consumer goods, etc. Man, in other words, must own not only his own person, but also material objects for his control and use.

    []

  2. Hoppe, “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,” Liberty (September, 1988); “The Justice of Economic Efficiency,” in EEPP; TSC, ch. 7. Symposium discussing Hoppe’s argument, “Breakthrough or Buncombe?”, esp. Murray N. Rothbard, “Beyond Is And Ought” (Nov. 1988); see also letters in January, 1989 (such as a letter from Douglas J. Den Uyl, p.6). []
  3. Rothbard, “Beyond Is and Ought,” originally published in Liberty 2, no. 2 (Nov. 1988): 44–45; see also Rothbard, “Hoppephobia,” originally published in Liberty 3, no. 4 (March 1990): 11–12 and reprinted at LewRockwell.com (Oct. 4, 2014). See also this Rothbard video commenting on Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, May 1989, after the publication of Hoppe’s TSC, which has comments by Rothbard echoing his positive comments in Liberty. See also this amusing anecdote by David Gordon where he recollects a joke Rothbard pulled on him about Hoppe’s argumentation ethics: David Gordon Speaks with The Society of Libertarian Entrepreneurs (part 2).
    Note: In R.W. Bradford, “At Liberty” (September, 1997) (overview of Liberty‘s first ten years, various controversies, etc.), he writes: “Our September 1988 issue trumpeted Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,” which proposed a radical alternative to the natural-rights-moralistic approach and the consequentialist-utilitarian approach. 17 Hoppe argued that “by being alive and formulating any proposition . . . one demonstrates that any ethic except the libertarian ethic is invalid.” Murray Rothbard was a great enthusiast for Hoppe’s argument and asked me to solicit responses from prominent Randian philosophers, whom he thought might share his enthusiasm. I decided to try to balance the responses by inviting some from individuals who would likely be more critical. We needn’t have bothered. We were again inundated by responses and letters-to-the-editor. In the end, the only support Hoppe received, aside from Murray’s enthusiastic encomium (“dazzling breakthrough”) was from Sheldon Richman.” He cites the November, 1988 issue. I can find nothing by Richman to this effect in this issue. There are a couple comments about Hoppe in Sheldon Richman, “The Absurdity of Alienable Rights” (January, 1989, p. 50): “… Waters overlooks the one essential element of self-ownership: the inalienability of individual rights. By agreeing to form the hypothetical, forever-binding corporation, the hypothetical persons have to be able to alienate their rights to life, liberty and property.

    Similarly, several of the critics of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s rights theory objected on grounds that slaves can discuss philosophy, thereby disproving Hoppe’s thesis that argumentation implies self-ownership. These critics also overlook the fact that, by definition, a slave is a person who does not possess the right to self-ownership; that is, a person whose rights have been alienated.

    Because they do not understand that  rights are inalienable, Waters and Hoppe’s critics have failed in their endeavors. Only by understanding the nature of rights can we come to grips with the philosophical issues involved.” Note: When I asked Richman about his response to Hoppe, he did not remember one. But he is not a fan of Hoppe and told me possibly he was intrigued at the time, that but he came to think it was rationalist gimmickry that tries to bypass ethics and that if he did praise it, he would retract it. []

  4. See also my blog posts “Revisiting Argumentation Ethics” and “Extreme Praxeology.” My post “Quotes on the Logic of Liberty” contains a several insightful quotes from famous and libertarian thinkers complementary to Hoppe’s themes and arguments. []
  5. Machan’s’s article is published at Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities 46 (June 1996): 45-55; also included as chapter 13 of Classical Individualism: The Supreme Importance of Each Human Being (Routledge 1998). For my critique, see Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights and my Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics and Its Critics. See also Remembering Tibor Machan, Libertarian Mentor and Friend: Reflections on a Giant. []
  6. Does not bother to mention Hoppe’s argumentation ethics; criticized by David Gordon here. []
  7. Abstract:

    “The purpose of this paper is to showcase the links between Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s libertarian argumentation ethics and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics with a special reference to the consensus theory of truth proposed by the latter thinker. More specifically, we contend that Hoppe’s theory is logically contingent on Apel’s views on truth in that some crucial gaps in Hoppe’s ground- ing of the so-called a priori of communication and argumentation are filled by Apel’s original arguments. Additionally, the paper provides a case for interpreting Hoppe’s ethics as a theory of rational conflict-freedom, which seems to cohere best with the transcendental-pragmatist approach. Finally, we offer a few comments on how the most common objections against Hoppe’s theory can be overcome on the basis of transcendental pragmatics and the conflict-freedom principle.”

    From pp. 36–37:

    “… we claim that Hoppe is to be classified as a proponent of the consensus theory of truth as expounded by Apel. More importantly, the Apelian consensus theory of truth is here identified as a presupposition or a background theory of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. We contend that the latter theory is logically contingent on the former. Thus, the advo- cates of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics must espouse Apel’s consensus theory if they want to uphold their stance. Opponents, on the other hand, should take it into account in order to avoid formulating misguided objections and, as they deem appropriate, redirect their criticism. In fact, as will be seen, several objections raised by critics stem from the neglect of the transcen- dental pragmatics and the concomitant misconstrual of the Hoppean ethics as one describing the factual conditions of possibility for argumentation. In reality, against the background of its transcendental-pragmatist presuppositions, Hoppe’s theory ought to be read as a conception that aims to prescribe principled solutions for conflicts over scarce resources.

    “The questions of the truth theory and epistemology in general have gone unnoticed by the vast majority of commentators. To our knowledge, the only exception is Ilia Schmelzer, who correctly acknowledges the consensus theory of truth of Habermas and Apel as the epistemological underpinning of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics (2013, pp. 4–32). He nonetheless puts stress on the sharp criticism of Hoppe from the standpoint of critical rationalism rather than on the exhaustive illumination of the links between Hoppe’s ethics and Apel’s and Habermas’ views on truth. Furthermore, whereas Schmelzer seems to perceive Hoppe’s theory as influenced by Apel and Habermas to by and large the same degree, we emphasize Hoppe’s connections to Apel.”

    []

  8. “Most of my observations will not be novel for scholars of libertarianism: I rely on the insights provided by great theorists of this philosophy—L. von Mises, M. Rothbard, W. Block and N. S. Kinsella, among others. Their works form the basis of the libertarian theoretical foundation of the book. For speech act theory, I rely on the classic works of J. L. Austin, H. P. Grice and J. R. Searle, as well as the followers of this intellectual tradition. I am greatly indebted to all the authors I cite throughout this book—if I manage to see into the distance, it is only because I stand on the shoulders of giants. However, I expect that some of those giants would not agree with what is written on the following pages. Some would think that I completely misinterpret them in my analysis, which may indeed be the case, intentionally or unintentionally. Wherever I realise that I twist certain theoretical postulates for my argument, I will indicate this.” []
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KOL167 | Speaking On Liberty (2012)

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 167.

I was a guest in July 2012 on the Liberty Minded show Speaking on Liberty, discussing intellectual property. The hosts, Kyle Platt, Jason Lee Byas, and Grayson English, were very good and asked excellent questions. The show is here, and the video is embedded below.

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KOL166 | Peter Schiff Show with Jeff Tucker: Patent Law (2012)

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 166.

I was a guest back on June 6, 2012 on the Peter Schiff Show (guest host Jeff Tucker), discussing problems with patent law. The original audio file for the full show is here; my segment was from 1:00:55 to the end (about 20 minutes total). For the podcast feed I have included only my segment.

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